Groden Motion for Reconsideration

8/8/2019 Groden Motion for Reconsideration

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STATEOF TEXAS

ROBERTGRODEN

CAUSENUMBERJl 0-035408-0

IN THEMUNICIPALCOURTNO. 6CITY OFDALLASDALLAS COUNTY.TEXAS

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STATE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND BRIEFTO THE HONORABLE ruDGE OF SAID COURT:

The State of Texas ("the State"), by and through its attorney, Frederick E. Williams,Assistant City Attorney, moves the Court to reconsider its Order dated December 16,2010,which granted the Motion to Quash filed by Robert Groden, Defendant (the "Order"), andschedule his causefor a trial on the merits. In support of this motion, the State respectfullyshows he following:1. Procedural History

The Order quashedand dismissed he State'scomplaint becausehe Court fbund that theState'scomplaint shouldhave alleged hat Defendant iolated Section50-156 of the Dallas CityCode (which contains a defense o prosecution hat purportedly authorizedDefendant's conduct),rather than allege hat Defendant violated Section32-10 of the code(which doesnot contain thatdefense).I The Court then found that the Statehad not presentedany evidencethat Defendanthad in fact violated several elementsof the offensedescribed n Section 32-10.2 Based on thesefindings, the Court concluded it did not have 'Jurisdiction over the case as presentedoondgranted he motion and dismissed he complaint.3

'SeeOrder, p. -2 ." SeeOrder,p.3-4.'SeeOrder, .5.State'sMotion for Reconsiderationnd Brief- Page

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2. Summary of Argument.The Court erredas a matter of law becausehe State(not the Defendant or the Court) has

the sole prerogative to choose he offense with which to chargethe Defendant, the Defendantcannot challengesufficiency of the evidence hrough pretrial motions,and the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of the offense charged. In this case, the State's choice to prosecute heDefendant under Section 32-10 is appropriate because t is a fundamental rule of statutoryconstruction that the specific provision governs over the general provision. Moreover, adefendantmay not challenge he sufficiency of the evidence n a pre-trial motion and the State s

not required to presentany evidenceat that stage. Furthermore, he Dallas municipal court hasjurisdiction of the offense alleged in the complaint. For all these reasons,the Court shouldreconsider ts earlier ruling and deny Defendant's motion to quashbefore the Court's plenarypower over the matterexpires, orcing the State o appeal.3. The Court erred in determining that the State's complaint was required to havecharged Defendantwith a violation of Section50-156rather than Section32-10.

In the Order, the Court determinedthat the State did not charge the Defendantwith aviolation of the proper ordinance.aHowever, neither the Defendantnor the Court has a right tochoose he offensefor which the Defendant s to be charged. In fact, the "separationof powers"doctrine protects that the prosecutor'sdiscretion to choose the offense to be prosecutedfromusurpation by the trial court. Charging decisionsare within the prosecutor'sexclusive domainand the 'oseparationof powers" and "prosecutorialdiscretion" doctrinesmandateudicial respectfor the prosecutor'sndepend nce.SeeMeshell v. State,739 S.W.2d 246,257 (Tex. Crim. App.19S7) en banc) (TexasSpeedyTrial Act unconstitutionalunder "separationof powersdoctrine"for interferingwith prosecutorialdiscretion); Roisev. State, T S.W.3d 225, 243 (Tex. App.-

oOrder,pp. -2 (findingDefendant's rgumentpersuasive.").State'sMotionfor ReconsiderationPage2

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Austin 1999, pet. refd), cert. denied, 53I U.S. 895 (2000) ("The presumptionof regularitysupports . . . prosecutorialdecisions and in the absenceof clear evidenceto the contrary, thecourtspresume hat they have properly discharged heir duties. In the ordinary case,so long asthe prosecutorhas probable cause o believe that the accusedcommitted an offensedefined bystatute, he decisionwhetheror not to prosecute,and what charge o file . . . generallyrests n hisdiscretion." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). An accusedhas no constitutionalright to be prosecuted nder anyparticularstatute. UnitedStates . Snype,441F.3d llg,l4l (2dCir. 2006),cert. denied,549U.S. 923(2006). It is the State hat brings he prosecution, hoosesthe allegations nd files the formal charging nstrument. See,e.g.,Tex. Codeof Crim. Proc.arts.21.20, 45.014(a),45.018, 45.201; Dallas City Charter ch. VII, g 3(3). The State has thediscretion not only to decide what charges o bring, but to decide whether chargesshould bedismissed.Peoplev. VanSchoyck,904N.E.2d 29,34 (Ill. 2009);seealso Tex. CodeCrim Proc.art.2.0I.

The Order erroneously transmutesevidentiary sufficiency decisions that a trial courtshould make only after trial to the pretrial stage,at which the prosecutor,not the court, decideswhat to charge. This shift in dynamics and balanceof powers from the pretrial to the trial stagehas been well-described in the context of an appeal involving the choice whether to chargelesser-includedoffenses

Before trial, the power lies wholly with the state. The state has the burden ofproving an accusation,but it also has great discretion as to what that accusationwill be. As a general ule, the statehas more resourcesavailableto it, particularlyinvestigatory resources.The stategathers he evidence, and on the basis of thatevidence,chooseswhat offenses o allege in the charging instrument. The statemay amend he indictment or information, abandoncounts or elements,or dismissand refile. It may restrict defenseaccesso physical evidence. State witnessesarenot compelled to communicatewith defensecounsel, and their statementsdo nothave to be divulged until after they testifu on direct examination. Although manyprosecutors'offtces do let defensecounsel see physical evidence and witness

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statements efore trial, they are not required to do so, and someoffices do not doso.At trial, the balance of power shifts somewhat.The state still controls the contentof the indictment and most of the evidence, but now the defendant has moreopportunity to challenge that evidence. If defensecounsel determinesthat thestate has failed in its burden to prove each and every element of the chargedoffense,then the choice of requesting nstructionson lesser-includedoffenses-ornot-must be made. At times, the decision is influencedby a client who adamantlyopposes nstructions on lesser-includedoffenses.The gamble for the defense sthat the ury will discem the failure of proof and, with no other choice available,acquit.Thechoice s big win versusbig loss."

Haynes . State,273S.W.3d183,191 Tex.Crim.App. 2008) Johnson, .,concurring).4. The State's complaint may appropriately charge Defendant with a violation of

Section 32-10.Assuming that the law allows the Court to determine whether the State charged the

Defendantwith the appropriateoffense(which the Statestrongly denies), t would neverthelessstill be proper (and even more appropriate) o charge he Defendantwith a violation of Section32-10 of the City Code rather than Section 50-156. It is a fundamental rule of statutoryconstructionthat the more specific provision in a law controls over the more general. See, e.g.,Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld,34 S.W.3d 887, 901 (Tex. 2000); LuJkin v. City ofGalveston, 3 Tex. 437 439(1885).

In this case,Section32-10 s more specific han Section50-156becauset appliesonly to"areas under the control of the park board" rather than to "public property in the city."Furthermore, the article of the City Code containing Section 50-156 expressly provides thatnothing in the articleprohibits enforcementof any other ordinance:

The provisions of this article and other city ordinancesare cumulative law, andthis chapterdoesnot preventenforcementof anothercity ordinance hat regulatesan areacoveredby this article and is otherwiseapplicable.

DallasCity Code$ 50-154.

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Thus, the State's complaint appropriatelychargedDefendantwith a violation of Section32-rc.s5. Section32-ll of the City Code is inapplicable to the State'scomplaint.

The Order notes that both partiesagree hat no Park Board regulationshave beenpostedat DealeyPlazaaspurportedly equiredby Section32-11 of the City Code as of the date of itshearingon Defendant'smotion to quashon November 16,2010.6 However,Section32-11doesnot apply o the State'scomplaint. Section32-ll states:

Thepark board shall adopl such rules and regulations as it deemsbest for themanagementof the public parks and where such rules have been adopted or aspecificpark area and posted within the specific park so regulated,any personfound guilty of violating such rules is guilty of an offense.Dallas City Code$ 32-11(emphasis dded).

Here, the State s not charging the Defendantwith a violation of a rule adoptedby thePark Board. Instead, he State s charging Defendantwith a violation of Section 32-10. As isshown in Section7 of this motion (below), the Dallas City Council enactedSection32-10 byordinance.

5 Defendant allegesthat he was told by city staff that there was no processor procedure n place to obtainan agreementor permits for DealeyPlaza. Defendant mplies that the City must have or createsucha procedureandallow him to apply for a permit or agreementbefore the City may prosecute him for a violation of Section 32-10.But Section :2- iO doesnot require the City to have or createsucha procedure. Moreover, Defendanthas not shownthe Court that he is entitled by law to have the City maintain or establishsuch a procedure before the State mayprosecute im for a violationofSection 32-10.Moreover, it is irrelevant that Chapter 32 of the City Code does not specifically list Dealey Plaza as a..public park" and that the Statedid not provide evidence n its response o Defendant'smotion to quash hat Dealeyplaza is-a "public park." Section32-10 on its face does not apply to "public parks"; instead, t applies o "areasunder the control of the park board." The Statewill have the burden at trial to prove that Dealey Plaza is an areaunderthe control ofthe Park Board.Likewise, it is irrelevant that neither side has presented he Court with the specific legal effects of thedesignationof Dealey Plaza as a National Historic Landmark. The designationwould be relevant only if it totallydiveited the City of iU rigtrts to regulate activities at the site. The Defendanthas made no such showing. In fact,the designationdo"r not aifect the siatusof Dealey Plazafor purposesof Section 32'10. See 36 C.F.R.65'2 "Effectsof Designation"and http://www.nps.eov/history/nhVQA.htm#66Seeorder, p. 4

i i ' : , ' 7 ' ' . i if \ , /

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It is an elementary ule that all personsare presumed o know the law. See,e.g.,GreaterHouston Transp.Co. v. Phillips, S0l S.W.2d 523,528 n.3 (Tex. 1990);City of Fort Il'orth v.Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1964). In particular,courts have repeatedlyheld thatpersonsare chargedwith knowledgeof a city's ordinances.See,e.g., Johnson,388 S.W.2d at403; Boord of Adjustmentof SanAntonio v. Nelson,577 S.W.2d 783, 786(Tex. Civ. App. - SanAntonio 1979,wit refd n.r.e). Thus, the law did not require he City to post Section32-10 ofthe City Code at Dealey Plaza, any more than the law would require the State to post theburglary section of the Penal Code at the door of a residence o enable the prosecutionof aburglar.

Furthermore,Section 32-11 does not require the Park Board to adopt rules for and postrules at all parks; it merely requires that any rules adoptedbe posted before a personmay becharged with an offense. Again, the State s not charging Defendantwith a violation of a ParkBoard rule. Accordingly, the fact that no Park Board rules have beenpostedat Dealey Plaza isirrelevant.5. The Court erred by examining evidence ather than focusing only on the complaint.

Article 27.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure ists the eight pre-trial pleadingsand motions a defendantmay make. Only two of thesecould possibly apply to this case: "(1) Amotion to set aside or an exception to [a charging instrument] for some matter of form orsubstance; . . and (8) AnV other motions or pleadings that are by law permitted to be filed."Tex. CodeCrim. Proc.art. 27.02(I), (8).

Groundsfor a motion to setaside and an exception are expressly set forth, respectively,in Article 27.03(setaside),and Article 27.08(exception o substance).Statev. Rosenbaum, l0S.W.2d 934, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). A so-called "motion to quaphl' s the functional

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equivalentof a motion to set aside.Td.; State v. Eaveso 00 S.W.2 ,220, 221 n.5 (Tex. Crim.App. 1990); eealso Crwen v. State,6l3 S.W.2d488,at 489-490 Tex.Crim. App. 1981).

The facts that go to the merits of the complaint should not be considered n a pre-trialmotion. SeeWoodsv. Stote, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("The purposeof apre-trial motion is to addresspreliminary matters, not the merits of the case tself. Preliminarymatters are those ssues hat can be determined before there is a trial on the general ssue of thecase.") (footnote omitted). A motion to quash should be granted only if a defect of form orsubstance xists. See Wellsv. State,516 S.W.2d663,664 (Tex. Crim.App. 1974) holding hata complaint that is valid on its face is sufficient to support a prosecutionby complaint). "[I]n apretrial setting there is no constitutional or statutory authority for an accused o raise and for atrial court to determine sufficiency of evidence to support or defeat an alleged element of anoffense. . ." Rosenbaum.910 .W.2dat 948.

In granting the Defendant's Motion to Quash, however, the Court considered severalissuesof fact which are not properly entertained n a motion to quash. For example, he Court'sOrder states:

"As applied to the case at hand, it is always incumbent upon the State o show how theactions of the Defendant all within this section of the Dallas Ciw Code and are thereforewithin the urisdiction of the Court."8"The Defendant stated that when he presentedhimself inquiring of such fseeking apermit] he was told that no processor procedure was in place for agreement and/or

' Although Defendant'smotion could theoreticallybe authorizedby Article 27.02(8)of the TexasCode ofCriminal Procedure,Defendant's motion fails to identiff what law would authorize ts filing and the State s awareof none.8Se eOrder,p. 3, l ines l-13.State's Motion for Reconsideration Page7

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permits for Dealy Plaza. This fact was not controverted by the State."e (Emphasisadded).

o 'oThe Court has been presented with no authority indicating that Dealey Plaza isconsidered 'public park'."10

o "The specific legal effects of designation [as a National Historic Landmark] have notbeenpresentedo the Court."ll

o "The Court doesnot consider nor co[lment on any of the other argumentspresentedbythe Defendant and this Order is limited to the application of the lsw to the acts presented

in this hearing regarding his case." (Emphasisadded).Each of these statements ontainsone or more issuesof fact to be determinedat trial.

Here, neither the Defendant nor the Court cites any defects of form or substancen thecomplaint which would be proper grounds for quashing the complaint. Instead, Defendant'smotion requires this Court to go behind the face of the complaint before trial to see f there issufficient evidence to support alleged elements of the offense. But, other than grand juryirregularitiesproscribed n Article 28.03 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which of course donot apply here), the trial court may test only the facial validity of allegations in a charginginstrument Rosenbaum,910 S.W.2d at 947. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals hasconsistentlyrefused to look beyond an indictment where analogous Jurisdictional" claims aremade by motion to set aside or otherwise. Id. In this case, he complaint complies with thestatutory equirements,providesadequatenotice to the Defendantof the alleged offense,and was

eSeeOrder,p. 3, lines 17-20.10SeeOrder,p. 4, lines6-8.1rSeeOrder,p.4, l ines15-16.State's Motion for Reconsideration Page 8

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timely filed. Thus, the complaint is valid on its face and legally sufficient to supporta trial onthemerits.127. The Court erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction over the offense

alleged n the complaint.In granting Defendant's motion, the Court found that it did not have 'Jurisdiction over

tfis caseaspresented."l3However, state aw clearly provides that the Court has urisdiction overall criminal cases such as this one) that arise under the ordinancesof the municipality and arepunishable y a fine.

Specifically, [a] municipalcourt of recordhas the.jurisdictionprovided by general awfor municipalcourts." Tex. Gov't Code $ 30.00005(a).The TexasGovernmentCodesets orththe general aw for municipal court urisdiction as follows:

A municipal court, including a municipal court of record, shall have exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction within the municipality's territorial limits and property ownedby the municipality located n the municipality's extraterritorial urisdiction in allcriminal caseshat:(1) ariseunder:(A) the ordinancesof the municipalif; . . . and(2) arc punishableby a fine . . . |,Tex. Gov't Codeg 29.003(a).

Similarly, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "A municipal court,including a municipal court of recordo shall have exclusive original jurisdiction within theterritorial limits of the municipality in all criminal cases hat: (1) arise under the ordinancesofthe municipality;and(2) arepunishable y a fine . . . ." Tex. CodeCrim. Proc.art. a.l4(a).

't The State has the burden at trial to prove eachelementof the offense alleged in the complaint beyond areasonabledoubt. When the State presentsa factually deficient case, the Texas Code of Criminal procedureprovides a safeguard or criminal defendants-a directed verdict: "lf upon the trial of a case in a . . . municipalcourt, the State ails to prove a prima facie caseof the offensealleged in the complaint, the defendant s entitled to adirectedverdict of not guilty." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 45.032. Thus, if the State does not presentfacts in itscase in chief that provide at least some proof of each of the required elementsof the offenseilleged, the Courtshouldgranta directedverdict upon proper motion.'' Order.p. 5.tate's Motion for Reconsideration Page9


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In this case, he State'scomplaintdatedJuly 23,2010 alleged hatDefendanthad violatedSection 32-10 of the Dallas City Codera and that the alleged offense occurred within theterritorial limits of the City of Dallas. The filing of the complaint in this case conferredjurisdiction on the municipalcourt. SeeStatev. Boseman, 30 S.W.2d588, 590n. 3 (Tex. Crim.App. 1992); Bass v. State, 427 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968);Bailey v. State, 15S.W.3d622,626(Tex.App.-Dallas2000,no pet.).

In addition, the complaint alleged hat Defendant committed the offenseon or aboutJune13,2010. The complaint was therefore filed within the two-year limitation period establishedbystate aw.rs Thus, the complaint filed in this cause s sufficient to vest urisdiction in the DallasMunicipal Court, and the Court maintains the authority to schedule the case for trial on themerits to properly determine ssuesof fact.8. The State's complaint is legally sufficient.

The requirements or a complaint used as a misdemeanorcharging instrumentare not asstringent as the requirements or a complaint or affidavit for a searchwarrant. See Vallejo v.state,408s.w.2d 113,114 Tex.Crim. App. 1966);Rose . State,799S.W.2d381,384(Tex.App. Dallas 1990, no pet.). A complaint that is valid on its face is sufficient to support aprosecution y complaint. See Wells,516 S.W.2d at 664. A complaint'spurposes to inform anaccusedof the facts surrounding he offense charged so he may preparea defense. See Chapav.

to The Dallas City Code is a codification of many ordinances enacted by the Dallas City Council. SeeDallas, Tex., Ordinance No. 8737 (Feb. 6, 196l) (a copy of the ordinance can be found at the beginning of both theprinted and electronic versions of Volume I of the City Code). The Texas Local Government Code authorizesmunicipalities o codify their ordinances. See ex. Loc. Gov't Code $ 53.001(a). A municipalcode of o rdinancessa record of the codified ordinances and establishes he content of those ordinances. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code $53.005(b). A court shall admit a printed code of ordinances n evidencewithout further proof SeeTex. Loc. Gov'tCode $ 53.006(b). The penalty range for a violation of Chapter32 of the Dallas City Code is S1.00 $500.00.Although the City is not required by law to show that Section 32-10 is a codification of an adoptedordinance asshown above, he City notes hat the section s a codification of part of Dallas, Tex., OrdinanceNo. 8019 (Apr. 6,1959), a certified copy of which is attached o and incorporatedby referenceas Exhibit A.'' See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 12.02. Of course, limitations is merely an affirmative defense,not ajurisdictional element. Proctor v. State,967 S.W.2d840, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). i'

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State,420S.W.2d943,944 Tex.Crim. App. 1967);Kindleyv. Stqte,879S.W.2d261,263 Tex.App.-Houston [14thDist.] 1994,no pet.); iose,799 S.W.2d at3B4.

The complaint filed in this cause s facially valid, meetsall statutory requirements,andsubstantiallycomplies with Article 45.019(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.r6Moreover, the complaint language s clear and specific as to the offense alleged. The complaintstates: "Said actor did then and there knowingly sell merchandise, o wit: magazines n areasunder the control of the Park Board, to wit: Dealy (sic) Plaza, without a written agreementor apermit issued rom the Office of the Park Board permitting the saleof such tems, in violation ofSection 32-10 of the Dallas City Code." The complaint tracks the languagecontained in theordinanceand providessufftcientnotice to allow Defendant o preparea defense.

The sufficiencyof an indictment or complaint is a questionof law. SeeState v. Mffi I54S.W'3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Ordinarily, an indictment s legally sufficient if ittracksthe languageof a penal statute hat itself satisfies he constitutional requirementof notice.See d.; seealso Lqwrencev. State,240 S.W.3d9I2,916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);Statev. Mays,967 S.W.zd 404,406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The Stateneednot allege facts that are merely

t6Article 45.0lg,"Requisitesof Complaint," provides:(a) A complaint is sufficient, without regard o its form, if it substantiallysatisfies he following requisites:(l ) it mustbe in writing;(2) it must commence"In the nameand by the authority of the State of Texas";(3) it must state the name of the accused, f known, or if unknown, must include a reasonablydefinite descriptionof the accused;(4) it must show that the accusedhas committed an offense against the law of this state, or statethat the affiant has good reason o believe and does believe that the accusedhas committed an offense asainst thelaw ofthis state; (5) it must state he datethe offense was committedas definitely as he affiant is able to provide;(6) it must bear the signatureor mark of the affiant; and(7) it must concludewith the words "Against the peaceand dignity of the State"and, if the offensecharged s an offense only under a municipal ordinance, t may also conclude with the words "Contrary to the saidordinance".(b) A complaint filed in justice court must allege that the offense was committed in the county in which thecomplaint s made.(c) A complaint filed in municipal court must allege that the offense was committed in the territorial limitsof the municipality n which the complaint s made.

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evidentiary n nature.Mays, 967 S.W.2dat 406tMoreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 2gS Tex. Crim.App. 1986).9- The Court erred by dismissing he State's complaint before trial becauseDefendantdid not meethis burden of proof.

The defendanthas the burden to prove that a complaint is defective. SeeKindley, 879S.W.2dat263; Bagsby . State,72l S.W.2d567,569 Tex.App.-Fort Worrh 1986,no pet.). Ina motion to quash, a defendanthas the burden of proof and must present evidence or legalauthority o supporthis motion. Weat v. State,537 S.W.2d,Z0,2l (Tex. Crim.App. 1976);worton v. state,492 S.W.2d519, 520 (Tex. crim. App. Ig73); Belt v. state, g14 s.w.2d22g.231 (Tex.App.-HoustonIlst. Dist] 1991,pet.refd); Statev. Perez,948S.W.2 362,364 Tex.App.-Eastland1997,pet.refd).

In the Defendant'sSupplementalResponseand Motion to Dismiss, he cites four reasonsto quash he complaint: (1) He wasnot properly servedwith noticeof the complaint-Defendantdoesnot cite any authority that the complaint must be served n misdemeanorcases,and in fact,serviceof the charging instrument is not required in misdemeanorcas"slt; (2) The ordinance sinapplicable to Defendant-Defendant doesnot statehow the ordinance s inapplicable to him;(3) The ordinance s unreasonablyvague-again, Defendantdoesnot statehow the ordinance svague;and (a) The chargeagainsthim, his arrest,seizureof his property and his prosecutionareunconstitutional. although defendantcitesthe First, Fourth and FouneenthAmendments o theUnited StatesConstitution,he doesnot state n specific termshow his constitutionalrights wereviolated.

Similarly, the Defendant's subsequentMotion to Quashdoes not cite any legal authorityfor Defendant'sconclusions. The Defendantagaincitesfour reasons o quash he complaint: (1)

" See ex.CodeCrim.proc.arts.25.01.25.04.State'sMotionfor Reconsiderationpage12

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A third complaint was filed which doesnot purport to amendor withdraw previous complaintsand the complaintwas not servedon Defendant-Defendant does not cite any legal authority forhis claims; (2) Defendantadoptsargumentspreviously made in his prior motions; (3) The newcomplaint assertsa totally different ordinance and is procedurally invalid and fundamentallyunconstitutional-Defendant doesnot statehow the filing of the complaint is unconstitutional;and (a) Defendantagain asserts hat the ordinance is inapplicable, but does not statewhy theordinancedoes not apply to Defendant. In both the Defendant's SupplementalResponseandMotion to Dismiss andthe Defendant'sMotion to Quash, he Defendant ails to presentevidence

or legal authority to supporthis motion, so the Court shoulddeny the Motion to Quash/Dismiss.WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Stateof Texasrespectfullyrequestshat

this Court: (l) reconsider ts decisiongrantingthe Defendant'smotion to quash,(2) withdraw itsOrder granting the motion datedDecember 16,2010, (3) enter an order denying the motion toquash,(4) schedule his cause or a trial on the merits, and (5) grant the State all fuither relief towhich it is entitled or the Court deemsappropriate.

Respectfullyubmitted,

TexasStateBarNo.24025714AssistantCity Auorney2014Main Street, uite206Dallas,Texas 5201Telephone (214)670-4439Fax (214)670-4814

zuCKE. WILLIAMS

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CERTItr'ICATE OX' SERVICEI hereby certifi that on this 286 day of December, 2010, a copy of the foregoing

documentwas delivered by facsimile to Defendant's counsel of record, D. Bradley Kiz.ziaat214.651.4330. . ,/

( " 'FREDERICKE. WILLIAMS

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CAUSENUMBERJlO-035408-01

STATEOF TEXAS $ IN THE MUNICIPALCOURTNO. 6$v. $ ctTY oF DALLAS$ROBERTGRODEN $ DALLASCOLINTY,TEXAS

ORDERIT IS ORDEREDhat he State'sMotion for Reconsideration.hich wasconsideredhis

day of 2010.s herebv:

Granted Denied

PresidingJudge,Dallas Municipal Court No. 6

the

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City of Dallas

STATEOF TEXASCOUNry OFDALTASCITYOF DALI-AS

l, ROSA A. RIOS,AssistantCitySecretary, f the Cityof Dallas,Texas,do herebycertify hat the attached s a true and conect copyof:

ORDINANCE O.8O19

Whichwaspassed y he DallasCityCouncil n April 6, 1959.

WITNESSMYHANDANDTHESEALoF THEclTY oF DALLAS, EXAS,his he23th ayof December, 010.\; J- _ - - /

- ; , ( ) ' te ( - : t r - . - ( ' z ln_ r_ ,ROSA A. RIOSASSISTANTCITY SECRETARYCITY OF DALLAS, TEXASPREPAREDY:AG

EXHIBITbt0.!t

$$$

h t t l ) 4t l /4 I r! ,IOFFICE FTHECITY ECRETARY IT YHALL DALLAS.EXAS 5201 TELEPHONE141670-3738


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; l

oRD$IANCE 0. 3Or9AN OFDII'IANCE ]"IBDE{G CIIAHTER94, TTILE )O{V, OF ffiE T9I}1 CODEOF CTTTL AI.ID CR]I'II{AI ORDII{AI{CESOTTEE Crry 0F DALIAS, By RrPnAlrr.rc A3lrCl&S 94-r rO 9l+-10, rNCIUSTVE; nrAqmlrG 1r'l I,rEU TEEREoT'ANElr cEAprER 94 CONSrSTrI.tc0F ARTTCIAS94-1 T0 94-13, I]lCLttSwEi PRoVIDING RUi,ESAND REqrlprTrollsFoR Tm oPEBATIoI\i 0F PT'BLIC PARKSAND SQUARES]{ TIIE CoRPOnIfIE Il'lIlS 0F Im CITY 0F DAilAS; PRo-EDING lUR TEE SEED IIMITS IN SAID PAnKS A$D SQUARES;PRoUIBITI$G DoGs II{ PttBLrc PARKS rNLEsSRESTRAINED;PROVIDIIIG rUR THE PROTECTIoNOF FISE, A]{IMALS, AND IPI{I^S KPI IN PUBLIC PAR}$; PRo-\rIDINc PISIAITIES FOR TEE WOIATIOI'I 0F TtrIS ORDII{AJ'ICE;PRoWDING FOR SyEnAEILIrY; AND HEEAJ.IIIGAIL ORDINAI{CESN CONFLICTrIIfH TIIIS OIDI{ANCE, AI,ID DECIARINGAN ISfERGfliCY.BE TT ORDA]]{EDBY TI]E CITT COUNCTLOF TIIE CITY OF DALIAS:SECTIOII1. That Chapter th of Title )OCV f the l-941 Code of Civil &d Crimlxal Ord,inalces of theCity of DaILas be arrd tfre 6a&e is hereby repeated, and in lieu thereof the folLowins isenacted., to-vl-!:

"Art. 94-1."Arh. 91+-2'" A r t . 9 4 - 3 ."A r t ,9 l+ -4 ." A r t . 9 4 - 5 ."A rb .9 l+ -6 ." l ; r r . 9 4 -7 ."Art. 94-8."Art. 94-9."Art, 94-lO,

"cuAgtER 9l+PARKS AI'ID SqUARESGeneta]. Regulatlons

Safety for Park Patrons,Injuring Gra6s, Vegetatlon or l&provenents.Abuslve or Ind.ecent Ianuage or Acts.Pros'ultutes ard Sex Perverbs.Cmelcia]- Vehicles.Speed Limits; Drivhg l4)on Walksi InJElng Vegetstlon.Dogs.Protection of Fish, Antuals, Bnd Fow16 Kept il Pa,rks.Parking.Possesslon of Firearms on Property Ormed, Iased., or Controlledby the C1-uy of Dallas Parh Deparbnent."Art. 94-11. Park operatin Schedu,l-es."Arb. 94-12. Sale of Merchandlse Ln Parks,"Arb. 9L-13. Park Soard Strau Adcrpt Rules and negulations;Postinr RenrllLtiong,rrArt,. 9L-14. Penal-ty.'Art. 94-1. gafety for Parh Patrons -- It ls hereby nade unlawful for uy lndividual or group oftnd.lviduals to parttclpate j.n ary actli.lty on ary public perk area vhen such actlvity a'il]. create acla.nger to the publlc or na:r be considered a public nui6sce. the Park Board. my deslgnate partlcultrlocatlons within park areas for speclflc activities ard whqn d.eemed necessarXr, i'- uay limit theconduct of such activlties by tbe 16sutrlce of speclal pemlts upon application whj.ch pemlts riILset out the partlcuLar condltlong uDd.er rhich activity is pemltted, Overnlght eepinG isprohlblted on s,ny tr)arh property excelt by specl-al pemit i.ssued by the Parli Board or itsrepresentatives for such actlvlty on speclfic occasions."Artlcle 94-2. lnJurlng Crass, Vegetation or lrq)rovmentsIt is hereby nade un].awful for sry pelson to cut, break, d.eface or in any vay illJure the trees,shr:ubs, plmts, gras6, turf, fountalnE, seats, fences, structules, isprorements, orrra.&ents ormonuents or properby, $itbln or upon any of the public puks.'Afclcle 94-3. Abusive or Indecent ran'guae or Acts. -- No person sha1l use o! Epe8.k arxthratenjng, abusive, insultlng or lndecent laruate 1n my of the public parks, and. nc peraonsheli cmit, i-n my of said. psrkt, ey ob6cene, Isd or lnaecent act or create uy nulsece."Artic].e !\-l+, Prostitutes and sec perverls - No comonly reputeal prostltute and/or serualperveri shall be al]-otred. vitbin or shell gov,i-thln ery of the pub11c puks, ard no lErson shal1accmlmy 6ny comonly reputed plostlture or se:ora]- perterb lnto or rlthin any of sald p8]'.s."Article 94-5. CGnmercial Vehlcles -- A1I vehlcles used. for the pur?ose of transporting freightud rnerchand.j"se, or brick, stone or gravel, al]d all those c(mon.Iy lsrm as floats, nove ltagons,exprEss or delivery vagons are prohlbited frm entering upon or bei-ng drlven tbrough Bny of thepublic parks of th e Cjly."Articte 94-6. *)eed. Ljri-ti Driving Upon Walk6j InJurjng Vegetation -- It shall be unl,wful- foraqy person to ride, dxive or go at a rate of speed. faster than speed llmlts as posted on stendardtrafflc signs, upon horeeback, ot upon any bicycle, motorcycl,e, vbeel or vheel6, or in sJryautonobile or my vehicle vhatgoever, upon ay d-riv. or street in sJry park of the clty, or to ri.d'eor drive any wheel or mimal upon any raLk in suchlatk, or to cLfu]b any tree, fence or buildlng,or to do sry fujury to any tree, shrub, flower or tle 6rass in ay aucfr pe!h."Arblcle 94-7. Dogs -- It shal.]- be unl-adul for ny omer, keeper or person having the custodl''or control of my d.og to cause or pemlt such arjltra]. to go lnto or upon the grounds of 8lty publicpark trithjn the City of Dallas, unless such dog is led by sme person and. rtained. in cu.stody bybavlng such ani.mal- securel:r fastened. by means of a chaLn, rotr)e or 6trap."Arblcle 9l+-E. Protection of flsh, anj.nxa.Ls ard forls kept jll parlG -- liherever the Ciiy ofDauj,s ovns or keeps a]ly flsh, a]}tu[a].s, or folrls on pub]-ic exhlbltlon in 8ry of-'the public larirsor grouds of the City, j.t shsIl be u]-awful for my person in my rHDer to lniure, smoy ori.nterfere vlth eny such ufual, fish or fow1, or to injue or interfere with, 1n ulj/ mer, el;of the enclosures in which any aninal, fish or fonl may be kept. The tern 'annoy' or 'interfexevj.thr shal-l- includ.e Jly attenryt on the psxt of the person, save BJrd except the d.uly authorizedkeeper thereof, or person ln chsge thereof, to feed or offer sy foodstuff or otb.er substmceto ary such rlns-I, flsh or folll. Whenever ary flsir, fovl or 81lna1s are kept on ed1b1t1on, itshall- be the duty of the publ-ic to obey al-l rules provlded by the P&rh Board or other authotit/fo r the extlibition of sy such elral, f ish or fml."Articfe 94-9, Perking -- Where vehicl,e parhi.rlg lots or aJeas have been set aside jn lair Parii :ard otirer public parlis ln the City of DalJas no vehlcle shall be drlven over or across thecurbs, sid.el,'eLi, grass or 1am wii.lai! such parh, but sha1l be parked. on sucl] Lots within a1dce*vileen -.iLe l:t.es desi: lati r l a single-velticle parl::n,: spece, uo no t othenl is ' '

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Groden Motion for Reconsideration

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Transcript of Groden Motion for Reconsideration