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2014 38: 563Capital & ClassVasilis Grollios

Dialectics and democracy in Georg Lukcs's Marxism

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Dialectics and democracyin Georg LukcssMarxism

Vasilis Grollios

AbstractThis article aims to bring to the surface the philosophical background of GeorgLukcss democratic theory by investigating his philosophy of dialectics in depth. Itpresents an innovative interpretation of his understanding of the role of the generalcommittee of the Communist Party in the transition to socialism, and his support ofStalinism. Its aim is to investigate, in a far more rigorous way than has been donebefore, the relation of his theory of dialectics to the Frankfurt Schools theory ofdialectics. Thus, for the first time in the literature, Lukcss understanding of the

role of the party is analysed by relating it to Max Horkheimers understanding ofthe role of the traditional intellectual.

KeywordsClass consciousness, materialism, Marx, defetishisation, Horkheimer, totality,negativity

IntroductionOne of the central figures in traditional Marxist theory is Georg Lukcs. Although manyarticles and books have been written on his political philosophy, very few have attemptedto analyse his theory of democracy by drawing a connection between his dialectics andhis theory of the state, the role he ascribes to the party in the transition to socialism, andthe way in which he believes class consciousness is formed. A philosophical analysis ofthese parts of his social theory requires an examination of Lukcss use of the mainnotions that comprise dialectical theory, such as materialism, totality, negativity, non-identity thinking, the dialectic between content/essence and form/appearance, and

Corresponding author:Vasilis GrolliosEmail:[email protected]

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564 Capital & Class 38(3)

fetishism. The focus here will be not only to identify the obvious uses of these notions inLukcss main political writings, but also to unearth their implicit use.

My analysis will attempt to bring to the fore a new aspect of Lukcss relation to theFrankfurt Schools theory of dialectics by showing the extent to which his theory can be

viewed as belonging to the bourgeois identity-thinking tradition. Thus, my analysis dif-fers from the majority of the interpretations of Lukcs presented to date, which attributeLukcss support of Stalinism to an error in his political tactics, or to the sleight of handhe employs in assigning a central role to the Communist Party. I will argue not only thatthe reasons for Lukcss Stalinism lie deep within his theory of dialectics, but, more spe-cifically, I will provide a foundation for the conclusion (a conclusion that, in terms of theexisting literature on Lukcs, is heretical) that despite his harsh criticism of the philoso-phy of German idealism, Lukcs does not succeed in disengaging himself from theframework of liberal methodology.

The papers goal is to offer a coherent view of Lukcss democratic theory by showingthe practical repercussions of his use of the notions that comprise dialectical theory, as

well as their connections to one another. Therefore, I hope the paper will be of interestnot only to philosophers but also to political scientists. As we are living in an era of crisisin which people are searching for new ideas that may help them fight for human dignity,and since all the ideological armoury of socialist philosophy is therefore being put to thetest, an effort to better elaborate on the core ideas of the classics of socialist philosophyshould be seen as a valuable exercise. Considering that we are witnessing intense socialunrest, just as Lukcs was in his time, the questions his philosophy posed and the prob-

lems it tried to resolve are not dissimilar from those we face today.This article is structured as follows. First, I will investigate Lukcss writings that deal

with aspects of the history of philosophy, including his reading of Marxs materialismand dialectics and the notion of labour in The Ontology of Social Being. In the subsequentsection, I will explore his understanding of totality and the formation of consciousnessthat underpins his theory of the party and state in History and Class Consciousnessand inhis book on Lenin. Finally, via an exploration of the democratic deficit in Lukcs, thedifferences in his approach and that of the Frankfurt School toward the notion of nega-tivity will be become clear.

Karl Marxs dialectical materialism in GeorgLukcss ontology

Before investigating Lukcss theory of democracy and the party in the third and fourthsections, it is first necessary to explore his reading of Hegels and Marxs philosophies ashis social theory follows and expands on Marxs dialectical materialism in particular.Rather than putting the contrast between the tradition of materialism and that of ideal-ism at the centre of his reading of the history of philosophy, as is usually the case, Lukcs

instead places the contrast between the tradition of irrationalism and the tradition thatfollows dialectical methodology at the centre of his analysis.Irrationalism hardens the limitations of perception governed by understanding

into perceptional limitations as a whole (Lukcs 1980b: 97). He accuses the irrationaltradition of rejecting dialectics and fetishising reality, since it begins with this discrepancy

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between the intellectual reflection and the objective original (Lukcs 1980b: 99). It isthus shackled within the framework of dualism between thought and reality, for it seesreality as being an area beyond reason (Lukcs 1980b: 99). Although expressed differ-ently, Lukcss position is similar to what Horkheimer has to say about the undialectical

nature of philosophy from Descartes until Hegel: it is undialectical because it treats reasonas ostensibly neutral, and is therefore unable to reveal the collision of interests lying hid-den at the core of reality.

The philosopher Lukcs most admires for making an effort to dispel this dualism isHegel, because for him, appearance contains law but more besides (Lukcs 1980b: 98).For Lukcs, dialectical thinkers like Hegel and Marx endeavoured to identify the essenceof reality by defetishising appearance, and sought to fathom the laws governing thecourse of history and socio-historical progress, to discover the reason behind theautonomous movement of collective history (Lukcs 1980b: 125).

According to Lukcs, the remarkable thing in Hegels philosophy was that he treatedthe questions of subject and object, ego and world, consciousness and being, as historicalproblems as forms of the historical development of human consciousness (Lukcs1972a: 211). The phenomena that Hegel analysed were, for Lukcs, not abstract philo-sophical notions, but forms of consciousness for the Germany of his time (Lukcs 1972a:212). For Hegel, philosophical notions such as alienation were not external to appear-ance, but rather part of it. Even more crucial is that ideas in Hegels philosophy do notrepresent forms of consciousness as they exist, but instead expose them in their contra-dictoriness: as moments of a process in which the contradictions produce the

objective possibility of the sublation of the contradictions (Lukcs 1972a: 214).According to Lukcs, Hegel is the most important dialectician before Marx because

he managed to lay the foundations of knowledge of a complex, dynamically contradic-tory reality, consisting of totalities (Lukcs 1978a: 78). Through the notion of media-tion, which is the categorical summarization of all the forces, processes, etc. thatobjectively determine the coming into being, the functioning, and the facticity of acomplex (Lukcs 1978a: 89), Hegel attempts to proceed from immediacy to the con-tradictions that lie deeper within reality and thus to connect the aforementioned totali-ties dialectically. However, the dialectical process in Hegel finally petrifies to yield a

metaphysical, non-dialectical object and thereby abolishes itself as a process (Lukcs1972a: 215). For Lukcs, Hegels social philosophy does not succeed in moving beyondthe historical prejudices of his time (Lukcs 1978a: 110), remaining imprisoned withinthe plane of the fetish-form, and is therefore unable to defetishise reality fully. Accordingto Lukcs, however, Hegels inability to transcend the fetish-form in his philosophyoccurs to a lesser extent than with the other major figures of the philosophical traditionbefore Marx.1

We should now turn to how Lukcs adjudges Marx to have succeeded in defetishisingthe forms that appear as fetishes in the capitalist mode of production. After setting out

Lukcss ideas, I will evaluate and critique them. According to Lukcs, the bourgeoisconception of economics isolates the so-called phenomena of pure economics from thetotal inter-relations of social being as a whole (Lukcs 1978b: 12), and is thus unable toprovide a picture of totality. Marxs breakthrough in the study of materialism was thediscovery of the ontological priority of the economy (Lukcs 1978b: 10) to the study of



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the totality of social being. For Marx, the economic is the prominent moment (Lukcs1978b: 18) in his treatment of reciprocal action, since extra-economic transformationsare in the last instance economically determined (Lukcs 1978b: 67).

In Marxs materialism, as in the wider tradition of materialism, Lukcs believes that

being has ontological priority over consciousness, meaning that the forms of conscious-ness are thus conditioned by the process of social, political and intellectual life (Lukcs1978b: 31).

The way in which Lukcs interprets materialism is unavoidably strongly connected tothe way he understands Marxs dialectics. He contends that dialectics in its Marxiansense refers to an interaction between economic and extra-economic phenomena insocial life (Lukcs 1978b: 34). However, since the economic moment is predominant,Extra-economic moments emerge with a necessity that is dictated by the law of valueitself (Lukcs 1978b: 35). Similarly, Lukcs holds the view that in Capital, one encoun-

ters the continuous interaction between the strictly law-like character of the economic,and the relations of the extra-economic (Lukcs 1978b: 36).

In Lukcss understanding of the dialectical relation between form/appearance andessence/content, the essence of the ontological development consists in the economicprogress and the ontologically necessary and objective contradictions involved inthis are its forms of appearance (Lukcs 1978b: 47). Lukcs is clear that the innovativeaspect of Marxs dialectical method is that abstractions and thought experiments are notdetermined by epistemological or methodological standpoints, but by the thing itself (Lukcs 1978b: 49). For Lukcs, Marxian dialectics reveals the different reified forms

that the economy takes because it considers the economic dimension of reality the pri-mary dynamic centre of social being (Lukcs 1978b: 49), and the Marxist ontology ofsocial being assigns priority to production (Lukcs 1978b: 59).

Lukcs also stresses that the totality formed by the dialectical and contradictory unityof society should not be understood as a unity that emerges as the end product of theinteraction of heterogeneous processes (Lukcs 1978b: 60). He emphasises the opencharacter of the Marxian dialectic, in contradistinction to the closed Hegelian dialectic.Lukcs attempts to make the open character of his interpretation of Marxs dialecticsmore evident by highlighting that although productive relations are predominant in the

last instance, this does not mean that we should reduce non-economic relations to theirdependence upon technology. To do so would lead to a fetishised and reified view ofproductive relations, and for Lukcs, therefore, production also has a socioeconomiccharacter (Lukcs 1978b: 66).

The discussion should now turn to the meaning of mediation in Lukcss thinking,since this is the term used to express and clarify the connection between the differentdimensions of reality. In Lukcss view, the base and superstructure have a dialectical rela-tion to each other because labour, as the original form of practice (Lukcs 1980a: 23), isthe essence of reality. He stresses that Marxs materialism is not mechanical, because men

are able to change the course of the dialectic of nature through their labour, and that Marxdifferentiated himself from earlier materialism by putting labour at the centre of the rela-tion between theory and practice (Lukcs 1980a: 54). For Lukcs, human beings media-tion to nature must take place through labour because only through it can man consciouslytransform natural causality. Therefore, the immanent tendency of the economy to develop



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into a closed system is neutralised (Lukcs 1980a: 87). By attributing an ontological prior-ity to the economic dimension of reality, Lukcs contends that peoples ability to intervenein the immanent tendencies of the economy is of primary importance, and considers thathe has therefore succeeded in attributing an open character to the dialectical development

of his philosophical categories.According to Lukcss reading of the history of philosophy, idealism fetishised phe-

nomena because in its framework, Only those forms of social practice that are farremoved from the metabolism between society and nature are taken into account(Lukcs 1980a: 68). He therefore believes that by making labour the basis of ones socialtheory, the social character of the philosophical categories comes to the fore.

Closely related to the notion of mediation is that of antithesis. For Lukcs, The mostacute antithesis in the capitalist mode of production is that between objective economicprogress and its human consequences (Lukcs 1980a: 91). This antithesis refers to

the collision between the values that stem from economic development and those thatstem from the protection of human needs. The heterogeneity and opposition of thesevalues leads to the uneven clarity of meaning of the overall socio-historic process, andto the fact that this entire process is a dynamic totality (Lukcs 1980a: 97). In his think-ing, the collision of values is responsible for the fetishisation of the forms; that is to say,for the fact that it is difficult to penetrate the essence that lies hidden inside the immedi-ate appearance of forms.

Lukcs attempts to protect himself from any accusation of determinism by indirectlycontending that class struggle is not a mere reflection of productive relations, but is

always a synthesis of economic law and extra-economic components it is a questionhere of whether and to what extent moments of chance intervene in the functioning ofeconomic laws (Lukcs 1978b: 97). While he may stress that, in his philosophy, scien-tific laws are nothing else but tendencies (Lukcs 1978b: 103), it appears that Lukcsregards class struggle as taking place in an extra-economic dimension, thus raising thesuspicion that Lukcs retains the idea of the separation of structure and agency encoun-tered in traditional liberal identity thinking.

This suspicion grows with Lukcss contention that Marx correctly ascribed eco-nomic regularities a similarly general validity to that of natural laws (Lukcs 1978b:

149). Throughout his chapter on ontology in Marx, he reiterates the argument thatalthough the superstructure is an autonomous entity, an autonomous dimension, itsexistence presupposes the process of economic reproduction. Despite this, Lukcss econ-omy and consciousness (the superstructure) remain two different entities, two differentdimensions, however strongly interrelated they may be.

This anti-dialectical separation of structure and agency can also be seen towardsthe end of his chapter on Marx in The Ontology of Social Being, where he argues thatMarx regards socialism as the necessary product of the internal dialectic of socialbeing, of the self-development of the economy as well as of the class struggle

(Lukcs 1978b: 159). The economic is a second nature an objectivity completelyindependent of individual alternative acts (Lukcs 1978b: 160). In one of his lastinterviews, Lukcs stated that Nature organic as much as inorganic nature runsits course according to its own dialectic, independent of the teleological projectsof men (Pinkus 1975: 74).

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Before moving on to examine Lukcss account in History and Class Consciousness,some further criticisms should be made. Contrary to Lukcss analysis, nowhere doesMarx identify materialism with the pre-eminence of the economic dimension or of theforces of production. In The Holy Family, Marx distinguishes his materialism from theFrench materialism of the 18th century by stressing that the latter will be defeated for-ever by materialism, which coincides with humanism (Marx 1975a: 125). At theheart of humanism is the fact that men, by drawing all their knowledge from experience,from the significance of industry or enjoyment, are able to assert their true individuality,

which presupposes the coincidence of true human interests and the interest of humanity(Marx 1975a: 130-131).

In his criticism of Hegel, Marx emphasises that criticism of speculative philosophyshould focus upon practice:

Theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable ofgripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominemas soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But for man theroot of the matter is man himself. (Marx 1975b: 182)

The centrality of human practice to Marxs materialism is reiterated in his EighthThesis on Feuerbach2(Marx 1976a: 8). Lukcss interpretation that the economy or pro-ductive forces fully define or express Marxs meaning of practice appears unsustainable.

In fact, the interrelation between the economic and the political on which Lukcs

focuses is not a distinctive characteristic of Marxs philosophy, but rather a typical featureof liberal philosophy. It could be argued that Adam Smith had a materialist3philosophyof history, since he explicitly assessed progress in terms of the extent to which every stageof civilisation promoted the division of labour. Smith adjudged those countries with thehighest degree of industry and improvement as having progressed further than those in

which the separation of different trades and employments from one another did nottake place (Smith 1999: 111). He also pointed to the inextricable connection betweenconsciousness and labour by stressing that the understandings of the greater part of menare necessarily formed by their ordinary employments (Smith 1937). J.S. Mill made thesame connection, as can be seen by the subtitle of his main work on economics, Principlesof Political Economy, as well by the title of its fourth book.4

Hegel had a more insightful appreciation of the social decomposition that the capital-ist mode of production inevitably causes than perhaps any other liberal thinker, becausehe put labour at the centre of his philosophy. He held that in the capitalist mode ofproduction, the ethical principle of the business class (the class that Marx would callcapitalists a few years later) vanishes, and that a part of this class succumbs to barbarism.This happens most necessarily, or rather immediately, through the inner constitution ofthe class (Hegel 1979: 171, 491). He also considers possession of property so impor-tant that he asserts that Not until he has property does the person exist as reason (Hegel

1991: 73, 41).Contrary to such liberal thinking, Marxs dialectic of essence/content and form/

appearance seeks to show that the constituted forms under which we live such as valueas money, the bourgeois parliamentary system, or the state are forms constituted by the



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way in which people come into contact with each other and with nature in order tosatisfy their elementary human needs, meaning that these forms are nothing but formsof human social practice. Marxs critique charges that this practice exists against itself asa mere personification of economic objectivity in the form of capital (Bonefeld 2001),

and by doing this, it defetishises the forms by revealing their essence, their human con-tent, the human practice that lies hidden in them.

Form-fetishes, such as the state or value as money, are the mystified appearance of thetopsy-turvy world; that is, the irrational way in which people come into contact witheach other in order to satisfy their basic human needs. The irrationality stems from thefact that this contact takes place via the subordination of our doing to the logic of capi-tal, the logic of time is money. This results in the irrational fact that peoples dailypractice does not fulfil the initial goal of their actions that is, to satisfy their needs butrather satisfies the need of money to multiply itself. Thus, thinking in materialist terms

does not mean that we should attribute priority to the economy or that we should deemit the predominant moment in the last instance, as Lukcs believes.

Moreover, in Open Marxism, which has its basis in the Frankfurt School theory andis the interpretation of Marxian thought that I follow, thinking in dialectical terms doesnot mean that we should strive to connect the economic and the extra-economic dimen-sions of reality, as Lukcss analysis attempts to do. Rather, dialectical thinking signifiesour awareness of the irrationality of having organised our existence under the logic oftime is money, a logic that gives rise to many different forms that appear rigid and natu-ral. This is why Marx states in Capital Volume IIIthat we live in an enchanted, perverted,

topsy-turvy world (Marx 1998: 817) that is in its essence contradictory.The contradiction of opposed class interests that promote different values is hidden

behind every form-fetish. The contradiction is that between, on the one hand, the val-ues that underpin the logic of the capitalist system accumulation of wealth, competi-tion, hard work, and time is money; and on the other hand, the values that protecthuman dignity, such as solidarity and putting peoples needs above profits. This contra-diction lies in the content, the essence of reality, and appears as all these different reifiedfetish-forms.

In the single reality in which we live, the economic dimension cannot be separated

from the extra-economic dimension, as such a view would necessitate the existence oftwo realities rather than one. Value or money is not a purely economic form, as Lukcscontends, but a social relation, a fetish, a reified form of appearance of the logic accord-ing to which we have organised our daily existence. Therefore, the essence that producesthe many different reified, perverted fetish-forms is not that of only one dimension ofreality (in Lukcss thinking, this would be the economic), but the way we have organisedour life in order to satisfy our most elementary needs.

When the above is considered, it is clear that Lukcs remains shackled to an undialec-tical separation of reality into structure and agency, logic and history. The economic

dimension of reality does not have a separate internal dialectic that can be modified bypeoples consciousness or class struggle, which ostensibly occur in another dimension.On the contrary, the economic, the political, ideology and ethics are mediated to eachother; they exist through each other; they are separate in unity, being forms of the sameessence, of the most important relationship in society, namely, the way people connect



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their doing in order to satisfy their most basic needs. Class struggle takes place in theessence of reality, a reality that appears as many form-fetishes, and all the forms of appear-ance are forms of expression of the class struggle. Society is class struggle. When this istaken into consideration, we are able to move beyond the trivial notion that all forms are

interrelated, or that a specific dimension of reality is always predominant in the lastinstance.

Lukcss understanding of contradiction is closer to liberal methodology than to thecritical-dialectical perspective. Liberal philosophers like Hegel or J.S. Mill would concur

with Lukcss idea that, after a certain point, the values that stem from economic devel-opment run counter to the protection of human needs. This explains why they adopt alukewarm attitude toward the values of accumulation of wealth and competition. Forthem, it is the states responsibility to restrict the excesses of capital accumulation and topromote capitalism with a human face. J.S. Mill goes so far as to suggest that after a

point, economic growth would no longer be necessary, and that people would no longerbe pushed to become Marxs vampires of capital.5

Merely diagnosing the incompatibility of the two value systems does not make amethodology dialectical, and nor does it explain either the uneven clarity of meaning ofthe overall process (Lukcs 1980a: 97) to which Lukcs refers (that is, the mystified,perverted form that essence takes), or the dynamic character of totality. Totality isdynamic and inherently contradictory because a tension characterizes all the concepts ofthe critical way of thinking (Horkheimer 2002: 208). Forms are the mystified way in

which the contradiction is being expressed. This contradiction means that, on the one

hand, we have to act as vampires of capital haunted by the logic of the accumulation ofwealth and hard work in order to survive; but on the other, this subordination perpetu-ates the existence of the fetish forms that dominate us.

For the Frankfurt School theory, contradiction is immanent in the reified form, sincethe form is an expression of the class conflict that lies within the essence of reality. Form-fetishes are in their essence modes of appearance of the class struggle, of the collision ofvalues that promote opposing class interests. As a result, forms and categories are openbecause they are products of the historical struggle between the opposed value systems.

Lukcss theory of dialectics differs radically from the above interpretation. He con-

tends that his dialectic can be considered open because people are able to change thecourse of development of the economy. In the interaction between the economic and theextra-economic realms, the latter can cause a change of course in the former. This doesnot mean, however, that Lukcs succeeds in dereifying or denaturalising form-fetishes.

An optimistic liberal such as J.S. Mill might follow Lukcs in agreeing that people cantransform the economy so that their basic needs are finally met. Nevertheless, forms suchas the state, the bourgeois-democratic parliamentary system, or abstract labour that mustbe transformed into money retain their validity and existences in such thinking, remain-ing rigid, fetishised and naturalised no matter what changes are made to the way in

which the economy functions. This is identity thinking, since the content of the formsis exhausted in their current form: forms have been transformed into transhistorical enti-ties because, despite dereification, they retain their existence. Considering the above, itseems that totality for Lukcs is not open after all, as the basic structure of bourgeoisidentity thinking about democracy remains untouched in his theory.



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Grollios 571

In the following section, I will attempt to show in greater detail how this occurs inLukcss theory. I will expand on how the democratic deficit in his thought is the resultof his adopting an understanding of the notion of contradiction that, as previously men-tioned, liberal philosophers would have no problem consenting to.

Totality and the formation of class consciousnessin Lukcss Marxism

Now that Lukcss understanding of dialectical materialism has been briefly explored, itis time to investigate the practical repercussions of his theory of totality and dialectics byfocusing on how class consciousness is formed.

Lukcss main goal in History and Class Consciousnessis to set out what it means forsomeone to have class consciousness, and to analyse how this is formed. For Lukcs, hav-

ing class consciousness equates with being able to dereify, to defetishise reality. But whatdoes it mean to defetishise the plane of immediate appearance? Since Lukcs does notregard contradiction as existing inside the form, then the form (such as the state) cannotbe defetishised. For Lukcs, the form is not a perverted, mystified mode of appearance ofan essence that lies deeper within it. Rather, mystification, or the uneven clarity (Lukcs1980a: 97) that Lukcs refers to, is caused by the heterogeneity and opposition/contra-diction of values to each other, values that lie outside the form.

Mystification, which is caused by the phenomenon of the topsy-turvy world, is causedin its turn by the fact that the human content from which the form stems appears as

something different than it really is. The undemocratic, perverted way with which peo-ple come into contact with each other in capitalism to satisfy their most elementaryneeds under the logic of time is money causes the collision of class interests the essencethat appears as many fetishised forms. The many different fetishised forms are forms ofappearance of class struggle. Therefore, fetishism is not caused by a collision of economicand non-economic values, as in the view held by liberals and Lukcs, but by the fact thatthe contradictory way in which we as a society have organised our time does not becomeimmediately apparent.

In Lukcss theory, defetishisation takes place when one has a theory of the whole and

thus becomes aware of the real tendencies of the whole process (Lukcs 1971: 10). Tocomprehend it is to recognize the direction taken (unconsciously) by events and tenden-cies towards the totality. It is to know the direction that determines concretely the correctcourse of action at any given moment (Lukcs 1971: 23). To have class consciousnessmeans to be able to develop a dialectical contradiction between its immediate interestsand its long-term objectives, and between the discrete factors and the whole (Lukcs1971: 71); it means to advance beyond what is immediately given (Lukcs 1971: 72).Only those who make the distinction between the momentary interest and the ultimategoal (Lukcs 1971: 72) can become conscious of the historical role of the class (Lukcs

1971: 73), and thus have class consciousness.For Lukcs, those who have authentic class consciousness are capable of showing thatalthough immediacy appears objective, it is the product of man. In this way, the eco-nomic structure of society is revealed (Lukcs 1971: 159), the fetishistic forms of thecommodity system begin to dissolve (Lukcs 1971: 168), and the proletariat is able to



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point out the road along which the dialectics of history is objectively impelled (Lukcs1971: 197).

Class consciousness is equated to the dialectic which is a specific kind of knowledgethat, through a diagnosis of the immanent tendencies of capitalism, leads to the knowl-

edge of the totality of the social process and thus can indicate to the proletariat the neces-sary strategy. Dialectics is a method that can be applied after it has been taught. Oncetaught the dialectic, one can learn to observe the perpetually new phenomena constantlyproduced under the laws of historical development; to find in historical necessity themoment of activity (Lukcs 1997: 88).

As expected, Lukcs holds that only a very few are able to acquire this special knowl-edge. Some sections of the proletariat have quite the right instincts as far as the eco-nomic struggle goes, but when it comes to political questions they manage to persist ina completely utopian view (Lukcs 1971: 78). There is a distance that separates the

consciousness of even the most revolutionary worker from the authentic class conscious-ness of the proletariat (Lukcs 1971: 80). The result of this is that In the absence of areal understanding of the interaction between politics and economics a war against the

whole economic system is quite out of the question (Lukcs 1971: 78). The very fewwho have authentic class consciousness, a view of the totality, must unite the spontane-ous discoveries of the masses, which originate in their correct class instincts, with thetotality of the revolutionary struggle, and bring them to consciousness (Lukcs 1997:88). This knowledge is brought to the working class from outside (Lukcs 1997: 99;Pinkus 1975: 87).

The gap between the elite and the mass of the proletariat is so large that the elite, asthe bearer of true class consciousness, is able to infer the thoughts and feelings whichmen would have in a particular situation if they were able to assess the interests arisingfrom it and their impact on the whole structure of society (Lukcs 1971: 51). Lukcstherefore differentiates between empirically given thoughts and the imputed class con-sciousness that comes from outside and must be learnt by the masses (Lukcs 1971: 51).Because the objective economic situation is not immediately apparent in its objectivecorrectness, then the guidelines must be found deliberately (Lukcs 2000: 71), thatis, they must be learnt from those who have imputed consciousness,6from those who

know the laws-tendencies that are immanent in the economy but are not apparent inimmediacy.One can infer from the above that ordinary workers, who by their daily activity are

forced to perpetuate the social relation of capital via the surplus-value they produce, can-not play any part in the process of dereification, denaturalisation, or defetishisation ofthe forms, but only accept the decisions that come from above, from the elite, from thelabour aristocracy that possesses the authentic truth.

In Lukcss social philosophy, form-fetishes are not expressions of the contradictionwithin which every worker is forced live in order to sustain his or her existence.7This

contradiction means that the worker is haunted by the logic of time is money, and isforced to transform his or her concrete labour into abstract labour (that is, into money)in order to survive, and in so doing, to produce and reproduce the entire social structureand the reified forms that are necessary for the accumulation of money by money,through competition, to take place. Since for Lukcs this contradiction lies outside the



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reified forms, they are not understood, as they are by Marx, as perverted, mystified,inherently contradictory expressions of the topsy-turvy world.

By employing traditional bourgeois identity thinking rather than attempting to pen-etrate through the fact, and inside the form, Lukcs classifies the form and compares it

to similar forms. In so doing, he accepts the existence of the form-fetish, and dogmati-cally asserts its actuality without explaining its existence. He presupposes the existence ofthat which must be explained and thus naturalises it. He falls victim to the illusion thatproperty and profit no longer play a key role (Horkheimer 2002: 236) in the formationof the reified forms, since the conflict of values is not in their essence. To put it another

way, for Lukcs, reified forms, such as the state, do not stem from the logic according towhich we, as a society, have chosen to spend our time the logic of time is money, thelogic upon which the capitalist mode of production depends.

If the contradiction under which the ordinary worker is forced to live in his or her

everyday life does not play any role in the process of fetishisation/reification, then solvingthis contradiction cannot play a role in the process of dereification/defetishisation. Iffetishism is caused by the collision of economic and extra-economic values, as Lukcsmaintains, then only those who possess the true understanding of the immanent tenden-cies of the economy can point the way towards dereification/defetishisation. For Lukcs,then, class struggle presupposes the possession of a specific kind of knowledge that onlyan elite few can have. When this aspect of Lukcss reasoning is acknowledged, the demo-cratic deficit in his theory becomes clear.

As previously noted, Lukcs gives the false impression that he adopts an open dialectic

similar to that of the Frankfurt School. For example, he stresses that dialectics is notimported into history but is derived from history made conscious as its logical mani-festation at this particular point in its development (Lukcs 1971: 177), and that everyphenomenon is recognized to be a process (Lukcs 1971: 184). However, when Lukcss

words and philosophy are viewed through the analytic prism that I have presented in thisarticle, a different conclusion must surely be reached.

The fact that Lukcss reading of fetishism does not stem from Marxs dialectic of thetopsy-turvy world explains why Lukcs does not regard class struggle as taking placeevery time ordinary workers pit their human dignity against the rule of money. For

Lukcs, class struggle occurs only when workers attempt to control the totality by retain-ing the fetish-form that they wish to abolish at some undetermined stage in the future.Since totality can be known and controlled, he ignores the untruth of identity, the factthat the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived, the remainder that is left whenobjects go into their concepts, the sense of non-identity (Adorno 1973: 5), the chaotic that which has not been included (Adorno and Horkheimer 2011: 27).

The chaotic refers to the fact that we cannot predict beforehand what form thedecision-making process will take if people choose to organise their daily means of sub-sistence by a different logic to that of capital, to that of time is money. We are thus

destined to live in and against the uncertainty that the chaotic causes. Any claim to cer-tainty leads to identity thinking, to a closed dialectic, to a prediction of human action,and thus to a limitation of human creativity. The dialectical materialist cannot have faithin any certainty, much less the privileged knowledge of totality that Lukcs presupposes,since no knowledge can provide us with a conclusive image of reality (Horkheimer 1993:



13


239) or of human creativity. The materialistic dialectic has an open-ended character thatdoes not regard the rational as completed at any point in history (Horkheimer 1978a:437-438). Instead, because the rational is never totally deducible (Horkheimer 1978b:107), the dialectic is open and negative.

Lukcss abandonment of the critical open-ended character of dialectics is also appar-ent from his reading of class in Marx. Lukcs interprets Marxs phrase class for itself asmeaning that the class struggle must be raised from the level of economic necessity tothe level of conscious aim and effective class consciousness (Lukcs 1971: 76). However,this interpretation does not accurately reflect Marxs meaning in The Poverty of Philosophy,

which Lukcs cites. Here, Marx highlights that although the mass of workers has com-mon interests and is already a class as against capital, it is only In the struggle [that]this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defendsbecome class interests (Marx 1976b: 211). Nowhere in his writings does Marx presup-

pose a specific knowledge, such as that of the whole or of long-term objectives, thatcould be considered a true class consciousness (Lukcs 1971: 76) or an authentic classconsciousness (Lukcs 1971: 80) that might make the class struggle effective. ForLukcs, then, class is a closed category. In Marx, however, we see that class is an opencategory that forms its content during the process of the struggle, and thus cannot havea presupposed authentic content.8

Defetishising the Party: Negativity in Lukcs and

Frankfurt School theoryBecause Lukcs regards the attainment of class consciousness as possible only graduallyand after long, difficult crises (Lukcs 1971: 259), with the proletariat having to sufferbefore it achieves ideological maturity, before it acquires a true class consciousness(Lukcs 1971: 76), the power of negativity is essentially postponed until the future. ForLukcs, since The proletariats real productive energy can only awaken after its seizure ofpower (Lukcs 1997: 68), defetishisation and negativity can come to the fore only whenthis has been achieved, since the mental achievements essential to the conduct of theeconomy and the state will only become apparent to large sections of the proletariat after

it has come to power (Lukcs 1971: 267). In Lukcss reasoning, then, dereification canoccur only at a point sometime in the future, because Until the objective crisis of capital-ism has matured and until the proletariat has achieved true class consciousness and theability to understand the crisis fully, it cannot go beyond the criticism of reification(Lukcs 1971: 76; see also Lukcs 1971: 70).

This does not mean, however, that the proletariat should patiently wait for the crisisto develop by itself. In such a case, the natural laws governing the economic process would not lead to the simple downfall of capitalism or to a smooth transition tosocialism (Lukcs 1971: 306). Instead, the proletariat must accelerate the development

of the existing tendencies through its conscious action (Lukcs 1971: 250; see alsoLukcs 1997: 32) and provoke the crisis, since crisis always signifies a point of relative suspension of the immanent laws of capitalist evolution (Lukcs 1971: 243). Afterthe crisis has begun to develop, the economy will presumably be consciously directed(Lukcs 1971: 251).



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Grollios 575

For Lukcs, the elite of the labour movement, those with the requisite understandingof the dialectical method so as to be able to make the most accurate diagnosis of thedialectical development of the immanent laws, must assume leadership of the proletariatin the form of the vanguard party. The Party is assigned the sublime role of bearer of the

class consciousness of the proletariat and the conscience of its historic vocation (Lukcs1971: 41), and must be always a step in front of the struggling masses, to show them the

way (Lukcs 1997: 35).Considering that the class consciousness of the masses is likely to develop slowly even

under the guidance of the vanguard elite, the party:

is sometimes forced to adopt a stance opposed to that of the masses; it must show them the wayby rejecting their immediate wishes. It is forced to rely upon the fact that onlypost festum, onlyafter many bitter experiences will the masses understand the correctness of the partys view.

(Lukcs 1971: 329)

Its politics may not always accord with the empirical reality of the moment But theineluctable course of history will give it its due. (Lukcs 1971: 42)

Given the aforementioned gap between the consciousness of the elite and the massesand the stratification of consciousness within the class (Lukcs 1971: 326), the detach-ment of the Communist Party from the rest of the proletariat its temporary isolation(Lukcs 1997: 35) is a risk that Lukcs considers unavoidable.

However, Lukcs stresses the fact that the party must not impose its views on themasses from above in a one-dimensional way, but must have the ability to be self-critical,to learn from the spontaneous creativity of the masses and not function as a stand-in forthe proletariat (Lukcs 1971: 327). However, no matter how good the partys disposi-tion toward the masses, Party organization must be of the utmost severity and rigourin order to put its ability to adjust into practice an adjustment that is impossible

without the strictest party discipline (Lukcs 1997: 35; see also Lukcs 1971: 316).What happens if there is a disagreement between the masses and the vanguard party?

Can the masses stand up to the decisions of the party and reveal their opposition?Although Lukcs does not pose the question directly, what emerges from his analysis is,

I believe, a negative answer, and any scope for disagreement is therefore eliminated. Themasses must subordinate themselves to the conscious collective will, which for Lukcscould not be other than the Communist Party (Lukcs 1971: 315). Furthermore, sincehistory will give it [the party] its due (Lukcs 1971: 42), the masses must succumb tothe rule of the party, accept their intellectual inferiority, and patiently wait for time toreveal the correctness of the partys decisions. In every instance where the ideas of theparty and the masses diverge, therefore, the masses are to be considered wrong in advance,because as we have seen, the party can predict the ideas that the masses would have ifthey were ideologically mature. Thus, contrary to Lukcss contention, a dialogue that

might prove stimulating for all cannot exist because one of the two participants, thegeneral committee of the party, holds the one and only truth. The ordinary worker canparticipate in perceiving the totality only by accepting the ideas of the party, of those

who hold the authentic truth, or as one might say, the monopoly of class consciousness.



15


The ideas that can lead to a transformation of the world are not those of the ordinaryworker, but those of the party.

Lukcss democratic deficit becomes even more evident when it is noted that even hisavowed support for the role of workers councils is essentially hollow, since they must act

under the leadership of the Communist Party (Lukcs 1972b: 63).Unfortunately, thus far none of the above observations have been made by Lukcss

interpreters. For instance, for one of the best-known interpreters of the democratic defi-cit in Lukcs, Istvn Mszros, there is an unrealistic overemphasis placed on politicaland ideological factors in Lukcs that goes hand in hand with fatefully underestimatingcapitals power of recovery and continuing rule (Mszros 1995: 316).

Thus the neglect of the material factors (Mszros 1995: 320) and an uncriticalattitude towards the concept of the class itself (Mszros 1995: 324) leads Lukcs to thehypostatization of class consciousness and collective will in the form of an idealized

party (Mszros 1995: 324).Along similar lines, Andrew Feenberg contends that Lukcs confused emergency

measures taken in the shadow of a revolution in a backward country with fundamentalchanges in the nature of the public sphere under socialism (Feenberg 2002: 69). As aresult, he underestimated the validity of the classical teachings concerning the politicaland legal preconditions of democracy (Feenberg 2002: 69).

In contrast to these interpretations, I have reached the conclusion (one that is hereti-cal in terms of the existing literature on Lukcs), that Lukcss support of Stalinism andoverestimation of the role of the party was not for reasons of political strategy, as he

himself claims and as Mszros and Feenberg believe, but for reasons that are deeplyembedded in his understanding of contradiction and its role in the formation of classconsciousness.

Paul Piccone supports the view that because in Lukcs the interaction between thewhole and part remains again limited to the domain of the self-objectifying Spirit andproceeds a priori (Piccone 1972: 115-116), his materialism never penetrates to the liv-ing dimension and, as a result, ends up with an imposing metaphysical system (Piccone1972: 126). Thus he slides in the romantic totality in articulating his theory of politicalorganization (Piccone 1972: 127). Contrary to the reasoning of Piccone and others,9I

do not believe that the problems in Lukcss philosophy have their origin in his leaningstoward Hegels dialectics, although they are of course related to it. The problem in Lukcsis not that he was led astray by Hegels spirit and therefore overestimated the role of theparty; the problem is bigger and much more deeply ingrained in his social philosophy.

As shown in the analysis thus far, Lukcss problem stems from his liberal identity-thinking reading of contradiction, with the consequence that he is unable to retain thelogic of the topsy-turvy world in his theory of defetishisation.

Very few studies have attempted to take on board this viewpoint. Guido Starostasreading of Lukcs is one of the most recent and stimulating. In Starostas analysis, the

gap between empirical and imputed class consciousness persists (Starosta 2003: 57) inLukcs because his dialectic was a too general and vague, and does not provide a clueabout the actual determinations of the existence of the proletariat (Starosta 2003: 56).This is because for Lukcs the revolutionary consciousness of the working class is not analienated consciousness that becomes aware of its own alienation but an abstractly



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Grollios 577

free consciousness (Starosta 2003: 56). Starostas analysis closely follows Simon Clarkesreading of Lukcs, which observes that Lukcs did not derive the ideological form of thefetishism of commodities from the alienation of labour, but if anything the other wayround (Clarke 1991: 315), with the result that he was led to an inverted interpretation

of Marxs theory of alienation, according to which the alienation of labour is not thesource of mystified and estranged social relationships (Clarke 1991: 317).

In advance of these readings, I have attempted to add a broader scope to the analysisof Lukcss philosophy in order to highlight how its imprisonment in identity thinkingleads to a social theory that suppresses the core of dialectics; that is, the negative ele-ment, and to a position in which the abolition of the irrationalism that forces people tolive as personifications of economic categories must be postponed to an indefinite timein the future. As Adorno aptly underlines, dialectics in Lukcs are paid lip-service allhas been decided in advance The core of his theory remains dogmatic (Adorno

1977:154). As a result, Lukcss thinking mirrors the main characteristic of bourgeoisidentity thinking: When called to act independently, we cry for patterns, systems, andauthorities (Horkheimer 2004: 126).

Lukcss theory of the state also demonstrates that negativity has been suppressed inhis theory. In Lukcs, the state has not been defetishised; it is not an unavoidably per-verted form, an expression of the irrationality under which we live in our topsy-turvy

world. It is perfectly possible that a balance of economic power between two classes incompetition may produce a state apparatus not really controlled by either so that theeconomic structure is by no means simply reflected in the state (Lukcs 1972c: 135). For

Lukcs, the state is not an inherently undemocratic form that will immediately be abol-ished when its real content has been overthrown, when people have organised the satis-faction of their basic needs in a different way to the irrationality of time is money. As aresult, Lukcss state appears as a neutral institution that takes its class character from theclass that succeeds in occupying it. Its abolition is therefore postponed to an indefinitepoint in the future.

For Lukcs, the state is relatively autonomous10(Lukcs 1978b: 146), and after theproletariat comes to power, it still needs to use the state to overcome by education theinertia and the fragmentation of these strata[11]and to train them for active and inde-

pendent participation in the life of the state (Lukcs 1997: 67). Lukcs needs the statein order to control totality,12to guarantee certainty, the implementation of another pat-tern. The function of the proletarian state is to lay the foundations for the socialist, i.e.the conscious organization of the economy (Lukcs 1971: 281). Although it is not men-tioned by Lukcs, it goes without saying that the state, at least in the first stages after itscontrol passes to the proletariat, will be run not by the masses, but by those who haveauthentic class consciousness, that is, the general committee of the party. The self-confidence that Marx considers essential if society is to be transformed into a democracyis discarded (Marx 1975c: 137).

In retaining the form of the political state in his theory, Lukcs therefore assumes thatreason has been realized (Marx 1975c: 143). However, precisely because categories areopen in dialectical theory, the rational is never totally deducible (Horkheimer 1978b:107), and the view that philosophical concepts must be pinned down, identified, andused only when they exactly follow the dictates of the logic of identity is a symptom of



17


the quest for certainty (Horkheimer 2004: 113). In Lukcs, then, we encounter aninverted configuration of the authoritarian-bourgeois theory of the state, or inHorkheimers words, the revolutionary movement negatively reflects the situation whichit is attacking (Horkheimer 1978b: 99). Horkheimers comment, State socialism is the

most consistent form of the authoritarian state (Horkheimer 1978b: 101) could equallyapply to Lukcss state socialism.

Contrary to Lukcss perspective, the abolition of irrationality does not presuppose akind of knowledge that can be obtained before the occupation of the state,13nor a changein the elite who run the fetish form of state. Negativity does not presuppose that theknowledge of totality can be obtained only by the very few the elite beforehand. Self-criticism (critical philosophy), Marx stressed, should be gained by the present time ofits struggles and desires (Marx 1975c: 145). We develop new principles for the worldout of the worlds own principles. We do not say to the world: Cease your struggles, they

are foolish; we will give you the true slogan of struggle (Marx 1975c: 144).The fight for human dignity starts dialectically, but not with a dialectic understood

as interaction but rather as the negative restlessness of our misfitting (Holloway 2010:85) to the rule of money, which unfolds in our power to say No! (Holloway 2010: 19).In the beginning is the scream (Holloway 2002: 1), not a specific kind of knowledge.The fight for dignity cannot wait until the proletariat has precipitated the capitalist crisis(Lukcss first stage) in anticipation of its occupation of the state (his second stage), sothat the contradiction under which we live can then be solved.

ConclusionIn a very short chapter about Lukcs in Negative Dialectics, Adorno focuses on what Ihave attempted to expand on here; that is, how Lukcss theory dispenses with negativity(Adorno 1973: 189-192). Adorno wants to make clear to the reader the closed characterof Lukcss dialectics, and the fact that the categories in his dialectics have nothing elseto reveal about themselves because the chaotic, the uncertain, the not-yet-known ele-ment that constitutes their content, their non-identity character, is discarded. For

Adorno, Lukcss focus only on reification foresees the end of contradictions, a reconcili-

ation that subsumes the alien and thus abolishes the core of dialectical thinking; that is,negativity (Adorno 1973: 191).By contrast, in the dialectic between essence/content and form/appearance, the

essence that constitutes the content of the form-fetishes (that is, the fact that we do notknow in advance exactly how people will decide to come into contact with each other inorder to satisfy their basic needs) is alien to us because it remains what is distant anddifferent, beyond that which is ones own. The tireless charge of reification resists thatdialectics (Adorno 1973: 191).

Lukcs did not succeed in revealing the open character of Marxian dialectics, and

consequently misinterpreted the Frankfurt School theory,14

accusing it of being a kindof interesting academism a secessionist academism, a theory that is contradictory inthe sense that there is nothing to be learned from it (Pinkus 1975: 100). In my view,however, Lukcss conception of the party has all the characteristics that Horkheimerattributes to the intellectual who follows traditional theory.15



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Grollios 579

Contrary to Lukcss interpretation, dialectics is not merely a method of classificationdifferent from that of the bourgeois-liberal static view of categories. Dialectics make usaware of the human content of the forms, their inherently inverted, contradictory char-acter, and, by extension, the fact that we cannot impose on reality any ideas or long-term

projects constructed in advance by an elite that purports to hold an authentic and trueknowledge. Defetishisation requires that we reject subordinating our doing to thedemands of the accumulation of wealth now, without having a pre-prepared plan inplace. Through turning the topsy-turvy world on its head, through non-identity think-ing, we propel a class struggle that can overturn capitalist logic by opening cracks in it,even though we cannot know with certainty where these cracks will lead us. Non-identitythinking only gives voice to the mystery of that reality (Horkheimer 2002: 217), and inso doing brings negativity to the fore. This is the mystery that identity thinking seeks toeliminate. I hope to have shown how this happens in Lukcs by explaining the inherent

connection between Lukcss theory of contradiction and dialectics and the democraticdeficit in his social theory. Given this, it is hoped that my non-mainstream interpretationof Lukcs that his political philosophy does not follow Marxs dialectical materialism,but could be considered a radical version of traditional liberal identity-thinking hasbeen justified in this article.

Endnotes

1. This tradition is characterised by Lukcs as bourgeois, and by Horkheimer as bourgeois andidentity thinking.

2. All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find theirrational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.

3. For more on Smiths materialist conception of society, see Clarke 1991: 1318. 4. Principles of Political Economy is composed of five books, and its full title is Principles of

Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy. The title of its fourthbook is Influence of the Progress of Society on Production and Distribution. See Mill (1965).

5. On J.S. Mills stationary state, see Book IV, Chapter VI of Principles of Political Economy. 6. Lukcs stresses that only imputed consciousness corresponds to the objective economic

position of the proletariat (Lukcs 2000: 66). 7. John Holloway elegantly describes this contradiction in the third part of Chapter 28 of Crack

Capitalism, which is subtitled: We who are schizophrenic and repressed (Holloway 2010:219). In this chapter, he writes: we are all permeated by this antagonism, we are all self-contradictory, torn internally by the struggle between the reproduction of capitalist relationsand the impulse to refuse-and-create (Holloway 2010: 221-222).

8. For a critical-dialectical understanding of class, see Richard Gunn (1987). 9. One of the most characteristic readings of this line of thinking, beside Piccones, is, I believe,

Moishe Postones. See Postone 2009, especially pp. 208-212.10. Considering that this understanding of the state has been taken up by Nikos Poulantzas,

who is one of the best-known state theorists, it would be worthwhile for the reader to readSimon Clarkes article on him (Clarke 1977). I consider most of what Clarke has to say about

Poulantzas to be also applicable to Lukcs.11. Here, Lukcs is referring to other exploited strata besides the proletariat.12. Holloway carries out an excellent analysis of totality and its relation to the state in Crack

Capitalism. See especially Chapter 27, part 3, entitled, The totality cannot be seizedfrom above, pp. 205-208. Although Holloways analysis of Lukcs covers only eight pages



19


(Holloway 2002: 81-88), it is impressive that he succeeds in focusing on the most importantaspect of Lukcss philosophy, which is the connection between fetishism and the formationof class consciousness. However, he does not expand on how negativity and contradiction inLukcs lead to a theory of fetishism that includes the creation of a new fetish: The idea of a

Hero (the Party) (Holloway 2002: 84). It is hoped that my article expands on this issue in astimulating way, and better clarifies the philosophical background to the democratic deficitin Lukcs.

13. Contrary to most readers of the Open Marxism tradition, I maintain that it does not followfrom this line of thinking that we should be indifferent towards occupying the state. For moreon this, see my review of Crack Capitalismin Grollios 2012.

14. For a positive account of what we can gain today from the dialectics of Frankfurt Schooltheory, see Holloways Crack Capitalism, and Bonefeld (2012).

15. On this, see Horkheimer 2002.

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Author biography

Vasilis Grolliosis an independent postdoctoral researcher in political philosophy, carrying outresearch on radical theories of democracy. His current research focuses on the first generation ofFrankfurt School theory, and he is working on a book project on that theme. He has published onJ.S. Mill and Karl Marx in Critical Sociology,Critique: A Journal of Socialist Theory,RethinkingMarxism, andJournal of Political Ideologies.

http://www.marxists.org/http://www.marxists.org/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://cnc.sagepub.com/http://www.marxists.org/http://www.marxists.org/

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