[G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.] 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID...
Transcript of [G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.] 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID...
[G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992.]
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and HO HANG (WITH ALIASES JOSE JO AND CONSING), respondents.
Leo B. Diocos for petitioner.
Antonio Ramas-Uypitching for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; AMBIGUITY CAUSED BY OMISSION OR
MISTAKE IN DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF DECISION; MAY BE CLARIFIED BY THIS
COURT BY AMENDMENT EVEN AFTER JUDGMENT BECOME FINAL. — The
dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as it
carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to
prevail over considerations of substantive justice. After all, the technical
defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that where there is
an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of
the decision, this Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even
after the judgment has become final. In doing so, the Court may resort to
the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the decision.
2. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS; DISSOLUTION
THEREOF BY PETITION FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES;
GROUNDS. — Art. 178(3) of the Civil Code has been superseded by Article
128 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may
petition for judicial separation on either of these grounds: 1. Abandonment
by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one spouse to
comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if
said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABANDONMENT, EXPLAINED. —
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although
able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties
and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. This idea is clearly
expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without any intention of returning."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENT CAUSE PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already
rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home
in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she
was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention
of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the
final determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the
private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property. Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the
Family Code, providing as follows: Art. 135. Any of the following shall be
considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: . . . (6) That at
the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
5. ID.; FAMILY CODE; MADE APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The
amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case
before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we
held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 231: The greater weight of
authority is inclined to the view that an appellate court, in reviewing a
judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question according to the law
prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to the law
prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment. The court will
therefore reverse a judgment which was correct at the time it was originally
rendered where, by statute, there has been an intermediate change in the
law which renders such judgment erroneous at the time the case was finally
disposed of on appeal.
6. ID.; ID.; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION THEREOF BY JUDICIAL
SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES; DIVISION BETWEEN SPOUSES. — The order of
judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the finding of
both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is indeed
their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided between
him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired during
coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private
respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties
properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered
in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
D E C I S I O N
CRUZ, J p:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with
three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the
herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife by whom he begot a daughter,
Monina Jo. The other two women and their respective offspring are not
parties to this case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of
conjugal property, docketed as Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an earlier
action for support, also against him and docketed as Civil Case No. 36, in the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35.
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 29, 1983,
Judge German G. Lee, Jr. rendered an extensive decision, the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing arguments and considerations, this
court hereby holds that the plaintiff Prima Partosa was legally married to
Jose Jo alias Ho Hang, alias Consing, and, therefore, is entitled to support as
the lawfully wedded wife and the defendant is hereby ordered to give a
monthly support of P500.00 to the plaintiff Prima Partosa, to be paid on or
before the 5th day of every month, and to give to the plaintiff the amount
of P40,000.00 for the construction of the house in Zamboanguita, Negros
Oriental where she may live separately from the defendant being entitled
under the law to separate maintenance being the innocent spouse and to
pay the amount of P19,200.00 to the plaintiff by way of support in-arrears
and to pay the plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 in the concept of attorney's
fees. prcd
As will be noticed, there was a definite disposition of the complaint for
support but none of the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property.
Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling
of the trial court in the complaint for support. 1 The complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action
and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article
178 of the Civil Code.
When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to
this Court for relief. The private respondent's petition for review on
certiorari was dismissed for tardiness in our resolution dated February 17,
1988, where we also affirmed the legality of the marriage between Jose and
Prima and the obligation of the former to support her and her daughter.
This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property.
It is here submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: a) the
judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under
Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code; and b) no such separation was
decreed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its decision.
The private respondent contends that the decision of the trial court can no
longer be reviewed at this time because it has long since become final and
executory. As the decretal portion clearly made no disposition of Civil Case
No. 51, that case should be considered impliedly dismissed. The petitioner
should have called the attention of the trial court to the omission so that
the proper rectification could be made on time. Not having done so, she is
now concluded by the said decision, which can no longer be corrected at
this late hour.
We deal first with the second ground.
While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No. 51 in the
dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court, the petitioner argues
that a disposition of that case was nonetheless made in the penultimate
paragraph of the decision reading as follows:
It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are
considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to
separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code,
which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
The petitioner says she believed this to be disposition enough and so did not
feel it was necessary for her to appeal, particularly since the order
embodied in that paragraph was in her favor. It was only when the
respondent court observed that there was no dispositive portion regarding
that case and so ordered its dismissal that she found it necessary to come to
this Court for relief. Cdpr
The petitioner has a point.
The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as
it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
The drafting of the decision was indeed not exactly careful. The petitioner's
counsel, noting this, should have taken immediate steps for the rectification
of the omission so that the ruling expressed in the text of the decision could
have been embodied in the decretal portion. Such alertness could have
avoided this litigation on a purely technical issue.
Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to
prevail over considerations of substantive justice. After all, the technical
defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that where there is
an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of
the decision, this Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even
after the judgment has become final. 2 In doing so, the Court may resort to
the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law expressed in the text or body of the decision. 3
The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property, holding that the petitioner and the private
respondent were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the
petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were
registered in the name of an apparent dummy.
There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph of the
decision of the trial court was a ruling based upon such findings and so
should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. The respondent
court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing
Civil Case No. 51 and thus upholding mere form over substance.
In the interest of substantive justice, and to expedite these proceedings, we
hereby make such modification.
And now to the merits of Civil Case No. 51.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of
abandonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the
petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where
she and Jo were living together "because that was our agreement." It held
that an agreement to live separately without just cause was void under
Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of
abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only
remedy available to the petitioner was legal separation under Article 175 of
the Civil Code, 4 by virtue of which the conjugal partnership of property
would be terminated.
The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted
Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the agreement
between her and the private respondent was for her to temporarily live
with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to
visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even
if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942, when she
returned to him at Dumaguete City and, he refused to accept her.
The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:
ARTICLE 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without
judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at
least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or
administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of
property.
The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the
Family Code, which states:
ARTICLE 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to
comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property,
subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. llcd
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to
marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left
the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed
within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.
Under this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the
family without just cause, even if said spouse does not leave the other
spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although
able to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6 This idea is
clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a
spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already
rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home
in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she
was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention
of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1988 until the
final determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the
private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private
respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal
property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by
Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply
with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart from
refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete
City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring
many children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and
their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against him for
support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions,
significantly, he even denied being married to her. The private respondent
has not established any just cause for his refusal to comply with his
obligations to his wife as a dutiful husband.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family
Code, providing as follows:
ARTICLE 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in
fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case
before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we
held in Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals: 7
The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an appellate
court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a question
according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not
according to the. law prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed
judgment. The court will therefore reverse a judgment which was correct at
the time it was originally rendered where, by statute, there has been an
intermediate change in the law which renders such judgment erroneous at
the time the case was finally disposed of on appeal.
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the
finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent
is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided
between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired
during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half. As the private
respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must include such properties
properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may have been registered
in the name of other persons in violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital
flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an
accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his
promise to her of his eternal love and care. LLpr
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in favor
of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the
petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between
them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the trial
court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said
conjugal partnership, including those that may have been illegally registered
in the name of other persons.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995.]
MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR.,
Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region,
Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent. cdasia
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL CODE; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; WHEN
SANCTITY THEREOF VIOLATED; EFFECT IN CASE AT BAR. — Contrary to his
protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only after
his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal
home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been scandalously
and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by
the fact that he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and
Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus
was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20,
1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly
lived together even while respondent's marriage to his first wife was still
valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and
Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven
years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent
spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's own
allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From that
time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla
Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to
presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all
purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan
in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was still valid and
subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the
inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According
to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation,
an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino). By
committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust
reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals
and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v.
Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).
2. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATION; CONSTRUED; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE
AT BAR. — An examination of the birth certificates of respondent's three
illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these
children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry
therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus
and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and
1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla,
which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that,
despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be
legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they
were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and
his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case
at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as
amended) which provides: Art. 269. Only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and
cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42
Phil. 855). The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on
August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus: Art. 177.
Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The reasons for this limitation are given
as follows: 1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would
be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3) There
will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too
violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous, especially if
the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code,
p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy).
4. LEGAL ETHICS; NOTARY PUBLIC; COMPENSATION; RULE; WHEN
VIOLATED; CASE AT BAR. — Respondent himself admitted that he prepared
and notarized the documents wherein he charged notarial fees. Though he
was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor due to
the fact that there has been no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this
defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts.
Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus: Sec. 252.
Compensation of Notaries Public — No fee, compensation, or reward of any
sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be
collected or received for any service rendered by a notary public. Such
money collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them personally.
Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the
fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government funds.
(Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p. 202.)
Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by
him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law
raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use. cdlex
5. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT; CASE AT BAR. — With respect to the charge that respondent
prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for
which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein,
respondent merely denied the said imputation but failed to offer any
evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves
no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People
v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to
adhere to, and let this remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, to wit: Canon 2 — A judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM p:
"We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found
to be patently wrong and indefensible. There ought to be no objection or
compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted
out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augeun stable." 1
Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be manned by magistrates
chosen for their probity, integrity, impartiality, dedication and learning. And
so, any judge wanting in any of these qualities should be broomed off and
out of the bench in order to improve the judicial landscape. Screening off
the misfits, considering the great number of judges and justices in the
country at present, is the arduous and Herculean task of this Court. The
effort if dramatized with rectitude and sincerity should bring about the
strengthening of the people's abiding faith in democracy and the integrity of
our courts of justice.
The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8,
1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of
respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with
"gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a
judge."
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of
gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent
had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan
during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly
shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May
23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous union because of the
fact that the respondent was then still very much married to Teresita
Banzuela.
Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements of a
marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.
cda
Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier,
respondent's wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran
vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged
therein for abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora
Pillarion with whom he had a son.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that
respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate," his three illegitimate
children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970
Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971
Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975
by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration
was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth
and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally
registered as legitimate.
The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption:
(1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice
of law by the preparation and notarization of documents, out of which he
charged fees beyond the authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary
Public. These acts which, according to the charge, amount to the private
practice of law, prejudice public interest.
Complainant submitted the following documents in support of these
allegations:
a) Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"), attesting to the fact that
respondent Judge Tabiliran prepared a Simultaneous Deed of Sale, (Annex
"C", Doc. No. 901, Page No. 77, Book No. V, Series of 1991 of Ex-Officio
Notary Public Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr.) and collect P600.00 from the vendees
(par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9 records);
b) Receipt prepared under instruction of the respondent showing that
he received P250.00 thru MCTC Aide Ely O. Inot for preparation and
notarization of Joint Affidavit declaring the correct ages of Carlo Manzano,
Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai dated November
12, 1991, when the legal fees therefor should have been P10.00 only (Annex
"D") (par. 10(a) a-2 Complaint, p. 9 records);
c) Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the direction of the
respondent dated November 12, 1991, showing that said respondent
received from Reynaldo Subebe the sum of P150.00 for preparation and
notarization by him of a Joint Affidavit declaring the correct age of Agata
Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias (par. 10 (a) a-c Complaint, p. 9
records);
d) Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated November 12, 1991, signed
by the respondent himself showing that he received from Nelly Baradas the
sum of P50.00 for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit attesting to
the correct age of one Luzviminda Jacoba (par. 10(a) a-d Complaint, p. 9
records);
e) Another receipt (Annex "G") dated November 12, 1991, issued by
the respondent, showing that he received from Torres P. Modai the sum of
P50.00, thru the same Ely O. Inot, MCTC Aide, for preparation of Joint
Affidavit attesting to the correct age of Flores Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e
Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records).
(2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by
an affidavit (Annex "M") executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide,
stating that he saw Edna Siton, complainant in a criminal case tried by
respondent, hand over to the latter a bag of fish and squid which
respondent Judge received.
(3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out
of which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio
Oriola, as supported by the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant
therein, and Benito Sagario, one of the persons present when the accused
perpetrated the acts aforesaid. (Submitted as Annexes "I" and "J",
respectively.)
Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the
foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a
dispenser of justice. By the example shown by the respondent, the public
had allegedly lost confidence in the administration of justice, perceiving as is
evident to see that the person occupying the position of a judge lacks the
morality and probity required of one occupying such a high office.
Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his
cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor
immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first
wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since
then, and until the present her whereabouts is not known and respondent
has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had
already elapsed since the disappearance of his first wife when he married
Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.
Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of
the Civil Code in order to show the legality of his acts:
"After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes except for those
of succession." (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.)
"After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for
those of succession." (Art. 390, Civil Code.)
The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that for
the purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee is to respondent's mind, a case in
point.
He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then
"single," but he denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false
misrepresentation, claiming that, since there were only three words to
choose from, namely: Single, Widow or Divorced, he preferred to choose
the word "single," it being the most appropriate. Besides, both he and
Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela
was honestly divulged.
On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications (Annexes
"4" & "5") from the Mayor of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to
the fact that there was no Notary Public in Manukan and, as such,
respondent may be allowed to notarize documents. He denied having
charged exorbitant fees. He claims that all the amounts received by him
were used to subsidize office expenses, since the funds he had been
receiving from the municipal government were not enough to cover
expenses in maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a certification
(Annex "6") from the Accounting Department of the Municipal Government
of Manukan to the effect that his yearly expenditures were more than the
yearly appropriations.
Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which states:
"A Judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to
improve . . . the administration of justice."
Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery claiming that it was
inconceivable for him to receive a bag full of fish and squid since his
residence was 42 kilometers from Jose Dalman where his courtroom or
office was located. It takes one an hour and a half by bus to reach Katipunan
and so, by the time he reaches his house, the fish and the squid should have
become rotten. In support of his denials, respondent submitted as Annex
"8", an affidavit of Ely D. Inot, their court Interpreter who declared:
xxx xxx xxx
"3. That last June 6, 1991, I was with the Municipal Judge, Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr., from the morning until we went home in the afternoon and we
in fact dined together in the local Carenderia of Jose Dalman as it is the
usual ways of the Judge to eat lunch together with the court personnel;
4. That when we went home in the afternoon of that day we were also
together riding in a bus, the Lillian Express and until I drop in Roxas and he
proceeded to Katipunan where his residence is;
5. That all the time during that day I did not noticed him bringing
anything except his 'Hand Bag' which he used to carry in going to the
office;" (Annex "8", Affidavit of Ely O. Inot, December 17, 1992.)
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an
Affidavit of Desistance in a case pending in his sala and thereafter charged
the accused, Antonio Oriola, the sum of P500.00 for legal services. The
complainant, he said, was the one who induced Arcelita Salvador (the
complainant in the rape case) to execute an affidavit (Annex "I") in support
of the charge of corruption against respondent.
Complainant's filing of the present case was motivated by revenge and
resentment because, earlier, respondent filed an administrative case (A.M.
No. P-91-597) against her for "Insubordination and Serious Misconduct."
The Supreme Court decided to reprimand her with a warning that a
repetition of her acts will be severely dealt with. Respondent claims that the
complainant had nevertheless repeatedly continued to do acts of
insubordination in the following manner:
1) She continues to keep court records and has kept refusing to hand
them over to respondent inspite of verbal and written orders;
2) She refused to receive a memorandum from the Vice-Mayor
requiring the Clerk of Court to submit an Annual report;
3) She refused to prepare the said annual report required of her as
Clerk of Court;
4) She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful orders of the Court.
On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En Banc, the herein
administrative case was referred to Executive Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the
Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2)
counts of corruption: (1) for acting as notary public and collecting fees for
his services; and (2) for preparing an affidavit of desistance in a case
pending in his Court and receiving payment for it.
In his report and recommendation dated August 3, 1993, Executive Judge
Angeles found that:
ON GROSS IMMORALITY:
In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986, (p. 13 of
the records), respondent did not hide the fact that he was married to
Teresita T. Banzuela, having disclosed it in his affidavit jointly executed with
Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986 (p. 115 of the records), particularly
paragraph 4 thereof which reads:
"4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to Teresita T
. Banzuela but who left and abandoned their family home sometime in 1965
in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and until now at present her
whereabouts is not known."
It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83(2) of the Civil Code
which, although bigamous, remains valid until automatically terminated by
the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42,
Family Code). Respondent's assertion that since 1965 to the present, his
first wife Teresita T. Banzuela had left their conjugal dwelling and did not
return, her whereabouts being unknown, was not controverted. Living as
husband and wife pursuant to an authorized bigamous marriage,
respondent cannot be said to be acting in an immoral and scandalous
manner, and the immoral stigma of extra-marital union since 1969 duly
declared in their aforesaid joint affidavit, may be considered cleansed by
their marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on ratification on
contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it being ratification of marital
cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art. 34 of the Family Code was
intended to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have
been living in a state of concubinage for more than five years (Tolentino,
Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245, cited in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code,
1992 Ed., p. 38). Indicating his civil status in the marriage contract as
"single" is hardly considered a misrepresentation of fact, specially to the
solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C. Ruedas, Jr. to whom the
aforesaid joint affidavit was submitted.
ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT:
Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom
were born before their marriage, were disclosed and made known to the
solemnizing officer and the latter himself, in his affidavit dated May 23,
1986 (p. 116 of the records) which supports the marriage contract of
respondent with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, having shown such fact.
Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia T. Zanoria dated May 27,
1993, consisting of three pages, was submitted by the complainant for the
purpose of proving her charge that the respondent falsely executed his
three separate affidavits, namely: Exhibit K dated May 24, 1983 regarding
the late registration of birth of his daughter Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M
dated May 28, 1988 regarding the late registration of birth of his third child
Saturn B. Tabiliran; and his affidavit dated May 27, 1988, Exhibit O, in
reference to the late registration of birth of his second child Venus B.
Tabiliran, stating inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight as the
reasons for the delayed registration of their births, without however
presenting said affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently denying respondent the
opportunity to cross examine her. Her affidavit is not among those brought
out in the pre-hearing conference, and was not discussed during the hearing
itself, submitting it only after the investigation proper was terminated. The
supposed affiant claimed she was the government midwife who attended to
the births of respondent's three children, denying, as the affidavit shows,
negligence, inadvertence or oversight on her part to register their birth on
time. Not having been presented for respondent to confront her, or an
opportunity to do so, Exhibit P cannot be considered evidence of the
charge. An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented (People vs.
Villeza, 127 SCRA 349), or admitted by the party against whom it is
presented.
ON CORRUPTION:
1. Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and collecting fees:
Respondent has admitted having prepared the documents and collected
fees, in the instances specified in par. 10 of the complaint, namely: (1)
affidavit of Ponciana Geromo; (2) Joint Affidavit of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila
Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of
Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias; (4) Joint Affidavit on the
correct age of Luzviminda Jacoba; and (5) Joint Affidavit on the correct age
of Flores Jalampangan, but not necessarily on the accuracy of the amounts
therein stated as having been collected by him from them (please see Pre-
Hearing Order of May 20, 1993 of the Investigating Judge). Seeking
justification of his acts, respondent submitted Annexes 4 & 5 of his
comments (pp. 118 and 119, records) which are certifications of Manukan
Mayor Eugene U. Caballero attesting that in the absence of a Notary Public
in Manukan town, respondent who is a Judge thereat was allowed "to
prepare and ligalize (sic) documents."
He declared "the fees derived from the preparation and notarization of
documents were mostly used by respondent to buy supplies and materials
of his Office," explaining that his office needs cannot be sustained by the
appropriations of the local government which are inadequate. On page 120
of the records, his Annex 6 shows a shortage in his appropriations for
supplies. And supplies from the Supreme Court can only be obtained if
secured personally but has to assume the expenses for transportation,
freight and handling.
Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not
prohibit him from acting as Notary Public, and the fees he has received were
much lower than the rates prescribed by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, submitting Annex 3, p. 117 of
the records, to prove it.
Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that a judge may, with due regard to official duties,
engaged in activities to improve the administration of justice, respondent
claims that due to his efforts, he was able to secure an extension room of
his office covering a floor area of 24 square meters, from the Sangguniang
Pampook of Region IX based in Zamboanga City, costing P19,000.00 per
certification shown in his Annex 7 (page 121 of the records).
In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis-a-vis the power of Municipal
Trial Court Judges and Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges to act in the
capacity of Notary Public Ex-Officio, the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M.
No. 89-11-1303, MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has ruled:
"MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no
lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notary public ex-officio
perform any act within the competency of a regular Notary Public, provided
that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and
turned-over to the municipal treasurer (Lapeña, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter
No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2) certification be made in
the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public
in such municipality or circuit." LLpr
Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and residing in
Manukan town, even in Jose Dalman which is within his circuit is confirmed,
respondent Judge while he may be justified in so acting as notary public, did
not, however, comply with requirement No. 1 which obliged him to charge
for the account of the Government and turn-over to the municipal treasurer
all notarial fees. And there is no way of determining the truth of his
assertion that the notarial fees he collected were "mostly used" to buy
supplies and materials for his office, absent any accounting.
2. Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:
Admitting the existence of Annex H found on page 21 in the records,
respondent, however, denied the imputation therein contained by affiant
Calixto Calunod that he received a sando bag full of fish and squid from a
certain Edna Siton who had a case with respondent's court as complainant
in a certain criminal case. Instead of calling the affiant himself, complainant
presented the Court Interpreter Ely O. Inot, who "confirmed that there was
squid and fish contained in a plastic bag which was left in Aseniero
Carenderia by a person unknown to her and some members of the Court
staff. When informed by the carenderia owner that the stuff was intended
for Judge Tabiliran, the latter told them to cook it, and they afterwards
partook of it without the Judge who already boarded the passenger bus."
(Record of Proceedings, p. 1, par. No. 1, dated June 11, 1993). Being her
witness, complainant is bound by her testimony. This particular charge is,
therefore, not proved.
3. Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting Fee for his Services:
Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before 2nd Asst. Provincial
Fiscal Valeriano B. Lagula were submitted: one by Arcelita Salvador,
complainant in an attempted rape case who was categorical in her
declaration that respondent Judge asked and received from Pitoy Oriola,
brother of accused Antonio Oriola the amount of P500.00 after the Judge
prepared the affidavit of desistance and motion to dismiss which he made
her sign (Annex I, p. 40 records). Benito Sagario who was present executed
another separate affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the records,
confirming it. In admitting the affidavit, respondent, however, denied the
imputation, asserting that it is false, but without confronting them or
presenting witnesses to dispute their accusation. He could have demanded
that the affiants, including the persons they mentioned were present in the
transaction, namely: accused Antonio Oriola, his brother Pitoy Oriola,
Ignacio Salvador, and INC Minister Antonio Caluña be required to appear for
his confrontation, but respondent chose not, contended himself only with
the explanation that it was just the handiwork of complainant Abadilla and
her husband, a major in the military who is an active member of the Iglesia
Ni Cristo of which affiant Arcelita Salvador also belonged, which is bare and
unsubstantiated. No other conclusion can be drawn other than holding, as
the Investigating Judge does, that this particular charge is true. Evidently,
Judge Tabiliran wants to avoid meeting them by way of confrontation. If he
is innocent, and is certain the charge is fabricated, he will surely raise hell to
insist that he confronts them face to face. Clearly, his deportment betrays
his insistence of innocence.
On Respondent's Counterclaim:
It was not proven. On the contrary, the controverting evidence shows that
the records of Criminal Case No. 2279 referred to in his Annex 9, p. 123 of
the records, were not in the possession of complainant. Quite obviously, Ely
O. Inot, respondent's Court Interpreter tried to cover up the fact that the
same were already being kept by Judge Tabiliran before he issued the
memorandum, Annex 9. Complainant, who is respondent's Clerk of Court
was not, therefore, in a position to comply with his Order.
Also, Mrs. Abadilla's failure to prepare the annual report of the Court in
1992 as called for in Annexes 10 and 10-A was, contrary to respondent's
claim, not by reason of her obstinate refusal to obey her superior but, by
sheer impossibility to comply, considering that monthly reports upon which
the annual report shall be based, were not prepared by her, not because of
her refusal to do so which is among those included in her job description,
but because the Judge himself took the work from her for no other reason
than to establish the false impression that the complainant is disobedient to
the Judge, and does not attend to her duties.
By and large, there is no harmony in their office. Complainant and
respondent are not in talking terms. They are hostile to each other.
Respondent's complaint that Mrs. Abadilla spat saliva in front of him
whenever they meet each other; destroying the Court dry seal by throwing
it at him one time she was mad; showing face; and sticking out her tongue
to him, are all puerile acts which the undersigned cannot conclude as
sufficiently established even with the testimony of Mrs. Ely O. Inot which is
far from being definite and categorical, whose actuation is understandable
because Judge Tabiliran, being her superior, has moral ascendancy over her
(Record of Proceedings, June 11, 1993).
The undersigned believes that the problem is on Judge Tabiliran, and not on
Mrs. Abadilla, who has been in the service as Clerk of Court under a
previous Judge of the same Court for quite long without any complaint
having been filed. The evidence disputing his counterclaim tends to show
that respondent tried to build up a situation of undesirability against his
Clerk of Court whom he wanted pulled out from her position in his Court.
Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And Comments:
The authority to investigate being confined only to matters alleged in the
complaint on the basis of which respondent filed his comments, other
matters not therein covered which complainant brought out by way of
presenting documentary exhibits, (from Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not
subject of this report and recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION:
The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and DECEITFUL CONDUCT have not been
proven, but the undersigned believes evidence is sufficient to sustain a
pronouncement of guilt on two counts of CORRUPTION, namely: acting as
notary public and collecting fees for his services in preparing affidavit of
desistance of a case in his Court. Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and
false imputation against his Clerk of Court are found duly established.
WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge from the service for a
period of three months is recommended.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross
immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said
Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B.
Tabiliran.
Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla
Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned
him and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had
been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as
1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely
Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on
July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born
on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla
Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to
his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the
Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an
absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except
for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent. By respondent's
own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From
that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla
Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to
presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all
purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan
in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabilaran was still valid and
subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the
inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According
to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation,
an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino).
By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust
reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals
and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v.
Tiongson , 229 SCRA 690). LLjur
As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We
are not in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts
for a proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of
the Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83
(2) of the Civil Code.
With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge
has likewise been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates
(Exhs. "J", "L", & "M") of respondent's three illegitimate children with
Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate
issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important to
note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and
prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a
lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent
marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any
way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was
an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.
Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:
ARTICLE 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of
adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code
(Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated
the above-mentioned provision thus:
ARTICLE 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional
rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores
change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous
children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years
after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy).
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give
refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent.
It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita
disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears
that on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent
entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (A.C. No. 906) which was decided by this
Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for abandonment of
his family home and for living with another woman with whom he allegedly
begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure
of his wife to substantiate the charges. However, respondent was
reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live
Separately from Bed," with a stipulation that they allow each of the other
spouse to live with another man or woman as the case may be, without the
objection and intervention of the other. It was also in the same case where
respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald
Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues.
Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that
Saturn and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are
erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate children.
With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the
Investigating Judge that respondent should be found culpable for two
counts of corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal fees
in preparing an Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.
Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the
documents (Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G") wherein he charged notarial
fees. Though he was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees
therefor due to the fact that there has been no Notary Public in the town of
Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and
illegal acts.
Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus:
SECTION 252. Compensation of Notaries Public. — No fee, compensation,
or reward of any sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by
law, shall be collected or received for any service rendered by a notary
public. Such money collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them
personally. Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their
services the fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government
funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p.
202.) LLcd
Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by
him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law
raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use.
With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of
Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the
amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely
denied the said imputation but failed to offer any evidence to support such
denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and
cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA
166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this
remind him once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Canon 2
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of
gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently,
orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all
without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
SO ORDERED. Llibris
[G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.]
LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J p:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in
the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's
capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more. CTEaDc
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 and Resolution 2
of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The
Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)
and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years
old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first
meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila
City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de
Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of
their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5)
months later.
On 8 March 1993, 7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He
asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the
adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy's
parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their
marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. 12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a
degree in psychology, when she was neither. 13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the
same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine
Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14
but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said
hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and
under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from
Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the
commercial industry worth P2 million. 16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when
she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that
Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when
he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she
altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She
bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired
it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of
calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no
longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He
tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he
finally left her for good in November 1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede
(Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical
psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner
was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person.
On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant
lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They further
asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It
reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to
suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her
marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version,
thus: ASHaDT
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because
she was afraid of losing her husband. 25
(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from David's act of touching her back and
ogling her from head to foot. 26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been
teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with
McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson,
and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she
reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979. 28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by
her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the
Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos
was employed with Saniwares. 29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but
averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was
the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her
husband's whereabouts. 30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported
almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00. 31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child
prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were
mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity
on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, 33
together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-
Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude
that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross
neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited
from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and
interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of
only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar
can fake the results of such test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held
that respondent's propensity to lying about almost anything-her occupation,
state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others-had been
duly established. According to the trial court, respondent's fantastic ability
to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a
world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. cDCaTH
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the
parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37
During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the
Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with modification by both the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment. While
conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals 40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner
elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence
conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by
the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may
indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the
fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence
presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such
evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent. 43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the
operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of
facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also known as the Molina case 45 ), and
indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC
in the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court
has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down,
there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 48 wherein the
Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated
under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that
the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as
the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding
cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous
on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a
decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose
the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for
its allowance. HSEcTC
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for
nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity
has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage
persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of
contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as
void, 52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons
already married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground
for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where "either
party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the
ground of a spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law
enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the enactment of the
Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The
mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the
grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio. 57 Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent,
just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the
essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did
not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa,
both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the
Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his
commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to
the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as
phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that
"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different from
physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code . . . [and thus]
should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the
same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological
incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns
though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals, 64
wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina 66 case. Therein, the
Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that
"[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was
to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding
specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: 71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity,
as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics.
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by
evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current
trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is
under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court
has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set
in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present,
and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. CSTHca
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in
Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation
of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the
Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one
member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages
already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74
It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church
doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and
the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 75 Still,
it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of
influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may
have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code
and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular
progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is
merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide
utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the
Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the
Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and
that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the
importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the
institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of
marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based
on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of
course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the
legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the
enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells
out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect
married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely
enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and
2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by
a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed
State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which
in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote
family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the
initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote
wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. SECHIA
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present
petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in
the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected"' by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature." HEcTAI
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law
on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor
General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however was dispensed
with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the
appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is
not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of
respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's
participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records
of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on
this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary
trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity
of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and
personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the
field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts
below considered petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even the
appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner. 80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a
preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed
with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of
the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant
evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily
negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven
by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual
and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to
petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation,
income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked
to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of
psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at
least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to
me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with
the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated
over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant
and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment
of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. . . .
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations
of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations
of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards
another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is
also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is
based on communication between individuals and what we generally
communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far
as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable
of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is
the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been
calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of
the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes,
what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,
which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her
husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then
that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same
way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in
extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact
that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the
marriage? IDcTEA
A- Yes, Ma'am. 83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity
of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that
[she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on
the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony,
as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did
not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos 85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We
deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis
for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common
conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their
own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However,
since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual
premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court
explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent
has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She
has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities.
She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in
a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and
respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such
repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity. 87
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before
she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had
found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year
of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever
such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it
likewise supports the belief that respondent's psychological incapacity, as
borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life
was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted
as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More
disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish
truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and
the trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them,
were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the
legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any
legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly
tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability
to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature
of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the
essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the
evidence convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth,
her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded
much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which
states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment
of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of
the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the
lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her
own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68,
in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the
trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be
able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88
Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts. DTISaH
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion 89 dated
30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of
respondent. 90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92
In fact, respondent's psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause 93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's
consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the
practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from
the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the
marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law
that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were
markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her
matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words,
afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern,
the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as
well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner. 94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only
by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the
proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They
hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court,
of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead
appreciated respondent's version as correct, and the appellate court
affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter
would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that
such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it
did not appear certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that
Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.
However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she
continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is
incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondent's condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that
respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat.
Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's expert witnesses
characterized respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained
silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts'
taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial
court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement
that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code. DTAIaH
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995,
began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code
committee, 96 then the opinion of canonical scholars, 97 before arriving at
its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity. 98
Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of
a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized
"by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However,
in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in
Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of
psychological incapacity. 101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial
court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether
respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did
not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical finding of
incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when
this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, 102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation
that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law
constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted. 103 Yet
we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical
averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was
not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep
reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before
Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not
have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in
those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is
actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation
of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be
insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical
diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling
cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by
the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we
are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological
incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are
further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological
incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was
warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does
the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible
that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with
petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's
avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal
contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in
love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10
August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No
costs. TAcSCH
SO ORDERED.
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D E C I S I O N
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City
of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in
Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo,
Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G.
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures
below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page
of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and
her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she
was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from
illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will
and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously
executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of
any kind such that she could dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of
P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named
Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her
interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in
equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said
spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed
of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the
will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on
September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September
2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following
grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix
was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of
fear.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after
due hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of
Francisco Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her
opposition by alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to
the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took
care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered
its decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but
declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to
the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a
motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the
portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.
Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a
motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees
the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to
intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that
portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied,
both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from
that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and
declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal
heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And
in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several error which,
stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has
oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2)
Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the
probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to
be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene
Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or
in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who
would be benefitted by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor (Idem.). On the other hand, in Saguinsin vs.
Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
"According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an 'interested person.' An interested
party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefitted
by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G., 1171). And it
is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special
proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party
thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G. R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs.
Barrion, 70 Phil. 311)."
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the
provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to
the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she
has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor
does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it
nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or
devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will
either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any
portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she
previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had
already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.
In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the oppositor
acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She
would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but
she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if
it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the
deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding
to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil
Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; . . ." And
the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey vs. Fabie, 68
Phil., 128, as follows:
"'Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or
mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They
cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there
is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. In this, article 943 is based
upon the reality of the facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested
parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the
legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child;
the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources
of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child
nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the
family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more them
recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.' (7
Manresa, 3d ed., p. 110.)"
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents.
As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the
relatives of the adopter.
"The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the
adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as
a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of
the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that
the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption.
Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the
adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between, the adopter and
the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652)
"Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not
extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is
prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal." (An
Outline of Philippines Civil law by Justice Jose B. L, Reyes and Ricardo C.
Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil law,
1955, Vol. 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol.
1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A
was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not
have been admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but
also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix
affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the
evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the
declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the
time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with her
intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation
clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it
was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as
such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the
will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it
was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the
testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses
to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of
the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be
one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the
attestation clause before he signed the document, and that all the
witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the
instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time
and place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively,
that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and
her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided
for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is
also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the
following observation:
"The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof
with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion
that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged
fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for
their supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the
vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico to exclude visitors, took place years after
the execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those facts may have
some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce
yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix,
had she really wanted to, from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did
not in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as
testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen
at the Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied
by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with
her."
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord
with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina
Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert
pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several
years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering
from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for
several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the
instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily
and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the
will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind
that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy
her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her
own (Coso vs. Deza, 42 Phil., 596). The burden is on the person challenging
the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a
matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is
sufficient but was disproved by the testimony the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in
a long line of decisions among which the following may be cited:
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will
cannot be entertained in probate proceeding because its only purpose is
merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law." (Palacios vs. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220)
". . . The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It
does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points
remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. . . .
"From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions
therein contained, it does not follow that such provisions lack of efficiency,
or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not
impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that
the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must
be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to
public morals." (Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-680)
"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts
that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more.
In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions
made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void
and another one valid." Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the
court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will
Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction.
Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for
he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other
pronouncements, touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some
relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the
same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is
ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J. Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur
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([1965V82E] VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANA DEL VAL
CHAN, ETC., oppositor-appellant., G.R. No. L-18753, 1965 Mar 26, En Banc)