Hahn R. - On Plato's Philebus 15B1-8

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On Plato's "Philebus" 15B1-8 Author(s): Robert Hahn Source: Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1978), pp. 158-172Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182039Accessed: 07-03-2015 13:55 UTC

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On Plato's Philebus 15B1-8 ROBERT HAHN

The meaning of the questions which Socrates sets forth at Philebus 1 5B 1-8 has been a matter of heated debate in the last two centuries. It seems to me that the translations and explications of the text have been unsatisfactory, and I shall try to show where scholars have gone astray and why. The problem concerns the nature of Unity, Being, and the relation between the One and Many. Let us now consider the passage. 29. Hp&,rov pV ?'; TLVOS 6 TOLMaTag eTvLaL ov&Vts B 1 vUToXaXo4XvELv &XOCos oiv'as. etTa i;s axv TavOTas, piacv 2 ixOTI1v ovyav &EL Tr'v ovTiivX4XL x;LT?T yEVEOLV I1TE 6XEipOV 3 iTpoa8UXoRuEvYsv, OIws EIVXL i3eIa3cLOTca RiaLV TOXVTqV; iET& 4 8e TOVT 'EV TOLS YLYVOILEVOLS aUv Xvi 'aELpOLS E'LTE 8LEaaVXV 5 XaL 'roXXa yeyovvtav rTtOV, E'CO' 8X'qV a&vrTv OvrTis 6 XxWPLS 0 'I iXVT)v x&BVVaxaTr.oV pOaLVOLT' &V, TaLVToV xOa' 7 Ev &,ua Ev L vre Xa; %o0XXOLS yy?VEa&XL. 8

"The first question is whether it is necessary to affirm that such unities truly exist, then again [sc. secondly], how these unities, each one although existing eternally [and] always self-identical, admitting neither a coming-into- being nor a passing-out-of-being, nevertheless can be established with the greatest certainty to be this one unity; and finally [sc. thirdly], in respect to the things which come-into-being, that is to say, in respect to the infinite, whether it must be assumed that it [sc. unity] has been dispersed [or dispersing itself] and come-to-be many, or whether it can come-to-be a whole [and yet] entirely separate from itself and one, in one and many things at the same time - which indeed would appear to be the most impossible view?"

We have here three questions. Before examining their structure and content, a few comments on my translation are in order. I have taken the &EL in line 3 as part of a "squinting construction" and have translated the phrases on either side of it with its adverbial force. I have treated the bX'v in line 6 likewise, taking it in the first sense as a predicate adjective and in the second as an adverb modifying aV'irv avrTris XwpCs; and I have treated the two occurrences of xaL, in lines 3 and 5, epexegetically.

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There has been much dispute as to what Plato is saying in this passage and it will be valuable to examine the arguments supporting the different interpretations. The commentators fall into two groups, those contending that two questions are being raised, and those who argue for three. There is often disagreement, however, among members of each group over the two or three questions which they believe emerge. I shall first examine the arguments by the proponents of "two" questions, and then proceed to consider the other group.

Two-Question group A. 15B2-8 reduced to a single question:

Badham, in his first of two editions of Plato's Philebus, believes that two questions are raised; he emends 6Xws for ows in line 4 and reads: "(1) whether the monads have a real being; and (2) how we can conceive that they subsist unchangeably as monads, and yet in the world of sense must be regarded as either distributed into as many parts as there are individuals to partake of them, or remaining as wholes in each individual, so that each monad is at once in each, and again one in many."' Poste follows Badham, but, unlike Dies, Cherniss, and Ross, he explicitly takes "rrpw'rov (or ,uv) Ideas a real existence? and (2) How are we to reconcile their unity with their apparent division or multiplication in the world of sense." But Poste reinstates the 8,uxs which refers, in his opinion, only to the succeeding clause which in turn gives jiIEr& 8? 'rOVTO the force of "and yet."2 Jackson also accepts only two, but understands them to be: "(1) Are there these monads? (2) How are we to suppose these monads - if they are each of them eternally, immutably, one, neither coming into being nor ceasing to be - severally to retain this their unity and yet, either by division or by multiplication, to be distributed amongst a plurality of particulars?"3 Jackson takes the participial clause ,Liav &x&airv wrX to describe the monads as essentially units and he believes this view is supported by the words 0 vs Exvat xT\, which contrast these units with a process of "pluralization" which they must somehow undergo in particular things.4 Wilamowitz5 follows in this same tradition; supposing a lacuna before o,uos he attempts to insert after ipoa8FXoj'vv the words ?v 8i 'o'rOl`ofXXO!S waLVO 'vqv which he believes to have dropped out, and thereby destroys the distinction between the second and third question. Natorp6 succeeds at the same reduction by rearranging the clauses. Schleiermacher's translation accomplishes the same thing.7 Hackforth8 adopts a very complicated reading which was originally put forth by J. Bury9 giving at 15B4 Pr-

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IaLO3 TXTa a (O= rrpTov) EyV TavTIV instead of BEPaL6'TaLa ,uivO TaVTrv. This leads him to reduce B2-8 to a single question, hence: (1) do the monads really exist? and (2) how can these eternal and immutable beings 'come- to-be' in a plurality of particulars?

Among more recent commentators, this version of the "two-question" interpretation has also found support. Gadamer explicitly endorses Schleiermacher and believes that Natorp's transposition ("Umstellung") achieves the same result.10 Dies, in the Bude edition of the Philebus, removes Burnet's mark of interrogation after TavT'Tv (line 4) which appears in the Oxford text, and replaces it with a comma; he follows Badham in emending oXws for 6otws and thereby reduces the so-called questions two and three to a single question." Cherniss follows Dies but accepts the o[S, whose position he explains as hyperbaton, and believes that no punctu- ation at all is needed after Trv'TNIV. The expression e'&TE 8LeTLeiVqV . . . p;vovT' &av is merely parenthetical; E'LVcL in line 4 and yLyveahaL in line 8

form a parallel construction, revealing that lines 2-8 constitute a single question.12 Ross follows Cherniss by arguing that the two questions are: (1) whether one must maintain the existence of such completely indivisible units, and (2) how, if each is one and the same forever and admits neither becoming nor perishing, it can be most surely one and yet related to the infinity of things that come into being.13 Albritton follows Cherniss and Ross.14 Crombie follows Dies in putting a comma after -rct(v in line 4, and believes that two questions emerge even though the MS text gives three; but, unlike Dies, Cherniss, and Ross, he explicitly takes "ErrpI Tov (or yv) for R'Lav"; otherwise, he claims the first two problems are the same.'5 More recently, Striker and Shiner joined the supporters of this version of the "two-question" interpretation. As Striker put it, "Wenn man den Satz so versteht, erscheint es besser, die Worte Lvr& oe TOrTO (15B5) nicht als Fortsetzung der mit 'rpC4Tov (B2) und ELTa (B3) begonnenen Aufzdhlung aufzufassen, sondern sie auf den Inhalt des vorangehenden CLTOt-Satzes zu beziehen."'16 Shiner subscribes to the view that the difficulties are two in number: (I)"... as to the 'existence' of the monads,. .. (B 1-2) and then, (2) given that they exist, how can each exist as a unity" (B2-8).'7 In 1975, Gosling became the newest member of this group, although introducing an alternative interpretation of the first question: "(1) The first is either whether such monads really exist or whether we can posit genuine units of the sort in question; and (2) The second is how are we to reconcile calling them units without attributing to them the plurality (of form) that afflicts them as a result of involvement with changing particulars."'18

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B. 15BI-4 reduced to a single question: Stenzel reduces the first and second parts to one question; he does so by

taking eLTa QrrCxs av as clarifying the clause introduced by rp&rov [Ev. Furthermore, Stenzel believes the iopws is doubtful and therefore suspects the whole clause which it introduces; he uses this argument to further support his view. He claims the two questions are: (I) whether there are these unities, and (2) how the unity of the Form is related to the multiplicity of appearance.19 Vanhoutte apparently also subscribes to this view when he compares the Philebus passage with the discussion in the Parmenides. He believes that there are two problems: the first he thinks is presented in lines 1-4 concerning the separate existence of the Forms -"Ici, de mdme, on s'interroge sur l'existence r6elle et immutabilit6 de ces formes ou, comme il est dit, de telles unites ou monades"; the second, in lines 5-7, concerning participation - "Cette participation, disait-on, ne peut etre participation ni A la partie ni au tout de la forme, car si c'est A la partie, la forme est morcelke, et si c'est au tout, elle est s6par6e d'elle-meme.20

Three-Question Group21 Payley, in 1873, understood Plato to be raising three questions: (1) Is an abstract unity a real existence? (2) In what way can it remain eternally the same existing as it does in things changeable? (3) Is it separable or self- contained?22 Badham, in his second edition, reversed his earlier position and turned to advocate three questions; the second question, obscured from his vision when he wrote the first edition, became apparent with the insertion of n before Ivca, which he believed was omitted in the text. Thus the three questions are: (1) Do the monads have real being? (2) Are the monads to be pluralized in yLyvo6uavoa, and (3) If so, how is the pluralization to be understood?23 Bury maintained that three questions are put forth, but emphasized that the second was primarily concerned with the relation of unity to being and not a problem of unity itself: "(1) the veritable existence of monads of the kind described," (2) the eternal nature of the monads, and "(3) how such a monad can be present either in whole or in part in the objects which come and go, while retaining that singleness and self-iden- tity."24 Bury argues that it is the proper understanding of the word 0[s, hence the purported second question, which caused the real difficulty of understanding what it is that is at stake in the passage. Bury admits three questions, but follows Stallbaum in understanding the second question, whom he quotes, "deinde quomodo unaquaeque ab ortu et interitu immunis esse intelligatur."25 The basis for this rendition Stallbaum believed he

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found in the hypothesis that the B`.wxs was corrupt; Bury brackets the Bjuos rather than excising it from the text, declares that Stallbaum has given us the right sense, and suggests that it is probably v-rws which should appear.26 Archer-Hind also understands three questions, but with a very different emphasis from his predecessors: "(I) Are there Ideas at all? (2) How are the ai 'rroXXoti 18cL comprehended in the universal Rovas? and (3) How is pLa txa'ni BE'o pluralized in the yLyvo%tva xai &UrELpa?" This interpretation is particularly novel in so far as Archer-Hind suggests that the second question (line 2-4) is "How can it be that these monads, each being individually self-identical and eternal, are yet one single unity?, in other words what is the relation of the special Ideas to the Supreme Idea - in the language of the Republic of the avTo 8 Ea7rV ExacTov to the avor 8 gwTlV &ya06v, or in that of the Timaeus, of the voqr& Cbxa to the av&or6 8 r tCOov.927

Burnet followed in the tradition of Stallbaum and Bury by taking the second question to be primarily concerned with the relation of 'unity' to 'being'. He argued that three questions are put forth in lines 1-8 which are: (1) do the units spoken of, which are, in fact, the Forms or Ideas, exist in rerum natura, (2) if they do, is not 'being' or 'existence' a character of each of them, and is this consistent with their supposed character of being strict units, and (3) how is each of them related to the temporary and mutable things called by the same name?28 Taylor's interpretation is in close accord with Burnet's. He thought the three questions were: (1) whether there really are such non-phenomenal unities, (2) how are we to reconcile their unity with their reality or being, and (3) how can we think of such units as being at once one and many?29 And Hardie, following Burnet and Taylor, assessed: "(1) Ought we to assume such 'monads' as really existing, (2) If each is 'one' and the same and liable to change can we say that it 'is' this one?, and (3) Are we to suppose that the monad is 'torn asunder' and becomes many when it is in the things that come to be, or is it present as a whole in each?"30 The "three-question" interpretation has not found much support among more recent commentators, but G. E. Anscombe championed this position in 1966. According to Anscombe, the three questions are: (1) "The first is whether these monads must be judged to exist," (2) "how each monad can be a monad," and (3) "the third is how they are related to the infinitude of becoming."31

Friedlander alone believes that lines 2-4 raise both the problem of relating 'unity' to 'being' and the problem of uniting or gathering together these unities. He thinks the three questions are: (1) Are these unities, or monads, really posited as being? (2) how can we envisage these true unities,

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eternal and unchangeable as they are, as parts of the one (or unity) itself; or put differently, how are unity and plurality compatible with each other in the realm of pure being? and (3) How is the unity of the monad, or Form, compatible with the plurality of things in the world of appearance, since the Form cannot be divided and cannot separate from itself to enter into plurality?32 The translation which I have provided shows into which group I fall. There are clearly three questions, each of which is complex. The great difficulty which the passage poses is that it raises two distinct but interrelated problems simultaneously in each of the three questions, and in each succeeding question the nature of these problems is developed. The problems, in the broadest sense, are: (1) the nature of these "unities" as unities, and (2) the relation of "unity" to "being". The general criticism of the "two-question" interpreters must be that this position is inadequate both to the passage at hand and the issues which are raised later in the Philebus. The central issue which ensues is one of "gradual transition," and here I think Archer-Hind and Friedlander are perfectly correct. The issue revolves around, not the sudden leap from Forms to a world of becoming, but rather a transition which requires a precise determination of relating Form and phenomena. Furthermore, all the attempts to emend the text have come about as a direct consequence of the fact that both of these problems are raised in each of the questions. These scholars either did not see or did not understand that both of these problems and their consequences must be thought through together. Hackforth's conjecture is not merely "improb- able," as Klibansky notes,33 but artificial as well. Wilamowitz's proposed insertion strains the text rather than improves it; it purposefully obscures the difficulty that the problem of multiplicity is already a problem posed for the "unities" even before we consider the problem of how the multiplicity of phenomena are unified. For this reason, Natorp's rearrangement of the clauses is equally unconvincing. The attempt to emend o6uts to 6oXs, or even worse to try to discredit the clause introduced by 'o,us as Stenzel does, arises from the same kind of short-sightedness. Apelt, Badham, Bury, Susemihl, and Dies all assail the 'oilus without foundation.34 Badham originally suggested 'oXws at 15B4, which he himself later rejected in his second edition of the text.35 Clearly, the adversative o`ixs picks up the concessive force of the preceding participle oivoov in line 3. The 6`ixs contrasts the Tav'aS with the ,iuav ravxirv on the one hand,36 and the Ru'av &x&a'r-v with the [u'av rrVnTaqv on the other. Accepting the genuiness of 0.ws, though, is not enough. There are those like Ross, for example, who accept Badham's altered position which reinstates the 56iws and yet still fail to see

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what is at issue.37 And moreover, explaining the position of 'ox's as hyperbaton only underscores the two issues raised by lines 24 rather than, as Cherniss would have us believe, undercuts the problem of the unity of the unities. Finally, Badham's correction of the text which requires that we read a [u' before eLvtL is also problematic. I agree with Archer-Hind, who is willing to accept Badham's interpretation if ,ui were in the MSS, but it is not; "although the second of Badham's questions is quite reasonable, it is hardly necessary, for it is implied in the third."38 Archer-Hind's assessment is certainly the most insightful, but still unsatisfactory. While I am con- vinced that there is implicit in the questions the inquiry of the relation of Forms or Ideas to the Form of the Good, I understand the problem differently. The problem of "the Good" is to understand the Good as that unaccountable, non-hypothetical first principle which accounts for every- thing accountable, and therefore the required account is one which reveals the relatedness between "being" and "unity," among unities (sc. the unity of unities), and between the unities and the multiplicity of phenomena. This relatedness must be viewed together from an epistemological and ontological perspective. So what we have here, in general, is a problem of understanding how the unities are gathered together, how we can show that they are genuinely unities, but it is also the problem of showing that and how the unities can be and yet be related to phenomena.

Question 1, Philebus 15B1-2, raises the problem of determining the ontological status of the Forms as unities. The phrase here is &XOq&s otcaas "truly being," or "truly real," or "truly existing," which reminds us of the mTavvrX5s ov at Republic 477A, "completely being"; rov EIXLXpLVioS 6rvos at Republic 477A, 478D, 479D (cf. also Symposium 211 E) "purely being"; 7reX.s 0v at Republic 597A, "perfectly being"; xXtvils OvTws oivSous in respect to the Form, Bed, Republic 597D, "really being"; and especially the later reference in the Philebus 59D, To ov o6v's "really being." We do not have here what we find at Timaeus 28A, T6o 8v'rs oiV'Uso'e OSv "not really being" (sc. the world of becoming). The first question, then, asks whether or not the Forms as unities should be ontologically characterized as "true being." Since the inquiry is whether or not the Forms are non-phenomenal entities, ontologically independent from those constituting the world of becoming, this first question asks if we are to retain the XwpLaUOs and maintain the structure implied by the Divided Line at Republic 509D-51 IE. Implicit in the question, therefore, is the problem of whether or not we shall continue to make the distinction between k-rtoL IvL1 and bo6a, for if we can "know" only the &XqOCs oivaos we cannot have knowledge of To oVTAs OV0S0iTE OV

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characterized by 8ot. But there is something more at stake which we can see foreshadowed even in this first question and explicated more fully in the second; we can see this by the word pLov'&6s. We may ask, why not p,ov&s? Why the plural and not the singular? The plural makes it clear that it is Forms (and not Form, nor the Form of the Good) which are the subject-matter. But why, we may inquire further, does Plato use the unusual term Ruovabes? It is likely that Plato employs the term 11ova8es because of the predominating concern of the dialogue with the mathematical precision requisite for expressing the determinate relation between two distinct ontological types of entities. The word [Lov&ies, therefore, not only suggests the sense of unity, but also "unity" as denoting a mathematical class and the most basic one at that. To speak of Rova8Es as &XqCos oivcas is to suggest a mathematical character of the Forms. This "mathematical" character of the Forms - viewed from this dianoetic perspective - provides an insight into how we may profitably proceed to investigate the nature of Forms (aWXii%s oSacs) as "unities." The mathematical perspective of Forms as unities establishes the context in which the dialogue proceeds.39 The plural form (jiov&Lrs), however, tells us something else which must be reconciled with the sense of ,uovas as a unity, and this matter is focused on in the second question. But here it should be noted that we already have plurality on the highest ontological level, and this, no doubt, stands in the back- ground as Plato's reason for choosing the plural. The problem of the One and Many is already a problem for the intelligible world which requires consideration even before we move to the contrast which the sensible world provides. But, as Gosling pointed out,40 to speak of the ,uov&8es as &XqaCos oiaas is also to give rise to another interpretation; it could also be taken to ask if the [tov&8rs are really unities, if we can properly speak of many unities as "unities" at all. Thus lines 1-2 raise two problems together; do the unities truly exist, and are the unities genuinely unities?

Question 2, 15B2-4, raises these two problems in a more developed way, and like question 1, requires us to raise them both together in the context of the connection of epistemology and ontology. The two problems at this stage of development are: (a) how are we to understand the nature of these unities as unities, and (b) whether a unity can be said to be and yet remain a single unity. Just as the first question (15BI-2), asking whether the

'8Es are Wq&ois oioas could be interpreted as inquiring whether the unities are truly unities or whether the unities truly exist, so (a) follows the sense of the former and (b) the latter.

Historically speaking, the interpretation of the expression E'tra 'rwS . . . pixv TOavT3'v has been overwhelmingly favored to concern itself with the

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problem: In what sense are these unities genuinely unities; how should we understand their nature as unities? This interpretation could look in two directions, however, either asking about the way in which these unities are related to multifarious phenomena, or asking how the various unities can be gathered together within a single systematic unity. This view, in its many modifications, has gotten the support of "two-question" and "three-question" interpreters alike - Badham (in both editions), Poste, Jackson, Schleiermacher, Archer-Hind, Natorp, Wilamowitz, Hackforth, Dies, Cherniss, Ross, Albritton, Anscombe, Shiner, Gosling and others. On the other hand, Stallbaum, Bury, Burnet, Taylor, Hardie and others have supported some version of the interpretation that these words mean: How can these unities be said to be and yet be unities? The problem, on this view, primarily concerns the relation of "unity" to "being." Friedlander alone has seen that both questions are raised by lines 2-4, but even he has not gone far enough to explain the text and philosophical problems satisfac- torily. I will try, then, to show how the text supports a position close to that of Friedlander's. But the philosophical justification for raising both questions together - the epistemological one which insists that a proper understanding of unity requires a knowledge which affords us precise determination in relating different kinds of entities; the ontological one which insists that the nature of unity must always be seen within the context of being - comes in the form that Plato insists upon throughout the later dialogues, namely that the questions of "what there is" and "how we know what there is" must always be understood as inseparable; or stated differently, the faculty or mode of apprehension and the object ap- prehended through the employment of a particular faculty are tied together inextricably.

Interpretation (a), how are we to understand the nature of these unities as unities, presents itself in the words eWma ?T7O aV TaVTas. . . 8Rws EIvaL O43aL6Ta'ra picav rotv3'rv; How is it that these unities (rav'Tas picks up ,uovaBas in line 1) - this field of unity already thought as plurality - are united or gathered together to be distinguished from every other ontological level. To ask the question in this way is to ask how these unities are unities at all; but it is also to ask how unities are so unified to be revealed as unities, to ask how the unities are gathered together into a systematic whole, a systematic whole which reveals how they are gathered together to be of the same ontological order and how they serve as the gathering together or for the gathering together of multifarious phenomena. This interpretation finds the essential contrast in cvfras (line 2) and t'av rTmr'T v (line 4) and treats the phrase juiov ixiaarqv . . . 1Tpoa8EXo,uCvqv as

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parenthetical. Furthermore, I take it that the attempts of several commentators to emend o,4ws to 5oXws were compelled by the conviction that interpretation (a) was precisely the point of lines 2-4, a point which seems to me to require no emendation of the text.

Interpretation (b), whether a unity can be said to be and yet remain a single unity, requires a different emphasis, reading otvrts ,uioav exaor-nv . . . oRs ELViat IEao6TaTa pieaV TeavT.qV. How is it that each one of these eternally existing and always self-identical unities which neither undergo genesis nor destruction can nevertheless be maintained with the greatest certainty to be this one unity. Here the emphasis is placed on the parallel construction between ,u;av bx&arv and icav Tav'TriV, both of which are contrasted with 6o,us ELSetvxL EPo't'TraT. But the question at lines 2-4 (as opposed to 1-2) takes for granted the ,uov&8es as "true being"; even if we accept that, how can it be definitively established that each of these unities exists (sc. is) and is a single unity? The o'ws (line 4), whose force is adversative, intensifies the concessive force of the preceding participle ovaiv (line 3), thereby setting up the contrast between the hypothesis that the unities are each eternal and self-identical and the problem of estab- lishing with the greatest precision how they are of such a sort. In this case, ovToav should be rendered "although eternally existing." The xait which follows, taken epexegetically, together with the clause it introduces, tells us how we should understand what it means for something to be ov'oav &L': "that is to say, admitting neither a coming-into-being nor a passing-out- of-being." The 0,uxs drives home the purpose of the concessive force of ovootv; nevertheless (these Forms as unities) can be established with the greatest certainty to be this one unity." The question is, then, how can a unity be affirmed to be? If each of these unities exists eternally and immutably, how can each be affirmed to be without denying their nature as unity? This question presses the problem in the Parmenides (129Bf.) and Sophist (241 Df.). How is the unity of a Form compatible with the being of that same Form? Can we say that a unity (sc. Form) exists? Does predi- cating existence, or anything else for the matter, of a unity cease to make it a unity?

Thus lines 2-4 develop the two questions raised at lines 1-2. Now we ask, how are we to understand the unity of these unities in such a way so that we can precisely determine the unifying function which they perform, and how is it that these unities can be without denying their unity?

Question 3, 15B4-8, makes it unambiguously clear that these two problems - the epistemological which asks us to understand the unity of the unities in such a way that we can express the unifying function which they

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serve in terms of precise determinations; the ontological which asks about the relation of "unity" to "being" - must be raised together because they are interwoven with each other. They must be raised together because they must be answered together if we are to have a complete understanding of this "systematic" philosophy.

The problem of understanding the relation of unity to tLvaL-yiyveahat is the problem of unifying different ontological orders of entities. But speci- fying this relation rests on a precise mathematical formulation; and the precise formulation in turn presupposes a certain ontological structure. In line 5, we move on to consider the things which come-into-being (yLy- v6ova); the xa;, taken epexegetically, explains the nature of yLYv6oieva as &1TELpa. That which comes-into-being is indefinite and indeterminate which requires definite determination, which the unifying structures provide, if the yLyv6RevVa-&isTLpa are to be intelligible at all. So the yvy- vo6Eva, the ontological aspect, leads us right into the 6rreipa, the epistemological. Then, concerning these unities in respect to the yLyv6opEva &TrELpa, we are asked if they have been dispersed (LE(aao>vv'qV, line 5) and become many (yeyovvuav, line 6); again, the problem of understanding the nature of unity and its relation to being are brought forth together. Then, whether the unities are whole (oXiiv, line 6) so that eavua and -yyvWa,KL must be viewed in a systematic and all inclusive context, or whether these unities are separate from themselves, which again requires the precise determinations to show how this could be. Even Socrates' remark, 8 8q iTav'rwv &8vvaxrTaTov pVOfLT' &v, carefully continues the very dichotomy which it addresses. And this can be seen most clearly by the expression Tav&rov xai

LyLyVw'xaL which follows. The xa' shows us that yiYVWC&aL and not ?ELVaL is the verb operating here, "that is to say" that each Form as a unity comes-to-be the same as itself and one, in one and many things at the same time. The Forms do not come-to-be anything - this is the very point taken for granted in lines 24. In one sense, the whole last part of the third question is wrong-headed, and this is why Socrates claims it is o 8n Sirr&vlTOv &8vva,XrWTaTOV. The problem of the One and Many, which engendered so much confusion in the Parmenides, falls prey to taking literally the metaphor that the Forms become many. In another sense, however, 8 8i1 'n&av'rnv &8vvax'1ra1'rov suggests precisely the task which must be rendered Svvar6v, it sets us the difficulty which must be overcome,41 that these unities unify etvat and yiyVEGOL in such a way as to present the ontological difference, but a difference unified into a single whole - a unity with differences. The problem of "unity" is to show, then, how becoming is a kind of being, that becoming and being are two aspects of one and the same

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world, that we can have a kind of knowledge of that which comes-and- goes. The occurrence of the optative qaXLVOVT' av (line 7) I take as ironic, in contrast with the 3efiLo',raTa (line 4) above and the a&vvaT'rTarov (line 7). Again, the epistemological claims are contrasted: on the one hand, the "claim with the greatest certainty," and on the other a statement of "seeming" and "appearance" - the optative gives the unspecified sense which determines that "the most impossible thing" be made possible. "Appearance" and "becoming" cannot be used to describe the Forms as unities; they characterize the world as ytyvo'iEvov and not as lv. And yet, "appearance" is of that which appears, and "becoming" is the coming- into-being of what is.

The task which 15B4-8 gives to us is a further development of the same problems posed in lines 1-2 and 2-4. The task is to show how the Forms, ontologically distinct from changing phenomena, are yet related to those phenomena. The problem, it seems to me, is dealt with in a two-fold manner: (1) to show how the field constituted by yLyVo6jIEVa is a kind of 6v- to show the meaning of yL'yvEo0ttX as xaT'a 'rrv TTis yevEuESx &vayxctav ovatav (Politicus, 283D), O`vrWs yLYvo6Mvov (Politicus, 283E), yeiVeLS eIs ovaCav (Philebus, 26D), and yey i'vi ovot (Philebus, 27B), the being of becoming" - in the fourfold classification of being later in that dialogue,42 and (2) to insist that the relation between Form and phenomena must be specified with a definite mathematical precision.43

Yale University

I Charles Badham, The Philebus of Plato. London 1855, (first edition), p. 10n. 2 Edward Poste, The Philebus of Plato. Oxford 1860, 9-10. 3 Henry Jackson, "On Passages in Plato's Philebus." Journal of Philology 25 (1897) 292. Cf. also a different phrasing in "Plato's Later Theory of Ideas." Journal of Philology 10 (1882) 262-63. In general agreement is Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato. Oxford 1892, vol. IV. 580. 4 ibid. 5 Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Platon. 2 vols. Berlin 1920, vol. I, 631. Cf. also, vol. 11, 354. 6 Paul Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre. Leipzig 1903, 314, esp. n.l. "Ich weiss mich aus der schwierigen Periode (15B) nicht anders herauszuwinden, als indem ich annehme, dass die Worte Bpws - araOrv nach xxpis zu setzen sind." 7 Friederich Schleiermacher, Platons Werke. Berlin 1826, vol. II, part III. 146, and 483-84. 8 R. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure. Cambridge 1945, 20n. 9 ibid. Cf. also R. G. Bury, The Philebus of Plato. Cambridge 1897, 216, where he mentions the view of J. B. Bury.

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10 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Platos dialektische Ethik - Phdnomenologische Interpre- tationen zum Philebos. Leipzig 1931, 93-4n. L. Robin, Platon. Paris 1938, 93ff. also understands two questions, but does not furnish textual details. 11 Auguste Di6s, Platon: Philebe. Bud& Series. Paris 1941, Cf. also, J. C. Kamerbeek, "Notes sur quelques passages du Philebe." Mnemosyne. IV, 10 (1957), 229-230, where he endorses Di6s' translation but disagrees with his textual reading; he accepts bws and Burnet's mark of interrogation after 'rna'v. 12 Harold Cherniss, "Some War-Time Publications Concerning Plato." (part II). American Journal of Philology 68 (1947). Cf. Philebus 12B5-6, and especially Phaedo 9IC8ff. and Theaetetus 14D5-7. 13 Sir David Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas. Oxford 1951, 131, esp. n. 1. 14 Rogers Albritton, A Study of Plato's Philebus. University Microfilms, No. 20,095. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1955. 15 I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. 2 vols. N.Y. 1963, vol. II. 362 and n. I. 16 G. Striker, Peras und Apeiron. in Hypomnemata. Heft 30. Gbttingen. 1970, 14n 1. 17 R. A. Shiner. Knowledge and Reality in Plato's Philebus. Assen 1974, 38. Cf. also N. Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London 1962, p. 114, who takes this position. 18 J. C. B. Gosling, Plato: Philebus. Oxford 1975, 147. Cf. pp. 5, 143-53. 19 Julius Stenzel, Plato's Method of Diakctic. Trans. D. J. Allan. Oxford 1940, 140. 20 M. Vanhoutte. La Methode Ontologique de Platon. Paris 1956, 139-40. 21 Damascius, head of the Academy at its close in 529 A.D., favored the three-question reading (Damascius: Lectures on the Philebus. ed. L. G. Westerink. Amsterdam 1959, 24) believing they were: "If they [monads] exist, if they are eternal and self-contained transcending all coming-to-be, and thirdly, in what way they are participated in by the things of the world." Marsilio Ficino, founder of the Florentine Academy, in his fifteenth century commentary on the Philebus also championed the "three-question" interpretation. According to him, the three questions are (Marsilio Ficino; The Philebus Com- mentary, ed. and trans. Michael J. B. Allen. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1975, 176-79): "Concerning these unities three major problems present themselves. One, are the species true or just conceptions of our intelligence? Two, if they really do exist, is each species one alone although in agreement with the many, and immutable although its the cause of mutable things? Three, if each is one and immutable, how can it impart itself to many things and things which are mutable in such a way that it is not made mutable in them, nor they made mutable by the fact that it is there? Also, can it be divided through the individual things, or can the whole of it be in them?" Later, in the eighteenth century, within the context of the Cambridge Platonists, Floyer Sydenham published a translation of the Philebus along with translations of many other dialogues by Thomas Taylor, The Works of Plato. London 1804, 5 vols.; vol. II p. 475. Sydenham understood three questions, much as Damascius had, but, believing the text faulty, proposed extensive and surely unnecessary emendations: "read EXFLv instead of E'vaL [line 4]; xai avrr-iv instead of vrxi'qv [line 4]; and avTwiv p, av1'Ts xwpCs instead of av&riv ai(rrs xwp;s [lines 6-7]." 22 F. A. Payley, The Philebus of Plato. London 1873, p. 10n2. Payley follows Grote (Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates. 4 vols. London 1865, vol. II 558.) Cf. also, T. Maguire ("The Philkbus of Plato and Recent English Critics" in Hermathena. vol. 1. 465) who follows Payley. 23 Charles Badham, The Philebus of Plato. London. 1878. (second edition). pm 10n. Cf. also his "Addenda ad Notas in Platonis Philebum"in Philologus 1855, 341.

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24 R. G. Bury, op. cit. 13n.5. 25 ibid. 14n. 26 ibid. Stallbaum's assessment (Platonis Opera Omnia. vol. IX, sect. II. Gothae. 1842, 115-16) that the second question asks, then how are we to understand each [of the monads] to be exempt from creation (ortu) and destruction? is not unreasonable, but it is blind to the sense which the adversative force of ilu.s conveys. Bury's strong inclination to correct oJ.Is to 6vrws is unconvincing for the same reason. This position was also endorsed - with minor variations - by F. Susemihl (Die Genetische Entwickelung der Platonischen Philosophie. Leipzig 1857, vol. II. 9, who follows both Stallbaum and Steinhart (Prolo- gomena ad Platonis Philebum. Naumburg 1853, 4.S. 32 Anm. 134) in opposing oFs. Susemihl criticizes Steinhart's interpretation by suggesting that he read 6vrws or ioXcs to catch the proper orientation. 27 R. D. Archer-Hind, "Note on Plato's Philebus 15A,B." Journal of Philology 27 (1901) 229ff., 231. G. E. Moore shares a similar sympathy, urging that three questions are intended, the second of which should be rendered: "How (we are to suppose) that these monads 'though' each one and always the same... ,are 'yet' most surely all of them one (.r&ya6v)." [Bury. op. cit. p. 215.] The point is that the second clause raises the question of the connection of Forms with one another in addition to particulars. 28 John Burnet, Greek Philosophy. London 1914, 326-7. Burnet makes a particularly interesting remark about the second question. "The sense of the question (15B2-4) has been much disputed. I think that, if we read it with an emphasis on the first ,iaxv and on e1vat, we shall see that it refers to the difficulty that arises when we predicate "being" of "one", that is, when we speak not merely of'rb Ev Ev but of TO EV 6V. When we do that the One at once seems to become two. That is a chief crux of the Parmenides." (cf. especially n. 3). The close connection with the Parmenides is considered later on; cf. n. 36, 38-40. Cf. also Classical Quarterly 15 (1921) 2, where Burnet argues against Wilamowitz' sup- position. 29 A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work. London. 1926, 411-412. 30 W. F. R. Hardie, A Study in Plato. Oxford 1936, p. 82. 31 G. E. Anscombe, "The New Theory of Forms," Monist (50), (1966) 407 and n. 4. A similar interpretation was advanced several years before by H. J. M. Broos, "Plato and Art: A New Analysis of the Philebus." Mnemosyne IV.4. (1951) 114; and also by M. W. Isenberg, "The Unity of Plato's Philebus". Classical Philology 35. (1940) 160-61. How- ever, C. Ritter in his Kerngedanken der Platonischen Philosophie. Munich. 1931 (in English, The Essence of Plato's Philosophy. Trans. A. Alles. N.Y. 1933, 195.) takes the second question to ask about the relation between the self-identical individual, and eternal nature of the unity and its special characteristic determined in this or that manner. Cf. also E. W. Schipper, Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues, The Hague, 1965, 44, who is a more recent supporter of the three-question group. 32 Paul Friedltinder, Plato. 3 vols. Trans. H. Meyerhoff. Princeton, 1969. vol. III. 534- 36n.27. 33 A. E. Taylor, Plato: Philebus and Epinomis. ed. R. Klibansky. London. 1956, 257. 34 Friedlander, op. cit., 535. 35 Badham, op. cit., 10nff. 36 A point which G. Schneider (Die Platonische Metaphysik), as quoted by Ritter (Es- sence. op. cit. p. 51) failed to recognize; the same criticism is rightly extended to A. Levi in his Il Concetto del tempo nellafilosofia greca sino a Platone. Milan 1919, 76. 37 Ross. loc. cit.

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38 Archer-Hind. loc. cii. 39 Here I have in mind, most especially, the project of expressing the relation between the One and Many, Many and One, by working out the 70V &pLiOtV . . .'n&rvra, which Taylor translates (op. cit. p. 110), "the whole numerical series" between them. 40 Gosling, op. cit. pp. 145-46. 41 I take this approach to be the same as the one employed in the Parmenides. Socrates states over and over again that he would be amazed if it could be shown that absolute unity is also many, or stated more generally, the one is many and the many one ( 1 29B2-3, B9-CI, C2-3, D7-8, E4-5, 7-8). The key point is: 'noXi REvTr&v 6e jx&XXov, ts \eyw, ayca1nEL1V, i' TLS EXOL T1V avuTIjv rarvv &TopiaV kV 01VTOLS ToLs ELbEUL 'TXOsavTO&alXTS 'XE- XOLVi1V, LW,O1rEp &V TOSL 6peVOIS &AXieem, oiv"rrs xai Ev TOis XoyLwvw Xa0avo4vos ?'TTL8EIE (129E9-130A3). It seems to me that the point of the Parmenides is to insist that Forms and sensibles must be related. The Eleatic conception of Being taken to its extreme, is simply untenable. If the Unity of Being is considered so absolutely as to be absolutely unrelated to anything else, nothing will follow from the hypothesis that "it is" or "is not".

Compare Parmenides 129B2-E5, where Socrates states that it would be OavLxao-T6v if one could show that the One is Many and the Many One: 'rb Ev iToXX&. . .r6t 'noXXix Ev. . .ii tavFLaa0rv XiyfLv (129D5-6), with Philebus 14C8-9: (v -yap b& 'r& iroXX& etvctL X,iL TO ?v ToTXX& 0avaar6Wov XEX1-V, where Socrates reiterates the same point. 42 Plato. Philebus. 22C-3 IA. 43 ibid. In a sense these three questions at 15BI-8 are already spoken of in the Par- menides. At Parmenides 135B, Parmenides remarks that if someone denies the existence of the Forms he will be quite at a loss because he denies that bc&Grov Trv arvrv &l eivetVL and as a result the ability to carry on discourse will be obliterated. This certainly reminds us of the Iaiev ix&oav o'voav 'rv tavrTiv at Philebus 15B3, and concerns at least one sense of both the first and second questions, namely, the independent and eternal existence of the Forms. At Parmenides 131A-E, some problems raised in question three (15B4-8) are considered. Parmenides asks, "Does it seem to you [Socrates] that either the whole Form being one is in each of the many things [participating] or what?" (13 1A9-10, cf. Philebus 15B6-10). The phrases aVor6 av(roD xwpis 131B2, ovxiiv vrs -Xwpis 131B6, remind us distinctly of the avxr4v avrs )(wpis at Philebus 15B8. The repeated occurrences of 6Xov at Parmenides 13 1A5, 8, B2, Cl, 3, and instances of &pua at 131 B2, 5, 9, suggest that an allusion is being made in the Philebus to this passage. There is yet another passage in which the second question in the Philebus passage alludes to the Parmenides. At Par- menides 142B, the relation between 'unity' and 'being' is called into question, though in a particularly different sense. Both Parmenides 142B and Philebus 15B5 hypothetically suppose a 'unity' and ask if it can be said 'to be'; but Philebus asks if we can declare with the utmost certainty that this unity truly exists and exists as a true unity, while Parmenides 142B asks if this 'unity' participates in 'being' if it is said to be. The hypotheses [especially the Second Hypothesis] emphasize the asymmetric nature of the relation [note that the question is asked whether 'unity' participates in 'being', but not the other way around].

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Article Contentsp. 158p. 159p. 160p. 161p. 162p. 163p. 164p. 165p. 166p. 167p. 168p. 169p. 170p. 171p. 172

Issue Table of ContentsPhronesis, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1978), pp. 87-196Front MatterDemocritus on the Nature and Perception of 'Black' and 'White' [pp. 87-100]Socrates and Ontology: The Evidence of the "Hippias Major" [pp. 101-117]Nature and Teaching in Plato's "Meno" [pp. 118-126]J. Gosling on [pp. 127-132]Plato's "Parmenides": Why the Eight Hypotheses Are Not Contradictory [pp. 133-150]Keyt on in the "Sophist" [pp. 151-157]On Plato's "Philebus" 15B1-8 [pp. 158-172]Hintikka on [pp. 173-178]Aristotle on the Existential Import of Singular Sentences [pp. 179-196]

Hahn R. - On Plato's Philebus 15B1-8

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