Hamas vs. Fatah, The Relationship between Fatah & Hamas

11 April 2011 Tedros Addisalem Balema

The Relationship between Fatah and Hamas

In the chaotic realm of Palestinian internal politics for the past twenty three years

there has been quite a lot of strife. The political sphere in Palestine is plagued with a myriad

of political entities, although their common enemy is the state of Israel and their common

goal is the liberation of the Occupied Territories from Israeli occupation, they are constantly

at odds with each other.

The reasons are diverse for their bickering, ranging from conflicting ideologies, goals

and future interests. Although Palestinian politics has a wide range of entities, two

conflicting entities have been in the lime light: Fatah and Hamas. Fatah, a soft-secular group

and the dominating force in the PLO, and Hamas, an “Islamist” group and winner of the

2006 Palestinian elections. In this paper I shall be exploring the relationship between these

two rivalling factions, the external and internal forces influencing Palestinian politics, and

hopefully use my exploration to answer a few personal questions of my own. These

questions include how the recent Arab revolts/revolutions have affect Palestinians? What are

the chances of these two factions reconciling? What does it take for the two factions to

reconcile and make a functional state later this year?

Before looking at the relationship between the two parties, one must look into their

respective backgrounds and histories. Fatah, is the reverse acronym for ( التحرير حركة

الفلسطيني ,(الوطني the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. The Fatah

movement was founded 1959 by members of the Palestinian Diaspora, mostly professionals

working in the Gulf States who had been refugees in Gaza and had gone on to study in either

1


Cairo or Beirut. The founding fathers included Yasser Arafat who was head of the General

Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) from 1952–56 in Cairo University, Salah Khalaf,

Khalil al-Wazir, and Khaled Yashruti who was head of the GUPS in Beirut from 1958–621.

In terms of ideology Fatah has a “soft-secular” (according to Loren D. Lybarger)

nationalist agenda. The term “soft-secularism” is when a party integrates religion as part of

their multi-faceted national identity. Their primary objective was that the state of Palestine is

to be liberated by the grit and determination by Palestinian Arabs. At the same time it was a

matter of personal pride for the Palestinian people, since the founding members of Fatah

were refugees and products of the Nakba. They called themselves the “shabab al-nakba”2 in

an article in the November 1959 edition of their newspaper Filastinuna Nida al-Hayat in

which the members of Fatah are no longer going to accept their “disgraceful” status as

destitute and thus will fight to the death for their land. With rhetoric such as this we see that

the founders of Fatah had great plans for the future involving years of bloodshed. The

inspiration for Fatah’s ideology to resistance came from the 1936 to 1939 Arab Revolts and

the military role of Palestinian fighters under the leadership of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni in

the 1948 Arab-Israeli War3.

In 1967, Fatah joined the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation). They were

given 33 seats out of 105 seats in the PLO executive committee. By 1969, Yahya Hammuda

ceded to Yasser Arafat the leadership of the PLO. Through the cession which got Yasser

Arafat his leadership position in the PLO effectively meant Fatah would be leading the

coalition of organisations in the PLO. It should also be noted that this leadership position of

Fatah in the PLO continues to this day.

2


The battle that captured the minds of Palestinians in Fatah’s favour would be the

Battle of Karameh in 1968. This battle occurred in the Jordanian village of Karameh, which

was the headquarters of Fatah at the time and the location of a sizable Palestinian refugee

camp. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was deployed there in response to rocket attacks

from Palestinian militias. The Jordanian government and Fatah commandos informed Arafat

of this large-scale Israeli assault on their base. Pro-Fatah Jordanians advised Arafat to

withdraw, however Arafat refused at the same time the Jordanian military told Arafat that

they will provide support should Arafat’s men get too heavily assaulted4. The IDF assaulted

Karameh with heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and jet-fighters5; however the Fatah

fighters held their ground. This completely surprised the IDF, at the same time the Jordanian

army started entering the area and thus the IDF had to withdraw.

Although 150 Fatah fighters lost their lives (versus 28 Israeli casualties), Fatah

claimed the battle victorious since the IDF had to withdraw. This victory was a huge contrast

to the 1967 war; Karameh was a symbol of dignity and pride, even the word Karameh (

means dignity. The victory was also a huge propaganda boost for Fatah. It also led (الكرامة

to massive international support and attention for Fatah and the “Palestinian Cause”,

including Fatah establishing representative offices in 80 countries6.

After the victory, Fatah’s agenda went towards a more sinister path. In 1970, the

splinter group Black September was created. The Black September group was an

organisation that initially swore to take revenge on King Hussein and the Jordanian army,

Fatah and the PLO grew too powerful in Jordan thus were attacked and expelled by the

Jordanian army (alongside executing Abu Ali Iyad). Black September was responsible for a

3


number of terrorist attacks in and outside Palestine, including the 1972 Munich Massacre

where eleven Israeli athletes and coaches were killed during the Munich Olympics. Black

September did not help Fatah’s cause in liberating Palestine since they moved international

opinion against them. If anything, they worsened the image of the PLO to that of a terrorist

group due to Black September’s attacks overseas. By 1973, the group was disbanded. In

1974 Arafat ordered the PLO to refrain from attacks outside Israel and the Occupied

Territories.

From 1968 to 1982, the PLO has had a strong presence in Lebanon. Lebanon,

especially southern Lebanon, was a significant base of operations for the PLO. In 1975, the

15 year long civil war in Lebanon began when Phalangist forces killed a bus-load of twenty-

six Fatah trainees. Later that year, an alliance of Christian militias overran the Palestinian

refugee camp of Quarantina7. The PLO, alongside the Lebanese National Movement (LNM),

retaliated by attacking the Phalangist stronghold of Damour. During the course of the civil

war, PLO cross-border raids against Israel increased. One such raid was the Coastal Road

Massacre in 1978, where thirty-seven civilians were killed; resulting in the IDF invading

South Lebanon and forcing Fatah forces northward to Beirut. In1982, IDF besieged and

bombarded Beirut. Thanks to negotiations, safe passage was given to Fatah and Arafat to be

in exile to Tunis.

In their years of exile in Tunis, the PLO (and Fatah) was distant from a concentrated

number of Palestinians and thus became less effective. Due to this distance, many

Palestinians felt abandoned and many felt a sense of hopelessness since the PLO appeared to

be the only “effective” resistance movement at the time8. However surprising event occurred

4


in 1987, the First Intifada which was a series of mass non-violent protests in the Occupied

Territories and East Jerusalem which ended in violent suppression by Israeli forces. The

Intifada showed there still was still the aspiration of Palestinian state-hood and nationalism in

the Palestinian peoples. These events lead to the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of

Independence. The significance of this event was that, the PLO legitimised itself in the

International sphere as a political party (I use the term “party” here in the most liberal sense)

and representative of the Palestinian people. At the same time they also recognised Israel’s

“right to exist”. This recognition also makes them appear to the International community that

they have abandoned their violent methods of the 70s and also allowed them to negotiate

much more effectively with Israel.

From 1988 onwards, we see a large shift in PLO/Fatah tactics. We see that they have

more-or-less cast off their legacy of Black September. PLO/Fatah frequented the negotiating

table more in their dealings with Israel and the International community. It was thanks to this

more frequent negotiating that resulted in the 1994 Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords, which

included the Palestinian right to self-determination, the withdrawal of Israeli military

personnel from the Occupied Territories, regional development and economic cooperation,

gave Palestinians and the International community a sense of hope that both sides were on

the road to peace. However by 2000, the Palestinians were disillusioned by the Accords since

the Camp David II Negotiations had broken down. Hence starting the Second Intifada; which

involved Palestinian political factions (including Fatah and Hamas) rallying up the

Palestinians in revolt against the Israeli government. The Intifada ended with Israel being the

victor militarily, but it did not end the Palestinian aspiration to be rid of the Occupation.

5


However Fatah, being the dominant force in the PLO, was also the dominant force in the

PA. Yasser Arafat was the first president of the PA (he died in 2004), Rawhi Fattouh the

second, and Mahmoud Abbas the third. Although currently Hamas is technically the ruling

entity in the PA, Mahmoud Abbas continues to rule the PA as well as the PLO.

Now that we have looked at the history of Fatah, we shall move on to the Fatah’s

rivalling faction: Hamas. Hamas (حماس), an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement (

االسالمية المقاومة ) was found in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood ,(حركة

المسلمون (الإخوان by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Mahmoud Zahar. Hamas as a faction has an

interesting charter. We could label their 1988 charter as “nationalist and Islamist”. The

nationalist portion of their charter includes the liberation of Palestine, which would include

Israel, East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories9. The “Islamist” portion to their charter

would be that Hamas intends to create this Palestinian state as an Islamic state; I personally

am not too sure what this would mean since the term “Islamic state” is an abstract term.

Could it mean a nation-state with a Muslim majority? Or a nation-state that would use the

Quran and the Hadith as the basis of their civil code or could it also mean, a nation-state

governed under some variation of Shariah?

Alongside these questions, their charter also seems to promote an anti-Jew narrative,

in which one line of the charter explicitly states, "...the Time will not come until Muslims

will fight the Jews [and kill them]; until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry:

Oh Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!” 10. with such

controversial statements in their charter, and a charter essentially defines a group and its

objectives. Their charter also has references to the Hadith, such as references to the Hadith,

6


including references to the end-of-time scenario, would imply that Hamas was out on a

apocalyptical war on Israel or would bring an end to Israel through violent means; is not

surprising that many states declare Hamas a terrorist organisation.

When looking at Hamas, one must remember that there are two main aspects: the

paramilitary and the social welfare wings. The less publicised aspect, the social welfare

wing, it is well known that Hamas devotes up to 90% of its estimated $70 million per annum

budget to an extensive social services network. These services include many relief and

education programs, funding of schools, orphanages, clinics, mosques, soup kitchens and

even sporting leagues11. Interestingly enough, they provide services that the PA (Palestinian

Authority) doesn’t effectively provide or not at all. This aspect of Hamas is clearly a

continuation of their Muslim Brotherhood roots; at the same time, this is also how Hamas

maintains their popularity with the general Palestinian populace.

Although Hamas is a far younger organisation when compared to Fatah and the PLO

but its history is no less dramatic. After the events of the First Intifada, Hamas was founded

as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’ first attack on Israel happened in 1989,

where two soldiers were abducted and killed. As a result, the IDF immediately arrested

Yassin and sentenced him to life in prison. Not only that, the IDF also deported 400 Hamas

activist, including Zahar, to Israeli-occupied-South Lebanon. These deportations also

resulted in Hamas building a relationship with Hezbollah ( الله .(حزب

In 1990s, Hamas could be said to be living up to their terrorist image. The Izz ad-Din

al-Qassam Brigades (the paramilitary wing of Hamas, created in 1992 by Yahya Ayyash).

7


They were notorious for conducting numerous attacks against the Israeli military and

civilians. One tactic they were well known for were suicide bombings, this is also how

Hamas got its unpleasant image internationally12. A major motivation for Hamas’ shift to

suicide bombing as a modus operandi was the February 1994 massacre by Baruch Goldstein

of 30 people in Hebron mosque13.

Of course, while the al-Qassam brigades were on the attack Israel does respond in

kind. In 1992, Israel responded to the killing of a border police officer by deporting 415

leading members of both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad to South Lebanon. Israel’s Mossad

(intelligence services) also has been undertaking assassination missions in order to cripple

Hamas. In 1996, Yahya Ayash, chief bomb-maker in Hamas and commander of the West

Bank battalion of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades was assassinated by Mossad14.

In September 1997, Mossad agents in Jordan failed to assassinate Khaled Mashaal;

however this caused a serious situation between Israel and Jordan in which King Abdullah

demanded the antidote for Mashaal from Israel or else war would be declared. Israel

complied and thus resulted in chilled relations between the two nations and the release of

Hamas’ spiritual head and found father: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. One would assume that

Jordan and Hamas were on cordial terms (as long as Hamas doesn’t launch any attacks from

Jordan into Israel and the Occupied Territories) but after two years Hamas was perceived by

Jordan as a threat to peace negotiations with Israel. In mid-September 1999, Jordanian

authorities arrested Hamas leaders Khaled Mashaal and Ibrahim Ghosheh on their return

from a visit to Iran and charged them of being members of an illegal organization, storing

8


weapons, conducting military exercises, and using Jordan as a training base15. Mashaal was

exiled and sent to Syria.

During the Second Intifada, al-Qassam brigades were very active. They launched both

military-style attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets. A

2007 study of Palestinian suicide bombings during the Second Intifada (September 2000

through August 2005) revealed that about 40% were carried out by the al-Qassam Brigades16.

This period could be said to beat Hamas “went all out” against the Israelis in which Hamas

used their full military capability and social influence.

In January 2004, Yassin said that Hamas would cease armed-resistance in exchange

for a Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem and at the

same time restoring the “historical rights” (referring to the al Nakba) "would be left for

future generations”17. Soon after that on January 25th 2004, senior Hamas official Abdel Aziz

al-Rantissi offered a hudna for 10 years in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state

and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories and East

Jerusalem. Of course Israel would not accept such terms and felt that the hudna was

completely insincere, in March Yassin was assassinated by Israeli air-strike and Rantissi was

assassinated the following month18.

From the 2004 statement onward, we see that Hamas was reforming itself as a

movement to a more political party-like movement; we must remember that Hamas is

technically not a political party. Although Hamas boycotted the 2005 Palestinian presidential

election, it did participate in the 2005 municipal elections organised by Arafat. In those

9


elections, Hamas won control of over a third of the Palestinian municipal council, besting

Fatah19. From these elections Fatah began viewing Hamas with suspicion and a potential

threat to their dominance in Palestinian political society.

In its election manifesto for the 2006 Palestinian Legislative election, Hamas did not

call for an end to Israel but they did call for organised armed resistance against the

Occupation20. The results of the election were that Hamas won 76 seats out of 132 compared

to Fatah’s 4321. This ended the dominance of the PLO for the past 40 years in Palestinian

politics. In 2006, Hamas offered Israel a hudna "in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal

from the occupied Palestinian territories: the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem,"22

and recognition of Palestinian rights including the "right of return."

However Mashaal also added that he would not impede on any other entity from

attacking, clearly this would make the suggestion of the hudna a farce. Even though Hamas

won the elections, the Quartet on the Middle East (the United States, Russia, and the

European Union) stated that financial assistance to the PA would only continue if and only if

Hamas renounces violence, recognise Israel, and accept previous Israeli-Palestinian

agreements, which Hamas refused to do23. As a result the PA has been inactive in its duties to

this day. Although Hamas won the elections, Fatah was not going to take their defeat lying

down.

From the period of March 2006 to December 2006, tensions were on the rise between

the two factions when power sharing talks collapsed. On December 15 th 2006, Abbas called

for a Palestinian general election, Hamas protested the legality of holding an election when

10


they have not even served a full term in office24. Hamas characterised this proposal by Abbas

as an attempted coup of using undemocratic means to overthrow the results of a

democratically elected government25.

In the Hamas-Fatah conflict, the situation did get violent. On December 15 th 2006,

fighting broke out in the West Bank after Palestinian security forces fired on a Hamas rally

in Ramallah. At least 20 people were wounded in the clashes, which resulted from Hamas

accusing Fatah of attempting to assassinate Ismail Haniya, the Palestinian prime minister26.

This from any party is a serious accusation since it openly accuses effectively the

government of attempted murder, which is damaging to one’s legitimacy. However, the fact

that the security forces (who is under the authority of Fatah) fired at a non-violent rally

already undermines the legitimacy of Fatah.

Within a couple of years of skirmishes, the result was that Hamas’ physical presence

in the West Bank was ousted due to the June 14th 2007 declaration by Mahmoud Abbas in

which the unity government was dissolved an martial law declared with him ruling with

presidential decree. On June 16, a Fatah paramilitary group called the al-Aqsa Martyrs

Brigades which stormed and ransacked Hamas offices in Ramallah. Fatah’s physical

presence in the Gaza Strip was ousted as well after the 2007 Battle of Gaza in which Hamas

crushed Fatah armed forces26. Effectively the Occupied Territories are divided between the

two factions, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Fatah in the West Bank. With country effectively

divided, the idea of a functional nation state would be a far-fetched idea. With Fatah

claiming both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as their region of governance when in

reality, Fatah has no real jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile Hamas effectively

11


controls the Gaza Strip and has a favourable opinion in Palestinian society considering that

they openly resist Israel, they perform duties of the state that Fatah fails to perform (i.e.

providing social services and infrastructure), and Hamas does not have the record of

corruption that Fatah possesses27.

With the histories in mind I ask myself, what are the possible scenarios for the

future? These factions have fought amongst themselves for the past few years, often resulting

in bloody consequences. It would appear that skirmishes between the two sides would

continue in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It would appear that Fatah would continue

attempting to control the PA in their favour and continue fighting to regain control of the

Gaza Strip. As a result, I personally am convinced that we can expect for years of bloodshed

between the two sides. We can also expect that reconciliation talks would be a remote

possibility unless there are dramatic events in the region that will make them direct their

hatred for each other to a third party, a common enemy is often needed when uniting divided

peoples.

However despite these predictions, on March 23rd 2008 Hamas and Fatah signed an

agreement in Sana’a, Yemen that resulted to a reconciliation deal. It called or a return of the

Gaza Strip to the pre-June 2007 status, however this has not happened neither have any

moves been made to fulfil this condition of the deal28. Although in terms of practicality, this

treaty has little or no merit since neither side don’t really trust each other, neither side

actually expected the other to honour their half of the treaty. In terms of symbolism, it would

seem that the Palestinian factions were willing to negotiate. In the eyes of the international

12


community, it would appear the two factions are willing to put consider negotiating and

hopefully create a legitimate, functional Palestinian government at a later date.

When one thinks about the situation between the two factions, reconciliation talks

are possible if a few conditions on both sides are met. Looking at Fatah’s conditions, talks of

reconciliation are possible should Hamas give up control of the Gaza Strip. At the same time

Fatah still wants to maintain their dominance in the PLO and the PA and thus would try

everything possible to ensure that they are the dominant force in Palestinian politics. We

must also remember that Fatah is dependent on foreign aid, from predominantly the United

States, Israel and the EU to a lesser extent, a “taming” of Hamas would be needed. Hamas’

charter is very controversial, considering that their main objective is to drive Israel to the sea

and impose a more Islamic narrative into Palestinian society. The charter alone would make

the Western backers very uncomfortable and Israel extremely concerned. In terms of

ideology, Hamas is far too extreme for the tastes of Fatah’s “soft-secularism”. Another issue

that Hamas would have with Fatah would be that Hamas continues to possess militias. Fatah

technically has dismantled their militias (they have control over the PA’s Security Forces),

for Fatah to suggest Hamas to dismantle their militias is insulting to Hamas.

At the same time, Hamas once said that Hamas would happily join the PLO, if

Hamas got a proportionate amount of seats: over fifty percent. This of course would mean

that Hamas would effectively become the majority of the PLO and become the PLO. One

would fear what would happen if Hamas became the dominant force in the PLO. One could

predict that many of the Israeli-PLO negotiated treaties and agreements would be in tatters.

The fact that Hamas doesn’t recognise Israel, they would most likely withdraw the PLO’s

13


1988 recognition of Israel. In terms of foreign policy it would be almost completely unwise

to allow Hamas to become the dominant force of the PLO simply because their charter and

ideology is simply far too unsuitable for a governing body, I would say unsuitable since their

charter is more suited for a movement at war and not adapted for settled governance.

Looking at the broader context within the Arab World (in Africa and Asia), we see

that there has been significant moves within Palestinian politics. Throughout the Arab World

for the past few months there has been great change on the socio-political level, citizens

(especially the youth) have become more politically conscious and thus are going on the

streets demanding reforms through protests such as those in Oman, Syria, Jordan, Sudan,

Morocco and instigating revolutions in Tunisia, Bahrain and Egypt. Such events so close to

Palestine have caused many of the major players in the region to raise eyebrows of concern.

Proof of this would be the recent talks and plans of the establishment of a Palestinian state

based on the pre-1967 borders (including east Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip)

29.

The motion so far has been viewed with great favouritism from a wide range of

entities, including forty-seven prominent Israeli intellectuals support the idea of a Palestinian

state and signed a petition to demonstrate their support, the signatories included 16 recipients

of the Israel Prize (the greatest honour in Israeli) among them Hulamit Aloni, Hannah

Marom and Yehuda Bauer30. At the same time, in the international community we see that

the number of UN nation states that recognises the Palestinian state has been increasing and

hopefully through the work of PA foreign minister Riad Malki, get even more international

support in the UN31.

14


Now, what would it mean if a functional Palestinian state was to be established

successfully? This would have many implications for the Levantine region as a whole.

Firstly a united Palestinian government will have to be established in which Fatah/PLO and

Hamas would have to share power according to how the proposed future elections in

September, in order for this to be effective there has to be successful results from

reconciliation talks and a signing and enforcement of a pledge of cooperation. Next, on

Hamas’, part there would have to be a curbing of the Qassam Brigades and its subsequent

absorption into the Security Forces or its complete disbandment. This would prove to be very

difficult considering that Hamas itself as a movement has a difficult time controlling the

Qassam brigades. The Qassam Brigades have proven to be staunch and stubborn fighters and

thus would require a lot of diplomacy and even underhanded force.

Next comes the International sphere, by the stage of elections Palestine expects that

there would be a significant amount of recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state and

member of the UN. With this recognition, comes with it legitimisation. On the side of Israel

it is highly predictable that Netanyahu would not recognise a Palestinian state on the basis of

“security”. However, due to popular opinion in the Western world (the EU and the US) it has

been increasingly been more pro-Palestinian (especially amongst the youth), reluctant

Western governments would have no choice but to actually take the popular opinion and

recognise Palestine as sovereign state.

This would mean that Israel’s allies on the international scale would end up

pressuring Netanyahu to recognise Palestine, with this recognition would come the legal

incrimination of Israel on the international scale. It is against international law for Israel to

15


build settlements on Palestinian territory (especially around East Jerusalem and the West

Bank), it is also against international law for Israel to be enforcing the much-hated check

points and walls of separation on Palestinian territories, and it is also against international

law and an act of war for Israel to blockade the Gaza Strip, demolish homes and agriculture

(i.e. olive groves). By recognising Palestine, Israel would officially be recognising that they

have committed violations of international law and thus would have to withdraw or face its

harsh consequence of isolation and even perhaps sanctions.

Once the political arena has been stabilised, with a functional government where

Hamas and Fatah/PLO are cooperating, the social aspect would have to be addressed. The

Occupied territories’ infrastructure as a whole is fairly weak. With this in mind, it would

mean that a great amount of aid and investment would be required in order to jump start the

Palestinian economy and create a situation where Palestine can trade with her neighbours and

beyond with a sense of security. This once again are all within the realm of speculation and

are what I believe would happen under ideal conditions. Alas once must wait until September

2011 and beyond to see what will happen in Palestine in the political sphere, will it be a

reborn functional state or a short lived failed-state?

Now with all these events past, present and future it will significantly affect the

concept of Palestinian identity. Palestinian identity for the most part has been shaped and

formed by past events within the past two centuries. The Palestinian identity compasses and

number of caricatures including the destitute nomad which was shaped by the al-Nakba (

(النكبة and the an-Naksa (النكسة) where 725,000 32 and 300,000 33 Palestinians were

displaced in the 1948 and the 1967 wars respectively. Another caricature would be that of the

16


resistance fighter willing to die for a home he has lost, this was shaped by the 1928 Arab

Revolts, 1936 Arab revolts, the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, and the Intifadas.

However a new identity is rising, that one of the Palestinian citizen; we must

understand that throughout Palestine’s modern-history, the Palestinians have never been

treated as citizens of their country, they have been treated as subjects during the Ottoman

Sultanate and the British Mandate period, they were treated as second-class-citizens in Israel,

clandestine refugees by other Arab states and as enemy-of-the-state in the Occupied

Territories. This new identity is a product of recent events, such as the Arab Spring in

neighbouring countries, giving a sense of new national pride and aspiration to be a citizen of

a state and not a mere subject.

Another issue of identity concerning Palestinians would be whether the Hamas

religious narrative or the PLO’s “soft secularism”. From the elections that Hamas was

victorious in, one would assume the religious narrative is on the rise. This assumption is

logical but it would be a misguided one, considering that Hamas’ popularity comes from its

determination to continue fighting the state of Israel, their social welfare programs and the

corruption found in Fatah/PLO. It is most likely that the “soft secularism” will remain to be

popular in the Palestinian public but it will not be a “soft secularism” that is normally

associated with a party affiliation to the PLO. This “soft secularism” would basically mean

that the Palestinian public in general would maintain that religion would be the basis of

morality but would not dictate the terms in matters of politics and ruling the state.

17


In conclusion, Hamas and Fatah are two factions who have much interest

maintaining a cordial relationship with each other. These two factions are almost opposites in

terms of ideology, a generation apart and have experienced a story of violence and

bloodshed. Both are strong factions in Palestine, whose divisions have done more harm to

the Palestinian people than good. Although they have started considering reconciliation and

power sharing talks, a greater test for Palestine would be whether or not these factions could

put aside their differences and work to form a functional government considering the

requirements for reconciliation are a little excessive on both sides and thus it would be

asking too much for them to form a larger PLO entity. However one must pay attention to

upcoming events this summer, in September and beyond to see whether or not Palestine will

become a functional state or plagued with factional divisions.

18


Sources:

1. Aburish, Said K. Arafat: from Defender to Dictator. New York: Bloomsbury, 1999.

Print.

2. Baumgarten, Helga. "The Three Faces/phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948–

2005." Journal of Palestine Studies (2005). Print.

3. IBID 1

4. IBID 1

5. IBID 1

6. Kurz, Anat N. Fatah and the Politics of Violence: the Institutionalization of a

Popular Struggle. Portland, Or.: Sussex Academic, 2005. Print.

7. Harris, William W. Faces of Lebanon Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions.

Princeton, NJ: Wiener, 1996. Print.

8. Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage, The Story of the Struffle for Palestinian Statehood.

1st ed. Boston: Beacon, 1996. Print.

9. "Hamas Charter The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 18

August 1988." MidEast Web Historical Documents. MidEast Web, 2002. Web. 8 Apr. 2011.

<http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm>.

10. Webman, Esther. "Anti-semitic Motifs in the Ideology of Hizballah and Hamas."

Project for the Study of Anti-Semitism (1994). Print.

19


11. Levitt, Matthew. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad.

New Haven: Yale UP, 2006. Print.

12. Gaviria, Marcela, prod. "Palestinian Territories: Inside Hamas." PBS Frontline.

Public Broadcasting Service. PBS, 9 May 2006. Television.

13. Holtmann, Philipp. Martyrdom, Not Suicide: The Legality of Hamas' Bombings in

the Mid-1990s in Modern Islamic Jurisprudence. GRIN Verlag, 2009. Print.

14. Kimmerling, Baruch, and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: a History.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003. Print.

15. IBID 11

16. "Human Capital and the Productivity of Suicide Bombers." Journal of Economic

Perspectives 21.3 (2007). Print.

17. Amayreh, Khaled. "Running out of Time." Al-Ahram Weekly [Cairo] 24 Jan. 2004.

Print.

18. "BBC NEWS | Middle East | Hamas Chief Killed in Air Strike." BBC News - Home.

BBC, 22 Mar. 2004. Web. 9 Apr. 2011.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3556099.stm>.

19. Price, Matthew. "BBC NEWS | Middle East | Hamas Success in Fatah Heartland."

BBC News - Home. BBC, 13 May 2005. Web. 10 Apr. 2011.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4541383.stm>.

20


20. McGreal, Chris. "Hamas Drops Call for Destruction of Israel from Manifesto |

World News | The Guardian." Latest News, Comment and Reviews from the Guardian |

Guardian.co.uk. London: Guardian, 12 Jan. 2006. Web. 21 Apr. 2011.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1684472,00.html>.

21. Erlanger, Steven. "Hamas Routs Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process."

The New York Times, 27 Jan. 2006. Print.

22. "Hamas: Peace with Israel for Withdrawal to ’67 Borders - Israel News, Ynetnews."

Israel News: Ynetnews. 3 Mar. 2006. Web. 11 Apr. 2011.

<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3223438,00.html>.

23. Pike, John. "HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)." GlobalSecurity.org -

Reliable Security Information. Globalsecurity.org. Web. 9 Apr. 2011.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas.htm>.

24. "Abbas Calls for Early Palestinian Poll. 16/12/2006. ABC News Online."

ABC.net.au. Reuters, 16 Dec. 2006. Web. 13 Apr. 2011.

<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200612/s1813209.htm>.

25. "International Institute for Strategic Studies Hamas Coup in Gaza." International

Institute for Strategic Studies Welcome. International Institute for Strategic Studies, June

2007. Web. 14 Apr. 2011. <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-

issues/volume-13-2007/volume-13-issue-5/hamas-coup-in-gaza/>.

21


26. "BBC NEWS | Middle East | How Hamas Took over the Gaza Strip." BBC News -

Home. 15 June 2007. Web. 11 Apr. 2011.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6748621.stm>.

27. IBID 21

28. Sudam, Mohamed. "Fatah and Hamas Sign Reconciliation Deal | Reuters."

Breaking News, Business News, Financial and Investing News & More | Reuters.co.uk. 23

Mar. 2008. Web. 15 Apr. 2011. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/03/23/uk-palestinians-

yemen-deal-idUKL23831120080323>.

29. Vick, Karl. "The Palestinians: Can Fatah and Hamas Be Friends? - TIME."

Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs, News Photos, Video, Tech Reviews - TIME.com.

Time, 21 Mar. 2011. Web. 15 Apr. 2011.

<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2060620,00.html>.

30. Press, The Associated. "47 Israeli Intellectuals Back Palestinian State - Wednesday,

April 20, 2011 | 6:56 A.m." Las Vegas Sun. 20 Apr. 2011. Web. 20 Apr. 2011.

<http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/apr/20/ml-israel-peace-plan/>.

31. Gradstein, Linda. "Palestinians to Push for UN Recognition as Independent State."

Top News & Analysis, US, World, Sports, Celebrity & Weird News. 10 Jan. 2011. Web. 14

Apr. 2011. <http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/10/palestinians-to-push-for-un-recognition-

as-independent-state/>.

32. McDowall, David. The Palestinians. London: Minority Rights Group, 1987. Print.

22


33. IBID 31

23

Hamas vs. Fatah, The Relationship between Fatah & Hamas

Documents

Transcript of Hamas vs. Fatah, The Relationship between Fatah & Hamas