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    On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction

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    Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (partial listing)

    Thomas McCarthy, general editor

    Karl-Otto Apel,  Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective

    Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr, editors,  The Communicative Ethics Controversy

    James Bohman,  Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and  Democracy

    James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors,  Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's

    Cosmopolitan IdealCraig Calhoun, editor,  Habermas and the Public Sphere

    Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato,  Civil  Society and Political Theory

    Maeve Cooke,  Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics

    John Forester, editor,  Critical Theory and Public Life

    Jiirgen Habermas,  Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law

    and  Democracy

    Jiirgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics

    Jiirgen Habermas,  On the Logic of the Social Sciences

    Jiirgen Habermas,  The Inclusion of  the Other: Studies in Political Theory

    Jiirgen Habermas,  Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action

    Jiirgen Habermas,  The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate

    Jiirgen Habermas,  The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures

    Ji irgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles

    Ji irgen Habermas,  Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays

    Jiirgen Habermas,  On the Pragmatics of Communication

    Ji irgen Habermas,  On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theoryof Communicative Action

    Jiirgen Habermas,  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a

    Category of Bourgeois Society

    Jiirgen Habermas, editor,  Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of  the Age "

    Axel Honneth,  The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory

    Axel Honneth,  The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts

    Axel Ho nn et h a nd Han s Joas, editors,  Communicative Action: Essays on Jiirgen

     Habermas's  The Theory of Communicative Action

    Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors,  Cul-

    tural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished   Project  of Enlightenment

    Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claud Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors,  Philo

    sophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of EnlightenmentHans Joas,  G. H.  Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His Thought

    Cristina Lafont,  The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy

    Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves and Seyla Benhabib, editors,  Habermas and theUnfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on  Th e Philosophical Discourse ofModernity

    Kirk Pillow, Sublime Understanding: Aesthetic Reflection in Kant and Hegel

    Albrecht Wellmer,  Endgames: The Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity. Essays and Lectures

    Albrecht Wellmer,  The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and

    Postmodernism

    Rolf Wiggershaus,  The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance

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    On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction

     Jiirgen Habermas

    translated by Barbara Fultner

    The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts

    Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative

    Action

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    Contents

    Translator 's In tr od uc tio n vii

    Reflections on the Linguistic Foundation of Sociology:

    The Christian Gauss Lecture (Princeton University,

    February-March 1971)  1

    I Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory

    Fo rm at io n in th e Social Scien ces 3

    II Th e Phe no men olo gic al Const itut ive Th eo ry of

    Society: The Fundamental Role of Claims to Validity andthe Mon adol ogic al Fo un da tio ns of Intersubjectivity 23

    III Fr om a Const itutiv e T he o r y to a Co mm un ic ati ve

    Theory of Society (Sellars and Wittgenstein):

    Com mun icat ive an d Cognit ive Uses of Lan gu age 45

    IV Un iversal Prag matic s: Reflections on a T h e o r y of

    Commu nicat i ve Co mp et en ce 67

    V Tr ut h an d Society: T h e Discursive Re de mp ti on of

    Fa ctua l Cla ims to Validity 85

    Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions

    (1976)  105

    Reflections on Communicative Pathology (1974) 129

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    I

    vi

    Notes

    Index

    171

    183

    Contents

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    Translator's Introduction

    Philosophy in the twentieth century, in both its analytic and conti

    ne nt al tradition s, ha s be en sh ap ed by wha t has co me to be kn ow n as

    "the linguistic turn." Be it in metaphysics, epistemology, or value the

    ory, philosophy of language has become a keystone of conceptual

    analysis. Most pr of ou nd ly pe rh ap s, th e linguistic tu rn has affected

    th e co nc ep tio n and un de rs ta nd in g of reas on. It is n o long er possible

    tod ay to de fe nd th e univ ersal validity of a tr an sc en de nt , objective

    reason, nor can language be regarded any longer as a neutral tool at

    reason's disposal. The role of this movement in critical theory is due

    in large me as u re to the work of Ji ir ge n Ha b er ma s . An d yet, in an increasingly po st mo de rn era, Ha be rm as has re ma in ed a de fe nd er of

    moder nity. Whil e th e reason of th e en li gh te nm en t has come u n d e r

    general at tack, he continues to endorse i ts emancipatory potential ,

    albeit in the altered form of a "postmetaphysical" reason that is al

    ways situated in contexts of interaction. Habermas locates the roots

    of rationality in the structures of everyday communication such that

    the critical po wer of re as on is i m m a n e n t in or di nar y lan gu ag e fro m

    th e start. T h e ai m of his intersubjectivist ac co un t of "co mmu nic ati ve

    reason" is to displace both subjectivist accounts that cling to Carte

    sian co nc ep ti on s of mo no lo gi cal selfhood an d objectivist acco un ts

    that ignore the agent's perspective entirely.

    The essays and lectures collected in this volume explain why

    Habermas considers a linguistic turn to be necessary, how he thinks

    it is to be worked out, and what he takes its implications to be. They

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    viii

    Translator's Introduction

    address questions concerning the nature of social interaction and i ts

    connection to communication, and they trace the implications for

    de ve lo pi ng an ad eq ua te social theory. Th ey will be of int ere st n ot

    only to readers who have followed Habermas's intel lectual develop

    ment but also to those looking for an introduction to his theory of

    communicative action. More generally, philosophers of language will

    find in these essays a hos t of or ig inal idea s on the re la ti on sh ip be

    tween language and society.

    Since i ts pub licat ion in 1981 , Ha be rm as 's  The Theory of Communica

    tive Action1  has been widely acclaimed for its co nt ri bu ti on to phi loso

    ph y a n d social theory. However, its two vo lum es are da un ti ng , no t

    only for reasons of length, but owing to the breadth of its subject

    matter and the denseness of i ts argumentation. The essays and lec

    tures in the present volume provide a less arduous route to under

    standing the theory behind that larger work. They are a part ial

    translation of   Vorstudien und Erginzungen zur Theorie des kommuni

    kativen Handelns,  which was pu bl is he d in 1984 an d con tai ns not on ly

    preliminary studies leading up to the fully developed theory of com

    municative action, but also several essays that complement  The Theory

    of Communicative Action  in important respects. The first part of this

    volume, "Reflections on the Linguistic Foundation of Sociology,"

    formed the text of the Gauss Lectures that Habermas delivered at

    Princeton in  1971.2

      The se lectu res are drive n by th e sam e the or eti cala im that underl ies  The Theory of Communicative Action,  namely, the at

    tempt to ground a theory of society on the foundations of communi

    cative rationa lity. Th ey pr ov id e a larg ely self -con tained ac co un t of

    the philosophical motivations behind the theory of communicative

    action as well as an elucidation of its theoretical grounding in what

    Habermas called first  universal  an d later  formal pragmatics.  Th e pre

    se nt ati on of th e issues he re is m or e accessible th an in  The Theory of

    Communicative Action  precisely becau se Ha be rm as is occ up ied withlaying out the general parameters of his project and situating it rela

    tive to other theories of society. Moreover, he discusses certain issues

    here, such as "systematically distorted communication," that he has

    n o t ad dr es sed in th e sam e detail again. In shor t, the se "p re pa ra to ry

    studies" offer imp or ta nt aids to un de rs ta nd in g his ma tu re philoso

    phy and social theory.

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    x i _ _ _ _Translator's Introduction

    reject "mea ni ng " as a basic, ir re du cib le co nce pt. In Hab er ma s' s view,

    to un de rs ta nd the na tu re of intersubjectivity, we n e e d to u nd er st an d

    how agents interacting with one another arrive at the same interpre

    tations of their situation; in this respect, intersubjectivity is grounded

    in sameness of meaning. Habermas regards communicat ion in lan

    gu ag e as th e pa ra di gm case of achie ving such "identity of m e an in g "

    and thus holds that l inguist ic normativity cannot be reduced to merebehavior in the sense of the objectivist paradigm. To distance himself

    from the subjectivist paradigm, Habermas goes on to argue that the

    normativity of me a n in g mu st be bas ed on th e intersu bjective (r ath er

    than merely subjective) validity of a rule. Thus, intersubjectivity is to

    be explained on the model of how two different individuals are able

    to use a term with one and the same meaning.

    That interlocutors succeed in assigning the same meanings to

    their actions and circumstances attests to their mastery of what

    Ha be rm as calls "co mmu nic ati ve c om pe te nc e. " O n this view, if we can

    delin eate the struc tur e of comm uni cati ve c om pe te nc e, we will also

    have captured the structure of communicative rat ionali ty. Haber

    mas's formal pragmatics aims to provide a rational reconstruction of

    this competence, that is, to transform an implicit knowledge, a

    know-how, into a "second-level know-that."5

      This is not to say, of

    course, that a speaker actually has representations of the recon

    str uct ed kno wled ge "in the he ad. " He r know-how is pr eth eor eti c: a

    skill or mastery of a practice in the Wittgensteinian sense. Subjects

    capable of speech and action have acquired a tacit mastery of

    rule-governed practices that enable them to reach a mutual under

    sta nd ing with on e an ot he r ab ou t the world. Successful co mmu ni ca

    t ion requires, then, that the rules consti tuting such communicative

    co mp et en ce be valid intersubjectively.

    H a b e r m a s uses Huss er l, Sellars, and Wit tgenste in as foils for hisown account. The subjectivist and objectivist paradigms are repre

    sente d by E d m u n d H uss erl an d Wilfrid Sellars respectively. In  The

    Cartesian Meditations,  Huss er l explicitly sets him self t h e task of re co n

    structing intersubjectivity from a subjectivist starting point. (The tra

    di ti on of in ter pr et ive sociology ini tia ted by Alfred Schiitz is r oo t e d

    in this Husser l ian enterpris e.) H ab er ma s argu es that Hu sserl ' s

    phenomenology of consciousness fails in the end to establish the

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    xii

    Translator's Introduction

    intersubjectivity of a community of transcendental egos, and so he

    tu rn s to Sellars. Sellars's ap p r oac h is initially pr om is in g bec ause he

    wants to model intentionality and the structure of thought on the

    structure of language: He takes a l inguist ic turn within the philoso

    phy of mind. However, his understanding of language, according to

    Habermas, is essentially objectivist. That is, speakers come to mean

    the same things by the same words because they respond similarly totheir environment and mutually observe each other 's responses

    from a mon olo gic al , thir d-pe rson perspective ra th er than from a

    dialogical second-person perspective. They are "monological lan

    gu ag e us er s" with a full, in te nt io na l (i nn er ) life of beliefs a n d de sires ,

    but lacking any interpersonal re la t ionships. But monological lan

    guage that cannot be used for purposes of communicating with oth

    ers,  H ab er ma s ar gu es, is no t really lan gu ag e at all. Th us , in diffe rent

    ways,  Husser l a n d Sellars bo th pre su pp os e ra th er than acc ou nt forthe existence of intersubjectivity.

    It is no accident that Habermas's argument against Sellars is remi

    nis cent of Wittg enst ein's private-language arg um en t. Samenes s of

    meaning is grounded in the validity of rules, and Habermas, follow

    ing Wittgenstein, argues that a subject cannot follow rules in isola

    tion . If s o m e o n e is follow ing a ru le , it mu st be at least in pr in ci pl e

    possible for so me on e else to check wh et he r she is following th at ru le

    correctiy; o n e per so n' s rule-following beh avi or is, in ot he r word s,

    subject to eval uati on an d criticism by an ot he r. Thi s pr ec lu de s any

    mo no lo gi ca l ac co un t of rule-following, for it pr es up po se s that differ

    ent people have the same competence and are mutually capable of

    assessing each other 's performance. ( i  Wittgenstein emphasized that

    me an in g is a ma tt er of use an d th at word s an d sen ten ces are used in

    interaction with others; his "use theory of meaning" was in this sense

    inh ere ntl y pra gm ati c an d intersubjective. As action a n d lan gu age areintimately interwoven, to understand an utterance is to grasp i ts role

    in a language game, that is, to understand it as a move in a rule-

    governed, interpersonal activity. Thus being able to engage in a

    lan gu age g am e pr es up po se s sharin g a fo rm of life with on e' s int er

    locutors. The rules constitutive of such language games are not stipu

    lated arbitrarily, but have the status of conventions, a topic to which I

    shall return below. Habermas elaborates on Wittgenstein's account

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    xiii

    Translator's Introduction

    in two ways. First, h e aim s to dev elo p a th eo ry of the st ru ct ur es of

    intersubjectivity: Though Wittgenstein's language games clearly sup

    pose dialogical relat ionships among part icipants in interaction, he

    does no t analy ze these relatio nsh ips as such . Sec on d, H a b e r m a s

    wants to do m o r e jus tice t h a n Witt gen stei n d id to th e fact th at lan

    guage refers to the world.

    Th e early Wit tge nst ein a t t em pt ed to ela bor ate a pu re ly cognit ivelan gua ge, the p ri me fun cti on of whic h was to re pr es en t the totality of

    facts that make up the world. The later Wittgenstein aborted that at

    tempt because, in Habermas's terms, he discovered communicative

    language use(s). In other words, he came to realize that language

    can be used for all sorts of purposes other than cognitive ones and,

    according to Habermas, henceforth mistakenly downplayed the im

    po rta nc e of the cognitive use altog ether . By cont rast, H a b e r m a s

    maintains that reaching mutual understanding requires a speakera nd hea re r to oper at e at two levels: th e level of intersubjectiv ity on

    which they speak with one another, and the level of objects or states

    of affairs about which they communicate. His discussion here is argu

    ably the best, most extensive elucidation of his conception of the

    "double structure of speech." He makes it clear that the two uses of

    language are  interdependent.  "A co mmu ni cat iv e theo ry of society mu st

    do justice to the do ub le cognit ive- communicati ve st ruc tur e of

    spe ech " (p. 64) . This dual str uct ure und erl ies the reflexive cha ract er

    of language: Natural languages can function as their own meta-lan

    guages, as Donald Davidson, for example, has also pointed out. Ac

    cording to Habermas, we cannot communicate about things or states

    of affairs in th e wor ld wi th ou t also "m et a- co mm un ica ti ng " ab ou t

    what we are doing or how we are using the content of what we are

    saying. It is here that speech act theory enters the picture. Every

    speech act takes the form  Mp,  whe re  M   expresses the i l locutionary

    force of the ut ter an ce (th e comm uni cati ve dimen sion ) a nd  p  ex

    presses i ts pre pos it i ona l co nt en t (the cognit ive dim ens io n) ab ou t

    which mutual understanding is to be reached. In this sense, al l

    sp eec h acts ha ve a cognitive an d a co mmu ni cat iv e di me ns io n.

    Ha be rm as 's key mo ve in l inking com mun icat ive rat ionali ty with

    a theory of meaning is to connect the theory of meaning with a the

    ory of ar g um en ta ti o n an d justification. T h e r e is, as h e put s it, a

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    xiv

    Translator's Introduction

    "validity basis"  to  speech;  all  sp eec h acts carry  an  implici t co mmit

    m e n t  to justification,  to giving reason s that back on e' s claims. Wh e n

    we  use  sp ee ch acts  to  communica te wi th  o ne  another ,  we move ,  as

    Robe r t Br a ndom  has  recent ly re min de d  us, in "the space  of   giving

    and asking  for  reasons."7

      Or, as Hab e rm as pu t s  it ,  every speech  act

    raises certain claims  to validity th at ar e o pe n  to bein g chal lenged a nd

    defended with reasons.  T h e  i l locut ionary com po ne nt  of an  ut terance expresses validity claims  a  speaker raises  in  per for min g speech

    acts.  Habermas init ial ly identifies four such claims:  intelligibility,

    t ru th , normat ive  Tightness, a n d  sincerity  or  t ruthfulness . That  is, in

    m a ki ng  an u t t e rance ,  a  speaker simultaneously raises  the claims that

    what  she  says  is  intelligible, that  the  propos i t ional c ont ent  of   what

    she says  is  t rue, that  she is m a k i ng  the  u t te rance  in the  appropr ia te

    social context,  a n d  tha t  she is spe aki ng truthfully. Fol lowing  o n  this,

    Habermas classifies speech acts into four types, each  of  which corre sponds  to one of the  fou r validity claims: co mmu nic ati ves (e.g.,

    speaking, asking, replying), constatives (e.g., reporting, asserting,

    claiming), regulatives (e.g. , Ordering, requesting, demanding,  re

    m i n d i n g ) ,  a n d expressives (e.g., kno wing , thinki ng, fearing, ho pi ng ,

    wishing). Communicative speech acts  a r e used  to m a k e explici t  the

    na t u r e  of an  u t te rance  itself.  In  constative speech acts, speakers rep

    resent states  of  affairs  in the  objective world  a n d refer  to  something

    in that world.  In  pe rf or mi ng regulative spe ech acts, speakers estab

    lish intersubjective relationships with interlocutors  and  thus relate  to

    a social world.  In  expressive speech acts, speakers refer  to  things  in

    their subjective world  by mak in g public inte ntio ns, desires,  or  other

    private states  or  occurrences .  In  The  Theory  of   Communicative Action,

    the  number of  validity claims  is r e duc e d  to three ; intelligibility  drops

    out ,  leaving  t r u t h , normative Tightness, and  sincerity.8

    Communicative action takes place against  a  back gro und consensus that  it  renews  a n d develops. W h e n commu nicat iv e interact i on  is

    pr oc ee di ng smoothly, inte rlo cuto rs m a k e wha t the y ar e saying intell i

    gible  to one anoth er , g ran t what they  are saying  to be  tr ue (i.e., the y

    assume  the refer ential expres sions they  are  using pick   ou t objects  to

    which  the  at tributes they predicate  of   th em actually appl y), r eco g

    nize  the  Tightness  of the n or m tha t  the  speech  act claims  to  fulfill,

    and don't doubt each other 's sinceri ty.  In shor t, they mut ual ly acc ep t

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    xv____ •Translator's Introduction

    the validity of the claims being raised. In this "normal" case, a

    speaker uses expressions such that the hearer understands the

    speaker as the speaker wants to be understood, she formulates prop-

    ositional contents such that they represent experiences or facts, she

    expresses her intentions (sincerely), and she performs speech acts

    such that they conform to recognized norms of accepted self-images.

    At the same t ime, part icipants in communicative action are assumed

    to be pr ep ar ed to reac h mu tua l un de rs ta nd in g— th at is, their a tt i

    tud e is co mmu ni cat iv e ra th er th an strategic (o ri en te d towar d realiz

    ing one's own ends). As such, they are assumed to be accountable,

    th at is, ca pa bl e of justifying th eir actio ns a n d expr essio ns. A cco un t

    ability thus refers to a general presumption of rationality, cashed out

    in te rm s of on e' s re ad in es s to justify the cla ims o n e raises. Becau se,

    normally, in raising validity claims, a speaker takes on the warrant to

    make good on them, formal pragmatics as a theory of "communicative rationality" can serve as a foundation for a  critical  theory. As a

    speak er can be call ed up o n to justify th e claims ra is ed in her utt er

    ances,  the bu r d en of jus tifi catio n a n d th e possibility of cri tiq ue ar e

    buil t into the very structure of language and communication.

    Wh en the consensus unde rlyi ng smoothly funct i oning co mm un i

    cative interaction breaks down and the flow of the language game is

    in te rr up te d, p art icu lar claims to validity may be them ati ze d. To re

    deem problematic claims to truth or to normative Tightness, we must

    resort to a level of argumentation that Habermas calls  discourse,

    through which we seek to attain a  rational  consensus on these claims.

    But how are speakers able to distinguish a true (or rational) from a

    false (or merely co nt in ge nt ) consen sus? No te tha t we rou tin ely as

    sume, as a matter of fact, that we are able to do so, and that, in this

    sense, speec h is fun dame ntal ly rat ional . To mo de l the ass ump tio ns

    buil t into the ideal of rat ional discourse, Habermas introduces the

    notion of the  ideal speech situation.  T h e ideal sp eec h situat ion is sub

     j ec t only to the "unforced force of t he be t te r a rgument " ; it is devoid

    of all other constraints. All interlocutors are equally entitled to make

    assertions, raise questions and objections, or provide justifications

    for their positions. And all express their true intentions. It is crucial

    to remember that discourses  as a matter offact   usually do not manifest

    the conditions of the ideal speech situation, but the model can serve

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    xvi

    Translator's Introduction

    as a standard in identifying deviations from the ideal of rational

    consensus.

    T h e que sti on of wh en ce th e justifications for th em at iz ed validity

    claims are drawn brings us to the notion of the lifeworld, which is

    complementary to that of communicative action. The l ifeworld pro

    vides a context of relevance within which communicative actions

    (and actors) are "always already" situated. As such, it always remains

    in the ba ck gr ou nd , st an di ng "at the backs" of part ic ipant s in co mm u

    nic ati on, as it wer e. It ca nn ot be tr an sc en de d: Speak ers and actor s

    cannot act by placing themselves outside of it. It has, on the contrary,

    a tr an sc en de nt al ch ar act er insofar as it fun ctio ns itself as a co nd it io n

    of possibility for communicative action. In this sense, it functions as a

    ba ck gr ou nd of mu tu al intelligibility. I nte r subjectively sha red , it

    makes possib le th e smo oth fu nct ion ing of everyday co mm un ic ati ve

    action. In general, speakers do not have explicit but only tacit knowledg e of it; no ne th el es s, th e lifeworld provides com mu ni cat iv e actor s

    with a shared stock of taken-for-granted interpretations on which

    they can draw in trying to understand others. In discourse, elements

    of this imp lic it kn ow led ge can be r en d er ed explicit in or d er to re

    deem validity claims that have been challenged. This connection be

    tween univ ersal prag mat ics a n d th e lifeworld is discussed in th e

    fou rth Gau ss Lect ure , wh er e Ha b er ma s def ends the l inguistic t u r n in

    phenomenology and suggests that universal pragmatics aims to elucidate basic structures of the lifeworld. Thus we can see that he early

    on conceived communicative action and l ifeworld as complemen

    tary, a connection he later strengthened and elaborated in  The The

    ory of Communicative Action.

    Of special no te is Ha be rm as ' s discussion of tr ut h in th e Gauss Lec

    tur es, for t r u th clai ms enjoy par ad ig ma ti c status as validity claims

    (p.  86). When we raise a truth claim, we use language cognitively.And Habermas's discussion of cognitive language use in the Gauss

    Lectures focuses on questions of reference and perception—ele

    ments that are not emphasized in his subsequent art iculations of for

    mal pragmatics. When attributing a property to an object, he claims,

    a speaker presupposes that the object exists and that the proposit ion

    she asserts is true. That is, she assumes that the subject expression

    has a referent and that the predicate can be correctly applied to it .

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    Translator's Introduction

    Ha be rm as he re end ors es a desc ripti on theo ry of refe renc e. Interest

    ingly, he also states that our experience is in the first instance sensory

    a n d onl y in th e se co nd in st an ce co mm un ica ti ve (p. 79). In lig ht of

    recent criticisms to the effect that he needs a theory of reference to

    avoid some form of linguistic idealism, the Gauss discussion is there

    fore important . 9

    It is also important because it contains an early treatment of theso-called  consensus theory of  truth,  which emerges from Habermas's ac

    count of the discursive redemption or vindication of validity claims.

    As we have seen, a claim is discursively vindicated if rational consen

    sus is re ac he d co n ce rn in g its validity, an d th e m e a n i n g of tr u th , ac

    cor din g to Ha be rm as , is exp lica ted by specifying th e con dit ion s

    under which validity claims can (or could) be vindicated. All of this

    suggests an episte mic co nc ep ti on of tr ut h as wha t is rationa lly ag re ed

    upon under ideal condit ions. The interest of the "consensus theoryof truth," however, lies not so much in what it says about the nature

    of tr ut h, as in wh at it says ab out ho w we rea ch a g r e e m e n t on claims

    to truth. Thus it is not so much a theory of   truth  as a theory of

     justification.  An d in fact, Ha be rm as has since ab an do n ed an epis

    temic conception of truth and has developed this conception of ra

    tional consensus primarily in the context of his theory of discourse

    ethics, whi ch he de ve lo pe d after the co mp le ti on of   The Theory of   Com

    municative Action.

    While the Gauss Lectures focus on truth as a dimension of validity,

    "Intentions, Conventions, and Linguist ic Interactions" (1976), an es

    say m o r e explicitly loc ate d within t he phi lo so ph y of action , focuses

    on the validity of social norms and examines the conceptual inter

    connections between rules, conventions, norm-governed action, and

    intentionality. Rather than establishing the need for a theory of communicative action on the grounds that other theories have failed to

    provide adequate accounts of intersubjectivity, Habermas is here

    concerned to demonstrate the need for a theory of action that is

    intersubjective. Th e con cep t of com mun icat ive action is to acc ou nt

    for intent ion al action, tha t is, actio n caused by in te rn al int ent ion al

    states (in Bre nt an o' s sens e) of th e agen t, as well as fo r n o r m -

    co nf or mi ng acti on or beh avi or in the sense of act ion in a cc or da nc e

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    with external rules. The essay aims at developing a concept of com

    mun icat ive action (or, as h e pu ts it he re , int era cti on me di at ed

    through interpreta t ion) that incorporates both intent ional and

    norm-governed act ion. Habermas concludes that the two models of

    intentional and norm-governed action that he discusses are comple

    mentary, and that l inguist ic communication can be seen as consti tu

    tive for both. But he does not advocate assimilating or reducing

    social to linguistic theory. Indeed, he argues against taking language

    as a paradigm for rule-following, or assimilating semantic and social

    co nv ent io ns an d takin g th e fo rm er as pa ra di gm at ic of the latter,

    since this wou ld obscu re th e crucial dist inction betw een co mmu ni ca

    tive and strategic action. Rather, he conceives conventions "in the

    sense of valid—that is, intersubjectively recognized-norms" as a sub

    set of rules of action in general. The latter includes rules of instru

    mental action and strategic rules as well.The duali ty of cognit ive and noncognit ive orientations continues

    to play a role in this essay as well. Habermas draws an analytic distinc

    tion between two types of intentionality, one referring to a cognitive

    re lat io n to a wo rl d of objects, the ot her ref er ri ng to the sta nce a sub

     j ec t adopts toward the p roposi t ional con ten t she is expressing. In ten

    tional action can be understood on the model of teleological action,

    in that the agent has a goal that she intends to accomplish and which

    thus functions as a cause of her actions. When we examine inten

    ti onal act ion wi th a view to th e ag en t' s cognit ive rela tio n to t he

    world, it is po ssi ble —up to a po in t— to un d er st an d this relati on

    mono log icall y. Th a t is, we can c onsid er h er as an indi vid ual in isola

    tion from others and independently of the culture in which she lives.

    Bu t as soo n as we try to give a n ac co un t of h o w t h e a g e n t come s to

    have the goals she has, this model begins to break down. For her

    goals d ep en d o n he r desires a n d o th er intent ion al states, whic h i n

    tu rn result from what Ha be r ma s calls he r "need int erp reta tio ns. "

    Th es e in tu rn a re a fu nct ion of the ag ent 's cultur al values a nd

    no rm s, an d this me an s that int ent ion al action ca nn ot be ac co un te d

    for monologically. Rather, our account of need interpretations re

    quires looking at how subjects interact in accordance with mutually

    recognized norms and values, and this establishes a nexus between

    intersubjective cultural tradit ions and individual needs.

    Translator's Introduction

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    r

    Translator's Introduction

    One of the negative consequences of starting from the teleological

    means-ends model is that values and motives of action are repre

    sented as private needs and wants—the most serious flaw of an em

    piricist ethics, in Habermas's view. But if a person's motives are to be

    intelligible to others, need interpretations must be intersubjecdve,

    although their intelligibility does not yet constitute a normatively

    bi nd ing sta nd ar d. An intel ligib le mot ive is n o t yet a just ific ation; thelatter requires reasons that all can share: "To say that a norm is valid

    is to say that it claims to express a universalizable interest and to de

    serve th e co ns en t of all th os e affected " (p. 122 ). This fo rm ul at io n an

    t icipates Habermas's subsequent formulation of the principle of

    universalizability of discourse ethics. More importantly, however,

    these relatively early writings show th e deep c on ne ct io n bet wee n the

    universalizability of interests and their origin in intersubjectivity. In

    sofar as o ur want s an d n ee ds always ap pe ar u n de r so me int erp ret at ion, they pr es up po se a co mm un it y that has a lan gua ge con tai nin g

    evaluative expressions, which in turn are rooted in an inter-

    subjectively sh ar ed tr adit ion of cu ltu ra l values. Th es e values b ec o m e

    normatively bind in g w h e n th er e is a cons ensu s th at is re pr od uc ed in

    language and sedimented in the form of conventions.

    Conventions, of course, are commonly appealed to in order to ex

    plain how we un de rs ta nd o ne ano ther . Ha be rm as does not pr esu ppose that there simply  are  such conven t ions tha t ma ke mut ual

    understanding possible any more than he presupposes that there

    simply are subjects wh o abi de by t h em (let al on e stipu late th e m ) . In

    stead, relying on G. H. Mead's analyses, he offers a developmental ac

    count of how such conventions are established as normative

    expectat ions presupposed in speech acts .1 1

      Once we accept that both

    having intentions and acting in accordance with norms presuppose

    linguist ic interaction, we can understand how subject formation isthe result of linguistic interaction, how we are socialized in and

    through communicat ive interact ion.

    Finally, the essay "Reflection on Communicative Pathology" (1974)

    seeks to address the question of deviant processes of socialization—a

    topic that any dev elo pme nta l accoun t of interactive co mp et en ce

    must address—and contains an analysis of the formal conditions of

    xix_

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    Translator's Introduction

    systematically distorted communication. Habermas's guiding  as

    sumpt ion here  is tha t  the deve lopment  of   interactive com pe te nc e  is

    connec ted  to th e d e ve l opm e n t  of  in te rna l mechanisms  for  control

    ling behavior,  b u t  th at these  two  deve lopments  are  disti nct (since

    m o r a l j u d g m e n t s  a n d  actual beh avio r  in  conflict resolution  d o n ot

    coinc ide) .  His  analysis stresses  t h e  co nn ect io n be tw ee n l inguist ic

    c om m uni c a t i on  an d ego dev elop ment : "Commu nicat ive act ion  is t hem e d i u m  of  socialization"  (p. 131). Pickin g u p on a  t heme men t io ned

    above, this essay establishes  the co nn ec ti on betw een subjectivity  and

    intersubjectivity  by  showing that  a  subject 's intent ions  a r e  socially,

    th at is, intersubjectively, st ru ctu red .

    Habe rmas want s  to  show tha t b o th social  a n d individual p athol o

    gies  ca n be  analyzed  in  t e rms  of   dis turbances  in  interactive co mp e

    tence. Such  an acc oun t, however, pre sup pos es  a m ode l  of   undisturbed

    or  normal  communica t ion  and  interaction  in th e t e rms  of  his f or ma lpragmatics .  O n  this approach  the  no t ion  of   normalcy  is not  deter

    m i ne d  by any part i cular cul ture ,  n o r is it a stat ist ical no r m;  it is r at he r

    a culturally invariant normative notion.

    H a b e r m a s  has be en cri t icized  for  p re sen t ing  too  idealized  an ac

    c oun t  of   com mun ica t io n, part icularly owing  to his  no t ion  of the

    ideal speech situation. This last essay shows that  he is very mu ch  at

    t u n e d  to the  empirical  vagaries of   communica t ion .  In  clai ming tha t

    the validity basis  of  speech  has t ra ns cen den tal status, Ha be rm as cer

    tainly does  not m e a n  to impl y that we can no t deviate from  the  condi

    tions  of   no rm al commun ica t io n; o therwise,  we  would  n o t  have  to

    explicate  the  normative  basis  of   speech.  The  condi t ions  of   possible

    communica t ion  are t hus  not t r anscendenta l  in th e sa me sense  as, say,

    Kant 's t ranscendental intui t ions  of  space  and  time  qua condi t ions  of

    possible percept ion. Nonetheless ,  the formal presu pposi t ions un de r

    ly ing communica t ion  a re ,  according  to  Habe rmas ,  unavoidable.Moreover,  as su ch they fun cti on so mew hat like  regulative ideals  in the

    Kantian sense. They  are not  inviolable,  b ut in  cases where  the  inter

    nal organizat ion  of   speech  is violated,  the  pa t te rns  of   c om m uni c a

    t ion  a r e  pathologically d istort ed.  We  ha ve al re ad y seen th at

    in te r locutors  may cha l lenge  the validity  claims raised  by o thers  and

    thereby prompt communication shifts from action  to discourse .  It is

    also  possible  t ha t  the claims  to intelligibility,  t r u t h , Tightness, or sin-

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    Translator's Introduction

    ceri ty are continually sus pen ded or flawed wit hou t pr om pt in g such a

    shift. If this ha p p e n s , th e result is systematically di st or te d c om mu ni

    cation. T h e ki nd of violation of the universal pre su pp os iti on s of

    co mm un ic at io n t ha t leads to systematic dist ort ion is no t the resul t of

    a lack of co mp et en ce in the la ng ua ge , a mi sc on ce pt io n of the level of

    discussion, or a retreat from communicative to strategic action.

    These all involve a cessation of communicative action, whereas in thecases that Ha be rm as has in min d, comm uni cati ve action con tin ues

    in spite of th e viol ation of its fo rma l pr esu pp os iti on s. Th e str ong est

    cases of systematic distortion are those in which the speaking sub

     jects themselves are unaware of their violation of communica t ive pre

    supposit ions, such as whe n a co mp et en t spea ker expresses he rself

    unintelligibly without realizing it , when one spouse deceives herself

    about her feelings for the other, or when a speaker thinks she is act

    ing in accordance with social norms but is actually violating them.

    Ideally, the rejection of a validity claim leads to discourse, in which

    th e sp ea ke r seeks to justify the claims she is ma ki ng ; or th e sp ea ke r

    shows by h e r actio ns tha t she is sinc ere. But this do es no t h a p p e n in

    cases of disto rted co mm un ic at io n th at stem from conflicts th at can

    not be quite suppressed yet must not become openly manifest—

    because, for example, they threaten the identi ty or self-understand

    ing of one or more interlocutors. This sort of situation results in a

    kind of paradox of systematic distortion of communication, for the

    very validity claims th at are be in g violated " serve to ke ep u p t he ap

    pearance of consensual action" (p. 155).

    This discussion makes clear that the idealizations required by this

    model of communication may fail. However, the idealized model al

    lows for a systematic un de rs ta n di ng of th e diff erent  sorts  of failure

    and provides the norms or standards for  criticizing  them.

    As the empirical l i terature upon which Habermas draws in this discussion indicates, systematic distortions connected with subject-

    fo rm at io n occu r par tic ula rly of ten withi n families. No t only is this a

    context in which people's identities are formed and confirmed, it is a

    con tex t in which a part icularly hig h pre mi um is pla ced on co mm un i

    cative rather than strategic action. On the one hand, families are ex

    pe ct ed to fun ctio n as units ; on th e ot he r ha nd , the ne ed s an d wants

    of individuals have to be met within the family structure. Thus there

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    Translator's Introduction

    is a tensi on an d po ten tia l conflict be twe en th e or ien tat ion towar d

    mutual understanding and the orientat ion toward individual need

    satisfaction. Failure to resolve such conflicts explicidy can lead to sys

    tematically dist orte d co mm un ic ati on , in which me mb er s empl oy  dif

    ferent strategies for maintaining or producing a "pseudo-consensus."

    The y ma}' seek to safeguard an end an ge re d cons ensu s an d pr eve nt

    cha lle nge s to it by, for inst ance, in te rr up ti ng or br ea ki ng off conversation, refor mul atin g a di sa gr eem ent as an agr eem en t, falsely re

    ciprocating another 's action, or—in the most extreme case that

    threatens the very intelligibility of their utterances and actions inas

    much as incoherence violates the norms of rat ionali ty—behaving in

    consistently. T h e no ti on of systematically dis tor ted co mm un ic at io n

    evidently introduces a third option between the successful comple

    tion of a speech act and what J. L. Austin terms a "misfire" in which

    the speech act itself fails.

    H a b er ma s links a family's po te nt ial for conflict to po wer relat ions,

    cl ai mi ng t ha t a "family's ability to solve . . . p r ob lems st ands in an in

    verse rela tion t o its in te rn al pot ent ial for conflict. Th e latter in t u r n

    is a fun ctio n of th e di str ib ut ion of pow er" (p. 161) . H e do es not ,

    however, sug ges t th at a heal thy family mu st succeed in tr an sc en di ng

    power relations. Rather, he allows for a "healthy" distribution of

    power, which, nevertheless, is connected to an "asymmetrical distri

    bution of opportunities" for gratification. Once again, there is a

    clear rec ogn it i on that empiric al circum stance s—even in com mu ni

    catively st ru ct ur ed con tex ts— div erg e significantly from t he id eal

    speech si tuation.

    While these lectures and essays provide a good introduction to the

    theory of communicative action, they are also transitional in nature:

    The y fo rm a bri dg e be twe en Ha be r ma s ' s work of th e 1960s a n d tha tof the 1980s. His linguistic turn was initially motivated by the convic

    tion that a critical social th eo ry re qu ir ed a sou nd me th od ol og ic al

    an d epist emolog ical fo un dat ion : he nc e the projec t of pro vidi ng a

    linguistic grounding for sociology. However, the project of develop

    ing a co mp re he ns iv e th eo ry of rationality, whi ch is wh at the t heo ry of

    communicative action in effect attempts, cannot be carried out

    mer ely fro m the me th od ol og ic al persp ective of finding an al ter na-

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    x x.iii__

    Translator's Introduction

    tivc to objectivist an d subjectivist social th eo ri es . Th us H a b e r m a s

    soon fo un d i t necess arv to devel op an acc ou nt of the pre supp osit ions

    of act ion ori ent ed toward reac hin g un de rs ta nd in g ind ep end en t ly of

    an account of the transcendental presuppositions of social-scientific

    knowledge . 1 2  This helps explain why the distinction between cogni

    tive an d com mu ni cat iv e la ng ua ge use, whi ch is so cen tra l in the

    Gauss Lectures, becomes less prominent in his subsequent formulat ions of the theory of communicative action.

    1 3

    At the same time, while Habermas has been working out a com

    plex theory of action, he has also elaborated his conception of

    spe ech act the or y an d of fo rma l pra gm at ic s to serv e as th e basis fo r a

    social theory of meaning. Since the writing of the Gauss Lectures, he

    has developed a systematic classification scheme for theories of

    meaning, in which he dist inguishes formal semantics, intentionalist

    semantics, and use theories of meaning. In his view, each of these fo

    cuses on but one of the three functions of language that an adequate

    the ory of me an in g mus t in co rp or ate . As we saw, in co mmu ni cat in g,

    we represent facts about the world, we express our subjective states,

    an d we interact with others; an d these thr ee functi ons c or re sp on d to

    the three validity claims of truth, sincerity, and  Tightness  th at for mal

    pragmatics analyzes.1 4

      In his recent work, in addition to speech act

    theory, Habermas also draws on Michael Dummett 's assertibilist se

    mantics, according to which the meaning of a sentence (or utter

    an ce ) is given by th e co nd it io ns u nder whi ch it is ac ce pt ab le to

    he ar er s. Dev elo pin g this asp ect of fo rm al pragma tics once agai n u n

    derscores the aspects of rationality and intersubjectivity; for to say

    that un der st and ing an ut terance is knowin g the condi t ions u nd er

    which it is acceptable entails that a speaker-hearer does not fully un

    der sta nd a given ut te ra nc e unless she knows wh at reas ons cou ld be

    offered to back up the claims raised in the utterance. And construedin this way, acceptabil i ty con dit ion s can no t be de te rm in ed ind e

    pe nd en tl y of an intersubjective prac tice of ar gu me nt at io n an d

     justification.

    Habermas has recent ly re turned to some of the themes adum

    brated in the early 1970s. One of these is the question of the nature

    of tru th , as I in di cat ed above . An ot h er is th e distinction be twe en

    communica t ive and noncommunica t ive language use .1 5

      Yet the views

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    Translator's Introduction

    art icu late d in thes e early work s are no t only relev ant to H ab er ma s' s

    cu rr en t tho ugh t ; they bea r on con tem po ra ry phi losophi cal discus

    sions more broadly. Within Anglo-American philosophy, there has

    been a resurgence of interest in pragmatics and in social theories of

    me an in g t ha t do justice to th e intersubjectivity of social int er act ion .

    A pr ime ex amp le is Ro ber t Br an do m' s  Making It Explicit,  which is an

    elaborate working out of a semantic theory based on social practicesan d, in particular , practice s of justification. O n B ra nd om ' s view, se

    ma nt ic s is ba se d on t h e giving of a n d asking for re as on s: T o give th e

    meaning of a sentence is to art iculate the condit ions under which i ts

    ass ert ion is just ifie d, w hi ch is to artic ula te a we b of jus tif icat ory rela

    t ions. However, unlike Habermas, Brandom does not dist inguish be

    tween irreducibly distinct types of validity claims; the focus of his

    analysis remains the assertion, which he continues to regard as basic.

    This consti tutes a potential challenge to Habermas's system not onlywith respect to the irreducibility of the three validity claims to truth,

    Tightness, a n d sincerity, b u t also wit h res pe ct to the sta tus of th e as

    sert io n withi n his ow n framework. Given the pr of ou nd influ ence

    Sellars has had on Brandom, Habermas's discussion of Sellars might

    also be a potentially fruitful point of engagement, with regard to

    both semant ics and percept ion.1 6

      It wo ul d be a way of fle sh ing ou t

    th e cognitive dim en si on of lan gu age an d clarifying its rel ati on shi p to

    the communicative dimension, a relationship that lies at the heart of

    Habermas 's project .

    Acknowledgments

    This project would not have been possible without the help and sup

    p o r t of ot he rs . I am in d eb te d to Je re my Sh apir o for his ex cell ent

    or ig in al tran slat ion of th e Gauss Lec tur es, wh ic h m a d e my ow n taskimmeasurably easier. My thanks to Harry Heft, Jonathan Maskit, Ste

    ven Vogel, Christopher Zurn, and especially Thomas McCarthy who

    all pro vid ed inva luab le feed back o n the translation an d in tro du c

    tion. I wo ul d also like to t h a nk Pat Davis, wh o tr an sf er re d th e origi

    na l type scri pt of th e lect ur es on to disk, as well as La rr y C o h e n an d

    Judy Feldmann of MIT Press for their assistance. Finally, I am grate

    ful to Jii rge n Ha be rm as for his gener osit y in re sp on di ng to my

    queries.

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    Reflections on the Linguistic Foundation ofSociology

    The Christian Gauss Lectures (Princeton University,

    February-March 1971)

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    Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to

    Theory Formation in the Social Sciences

    There are competing theoretical approaches in the social sciences

    that differ not only in the kinds of problems they address and the research strategies th ey apply, b ut in th ei r fu nd am en ta l pri nci ple s.

    They diverge in their choice of categorial frameworks and in how

    they con cep tua liz e their objec t do ma in —t ha t is, in ho w they defi ne

    what it is they are actually studying. These differences of conceptual

    strategy express more deeply rooted conflicts: conflicting views of sci

    ence and cognitive interests. My aim here is not to investigate and

    systematically ex p o u n d these theo retic al ap pr oa ch es . I in te nd ra th er

    to deve lop a pa rt ic ul ar co nc ep tu al strategy for t he social sciences an dto establish its theoretical plausibility and potential. I should like to

    begin with some comp arati ve met ho do log ica l con side rati ons that

    lead to some preliminary classifications. These are to serve exclu

    sively as a provi siona l de lim itat ion of a co m mu nic at i on th eo ry of so

    ciety. This theory does not yet exist in a satisfactory form, and I can

    only discuss a few issues that moti vat e me to con si de r suc h an ap

    pr oa ch to be fruitful.

    In te rms of co nc ep tu al strategy, th e first dec isi on th at is of fun da

    mental significance for a theoretical program in the social sciences is

    whether to admit or re ject "meaning"  [Sinn]  as a pri miti ve ter m. I

    take the paradigm of "meaning" to be the meaning  [Bedeutung]  of a

    word or a sentence.1

      Thus I am assuming that there are no pure or

    a priori speaker intentions; meaning always has or finds a symbolic

    expression; to attain clarity, intentions must always be able to take on

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    4

    Lecture I

    symbolic fo rm an d to be expr esse d. This exp res sio n can be an ele

    ment of a natural language or linguistically derivative (it may, for ex

    am pl e, be lo ng to a system of signs with wh ich th e deaf -mu te or

    drivers in traffic co mm u ni ca te ). T h e express ion may also be no n

    verbal, that is, it may take the form of an action or of a bodily ex

    pression (a grimace or gesture), or of an artistic or musical

    re pr es en tat io n. I a m assu ming that a me an in g tha t is express ed

    nonverbally can in principle be rendered, at least approximately, in

    words: Whatever can be meant can be said. 2  T h e converse, however,

    does not hold. Not everything that can be said is necessarily express

    ible nonverbally.

    If we may def ine "m ea ni ng " from th e ou tse t as linguistic m e an i n g

    [Sinn],  th at is, wi th re fe re nc e to th e significati on  [Bedeutung]  of

    words and sentences, then this first basic decision in conceptual strat

    egy can be re fo rm ul at ed m o r e precisely. It is in fact a m et at he or et ic aldecision as to wh et he r linguistic co mm un ic at io n is to be reg ar de d as

    a constitutive feature of the object domain of the social sciences. The

    te r m "con stitutive" me an s th at the object d o m ai n stu die d by th e so

    cial sciences is itself determined in terms of linguistic communica

    tion. Sometimes we describe language by using categories of

    observable behavior or transmissible information and explain l in

    guistic processes in terms of learning theory. In these cases, mean

    ingfully st ru ct ur ed forms are ta ke n as objects am o n g ot he r physicalobjects; the latter are described in a conceptual framework that is

    not specific to any language and are studied by means of empirical

    the ori es. In cont rast , la ng ua ge is constitutive of an object do ma in if

    its cate gor ial fra mewo rk is suc h th at meani ngfu lly s tr uc tu re d fo rm s

    (such as pe rs on s, expressi ons, a n d institutions) ca n a p p e ar in it as

    p h e n o m e n a req uir ing expla nat ion. "Mea nin g" has th e s tatus of a

    pri miti ve t er m in the social scie nces if we use it to cha rac ter ize th e

    structure of the object domain  itself,  rath er t ha n ju st individual ele

    ments within it. I should like to clarify this first metatheoretical deci

    sion by pointing out three of its implications.

    (a) Behavior versus action

    Only if "meaning" is admitted as a primitive term in sociology can we

    distinguish action from behavior. At present I should like to set aside

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    Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

    the prior pr ob le m of the de ma rca tio n betwee n those ob servab le

    events tha t we in te rp re t as beh av io r an d th ose events that we ca nn ot

    interpret as behavior. The interpretive scheme that allows us to un

    derstand the motion of a body as the expression of an organism, in

    other words, as the movement of a living body, has not yet been satis

    factorily analyzed. 3  By des cri bin g an obs erv abl e mot io n as behavio r,

    we ascribe it to an or ga ni sm th at re p r odu ce s its life by ad ap ti ng t o its

    envir onmen t. We un de rs ta nd i t as a mo ve me nt b ro ug ht abo ut by an

    organism. In so doing, we are assuming that there is an endty  X   that

    in some broad sense is "responsible" for this movement. In this con

    text, of course, the category of responsibility can be used only in

    scare qu ote s, th at is, wit h cert ain res erva tion s. Fo r an an im al ca nn ot

    be held responsible for its behavior in the same sense that a subject

    capable of speech and cognition can be held responsible for its ac

    tions. Nonetheless, we apparently derive the perspective from which

    we interpret motions as modes of behavior from a private modificat

    ion of the pre-understanding of our own social lifeworld. I call this

    modification  privative  be ca us e we are capa ble of dis tin gui shi ng be

    havioral resp onse s from ot he r events wit ho ut ha vin g to app eal to th e

    cate gor y of me an in g. For that catego ry ma ke s it possible to differen

    tiate between behavior that I can understand as intentional action

    and behavior that cannot be comprehended under this descript ion.

    I call behavior  intentional  if it is go ve rn ed by n o r m s or or ie nt ed torules. Rules or norms do not happen like events, but hold owing to

    an intersubjectively recognized meaning  [Bedeutung].  No rm s have se

    mantic content: that is , a meaning  [Sinn]  that be co mes th e rea son o r

    motive for behavior whenever they are obeyed by a subject to whom

    things ar e mea nin gfu l. In this case we spe ak of an action. Th e in te n

    tion of an acto r wh o or ien ts his or h er beha vio r to a ru le co rr es po nd s

    to the meaning of that rule. Only this normatively guided behavior is

    what we call action. It is only actions that we speak of as intentional.

    Observable behavior fulfills a prevailing norm if and only if this be

    havior can be understood as produced by an acting subject who has

    gras ped the me an in g of the no r m an d obeye d i t intentionally. Behav

    ior that we observe over a particular period of time can de facto ac

    cord with a given norm without being norm-governed. That is why

    we dist inguish regula r beh avi or fr om rul e-g ove rne d behavior, o r

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    6

    Lecture I

    action. We discover regularities through inductive generalizations;

    eit he r the y exist or they do not. In contrast , we mu st und er st an d th e

    meaning of rules; thev have normative validity. We can break rules;

    but it is me an in gl es s to say t hat regular itie s ar e violate d. Rul es that

    underlie a practice can be accepted or rejected, whereas regularities

    in behavior can be affirmed or denied. Naturally we can assert the

    existence of regularities in contexts of intentional action as much as

    in a chain of behavioral responses. But in the former case, we can de

    duce the assertion from the fact that norms are followed with spe

    cifiable probability, whereas in the latter we must base our assertion

    on an induc tive gene raliz ation from obs erve d behavior.

    (b) Observation versus the understanding of meaning [Sinnverstehen]

    The distinction we have drawn between behavior and action leads to

    a fur the r dis t inction betwee n different mo de s of exp er ien ce inwhi ch be hav ior al respo nse s and acti ons are accessible to us. We ob

    serve behavior and behavioral regulari t ies, whereas we understand

    actions. O n c e ag ai n it is th e cat ego ry of me a n in g that differ entiates

    the two mo de s of ex pe rie nce . I ca nn ot obs erve actions as me r e be

    havior. For if a given behavior is to be described as an action, then I

    mu st relate feat ur es of this be ha vi or to rules on whic h it is ba se d an d

    un de rs ta nd th e me an in g of these rules . Of course the app reh ens ion

    of s t ru ctur es of act ion th ro ug h the unde rst and ing of me an in g rests

    on observations.

    Let me co mp ar e two pe rce ptu al ju dg me nt s or "observation state

    ments." "I see a fly bouncing against the window" is a sentence in

    which I report the observation of a behavior. In contrast, "I see John

    returning from work" is a sentence with which I describe an "ob

    served" action.  I us e th e exp re ss ion "to see" in the sam e way in bo t h

    cases. For both sentences report events that the speaker claims to

    perceive at the time. Nevertheless, in the former case "seeing" means

    obs erv ing an even t th at can be co m p r eh en d e d as behavior, whe reas

    in the lat ter i t means understanding an action. Of course this under

    s tanding  is based on  the obse rvati on of an occur ren ce (th e do orb ell

    rin gin g, a pe rs on ent er in g the roo m, etc.); b ut th e ob ser ved behav

    ioral elements and events are  interpreted   with reference to a structure

    of action . T h e latte r consists in no r ms , in this case, social no r ms th at

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    7____

    Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

    regulate work hours and transportation to and from work. I have to

    be acquainted with norms of this sort and the conditions of their ap

    plication in order to know when a given occurrence can be inter

    pr ete d as a case in wh ich th e no r m appl ies. "I see J o h n r et ur n in g

    from work" me an s that I un de rs ta nd an obser ved occ urr enc e as the

    fulfillment of a norm: that is, as a particular action—in this case, as

    "returning from work." To see, observe, or perceive an action always

    involves un de rs ta nd in g a n o r m (or the co rr es po nd in g int ent ion of

    the actor) and interpreting movements (or states of affairs) in the

    light of the n o r m (or int ent ion ) that is un de rs to od .

    The decis ion whether intendonal act ion should be admit ted has

    meth odo log ical implic ations precisely with rega rd to th e mo d e of ex

    perience. This can be seen at the level of problems of measurement.4

    Measurements serve to transform experience into data that meet the

    de ma nd s of inters ubjecti ve reliability a n d on t he basis of whi ch th e

    claim to empirical validity of theoretical statements can be verified.

    Observations of events (and behavioral responses) can be linked

    with th e la ng ua ge gam e of physica l me as ur em en t. Bu t th er e is no

    co rr esp on din g system of rel iably incu lcate d basic me as ur em en t op

    erations, such as the one available for moving bodies (or points of

    mass) for objects such as actions, which are accessible only through

    communica t ive exper ience  [sinnverstehende Erfahrung].  In ot he r

    words, observations that can be expressed in descriptive sentences ofa la ng ua ge for thin gs an d events can be verified th r o u gh re co gn ize d

    procedures that are reducible to physical measurement . The inter

    pretation of the meaning of symbolic forms such as actions, which

    can be re pr ese nte d in descripti ve se nte nce s of a la ng ua ge fo r pe r

    sons and expressions, cannot be reliably operationalized in analo

    gous fashion. Unti l now, the measurement of symbolized meaning

    has depended on ad hoc procedures that in the final analysis rest on

    an understanding of language that remains prescientific, al though i tmay be shaped by the discipline of hermeneutics. In principle, any

    one wh o maste rs a na tu ra l lang ua ge can, by virt ue of co mm un ica ti ve

    competence, understand an infinite number of expressions, if they

    are at all mea nin gfu l, a n d m ak e th e m intelligible to others . T h at

    is,  she can interpret them. Some are more practiced at this than

    othe rs: He rm en eu ti cs is an art an d not a me th od .5

      We make use of

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    8

    Lecture I

    hermeneut ics , the ar t of interpreta t ion,  instead   of a meas ur em en t

    procedure; but i t is not such a procedure. The only thing that would

    allow for the dev el op me nt of basic me as ur em en t oper ati on s for

    me an in g woul d be a the ory of ordinary- language com mun ica t io n

    that did not merely guide and discipline the natural faculty of com

    muni cativ e co mp et en ce , as he rm en eu ti cs does, bu t tha t could also

    explain it.

    (c) Conventionalism versus essentialism

    No matter how the problem of measuring the meaning of symbolic

    expressions is solved, the experiential basis of a theory of action re

    mains distinct from that of a behaviorist theory in the strict sense.

    For the adequacy of a description of a meaningfully structured con

    struct, an ut te r an ce or an action, can be tested only by ref ere nc e to

    the knowledge of the subject who produced the expression. In many

    cases a subject capable of action may not be able to specify explicitly

    the norms according to which it orients his behavior. Nevertheless,

    insofar as it masters norms and can follow them, it has an implicit

    knowledge of rules. On the basis of this know-how it can always de

    cide wh et he r a given behav ioral respo nse c orr esp ond s to a kn own

    rule a t all, th at is, wh et he r it can be un de rs to o d as actio n. Th e sub

     jec t can dec ide whether , in a given case, such a behavioral r esponse

    acc or ds wi th or deviates fro m a given n o r m , an d to wh at ext en t it deviates from a n un de rl yi ng n or m. Th e situation is simil ar wit h re ga rd

    to linguistic utterances. Usually, competent speakers are able to ex

    plicate the grammatical rules of the natural language in which they

    fo rm and u nd er st an d sent enc es only incompletely, if at all. Non et he

    less,  every adequately socialized speaker has at his disposal a

    know-how that enables him to dist inguish phonetic utterances from

    mere sounds, to distinguish semantically meaningful and syntacti

    cally well-fo rmed s ent enc es fro m th ose that are deviant, an d to o rd ersuch sentences according to the degree of their deviation. This intu

    itively available knowledge of rules that competentiy speaking and

    acting subjects have, which can also be discursively articulated at any

    time, provides the required experiential basis for theories of action.

    Strictly behav ioris t the orie s, on the ot he r ha nd , de pe n d exclusively

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    9

    Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

    on obser vat ion al dat a. This fact gives rise to an i m p o r t a n t dif fer enc e

    between the structures of the two types of theory and their relation

    to their respecdve object domain.

    Theories that are to explain the phenomena accessible through

    the unders tanding of meaning  [Sinnverstehen]—that is, t he ut te r

    ances an d exp res sio ns of subjects capable of sp ee ch an d act io n—

    m u s t tak e the fo rm of a systematic expli catio n of th e kn ow led ge of

    rules base d on wh ich com p et en t speakers a n d actor s ge ne ra te their

    expressions. Th e o r y fo rm at io n serves to re co ns tr uc t the systems of

    rules acco rdi ng to whic h meaningfu lly s tru ctu red forma tion s, sen

    tences an d action s, ar e pr od uc ed . Th es e genera tive rules nee d no t

    be directly read off the surface structure of expressions. As with

    grammar, there may be deep structures, which underlie the surface

    structures that have been produced and yet are part of a competent

    speaker 's implici t know-how; he nc e they ar e no net he les s known. T h e

    goal of such a theory is the hypothetical reconstruction of rule sys

    tems that disclose the internal logic of the rule-governed generation

    of intelligible surface st ruc tur es. Let us no w assu me th at these intelli

    gible surface stru ctur es cor re sp on d to th e emp iric al regulari t ies of

    observable events (and behavioral responses). In this case we could

    compare the reconstruction of the abstract systems of rules underly

    ing surface structures with theories of the empirical sciences from

    whic h we derive laws of n at u r e tha t so meh ow "un der lie" empir icalregularities. Bu t this co mp ar is on clearly reveals th e differe nce in

    status of the two types of theories. The hypothetical reconstructions

    advance an almost essentialist claim that is absent from the nomo-

    logical theories in the empirical sciences. For, insofar as the latter  ref

    er to the object domain of physicallv measurable events, the

    primitive terms of systems of nomological statements are primarily

    introduced by convention. They provide the idiom for a theoretical

    constru ct tha t can be cor ro bo rat ed indirect ly th ro ug h the derivat ionof lawlike hy po th es es th at ar e sub ject to con fi rma tio n. O n e mi gh t say

    that nomological hypotheses, if they are true, correspond to struc

    tures of a reality objectified in terms of physics or the behavioral sci

    ences (or that they pick out invariant features of this objectified

    reali ty). But they cannot be said merely to reconstruct an intuit ive

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    10

    Lecture I

    knowledge that competent observers of this reality always already

    possess. Rather, the sort of knowledge thus produced is, as a rule,

    quite counterintuit ive.

    In contrast, the rational reconstructions of the knowledge of sub

     jects capab le of speech and act ion do raise such an essentialist claim.

    T h e primitive term s to be emp loye d in the recon str uct ion of struc

    tures of operationally effective generative rules, therefore, are not in

    troduced conventionally. Instead they are introduced in connectionwith categories that must be derivable from the self-understanding of

    the very subjects who produce these structures. As I see it, the

    essentialist moment consists in the fact that hypothetical reconstruc

    tions, if tr ue , co rr es po n d no t to str uct ure s of an objectified reality

    but to structures of the implicit know-how of competent subjects ca

    pable of ju d gm en t. Wh at is to be explicated by these rec ons tru ctio ns

    are the operationally effective rules themselves.

    I ha ve discussed the meta the ore tica l decision wh et he r me an in g

    should be admitted as a primitive term in the social sciences by look

    ing at three methodological implications of great import . Having

    do ne so, I ca n pro vid e a prov ision al de ma rc at io n be twe en objectivist

    and subjectivist approaches to theory formation. I shall call a theo

    ret ical program  subjectivist   if it conceiv es of society as a me an ingf ul ly

    structured system of life  [Lebenszusammenhang], and as a sys tem of

    symbolic express ions and structu res that is cont inuo usly p ro d uc edac co rd in g to und erl yin g abstract rules. T h u s the or y is given the task

    of rec on str uct ing a proc ess whereb y a meaningfu lly s tr uct ur ed social

    reality is pr od uc ed . In con tras t, I shall call a the ore tic al p r o g r a m

    objectivist   if it conceives the life process of society not internally as a

    proce ss of con str uct ion , that is, of the pro du ct io n of mean ing ful

    structures, but externally as a natural process that, like other pro

    cesses, can be observed in its empirical regularities and explained by

    means of nomological hypotheses. In this sense, all strictly behaviorist theories, such as classical learning theory, are objectivist. At this

    po in t I pre fer not to dec ide betwee n these two co mp et in g ap

    proaches. I shall content myself with pointing out that the objectivist

    theoretical program, which has been quite successful within its lim

    its,  has to deal with difficulties arising from its methodological ne

    glect of the symbolic prestructuring of social reality. These

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    n___ _ _Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

    difficulties show up at the level of the measurement problems in

    volved in atte mp tin g to re du ce action to behavior, wh ich have b ee n

    discussed by Cicourel (1965) and others.6

      T h e s e difficulties are

    exemplified by wh at can no w be con si de re d th e failed at te mp t to de

    velop a behaviorist theory of language.7

    1  do not want to enter into

    this discussion he r e. Inst ea d I will limit myself in th ese l ecture s to th e

    theoretical program of subjectivism. The generative theories of soci

    ety  [Erzeugungstheorien], as I sha ll call t h e m fr om n o w on , hav e com

    plementary difficulties to deal with. A theoretical program of this

    kind must answer three questions. Assuming that society is conceived

    as a process of generating a meaningfully structured reality:

    (a) Who is the subject of this generative process, or is there no such

    subject?

    (b) How is the mode of this generative process to be conceptual

    ized—as cognitive activity (Kant and Hegel), as linguistic expression

    (H um bo ld t) , as la bo r (M ar x) , as artistic cre ati on (Schelling , Nie

    tzsche), or as inst inct (F reu d) ?

    (c) And, finally: Are the underlying systems of rules according to

    which social reality is constructed invariant for all social systems, or

    do even these abstract rule systems develop historically, and is there

    possibly an inner logic of their development that can be recon

    structed as well?

    Before setting u p a typology of ho w th e most i m po r t a n t ge ne ra ti ve

    theories of society have answered these questions, I want to discuss

    very briefly two fu rth er fu nd ame nt al decisions co nc er ni ng co nce p

    tual strategy that have great bearing for theory formation in the so

    cial sciences.

    T h e  second metatheoretical decision  is w he th er int en tio na l action is to

    be conceptualized in the form of purposive-rational action or in theform of communicative action. Let me first characterize these two

    types of action with reference to the status of the rules that govern

    behavior in each case. By purposive-rational action!  un de rs ta nd ei ther

    instrumental action or rat ional choice or a combination of the two.

    Instrumental action follows technical rules based on empirical

    knowledge. These rules imply condi t ional predict ions regarding ob

    servab le events, wh et he r physic al or social. Th u s suc h pr ed ict io ns

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    12

    Lecture I

    ca n pr ov e to be co rr ect or inc orr ect . Rati ona l cho ice is go ve rn ed by

    strategies based on analytical knowledge. They imply derivations

    from preference rules (value systems) and decision procedures.

    These proposit ions are derived either correctly or incorrectly. Pur

    posive- rational action attains definite goals u n d e r given con dit ion s.

    But whe rea s th e mea ns organ ize d by in str ume nt al action are app ro

    priate or inappropriate according to criteria of effective control of

    reality, strategic action depends only on the correct assessment of

    possible behavioral options, which results from derivation using val

    ues and maxims alone.

    By  communicative action  I un de rs ta nd symbolically me di at ed inter

    action. It is go ve rn ed by bi nd in g no rm s that define rec ipro cal e xpec

    tat ions ab ou t behav ior an d th at mu st be un de rs to od an d

    acknowledged or recognized by at least two acting subjects. Social

    no rm s are enf orce d th r ou g h sanctions. Th ei r me an in g is objectifiedin symbolic expressions and is accessible only through ordinary lan

    guage communication. Whereas the effectiveness of technical rules

    and strategies depends on the validity [ Gultigkeit]  of empirica lly tru e

    or analytically correct propositions, the validity  [Geltung]  of social

    n o r ms is en su re d by an intersubjective r eco gn iti on t ha t is base d on a

    consensus about values or on mutual understanding. Violating a rule

    has different c on seq ue nc es in each case. In co mp et en t behavior,

    which violates proven technical rules or correct strategies, is cond e m n e d p er se to failure t h r o u g h its lack of success. T h e "pun ish

    m en t ," so to spe ak, is bu ilt in to its fo un de ri ng o n t he shoal s of reality.

    Deviant behavior, on the other hand, which violates prevailing

    norms, triggers sanctions that are connected with the rules only ex

    ternally, by convention. Learned rules of purposive-rational action

    pr ovi de us wit h a reg ime of skills; in contrast, int er na liz ed no rm s fur

    nish us with a regime of personality structures. Skills enable us to

    solve problems, whereas motivations allow us to conform to norms.

    Table 1 sum mari zes thes e definit ions. Th ey requ ire a mo re precise

    analysis, wh ic h I ca nn ot und er ta ke her e.

    Theory formation in the social sciences has the option of defining

    the object domain to comprise either actions of the strategic type

    only or both strategic and communicative actions. Strategic action

    can be considered as a limiting case of communicative action; it oc-

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    13

    Qbjectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

    Table 1Rules of Action

    Technical and StrategicSocial No rm s Rules

    Linguistic Means of

    Definition

    Elements of Definition

    Mechanisms ofAcquisition

    Function of the Type ofAction

    Sanctions for ViolatingRules

    intersubjectively sharedordinary language

    reciprocal normative ex

    pectations of behavior

    internalization of roles

    maintenance of institutions (conformity to

    norms based on reciprocal reinforcement)

    punishment based onconventional sanctions;

    failure against socialauthority

    context-free language

    conditional predictions;

    conditional imperatives

    learning of skills andqualifications

    problem-solving (goal attainment, defined interms of means-endsrelations)

    lack of success; failureagainst reality

    curs whe n ord ina ry langu age com mun ica t io n between interlocut ors

    breaks do wn as a me an s of ma in ta in in g consensus , an d each assu mes

    an objectifying attitude toward the other. For strategic action is based

    on rules for the purposive-rational choice of means; and, in princi

    ple,  each actor can make this choice by  herself.  Maxims of behaviorin strategic actio n are d e te r mi n e d by th e interests of max imi zin g

    gains and minimizing losses in the context of competition. In this

    case,  my other is no longer an alter ego whose expectations I can

    fulfill (or dis app oin t) ac co rd in g to intersubjectively re co gn ize d

    no rm s. Rather, she is an o p p o n e n t who se decisi ons I seek to

    influence indirectly by me an s of pu ni sh me nt s an d rewards. In stru

    mental actions, on the other hand, are not social actions at all;

    rather, they can appear as components of social actions (i.e., as ele

    ments of role definitions). If only strategic actions are admitted, we

    can develop rational choice theories such as theories of exchange. If

    com mun ica tiv e action s are ad mi tt ed as well, we can deve lop conv en

    tional theo rie s of acti on such as tho se of We be r or Par sons .

    T h e  third metatheoreticcd decision  that I consider to be of major con

    se qu en ce is wh et he r we sh ou ld ch oos e an atomisti c or a so-called

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    14

    Lecture I

    holistic approach. I cannot go into the details of the extensive litera

    ture on this issue. 8  Both conceptual strategies seem to me to be feasi

    ble,  al though the different theories have different domains of

    application and capacities. At the level of theories of action, the

    atomistic approach takes the form of methodological individualism.

    J. W. N. Watki ns (in ag r ee me n t with Po pp er ) has fo rm ul at ed two in

    dependent postulates: (a) "the ultimate constituents of the social

    world are individual people who act more or less appropriately in the

    light of their dispositions and the understanding of their situation."9

    Thus all social phenomena must be analyzable in the form of state

    ments about the actions of individual subjects. Statements in a theo

    retical idiom, which contains expressions for supraindividual social

    entities, such as roles, institutions, value systems, and traditions, are

    inadmissible unless they can be reduced to statements in another

    theoretical idiom in which the only predicates are for acting subjects,

    their utterances, and their motivations. The second postulate is that

    (b) "no social tendency exists which could not be altered if the indi

    viduals concerned both wanted to alter it and possessed the appro

    pria te informat ion."1 0

      This stronger claim has the status of a

    philosophical assumption. It states that subjects capable of speech

    a n d action ar e th e only age nts of c h a n g e in th e historical deve lop

    ment of social systems. Social change can be explained with refer

    ence to the properties of supraindividual units (such as systems,gr ou ps , or struct ures) if a n d only if these supraindivi dual pr op ert ies

    are reducible to properties of individual subjects capable of speech

    and action. The counterposition to an individualistic theory of ac

    tio n is r ep r es en t ed tod ay by social systems th eo ry (such as th e wor k

    of Deutsch, Parsons, and Luhmann). Systems theory takes into ac

    count the fact that the structure of social norms transcends the sub

     jectively i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g of individuals acting according to n o r m s .

    Systems are introduced as units that can solve objectively given problems through learning processes that transcend individual subjects.

    Th e th re e op t io ns th at I have me nt io ne d, from whi ch a con cep tual

    strat egy fo r the social scie nces mus t be cho se n, offer co nv en ie nt cri

    teria for classifying the most important theoretical approaches, as in

    dicated in table 2.

    I do not want to examine the relative fruitfulness of these various

    theor etica l appr oac hes . This overview is in te nd ed ra th er for the

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    15Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

    Table 2Approaches to Social Theory

    behavior

    notadmissible

    Meaning as primitive term

    admissible

    strategic action communicative(and strategic)

    action

    atomistic behaviorist

    psychologyrational choicetheories (e.g.,pure economics)

    "interpretive"sociology (e.g.,

    ethnomethodology)

    holistic biological systems theory

    social cybernetics

    (e.g., organizational sociology)

    structuralist andfunctionalist systems theories; sym

    bolic interactionism

    purpose of classifying the generative theories of society that I am in

    terested in. Obviously they do not belong among strictly behaviorist

    theories; n o mor e, however, do they bel on g am o n g the orie s of strate

    gic action. These theories incorporate assumptions of rat ionali ty that

    obtain—approximately—but for limited segments of social reality.

    Both rational choice theories and social cybernetic models have a

    normative analytical status. They can be applied only on one of two

    pr esu ppos iti ons. The first is that subjects act rat ionall y a n d tha t t he

    assumed maxims of behavior are in fact the basis of their actions.

    The second is that the self-regulating systems are stabilized in pre

    cisely the state that is conventionally postulated to be optimal. Gen

    erative theories of society cannot belong to this type of theory, since

    they claim to c o m p r e h e n d th e life pr oce ss of society as a wh ol e an d,

    in particular, as a concrete process of the generation of meaning

    structures. They do not content themselves with segments of realitythat can be seen as approximating models of rationality. In other

    words, they are not satisfied with a normative analytical status. There

    fore they must be classified under the type of theory that appears in

    the right hand column of the table.

    To be able to use this fra mew ork to differ entiate be tw ee n differ ent

    co nst ru cti on th eo ri es of society, we mu st re tu rn t o th e quest ion s tha t

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    16

    Lecture I

    already forced themselves upon us with regard to the as yet unclear

    concept of the generation of meaningfully organized structures of

    life.  If I am right, we can try to clarify