Hamas vs. Fatah, The Relationship between Fatah & Hamas
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Transcript of Hamas vs. Fatah, The Relationship between Fatah & Hamas
11 April 2011 Tedros Addisalem Balema
The Relationship between Fatah and Hamas
In the chaotic realm of Palestinian internal politics for the past twenty three years
there has been quite a lot of strife. The political sphere in Palestine is plagued with a myriad
of political entities, although their common enemy is the state of Israel and their common
goal is the liberation of the Occupied Territories from Israeli occupation, they are constantly
at odds with each other.
The reasons are diverse for their bickering, ranging from conflicting ideologies, goals
and future interests. Although Palestinian politics has a wide range of entities, two
conflicting entities have been in the lime light: Fatah and Hamas. Fatah, a soft-secular group
and the dominating force in the PLO, and Hamas, an “Islamist” group and winner of the
2006 Palestinian elections. In this paper I shall be exploring the relationship between these
two rivalling factions, the external and internal forces influencing Palestinian politics, and
hopefully use my exploration to answer a few personal questions of my own. These
questions include how the recent Arab revolts/revolutions have affect Palestinians? What are
the chances of these two factions reconciling? What does it take for the two factions to
reconcile and make a functional state later this year?
Before looking at the relationship between the two parties, one must look into their
respective backgrounds and histories. Fatah, is the reverse acronym for ( التحرير حركة
الفلسطيني ,(الوطني the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. The Fatah
movement was founded 1959 by members of the Palestinian Diaspora, mostly professionals
working in the Gulf States who had been refugees in Gaza and had gone on to study in either
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Cairo or Beirut. The founding fathers included Yasser Arafat who was head of the General
Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) from 1952–56 in Cairo University, Salah Khalaf,
Khalil al-Wazir, and Khaled Yashruti who was head of the GUPS in Beirut from 1958–621.
In terms of ideology Fatah has a “soft-secular” (according to Loren D. Lybarger)
nationalist agenda. The term “soft-secularism” is when a party integrates religion as part of
their multi-faceted national identity. Their primary objective was that the state of Palestine is
to be liberated by the grit and determination by Palestinian Arabs. At the same time it was a
matter of personal pride for the Palestinian people, since the founding members of Fatah
were refugees and products of the Nakba. They called themselves the “shabab al-nakba”2 in
an article in the November 1959 edition of their newspaper Filastinuna Nida al-Hayat in
which the members of Fatah are no longer going to accept their “disgraceful” status as
destitute and thus will fight to the death for their land. With rhetoric such as this we see that
the founders of Fatah had great plans for the future involving years of bloodshed. The
inspiration for Fatah’s ideology to resistance came from the 1936 to 1939 Arab Revolts and
the military role of Palestinian fighters under the leadership of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni in
the 1948 Arab-Israeli War3.
In 1967, Fatah joined the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation). They were
given 33 seats out of 105 seats in the PLO executive committee. By 1969, Yahya Hammuda
ceded to Yasser Arafat the leadership of the PLO. Through the cession which got Yasser
Arafat his leadership position in the PLO effectively meant Fatah would be leading the
coalition of organisations in the PLO. It should also be noted that this leadership position of
Fatah in the PLO continues to this day.
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The battle that captured the minds of Palestinians in Fatah’s favour would be the
Battle of Karameh in 1968. This battle occurred in the Jordanian village of Karameh, which
was the headquarters of Fatah at the time and the location of a sizable Palestinian refugee
camp. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was deployed there in response to rocket attacks
from Palestinian militias. The Jordanian government and Fatah commandos informed Arafat
of this large-scale Israeli assault on their base. Pro-Fatah Jordanians advised Arafat to
withdraw, however Arafat refused at the same time the Jordanian military told Arafat that
they will provide support should Arafat’s men get too heavily assaulted4. The IDF assaulted
Karameh with heavy artillery, armoured vehicles and jet-fighters5; however the Fatah
fighters held their ground. This completely surprised the IDF, at the same time the Jordanian
army started entering the area and thus the IDF had to withdraw.
Although 150 Fatah fighters lost their lives (versus 28 Israeli casualties), Fatah
claimed the battle victorious since the IDF had to withdraw. This victory was a huge contrast
to the 1967 war; Karameh was a symbol of dignity and pride, even the word Karameh (
means dignity. The victory was also a huge propaganda boost for Fatah. It also led (الكرامة
to massive international support and attention for Fatah and the “Palestinian Cause”,
including Fatah establishing representative offices in 80 countries6.
After the victory, Fatah’s agenda went towards a more sinister path. In 1970, the
splinter group Black September was created. The Black September group was an
organisation that initially swore to take revenge on King Hussein and the Jordanian army,
Fatah and the PLO grew too powerful in Jordan thus were attacked and expelled by the
Jordanian army (alongside executing Abu Ali Iyad). Black September was responsible for a
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number of terrorist attacks in and outside Palestine, including the 1972 Munich Massacre
where eleven Israeli athletes and coaches were killed during the Munich Olympics. Black
September did not help Fatah’s cause in liberating Palestine since they moved international
opinion against them. If anything, they worsened the image of the PLO to that of a terrorist
group due to Black September’s attacks overseas. By 1973, the group was disbanded. In
1974 Arafat ordered the PLO to refrain from attacks outside Israel and the Occupied
Territories.
From 1968 to 1982, the PLO has had a strong presence in Lebanon. Lebanon,
especially southern Lebanon, was a significant base of operations for the PLO. In 1975, the
15 year long civil war in Lebanon began when Phalangist forces killed a bus-load of twenty-
six Fatah trainees. Later that year, an alliance of Christian militias overran the Palestinian
refugee camp of Quarantina7. The PLO, alongside the Lebanese National Movement (LNM),
retaliated by attacking the Phalangist stronghold of Damour. During the course of the civil
war, PLO cross-border raids against Israel increased. One such raid was the Coastal Road
Massacre in 1978, where thirty-seven civilians were killed; resulting in the IDF invading
South Lebanon and forcing Fatah forces northward to Beirut. In1982, IDF besieged and
bombarded Beirut. Thanks to negotiations, safe passage was given to Fatah and Arafat to be
in exile to Tunis.
In their years of exile in Tunis, the PLO (and Fatah) was distant from a concentrated
number of Palestinians and thus became less effective. Due to this distance, many
Palestinians felt abandoned and many felt a sense of hopelessness since the PLO appeared to
be the only “effective” resistance movement at the time8. However surprising event occurred
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in 1987, the First Intifada which was a series of mass non-violent protests in the Occupied
Territories and East Jerusalem which ended in violent suppression by Israeli forces. The
Intifada showed there still was still the aspiration of Palestinian state-hood and nationalism in
the Palestinian peoples. These events lead to the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of
Independence. The significance of this event was that, the PLO legitimised itself in the
International sphere as a political party (I use the term “party” here in the most liberal sense)
and representative of the Palestinian people. At the same time they also recognised Israel’s
“right to exist”. This recognition also makes them appear to the International community that
they have abandoned their violent methods of the 70s and also allowed them to negotiate
much more effectively with Israel.
From 1988 onwards, we see a large shift in PLO/Fatah tactics. We see that they have
more-or-less cast off their legacy of Black September. PLO/Fatah frequented the negotiating
table more in their dealings with Israel and the International community. It was thanks to this
more frequent negotiating that resulted in the 1994 Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords, which
included the Palestinian right to self-determination, the withdrawal of Israeli military
personnel from the Occupied Territories, regional development and economic cooperation,
gave Palestinians and the International community a sense of hope that both sides were on
the road to peace. However by 2000, the Palestinians were disillusioned by the Accords since
the Camp David II Negotiations had broken down. Hence starting the Second Intifada; which
involved Palestinian political factions (including Fatah and Hamas) rallying up the
Palestinians in revolt against the Israeli government. The Intifada ended with Israel being the
victor militarily, but it did not end the Palestinian aspiration to be rid of the Occupation.
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However Fatah, being the dominant force in the PLO, was also the dominant force in the
PA. Yasser Arafat was the first president of the PA (he died in 2004), Rawhi Fattouh the
second, and Mahmoud Abbas the third. Although currently Hamas is technically the ruling
entity in the PA, Mahmoud Abbas continues to rule the PA as well as the PLO.
Now that we have looked at the history of Fatah, we shall move on to the Fatah’s
rivalling faction: Hamas. Hamas (حماس), an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement (
االسالمية المقاومة ) was found in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood ,(حركة
المسلمون (الإخوان by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Mahmoud Zahar. Hamas as a faction has an
interesting charter. We could label their 1988 charter as “nationalist and Islamist”. The
nationalist portion of their charter includes the liberation of Palestine, which would include
Israel, East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories9. The “Islamist” portion to their charter
would be that Hamas intends to create this Palestinian state as an Islamic state; I personally
am not too sure what this would mean since the term “Islamic state” is an abstract term.
Could it mean a nation-state with a Muslim majority? Or a nation-state that would use the
Quran and the Hadith as the basis of their civil code or could it also mean, a nation-state
governed under some variation of Shariah?
Alongside these questions, their charter also seems to promote an anti-Jew narrative,
in which one line of the charter explicitly states, "...the Time will not come until Muslims
will fight the Jews [and kill them]; until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry:
Oh Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him!” 10. with such
controversial statements in their charter, and a charter essentially defines a group and its
objectives. Their charter also has references to the Hadith, such as references to the Hadith,
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including references to the end-of-time scenario, would imply that Hamas was out on a
apocalyptical war on Israel or would bring an end to Israel through violent means; is not
surprising that many states declare Hamas a terrorist organisation.
When looking at Hamas, one must remember that there are two main aspects: the
paramilitary and the social welfare wings. The less publicised aspect, the social welfare
wing, it is well known that Hamas devotes up to 90% of its estimated $70 million per annum
budget to an extensive social services network. These services include many relief and
education programs, funding of schools, orphanages, clinics, mosques, soup kitchens and
even sporting leagues11. Interestingly enough, they provide services that the PA (Palestinian
Authority) doesn’t effectively provide or not at all. This aspect of Hamas is clearly a
continuation of their Muslim Brotherhood roots; at the same time, this is also how Hamas
maintains their popularity with the general Palestinian populace.
Although Hamas is a far younger organisation when compared to Fatah and the PLO
but its history is no less dramatic. After the events of the First Intifada, Hamas was founded
as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas’ first attack on Israel happened in 1989,
where two soldiers were abducted and killed. As a result, the IDF immediately arrested
Yassin and sentenced him to life in prison. Not only that, the IDF also deported 400 Hamas
activist, including Zahar, to Israeli-occupied-South Lebanon. These deportations also
resulted in Hamas building a relationship with Hezbollah ( الله .(حزب
In 1990s, Hamas could be said to be living up to their terrorist image. The Izz ad-Din
al-Qassam Brigades (the paramilitary wing of Hamas, created in 1992 by Yahya Ayyash).
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They were notorious for conducting numerous attacks against the Israeli military and
civilians. One tactic they were well known for were suicide bombings, this is also how
Hamas got its unpleasant image internationally12. A major motivation for Hamas’ shift to
suicide bombing as a modus operandi was the February 1994 massacre by Baruch Goldstein
of 30 people in Hebron mosque13.
Of course, while the al-Qassam brigades were on the attack Israel does respond in
kind. In 1992, Israel responded to the killing of a border police officer by deporting 415
leading members of both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad to South Lebanon. Israel’s Mossad
(intelligence services) also has been undertaking assassination missions in order to cripple
Hamas. In 1996, Yahya Ayash, chief bomb-maker in Hamas and commander of the West
Bank battalion of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades was assassinated by Mossad14.
In September 1997, Mossad agents in Jordan failed to assassinate Khaled Mashaal;
however this caused a serious situation between Israel and Jordan in which King Abdullah
demanded the antidote for Mashaal from Israel or else war would be declared. Israel
complied and thus resulted in chilled relations between the two nations and the release of
Hamas’ spiritual head and found father: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. One would assume that
Jordan and Hamas were on cordial terms (as long as Hamas doesn’t launch any attacks from
Jordan into Israel and the Occupied Territories) but after two years Hamas was perceived by
Jordan as a threat to peace negotiations with Israel. In mid-September 1999, Jordanian
authorities arrested Hamas leaders Khaled Mashaal and Ibrahim Ghosheh on their return
from a visit to Iran and charged them of being members of an illegal organization, storing
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weapons, conducting military exercises, and using Jordan as a training base15. Mashaal was
exiled and sent to Syria.
During the Second Intifada, al-Qassam brigades were very active. They launched both
military-style attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets. A
2007 study of Palestinian suicide bombings during the Second Intifada (September 2000
through August 2005) revealed that about 40% were carried out by the al-Qassam Brigades16.
This period could be said to beat Hamas “went all out” against the Israelis in which Hamas
used their full military capability and social influence.
In January 2004, Yassin said that Hamas would cease armed-resistance in exchange
for a Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem and at the
same time restoring the “historical rights” (referring to the al Nakba) "would be left for
future generations”17. Soon after that on January 25th 2004, senior Hamas official Abdel Aziz
al-Rantissi offered a hudna for 10 years in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state
and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Occupied Territories and East
Jerusalem. Of course Israel would not accept such terms and felt that the hudna was
completely insincere, in March Yassin was assassinated by Israeli air-strike and Rantissi was
assassinated the following month18.
From the 2004 statement onward, we see that Hamas was reforming itself as a
movement to a more political party-like movement; we must remember that Hamas is
technically not a political party. Although Hamas boycotted the 2005 Palestinian presidential
election, it did participate in the 2005 municipal elections organised by Arafat. In those
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elections, Hamas won control of over a third of the Palestinian municipal council, besting
Fatah19. From these elections Fatah began viewing Hamas with suspicion and a potential
threat to their dominance in Palestinian political society.
In its election manifesto for the 2006 Palestinian Legislative election, Hamas did not
call for an end to Israel but they did call for organised armed resistance against the
Occupation20. The results of the election were that Hamas won 76 seats out of 132 compared
to Fatah’s 4321. This ended the dominance of the PLO for the past 40 years in Palestinian
politics. In 2006, Hamas offered Israel a hudna "in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal
from the occupied Palestinian territories: the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem,"22
and recognition of Palestinian rights including the "right of return."
However Mashaal also added that he would not impede on any other entity from
attacking, clearly this would make the suggestion of the hudna a farce. Even though Hamas
won the elections, the Quartet on the Middle East (the United States, Russia, and the
European Union) stated that financial assistance to the PA would only continue if and only if
Hamas renounces violence, recognise Israel, and accept previous Israeli-Palestinian
agreements, which Hamas refused to do23. As a result the PA has been inactive in its duties to
this day. Although Hamas won the elections, Fatah was not going to take their defeat lying
down.
From the period of March 2006 to December 2006, tensions were on the rise between
the two factions when power sharing talks collapsed. On December 15 th 2006, Abbas called
for a Palestinian general election, Hamas protested the legality of holding an election when
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they have not even served a full term in office24. Hamas characterised this proposal by Abbas
as an attempted coup of using undemocratic means to overthrow the results of a
democratically elected government25.
In the Hamas-Fatah conflict, the situation did get violent. On December 15 th 2006,
fighting broke out in the West Bank after Palestinian security forces fired on a Hamas rally
in Ramallah. At least 20 people were wounded in the clashes, which resulted from Hamas
accusing Fatah of attempting to assassinate Ismail Haniya, the Palestinian prime minister26.
This from any party is a serious accusation since it openly accuses effectively the
government of attempted murder, which is damaging to one’s legitimacy. However, the fact
that the security forces (who is under the authority of Fatah) fired at a non-violent rally
already undermines the legitimacy of Fatah.
Within a couple of years of skirmishes, the result was that Hamas’ physical presence
in the West Bank was ousted due to the June 14th 2007 declaration by Mahmoud Abbas in
which the unity government was dissolved an martial law declared with him ruling with
presidential decree. On June 16, a Fatah paramilitary group called the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades which stormed and ransacked Hamas offices in Ramallah. Fatah’s physical
presence in the Gaza Strip was ousted as well after the 2007 Battle of Gaza in which Hamas
crushed Fatah armed forces26. Effectively the Occupied Territories are divided between the
two factions, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Fatah in the West Bank. With country effectively
divided, the idea of a functional nation state would be a far-fetched idea. With Fatah
claiming both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as their region of governance when in
reality, Fatah has no real jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile Hamas effectively
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controls the Gaza Strip and has a favourable opinion in Palestinian society considering that
they openly resist Israel, they perform duties of the state that Fatah fails to perform (i.e.
providing social services and infrastructure), and Hamas does not have the record of
corruption that Fatah possesses27.
With the histories in mind I ask myself, what are the possible scenarios for the
future? These factions have fought amongst themselves for the past few years, often resulting
in bloody consequences. It would appear that skirmishes between the two sides would
continue in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It would appear that Fatah would continue
attempting to control the PA in their favour and continue fighting to regain control of the
Gaza Strip. As a result, I personally am convinced that we can expect for years of bloodshed
between the two sides. We can also expect that reconciliation talks would be a remote
possibility unless there are dramatic events in the region that will make them direct their
hatred for each other to a third party, a common enemy is often needed when uniting divided
peoples.
However despite these predictions, on March 23rd 2008 Hamas and Fatah signed an
agreement in Sana’a, Yemen that resulted to a reconciliation deal. It called or a return of the
Gaza Strip to the pre-June 2007 status, however this has not happened neither have any
moves been made to fulfil this condition of the deal28. Although in terms of practicality, this
treaty has little or no merit since neither side don’t really trust each other, neither side
actually expected the other to honour their half of the treaty. In terms of symbolism, it would
seem that the Palestinian factions were willing to negotiate. In the eyes of the international
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community, it would appear the two factions are willing to put consider negotiating and
hopefully create a legitimate, functional Palestinian government at a later date.
When one thinks about the situation between the two factions, reconciliation talks
are possible if a few conditions on both sides are met. Looking at Fatah’s conditions, talks of
reconciliation are possible should Hamas give up control of the Gaza Strip. At the same time
Fatah still wants to maintain their dominance in the PLO and the PA and thus would try
everything possible to ensure that they are the dominant force in Palestinian politics. We
must also remember that Fatah is dependent on foreign aid, from predominantly the United
States, Israel and the EU to a lesser extent, a “taming” of Hamas would be needed. Hamas’
charter is very controversial, considering that their main objective is to drive Israel to the sea
and impose a more Islamic narrative into Palestinian society. The charter alone would make
the Western backers very uncomfortable and Israel extremely concerned. In terms of
ideology, Hamas is far too extreme for the tastes of Fatah’s “soft-secularism”. Another issue
that Hamas would have with Fatah would be that Hamas continues to possess militias. Fatah
technically has dismantled their militias (they have control over the PA’s Security Forces),
for Fatah to suggest Hamas to dismantle their militias is insulting to Hamas.
At the same time, Hamas once said that Hamas would happily join the PLO, if
Hamas got a proportionate amount of seats: over fifty percent. This of course would mean
that Hamas would effectively become the majority of the PLO and become the PLO. One
would fear what would happen if Hamas became the dominant force in the PLO. One could
predict that many of the Israeli-PLO negotiated treaties and agreements would be in tatters.
The fact that Hamas doesn’t recognise Israel, they would most likely withdraw the PLO’s
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1988 recognition of Israel. In terms of foreign policy it would be almost completely unwise
to allow Hamas to become the dominant force of the PLO simply because their charter and
ideology is simply far too unsuitable for a governing body, I would say unsuitable since their
charter is more suited for a movement at war and not adapted for settled governance.
Looking at the broader context within the Arab World (in Africa and Asia), we see
that there has been significant moves within Palestinian politics. Throughout the Arab World
for the past few months there has been great change on the socio-political level, citizens
(especially the youth) have become more politically conscious and thus are going on the
streets demanding reforms through protests such as those in Oman, Syria, Jordan, Sudan,
Morocco and instigating revolutions in Tunisia, Bahrain and Egypt. Such events so close to
Palestine have caused many of the major players in the region to raise eyebrows of concern.
Proof of this would be the recent talks and plans of the establishment of a Palestinian state
based on the pre-1967 borders (including east Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip)
29.
The motion so far has been viewed with great favouritism from a wide range of
entities, including forty-seven prominent Israeli intellectuals support the idea of a Palestinian
state and signed a petition to demonstrate their support, the signatories included 16 recipients
of the Israel Prize (the greatest honour in Israeli) among them Hulamit Aloni, Hannah
Marom and Yehuda Bauer30. At the same time, in the international community we see that
the number of UN nation states that recognises the Palestinian state has been increasing and
hopefully through the work of PA foreign minister Riad Malki, get even more international
support in the UN31.
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Now, what would it mean if a functional Palestinian state was to be established
successfully? This would have many implications for the Levantine region as a whole.
Firstly a united Palestinian government will have to be established in which Fatah/PLO and
Hamas would have to share power according to how the proposed future elections in
September, in order for this to be effective there has to be successful results from
reconciliation talks and a signing and enforcement of a pledge of cooperation. Next, on
Hamas’, part there would have to be a curbing of the Qassam Brigades and its subsequent
absorption into the Security Forces or its complete disbandment. This would prove to be very
difficult considering that Hamas itself as a movement has a difficult time controlling the
Qassam brigades. The Qassam Brigades have proven to be staunch and stubborn fighters and
thus would require a lot of diplomacy and even underhanded force.
Next comes the International sphere, by the stage of elections Palestine expects that
there would be a significant amount of recognition of Palestine as a sovereign state and
member of the UN. With this recognition, comes with it legitimisation. On the side of Israel
it is highly predictable that Netanyahu would not recognise a Palestinian state on the basis of
“security”. However, due to popular opinion in the Western world (the EU and the US) it has
been increasingly been more pro-Palestinian (especially amongst the youth), reluctant
Western governments would have no choice but to actually take the popular opinion and
recognise Palestine as sovereign state.
This would mean that Israel’s allies on the international scale would end up
pressuring Netanyahu to recognise Palestine, with this recognition would come the legal
incrimination of Israel on the international scale. It is against international law for Israel to
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build settlements on Palestinian territory (especially around East Jerusalem and the West
Bank), it is also against international law for Israel to be enforcing the much-hated check
points and walls of separation on Palestinian territories, and it is also against international
law and an act of war for Israel to blockade the Gaza Strip, demolish homes and agriculture
(i.e. olive groves). By recognising Palestine, Israel would officially be recognising that they
have committed violations of international law and thus would have to withdraw or face its
harsh consequence of isolation and even perhaps sanctions.
Once the political arena has been stabilised, with a functional government where
Hamas and Fatah/PLO are cooperating, the social aspect would have to be addressed. The
Occupied territories’ infrastructure as a whole is fairly weak. With this in mind, it would
mean that a great amount of aid and investment would be required in order to jump start the
Palestinian economy and create a situation where Palestine can trade with her neighbours and
beyond with a sense of security. This once again are all within the realm of speculation and
are what I believe would happen under ideal conditions. Alas once must wait until September
2011 and beyond to see what will happen in Palestine in the political sphere, will it be a
reborn functional state or a short lived failed-state?
Now with all these events past, present and future it will significantly affect the
concept of Palestinian identity. Palestinian identity for the most part has been shaped and
formed by past events within the past two centuries. The Palestinian identity compasses and
number of caricatures including the destitute nomad which was shaped by the al-Nakba (
(النكبة and the an-Naksa (النكسة) where 725,000 32 and 300,000 33 Palestinians were
displaced in the 1948 and the 1967 wars respectively. Another caricature would be that of the
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resistance fighter willing to die for a home he has lost, this was shaped by the 1928 Arab
Revolts, 1936 Arab revolts, the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, and the Intifadas.
However a new identity is rising, that one of the Palestinian citizen; we must
understand that throughout Palestine’s modern-history, the Palestinians have never been
treated as citizens of their country, they have been treated as subjects during the Ottoman
Sultanate and the British Mandate period, they were treated as second-class-citizens in Israel,
clandestine refugees by other Arab states and as enemy-of-the-state in the Occupied
Territories. This new identity is a product of recent events, such as the Arab Spring in
neighbouring countries, giving a sense of new national pride and aspiration to be a citizen of
a state and not a mere subject.
Another issue of identity concerning Palestinians would be whether the Hamas
religious narrative or the PLO’s “soft secularism”. From the elections that Hamas was
victorious in, one would assume the religious narrative is on the rise. This assumption is
logical but it would be a misguided one, considering that Hamas’ popularity comes from its
determination to continue fighting the state of Israel, their social welfare programs and the
corruption found in Fatah/PLO. It is most likely that the “soft secularism” will remain to be
popular in the Palestinian public but it will not be a “soft secularism” that is normally
associated with a party affiliation to the PLO. This “soft secularism” would basically mean
that the Palestinian public in general would maintain that religion would be the basis of
morality but would not dictate the terms in matters of politics and ruling the state.
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In conclusion, Hamas and Fatah are two factions who have much interest
maintaining a cordial relationship with each other. These two factions are almost opposites in
terms of ideology, a generation apart and have experienced a story of violence and
bloodshed. Both are strong factions in Palestine, whose divisions have done more harm to
the Palestinian people than good. Although they have started considering reconciliation and
power sharing talks, a greater test for Palestine would be whether or not these factions could
put aside their differences and work to form a functional government considering the
requirements for reconciliation are a little excessive on both sides and thus it would be
asking too much for them to form a larger PLO entity. However one must pay attention to
upcoming events this summer, in September and beyond to see whether or not Palestine will
become a functional state or plagued with factional divisions.
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Sources:
1. Aburish, Said K. Arafat: from Defender to Dictator. New York: Bloomsbury, 1999.
Print.
2. Baumgarten, Helga. "The Three Faces/phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948–
2005." Journal of Palestine Studies (2005). Print.
3. IBID 1
4. IBID 1
5. IBID 1
6. Kurz, Anat N. Fatah and the Politics of Violence: the Institutionalization of a
Popular Struggle. Portland, Or.: Sussex Academic, 2005. Print.
7. Harris, William W. Faces of Lebanon Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions.
Princeton, NJ: Wiener, 1996. Print.
8. Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage, The Story of the Struffle for Palestinian Statehood.
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