1

Introduction

This essay seeks to demonstrate that although the Thai middle class deserves some

credit for deepening democracy in Thailand, it does not translate to Thailand being a

liberal democracy by any interpretation. The promulgation of the 1997 Constitution,

fondly referred to as the ‘People’s Constitution’ which was meant to usher in a

democraticerahasnotonlybeenabused,butrepealedandreplacedwithanoppressive

military-backedConstitutionin2007.

This paper approaches the question by analysing the different political players in

Thailand, and critically evaluating whether their actions or policies furthers

democratisationefforts,orerodesit.

Itissubmittedthatthispapernotonlyevaluatesproceduraldemocraticideals–namely,

free and fair elections – but also substantive democracy involving civil and political

rights.

Thaimiddleclass

InthispartoftheessayIwilldemonstratethroughtheeventsof1973,the1990s,and

the post-2006 Thaksin era, the Thai middle class does not subscribe to democratic

ideals.

Firstly, in the student-led uprising of 14 October 1973 where the Thai state was

confrontedwith the bourgeoisie resulted from socio-economic policies and expanded

nationaleducationscheme.ThisuprisingsubsequentlyleadtothedownfalloftheSarit,

Thanom, and Praphat military regime, and the establishment of a constitutional

democracy.However, this ‘victory fordemocracy’wasunderminedon6October1976

2

whenthemilitaryopenedfireonprotestorsatThammasatUniversitythatwasmetby

middle-classapathy.1

Although short lived, I will consider the quality of democracy during this three-year

periodtoseewhetherdemocraticidealswereembracedbythemiddleclass.Firstly,the

electocrats electedwere largely interested in short-term financial and factional gains.

For thisgroup, theestablishmentofparliamentarydemocracyservedasnothingmore

than a golden opportunity to convert their questionable wealth and influence into

national politics.2Tejapira submitted that this group treated politics as nothingmore

thanabusiness,oftentimessellingpublicpolicytothehighestbidder.3

Ockeyconsidersanalternativeangle,namelythatthe6Octobermassacreevidencesthe

‘lack of a unified middle class with a clear awareness of its interests’.4 Benedict

Anderson attributed this to the new middle class’ insecurity that their ‘ascent from

backstreetdustwouldendwhere ithadbegun’,andassuch, ‘thosewhohadsincerely

supportedthemassdemonstrationsin1973welcomedthereturntodictatorshipthree

yearslater’.5

Thisinterpretationofthe1973-1976eventsevidencesthatnotonlydidthemiddle-class

not demonstrate a comprehensive knowledgeof substantivedemocratic ideals; itwas

alsoalow-quality,andexclusionaryproceduraldemocracy.

1KasianTejapira,2006.‘TopplingThaksin’.InNewLeftReview39:122ibid3ibid:144JamesOckey,2004.‘Makingdemocracy:Leadership,class,gender,andpoliticalparticipationinThailand’(UniversityofHawaiiPress)page1605BenedictAnderson,1997.‘Withdrawalsymptoms:SocialandculturalaspectsoftheOctober6Coup.’InBulletinofConcernedAsianScholars9:19

3

TheThaieconomicboominthe1980s-1990sthroughthediversificationofitseconomy,

shift from traditional agricultural to industrialization oriented exports, and also a big

influx of foreign direct investment lead to many scholars of modernization theory

predictingthatthisnewurbanmiddleclasswillnurturedemocraticidealsinThailand.

However, as I will prove in this part of the paper, themiddle class actionswere not

alwaysmotivatedbygreateradoptionofdemocraticideals.

Firstly, this is evidenced when the middle class who firstly protested against the

Chatichaigovernment,which leadtoamilitarycoupthat instatedGeneralSuchindaas

theirleader.TheFarEasternEconomicReviewreportedatthetimethatthecoup“was

widely accepted” and “almost popular.”6. However, public opinion on the unelected

General Suchinda only changed when he ran for office, backtracking on his earlier

promisethathewasuninterested.Inresponsetothisevent,publicopiniononthe1991

coup-makerschanged.Nolongerweretheyviewedasselfless,butinsteadgreedy,self-

interestedandcorrupt.Onlyafterpublicopinionhadchangeddidproteststhatleadto

ejection of the military government started. Englehart argues that this clearly

demonstrates that the protests were more about ‘corruption than democracy in any

formal,proceduralform’.7

Englehart’s argument is corroborated by Girling and Voravidh’s submission that the

‘middleclasstendstobepragmatic,materialisticandself-interested–

Theyonlysupportdemocracyifthealternativeprovidesconditionsantitheticaltotheir

interests’.8

6RodneyTasker,1991.‘PopularPutsch’.FarEasternEconomicReviewpage177NeilEnglehart,2003.‘DemocracyandtheThaimiddleclass:Globalisation,modernization,andconstitutionalchange.InAsianSurvey(43)2:2618ErikKuhonta,2008.‘AresearchnoteonthemiddleclassanddemocracyinThailand’.<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=erik_kuhonta>accessed17thMarch2015

4

Englehartthenputsforthanalternativetheoryforthemainreasonfordemocratization

ofThailandinthe1990s.HeattributedthistotheliberalizationofThailand’seconomy

during this period, and Thailand’s reliance on foreign investment. How this lead to

democratization was due to the fact that foreign investors had preference for

democraticregimesasitwasviewedtobemorestable.However,Englehartmakesnote

that this analysis only impinged on local politics to the extent that it helped

democratizationeffortsalreadypursuedbyactivists.9

However,itisimportanttonotethatdemocraticactivistsatthetimeliketheCampaign

forPopularDemocracy(CPD)groupconsistedofawiderangeofplayersfromdifferent

backgrounds, and was not limited to middle-class participation. Furthermore,

monitoring groups like PollWatchwhich had been set up to ensure theMarch 1992

electionswere clean and fair, and to encourage democratic consciousness among the

populationplayedapivotalroleinthedeepeningofdemocracytoo.10

The third case study for themiddle-class’ role in democratisation efforts in Thailand

concerns the middle-class involvement in the People’s Alliance of Democracy (PAD),

morecommonlyknownasthe‘YellowShirts’.ThePADwasformedin2006,anditscore

leaders were Chamlong Srimaung, Sondi Limthongkul, Somsak Kosaisuk, Somekeit

Pongpaibul and Pipob Thongchai. The Yellow Shirts consisted of a loose grouping of

royalists,urbanmiddleclass,andultra-nationalists.11

OneofthefirstinstancesthatdemonstratetheYellowShirts’lackofdeferencetowards

thedemocratic rule of law is seen after theKinghad tasked the courts to resolve the

political crisis in 2007. After publically supporting the court’s decision to dissolve

9Englehart:2003:25410WilliamCallahan,1998.‘ImaginingDemocracy’(InstituteofSoutheastAsianStudies)pages114-11711NickNostitz,2009.‘RedvsYellow:Thailand’scrisisofidentity’(WhiteLotusPress)page8

5

ThaksinShinawatra’sThaiRakThaiparty(TRT),andcallingforarespectfortheruleof

law– theysubsequentlydemonstrateddoublestandardswhenthecourtsubsequently

issuedarrestwarrantsfornineofthetopPADleaders.12

ThisIsubmitisoneofthemanyinstancesthatdemonstratestheYellowShirts,andthe

urbanmiddleclass’shypocriticalpositionwhenitcomestodemocracy.

After successfully forcingThaksin into exile, thePAD leader Sondhi launched the ‘last

whistleblow’ where the PAD would seek to takeover Government House to block a

meeting of the People’s Power Party (PPP) cabinet. After the PAD was successful in

doing so, PrimeMinister (PM) Samak Sundaravej offered to call for a referendum to

allow popular opinion to decide the next PM thatwas promptly rejected by the PAD.

This lead to an impasse which the constitutional court resolved by finding Samak in

violationoftheconstitutionforparticipatinginatelevisioncookingshow.13

AsonlySamakwasbannedfrompolitics,thePPPtopbrasschoseSomchaiWongsawat,

whowasmarried to Thaksin’s younger sister Yaowapha as PM. In response, the PAD

implemented “King Taksin Operation” aimed at pressuring PM Somchai to resign

unconditionally. This lead to another intervention by the activist constitutional court

whichdissolvedthePPPforvotebuying,andbanningtheexecutives, includingthePM

frompoliticalparticipationforfiveyears.14

Followingthis,thePADannouncedvictory,andmoreworryinglythattheywouldreturn

tothestreetsifthenewgovernmentwasnottoitsliking.JamesOckeyarguedthatthe

greatestdamagedonebyPAD’sactionswasto thatof thedemocraticsystemitself.By

12DuncanMcCargo,2009.‘ThaipoliticsasrealityTV’.InTheJournalofAsianStudies(68)1:1413JamesOckey,2009.‘Thailandin2008:Democracyandstreetpolitics’.InSoutheastAsianAffairspage32314ibid:327

6

outrightly refusing to recognise democratic outcomes, and in promoting a coup and

greater involvement of the constitutional court in politics, the PAD had damaged the

foundationsofdemocracyinThailand.15

MarcSaxerprovidesaninsightfulanalysistothereasonswhytheThaimiddle-classdid

not democratise asmodernisation scholars predicted. Saxer attributes this to the fact

thatonce ‘democracywas institutionalised, they foundthemselves tobethestructural

minority’.Hewentontosubmitthat theThaimiddleclass feels liketheyweregetting

‘robbed’asitwastheirtaxrevenuesthatwerebeingusedbycorruptpoliticianstobuy

‘ruralvotes’insteadofupgradingpublicinfrastructure.16

Inthispartoftheessay,IhavedemonstratedthattheThaimiddle-classwassplitinthe

1970s,andwerenotacohesiveclassthatfoughtfordemocraticidealsaslaterprovenin

1976.However,themiddle-classdeservessomecreditforthedeepeningofdemocracy

inThailand in the1990s, although the economic crisis and civic society organisations

playedrolestoo.Inthepost-Thaksinera,theurbanmiddle-classwiththeirsupportfor

theYellowShirtshasultimatelyunderminedthefoundationsofdemocracyinThailand.

ThaksinShinawatra

The secondpart of this paperwill demonstrate thehighlydivisivebillionaireThaksin

Shinawatra playing an active role in blocking democratisation efforts in Thailand by

abusingtheConstitutionalamendmentsin1997.

The1997People’sConstitutionwas intended topromote transparency, accountability

and stability by strengthening the executive, establishing a fully elected bicameral

15ibid:33116MarcSaxer,2014.‘HowThailand’smiddleclassthreatensdemocracy’.<http://www.socialeurope.eu/2014/01/thailands-middle-class/>accessed16thMarch2015

7

legislature,introducinganewelectoralsystemthatfavouredlargermorestablepolitical

parties,andinstallingnewindependentagenciestoactaschecksandbalances.17

However,thisnobleintentionenabledtheriseofThaksin’sTRT.Thaksinwonthe2001

electionsandbecamethe firstPMtocompletea four-year term.Hesubsequentlywon

the2005 elections in a landslide victorywinning almost 61per cent of the votes and

almost three quarters of seats in elected Lower House. Prima facie this looks like

democraticrulehasfinallybeenestablishedinThailand.Howeveruponclosescrutiny,it

becomesevidentthatalthoughhederivedhis legitimacythroughelections,heruledin

anauthoritarianmanner.18

Moreover,Thaksin’smethodofgoverningwasanaffront to theprinciplesof the1997

Constitution. Under Thaksin, wealthy entrepreneurs played a key role in running the

country, and popular participation was, as Duncan McCargo described, ‘reduced to a

consumption mode: voters and citizens would merely be end users of products

developedbyatechnocraticandentrepreneurialelite’.Additionally,institutionsshould

nottempergovernmentpolicies.19

AlthoughwidelycreditedwithbringingThailandtotheworld’seconomicstage,itwasat

the expense of rampant cronyism and corruption. Critics accuse him of instituting

authoritarianrulebehindafaçadeofdemocraticlegitimacyflowingfromelections.20

Additionally, it is submitted that Thaksin also circumvents the 1997 constitution in

order to protect his personal interests and only invokes it when it benefits him. For

17ThitinanPongsudhirak,2008.‘ThailandSinceTheCoup’.InJournalforDemocracy(19)4:14118ibid:14219DuncanMcCargoandUkristPathmanand,2005.‘ThaksinisationofThailand’(NIASPress)page1420Pongsudhirak2008:143

8

example,Article110ofthe1997ConstitutionprohibitedanyMemberofParliamentto

ownacompanyholdingstateconcession.Thaksintransferredthebulkofhisassets to

wifeandchildrentocircumventthis.21

AnotherexampleofThaksinavoidinginstitutionalchecksandbalanceswasseenwhen

hemobilisedhisallieswiththeintentionofpressuringtheConstitutionalCourtwhowas

hearinghis corruption case. This interferencedemonstrates a lack of respect towards

theConstitutionalCourtandalsojudicialprocedures.22

WhentheCourtclearedhimofthecorruptionchargesinAugust2001,hetoldreporters

that he derives a greater legitimacy than the appointed independent bodies as he

received elevenmillion votes in the elections. According to this line of argument, the

TRT’s massive mandate grants them legitimacy to circumvent check and balance

institutionsthatweresetupunderthe1997Constitution.

Furthermore, a 2002 survey found that the newly consumerist Thai peasantry had

sufferedfromtheeconomiccrisis,andconsequentlybecameincreasinglydependenton

the local godfathers. Politically, these godfathers act as canvasserswhomobilise their

network for politicians in return for political favours. Thaksin’sTRT exploited this by

usinggovernmentbudgettobuyupthesecanvasserswholesale.23

Ontheotherhand,Thaksinusedhistermsinofficetodramaticallybolsterhisfamily’s

fortune. In1995,Thaksinhadputhis own fortune at 70billionbaht, andby2003, his

family-owned companies were valued at over 425billion baht – amounting to almost

21McCargoandPathmanand2005:1422McCargoandPathmanand2005:1523Tejapira2006:28

9

ninepercentofallthestockstradingontheThaistockmarket.24Besidesbolsteringhis

personalwealth,ThaksinalsoplunderedtherevenueoftheGovernmentLotteryOffice

(GLO).Promotinghis friend,SurasitSangkapongas itsDirectorGeneral,didthis.Since

theGLO’scofferswerenotsubjectedtoparliamentaryscrutiny,Thaksintreateditashis

personal cash cow to fundhiswildly populist policies designed to appeal to the rural

voters.Usingthisfundtoavoidparliamentaryscrutinyisarguedtobeanotherexample

ofThaksincircumventinganinstitutionsetupunderthe1997Constitution.

Additionally,Thaksinalsounderminedtheautonomyof thepolice forceby interfering

with promotions.However unlike his predecessors, Thaksinwent further through his

anti-drugs policy and suppression of ‘dark influences’. To carry out these policies,

Thaksinreliedonaninnercircleofseniorpoliceofficers.OneofThaksin’sobjectivesfor

introducingthesepolicieswastounderminethefinancialbaseofhispoliticalrivalswho

areoftentimes involved in thedrug trade.25Inexecuting thepolicies tounderminehis

politicalrivals,Thaksinauthorisedthenarcoticssuppressionofficersandpoliceto‘take

all necessary steps’ – including extra-judicial killings. These killings that began hours

before the launch of thewar on drugs, endedwith over three thousand people dead.

HumansRightsWatchcondemnedthispolicy,chargingittobeaviolationofdueprocess

thateveryhumanbeingisentitledto,andalsoaviolationofbasichumanrights.26

All thiscoupledwith the fact thathemade themilitaryhis long-termpoliticalbaseby

promotinghisrelativesandclassmatesfromtheArmedForcesAcademiesPreparatory

School Class 10 had effectively created an elaborate network entirely dependent, and

subordinatedtoThaksin.27

24McCargoandPathmanand2005:21625McCargoandPathmanand2005:22726‘Humanrightsabusesandthewarondrugs’.<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm>accessed19thMarch201527McCargoandPathmanand2005:147

10

Although he derived his legitimacy from elections, his consolidation of power while

underminingthe independentbodies issubmittedtobeanaffront togooddemocratic

practice. Thaksin’s government effectively amounts to an authoritarian rule with no

spaceformeaningfulopposition.

Monarchy

This section of the paper seeks to demonstrate that although absolute monarchy in

Thailandended in1932,KingBhumibol, throughaculturalpassivecounter-revolution

hasestablishedhimselfasthemosthegemonicmonarchinmodernThaihistory.28

McCargosuggeststhattheroyalinstitutionoperatesona‘networkmonarchy’–aform

of semi-monarchical rule ‘underpinned by nostalgia for pre-1932 absolute monarchy

while being temperedby a reluctant recognition that nomodernThaiKing canbe an

absoluteruler’.Themain featuresof thisnetworkmonarchyare that theKinghas the

final say in political decisions in times of crisis, he is the ultimate source of national

legitimacyandmostimportantly,isintimatelyinvolvedinpolitics.29

Generallywhena leader isunable tobe anautocrat, hehas an incentive to cooperate

with others in the formation of a non-autocratic government. However in Thailand,

althoughtheKingpermitstheformationofapparentlyrepresentativegovernments,he

laterutilitieshisnetworkstounderminethem.30

The 1973 events demonstrate this, where frustrated with the shortcomings of the

military, bureaucratic and political leadership, he supported the student-led uprising

28Tejapira2006:1729DuncanMcCargo,2005.‘NetworkMonarchy’.InThePacificReview(18)4:500-50130ibid:502

11

againsttheThanomKittikachornandPraphasCharusathienmilitaryregime.31However,

merelythreeyearslaterin1976thepalacegavetacitsupporttothebloodyeventsof6

October.Appearingonradiotwodaysafterthemassacreofstudentdemonstrators,the

kingexpressedastrongendorsementforthemilitarycoup.32

On theotherhand,whenChatichaiChoonavan succeededPremTinsulanondasPrime

Ministerin1988,ChatichaitriedtodismantletheundemocraticnetworkstheKingand

Premhadbuilt.However,asthiswasagainsttheKing’sinterest,thepalacehadnotonly

supportedthemilitarycoupagainsthimin1991,butalsogiventhecoupleadersprior

consent.33In relation to themuch-criticised draft constitutionwritten by themilitary

regime forallowinganunelectedperson tobePM, theKingweighed inandurged the

people to accept it as it was ‘reasonable’ and could ‘gradually be amended the

democraticway’.34

ThisIsubmitdemonstratesthattheKingisnotonlysupportingamilitaryregimeatthe

expense of democratic ideals, he does not conform with the traditional model of a

constitutionalmonarchywhoissupposedtobeabovepolitics.

Additionally in 2006when themilitary overthrew the democratically electedThaksin

government, theKing gave themilitary-appointed government a royal blessing. In his

birthday speech, theKingapplauded the ‘personal sacrifice’madeby thenewCabinet

membersto‘salvage’thecountry.35

31MichaelConnors,2003.‘DemocracyandNationalIdentityinThailand’(RoutledgeCurzon)page13032Tejapira2006:1233KevinHewison,1997.‘PoliticaloppositionsandregimechangeinThailand’.InPoliticalOppositionsinIndustrialisingAsia(Routledge)page7034KevinHewison,1997.‘Themonarchyanddemocratisation’.InPoliticalChangeinThailand(Routledge)page7035‘Thailand’skingendorsesthecoup’,2006.<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/thailands-king-endorses-the-coup/>accessed12March2015

12

The wording used by the King in his birthday speech aptly demonstrates how little

deferencehehastowardsademocraticallyelectedgovernment(albeitonebeingridden

withcorruptionandcronyism).Hewisonsuggeststhatthis isduetotheKingreferring

to himself as ‘elected king’, on the basis of the palace’s enormous popularity. Ergo,

conferring upon him a ‘super-mandate’ from the people that then justifies his

interventions in thepolitics.Thisestablishes thathehas littleregard forwhatMorrell

andChai-Anancallthe‘politicalnoiseofrepresentativeprocesses’.36

This form of picking whoever suits his interest most is submitted to be inherently

illiberal as it marginalises formal political institutions and procedures. It also

underminesdemocraticprinciplessuchastheruleoflawandpopularsovereignty.37

WhilescholarssuggeststhatmonarchiesinSoutheastAsiacanprovidespecialassetsto

supportdemocratictransition,itisarguedherethatinThailand,themonarchyhaslong

beendedicatedtoresistingdemocraticchange,embracingthecauseofpoliticalreform

onlybelatedlyandreluctantly.38KingBhumibol,andtheroyalinstitutioninThailandis

undoubtedlyoneofthepartiesguiltyofblockingdemocratisationeffortsinthecountry.

Military

The last section of this paper will demonstrate that from the outset of modern Thai

politico-history, themilitaryhasacted in its interest at theexpenseofdemocracyand

thetraditionalseparationofmilitaryandcivilianpolitics.

36DavidMorrellandChai-AnanSamudavinija,1981.‘PoliticalconflictinThailand:Reform,reaction,revolution’(Oelgeschlager,Gunn&Hain)page27137McCargo2005:50138McCargo2005:504

13

The 1932 coup d’étatwhich lead to the firstwritten constitution in Thailandwas no

matter howbeautifullywritten, a document to consolidate power in the hands of the

militaryelite.39

In 1991, after the military overthrew the Chatichai elected government on alleged

grounds of rampant corruption, the coup-makers formed the National Peace Keeping

Council(NPKC)torunthecountry.TheleadersappointedAnandPanyarachunasPM.At

first, the military-lead leadership gained popular support in Thailand due to its

undemocraticnatureashewasseenastobenotbeholdentowardsanypartyorinterest

group.Howeverwhen they sensed that oppositionwasbuilding towards their regime

following the election of General Suchinda to PM, and the hunger strikes by Chalart

Vorachart and Chamlong Srimaung – the military opened fire upon the protestors

leadingtotheeventsof‘BloodyMay1992’.Itissubmittedthatthequellingoflegitimate

dissentisinfringinguponthecivillibertiesoftheThaipeople.40

Followingthe2006coupagainstThaksin, themilitary formedtheCouncil forNational

Security (CNS) in order to govern the country. The CNS then formed a separate

Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), assigning them the responsibility to draft a

Constitution within six months. This process however was lacking any semblance of

democracyastheCNShadissuedbindingguidelinesonthecontentoftheConstitution,

and also had ignored any meaningful public consultation. Additionally, although the

draftConstitutionwasofferedbeforepublicreferendum,themilitaryhadcautionedthe

electoratethatiftheyrejectedthedraftConstitution,themilitarywouldpickoneofthe

previousseventeenconstitutions.41

39KobkuaSuwannathat-Pian,2003.‘Kings,CountryandConstitutions’(RoutledgeCurzon)page3640Englehart,2003:25641BjornDressel,2009.‘Thailand’selusivequestforaworkableconstitution’.InContemporarySoutheastAsia31(2):303

14

Moreover,thecompositionoftheConstitutiondraftersdrewquestionsoflegitimacyof

thedraftingprocess.AccordingtoArticles19-25ofthemilitary’sinterimconstitution–

Two-hundredCDAmemberswouldbeelectedfromthemilitaryappointed2000-strong

NationalPeople’sAssembly(NPA).Fromthispooloftwohundredcandidates, theCNS

willshortlistahundredcandidatesfortheCDA,whowillsubsequentlyelecttwenty-five

members to the Constitution Drafting Committee. The problem with this selection

processisthatalloftheinitialcandidatesareappointedbythemilitary,whichwillhave

considerable influence on the drafting process removing any sort of democratic

elements.42

Furthermore,thenominationprocessatthefirststagewasunderminedbyballotsbeing

circulated hours before voting which invited lobbying, bloc voting and more

importantly, vote buying.43As a consequence of these efforts, the military’s interests

were significantly better represented in the Constitution Drafting Committee as

comparedtothepeople’sinterests.

Byanalysingthedebatesonthe2007constitution,onecansubsumethatitwasfocussed

oninstitutionalarrangementstopreventaconcentrationofexecutivepowerandsingle-

partydominancethroughthereinforcementoftheindependentoversightagenciesand

thejudiciary.Thisexercisereinforcedthetrendtowards‘judicialising’Thaipoliticsthat

hadbegunwiththe1997Constitution.44

Theseprovisionsareobviously intendedtominimise theroleThaksinShinawatraand

his Thai Rak Thai politicians play in Thai politics by removing their legal and moral

42Ibid:30343‘200shortlistedtodraftnewCharter,butaccusationsmadeofimproperNPAvote’,BangkokPost,20December200644Dressel2009:304

15

legitimacy gained through popular elections. By creating these dubious institutions, it

wouldbeeasierforthemilitary,orthebureaucratstotakeextra-democraticmeasures

tooustanelectedPrimeMinister.45

Prior to the constitutional referendum, Somkid Lertpaitoon, the CDC Secretary had

warned theThaipeople that if they reject thedraft constitution, itwouldbe replaced

with a CNS-drafted version. Additionally, the military junta passed legislation

prohibiting criticismof thedraft constitution,making thosewhodoso liable toheavy

finesorimprisonment.Thishadtheeffectofmuzzlingdissent,whileindirectlycoercing

thepopulationtoadopttheConstitution.Thisseverelyhamperedtherighttoautonomy

ofchoiceanotherwisedemocraticregimewouldprovide.46

The2007Constitutionhadtheeffectofunderminingtheexecutivebypreventingsingle-

party dominance. This was achieved by altering critical institutional arrangements,

resultinginadispersionofpoliticalpower,hencediminishingtheimpactofdemocratic

electoral process. Also, by reverting from single-member to multi-member

constituencies, itfragmentsthevotethatpreventsaconcentrationofvotesforasingle

popularparty.Additionally,thisblocvotingprovidesindividualpoliticiansincentivesto

pursue personal interests rather than collective party strategies, further undermining

partysolidarityinParliament.47

Moreover, the number of Senatorswas also dropped from200 to 150,with 76 being

directly elected while the remaining 74 being appointed by a seven-member Senate

Selection Committee consisting of heads of independent agencies and judges. As the

senatorsareresponsiblefortheappointmentoftheindependentagenciesandjudges,it

45Dressel2009:30546Dressel2009:30647Dressel2009:310-311

16

presents a clear conflict interest that not only undermines the Senate, but also the

legitimacyandindependenceoftheagenciesandcourts.48

The revision of Article 237(2) of the Constitution allows the Constitution Court to

dissolveanentirepoliticalparty if oneof itsmembers is foundviolatingelection law.

This confers upon the judges’ far-reaching powers in the Thai political process. In a

liberaldemocraticgovernment,aprovisionlikethisservesasagreatprotectoragainst

corruptpoliticalpractices.However,aswasestablishedintheprecedingparagraph,the

‘independent’ bodies and courts in Thailand in 2007 suffers from a lack of

independence. Dressel concludes that these ‘further judicialisation’ of Thai politics is

meanttocontaintheinfluenceoftheurbanandruralpoorwhomconstitutethemajority

oftheelectorateinThailand.49

Moreover,Article309ofthe2007Constitutiongrantedblanketamnestytoallactorsin

the2006coup,and2006-2007militaryadministrations.Thevaguewordingusedleaves

apossibilityforwiderinterpretationofamnestytoalsocoverfuturemilitaryactions.50

Byanalysingtheconstitutionalchangespromotedbythemilitary,itisobviousthatthe

military is acting in its own interests, despite the fact that it claims otherwise.When

comparedtothemilitarycoupin1992,itisalsoevidentthatthemilitary’sroleinThai

politics is not on the wane, but instead it is constantly increasing with the military

systematicallyconsolidatingpowerintheThaipoliticalrealm.

The fact that the military’s Internal Security Operations Command had passed the

InternalSecurityAct2008substantiatesthisclaim.ThisActconferswidediscretionto

48Dressel2009:31149Dressel2009:311-31350PaulChambers,2010.‘Thailandonthebrink’.InAsianSurvey(50)5:847

17

the top military officers to define what constitutes an internal security threat, and

allowing indefinitely arrests and detentions without warrants, while preventing the

prosecution of soldiers for human rights violations.51This Act is submitted to be an

affronttotheruleoflawasitcircumventstheappropriatejudicialproceduresandthe

right todueprocess.Additionally, this legislationprovidesnosafeguards forThaicivil

liberties.52

OnMay222014,theNationalCouncilforPeaceandOrder(NCPO)toppledtheelected

government of Yingluck Shinawatra. The establishment of martial law and further

deterioration of Thai democratic rights followed quickly behind. Under martial law,

political activitiesarebanned,public assembliesofmore than fivepeoplearedeemed

illegal, the media is heavily censored, police are given wide discretion to search and

seize items, andpeople canbe summoned anddetained for up to sevendayswithout

charge.53

Furthermore, the NCPO leader Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha is able to

orderanycriminalcasetobeheldinamilitarycourt.HumanRightsWatchcriticizesthis

tobeagainsttheprinciplesofafairtrialasthereisnoassurancethatthosechargedwill

be given an equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice. This is

submittedtobeafurthererosionoftheThaijudiciary,andalsodemocraticrights.54

51InternalSecurityAct2008.<http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/tlaw0342.pdfaccessed>15March201552PaulChambers,2010.‘Thailandonthebrink:Resurgentmilitary,erodeddemocracy’.InAsianSurvey50(5):848-84953‘MultipletargetsThaimartiallaw’,2015.<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/multiple-targets-thailand-martial-law/>accessed19March201554‘Thailand:Endmilitarydetentionofcivilians’,2015.<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/13/thailand-end-military-detention-civilians>accessed19March2015

18

The fact that 73peoplehave faced trial before themilitary courts for participation in

anti-coupprotests, 23 people for lèsemajesté under the Computer CrimeAct, and54

people for charges of committing acts of terrorism further evidences the fact that

martial law in 2014 was meant to silent military regime opposition.55Furthermore,

HumanRightsWatchhascriticizedthisdetentionofciviliansasbeinganinfringementof

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that ensures due

processandarbitraryarrestordetention.56

In this section of the essay, I have critically analysed the key events inmodern Thai

historywhere themilitary had played a role in. In each event I have proven that the

military does not act ‘for the greater good’ of the nation as it proudly proclaims, but

insteadtoprotectitsowninterests.

Conclusion

TheThaimiddleclassdeservescreditforthedemocratisationofThailandinthe1990s

thatleadtothecreationofvariousindependentmonitoringinstitutions.Nevertheless,it

is important to note that the contribution towards democracy made by the Asian

FinancialCrisis,andotheractivistsduringthatperiod.However,Iarguethatthemiddle

classnow isoneof thebiggestobstacles towards furtherdemocratisation inThailand.

Through its participationwith the PAD, it has set a dangerous precedent of claiming

vetooverthedemocraticprocessandreservingforitselfmoralauthoritytodecidethe

PM.This,IsubmiterodesthefoundationsofThaidemocracy.

55‘MultipletargetsThaimartiallaw’,2015.<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/multiple-targets-thailand-martial-law/>accessed19March201556‘Thailand:Endmilitarydetentionofcivilians’,2015.<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/13/thailand-end-military-detention-civilians>accessed19March2015

19

However, it is also important to note the role played by other political players in

blocking Thai democracy. For example, ex-PM Thaksin who although derived his

legitimacy from elections, consolidated power for himself while undermining the

monitoringbodies.TheKingisalsoguiltyasheplaysanactiverolebyabusinghismoral

legitimacy to influence political outcomes. Lastly, the military through either its

military-backedconstitutions,declarationsofmartiallaw,orabusesofhumanrightsis

arguedtobethebiggestobstaclefordemocratisationdeepeninginThailand.

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