Hanns Joas

7/17/2019 Hanns Joas

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/hanns-joas 1/5

•

•

.

· ~ -

. ¡ ·

l

r·

.

Í·

•

.

,.

;

V

'

f

•

.

.

l·

' .

.

.

.

t

·•

1·

'

-

••

l

: .

;..• .

•

...

•

•

,

·;. ..

.

,

.

.

.

.

;,

'

.

•

1

WHAT IS

THEORY?

of theoretical and empirical knowledge.

Popper

himself

-

in his defence -

certainly recognized this difficulty: There

are

no pure

obseryations:

they

are

pervaded

by

theories and

guided

by

both problems and theories,

(Popper,

Logik der

Forschung

p.

76;

original emphasís).

1

He too

emphasized

that

every

account of

an

observation, every statement about an event, every basic state

ment ,

uses

concepts that cannot

be

corroborated

by unmediated

sensory data.

He was thus also of the opinion that every

attempt

to

test a

theory must con

elude

or

begin with sorne sort

of

basic statements

upon

whose

correctness

researchers

must

agree on the basis of

convention

or

by

mak.ing a

decision.

Scíence, for Popper, is

thus not

built u

pon

a rock,

but

in

a

certain sense on (pro-

visional) dogmas,

on

conventions

or

scientists, (more

or

less)

arbitrary

deci

..

sions to recognize as correct

basic

statements

about observations.

But

this was no

great problem for

Popper

since

he

was ofthe

opinion that

we

may in

turn - ifany

doubt

arises as to

their

correctness-

subject these basic statements

to scrutiny)

that

is,

test

them

As

it turned out, philosophers ofscience and

scientists

carrying out

research

on

how

scientists actually work were dissatisfied with

this

Popperian defence

of the method of falsification. One book, which

was

to become almost

as

famous as Popper s Logic carne

to play

a particularly

important

role

in

this

debate:

Thomas S.

Kuhn s

The Structure of

Scientific

Revolutions from 1962.

Kuhn

(1922-96),

an

American

originally

trained

as a physicist)

investigated

the

process

of

research

in his home

discipline

in quasi-sociological

fashion,



SOCIAL

THEORY: TWENTY

lNTRODUCTORY LECTURES

a

t ~ p o r a r y

puzzle, an ·anomali withina proven theory. Kuhn documented a

~ u l t t t u d e oí such or ~ ~ cases in th.e history of c i e n c e ~ drawing our atten

t i ~ n to the

fact -

and

this 1s

the key

potnt -

that

this adberence to the old the

o n ~ s

was

by no rneans

an

expression of dogmatism or irra.tionality. Again and

aga1n. tbere

have been good

reasons for

this

conservatism:

the

old theories

have r o v e d their worth in the past; it may be possible to integra e the new dis

covenesby further

developing the old

theories, by

means

of

auxiliary hypoth

eses

e x a ~ p l e ;

the

new theory

has not

yet

been

fully

worked

out

and

is

often

deficJent or 1ncomplete; it is possible

that we

are dealing merely with faulty

measurements rather than genuine falsification,

and so

on.

n

r i e f ~

in

the con

text of cientific practice. ther e has often been a complete lackof clear criteria

by which

to

ascertain

when

a tb eory should be considered falsified.

Kuhn,s

book

deals exdusively with the history

of

the natural sciences. But

very similar accounts of the research process

can

of course al

so

be found in

the humanities

and

social sciences. where it seems to be even more difficult

to

destroy a theory,

that

is,

to

falsify it as a whole, by means

of an

empir

ic.al

observation. We need

only

think of the history of Marxism. As a social

scientific theory, Marxism

can

of course -

and it

itself demands no less - be

tested against social reality. Now, many of the theoretical statements formu

lated or defended by Marx

or

Marxists, to

put

it

carefully, conflict

with

empir

ical reality. Much

of

what Marx predicted never happened: the polarization of

the population into a rich capitalist class on the one hand

and

a numerically

proletariat on the otber failed to occur; the socialist revolutions forecast

by Marx and Engels

did not

take place or at least

not

where they were sup

posed

namely in the industrially advanced countri es unde r the leadership

of the working

dass;

successful revolutions too k place at best on the global

peripheries

and

with a significa.nt role being played by the peasantry. that is,

the

wrong'

group

ofpeople;

the

dissolution

of

all particularistic ties. predicted

by

Marx

and Engels

in t.he

Communist Manifesto

supposedly propelled by

the economy- among other things,

they predicted

that

nation-states would

d i s p ~ r

-

did

not h p ~ n

either.

In

fact, the late nineteenth

and

twentieth

unturies

turned

the

assumptions

of

Marx

and

Engels

upside down: this

was

the great

age of

nationalism

and

nation-states.

If

one adhered to the Popperian

principie of falsifkation. all these observations would have inevitably led to

conclusive refutation of Marxism

and

thus its defi.nitive rejection. But this

did not occur. Those convinced of the vaüdity of Marxism as

an

approach to

research aJways managed to persuade themselves, and dearly others too, of

the productivity of the Marxist paradigm

by

means

of

a series

of

auxiliary

b y p o t h ~ s e s The proletarianization of tbe majority of the population in the

highJy industriaüud countrie- ,

so

the argument goes, failed to occur becaus.e

capitaJj m managed to

relieve

poverty •at

home·

by

intensifying exploitation

{ the

iñi ld

Workf; this was also the reason

why

revolutions failed

to

take

place

in

the Western countries,

in which

theworkers

were

(bought'

by

'capital',

f

>

;:

,.

·

'

.

. ¡

.

..

'

'

...

....

,

'

.

,.

1

l

'

.

f.

f

t

•

·

f,

.

l

••

t

..

'

WHAT IS THEORY?

13

through welfare benefits for example, but took place instead in the countries

of the impoverished and exploited Third World; and Marx

and

Engels m

indeed ha

ve

been too

quick

to forecast the end of he nation-state, but today- In

the

age

of globalization -

things

were happening precisely

as

they had always

predicted, and so on. In brief, Marxian t ~ e o r is said . to

be

wrong, but

merely to require adaptation to changed histon cal condittons. .

You can decide for yourselves what you make of this defence of Marx1sm.

For

our purposes,

all

that

rnatters

is

the

insight

that

the

natural and social

sciences in general, and by no means only Marxism, appear to entall a fairly

large number of defensive lines from which the proponents of a theo

ry

c

an

shield it against empirical falsification. In fact, theories

in

the social sciences

have in sorne ways proved even more resistant to unambiguous falsificati on

than in the natural sciences.

The

former not only feature disagreements o

ve

r

preciselywbat falsification entails, but even about what exactly a theory is say

ing. While natural

scienti.fic

theories are for the most part relatively clearly

formulated, the social sciences and humanities are more often ·confronted with

the problem that there is no real agreement over precisely what the content of

a theory is. You may be familiar with this phenomenon from your seminars on

the dassical sociological authors or from reading the secondary literature on

them. What did Marx, Durkheim, Weber, etc.

really

say?

What

is

the correct ,

once-and-for-all interpretation of the theories of Marx, Durkheim, Weber,

and others? But a theory whose very content is contested is, logically, sc

ar

cely

amenable to unambiguous empirical falsifi.cation.

But let us return to Kuhn and his book

Th

e tru

cture ofScientific Revolutions.

According to him, in the natural sciences at any rate, there are no compelling

logical arguments against a theory; there

can

be no

unamb

iguous falsification.

And, Kuhn suggests, we should not be s urprised

ifthe

daily routine of esearch

passes off without much sign of criticism. Exlsting theories are used for long

periods without being scrutinized, precisely because scholars are convinced

of heir fundamental fruitfulness. This routinized type of research Kuhn calls

'normal science

'.

Puzzling or contradictory oc

curr

ences, problematic experi

ments, etc. are not regarded as falsification

in

th

e co

ur

se

of

n o r m a l

sdence

',

but r a t h e r to repeat, as anomalies, which one hopes to be able to remove or

resolve

at so

rne

point

with existing th eoretical means. 'Normal science, is

research

firmly based upon one or m

ore

past scientific achievements, achieve

ments that sorne particul

ar

scientific community acknowledges for a

time

as supplying

the

fu

und

ation for its fu r ther practice

(Kuhn,

Structure. p. 10)

Further, the history of science, ac

cording

to Kuhn,

only

very ra.rely features

instances of

individual

sdentists suddenly embracing a new theoretical

edi·

fice

in

response to a persu

asive

argument or impressive experiment.

The



' ~ <

_

__

,_._,

· - ~ • - • u - - - • • - - = - = - -

--·=--st•a•au•s•••-..a••••a-. t oa:.-.·ww•s

....

_..íiill:l•srl(ltl•n--z:•g

~ : s

_._ _ _

- ~ ·

·

··· ·

·-·

.

'

.

. : .

· .

.

.

. .

. .

~ · I W » ~ I I ~ f i ~ 4 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 f i / # I I ~ J . í j ¡ M * J J J I -

. _ i ' " " W V 4 1 M I ~ J P ~ N f l n • : . } ~ H ~ ~

~ ~ ~ ~ t l l m

ti/ 1 . .1 I ~ ~ I J ~ ~ ; J i ~ · ~ J I A i t J l i J

·

IJU M

Íl/

. IJI l l i i i # ~ J J / lH

11

1

.

)¡IJil/¡

- ~ - W I I i

iWMi/Nii

t c ~ . a s a M e a ~

wtth ._ ,

bis

~ 1M

Ms

Mes\ , . , . . - . ~ •

._..

-.-1'

f'h*• .nd tht i'&rttod by t n e n n ~

~ m u ·

aity

l$

btiet'IM

omab\

~

1'\de

Qd

\ \ ~ ~ Ñ

N ~ K h

p r . c t ~ ~ a i

it

\l.l\til

'}\e

W C \ U ~ MW

. ; l $ U ~ r e ~ t . . _ " \ 1 \

: K ~ $ \ 's ~ S ll\ \he l\\¡ttvy

a.nd

~ M ' \ & Y

\f

. . : ~ e IS ht \ ~ n t Ñ \\\lt

e n 1 a U ~ profound ~ ~ ¡

~

l ' h i l o s a p h ~ ~

S ( l ~ ~ ~

Th

~ { ' N t t h ~

~ - - . t . ' l af \ : ~ da$S nat t\tn;t,a.n n ~ ~ l y w

\ ~ ~

Wilh 1 \ . " p ~ r \ ~ t t ~ n ' l ' ' ••

¡ t a n d • t ~ \ M U O O his 'pfinci¡lle \lf a l ~ " ' i " ~ ' ' And

M ' " ~

~ ~ s uf u h n ~

• ~ - \ ' - ' " n t 5 we un cr1•1rilv ' ® d ~ d e l h • t t' \

p Klt \f

t c u ü ~ l ~ ~ f l • ' ~ ' ~ ~ '

pror.odtna

\n

,.:Gf'd•"'twith thf l'fl"'·ple f f • l i l f i ~ ~ " ' " ' N"umt\ l,,_

~ n ; e

t.hi'

i'ion'c \ ~ k h p t \ . " \ \ . e o J ~ \ U , ~ f ~ ü ~ . t l y ~ \ J J \ ) \ \ \ i n i ~ t a ~ h h

wUh

~ ¡ ~ ~ t l'-' cctt•in h O \ ) f t h ~ ~ · ~ s . " m p \ \ t . ) \ n , Ulf\Y h• hljh\f l ~ f i l \ l H ~ H n lt

m ~ y wtll m•ll•

¡enac

Ofit tq c J ~ ~ ' lhe tht:W)l v c . r ~ llU't 4 ~ \ U \ t r t t T r ~ ~ \ l - ~ l \

Uon

c r ~ p i "P·1hl' WU"-l4 ' ' ~ \ ) t ~ p Al " " ~ ~ n l ü n e th.: p r t l ~ ~ h : ~ r ~ ~ ~ • H ~ h h

may

m • ~ t

~ ~ " ' '

tA

iniu•llv

nls,.

·pr•'

~ h ¡ ~ ' ~ f l • h ~ n

' (\'

' - ' \ H H

~ ~ u ~

t fl\o

~ u - ,

*'mcr• _H,lf\\eh•,.1Jl

tho

hllpt

t h . ~ l

tht

p f ú \ 1 \ ~ ) s . \ n t ~ r n - - \ l h ~

\ l l ~ 1 - \ f

J ) Q n . : t h ~ S l ~ n ht T ~ a ~ v t í l $ A m ~ p ~ J \ l 1hh W4ii hl f t t ~ l f T ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l t l ) lh.: ~ ) i tH

1h5

l l 1 ~ h · r ~ m hv

a . . : 1 r : n ~ ~ -

f u n h ~ • m ~ n

~ u } H l

~ h A w ~ ~ 1

h•l ftttr " u m ~

' ' '

' w

~ , . ~ • ~ P m t - ~ ~ l h t

~ ~ ) ~ ' " f

l h • ~ l l ~ ~

w t . ~ ~ t m t t ~ l l l ~ ¡ f h

the

h ~ - • ~

; J ~ r ; n v n ~ t ¡ I J l ~

~ ~ - ' J

V I I f i Q » ~ ¡ . : ~ t ~ J ~ l ; 4 t U

Ht

-H" t4H4 i

i h ~

\11\.l,Oll•h

~ r ~ ~

1Q

~ l l f p . : J

, . ; ¡ J J . : r t ~ H ~

f ~ l • í t l

..tllilJl. Jh') h•v;

~ J t t t ~ p l H H \ \

ilPJy_ h J ~ p s : r

~ n f ~ J

l ~ H · ~ 4 h H · · ~ S : U i h 1•H'Hhta

· h ~ l \ - l l H l

~ \ l l ~ lH h O lH •hU

·

»f·

.

t · m ~ ~ ~

n ~ , r uu .)l Hl .b·

-h h ~ l ~

w

Jh,;

p n • ~ t h

p ~ H ~ - , ~ ~

4f .,

• : : ~ J t f ' -

r i J h J U ~

ws

; . , t ~ n

~ r ' w ~ m a l

n u 1 l w ~

).4,,l .hPíh 'u

H•un ~ ~ ~ h u

~ H , . l - 1 , . _ ~

~ 1 1 4 1 ~ ~ ~ • ~ ~ ~ " H•''"Y " ~ ' ••

,,.

•

p.,,¡w•

. •

Hl• ' 1•, 111•, 111 . 1

111

P , ~ ~ - ~ l ¡ t H l

• h J ~ ~ ·

~ H 4

·

-j.h;H

,

JU"'

J S i ~

* ~ q • I H

•

hn

\'1•

Uit

• • J i r J M J l ~

f ) J . l f • ~

J t ~ H l IJ ~ ~ ~ ~ i A ' . , WUh.¡ij\ ~ h h H J l ul f i ó t Wlh ~ ~ ~ ~ ¡ I H ) ~ H • ~ t h

-WfU ... i j 4 4 { ; ~ ) ~ ~ h l i t f ~ - ~ - H(;)t: Ji:uhH J · · · ~ {f t i

t4.1).,

~ , a ~ H t • J l & q , t H

w h ~ J • g f 4 V H ) . ; t ~ •

~ j : , J J ~ H »

J u ; - y ~ r ~ , J , . ¡ ~ - , H J H d H j J ~ J • i ~ . , , _ t . t J ~ I l · t ~

t t ~ J H J f ' ~ ~ H ~ o ~ J , 4 ~ ~ h ~ k ~ ~ y J • ~ .Ai . , H i j . I H J ~ . , ¡ J ; • I ~ r , ~ l l l J " '

. . , u ~ ' * t i ~ J 1 J j j l wlp

J

: i i , ~ . , ~ · ~ U H i i b ~ lJ u" l # t ' J J I { I ~ ..H) ._ 'h•

Jll•••

•Hdt

1 ~ P I ~ N ~ + ' l H i f . A i 4 t > - J ~ H ~ ~ ~ ~ H t ~ . ; , t uhn n r , . J;- JI

; - - ~ - ¡ ; ~

~ ~ ~ H l ~ ; .

~ ~ ~

~ ~ j J . ¡ i j ; j ~ U I J # ~ J ~ J j , l i t l ~ w w

*tf

1q ~ ~ _ H t ' } ~ • J ~ ~ I ~ U

J._H ,_.

f j

J • h 4 a . " ~ f. }J¡ i iJ

~ - l t 4 J J H I I ~ b ~ l " ~ t l f

i

~ · ~ J ~ ~ ~ -· l t i i i # J ~

~ ; ~

;j .. ~ ) J • ,., •tY,.• , , . _ , , , . , .

~ n 4 ~ • ¡ V f j ~ . , J ~ t j j • # l

l f H ~ ~

t; I

H¡•

>¡i ~ ) . J ~ i ~

),. ' l - ~ 6 A

j l j l• J f¡ _,H

't .,

tN•:. _ ¡¡J;;4 f'''f

~ H ~ • t ~ ~ J . I f I,...}Hf;a4; .. H)

)1.-ti

HIIJl•H , , ' ~ ' . ~ ~ . . f ¡ L ~ l l ~ ~ , _ t d i i J I l i · ~

~ _ , ~ ; ¡

~

~ # ~ ~

~ 1 1 1 # ,

f.* •;

~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ · ; · · ~

~ ~ ~ ~ t

· ~ ~

.. .

.

..

.. : ; i j ~ i ; f .1· )Jfffll•l Wlili/ N ·J/tHJt' 1 1 1 ~ 1 . ~ ¡

-



... . . , ._ . . . . . . . • u w v n ~ ' . c . N 1· y

lNTROOUCTORY

LECTURBS

In any case, Kuhn's works were the point

of

departure for a vehement debate

within the philosophy of science on the status of science, particularly in the

1 9 ~ 0 s

and 1970s.

While sorne criticized Kuhn

for giving

free rein to relativism

(hts

of

the c o m m e n s u r ~ b i l i t i

of

theories,

whose

quality could not be

estabbshed tmplrtcally was sa1d to place science on tbe same Ievel as any old

world view, making ratíonal discussion impossible}, others welcomed the rela

tivistic

conclusions

which - so they

beiieved - could

be

drawn from Kuhn's

analyses. The 'anarchistic'

and

for a time highly fashionable philosopher of

science Paul Feyerabend stated, for example, that neither their methods nor

results

legitima e

the ambitions

of

scientists: 'Science

is

one [i]deology among

many' Science in

a

Free Society,

p.

106), tbat is, merely one form ofknowledge

among

others

(such as rnagic) .

But both the orthodox defenders of science and their anarchistíc crit

ics interpreted Kuhn wrongly or at least in a very individual fashion. Kuhn

did n.ot assert

that

competing paradigms constitute totalities or

world

views

hermetically sealed off from one another, between which, and with respect to

their empirical fruitfulness,

it

is impossible to rationally choose, but

in

which

one could at best profess o n e ~ s faith- as with different religions. He merely

argued that

in

many cases no truly clear

empirica/

criterion exists enabling us

to decide why we have to choose one paradigm rather than another. This is,

however, not the same

as

saying that no arguments at

all

may

be

put forward

for accepting or rejecting a theory on this line of reasoning, see Bernstein>

The

Restructuring

o Sodal and

Political Theory,

pp. 152-67).

By

no means did

Kuhn launch a frontal attac.k on the rationality of science' in his account of

the history of science.

In bis

view, the transition from one theory to another

is neither

an

unfounded choice.between vocabularies

nora

mysterious shift

from one theoretical discourse to another. There certainly are reasons why

it

is necessary to adopt a new paradigm. lt

is

possible to

discuss rationally

the

paradigm shift to which one aspires or which one rejects; the pros and cons of

the

particular theory can be weighed up, even

if we

must give up the hope that

there is one ·crucial experiment, that will make the decision for us.

What

is

more) Kuhn·s analyses of he history of science- though his radical

and problematical notjon of the 'inc ommensurabiliti of paradigrns appears

to exdude this - almost

always

show that paradigms overlap substantiaUy.

The various theoretical edifices are connected

y

many corridors. In reality,

not just the history ofthe natural sciences, but

also

that ofthe social sclences,

shows that certain tmpirical findings are unanlmously endorsed

y

the rep·

resentatives

o

dílfering pandigms, and that even a fair number of

theorttical

statements meet with general approval beyond the boundaries of paradigms.

What does

alJ tbis

mean for the social sciences

or

for social

theoryf

We

can

draw

two

'onclualons

from

our discuasion of the

philotophy

of sclence

so far.

particulady from the Kuhnian

analyaea,

whieh are

of

great

significance

to the

foUowi.na

lecturea.

First:

the

fact

that thc current theoretical landsc:ape

o

he

WHAT IS THEORY?

7

social sciences appears confusing, the fact that many dífferent social theoríes

or paradigms exist, some of which are at extreme variance with one a n o t ~ e r

does not mean tbat these theories or their theorists are incapable of engag1ng

in a rational debate. In the níne teen lectures to come

we

will

be

introducing

you

to

an arra

y

of theories.

Yo u will see

- and this

is

one of he central theses of

this lecture series - that the various theorists communicate with one another,

that they make critical reference to one another, such that their theoríes ove:

lap, resemble and complement one another to sorne d ~ g r e e . ~ e fact that soct

ology,

for example, is not based on

one single

parad1gm arnved at through

abstraction

as

applies, for example,

to

economics, in which a spedfic theoreti

cal school

is

dear ly dom.inant or hegemonic), the fact that a much lamented,

confusing theoretical diversity prevails within sociology, does not mean that

the subject is fragmenting, or

is

bound to fragment, into a collectionofdiscon-

nected approaches.

For you

, who are now being introduced

to

the world of modern social

theory, this leads to one inescapable

conclusion

You will not, presumably,

become experts on all the theoretical schools presented here dur ing the course

o your studies; no one could expect

yo

u to, especially

since

yo

u

would be hard

pushed to find a professor of the social sciences who is truly up to speed with

all these theoretical currents.

But

do not escape from this confusion by taking

refuge

in

the

fi.rst

theory that takes your fancy.There are already too many stu

dents who know only one single theory really well and who are so enthusiastic

about it that they disdainfully ignore all other approaches. Unfortunately, a

fair number ofyour professors, who have not infrequently specializ.ed in one

and only one theory and consider all other theories in principie bad

'

or use

less, are also a living example of such behaviour. As we have said, the vari·

ous approaches that exist within sociology have much potential for mutual

exchange. For this reason we advise yo u toengag e in dialogue with different

theoretical schools as you proceed with your studies. This will help you

avoid one-sidedness and blindness to other perspectives. Given that, as we

have shown, empirical and theoretical knowledge are very much connected,

these are pitfalls that would surely rub off on your empírica work.

The second conclusion to be drawn from the 'debate, between Popper and

Kuhn is directly relevant to the following lectures.

f

t is true that theoretical

issues cannot be settled solely with empirical means, that the leve

ls

of empir

ical and theoretical knowledge cannot be

clearly separated, tha t - as Figure

1.1

on page 10 produced y

Jeffrey

Alexander elucidates - we must work on the

assumption that empirical and metaphysical environments are ranged along a

continuum, then

lt is also

clear that theoreti

ca

l work

within th

e social

sciences

must be more than the mere creation and falsificatlon of

law

s or universal

statements,

as

should be the case acco.rding to Popper and

th

e rational choice

theorJsts.

Social theory must also concern itself

with

what are called

'general

presuppositions' in l e ~ a n d e r · s diagram

.

Theore ti

ca

l

issues thus range from



SOCIAL THIO&Y: TW NTY INT.IOD\JCTO&Y L.ICTUitES

aenuaüzations

to iaterptetive s y s t ~ n l S

wbicb

link

basic b i ~ i c L metapbyskal. political

and

moral ·

attitu&s

to the world..

A.n)OOt wishin¡ to bt

put

of the social sdentific worJd cannot. t h e r e f o ~ .

enps.inl

in

critial ~ t ~ oo all thts(' ltwols.

Th0$e

hoping to stick with

purdy tmpricaJ

will

bt

disappointtd. (lt

i$

surdy unnecessaryfor

us

to

repeat

apio lhat out conaptioo oftheory Js not unconttsttd.

As

Wle

havc

said. c h u • t e ~ of ationaJ choice h e o r i ~ s would not describe many of heo thc·

ories pnsented

in what

follows

u

' t h ~ i e s '

in first place.

Should you

wish

ro

tW.

•

look

at

tbe

conttoversy

sua

rounding queltioo 'What

u

(sodal)

t.beorr.·.

)'0'1 are a d v i ~ to compart tht fint chapter

of }eft'rt')'

Alexander's

book l W f ~ t r y Ltctt4ns: Sociolotfcal11ttory

sirtct

World War JI with the com·

nxnu m·

<k

·by Hartmut Esser. one

of

Ge.rmany'slndlni rational choice thco

riJts, in bis book

Soziologit AllgtJtttiltt.

GrvndiRgtn. chs . 3 and4.)

Jf

wr • k ~

as

our

basis

thls broad concept oftheory. dots this

QOt mtan

th•t

tbe debate must ntuuari ly run out .of control. with

t\ttry

scholar

biS

.own

t h ~ l d l n and nothinJ stand n¡ jn the way of an arbitra.ry n c r t ~

in

tht

tu1mber

o

thtorifd Quitf a i m p l y ~

tbc

anawtr b - n o ~ It

hu

in

fut

~

a p p a ~ n t witbin t.M

socJal

sdenti6c

disdplines- and

this

brings U

badt to

our

fint

roncl:ulion- that

d t ' s p l t ~

t b ~

areat tht-oreUcal divenUy, scholan

art

Ja.ratly

Jn

a¡rerment

about wbat

thc

fundamental

or

cott

rrsearch topica

ve.

And tt la posuble

to

i<WnUfy t ht'se. Wt

btllew th·

at tht thtorftict)

~ v t l o p m ~ n t

of

the aocial

a c i t n c ~ a can be undet¡tood

asttvolvln¡

atound tbrte \'ery

sp t

·

cific

qutsUons. Thcsc

art 'What

11 actlonf'; 'What b

aocial

ordert·: and

·wh•t

dtttrn1Jnes

IOclal

changef'

AJI

thtorbtl

.. and

thls

applics to

both tht

dt$·

s i c ~ J I authora o ICX'iolo¡ic&l thfllt)' u wellaa modtrn social thtorista - h&vt

taktn up thtae thret qutaUon¡. Weshould ldd that theae artol

count

always

cJOtely Unktd:

thf

tuttons ofhuman bflnas are nevet tntinly random. oclíd

ordu alwaya J o p .

and ~

a r ~

tubject to hlttorical

chanp.

Though cbt

wrttinga

of

the h e ( ) ~ Ú t a

dbcu•ud in

what (ollowa

approach thtae

qutstlona

ln markedly d i . f h r ~ n t way•

-

tornr '"re more lnteretted in actfon tban order,

many wtrt O ( : ~ u p i e d mQrt with

aocjaf

atablUty than social change - theae

muhUJJy

entwined questions ha\'e

aJwayt

bern

preunt.

What

m a k ~ s

these

question110 particuJarly Jntercsting u tbe ftct that the proceas of anawerlng

tbtm almoit

inevttably

leadl thtorlsta to makt ccrtain dtagnoaea

eftbefr timt.

The various

theori1u'

oft.en hithJy abttract idea• about social action, tocial

order

and

social

tha

.np

find

exprewon - howtvtr dlrectly or indfrectly - in

vtry

conc:rttt

appralsab of

tht

state of conttmpor•ry sodttics,

thelr

future

'devdopmmtaJpctht'

and

ewnof htir

putt.

Getting to grip1 wJth theu thrte

quettiona ia thUI not a purely fom,alistic tutc i f or an end in UeJf. but

leada

' ctrai¡hr to

tbt htut

of

be ficld

of actívíty

which maktJ

the sodalaciencea

10

intdlectuaUy ltimulazing and anractlve to a broad publk:

thdr

atrtvins to

e o d e t ~ a aod detect future tremb.

·

. ..

WHA'l' IS THEO&T

"Ibis

vuy

fac1 furDL\bts us W.ith

a basis

<JO

wbdl to tbe followi"'

k ~ Our tbesis

is

that the o

modeJ n social

the:ory be

understoOd

a.s an

unttasing search

fur aftssJUs

to tlw

1b1ee q1Kstions

a:wa·

tiooed

above a.nd that

tbe

coowquent

M-bateo

-. . moved to a m tbt

l930s

by

a great Ame-rican

sodolosist"

to ra-bom succe«ÜDJ

tbe«ists ~ p e e t

edly reíu - implkitlyor

explkitly.

qprovinsly . ; ~ i t i c a l l r -

to

thi.s day.

\\·e

~ rtfwin¡ to Tlkott

Patsoos; in

J.isbt o l ~

·

si&

· ·

oi his. work i lc

nlodern social

theoey

the next thf«<

l« tuns

~ ' r o t e ' d

to

lb<- b i s t ~

.

ofthe

r«eption

ofl'lkott

Panons

· work

d l o ~ S

"•ith

th<-

u t ~

d v t ~ ·

. be

point

'"bich

W< h a \ ~ a l ~ a d ) ' tout"hed upon and

r l i n Ñ a b o ' ~

b ~ ·

no

mtans has socioJosy

simp.l)

·

i s i n t ~ g n t ~ into

various v e t k a l nor

h•s

tbis bffi\ its

C.tt.

Ratbt.r. it b a dtscipline in

"--hidt the

i k , ~ m l

olthc«y W.$

propell«l

tbrw·ard

h r o u ~ h romnl\lnkati\'\J\.. r.ttl\."\NJ d i ~ t t ' < '

..

m(nt 1nd c o n t r o , ~ r s . i a l d ~ b t t < - $ Arnong otht:r

t h i ~

~ h o b t $ t ~ n . k n c ~ ·

~

constalltly

~ ~ r

b.Kk to th(' S}'$t('nl of ~ u a h t

l ' f \ ~ \ k ~ b ~ ' Ta"'""')tt

~ l O s

Clftttd tht unit)t

whicll

\ \ ~ n ~ ) W - d ~ p i c t b\ tht s u ~ ~ t n i ~ ~ n

l ~ t u r o s

Wt $hall ' n ~ y to you·in

A

n'lU\1\ d ~ t 1 i l a . th<

{\tt <1\\

~ ~ ~ t • l ~ ~ ~ ~

Parsoos undtrstuod S t . x l ~ l a c t h . ) n , h(\w

h(l

\ ~ ~ h ~ "\ . s«i•l

\ 1 ' \ l ~ t \

"'h•t

had

ro t•y

about

$udal \ a ~ , how ht n ~ r p f f t ~ ' h t $ ~ f l l o ,nJ

h\'w•nJ

tht othtr thtortUtaJ W\ools <-ontrtsttd i ~ h hi$

i t ~ ·

' ~ a l $ \ ' a h ~ l\)

hrw1h

1

•

lntrod\l(< you t()

tht anost lmpt"tt<\nl u \ h \ ' ~ t h ~

fuunJ<.rs

\ ) f t ~ vttk,..a$

r t t l ~ a l

s(hools.

\1../e int.tnd

t() ¡lVt

you tn QVt

.

ra\l ~ \ f t h t 1 \ ~ \ . j ~ ~ \ f tl\\l'\tk•t

~ s t & t ( h in

whkh the vtrlQus t h e o ~ t k

S<hools

WtN M$t

• h l ~

t\)

d t \ ~ , ' \ ~

t·htir particular t ~ n ¡ t h l , b\lt also

t . h ~ ~ c

that

elt¡x\Std ~ ' r

w t t k n ~ s s t l 1hu

last sht')Uld

bt

ofptrtleular

int-erest

to

thost o()\lU

whost inttrtst'

ttnJ at

wíU

ultlmately t.end towards thf

empirkal.

lt wiU br.tng t n ~ to

you

<>n<t

~ é i i l

é

putnt haw addrt&std on several o c c a s b . 1 n &

tht

ulthnatt i t n p o s ~ i b i l i t y út

drawlng a ~ a r d vld.ln¡ ltnebetwetn en1pirkal

and

~ o ~ t . i c a l know\tdgt.

Hanns Joas

Documents

Transcript of Hanns Joas