GPG 1997 No - Complete Pictureregulations.completepicture.co.uk/pdf/Planning/Enforcing...

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION Page9

PREFACE OF DOS AND DON’TS Page11

CHAPTER 1 Page13

Stating theauthority’senforcementpolicy

Introduction1.1 Why apolicy is needed1.2 Reviewingthepolicy1.3 Thepolicy statement1.4-1.5 Formulatingthepolicy statement1.6-1.7 The availabilityof appealcostsin enforcementproceedings1.6 Unreasonable behaviour1.7 Surcharge only for“wilful misconduct”

CHAPTER 2 Page16

Investigating allegationsof unauthorised development

Introduction2.1 Establishingtheplanning history

2.2 Recordingthe investigation

2.3 Citizen’s charterstandards

2.4 The authority’s investigativepowers

2.5-2.7 The planningcontraventionnotice

2.8 Compensationfor loss ordamageresultingfrom subsequentstop notice

2.9 Accessto HM LandRegistry2.10-2.11 Othersourcesof information in theCouncil’s records

2.12 Theright of entryto land for enforcementpurposes

2.13 Theduty to administeracautionduring investigation

CHAPTER 3 Page20

Decidingwhetherto takeformal enforcementaction

3.1 Introduction

3.2 The requirementof “reasonableness”3.3 The Local GovernmentOmbudsman’sjurisdiction3.4 Theimportanceof judicial authority

3.5 Government’splanningguidance

3.6 Substantiatingadecisionnot to takeenforcementaction

3.7-3.8 Thealternativecourseof granting planningpermission3.7 Informing neighboursandinviting views3.8 Otherconsultation3.9-3.10 Timing of the authorisationto issueanenforcement notice3.11-3.12Consideringwhetherit is “expedient”to issuean enforcementnotice

3.13-3.15“Issueestoppel”

3.13 The leadingcases

3.14 Inapplicableto planningmerits

3.15 Inapplicableto noticesquashed on proceduralgrounds

CHAPTER 4 5

Issuinganenforcementnotice

4.1 Introduction—whatis meantby “issuing” a notice

4.2 Properauthorisation toissue anotice

4.3 Delegationof functionsto acommittee4.4 Delegationof functionsto an authorisedofficer

CHAPTER 5 Page 27

Formulatingthe termsof anenforcementnotice

5.1 Introduction— the needfor clarity andprecision

5.2 The legislativerequirements

5.3-5.4 Statingthemattersconstitutingtheallegedbreachof planning control

5.5-5.6 Nullity andinvalidity

5.7 Alleging separatebreachesof planningcontrol in onenotice

5.8-5.9 Categorisingtheallegedbreach

5.8 The two typesof breach

5.9 Issuingnoticesin thealternative5.10-5-12 Specifyingthe stepsrequiredby the enforcementnotice

5.10 Precisionneededfor subsequentprosecution

5.11 Basicprinciples

5.12 Examplesof unenforceablerequirements

5.13 Makingthe developmentcomplywith the termsof aplanningpermission

5.14-5.15Discontinuanceof useof land or restorationto its previouscondition

5.14 Takingcarenot to requiremorethan is justified

5.15 Removingoperationaldevelopmentat the sametime5.16 Remedyingany injury to amenitycausedby the breach

5.17-5.18“Under-enforcement”

5.17 Section173(11)

5.18 Confirmingdeemedpermissiononcenoticecompliedwith

5.19-5.22 Specifyingtheeffectivedate ofanenforcementnotice

5.19 A calendar date

5.20-5.22Relationshipto date ofserviceandperiod for appeal

5.22 Effectof Sections175(4) and289(4A)

5.23-5.25 Specifyingthecomplianceperiodin anenforcementnotice

5.23 The requirementto specifyandthepowerto extend

5.24-5.25How long to allow

5.26-5.27 SpecifyingtheLPA’s reasonsfor issuingthe notice

5.26 Requirement ofRegulationsand examplenotices

5.27 Whyreasonsare neededandwhat theyshouldcontain

5.28-5.30 Specifyingthe enforcementnotice land

5.28 Requirement ofRegulationsandthe needfor precision

5.29 Why aplan is best5.30 Whenaplan is not essential5.31 Explanationof the enforcementappealprovisionsandprocedure

CHAPTER 6 6

The responseto anenforcementnoticeappeal

6.1 The statutoryright of appeal

6.2-6.5 The groundsof appeal

6.2 The sevengrounds

6.3 Ground (a) andthe deemedapplication

6.4 Grounds(b), (c), (d) and (e) (the“legal grounds”)

6.5 Grounds(f) and(g)

6.6-6.7 The enforcementappealprocess

6.6 Theneedfor promptresponses andthepursuitof anegotiated settlement

6.7 Thethreetypesof procedure

6.8 Requirements tobe fulfilled by theLPA6.9 Inquiry appeals

6.10 Public notification of the inquiry andappeal

6.11 Powerto quash theenforcement noticeon proceduralgrounds

6.12-6.14Possiblewithdrawalof an enforcementnoticeduringthe appeal6.12 Monitoring representationsandconsideringpossibledefects

6.13 Noticesissuedin the alternative

6.14 Notification of the withdrawal6.15-6.17Inquiry appeals:preparingfor the inquiry

6.15 How bestto presentthe evidence6.16 Documentaryevidence

6.17 Recordingdevelopmentssinceissuingtheenforcementnotice

6.18 The onusof proof

6.19 The testapplicableto evidence

6.20. Possiblegrantof planningpermission onappeal6.21 Award of costsin enforcementappealproceedings

6.22-6.26Scrutinisingthe appealdecision

6.22 How to implementor whetherto challenge6.23 If the decisionis favourableto theLPA

6.24 If the decisionis unfavourableto theLPA

6.25 Whetherto challenge and, ifso, whichprocedure touse6.26 Thepossibilityof a submissionto judgment

CHAPTER 7 Page44

Serving astopnotice

7.1 Purposeof a stopnotice7.2-7.5 The scopeof a stop notice

7.2 Mustderivedirectly from the enforcementnotice

7.3 Stopping anactivity onall or partof thesite

7.4 Prohibitory,not remedial

7.4 Stopping anancillaryor incidentalactivity

7.5 Whatcannotbeprohibited7.6 Authority for serviceof a stopnotice

7.7-7.9 Therecipientof astop notice

7.7 Therequirementfor service

7.8 Displayinga sitenotice7.9 Annexing a copyof theenforcement notice

7.10 Time-limit for compliancewith a stopnotice7.11 Whenthe effectof a stopnoticeceases

7.12 Formulating the termsof a stopnotice

7.12 The needfor precisionto providea basisfor prosecution

7.13 Mattersof factand degree

7.14 Assessingastopnotice’s likely consequences

7.15 Prosecutinga stopnoticecontravention

7.16 Injunction in supportof a stopnotice7.17-7.19The LPA’s possible liabilityto compensationwhereastop noticeis served

7.17 Exaggerationof therisk7.18 Whencompensationis payable

7.19 Time-limit for claiming compensation

CHAPTER 8 Page50

Servinga breachof condition notice(BCN)

Introduction

8.1 A summaryprocedure

8.2-8.4 ChoosingbetweenaBCN andanenforcementnotice

8.3 Some advantagesof a BCN

8.4 Possibledisadvantagesof a BCN8.5 The recipientof a BCN

8.6-8.7 Formulatingthe termsof a BCN

8.8 The complianceperiod

8.9-8.11 The defenceagainstprosecution

8.9 Section 187A(11)(a)

8.10 Section 187A(11)(b)

8.11 Theonusof proof tobe dischargedin relyingon thesedefences

CHAPTER 9 Page 54

Obtaininganenforcementinjunction

9.1-9.3 Thestatutory provisions9.4-9.8 The scopeof anenforcement injunction9.4 “Apprehended” breach ofplanningcontrol9.5 Whento seekan injunction

9.6-9.8 Relevantcaselaw

9.9 Thepersonalnatureof injunctive proceedings

9.10 Procedurewhere aperson’sidentity is unknown9.11 A possibleundertakingin damages

9.12 Failure to observethe requirementsof an injunction

9.13 Consideringwhetherto initiate injunctive proceedings

CHAPTER 10 Page59

“Default” actionto securecompliancewith enforcementnotice

10.1 The “default” power10.2 Thescopeof defaultaction

10.3 Thepossibilityof judicial review

10.4-10.6 Practicalarrangementsfor taking defaultaction

10.4 Organisation, publicityandpolice presence

10.5 A list of matters to consider andwhetherto seekan injunction

10.6 The offenceof wilful obstruction10.7 The LPA’s powerto recovertheir expensesof defaultaction

10.8-10.9 Subsequentreinstatementof works which hadbeenremoved

10.8 Giving noticeof intention to takedefaultaction10.9 The offenceprovisionsof section181(5)

CHAPTER 11 Page 62

Prosecutingenforcementnoticeoffences

Introduction11.1 Whetherto prosecuteand penalties11.2 Prosecution,“default” actionor both?

11.3 The two categoriesof offence

11.4-11.6Offencecommittedby the owner of land11.4 Section179(1)and(2) andchange of ownership11.5 The defenceunder section179(3)11.6 The defence under section179(7)11.7-11.8Offence committedby someonewho controlsor has aninterestin theland11.7 Section 179(4)and(5)

11.8 Thepower to permitan activity tobe carried on11.9 Thenatureof an enforcementnoticeoffence11.10-11.12Challengingthe validity of anenforcement noticein prosecutionproceedings11.10 The provisionsof section285

11.11-11.12Useful case law

11.13-11.14Presenting theprosecution’scaseeffectively in Court11.13 EnsuringMagistrates appreciatetheseriousnature oftheoffence11.14A stepby step approach11.15 Applicationby the defendantfor anadjournment11.16 Further appeal to Court ofAppeal(Criminal Division)11.17-11.19Thepenalties onconvictionof an enforcementnoticeoffence11.17 Thepenalties available tothe Courts11.18-11.19Taking account of financial benefitfrom theoffence

CHAPTER 12 Page68

Efficient andeffective organisationof planningenforcement

12.1 Complexityand theneedto co-operateandorganise12.2 Action or reaction

12.3 Setting priorities12.4 Targettime-limits forprogressingenforcement action12.5-12.7Documentingthe case

12.5 Maintaininggood records

12.6 Whatacaserecordshouldcontain12.7 Usingcomputersfor recordingandbudgetarycontrol

12.8 Theorganisation ofthe enforcementteam

Introduction

Enforcing planning control

Good practice guide for local planningauthorities (LPAS)

INTRODUCTION

Sections 1 to 11 of the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 (“1991 Act’), together withrelated secondarylegislation,Departmentof the EnvironmentCircular 21/91 and17/92and

PlanningPolicy GuidanceNoteNo 18 (PPG18),publishedin December1991,represented

theculminationof the Government’s responseto, and implementationof, mostof the

recommendations madeby RobertCarnwathQC, in his 1989 report“Enforcing Planning

Control” (ISBN 0 117521949).

2. The report’s final recommendationwasthat considerationshouldhe givento the

preparationof a practicemanualfor LPAson all aspectsof (planning)enforcementwork.

3. Thisguide is the Government’s responseto that final recommendation.

THE PURPOSE OF THE GUIDE

4. It wasrecommendedthat the guide shouldcoverbestpracticewith regardto investigation,

negotiation,drafting andprocedure,appeals,prosecution,stopnotices,injunctions,default

actionandotheraspectsof the system,andincludeexamplesfrom actualcases.The twelve

partsto this manualattempt toaddressthesefundamentalrequirementsandare prefacedby

a brief summaryof “dos” and“don’ts”.

5. Thereis inevitably someoverlapwith the proceduraladvicenow containedin the

consolidatedandup-datedplanningenforcement Circular10/97,andevento someextentwith thepolicy advicecontainedin PPG18.The primary intentionof this guide,however,

is that it shouldsimply complementthosepublications. It is not intendedto give furtherpolicy guidanceor to duplicatethe proceduralguidancein the Circular. It is recognised

that the Departmentof the Environment,TransportandtheRegionsis not itself involved

in mostof the day to daydevelopmentcontrol processesthat concernLPAs. Its primary

role is confinedto providing, throughParliament,thelegislative enablingframeworkand

powersfor LPAs to usein the courseof this work, to providingpolicy andproceduralguidance,and toits statutoryduties,throughthe Secretaryof Stateor PlanningInspectors

actingon his behalf, in determiningappealsagainstenforcementnotices. It is alsorecognisedthat the appealprocess,in which the Departmentandits PlanningInspectorate

agencyare mostdirectly involved,will often form only a small part of the totalworkinvolved in enforcingplanning controlin any particularcase. Many LPAs will already

havedevelopedtheir own effectiveandperfectlyacceptablemethodsof undertakingall the

practicalwork involved in enforcingplanningcontrol. If thosemethodsare alreadyproven

to be effective, it may bereasonableto continueto usethem.

9

EnforcingPlanningControl

6. The manualis not only intendedto assistprofessionalPlanningstaff in LPAs. It isaddressedequally to LPA lawyers,administratorsandinvestigatingstaff, suchasEnforcementOfficers,aswell asto thosemembersof a LPA involved in delegatingvariousenforcementpowersto officersand committees,or who are involved in takingdevelopmentcontrol decisionsthemselves.It will also be ofhelpto thoseconcernedwith thedevelopmentcontrolof listed buildings andconservationareas,minerals,hazardoussubstancesandprotectedtrees.

EXAMPLES FROM CASES

7. Throughoutthe text, efforts have beenmadeto include referencesto the mostup to date,

relevantjudicial authoritiesknownaboutatthe time ofpublication. Wherepossible,casecitationsusedare takenfrom full casereportscontainedin theJournal ofPlanning&EnvironmentLaw (JPL), asthis is thepublicationthoughtmost likely to bereadilyavailable toLPA officers. Wherea full casereport is not knownto beavailable,judgmentsummarieshave beencited, takenfrom JPLbulletins(the greenpagesprecededby theletter “B”) or EstatesGazette casesummaries(the loose,green“EGCS” inserts). Otherreports citedaremainly takenfrom Property,PlanningandCompensationReports(P&CR) andJustice ofthe Peace &Local GovernmentLaw (JP).

10

Introduction

DO DON’T

Have an enforcement policy Enforce solely to regularise acceptable development

Have regard to judicial authority Enforce solely to obtain a fee

Have regard to the provisions of the Give weight, either way, to the factdevelopment plan and other material that the development has already taken place

Have regard to national policy guidance Have regard to other immaterial (non-planning)considerations

Have regard to procedural advice in Let protracted negotiation delay essentialDOE/WO Circulars and use the enforcement actionexample/model notices as guides

Investigate complaints thoroughly and Be overtaken by time limits for enforcementact promptly

Keep accurate records, including Forget to consult other departments andphotographs where possible sources of information

Respect complainants’ confidentiality

Prevent delay by ensuring that a properly delegatedperson is always available to take urgentaction/decisions when needed

Be prepared to give reasons for taking Act without proper authority accordingenforcement action or ignoring a to Standing Ordersbreach or inviting an application for permission

Use the appropriate investigative powers Seek to restore land to a better condition than it was inbefore the breach took place

Be prepared to justify using those powers Be too legalistic

Use HM Land Registry and own records Be unduly cautious about serving stop notices

Maintain close liaison between Council Departments Hesitate to issue enforcement notices in the alternative,if unsure of the nature of the breach

Have regard to the provisions of the Police and Ignore other uses on land in mixed use whenCriminal Evidence Act 1984 when interviewing formulating allegations, or the provisions ofpersons suspected of criminal offences section 173(11)

Be aware of the Local Government Ombudsman Require “immediate” compliance with an enforcementnotice (that does not give a period)

Keep up to date with reported case law and keep Forget that a neighbouring LPA may have relevantstaff informed by circulating it experience or be a source of advice

11

Statingthe authority’senforcementpolicy

CHAPTER 1

Stating the authority’senforcement policy

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The planningauthority’s decisionwhetherto take enforcement actionmustalways bewell-

founded.Whetherit is “expedient” for the authorityto initiate formal enforcementaction,

to remedyor stopanallegedbreachof planningcontrol, requiresthoroughassessmentof therelevantfactors in every case.That assessmentis mademoredifficult if the authorityhavenotproducedaclearstatementof enforcementpolicy to provideadecision-makingframework.Paragraph9.1 of thebooklet entitled“A CharterGuide: DevelopmentControl”

(publishedjointly by the NationalPlanningForum,Departmentof theEnvironmentand

theWelshOffice) states—

“The Council’spolicy on enforcementwill be publicised.It will explain theCouncil’senforcementproceduresandpractice.”

1.2 Whatthe authority’senforcementpolicy statementshouldsaydependspartly on thejudgement ofthe PlanningCommittee,advisedby their officers, on whatresourcesshouldbe allocated to the task of enforcingplanning controlefficiently andcost-effectivelyintheir administrativearea.The businessof investigatingandremedyingallegedbreaches of

control is usuallylabour-intensive.Theresourcesallocated forthispurposeshouldtherefore

beregularly reviewedas local circumstanceschange.It is recommendedthat thisshould

takeplace at leastoncea year,possiblyto coincide withthe annualbudgetprocess.

Reviews shouldbe basedon up-to-date informationaboutenforcementactivity and trends,using IT equipmentto maintainaccuraterecordsandretrievedata.

THE POLICY STATEMENT

1.3 A statementof enforcementpolicy will addresssomeor all of thefollowing issues—

(1) the mainplanningpolicies applicablein theCouncil’s administrativearea,as statedin

their developmentplan;

(2) the typeandincidenceof enforcementproblems;

(3) the resources(financialandstaff) to be devotedto enforcingplanningcontrol,aspartof theauthority’splanning functionor in associationwith theirotherenforcementresponsibilities;

(4) theprocedurefor dealingwith complaintsaboutallegedlyunauthoriseddevelopment;

(5) anyspecialplanningenforcementissuesthe authoritymayanticipate(egunlawful

13


DO DON’T

Allocate the necessary resources to see action Forget to enter action in the register of enforcement andthrough to the end stop notices and breach of condition notices

Delegate sensibly (the next committee meeting may Forget to withdraw a redundant notice in good timebe too late)

Make sure action is properly authorised Forget that BCNs are available for some breaches

Be clear and precise in specifying breaches Ignore the possible advantages of “default’ action over

and requirements prosecution

Use plain language Hesitate to challenge an appeal decision that is clearlydefective

Be prepared to use all the enforcement powersavailable, commensurate with the seriousnessof the breach

Use the provisions of sections 171 B(4)(b) Forget some Magistrates’ Courts see few enforcement

and 289(4A) cases

Make sure the reasons for issuing the enforcement Try to prosecute an owner under section 179(4)notice match its requirements

Stick to procedural time-limits or ask forjustifiable extensions

Be prepared to counter requests for adjournment

Set priorities for enforcement action Ignore the benefits of computerised record-keeping

Involve the police if trouble is expected Ignore the safety of staff

Have regard to the Council’s obligations under Be strong with the weak and weak with the strongother legislation which may be invoked as aresult of enforcement action

Be flexible and consider Qenuine alternative Be influenced by threats or other irregular pressures

solutions

12


winning andworking of minerals;unauthorisedwaste-tipping;or the frequent

stationing of residential caravanson privately ownedlandwithoutplanning

permission);and

(6) how the authority intends tomonitor new building activity onsiteswhere the building

controlfunction is not beingcarriedout by the authority.

FORMULATING THE POLICY STATEMENT

1.4 Thestatementof enforcementpolicy shouldbe formulatedby referenceto—

(1) nationalpolicy in PlanningPolicyGuidanceNote (PPG)18, “Enforcing Planning

Control”;

(2) relevant statementsin the authority’sdevelopmentplan;

(3) the needto maintain the integrity ofspeciallyprotectedareas,including National

Parks,Areasof OutstandingNaturalBeauty,Sitesof SpecialScientific Interest and

ConservationAreas; and

(4) the needto achievea reasonable balancebetweenprotectingamenityandother

interestsof acknowledgedimportance throughoutthe authority’sareaandenabling

acceptabledevelopment totakeplace,eventhoughit may initially havebeen

unauthorised,

1.5 The authority should haveregard,where appropriate,to the provisionsin section73A oftheTown andCountryPlanningAct 1990,asamended.Theseprovisions enableplanning

permissionto be grantedfor buildingsor worksconstructedor carriedout, or a useof landinstituted,without planningpermission.The authority’sapproachto enforcing planning

control overunauthorised developmentshouldnot thereforebe stricter, for planning

purposes,than it would be whenconsideringthemeritsof aprior applicationfor planningpermissionbeforedevelopmentstarts.The authority shouldnotusetheir enforcement

powerssolely to compelsomeonewho has carriedout unauthorised developmentwhich is

acceptable onits planningmerits,without the imposition ofany planning conditions,to

paytheplanning applicationfee theauthoritywould havereceivedif an applicationhad

beensubmittedto them.

THE AVAILABILITY OF APPEAL COSTS IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS

1.6 Appealcostsmay beawardedagainstthe authoritywhere someonewho appealsto the

Secretaryof State against anenforcement noticecanshowthat theauthority behaved

“unreasonably”during the enforcementproceedings,if the appellantincurs unnecessary

expensein pursuingthe appeal.A detailedexplanationof “unreasonable”conductis in

paragraphs21 to 28 of Annex3 to DOECircular8/93. In brief, whenconsideringwhether

to usetheir discretionaryenforcementpowers,the authoritywill be expectedto ensurethattheir decisionto issuean enforcementnotice takesfull account of relevantjudicial

authority, policy guidancein PPG18 and anywell-publicisedappeal decisions.

1.7 Nevertheless,the authority shouldnot be inhibitedfrom taking enforcementaction whichthey consideressentialin the public interestby any suggestionthat individual membersof

the Planning Committeecouldbe “surcharged”if thereis asubsequentawardof appeal

14

The responseto an enforcementnoticeappeal

(6) that the stepsrequiredby the notice to be taken,or the activities requiredby thenotice to cease,exceedwhat is necessaryto remedyany breachof planning control

which maybe constitutedby thosemattersor, as the casemaybe,to remedyany injury

to amenitywhich hasbeencausedby anysuchbreach(ground (f));

(7) that anyperiodspecifiedin thenotice in accordancewith section173(9) falls short of

whatshouldreasonablybe allowed(ground(g)).

6.3 The appealon ground(a) is anappealsolelyon planningmerits.Thisgroundof appealis

directly linked to the “deemed”applicationfor planningpermissioninherentin an

enforcementappeal,for which section177(5)of the 1990 Act provides.In most cases,an

administrativefee is payable(in accordancewith a tariff prescribedin the Planning

Application FeesRegulations)to theSecretaryof Stateandthe LPA asa contribution

towardstheir expensesin dealingwith thedeemedplanningapplication.Whenthis fee is

not paidwithin the time-limit specifiedfor it in eachcaseby the Secretaryof State,section

177(5A)of the 1990 Act providesthat the appealon ground(a) andthe deemedplanning

applicationwill lapse.The appealcanthenonly proceedon whicheverof grounds(b) to

(g) the appellanthasselected.

6.4 Grounds(b), (c), (d) and(e) are usuallyknownas the “legal grounds” of appealbecause

theyare eachconcernedwith mixed issuesof factandPlanningLaw. An appellantwho

relieson any of thesegroundswill haveto providerelevantfactsto supportthem.This

processwill usuallyinvolve adetailedexaminationof theplanninghistoryof the

enforcementappealsite.

6.5 Grounds(f) and(g) deal, respectively,with whetherthe LPA’ srequiredremedialstepsin

the enforcementnoticeare excessivefor their purpose;andwhetherthe specified

complianceperiod is shorterthanshouldreasonablybe allowed.Thesetwo groundsarenot

concernedwith theplanningmerits of the allegedbreachor with any legal issuewhich may

be involved in the appeal.

THE ENFORCEMENT APPEAL PROCESS

6.6 Becausethesubmissionof a valid enforcementappealsuspendstheeffect of the

enforcementnotice,it is vital for theLPA’ sofficers to respondpromptlyto the Planning

InspectorateAgency’ srequestsfor information.Quick responseswill enabletheappealto

be processedefficiently andeven-handedlytowardsboth principal parties.Unlessthe

LPA’s responseis promptandhelpful, a stalematecanresultwhich brings the entire

planningenforcementprocessinto disreputeandis likely to provokecriticism from any

neighboursof the sitewhoseamenityis adverselyaffectedby thebreachof control. If the

LPA considerthereis a realisticprospectthat negotiationwith the appellantcouldresult in

withdrawalof the appeal,or of the enforcementnotice,theyshouldpursuenegotiations

vigorouslyduringthe appealand inform the PlanningInspectorate’scaseofficer aboutwhat

progressis being made.

6.7 Mostenforcementappealsare decidedby “an appointedperson”,who is a Planning

Inspectorto whom the Secretaryof State’sjurisdiction to determinethe appealis formally

transferred.Thereare threeproceduresfor processinganddecidingtheappeal—

(1) by a public inquiry (including a site-inspection):an inquiry will usuallybe heldwhen

37

Statingthe authority’senforcementpolicy

costs againstthe authorityfor “unreasonable”conduct.Theprovisionsof section20(1)(b)

of theLocalGovernmentFinanceAct 1982enablethe auditor to certify thatan amountis

duefor recovery where“a losshasbeenincurredor deficiency causedby the wilful

misconductof anyperson”.It seemsmostunlikely that a PlanningCommittee’scollective

decision,evenif it is contraryto officers’ advice,would everamount to“wilful misconduct”,

unlessit wasmadefor an improperpurpose.

Enforcing PlanningControl -

CHAPTER 2

Investigating allegations ofunauthorised development

INTRODUCTION

2.1 At the outset,thoroughinvestigation ofthefactsof any allegedlyunauthorised

developmentis vital to effectiveenforcementof planningcontrol.Theplanning historyofthe relevantparcelof land must be establishedas accuratelyas practicable,usingall the

availablesources(including the knowledgeof theParishCouncil and local residents).

2.2 A completedocumentaryrecordof all investigationis essential.Whereverpossible,it

shouldincludephotographicrecordswhich are signedanddatedby thepersontaking the

photographs.All photographicrecordsshouldhe supplementedby a locationplan showing

the positionfrom which eachphotographwastaken.

CITIZEN’S CHARTER STANDARDS

2.3 Thejointly publishedDOE, WelshOffice andNationalPlanningForumbookletentitled

“Planning—CharterStandards”(April 1994) recommendsto planningauthoritieswhat

constitutesa goodstandardof planningenforcementservice,asfollows—

(1) acknowledgingsomeone’scomplaintwithin threeworking daysof receivingit;

(2) treatingthe complaint as confidential,as far as possible,within the authority;

(3) visiting the siteof the allegedlyunauthorised developmentand ascertainingwhat

activities are taking placethere;

(4) writing to the complainantagain,within fifteen working daysof the complaint,

explainingwhataction the authorityproposeto take,or why they think no formal

enforcement actionis needed;and

(5) telling the complainantabout theauthority’sdecisionto takeformal enforcement

actionwithin ten working daysof the authority’smaking thatdecision.

THE AUTHORITY’S INVESTIGATIVE POWERS

2.4 The planning authority havethreemain investigativepowersfor planningenforcement

purposes.They are—

16

Investigating allegationsof unauthorised development

(1) section330of theTown and CountryPlanningAct 1990: this powermay be usedinorder to obtain relevantinformation at an earlystageof theenforcementprocess.

Receiptof a noticerequestinginformationwhich is clearly being soughtfor a possible

enforcementpurposemay suffice to prompttherecipientto remedythe apparently

unauthoriseddevelopmentstraightaway,without any formalenforcementaction.(The

recipientof the noticemustbeeitherthe occupierof thepremisesor the person

receivingrentfor them.)

(2) section16 ofthe Local Government (MiscellaneousProvisions)Act 1976 : these

provisionsare primarily intendedto enabletheauthority to establishthe factsabout

ownershipof land.The requisitionmay bedirectedto theoccupier,any freeholder,

mortgageeor lessee,anypersonreceivingrent from the land,andanypersonwho is

legally authorisedto manageor arrangethe letting of the land.

Two offencesmay arise fromtheseprovisions,namely—

(a) failure to respondto the noticewithin the statedtime-limit; and

(b) furnishing information which the defendantknows to be false, orcontainsa

recklesslymadefalsestatement.

On conviction of eitheroffence,the maximumsummarypenaltyis £5,000.

(3) section171Cofthe Town and CountryPlanningAct 1990: these provisionsenablethe

authorityto servea “planningcontraventionnotice”, as describedin paragraphs2.5 to

2.7 below.-

THE PLANNING CONTRAVENTION NOTICE

2.5 The planningcontraventionnotice (PCN) is intendedto bethe main methodby which

the planning authorityobtain information aboutallegedlyunauthoriseddevelopment.

Guidanceon how to usethis typeof notice is givenin Annex 1 to DETR Circular 10/97.A

model PCN is provided in the Appendixto Annex 1.

2.6 ThePCN may also beusedto invite its recipientto respondconstructivelyto theplanning

authority by discussinghow anysuspected breachof control may besatisfactorily remedied.This might include,for example,a discussionwith officers orelectedmembers about

whetherconditional planningpermissionmight be grantedfor whatever developmentismutually agreedto havetakenplace.This is an optionalprocedure,for usein appropriate

circumstances.No face-to-facediscussionneedbe offeredin caseswhere theplanning

authorityconsiderit unnecessaryor unhelpful,or whereit would delayurgently required

enforcementaction.

2.7 Judgmentgiven in the High Court on 19 December1994,in thecaseof R v TeignbridgeDistrict Council ex parte TeignmouthQuayCoLtd [1995] JPL 828,held that, while the

PCN procedurewasnotasdraconianas an enforcementnotice,it wasnevertheless“an

intrusive procedure”which shouldnot be deployedunlessit appearedto theplanning

authority that a breachof planningcontrol might havetakenplace.It follows from this

judgment thatthe authority shouldneveruse aPCN to carry out an investigative“trawl”,

just tosatisfy themselves aboutwhatactivities are takingplaceon aparcelof land.Beforea

17


PCN is served,the authoritymust havesomeprima facieevidenceto justify their suspicionthat abreachof planningcontrol is takingplace,or hasoccurred,on theland to which the

noticerelates.

COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM SUBSEQUENTSTOP NOTICE

2.8 Section186(5)(b)of the 1990 Act providesthat, in theeventof a claim forcompensation

for loss or damageresultingfrom a stop noticeprohibiting someactivity on the land by

someonewho wasstatutorily requiredto provide information to the authority,no

compensationis payablein respectof loss ordamagewhich couldhave beenavoidedhad

he or sheprovidedthe requiredinformation,or hadotherwise co-operatedwith the

planning authoritywhenrespondingto their notice.Theseprovisionsshouldhelp to

providea financialincentivefor the recipientof anyof thesethreetypesof notice to replyfully andtruthfully to a requestfor information. The modelPCN in the Appendix to

Annex 1 to DETR Circular 10/97mentionsthe effectof theseprovisionsin Schedule2(paragraph 4).Therecipientof sucha noticeshouldbe specificallywarnedaboutthem

where theauthority anticipatea subsequent decisionto serveastop noticebecausethe

apparentbreachof control is particularly serious.

ACCESS TO HM LAND REGISTRY

2.9 Wheretheauthority cannotobtainessentialinformation aboutland ownership,or they

suspectthat falseor incomplete informationhasbeensubmittedto them in responseto a

requisition, it maybe worthwhile to seekinformationfrom HM Land Registryaboutthe

identityof peoplewho havea legal interest inaparcelof land.TheLandRegistry now

maintainsan “open” registerof interestsin- land.The registeris being progressively

extendedandwill eventuallyinclude all land in EnglandandWales. Forland whichhas

beenenteredon theregister,the authority shouldbe ableto obtain informationfrom the

relevantDistrict LandRegistry’sChiefRegistrar.

OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN THE COUNCIL’S RECORDS

2.10 Staffresponsible forinvestigatinganysuspected breachof planningcontrol shouldbearin

mind thatotherDepartmentsof the Council may alreadypossessrelevantfactual

information aboutthecurrentownershipor use of aparticularparcelof land,or its history

havingregardto theprovisionsof the DataProtectionAct 1984.For example,information

may have beenobtainedfor Council Tax assessmentpurposeswhich would help to establish

the legalstatusor ownershipof land.

2.11 It is particularly importantthat theplanning authoritydo notoverlookanyrelevant

informationavailableto the Council for Building Regulationspurposes.Sometimes,a

personwho hasnot obtainedtherequisiteplanningpermissionfor developmentwill have

soughtandreceiveda Building Regulationsapproval.Thisoftenmeansthat aperson

responsiblefor building controlhasinspected,or will inspect,thebuilding work taking

placeon theland.The authority shouldensurethat effectiveliaison arrangementsfor

transmittinginformationalwaysoperatebetween staffin their PlanningDepartmentand

thoseresponsiblefor building control.Thiswasemphasisedby the High Court’s judgment,

on 31 July 1986,in thecaseof R v BasildonDistrict Council ex parte Martin Grant Homes

18

Investigatingallegations ofunauthorised development

Ltd [1987] JPL 863:theCourtheld that,wherethe Council’sPlanningCommitteehadgranted planningpermissionfor ninedwellingsandassociateddevelopment,theymustbedeemed tohaveknownof a Building Regulationsconsent grantedby the Councilafewweeksearlier for the samedevelopment.In a report published on15 July 1992 (ManchesterCity Council,ComplaintsNos. 90/C/2240and91/C/1726),the Local GovernmentOmbudsman stated,asa principle,thatthereis maladministrationwhere alocal authority’sbuilding controlstaffdo not notify theplanningstaffwhentheybecomeawareof apossiblebreach ofplanning control.

THE RIGHT OF ENTRY TO LAND FOR ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES

2.12 Sections196A, 196Band196C oftheTownandCountry PlanningAct 1990 provide theplanningauthority’sauthorisedofficers with the right to enterlandfor enforcementpurposes. The powers are limited to what is considered essential to enable the authority toenforceplanning controleffectively in most situations theirofficers are likely to meet.Annex 5 to DETR Circular10/97 explains indetail-howthesepowersarebestused.

THE DUTY TO ADMINISTER A CAUTION DURING INVESTIGATION

2.13 Provisionsin sections66 and67 of the Police and CriminalEvidenceAct 1984 requirea

caution tobe administeredin certaincircumstanceswhenacontraventionis being

investigated,or, during an investigation,whenit is first suspectedthat an offencehasbeen

committed.(It shouldbe notedthat the powerto enterland andcarry out an investigation

for planningenforcementpurposes doesnot dependon a prior suspicionthatsomecontraventionof PlanningLaw has occurred.)A code of practice,knownas “CodeC”(Codeof Practice forthe detention,treatmentandquestioningof personsby policeofficers), hasbeenissuedby the HomeSecretary.It explains when,andin whatterms,acautionmustbe given during an investigation.Theplanningauthority’sSolicitoror LegalAdviserwill be awareof the requirementsin the Police andCriminal EvidenceAct 1984andwill be able to advise the authority’sofficers aboutwhenandhow it should beappliedin practice.

19

Enforcing PlanningControl

CHAPTER 3

Deciding whether to take formalenforcementaction

INTRODUCTION

3.1 The decisionwhetherit is “expedient”(as in section 172(1)(b)of theTown andCountry

PlanningAct 1990) to takeformal enforcementaction in any caseis within thelocal

planningauthority’s sole discretion.Theauthority must haveregardto relevantplanning

policies in their developmentplan andtheparticular circumstancesof any alleged,or

suspected,breachof planningcontrol.But the authority’s discretionis not “unfettered”.

THE REQUIREMENT OF “REASONABLENESS”

3.2 The decisionmustnot be“unreasonable”in the judicial senseof “Wednesbury

unreasonable”.This meansthat it mustnotbe basedon irrationalfactors;or taken without

proper considerationof the relevantfactsandplanning issues;or basedon non-planning

grounds.For example,it would notbe reasonablefor the authority to seekto remedya

noise-nuisanceby issuingan enforcementnoticeunlesstherewerealso relevantplanning

reasonsfor requiring theuse ofland whichis causingunacceptablelevelsof noiseto

neighboursto ceaseor besubstantiallymodified,Generallyspeaking,if a decisionto take

enforcementaction is unreasonable,theremedylies in an appealto the Secretaryof State

againsttheenforcementnotice.The appealwill consider whetherthereis a proper

planningcasefor thenotice.Althoughit rarelyhappens,an authority’sdecisionto take,or

not to take,enforcementactionmay be challenged,in theHigh Court, by wayof an

applicationfor leaveto bring judicial review proceedings.The Courtis likely to accept

jurisdiction to considerjudicial reviewonly wherethe rightof appealis not appropriate,

suchas whereit is allegedthat the enforcement noticewas issuedin badfaith or wasnot

properly authorised.Similarly, adecisionnot to takeenforcementactionwill not be

reviewableunlessit is basedon an errorof law, or is arbitraryor capricious.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN’S JURISDICTION

3.3 Many investigationsof allegedor suspectedbreaches ofplanningcontrol resultfrom

neighbours’complaintsto the authorityaboutnuisance.It follows that, in deciding

whetherto takeformalenforcementaction,the authoritymust observedecision-making

proceduresenablingthem to satisfyany complainantsthatwhateverdecisionis eventually

takenis well-foundedin all respects.Decisionswhetherto takeformal enforcementaction

are regularlyfeaturedin reportsby the LocalGovernmentOmbudsmaninto alleged

“maladministration”.The Ombudsmanheld in onesuchcase(BassetlawDistrict Council,

20

Decidingwhetherto take formalenforcementaction

ComplaintNo. 90/7/1723,reportissuedon 7 May 1992) that, wherethereis evidenceof a

breachof planningcontrol, therewill be maladministrationunlessthe planning authority

eithersolicit an applicationfor planningpermissionto legitimise the situation,or consider

taking enforcementaction. In this context,it is vital for the authority to maintaina

properlydocumentedrecordof their investigation ofeachcaseandof thereasons whythey

decidedto take, or not to take,enforcementaction. Providedsucha recordis maintained,

it shouldusuallybe sufficientto convincethe LocalGovernmentOmbudsmanthat no

maladministrationhas occurred.

THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

3.4 The planning authoritymustalwayshaveregardto relevantjudicial authority in deciding

whetherformal enforcement actionis appropriate.Thereare manyrelevantcases,of which

the most importantare mentioned inthe Encyclopediaof PlanningLaw andPractice

publishedby Sweet& Maxwell Ltd. Wherethereis any doubtexpertlegal adviceshouldbe

obtainedbeforeadecisionis taken. Inexceptionalcases,it may beprudent toseek

Counsel’sopinion on matterswherethereis apparently conflictinglegal opinionor judicial

authority.Although thefee for Counsel’sopinionmay seemcomparativelyexpensivein

this context,it may laterprove to be well worthwhile, especiallyif it meansthat the

authority decidethecorrectcourseof action,andsuccessfullydefend any appealor court

challenge.It will be evenmoreworthwhileif it enablesappealsto be avoided.

GOVERNMENT’S PLANNING GUIDANCE

3.5 TheGovernment’s planningpolicy guidanceon the generalapproachto enforcementand

the criteriafor taking enforcementactionin someof themost frequentlyencounteredcases

of unauthorised developmentare statedin paragraphs5 to 18 of PPG 18 (“Enforcing

PlanningControl”). The decisiveissuefor the planning authorityto considerin eachcase

is whetherthe allegedbreachof control would unacceptablyaffectpublic amenityor the

existinguse oflandor buildings meritingprotectionin the public interest.It is also

important toensurethat anyenforcementaction whichthe authority decideto takeshould

be commensuratewith the seriousnessof the breachof control it is intendedto remedy.

SUBSTANTIATING A DECISION NOT TO TAKE ENFORCEMENT ACTION

3.6 Althoughthe planning authorityhavediscretionto takeformal enforcementactionwhen

it appearsto them “expedient”to do so,it is equally importantto ensurethat adecisionnot

to initiate enforcement actionis well-founded.This is becauseof possiblejudicial review.

The High Court’s judgment, on29 July 1994,in the case of Rv SevenoaksDistrict Council

ex partePalley [1995] JPL 915,illustratestheway in which the Court mayintervene

(following a judicial review application)to quashadecisionnot to take enforcement

actionwheretheapplicant inthe judicial reviewproceedingswas aneighbouring

landowner.In brief, the point at issuein this case waswhetheraparcelof landwasbeing

usedfor “agriculture” or wasin mixed usefor agricultural activitiesanda tradeor business.The Judgeheld that theCouncil’sofficer should havemadefurtherenquiriesto determine

whetherthe use ofthe landwasfor thepurposeof a tradeor business.Suchenquirieswere

not madeandthe questionwasnot addressedin the Council’s officer’s report tothe

21


Planningsub-committee.A laterdecision, basedon theseenquiries,not to take

enforcementactionwasthusflawed andwasconsequentlyquashedby the Court.

THE ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF INVITING A PLANNING APPLICATION

3.7 Wheneverit is appropriate,the usualalternativeto taking formalenforcementaction is to

invite a retrospectiveplanning application.In approachingthis possibility, the LPA should

considerthe meritsof grantingplanningpermissionfor unauthoriseddevelopment inthe

sameway astheywould approachaplanning applicationfor proposeddevelopment.The

fact thatthe developmenthasalreadytakenplaceshouldmake nodifferenceto the LPA’s

considerationof its merits.

3.8 TheLPA would needto takeinto accounttheviews of neighboursandother interested

parties.

(1) otherDepartmentsof the authority (egthe EnvironmentalHealthDepartmentif the

developmentinvolvesnoise-nuisance);

(2) the local highwayauthority;

(3) statutoryconsultees(eg theEnvironmentAgency if thedevelopmentinvolvesactualor potential pollutionof a water-course).

TIMING OF THE AUTHORISATION TO ISSUE AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE

3.9 Becausethe provisionsof section172(1)of the 1990 Act enablethe LPA to issuean

enforcement notice“where it appearsto themthat therehasbeenabreachof planning

control,...“ it is vital that, when authorisingthe issueof a notice,thereis some

evidenceavailableto themto show that theallegedbreachhasoccurred.It follows from

theseprovisionsthat the LPA cannotlawfully authorisethe issue of an enforcement

notice in anticipationof a breachof control. (Theseprovisionsdo not applyto a

planning enforcement injunction,wheretheprovisionsof Section187B(1) of the 1990

Act enable an “actualor apprehendedbreachof planning control tobe restrainedby

injunction,...”).

3.10 The requirementthat someevidenceof a breachof controlshould existcanproduce

practicaldifficulties whenit is unclearwhetheranew useof land is merely temporaryor is

intendedto be permanent. Thesedifficulties canbeparticularly troublesomewherea

landowneror occupierclaims thata newusebenefitsfrom”permitteddevelopment”rights

grantedby virtue of provisionsin the GeneralPermitted DevelopmentOrder. This is

illustratedby the circumstancesof the High Court’s judgment inthecaseof R v Rochester

upon MedwayCity Council ex parte WendyHobday[1990] JPL 17. In that case,the LPA’s

decisionon 17 November1987 purportedto authorisethe issueandserviceof an

enforcementnoticeon or afterthefifteenthdayof markettradingat a time whenonly 7days’tradinghadelapsed.It wasclaimedthat theactivity thenbenefitedfrom “permitted

development” rightsin the GeneralDevelopmentOrder, current atthat time, which

allowedtheholdingof a temporarymarketon notmorethan 14 daysin anycalendaryear.

If theyconsidered,as in this case,thenewuse was atemporaryone,the LPA couldonly

22

Decidingwhetherto take formalenforcementaction

authorisethe issueof anenforcement noticeafter theperiod of “permitted development”hadexpired. Subsequently,theLPA decidedthat thenew usehadbecomepermanentandsought,at meetingsin March andApril 1988,to ratify the resolution of17 November1987.TheCourt’s judgmentheld that, becausetheoriginal resolutionwas invalid, it couldnot subsequentlyberatified.

CONSIDERING WHETHER IT IS “EXPEDIENT” TO ISSUE AN ENFORCEMENTNOTICE

3.11 Theprovisionsof section 172(1)(b)enablethe LPA to issueanenforcementnotice where

it appearsto them “expedient toissue thenotice, havingregardto the provisions ofthedevelopmentplanand to anyothermaterialconsiderations.”It follows from theseprovisionsthat thequestion of“expediency”is a discretionarymatteron which the LPA

must themselvesdecidein theparticular circumstances of eachcase.Providedthe LPAhaveproperlydirected themselves inrelationto considering anyrelevantprovisions ofthedevelopmentplanand anyotherconsiderationswhichare clearly material for aplanningpurpose,their decisionwhetherto issueanenforcementnoticeshould becapableof

withstandingany criticism that it wasnot well-founded.

3.12 Occasionally, somebodywith a privateinterest inthe land,or in someneighbouringparcel

of land,may representto the LPA that enforcementactionshould betaken to protect,or

to further,thatprivate interest. Thishappenedin the case ofPerry v Stanborough

(Developments)Ltd and WimborneDC and Dorset CC [1978]JPL 36, where aneighbouring landowner sought to compeltheLPA to enforce aplanningcondition

requiring an estate road to befully madeup to the adjoiningboundary ofthe developer’sland. Inrefusingtheapplication,theCourtheldthatParliamenthadexpresslyleft it to theLPA to decidewhetherenforcementactionwasdesirableor not. Thefactthat theLPA had

imposedaplanningconditionin relationto thedevelopmentof onepieceof landcouldnot mean thattheLPA necessarilyhadan obligationto enforceit for the benefit oftheowner ofanotherpieceof land.

“ISSUE ESTOPPEL”

3.13 Judicialauthority hasestablishedthat the legalconceptin privatelaw knownas “issue

estoppel”appliesin strictly limited circumstancesto the LPA’s decisionwhetherto initiate

enforcementaction. Thetwo leadingcases(whichare judgmentsgiven in the Houseof

Lordson 14 December1989) arecited asThrasyvoulouv Secretaryof Statefor the

EnvironmentandHackneyLBC; andOliver and Othersv SecretaryofStatefor the

EnvironmentandHaveringLBC [1990]59 P&CR 326. Briefly summarised,thejudgementsmeanthat thelegal conceptof “res judicata” (literally, the matter havingbeenjudged)appliesto decision-makingon appealson grounds(b) to (e) in section174(2) of the 1990Act (knownas the“legal groundsof appeal”).Thus, once a mixedissueof law and fact(forexample,whethera particular change ofuseof landamounts inlaw to a “material changeof use”) hasbeendecidedin an enforcementappeal,theLPA are “estopped”(that isprecluded)from subsequentlymaking the sameallegation in alaterenforcementnotice,inthe absenceofany materialdifferencein thefactsofthe use.Thisconceptextends to anyattemp,ttheLPA might make todescribea particularuseof landin different termson asubsequentoccasionif the reality is that the actualuseof the landwas thesameon bothoccasions.The practicalconsequenceis that,once anissueof factandlaw hasbeendecided in anenforcementappeal,andtherehasbeenno furthersuccessfulappealagainst

23


it (under section289 ofthe 1990 Act) to the High Court, the LPA cannotre-openthat

particularissueby taking furtherenforcementactionon it.

3.14 Issueestoppeldoesnot applyto anydecisionon planningmerits (ground(a) andthe

deemedplanning applicationin an enforcementappeal) becausea decisionwhetherto

grantplanningpermissiondoesnotdependon questionsof law andfact: it is anexerciseof

thedecision-maker’splanning judgement.

3.15 Issueestoppeldoesnot applywherethe Secretaryof Statehasallowedan appeal and

quashedan enforcement noticeon proceduralgrounds,in accordancewith the powerin

section 176(3)(b)of the 1990 Act. In thecaseof R v WychavonDC andSecretaryof State

for the Environment exparteSaunders[1991] EGCS 122, theHigh Courtheld that a

decisionto allow an appealandquasha noticeon proceduralgroundsdid not confer any

legal rights on thedevelopmentallegedin the notice.

24

Issuing anenforcementnotice

CHAPTER 4

Issuing an enforcementnotice

INTRODUCTION

4.1 The provisionsof section172(1)of theTown andCountryPlanningAct 1990enablethe

LPA to issueanenforcement noticewheretheyconsidertherehasbeena breachof

planning controlandit is expedient toissuethe notice.What is meantby “issuing” an

enforcement noticeis not definedin the 1990Act. TheDepartmentof the Environment,

Transportandthe Regionsinterpretsthis termasmeaningthat the LPA shouldproducea

properlyauthorisednoticewhich is thenretainedin their documentaryrecordof

enforcementnotices.Copiesof eachenforcement noticehaveto be servedon specified

persons whohave aninterestjn therelevantland.

PROPER AUTHORISATION TO ISSUE A NOTICE

4.2 Becauseanenforcement noticeissuedwithout properauthorisationis likely to be

vulnerable tolegalchallenge onthe groundthatit is “a nullity” (and, thus,of no effect), it

is vital to ensurethat every enforcement noticeis properly authorised.The relevant

provisionsfor dischargeof a local authority’sfunctions, includingissuingenforcement

notices,are in section101 of theLocal GovernmentAct 1972.Among otherthings, they

enablean authorityto arrangefor the dischargeof anyfunctionsby acommittee,a sub-

committeeor anofficer of theauthority.It shouldalwaysbe clearfrom an authority’sstandingordershow theirplanningenforcementfunctionsare to be exercised,especiallywhenthereis a scheme fordelegationof functionsto officers.

DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO A COMMITTEE

4.3 The provisionsof section101 of the Local GovernmentAct 1972 donotenablea LPA to

delegatethe functionof issuinganenforcementnoticeto oneelectedmemberof anauthority,evenif that memberis the chairmanof the authority’sPlanningCommittee.Thisis becausetherecannotlegally be a“committeeof one”. But the functioncanbe delegated

to a particularofficer. Thisdistinction is explained intheHigh Court’s judgment given on14 November1985 in the caseof R v SecretaryofStatefor theEnvironmentex parte

Hillingdon LBC [1986]JPL 363.Therecouldbe goodreason why decisionmakingwasentrustedto anofficer of theCouncil,who wouldhaveno party politicalallegiance,whereasthe samecouldnot be saidof an individual electedmember.In dealing with theneedtoestablisha procedurefor emergencyauthorisationof enforcement actionwhena PlanningCommitteemeetingwas not scheduled,Woolf J gavehis opinionthat it would be difficult to

fault a procedurewherebydecisionswere takenby a duly authorisedofficer, pursuantto

section101 of the 1972 Act, in consultationwith the electedCommitteechairman.

25


DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO AN AUTHORISED OFFICER

4.4 A schemefor delegation ofplanningenforcementfunctionsto anauthorisedofficer, or

officers, shouldbe clearlystatedin an authority’sstandingorders.If a specifiedChief Officer

(eg the BoroughSecretaryor CountySolicitor) is authorisedto issueenforcementnotices,

thepersonholding thatpost is not requiredto authorise eachnoticepersonally:someoneproperlyactingon theChief Officer’s behalfmaydo so. TheHigh Court’s judgment inthe

case ofCheshireCC v Secretaryof Statefor the Environment[1988] JPL30, held that theCountyCouncil’ssenior assistantsolicitor could properlyauthorisetheissueof an

enforcement noticealthoughthe Council’sdelegationwasexpresslyto theCounty

Solicitor.

26

Formulatingtheterms of anenforcementnotice

CHAPTER 5

Formulating the terms of anenforcement notice

INTRODUCTION

5.1 Once theLPA havedecidedto issueanenforcementnotice,it is vital to considerwith the

utmostcare howto formulatethe termsof thenotice.Thisrequiresclarity andprecisionin

the useof language.Enforcementnoticesare not improvedby the inclusionof legalistic

termsorobscure expressionswhich canonly be understoodby experiencedpractitioners.

Time spent onformulating thetermsof an enforcementnotice,so that theyare

immediatelycomprehensibleto a laypersonreadingit,,will usuallybe repaid lateron,

especiallyif eventuallythe noticehasto providethe foundationfor acriminal prosecution,

in accordancewith the provisionsof section179of theTown andCountryPlanning Act

1990.

THE LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS

5.2 Thelegislativerequirementsof avalid enforcementnoticeare statedin section173 of the

1990 Act. It is essential for thenotice to—

(1) statethematterswhich appearto the LPA to constitutethebreachof planningcontrol

(subsection(1)(a));

(2) statethe LPA’s opinion on which of the two paragraphsin section171A( 1) of the

1990Act [defining what constitutesabreachof planningcontrol] is theone relating to

the allegedbreach (subsection(1 )(b));

(3) specifytheremedialstepswhich the LPA require to be taken,or the activitieswhich

the LPA requireto cease,in orderto achieve,wholly or partly, anyof the alternative

purposesdefinedin subsection(4) of section173 (sub-section(3));

(4) specifythe calendar dateon which thenotice is to takeeffect(subsection(8));

(5) specifythe complianceperiodwithin which anyrequiredremedialsteps areto be

taken(subsection(9));

(6) specifythe LPA’s reasonsfor issuingthenotice (subsection(10) andregulation3(a) of

theEnforcementNoticesandAppealsRegulations1991);

(7) specifythe preciseboundariesof the land to which thenotice relates(subsection(10)

andregulation3(b) of the EnforcementNotices andAppealsRegulations1991);

27


(8) be accompaniedby an explanatorynotegiving information to the recipientof every

copyof thenoticeabout theright of appealto the Secretaryof Stateandthe appeal

procedure(subsection(10)andregulation4 of the EnforcementNotices andAppeals

Regulations1991).

Theserequirementsarediscussedin thefollowing paragraphs5.3 to 5.31.

STATING THE MATTERS CONSTITUTING THE ALLEGED BREACH OFCONTROL

5.3 Therequirementto statethemattersconstituting, inthe LPA’s opinion,the allegedbreach

of planningcontrol is fundamental totheentire enforcementprocess.This is becausethe

statementof the allegedbreachmay subsequentlyhaveto providethe foundationfor—

(1) theserviceof astopnotice,to reinforce the effectof theenforcementnotice;or

(2) theSecretaryof State,or aPlanningInspector,to considerany mattersarisingfrom a

valid appealundersection174of the 1990 Act; or

(3) in theeventof subsequentnon-compliance withan effectiveenforcementnotice,acriminal prosecutionby theLPA (under section179 of the 1990Act) for thatoffence,

in which an allegedcontraventionof thenotice’s requirementswill haveto be proved

“beyondreasonabledoubt” (thecriminal standard ofproof).

Thus,unlessan enforcementnotice’s allegationis firmly founded,from the outset,on

factual information about thesuspectedbreachof control, theLPA may well experience

difficulty at a laterstageof enforcementproceedings.

5.4 Theleadingstatementof the legally correctapproachto the contentof an enforcement

notice is found in Lord JusticeUpjohn’s judgment intheCourt of Appeal, on12 December

1962,in thecaseof Miller-M cadv Minister of Housingand Local Government[1963] 1

Al 1 ER459,wherehesaid that the recipientof anenforcementnotice “is entitled tosay

thathe mustfind out from within thefour cornersof thedocumentwhathe is requiredto

do or abstainfrom doing”. Lord JusticeUpjohn alsoidentified a testto be appliedin

decidingwhetheranenforcementnoticesatisfiedthe statutoryrequirement.He saidthe testmustbe: doesthenotice tell him fairly whathe hasdonewrongandwhathe

must do to remedyit?”

NULLITY AND INVALIDITY

5.5 LPAs are naturallyconcernedto ensurethat any enforcementnotice theymay issue isnot

subsequentlyfound to be a “nullity” or “invalid”. In thecaseof Miller-M eadv Minister ofHousingand Local Government,Lord JusticeUpjohn distinguishedbetweenthesetwo legal

concepts.A notice is “bad on its faceanda nullity” if someonecannottell in what respecthe hadallegedlyfailedto complywith a condition, orcouldnot tellwith reasonable

certaintywhat steps mustbe taken toremedytheallegedbreach.Sucha noticewould be

“so much wastepaper”;and,for that reason,therewould be no need(andthusthereis no

statutorypower) to quashit. In contrast,wherethereis afundamentalerror in thenotice,

which is demonstrableby referenceto evidentialfact (suchas allegingdevelopmentwithoutplanningpermissionwhen inlaw no permissionis required),thenotice will be

28

- Formulatingthe termsof an enforcementnotice

invalid. When thosefactsare adduced- for example,in adjudicationon anenforcementappeal- thenoticemaybe quashedfor invalidity.

5.6 Thedistinctionbetween nullityandinvalidity wasfurtherexaminedin theCourtofAppealCriminal Division’s judgmenton 11 April 1995,in thecaseof R v Wicks [1996]160 JPL743. In thatcasetheCourt distinguishedbetween“defectson thefaceof a noticerenderingit a nullity” and“thosematterswhich mayrendera notice invalid”. The Court

heldthatno evidencewould be required if adefendantallegedthatan enforcement noticewas anullity: this is becauseit would benecessaryto showthat thenoticewas “patentlydefectiveon its face”,as amatterof law. “Invalidity” involved different considerations.Theissuewould bewhethertherehadbeenprocedural irregularityor deficiency,or theLPA hadbeen“Wednesburyunreasonable” in takingthedecision toissuethe notice.In thosecircumstances,it wouldbe necessaryto considertheevidence abouttheLPA’s processinconsideringenforcement actionandthedecision toissuea notice. Onlythe High Courthadthe power to quash anenforcement noticeon invalidity grounds:no criminalcourthad thatpower.

ALLEGING SEPARATE BREACHES OF PLANNING CONTROL IN ONE NOTICE

5.7 Whereenforcement actionis authorisedagainst separatebreaches ofplanning controlinvolving activities on thesameparcelof land, it is prudentto considerwhetherto stateeach allegation in aseparateenforcementnotice.The decision onhowmany notices toissuewill usuallydependon thecomplexityof activities onthe site andthe planninghistory of the land. If the LPA arefacedwith a particularlycomplicated situation,it maybe

preferableto use aseparateenforcementnotice to allegeeach breachof control.But the

High Court’s judgmenton 8 May 1992,in the caseof ValentinaofLondonLtd and

RoundaletLtd v SecretaryofStatefor the Environmentand Islington LBC [1992]JPL 1151,is authorityfor theview thatallegationsaboutamaterialchangeof use andabout

operational developmentcanbeincludedin the sameenforcementnotice; and thiswould

be normalwherethe allegationsrelateto connectedmatters,eg whatwould be submitted

in oneplanning applicationfor proposeddevelopment.

CATEGORISING THE ALLEGED BREACH

5.8 Subsection(l)(b) of section173 of the 1990Act requirestheLPA to statetheir opinionon which of the two paragraphsin section171A( 1) of the 1990 Act is the one relating to

theallegedbreach. The twoparagraphsare —

(a) carrying out development withoutthe requiredplanningpermission;or

(b) failing to comply with anyconditionor limitation subjectto which planning

permissionhasbeengranted.

In mostcasesit shouldnotbe difficult to makethis distinction satisfactorily,dependingon

the facts andplanninghistory.

5.9 It is sometimesnot clearfrom theplanninghistory andthecurrentcircumstances oftheland how the allegedbreachis most accurately stated. Inthatevent,thereis no objectionto issuingtwo notices“in the alternative”relating to thesamebreach.For example, where

29


it appearsthat anadditional, unauthorisedusehasbeenstartedin a recentextension toa

building, it may wellbe prudent toissue a“material changeof use”andan “operational

development”notice.If, during thecourseof an enforcementappeal againsteachof two

noticesissuedin the alternative,it is clearthatonenotice is preferableto the other, the

LPA shouldbe readyto withdraw the alternative noticeso that the expenseinvolved in

dealingwith two appealsis reduced.Wherethe LPA haveclearlystatedthat two notices

havebeenissued “inthe alternative”and onenotice is subsequentlywithdrawnbecauseit is

acknowledgedto be superfluous,theLPA will notnormally be at risk of an awardof appeal

costs againstthem onthegroundthat theybehaved“unreasonably”(asinterpretedin DOE

Circular 8/93) by issuingtwo notices.

SPECIFYING THE STEPS REQUIRED BY THE ENFORCEMENT NOTICE

5.10 It is essential forthestepsrequiredby an enforcementnotice to be formulatedwith the

utmostprecision.This is because,in the eventof subsequentprosecution(under section

179 of the 1990 Act) for anoffenceof contraveningthe notice,any uncertaintyabout the

requiredstepswill tend to defeatthe prosecution’s(the LPA’s) case.Thiswasclearlystated

by JudgeWoolley in Mold CrownCourt, on 26January1988,in the case ofWarringtonBC

v Garvey [1988] JPL 752, when he said—

“He [the Judge]did not seeit asany partof his role in acriminal caseto construeanything

benevolentlyin favourof the localplanningauthority, or in the contextof a criminal case

in favourof theprosecution.If therewasuncertainty,if therewasdoubt, if oneor moreof

the essential ingredientsof anoffencewereconsideredto be dubious,it wasnot hisduty

and indeedit would be contraryto his duty, presidingas he did in acriminal trial to

construethemin favour of the Prosecutionandagainstthe Defendant

In that case,theJudgewent on to find irregularities in eachof the enforcementnoticeson

which theprosecution’sindictment relied.Consequently, hedirectedthejury to returna

“not guilty” verdict on eachcount inthe indictment.

5.11 Thereis no certainmethodof successfullyspecifyingtherequiredstepsin every

enforcementnotice.Sometimes thestepsmay be quitestraightforward(eg. “ceasethe use of

the building as a dwelling house”);or severaldifferent stepsmaybe required(eg. “ceasethe

use ofthe landas a haulagecontractor’sdepot”; “removeall the woodenpalletsstacked on

the land”; and “remove the diesel fuel storage tank from the land”.); or a series of steps maybe requiredin accordancewith differentcomplianceperiodsin orderto achievesatisfactoryconditions on the site. The two vital considerations in formulating the required steps are—

(1) to express them precisely in plain language, so that anyone subsequently required toimplementthe stepswill not be left in doubtaboutwhat is required; and

(2) to ensurethat the steps donotgo beyondwhat needsto be requiredin order to remedy

any breach of control or any injury to amenity on the enforcement notice site: this is to

safeguardthe LPA’s interestagainst anysubsequentappealon ground.(f) in section

174(2)of the 1990 Act.

5.12 Thefollowing are examplesof requiredstepswhich areunlikely to be enforceablein practice—

(1) “return the land to thephysicalcondition inwhich it wasbeforethe breachof control

occurred”;

(2) “take all possiblestepsto minimise noise andfumesfrom activities on the land”;

30

Formulatingthe terms of anenforcementnotice

(3) “carryout acomprehensivelandscapingscheme onthe boundaryof the site, to the

local planningauthority’s satisfaction”.

MAKING THE DEVELOPMENT COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF A PLANNINGPERMISSION

5.13 The provisionsof section173(4)(a) of the 1990 Act enable anenforcementnotice to

requirestepsto be takenfor the purposeof “remedyingthebreachby makingany

developmentcomplywith the terms (includinganyconditionsandlimitations) of any

planningpermissionwhich hasbeengranted inrespectof the land,...”Any such

permissionmay havebeengrantedby the LPA themselves (in responseto a planning

application),or by theGeneralPermittedDevelopmentOrder (“the GPDO”). Wherethe

permissionwasgrantedby the LPA, it is importantto ensurethat therequiredstepsare

reasonablein the particularcircumstancesof thedevelopmentascarriedout (eitherwholly

or partly)andare not adisproportionateremedy.Forexample,if a dwellinghousehasbeenbuilt 3.0 metresnearerto the neighbouringsiteboundarythan indicatedon the approved

plans,it maywell notbe justified to requirethedemolition of thebuilding andits re-

construction intheexactlocationshownon theplans,unlessthis is the only way to

remedywhat would otherwiseamountto unacceptableoverlookingof the neighbouring

dwelling. Insteadof demolition,the LPA might considera requirementfor remedialworks

to makethedevelopmentacceptable,suchasno openingwindows or the useof opaque

glazing.

DISCONTINUANCE OF USE OF LAND OR RESTORATION TO ITS PREVIOUSCONDITION

5.14 Theprovisionsof section173(4)(a)of the 1990 Act also enablean enforcementnotice to

requirestepsto be takenfor thepurposeof “remedyingthebreach..., by discontinuingany

useof theland or by restoringthe landto its conditionbeforethebreachtookplace.”

Thesestepsshouldenablethe LPA to respondflexibly to mostbreaches ofcontrol. In

consideringwhatwasthe conditionof the landbeforethe breachoccurred,it is importantnot to imposeexcessiverequirementsfor the sakeof tidying up aderelictsite. If there is

photographicevidence(including reliablydatedaerial photographs)of the previous

conditionof the site, they may beuseful in supportingthe casefor this type of requirement.

5.15 Thereis judicial authority to supportthe view that,wherethebreachof control involvesa

materialchangeof use ofland, a restorationrequirementmayextendto remedying“operationaldevelopment”which hasbeencarriedout as partandparcelof thechangeof

use.Forexample,in thecaseof Murfitt v SecretaryofStatefor theEnvironmentand East

CambridgeshireDC [1980] JPL 598,the High Courtheld that somehardstandingwhichhadbecome“immune” from enforcementaction,becauseit hadbeenlaid downmorethan

four yearsbeforethedate oftheenforcementnotice,could neverthelessbe requiredto be

removedbecauseit wasan integralpart of the materialchangeof useof thelandfor

parkingheavygoodsvehicles.

REMEDYING ANY INJURY TO AMENITY CAUSED BY THE BREACH

5.16 The provisionsof section 173(4)(b)of the 1990 Act enablean enforcementnotice to

require, alternatively,stepsto be takenfor the purposeof “remedyingany injury to amenity

which hasbeencausedby the breach”.While this provides thepossibilityof tailoring the

31


requiredsteps,so that they matchtheremediationprocesson the land as closely as possible,

it is essential forthis typeof stepnot to be oppressive.This is emphasisedby theuse ofthe

words“wholly or partly” in the precedingsub-section173(3).

“UNDER-ENFORCEMENT”

5.17 “Under-enforcement”(namely,requiringstepsto be takenwhich do not fully remedythe

breachof control allegedin the enforcementnotice)haslongbeena familiar processfor

LPAs, althoughtherewaspreviously some legaldoubtaboutwhetherit wasproperly

authorisedby theenforcementprovisions.Thecombinedeffectof subsections(3), (4) and

(11) in section173 of the 1990 Act is to removeany legaldoubt thatunder-enforcementis

permissible.Theeffect of theprovisionsin section173(11)of the 1990Act is that where —

(1) theLPA have“under-enforced”(by requiring less onerousremedialstepsto be taken

than might havebeenrequired);and

(2) therecipientof thenotice has compliedwith all therequiredsteps,

planningpermissionis granted(by deemingprovisions)for retentionof any operational

developmentor continuationof any activities which werewithin the scopeof the alleged

breachof controlbutnot subjectto anyof therequiredsteps.Thus,whenconsidering

possibleunder-enforcement,the LPA needto assesswhat the practicalconsequenceswill

be,in eachcase,if “deemed”permissionsubsequentlyappliesto any developmentor

activities remainingon theland after compliancewith the enforcementnotice’s

requirements.

5.18 Thereis no legislativerequirementfor the LPA to notify the recipientof an “under-

enforcing”notice that, on compliancewith its requirements, planningpermissionwill be

“treatedas having beengranted” fortheretentionof operational developmentor

continuanceof someactivities not includedwithin the scopeof the requiredsteps.

Nevertheless, foravoidanceof possibledoubt(especiallyif theownershipof the land

subsequently changes),it will usuallybe prudentfor the LPA to give written notice ofwhat

they regardas thepermission deemedto have beengrantedby virtue of section173(11).

Thisnotification could also berecordedin theregisterof enforcementnoticesmaintained

by virtue of therequirementsof section188of the 1990 Act.

SPECIFYING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE

5.19 Theprovisionsof section173(8) of the 1990 Act require that anenforcementnotice “shall

specify the date on which it is to take effect and, subject to sections 175(4) and 289(4A),shall takeeffecton thatdate”.Thisdateis known as the effectivedateof thenotice.It mustbe a calendardate.It is insufficiently precisefor theeffectivedateto be stated,

for example,as “30 daysafter serviceof thenoticeon all recipients”.

5.20 The effectivedate ofa notice is directly relatedto—

(1) therequiredprocedurefor servinga copy of thenoticeon the peoplewith an interest

in theland (by virtue of section172(3)(b)of the 1990 Act); and

32

Formulatingtheterms of anenforcementnotice

(2) the requirementsfor submittingan appealto the Secretaryof State againstthenotice

(by virtue of section174 of the 1990Act).

5.21 The provisionsof section 172(3)(b)of the 1990Act requirethat serviceof an enforcement

noticeshall takeplace “not less than 28 daysbeforethe datespecifiedin it as thedateon

which it is to takeeffect”. Thus thereis effectivelya minimumperiodof 28 daysbetween

the dateon which everyonewith an interest inthe landmusthave beenservedwith a copyof thenoticeandthe dateon which the noticecomesinto force.This required28-day

periodneedsto becarefully consideredwherethereare numerousrecipientsof an

enforcement noticewho are to beservedby postaldelivery. It may beprudentto allow amarginof severaldaysabove theminimumperiodof 28 days sothat everyrecipientof a

copy of the noticewill receiveit not less than 28 daysbeforetheeffectivedate.

5.22 Theprovisionsof sectionl74(3)(a) of the 1990 Act statethatanenforcementappealto

the Secretaryof Stateshall bemade“beforethe datespecifiedin the enforcementnoticeas

thedateon which it is to takeeffect ....“. The effectivedate in the noticealsoprovidesthe

time-limit within which anyenforcementappealto the Secretaryof Statemust be

received.Any appealwhich is not receivedby thePlanningInspectorateAgency(which

receives appealson the Secretaryof State’s behalf)beforetheeffectivedatein the notice

will usuallyberegardedas notvalidly made.Moreover,by virtue of theprovisionsof

section 175(4)of the 1990 Act, thesubmissionof avalid appealto theSecretaryof State

suspendstheeffectof theenforcement noticeuntil the appealis finally decidedor

withdrawn,exceptin onecase.The exceptionis wheretherehasbeena furtherappealto

the High Court, on apoint of law, againstthe Secretaryof State’sor a PlanningInspector’s

enforcementappealdecisionat first instance.In thatevent,theprovisionsof section289(4A) ofthe 1990 Act enablethe High Court, or the Court of Appeal, to orderthat the

enforcementnoticeshallhaveeffectwholly or partly until those litigation proceedingsare

finally decidedandanyre-determinationof the appealby the Secretaryof State hasbeen

issued. If the Court makes such an order, it can also impose such terms as it thinks fit,including a requirementthat theLPA give anundertakingasto damageswhich mayresult

from bringing the enforcementnotice into effect, or suchotherundertakingas theCourt

may requirefrom the LPA. In thecaseof RogerBownand RB TransportLtd v Secretaryof

Statefor the Environmentand HarboroughDC [19961JPL B130, the High Court directed,

on 29 February1996,that the enforcementnoticeshouldtakeeffectpendingfinal

determinationof an appealto theCourt againstthe Secretaryof State’s appealdecision,

becauseconsiderableharm, in termsof safety,anddamageto the environmentwas likely to

be causedby the continuationof the appellants’activities.

SPECIFYING THE COMPLIANCE PERIOD IN AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE

5.23 Section 173(9)of the 1990 Act providesthat anenforcementnotice “shall specifythe

periodat theendof which any stepsare requiredto have beentakenor any activities arerequiredto haveceased andmayspecifydifferentperiodsfor different steps oractivities;

. This is usuallyknown as the complianceperiod.Additionally, section173A(1)(b)of

the 1990 Act providesthat theLPA “may waiveor relaxany requirementof sucha notice

and,in particular,mayextendany periodspecifiedin accordancewith section173(9).”

5.24 The provisionsof section173 and173A do not indicatewhat factorsthe LPA should

considerin decidinghow long thecomplianceperiodfor taking anyremedial action

requiredby the enforcementnoticeshouldbe.Thelimiting factor derivesfrom theprovisionsof section174(2)(g) of the 1990 Act which enable anenforcementappealto be

33


basedon the groundthat the complianceperiodspecifiedin thenotice “falls short of what

should reasonablybe allowed”. Theseprovisions effectivelyoblige theLPA to considercarefully what therecipientof the enforcementnoticewill haveto do, in practice, to carry

out the required remedialstepsand,consequently,how much time it is reasonableto permit

for thatpurpose.This will clearly dependon the particular circumstancesof eachcase.If

the requirementsare unusuallyonerous(egremedyingthe effectsof a large-scalewaste-

tipping operationby removinglargequantitiesof wasteby lorry), or the work involved can

only be carriedoutduring suitableweatherconditions,it may beadvisableto discussthe

matter withtheowneror operatorof the enforcement noticesite, with a view to agreeing

on amutually acceptablecomplianceperiod. If anysuchnegotiations takeplace,the LPA

shouldnotoverlook the interestof any local residentsor otherneighboursof thesite whose

amenityis seriouslyharmedby thebreachof control. If the LPA alsoserveastopnotice,to

reinforcethe effectof therelatedenforcementnotice, theprohibition in thestopnotice

will normallyremaineffective fortheduration oftheenforcementnoticecompliance

period.

5.25 In decidingon the complianceperiod’sduration, theLPA shouldbearin mind that staff

resourceswill usuallyhaveto be devotedto monitoring remedialwork while it takesplace

on the enforcement noticesite. This suggeststhat theperiodshouldbe asshort as canreasonablybe allowed.A helpful rule of thumbis that the complianceperiodshouldnot

normallyexceedoneyear,unlesssomeexceptional circumstancejustifies it. If a compliance

periodis to exceedoneyear,the LPA shouldconsider whetherthe bettercourseis to granta time-limitedplanningpermissionfor whateveractivity is to takeplace on the site.

SPECIFYING THE LPA’S REASONS FOR ISSUING THE NOTICE

5.26 Theprovisionsof regulation3 of the Town andCountryPlanning(EnforcementNotices

andAppeals) regulations1991 (SI 1991/2804)(“the 1991 Regulations”)requireevery

enforcementnotice the LPA issueto specifythe reasons whythey considerit “expedient”toissuethe notice. The example enforcementnoticesin Annex 2 to DETR Circular 10/97

indicatehow reasonscanhelpfully be statedin the text of the notice.

5.27 Thereasoningprocessis importantas ameansof explainingto the recipientof any

enforcementnoticewhy, in the LPA’s view, enforcementaction is justified. Evenif the

recipientof the noticehas previouslyrefusedto discussthe allegedbreachof control with

the LPA’s officers, apersuasivestatementof reasonsmayhelp to convincehim that nothing

is likely to be gainedfrom submittingan appeal againstthenotice.And, in the eventof an

appeal,the Secretaryof Stateor a Planning Inspectorwho is to decidethe appealwill

critically examinethe statementof reasonsin orderto assessthemeritsof enforcement

actionon planninggrounds.Thestatementof reasonsshouldalwayscorrespondclosely to

anyreasoningin aCommittee reportwhich recommendedissuingthe enforcementnotice.

If the PlanningCommitteeauthorisedthe issueof an enforcementnotice for different,or

additional,planningreasons,theseshouldbe includedin theLPA’s statementof reasonsfor

issuingthe notice.

SPECIFYING THE ENFORCEMENT NOTICE LAND

5.28 The provisionsof section172(2)of the 1990Act statethe requirementto servea copy of

an enforcement noticeon the owner and occupier“of the landto which it relates”.

34

Formulatingthetermsof anenforcementnotice

Regulation3(b) of the 1991 Regulationsrequiresanenforcementnotice to specify “the

preciseboundariesof theland to which the notice relates,whetherby referenceto a plan

or otherwise”.It is becausean effectiveenforcementnoticealsobecomesa “local land -

charge”(which is materialfor anyconveyancingpurposes)that theseprovisionsstrongly

emphasisethe importanceof preciselydefining the boundaryof the enforcementnotice

site.

5.29 Thebestway of definingthe boundaryof a site is by referenceto anOrdnanceSurveybase

map,to ascaleof not less than 1/2500. If thepreciselocation of a building, or an area

wherea materialchangeof usehasallegedlyoccurred,on enforcementnotice land, is in

doubt, the LPA shouldarrangefor it to be accuratelysurveyedbeforethe enforcement

noticeplan is finalised.Thiswill help to minimise thepossibility that the notice maybe

quashed,on appealto the Secretaryof State,becausethe locationplan (and,consequently,

the enforcementnotice) is fundamentallydefective.

5.30 Although the inclusionof a locationplan is usually the mosteffectiveway of specifyingthe

enforcementnotice land, this procedureis not essentialin every case.The High Court’s

judgmenton 9 July 1991,in the caseof Wiesenfeldv SecretaryofStatefor theEnvironment

and BarnetLBC [1992] JPL 556,held that the words“or otherwise”in regulation3(b) of

the 1991 Regulationsindicatedthat someflexibility is intended.Thereis no needfor the

site-boundaryto be identified by its lengthor thepointsof the compass.Where

appropriate,a verbaldescriptionof thesitewould suffice, includingmerelythe addressof

the premises,bearingin mind that, in conveyancingpracticein urbanareas,it was

sufficient to rely on the addressof the site as the meansof ascertainingits boundary.

EXPLANATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT APPEAL PROVISIONS ANDPROCEDURE

5.31 The provisionsof Regulation4 of the 1991 Regulationsrequirethat every copy of an

enforcementnoticeservedby a LPA beaccompaniedby an explanationwhich includesthe

following matters—

(1) a copy of sections171A, 171Band172 to 177 of the 1990Act, so that the recipientis

awareof the enforcementappealprovisionsandprocedures,including the groundson

whichan enforcementappealmay be submitted;and

(2) notificationof the time-limit within which an enforcementappellantmustspecifythe

groundson which the appealis madeandthe factson which eachgroundof appeal

will be supported.

Thereis no needfor the LPA to setup their own arrangementsto fulfil theserequirements.

The Departmentof the Environmentsupply, throughthe PlanningInspectorateAgency,

anofficial explanatorybooklet aboutthe entireenforcementappealprocessanda stock of

enforcementappealforms,which canbeusedwheneveran enforcementnotice is issued.

35


CHAPTER 6

The responseto an enforcementnotice appeal

THE STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL

6.1 Section174 of theTown andCountryPlanning Act1990 (“the 1990 Act”) providesa right

of appealto theSecretaryof Stateagainstan enforcementnotice.The peopleentitled to

appealare definedas—

(1) “a person havinganinterest in the land”: this meansanyonewho possessesa legalinterest

in the parcelof land to which thenoticerelates,butdoesnot includea trespasser;and

(2) “a relevantoccupier”:section174(6)of the 1990 Act definessuchan occupieras “a

personwho (a) on the dateon which the enforcementnotice is issuedoccupiesthe

land to which thenotice relatesby virtue of a licence;and(b) continuesso to occupy

the land whenthe appealis brought”.

Anyonewho is within the legal scopeof thesetwo categoriesof appellantmay appeal

againsta relevantenforcementnotice,regardlessof whethera copyof the noticewasserved

on themindividually (asrequiredby section172(2)of the 1990 Act).

THEGROUNDSOFAPPEAL

6.2 Section 174(2)of the 1990 Act provides sevengroundsfor an enforcementappeal,as

follows—

(1) that, in respectof anybreachof planningcontrolwhich maybe constitutedby themattersstatedin thenotice,planningpermissionought tobe grantedor, asthecase

maybe,the conditionor limitation concernedought tobe discharged(ground(a));

(2) that those mattershave notoccurred(ground(b));

(3) that those matters(if theyoccurred)do notconstitutea breachofplanning control

(ground(c));

(4) that, at the datewhenthe noticewas issued,no enforcementactioncouldbe taken in

respectof any breachof planning controlwhich maybe constitutedby those matters

(ground(d));

(5) that copiesof the enforcementnoticewerenotservedas requiredby section172

(ground(e));

36


thereis aconflict of evidenceaboutoneof the“legal grounds”of appealin section

174(2) of the 1990 Act andtheevidenceof witnessesneedsto betestedin cross-

examination;

(2) by a hearing (including a site-inspection):this proceduremaybe apt whereoneof theprincipal parties hasaskedto be“heard” but theformality of a public inquiry is not

considerednecessary;

(3) by written representations,with or without a site-inspection:this procedurewill be usedwheneverbothprincipal partiesacceptit andthePlanningInspectorateconsidersthat

an inquiryor hearingis unnecessary.A site inspectionmaynotbe necessaryif the‘‘planning merits” of theappealdo not fall to beconsidered(because,for example,the

fee for the deemedapplicationhasnot beenpaid) andthe appealrevolvessolely

aroundthe legal interpretationof agreedfacts. As soonasthey are awarethat an

enforcementappeal hasbeenvalidly made,the LPA’s officers shoulddecidewhat

proceduretheywill ask the PlanningInspectorateto adopt.Thisdecisionshouldtake

accountof the mattersat issuein theappealandthe resourcecoststhe LPA will incur

in respondingat all subsequentstagesof their preferredprocedure.It shouldbenoted

that when oneparty has exercisedthe right to be heard,thePlanningInspectorate,

actingon behalfof the Secretaryof State,will decidewhetherahearingor inquiry will

be held, taking into accountthe circumstancesof eachappeal,including any

preferences alreadyexpressedby the principalparties.

REQUIREMENTS TO BE FULFILLED BY THE LPA

6.8 PartIII of theTown andCountryPlanning(EnforcementNoticesandAppeals)

Regulations1991 (SI 1991/2804) imposescertainproceduralrequirementson theappellant

andthe LPA in anenforcementappeal.Therequirements ontheLPA are—

(1) within 14 daysfrom being givennoticeof the enforcementappeal,to sendthe

Secretaryof Statea copy of the enforcementnoticeanda list of the names and

addressesof the peopleon whom a copy of the noticewasserved,as requiredby section

172(2)of the 1990 Act (regulation6);

(2) wherea local inquiry is to be held andthe datefixed for holdingthe inquiry is less

than 18 weeksafter thedate ofthe Secretaryof State’swritten notice ofhis intention

to causean inquiryto be held (the “relevant date”),to submit astatementof the

LPA’s proposedsubmissionson the appealat least6 weeksbeforethe inquiry date

(regulation7);

(3) in anyothercasewherea local inquiry is to be held,to submit thatstatementnot later

than12 weeksafter the“relevantdate” (regulation7); and

(4) whereno inquiry is to beheld, to submit their statementof caseno later than 28 days

afterthe dateof theSecretaryof State’srequestfor it (regulation7)

TheLPA’s statementsin sub-paragraphs(2), (3) and(4) abovemust include—

(a) asummaryof theLPA’s responseto each groundof appeal;and

38

The responseto anenforcementnotice appeal

(b) a statementwhethertheLPA would be preparedto grantplanningpermissionfor

the allegedbreachof control and,if so, particularsof any conditions theywouldwishto haveimposedon any suchpermission(regulation7).

The LPA’s statementsshouldbe entirely consistentwith the LPA’s reasonsfor taking

enforcementaction.But theyshouldnot be over-elaborateor legalistic.A clearly and

succinctlyexpressedstatement, whichis readilycomprehensibleto theappellant andany

“interestedpersons”,will best fulfil this requirement.

INQUIRY APPEALS

6.9 WhereaPlanningInspectoris to holda public local inquiry into an enforcementappeal,

theprovisionsof the Town andCountryPlanning(Enforcement)(InquiriesProcedure)

Rules1992 (SI 1992/1903)prescribe theappealprocedure.The LPA’s officers who are to

participatein an enforcementappealinquiry shouldbe familiar with all therequirementsof

theseRules.In particular,theLPA’s officersshouldcarefully considerwho is to leadthe

authority’scaseat the inquiry andthe witnessesthey intend to call in supportof their case.

Wherea witnessrepresentinganotherauthority (eg theCountyCouncil ashighwayauthority) oranotheragency(egthe EnvironmentAgency commentingon awater quality

issue) isto be called, it is vital to ensurethat the witness’sevidenceis directly relevant,

professionallypresentedandentirely consistentwith theLPA’s case.

PUBLIC NOTIFICATION OF THE INQUIRY AND APPEAL

6.10 Rule 11 of the EnforcementInquiriesProcedureRulesprescribesthe procedureto befollowed in publicly notifying the arrangementsfor an inquiryinto an enforcementappeal.

In appealswherea local inquiry is not beingheld, regulation8 of theEnforcementNotices

andAppealsRegulationsprescribesthe notificationof the appealwhich theLPA mustgive

to occupiersof propertyin thelocality of the enforcementnoticesite and anyotherpeoplewho, in the LPA’s opinion, are affectedby theallegedbreachof planning control.

POWER TO QUASH THE ENFORCEMENT NOTICE ON PROCEDURALGROUNDS

6.11 Provisionsin section176(3)(b) of the 1990 Act enabletheSecretaryof Stateto allow an

appealandquashtheenforcementnotice if the LPA fail to comply with anyproceduralrequirementin PartII of the EnforcementNoticesandAppealsRegulations,other thanthe

requirementto give public notification of theappeal.The Department’sexperienceis that

this discretionarypower is only rarelyused.Whenits useis beingconsidered,theLPA will

be givenadequatewarningandshouldthentake immediatestepsto submit the required

information or statement(preferablytransmittingit by fax),

POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE DURING THE APPEAL

6.12 As an enforcementappealproceedsto thepoint at which a public inquiry or site-inspectionis to take place,the LPA’s officers shouldmonitorall statementsandrepresentationsthe appellant andany “interestedpersons”make.TheLPA’s officersshould

alsoconsider anyadvice issuedby the PlanningInspectorateduring theappeal’sprocedural

39


stage.If officers concludefrom their considerationof anotherparty’sstatementsthat an

enforcementnotice is fundamentallydefective,so that it cannotbe correctedin theappeal

decision(using theSecretaryof State’spowerin section176(1) of the 1990Act), they

shouldtakestepsto withdraw thenotice assoonaspracticable.If the appellant,or anagent

on the appellant’sbehalf,warnsthe LPA that the notice is fundamentallydefectiveandthe

warning is ignored,or rejectedwithout adequatereasons,theLPA will be at riskof having

theappellant’sappealcostsawardedagainstthem if the notice is quashedby the Secretary

of Stateor a PlanningInspector.

6.13 If two enforcementnotices havebeenissued “inthe alternative”andit becomesclearthat

oneof them is superfluous,the LPA shouldtakestepsto withdraw the superfluousnotice as

soonas practicable.To safeguardthe authority againsta possibleawardof the appellant’s

costs,theLPA shouldexplain that the noticeis beingwithdrawnbecauseit is no longer

considerednecessaryto maintainit, as the serviceof two noticeswasprecautionary.

6.14 Wheneveranenforcementnotice is withdrawnduring the appealprocess,theLPA should

ensure,in accordancewith the provisionsof section1 73A(3) of the 1990 Act, that

notification of thewithdrawal is givento everyonewho haspreviouslybeenservedwith a

copy of it, or who would be servedif the noticewere re-issued.Therelevantentry in the

LPA’s enforcementnotice registershould also bedeleted.

INQUIRY APPEALS: PREPARING FOR THE INQUIRY

6.15 In preparingfor an inquiryinto an enforcementappeal,the LPA’s officers will needto

considerhow bestto presenta thoroughlyco-ordinatedandwell substantiatedcaseon the

authority’sbehalf, especiallyif theappealinvolvesa lengthy planninghistory, or

complicatedlegal issues, orboth. It is essentialto decide,well beforethe inquiry, how each

witness’sevidencecanbestbe presented.In giving evidenceas to the facts,it is always

preferableto rely on awitness whocanspeakfrom personalexperience: for example,an

EnforcementOfficer who hasobservedthe appeal siteovera long period,or a neighbour of

the site who haskept detailedrecordsof activities takingplace onthesite on recorded

dates,maybe betterequippedto give evidencethana PlanningOfficer who mayonly have

visitedthe site intermittently. If technicalevidenceis neededto supportthe LPA’s case,the

authority’sofficers should ensurethat responsibility forit is allocatedto someone(possiblya

consultant)who is professionallycompetentto dealwith therelevantissuesand to

withstandany detailedcross-examination.

6.16 Particularcaremustbe taken inproducingthe relevantdocumentaryevidence.Thismay

includesworn affidavits, copiesof any planningpermissionrelating tothe appealsite,

previous “establisheduse”certificates,correspondencewith officers about activitieson the

site, andrepliesto requestsfor theappellant toprovide information (including,for

example,theresponseto aplanningcontraventionnotice).Photographicevidence,

including aerialphotographs,canbeparticularly useful in anenforcementappealin

establishingwhatactivities were takingplaceon thesite in the past.If photographsare to

be submittedin evidence,they mustbe of sufficiently good quality to enablethe activities

on the site to be establishedsatisfactorily andreliably dated.

40

Theresponseto an enforcementnoticeappeal

6.17 The LPA’s officers shouldbearin mind that further development, includingnewactivities,

may takeplaceon the appeal siteat any time after anenforcement noticehasbeenissued.

It is thereforeprudent tokeepthe appealsite underregularobservationand torecord any

significantdevelopment whichmayoccur betweenservingcopiesof the enforcementnotice andthedateofa public inquiry or site inspection.If possible,aphotographicrecord

of newdevelopmentor activities shouldbe made.Sometimes,the owneror occupierof the

appeal sitemay takestepsto “tidy up” the site in advanceof the PlanningInspector’s site-

inspection.It is thereforeimportant tohavea witnessavailableto give first-hand evidence

about theconditionof the appealsite, andtheactivities taking placeon it, on the date of

issueof theenforcementnotice.

THE ONUS OF PROOF

6.18 The appellant’sandthe LPA’s respectiverole in an enforcementappeal inquiryis

sometimes misunderstoodbecausetheenforcementnotice is mistakenlyregardedas ifit

wereanindictment incriminal proceedings.An enforcementnotice is a statementthat,in

theLPA’s opinion, a breachof planningcontrol appearsto havetakenplaceon the land.

Theenforcementappealenablesthe recipientof thenotice to rebut the LPA’s opinion

that a breachappearsto haveoccurredor, if a breachof control is admitted,to maintain

that planningpermissionshouldbegrantedfor it. It follows that the onusof proof in an

enforcementappealis on the appellant toshow, byvirtue of the materialfactsadducedin

supportof any of the grounds(b) to (e) in section174(2)of the 1990 Act, that the appeal

shouldbe allowed.The onusin the appealis not on the LPA to show that the appeal

shouldbe dismissed,althoughin practicethat may well constitute theLPA’s main line of

argumentat the inquiry in responseto any legalgroundof appeal.

THE TEST APPLICABLE TO EVIDENCE

6.19 Proceedingsat anenforcementappealinquiry takeplacebeforean administrativetribunal

(constitutedby thePlanning Inspectorin person). Theyare not Courtproceedings.It

follows that thecorrecttestapplicableto the submittedevidenceis what is calledthe “civil

standard of proof’ whichinvolvesthe tribunal’sassessment“on the balanceof

probabilities”.This is a lessdemandingstandard ofproofthan thetestusedin criminal

proceedings,which is “beyondreasonabledoubt”. If there is a conflict of evidenceon a

materialfactor facts,it is the PlanningInspector’sresponsibilityto decide,on the balance

of probabilities,which evidenceis to be preferred.

POSSIBLE GRANT OF PLANNING PERMISSION ON APPEAL

6.20 If the appealis proceedingon ground(a), including the “deemed”planning application,

theLPA’s officerswho are to attendthe inquiry shouldagreeon acontingentlist ofplanningconditionsfor submissionat the inquiry if thePlanningInspectoris mindedto

grantplanningpermissionfor thedevelopmentinvolved in the allegedbreachof control,or partof it. The submissionof a list of conditionsdoesnot imply that the LPA concede

thatplanningpermissionshouldbe granted:it simply registersthe LPA’s concernthat any

permissionwhich may begrantedshouldbe effectivelycontrolled by the suggested

conditions.If authority to take enforcement actionhasnot beendelegatedto the LPA’s

officers, orwheresuch authorityhasbeendelegatedbutauthority to grantpermission,or todetermineconditions,hasnot been,

41


it maybe advisableto obtain therelevantPlanningCommittee’sapproval foranyproposed

list of conditionsto be submittedat an inquiry.

AWARD OF COSTS IN ENFORCEMENT APPEAL PROCEEDINGS

6.21 Eachparty to an enforcementappealmay applyfor an awardof its appealcostsagainst

anotherparty, regardlessof the procedureusedto processanddecidethe appeal.Thereis

someevidencethatLPAsare generallyreluctantto pursuethe possibilityof a costs

application,especiallyin written representationsenforcementappeals.Enforcement action

is oftenlabour-intensiveandtheinquiry appealprocessusually involves theproductionof

documentary evidenceandthe attendanceof witnessesat an inquiry, causingtheLPA

substantialexpense.It is thereforeprudentalwaysto consider whethera costsapplicationagainstthe appellantis justified. As with anyotherappealcostsapplication,the LPA will

haveto showthat the appellant’sbehaviourin the appealproceedingswas“unreasonable”

(asthat termis in interpretedin DOECircular8/93) and that, consequently,theLPA haveincurred unnecessaryexpenditurein the appealprocess.Theguidancein the Circular

includesillustrative examplesof whatmay amountto “unreasonable”conductin an

enforcementappeal.By the sametoken,theLPA’s officers should ensurethat their own

conduct in the appealproceedingsis reasonableat all times, so that theydo not put the

authorityat risk of an awardof appealcostsin theappellant’sfavour.

SCRUTINISING THE APPEAL DECISION

6.22 The PlanningInspector’sor Secretaryof State’sdecisionletter shouldbe scrutinisedto

establishwhat furtheractionmay benecessary,dependingon theoutcomeof the appeal.

6.23 If the enforcement noticeis upheld,officers will needto considerwhatfurther stepsmaybe

neededto ensurecompliancewith its requirements.If these involveasubstantialamountof

remedialwork (egthe removalof largequantitiesof wastematerialor scrap fromthe site),

it is prudent todiscusswith the landowneror occupierof the sitehow thework is to be

carriedout and,if possible, agreea timetablefor it to be donewithin the compliance

period.The provisionsof section173A(1)(b)of the 1990 Act enablethe LPA to extend

the complianceperiod at anytime if it is clearly reasonableto allow moretime for any

particularly onerousrequirement.

6.24 If the appealsucceeds,officers will occasionallyneedto consider whetherthereare grounds

for seekingleavein the High Court to appeal againstthedecision,on a pointof law, in

accordancewith the provisionsof section289 of the 1990 Act. The time-limit for this typeof appealis 28 daysfrom thedate ofreceiptof the decision letter,althoughthe Court has

discretionto admita late leaveapplication inexceptionalcircumstances.This type of

appealwill normally needto be assessedby an experiencedPlanninglawyer, or it may well

be prudent toobtain Counsel’sopinionbefore anydecision is taken toincur theadditional

expenseof an appealin the High Court.

6.25 An applicationundersection288 ofthe 1990 Act canonly be usedto challengeadecision

to grantplanningpermissionunderparagraph(a) of section177(1) or to dischargea

conditionor limitation underparagraph(b) of that section.Unlike an applicationunder

section289,a section288 applicationdoesnot requirethe leaveof the Court, but it mustbemadewithin 6 weeksof the date ofthedecisionletter andtheCourthasno discretionto

42

The responseto anenforcementnoticeappeal

extendthis time-limit. However,while a successfulapplicationundersection288 cansecurethequashingof a decisionto grantplanningpermissionor to dischargeacondition

or limitation, it cannotsecurethereinstatementof an enforcementnotice whichmayhave

beenquashedat thesametime by theappealdecision.Only an application undersection289 cando that.Moreover,in thecaseof Gill v Secretaryof Statefor the Environmentand

North WarwickshireBC [1985]JPL 710,it washeld that adecisionto grantplanning

permissionundera formercomparableprovisionto section177(1) of the 1990 Act, could

be challengedundereitherof the formerprocedureswhich are now providedby sections

288 and289 of the 1990 Act.

6.26 In decidingwhetherto appealin the High Court, theLPA’s officers shouldbearin mind

that,unlessthe appealdecisionis successfullychallengedby an appealto the Court, thetermsof the decisionwill apply in all respects.Thus, if (for example)the text of the

decisionlettercanvassesanumberof possibleplanningconditions whichtheInspectorintends toimposeon a conditionalgrantof planningpermission,butonesuchcondition is

clearlyomitted from the actualgrantof permission,that deficiencycanonly be remedied

by way of a furtherappealto theHigh Court. Indecidingwhetherto appeal againsttheappealdecision,theLPA’s officers should beawarethat a well-foundedappealmaynot

necessarily involvea full hearingby a DeputyJudgein theCourt. This is becausethereis a

legalprocess,known as “submissionto judgment” which enablesthe Secretaryof State

formally to concedethat the decisionwas legally defectivein oneor morerespectsand,

consequently,to agreewith theLPA that it should be“remitted” to theSecretaryof State

for his re-determination.Whenthe Department(actingthroughthe TreasurySolicitor’s

Departmentasagent)agreesto this process,theLPA’s litigation costsin bringing the

appealin the High Court will normallybe metby theDepartment.


CHAPTER 7

Serving a stop notice

PURPOSE OF A STOP NOTICE

7.1 Becausean appealto the Secretaryof State(undersection174 of theTown andCountry

PlanningAct 1990)effectivelysuspendsanenforcement noticeuntil the appealis finally

determined,or the noticeis withdrawn, the stopnoticeprovisions(in sections183 to 187 of

the 1990Act) enablethe LPA to dealeffectivelywith the interim situation.Theseprovisions

enablethe LPA to serve astopnotice, prohibitingthecarrying out,on the enforcement

noticeland, of any activity which is within thescopeof thebreachof control allegedin the

enforcementnotice.The stopnoticemayrequire anysuchactivity to ceaseuntil thedatewhenthe complianceperiodspecifiedin the relatedenforcementnoticeexpires.

THE SCOPE OF A STOP NOTICE

7.2 Thestopnoticeprovisionsof the 1990 Act are legally constructedso that what is

prohibitedby thenoticemustderiveentirely from the relatedenforcementnotice.

Consequently,if the LPA anticipatehaving to servea stopnotice,they shouldconsiderits

scopewhenthe enforcementnotice is being formulated.

7.3 Theprovisionsof section 183(1)of the 1990 Act enablethe LPA to prohibit the carrying

out of an activity “on land to which the enforcementnotice relates,or any part of that land

specifiedin thestopnotice.” It follows from theseprovisionsthat the activity to be

prohibitedmustbetaking placesomewhereon theparcelof land comprisingthe

enforcementnoticesite. Thus the activity need notbe taking placeon the entire

enforcement noticesite: it might be confinedto a specific areaof thesite, eg aparticular

building from which noise,fumesanddustare beingemitted;or aportionof thesitewhere

openstorageof scrapmaterialsis unacceptablebecauseof the height at which the scrapis

piled. In decidingwhetherto limit thestopnotice to partonly of theenforcementnotice

site,the LPA will needto consider whetherthe activity to be prohibited is capableof

readilybeingmoved aroundto any otherpart of the site, egopenstorageof pallets:if so, it

will usuallybe prudent tomakethestopnoticeapply to the entire enforcementnotice site.

7.4 An “activity” which astop noticemayprohibit is definedin section183(2) of the 1990 Act

as—

any activity specifiedin theenforcementnoticeas anactivity which the local planning

authority requireto ceaseand anyactivity carriedout as partof that activity or associated

with that activity.”

Becausea stop noticeis prohibitory, it is not apt forusein any circumstancewhich requires

somepositiveaction to betaken inresponseto it. A stop noticecanonly compel an

44

Serving astopnotice

activity to cease,orreduceor minimise thelevel of an activity. Providedthe activity to beprohibited is within the scopeof the breachof control allegedin the enforcementnotice,a

stop noticemay applyto it. Thus,wherean enforcementnoticeallegesamaterialchange

of useof land,a stopnoticemayprohibit anactivity which is ancillaryor incidental to the

changeof use (eventhoughanenforcementnotice itself couldnot be directedagainst an

ancillaryor incidentaluse).

7.5 By virtue of section183(4)and(5) of the 1990 Act, a stopnotice cannotprohibit—

(1) theuse ofany building as a dwellinghouse;

(2) thecarryingout of anyactivity if the activity hasbeencarriedout (whether

continuously or not)for aperiod ofmorethanfour yearsendingwith thedate of

serviceof the notice.For this purpose,any period duringwhich theactivity wasauthorisedby planning permissionis not counted.

AUTHORITY FOR SERVICE OF A STOP NOTICE

7.6 It is importantto obtainproperauthorisationfor serviceof astopnotice,eitherfrom the

relevant committeeor theCouncil’sofficer to whomauthority to proceedwith servinga

stopnoticehasbeendelegated.Although thereis no right of appealto the Secretaryof

Stateagainsta stbpnotice,it canbe challengedon the groundthat it wasnotproperly

authorised,or that the decisionto issueit was“Wednesburyunreasonable”.A challengeon

this basismaybebroughtby seekingleave, in theHigh Court, to bring judicial review

proceedings,or by wayof the defenceto aprosecution undersection187 of the 1990Act

for contraveningthe prohibition inthe stopnotice.

THE RECIPIENT OF A STOP NOTICE

7.7 Therequirementfor serviceof a stopnoticeon interestedpeopleis less rigorousthan for an

enforcementnotice.Section 183(6)of the 1990 Act providesthat a stop notice“may be

servedby the local planning authorityon anypersonwho appearsto themto havean

interest intheland or to be engagedin anyactivity prohibitedby thenotice”. Nonetheless,it is prudentfor the LPA to makethoroughenquiryinto the identity of theowner, andany

otheroccupieror operator,of the stop notice landso thatany subsequentallegationof

defectiveserviceprocedurescanbe effectivelyrebutted.

7.8 Section 184(6)of the 1990 Act containsusefulsupplementary provisionsenablingtheLPA

to displaywhatis calleda “sitenotice” on the stopnotice land.The three-foldpurposeof a

sitenotice is—

(1) to statethat a stop noticehasbeenservedandthatanypersoncontraveningit maybeprosecutedfor an offenceundersection187 of the 1990 Act;

(2) to give thedatewhenthestopnotice takeseffect; and

(3) to indicatethe stopnotice’srequirements.

Whereverthereis difficulty in establishingtheidentify of everyonewho mayhave an

interest inlandto which a stopnoticewill apply, it would be prudent toensurethatat least

onesitenoticeis prominentlydisplayedon any stop noticesite.

45


7.9 Theprovisionsof section184(1)of the 1990 Act requirethat a stopnoticemust referto

the enforcement noticeto which it relatesandhavea copyof that notice annexedto it.

TIME-LIMIT FOR COMPLIANCE WITH A STOP NOTICE

7.10 Theprovisionsof section184(2)of the 1990 Act requirethata stopnoticemustspecifythe

dateon which it will takeeffect. This mustbe acalendardate. It is referredto as the

effectivedate.In section184(3)of the 1990Act, thereare specifiedlimits on the effective

date. In normalcircumstances,thelimits are—

(1) notearlier than3 days after thedateon which the stop noticeis served;and

(2) not later than 28 daysafter the dateon which thenotice is first servedon any person.

The three-daytime-limit for bringing a stopnotice into force canbe waivedif the LPA

considerthereare “special reasonsfor specifyingan earlierdateanda statementof thosereasons is served with the stop notice.” These provisions (in section l84(3)(a) of the 1990Act) enablea stop noticeto bebroughtinto force immediatelywherethe LPA considerthat the activity to be prohibited is so environmentallyharmful, or likely in practiceto be

irremediable,that it is imperativeto prohibit it at once.

WHEN THE EFFECT OF A STOP NOTICE CEASES

7.11 The provisionsof section184(4)of the 1990Act statethat astop noticewill ceasetote

effectivewhen—

(1) theLPA withdraw therelatedenforcement noticeor that notice is quashedin

proceedingson an enforcementappealto the Secretaryof State,or in any judicial

review by theHigh Court;

(2) the complianceperiod in the enforcement noticeexpires(so that it then becomesa

criminal offencenot to carryout the requiredremedialsteps);

(3) the LPA withdrawthestopnotice.

FORMULATING THE TERMS OF A STOP NOTICE

7.12 Aswith the termsof an enforcementnotice,it is vital that the termsof a stop noticeare

formulatedwith theutmostclarity and precision.Sincethereis no right of appealto the

Secretaryof Stateagainstastopnotice,thereis no opportunityfor any draftingdeficiency

in it to be corrected afterit hasbeenserved.The allegedbreachof planningcontrol will

have beenstated inthe enforcementnotice to which the stop noticeis related.But, unlike

the enforcementnotice,the stopnotice doesnotspecifyanyrequiredstepsto be takenfor a

remedialpurpose.Thestop noticesimply prohibitsall the activitiescomprisedin the

allegedbreachof control,or certainof thespecifiedactivities at which the LPA have

decidedto directthe notice. In the eventof asubsequentcontraventionof a stopnotice,

the LPA may needto initiate prosecutionproceedingsundersection187 of the 1990 Act,

46

Serving astop notice

which would requiretheLPA to prove“beyondreasonabledoubt” (the criminal standard of

proof) that theprohibition hadbeencontravenedby thedefendant.Thetermsof the

notice mustprovidethe basisfor any suchprosecution.

7.13 It ishelpful in formulatingthe termsof a stop noticeto recall that the High Court’s

judgmenton 16 July 1986,in the caseof R vRunnyinedeBC ex parteSarvanSinghSeehra

[1987] LGR 250,held that questionsof fact anddegreeare frequentlyencounteredin

PlanningLaw and thereis no objection to incorporatingsuchmattersinto enforcement

andstopnotices,eventhoughthe resultcreatesuncertaintyasto the standard of conduct

requiredin orderto comply with the notices.Thepoint at issuein that case wasthe alleged

imprecisionof theprohibition inRunnymedeBC’s stopnotice,as follows—

“Use of the landfor thepurposesof religious meetingsandservicesandfor the purposesof

religious devotion otherwisethan as incidental to the enjoymentof the dwelling houseas

such.”

It was arguedon Mr Seehra’sbehalfthat the wordsafter“religious devotion” madethe

prohibition inthestopnotice toouncertainforhim to be confidentof holdingreligious and

devotionalmeetingsathis homein Chertseyin sucha wayas to avoidcontraveningit. He

soughtjudicial review in orderto havethe stopnoticequashedby the Court or to obtain a

declarationthat it was invalid or void. Mr JusticeSchiemannrefusedthe applicationon the

groundthat, althoughMr Seehrahadwell-foundedworriesabout thetermsof thestop

notice,they did not result in the stop noticebeing regardedas void. The noticegavethe

recipientan indication of whathe mustdo andwhat he mustnot do; andtherewasno need

(in the Judge’sview) for a precisespecificationof the numberof people,or the amountof

noise,or whateverit may bethat is complainedof, beforea stopnoticehas anyvalidity.

ASSESSING A STOP NOTICE’S LIKELY CONSEQUENCES

7.14 Becausea stopnoticecanhaveimmediatelyseriousconsequenceson a business,

Governmentguidancein Annex 3 to DETR Circular 10/97advisesthata “cost/benefit

assessment”shouldbe carriedout. Thepurposeof this exercise,which need notbe over-

elaborate,is to examinethe foreseeablecoststo thecompany,operatoror landowneragainst

whoseactivities thestopnotice is directed,andthebenefitto amenityin the vicinity of the

sitewhich is likely to result.The High Court’s judgmenton 12 October 1994,in the caseof

R v ElmbridgeBC ex parteWendyFair MarketsLtd [1995] JPLB36, heldthat thesame

guidancein thepreviousCircular (DOE Circular 21/91) wasadvisoryandnot binding onthe LPA if theycould showadequatereasonsnot to follow it. The LPA in this case

(involving landin theMetropolitanGreenBelt) wereawareof the effect thestop notice

would haveon marketoperators, tradersandcustomers;andtherewasevidencethat theyhadweighedevidenceof that effectagainstthe seriousnessof the GreenBelt objection.

They werenot requiredto go into a “more detailedeconomicexercise”.The Courtshould

not substituteits own view for thatof the LPA on the expediencyof servinga stopnotice.

PROSECUTING A STOP NOTICE CONTRAVENTION

7.15 Unlike an enforcement notice contravention, which can be remedied by the LPA's own“default action” (by virtue of the provisions in section 178 of the 1990 Act), a stop notice

contraventioncanonly be dealtwith by initiating prosecutionproceedingsundersection

187 of the 1990 Act. To emphasisethe seriousnessof contraveninga stopnotice,the LPA

47


shouldalwaysconsidera possibleprosecutionas soonas they have evidenceof an offence.If

thereis likely to be delayin hearingthe casein the Magistrates’Court or Crown Court, the

LPA should emphasisethe seriousnessandurgencyof the caseto the Court’s administrators

andask foran “expedited”hearing.

INJUNCTION IN SUPPORT OF A STOP NOTICE

7.16 Eventhoughtheyhaveserveda stopnotice,the LPA mayfind that it is deliberately

contravenedandthehearingof aprosecution undersection187 of the 1990 Act cannotbe

arrangedquickly. In that event,the LPA maywish to seekan interlocutory(that is,

interim) injunction to restraintheprohibitedactivity. In a caseinvolving Tower Hamlets

LBC andacompanyknown as PeachbarLimited, Mr JusticeBrookegrantedsuch aninjunction on 18 December1989 in circumstances wherecriminal proceedingson the stop

noticeoffencecould notbe heardby the ThamesMagistrates’Court until 22 February1990.When PeachbarLimited challengedtheHigh Court’s grantof an interlocutory

injunction, theCourt of Appeal (Civil Division) held, in a judgmentgivenon 20December1989,that theJudgein the High Court wasentitled totakeinto accounttheflagrantanddeliberatebreachof PlanningLaw in weighing“the balanceof convenience”in

theCouncil’s applicationfor an injunction;and it wasnot for theCourtof Appeal to

interfere in aquestion whichwasfor the High CourtJudge’sdiscretion,unlessit couldbe

said thathis decisionwas soclearly wrongthat it wasgenuinelyperverse.In this case,the

Judge’sdirectionsto himselfwere “impeccable”andtheCourt of Appealdismissed

PeachbarLimited’s appealagainstthe grantof the interlocutoryinjunction.

THE LPA’S POSSIBLE LIABILITY TO COMPENSATION WHERE A STOPNOTICE IS SERVED

7.17 SomeLPAs are reluctantto servea stopnotice,evenwherethey considerit is justified,

becausethey believe,or areadvisedby officers, that thereis asubstantialrisk of having to

pay compensationfor financial losswhich therecipientof thestop noticemay incur. In

practice, this risk is often exaggerated.Thereis no evidenceof frequentor substantial

paymentsof compensationhavingto be madeby LPAs who servestopnoticeswhich are

legally well-founded.

7.18 Section186(1) of the 1990 Act providesthat,on servingastopnotice,the LPA will only

haveto pay compensationif thefollowing circumstancesarise—

(1) therelatedenforcementnotice is quashed,on appealto theSecretaryof Stateon one

of the grounds(b) to (g) in section174(2) of the 1990 Act: this meansthatcompensationis not payablewhenthe relatedenforcementnotice is quashed ona

“ground (a)” appealbecauseplanningpermissionis granted;

(2) the relatedenforcementnotice is varied(otherwisethan on a “ground (a)” appeal)so

that any prohibitedactivity in thestopnoticeceasesto be arelevantactivity within

theenforcementnotice;

(3) theLPA decideto withdrawtherelatedenforcementnotice for somereasonotherthantheir decisionto grantplanningpermissionfor thedevelopment towhich the

enforcementnotice relates;

(4) the LPA decideto withdrawthestopnotice.

48

Servingastopnotice

And, evenif theLPA incur a liability to pay compensationfor oneof thesefour reasons,that liability may be reducedor eliminatedin anycasewheretheclaimantwasrequired,by

a planningcontraventionnoticeor other formal requisitionfor information,to provideinformation to the LPA anddid not provideit or did not otherwiseco-operatewith the

LPA whenrespondingto the notice. Thepurposeof theseprovisionsis to ensurethat

someonewho fails to providetheLPA with requiredinformation,or pursuesa courseof

non-cooperationwith theLPA, shouldnotbe able to obtain anycompensationfor loss ordamagewhich couldhave beenavoidedif he or shehadprovidedtherequiredinformation

or co-operatedwith theLPA.

7.19 Thereis a 12-monthtime-limit (runningfrom the date ofthe decisionon the relatedenforcementnotice appeal,or thedate ofwithdrawing theenforcementnoticeor stop

notice)on claimingcompensationfor loss or damagedueto a stopnotice.The usualapproach,if liability is admitted,is for the LPA andthe claimantto agreeon the amountof

anycompensation whichmaybe payable.If agreementon the amountpayablecannotbereached,the disputeis normally referredto the Lands Tribunal for decision.


CHAPTER 8

Serving a breach of conditionnotice

INTRODUCTION

8.1 The provisionsof section187A of the TownandCountryPlanning Act1990 enablethe

LPA to servea “breachof conditionnotice”. This typeof noticehasbeenavailablesince

July 1992.It providesa summaryprocedurefor theLPA to securecompliancewith

conditionsimposedon agrantof planningpermissionfor carryingoutany development of

land. (By virtue of section187A(13)(a)of the 1990 Act, “conditions” includes

“limitations” on agrantof permission,suchas,for example,the limitations on certain

“permitteddevelopment” rightswhich are grantedby virtue of the GeneralPermitted

DevelopmentOrder.)

CHOOSING BETWEEN A BREACH OF CONDITION NOTICE AND ANENFORCEMENT NOTICE

8.2 Whenconsideringhow bestto securecompliancewith a planningcondition, the LPA will

often haveto choosebetweenservinga breachof conditionnoticeand issuingan

enforcementnotice.Thischoicemaynot bea simple matter:someof the relevantfactors

are explained inthe following paragraphs8.3 and8.4.

8.3 Some advantagesof servinga breachof conditionnotice are—

(1) becausethereis no right of appealto the Secretaryof Stateagainstthe notice,its effect

cannotbe suspendedby meansof an appeal;

(2) if the “person responsible”for securing compliancewith anyconditionsis in breachof

the notice,a criminal offenceoccursandmaybe prosecutedimmediatelyin theMagistrates’Court,wherethe maximumpenaltyon conviction is £1,000;

(3) thethreatof beingprosecutedfor contrayeninga breachof conditionnoticemay

suffice to persuadethe recipientof it to comply with the conditionwithout further

actionby the LPA.

8.4 Somepossibledisadvantagesof servinga breachof conditionnotice are—

(1) becausethereis no right of appealto theSecretaryof State,thenoticecannotbe

correctedif it containssomesignificantdefect;

50

Serving abreachof conditionnotice

(2) if someonewho is in breachof the notice is prosecuted,the onusof proof is on theLPA to show“beyondreasonabledoubt” (the criminal standard of proof)that an

offencehas occurred;

(3) if the noticecanbe shownto be fundamentallydefective,or theLPA exceed their

powerin servingit, thenotice may bequashed,by the High Court, on judicial review,

thusdelayingthe enforcementprocessandcausingexpensefor the LPA;

(4) if someonewho hasbeenprosecutedandconvictedof an offenceof contraveninga

breachof conditionnoticestill persistsin contraveningit, thereis no “default” power

for theLPA to entertheland andcarry out anyworkswhich may berequiredby the

notice.

THE RECIPIENT OF A BREACH OF CONDITION NOTICE

8.5 Thepersonon whom a breachof conditionnoticemay beservedis referredto in

section187A(3) ofthe 1990 Act as—

(1) “any personwho is carryingoutor hascarriedout thedevelopment”(paragraph(a));

or

(2) “any person havingcontrolof theland” (paragraph(b)).

The definitionof the first categoryis self-explanatory,but it is elaboratedby

section187A(13)(b)of the 1990 Act which providesthatcarryingout any developmentis

to include “causingor permittinganotherto do so.”Thus,for example, wheretheownerof

a building which is beingconvertedto adwellinghouseinstructsaconstructioncompanyto

carry outconversionwork which contravenesaplanningcondition, a breachof condition

noticecanbe servedon the building’s owner orthe constructioncompanyor both. The

definitionof thesecondcategory(“any person havingcontrolof the land”) is specifically

limited by subsection(4) of section187A so that the breachof conditionnoticeservedon

suchapersoncanonly relateto “conditions regulatingtheuse ofthe land”. Forexample,

wherea housebuilderhascarriedoutresidentialdevelopmentof 20 housesincontraventionof aconditionrequiringa specifiedtypeof roof-tile to be usedon all the

houses,andthe houseshaveall beensold to individual owner-occupiers,thebreachof

conditionnoticecouldnot be served,eventhoughtheowner-occupiershavecontrolof theland,becausethis typeof planningcondition is not a conditionwhich regulatestheuseof

the land.

FORMULATING THE TERMS OF A BREACH OF CONDITION NOTICE

8.6 The provisionsof section187A(5)and(7) of the 1990 Act requirethat abreachof

conditionnoticemust—

(1) specifythe conditionwith which, in theLPA’s view,the recipientof thenoticehas

failed to comply;

(2) specifythe stepswhich the LPA considerought tobe taken,or theactivities which

ought tocease,to securecompliancewith thespecifiedcondition;

(3) statethe period allowedfor compliancewith thenotice.

51


8.7 It is vital to stateall thetermsof a notice withthe utmostclarity and precision,bearingin

mind that anyprosecutionof a contraventionof thenoticewill result in theMagistrates’

Court’s examination ofits termsin the minutest detail. Thisis particularly relevantto therequiredsteps,wheretherecipientof the noticemustnot beleft in anydoubtaboutexactlt

what hasto be done,or what mustcease,in orderto complywith whatevercondition is

specifiedin the notice.

THE COMPLIANCE PERIOD

8.8 The provisionsof Section187A(7) ofthe 1990Act prescribethat the complianceperiod in

abreachof conditionnotice is to be—

(1) a periodnot less than 28 days,startingwith the date ofserviceof the notice (paragraph

(a)); or

(2) the initial complianceperiod,extendedby aperiodto be specifiedby a furthernotice

servedon thepersonresponsible(paragraph(b)).

Section187A doesnot prescribeany criteria for the LPA to usein decidingwhat

complianceperiodto specifyin the notice.But, sincesection1 87A(11) (a) providesa

defencefor apersonwho is prosecutedfor contraveninga notice that “he took all

reasonablemeasuresto securecompliancewith the conditionsspecifiedin the notice”, the

LPA shouldensurethat thecomplianceperiodprovidesa reasonabletime to accomplish

whateverthe notice requires.Whena substantialamountof work is neededto comply fully

with acondition, it maybe advisablefor theLPA to try to agreeon the duration ofthe

complianceperiodwith thepersonon whom the notice is to be served,eventhoughwhat

is to be requiredis at theLPA’s discretion.

THE DEFENCE AGAINST PROSECUTION

8.9 Section1 87A(11) of the 1990 Act providestwo statutorydefencesagainstprosecutionfor a

personchargedwith the offenceof contraveningabreachof conditionnotice.As

mentionedin theprecedingparagraph8, the mainavailabledefenceis that theperson

charged“took all reasonablemeasuresto securecompliancewith the conditionsspecifiedin

the notice”. It is for theCourt todecidewhat it wasreasonablefor the personprosecutedto

do in theparticular circumstancesof the caseto achievecompliancewith the conditionsin

thenotice.

8.10 Thedefencein section187A(11)(b) ofthe 1990 Act is confinedto “any person having

control of the land”: consequently,this defenceis available foran offenceinvolving a

breachof a conditionregulatingtheuseof the land.Sucha personmayclaim that “he no

longerhadcontrol of theland” at the time theoffencewasallegedto havebeencommitted.

8.11 Anyonewho seeksto rely on eitherof thesedefencesmustprovethe defenceon the

balanceof probabilities.It is not for theLPA to proveeitherthat the defendantdid not

takeall reasonablestepsto securecompliancewith the conditions;or that aperson(in the

caseof section187A(2)(b) and(4)) still hadcontrol of the land on the datewhenthe

noticewasserved.

52

Servinga breachof condition notice

8.12 A breachof conditionnoticewill continueto haveeffectin a recurringsituation,eg if aBCN requiringa breachto stopis compliedwith but thebreachlater recurs,theoriginalnoticecanbe enforced afreshandanew noticeis not normallyrequired.Onceserved,it

will continuein forceuntil withdrawn.Section 187A(8)providesthat theperson

responsibleis in breachof thenotice if at any time afterthe endof the complianceperiod thenoticehasnot beencompliedwith, Evena successfulprosecutiondoesnot preventa

furtherprosecution inrespectof thesamenotice (section187A( 10)). However,the

“personresponsible”mustbe thesameor anew noticewill needto beservedon thenewpersonresponsible.

53


CHAPTER 9

Obtaining an enforcementinj unction

THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

9.1 Section187B(1)of theTown andCountryPlanningAct 1990 providesa wide-ranging

powerfor the LPA to obtain aplanningenforcementinjunctionwhenacourt orderis

neededto restrainabreachof planning control. Theprovisionsare asfollows—

“Where a local planning authorityconsiderit necessaryor expedientfor any actualor

apprehendedbreachof planningcontrol tobe restrainedby injunction, theymayapply to

the court for an injunction, whetheror not they haveexercisedor are proposingto exercise

anyof their otherpowersunder thisPart.”

Section 187B(4)of the 1990 Act explainsthat “the court”meansthe High Court or the

CountyCourt.

9.2 The Court’spowerto grantan injunction is wide-ranging.Section187B(2)of the 1990 Act

provides—

“On an applicationundersubsection(1) thecourtmay grantsuchan injunction as the

court thinks appropriate forthepurposeof restrainingthebreach.”

9.3 Theseprovisionshave beenin force sinceJanuary1992.They are availablein additionto

thepowers conferredby section222 of the LocalGovernmentAct 1972,which enablea

local authorityto institute any legalproceedingsin their own namewherethey considerit

expedientfor the promotionor protectionof the interestsof the inhabitantsof their area.Thepreferable course,in dealingwith any actualor allegedbreachof control for which

injunctive relief is to be sought,is for the LPA to usethe provisionsin section187Bof the

1990 Act.

THE SCOPE OF AN ENFORCEMENT INJUNCTION

9.4 The scopeof an injunctionwhich maybe soughtundersection187Bof the 1990 Act is

apparentlyvery wide. It mayapply to “any actualor apprehendedbreachof planning

control”. In this context“apprehended”is takenasmeaningananticipatedbreachof

control,eg.whereit is clearthat preparationsare being madeto establishapermanent

residentialcaravansite; or amajor waste-tippingoperationis aboutto start; or mineral

extractionis aboutto re-startat a long sincedisusedlimestonequarry—all without the

planningpermissionrequiredin eachcase.

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9.5 An injunctionmaybe soughtat any stageof the planningenforcementprocess,eitheras

the LPA’s preferredremedyor in additionto someotherformal enforcementaction. For

example,if anenforcementnotice requiring theuseof landfor scrap-metalrecoveryto

ceaseis suspendedby an appealto theSecretaryof State,but therecoveryoperationsare

extendedto a two-shift systemandweekendworking, it maybe justified to seekaninjunction to restraintheextendedworking; or if, despitebeingprosecutedby theLPA for

contraveningan effectiveenforcementnotice,the operator ofahaulagebusinesscontinues

to defy the notice,seekingan injunction may betheLPA’s only effectivecourseof action.

Wheninitiating injunctive proceedingsby virtue of section187Bof the 1990 Act, the LPAdo nothaveto show that the grantof an injunction is theonly availableremedy:it is

sufficientfor the LPA to “considerit necessaryor expedient”for the breachto be restrained

by an injunction.

9.6 Judicial authorityhasestablishedthat the High Court or CountyCourtshouldapply the

injunctive provisionsin section187Bof the 1990 Act flexibly, with properregardto the

underlyingplanning controlenforcementsituation.This canbe seenfrom the Court ofAppeal’sjudgmenton 7 February1994in the case ofRunnymedeBC v Harwood [1994]

EGCS23. In that case,thedefendant(Mr P C Harwood)hadsoughtpermissionfor the

changeof useof formerfarm-land,nearEghamin Surrey,to usefor the maintenance andrepairof commercialvehiclesfor a period offive years;and,separately,to converta former

agricultural buildingon the landto residentialuse.Theplaintiff (Runnymede BC)refused

both applicationson 20 August1993, butboth developments wentaheadwithout

permission.In initial injunctive proceedingsin the High Court, theJudgegrantedfourinterlocutory (that is, interim) injunctions.Among them, oneinjunction restrainedMr

Harwoodfrom continuing tousethe landfor the storageof motorvehicles;and anotherrestrainedhim from moving or causingor permittingany personto move into occupation

of aparticularbuilding on theland.Just underthreeweekslater, theseinjunctionswere

dischargedby anotherHigh CourtJudgewhenMr Harwoodundertookto prosecute

planningappealsagainstRunnymedeBC’s refusalof permissionwith all due diligence.The

reasonfor the Judge’sdecisionwasthathe consideredagrantof interlocutoryrelief, in

advanceof the latertrial of the action,would prejudicethedefendant’schanceof resisting

theCouncil’scaseat thetrial becauseMr Harwoodwould then no longerbe on theland,or living in the building, if an interim injunction weregranted.In reachingthis conclusion,

theJudgeapplied legalprincipleslaid down in theearlier injunctive caseof East

HampshireDC v Davies [1991] 2 PLR 8 which precededthenew powersin section187Bof

the 1990 Act. The Courtof Appealheldunanimouslythat the High CourtJudgehadmisdirectedhimself in concentratingon theinterlocutorynatureof theapplicationand in

applying the principlesstatedin the caseof EastHampshireDC v Daviesto an application

undersection187B of the 1990Act. TheCourt of AppealstatedthatParliamenthad

clearlyenactedapower for theCourt tograntan injunctionto enforceplanningcontrol

overactualandapprehended breachesof control; and it couldnothave beenParliament’s

intention, wheretherehadbeenan actualbreach,that thepowershouldonly be

exercisableat thetrial of the action,with interlocutoryapplicationsconfinedto preserving

the “statusquo” until the trial. Accordingly, theCourt restoredthe injunctions,as soughtby the Council, but suspendedthe effectof the injunctionrelatingto the particular

building on the landuntil theplanningappealhadbeendetermined.

9.7 In another judgment given on 7 February 1994, in the case of Croydon LBC v Giadden andAnother [1994] EGCS24, theCourt of Appealheld thatsection187Bof the 1990 Act was

drawnon the statutory assumptionthat an actual,aswell asan intended,breachof

planningcontrolcouldbe restrainedby injunction. Therefore,theword “restrained”had to

begiven a wider, and inthe contextmore natural,meaning.Oncethatwasdone,it was

55


obvious that amandatoryinjunction (asopposedto a merelynegativeinjunction) wasnot

excluded.It appearsto follow from this judgment thatthe High Court or CountyCourt

may grantan injunction, undersection187Bof the 1990 Act, requiringsomeaction to be

taken todealwith the breachof control.

9.8 In a judgmentgiven on 29 March 1995, in thecaseof HambletonDC v Bird and Another

[1995] EGCS67, the Court of Appealoverturnedthe CountyCourt’s refusalof aplanning

enforcementinjunction againstan extendedgypsyfamily on the groundthat thefamily

might haveanarguable casefor thegrantof planningpermissionif they re-appliedto

HambletonDC for it, andthe overall public interestdid not (in theCountyCourt’sview)

justify grantingan injunction which would causegrossdisruptionto the family group.The

Court of Appealheldthat the possibility of planningpermissionbeinggranted infuture was

not a legitimate reasonfor refusingan injunctionto restrainabreachof the law. It wasfor

the planning authority,andnot the Courts,to consideranyplanningapplication inthe

light of policy considerations.It wasnot for the Courtsto usurpthe decision-making

function ofthe Council.Where thebalanceof public interestin suchmatterslay wasfor

the planning authority,not the Judge.The Court of Appealheld that the respondents(the

gypsies)had demonstratedaconstantintention to remainin residenceat the farm and

break thelaw, which couldnotbe tolerated.Accordingly, theCourt grantedthe injunctionsoughtby HambletonDC, butsuspendedit for threemonths toenablethe extendedgypsy

family to makealternativearrangements.In giving judgementon 7 July 1995,in the caseof

South HamsDC v Halsey [1996] JPL 761,the Courtof Appealdismissedanappealagainstthe High Court’s mandatoryinjunction requiring demolitionof part of a building as

requiredby an enforcementnotice.TheAppeal Courtheld thatwhile it wasopento a

defendantto assertthat theenforcementnoticewas anullity, thepresentnotice wasnot a

nullity (in thesenseof Miller-Mead); that althoughthe defendanthadbeenacquitted in

the CrownCourt on a prosecutionundersection179, the Council’s applicationfor an

injunctionundersection187Bwasnot an abuseof process;andthatsection187Bconferred

wider scopeandapplicationthanwasthe caseunderthe previouscommonlaw, andwas

wide enoughto allow the grantof mandatoryinjunctions(see alsoCroydonLBC v

Gladden). In R v Basildon DC ex parte Clarke [1996] JPL 866, on 21 December 1995,where theCounty Court hadrefusedto adjournproceedingson the injunction to allow the

applicationfor judicial review to be disposedof, the High Court notedthe variouscasesinwhich the complexrelationshipsbetweeninjunctionsandjudicial review hadarisen,and

soughtto establishamorestreamlinedapproach.The proceduralpointshighlightedby the

caseswereconsideredlikely to be ofno morethan theoreticalrelevancein the majority of

cases.It was heldthat if somethinghadgoneseriouslywrong with the procedure,whether

in the initiation of the injunctionproceedingsor in any otherway, therewasno reasonwhy

the County Courtcould notproperlytakeit into accountwhendecidingwhetherto grant

or refusethe injunction.

THE PERSONAL NATURE OF INJUNCTIVE PROCEEDINGS

9.9 Unlike anenforcementnoticeor a stopnotice,a planningenforcementinjunction is not

primarily directedat the parcelof landon which thebreachof control is taking place.

Injunctive proceedingsare “personal”in thesensethat the LPA seeksto obtain an order

from theCourt to restraina person,or anumberof people, whomust eachbe cited by name

in theLPA’s application,from carryingon the breach.It follows that, in assessingwhat is

called“the balanceof convenience”in thedecisionwhetherto grant injunctive relief on

the LPA’s application,the Court will haveto weigh thepublic interest(which the LPA

56


represents)againsttheprivateinterestof thepersonor peoplewhomtheLPA seektorestrain..Thisdiffers from,for example,the processof an enforcementappealwherethe

decision-makeris concernedwith whether theappealshouldsucceed onits legalor

planningmerits.And, evenif the Court concludesthatan interlocutoryinjunction should

begranted,its effect may besuspendedfor a specifiedperiodso that the defendanthastimein which to makesuitablealternativearrangementsfor whateveractivity is to be restrained.

TheCourt may requirethe plaintiff (theLPA) andthe defendantto appearin personat the

endof an initial periodof suspensionof an injunction, so that thebalanceof convenience

canbe reassessed.

PROCEDURE WHERE A PERSON’S IDENTITY IS UNKNOWN

9.10 Although it will usuallybe necessaryfor theLPA’s applicationto theCourt to citethe

nameof anypersonor personsagainst whoman injunction is sought,section187B(3)of

the 1990 Act enablesRulesof Court to providefor such aninjunction to be issuedagainsta

personwhoseidentity is unknown.Thisrule-makingpowerhasbeenusedto makeOrder

110 in the Rulesof the SupremeCourt (insertedby SI No. 1992/638 fromApril 1992) and

to insert Order 49,rule6, in the CountyCourtRules1981.Theseproceduralrulesspecify

thedocumentary evidencethe LPA will be expectedto provide if theyseekaplanning

enforcementinjunctionagainstapersonwhoseidentity is unknown.

A POSSIBLE UNDERTAKING IN DAMAGES

9.11 Anotherexampleof thepersonalnatureof injunctive proceedingsis that, where theCourt

grantsan interlocutoryinjunction, pendingthe eventualtrial of the actionor theoutcome

of aconcurrent enforcementappeal,theJudgehasdiscretionto requirethe personseeking

the injunction to give what is called“an undertakingin damages”to the personor peoplewhom the injunction will restrainduringthe interimperiod.The purposeof such an

undertakingis to providefinancial compensationfor theinjunctedpersonif a substantive

injunction is not grantedat the eventualfull trial of the action,or if it is subsequently

shownthat no breachof planningcontrolhas occurred.TheJudgein the interlocutoryproceedingswill exercisethe Court’sdiscretion in the particular circumstancesof eachcase.

Moreover,it shouldnot necessarilybeassumedthat anundertakingin damageswill be

required.In the case ofKirkleesMBC v WickesBuilding SuppliesLtd [199213 All ER 717,theHouseof Lordsheld (in aSundaytradingcasewherethe local authorityhadsought an

injunctionundersection222 of the LocalGovernmentAct 1972) that theCourtneednot

necessarilyrequirethe authorityto give an undertakingin damages wheretherequirementwould effectively result in thefailure of the law enforcementprocess.

FAILURE TO OBSERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN INJUNCTION

9.12 Any failure to comply with the termsof an injunction is alwaysan extremelyseriousmatter.

(A personwho doesnot comply is in contemptof the Courtandis technicallyknown as a

“contemner”.)Theprovisionsof Order45, rule 5, of the Rulesof the SupremeCourtgive

the Court discretionto commit to a termof imprisonmentsomeonewho refusesor neglects

to do somethingrequiredby aCourt orderwithin the time specifiedin the order.But, as

with the grantof an injunction,the Court hasdiscretionto decidewhethera term of

imprisonmentis appropriatein the particular circumstancesof anycontemptit hasto

consider.How thatdiscretionmay be exercisedin the case of aplanningenforcement

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injunction is illustratedby the Court of Appeal’s judgment, on4 October1993, in thecase

of Quildford BC v Valler and Others (Times Law Report, 15 October1993),where

Guildford BCsoughtto enforcethe termsof an injunction undersection187Bof the 1990

Act againsta groupof gypsieswho continuedto occupya residentialcaravansiteon their

privately ownedlandin theCouncil’sarea.In earlierproceedingsin theHigh Court, on 20

April 1993 [1993] EGCS78, Mr Justice Sedleyhadconcludedthatcommittal to prison for

contemptshouldnot be orderedunlessthedefendant’sconductinvolved a degreeof fault

or misconduct.In this case,theJudgeconsideredthat thegypsieshaddoneall theycould

possiblydo to find acollectivesiteandthe Councilcould suggestno alternativesite in their

area.Accordingly, as therewasno evidenceof wilful or deliberate disobedienceof the

Court’s order,nor anywilful refusal or neglectto comply with it, thedefendant’scontempt

could notattracta prison sentence.TheCourt of Appealheld that the High CourtJudge

had takentoonarrowa view of the Court’spowerto sentencea contemner toa prison

term. The judgmentheld,instead,that theHigh Courthad jurisdiction to commita

contemner toprison for negligentlyfailing to complywith an injunction.Thiswas

necessaryto enablethe Court toact as aguarantorof therule of law.However,thepower

wasdiscretionaryandenforcementwasnot automaticallyavailableat thedemand ofthe

plaintiff whoserights werebeinginfringed. In conclusion,the Courtof Appealalsoheld

that the High Court hadbeenright not to imposea prisonterm in this casewherean order

of committal would havefaced the particulargroupof gypsieswith a stark choicebetween

imprisonmentand abandoningtheir communalexistence.Thereappearsto be no

conclusiveauthorityon theeffectof acontemner’sreleasefrom prison on the injunction.

However,in thecaseof In re Barrell Enterprises[1973] 1WLR 19, the Courtof Appealheld

thataperson shouldbe releasedafter six monthsimprisonmenteventhoughtherewasno

likelihood of hercomplyingwith the injunction in respectof which shewas in contempt.

This suggeststhat the Court assumedthat shewould not beimprisonedagainfor the same,

continuingcontempt.

CONSIDERING WHETHER TO INITIATE INJUNCTIVE PROCEEDINGS

9.13 The decisionwhetherto initiate injunctive proceedingsmustalwaysdependon the

particular circumstancesof an actualor apprehendedbreachof control. It shouldnormally

bea corporate decision, involvingthe Council’s PlanningandLegal Departments.The

legalconsiderationsmay be socomplexthat it is prudentto obtain a Counsel’sopinionon

themerits of thecaseas partof thedecision-makingprocess.If Counseladvisesthat thereis

an arguablecasebutthat it is almostcertainto fail, therewould needto be extremely

exceptional circumstancesto justify bringingthe proceedings.In any event,if proceedings

are to bebrought in the High Court, Counselwill haveto be instructed,and it is always

difficult to instruct Counselto advocatea casewhich he or she hasadvised against.What

mattersis whetherthegrantof an injunction is theonly effectivemeansof taking

enforcementaction in the particular circumstancesfacedby theCouncil.

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“Default” actionto secure compliance withenforcementnotice

CHAPTER 10

“Default” action to securecompliance with enforcementnotice

THE “DEFAULT” POWER

10.1 Section178 of theTown andCountryPlanningAct 1990 enablesthe LPA to take action

where,on expiry of theenforcementnoticecomplianceperiod, the requiredstepshavenot

beentaken,by carryingout “default” action themselvesandrecoveringtheir reasonable

expensesfrom the then ownerof the enforcementnotice land.Theprovisionsof section

178(1)of the 1990 Act are—

“Where any stepsrequiredby anenforcementnotice to be takenare not takenwithin the

periodfor compliancewith the notice,the local planning authoritymay—

(a) enterthe landandtakethe steps;and

(b) recoverfrom thepersonwho is thenthe owner ofthe landany expensesreasonably

incurredby them in doing so.”

Since thescopeof this powerwasextendedby provisionsin the Planning and

Compensation Act1991,someLPAshavefound it themosteffectiveandeconomicalway

of securing compliancewith anenforcementnoticewherethe owneror occupierof the

land is reluctantto carry out therequirements.In somecases,a formalnotification of the

LPA’s intention to carryoutrequiredworks on a futuredatehaspersuadedthe owner or

occupier to do what is required.

THE SCOPE OF DEFAULT ACTION

10.2 While it is now clearthat the scopeof theLPA’s “default” actionextends tothe whole

rangeof stepswhich may berequiredby virtue of the provisionsin section173(3)to (7) of

the 1990 Act, particularcareis essentialwhenaction is taken tocompela useof landto

cease.Forexample, where the requiredsteps areto ceasethe useof privately ownedland as

a residentialcaravansiteand toremoveall thecaravansstationedon the land, if the LPA

arealso the housingauthority,theywill needto considerwhat statutoryduty theymay

havetowardspeoplewho could be homelesson eviction from thesite. If the LPA are not

the housingauthority,theywill needto considerthehousingauthority’sposition.

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THE POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

10.3 TheLPA’s decisionto take“default” actionmay be challengedby a leaveapplicationto

seeka judicial reviewof thedecisionin the High Court,on the groundthat it is

“Wednesburyunreasonable”.In that event,theLPA will needto showthat theyhaveacted

reasonably(in the “Wednesbury”sense)by consideringall the relevantcircumstances

before deciding to take action. In the case of R v Greenwich LBC ex parte Patel [1985] JPL851, the Courtof Appealdiscussedthecircumstancewheredefaultactionwasto be taken

againstan owner of landwho hadnot beenservedwith a copyof an enforcementnotice

(because hisexistencewasentirely unknown tothe LPA),andconsequentlyhadnot

appealedagainstit, but wasableto adducefactswhich might haveresultedin a successful

enforcementappeal.The Courtconcludedthat, in a caseof this kind, the LPA ought to

investigatethe relevantfactsbeforedecidingto take“default” action.If the LPA failed to

investigatethe facts,it would amountto unreasonableconduct; and,while theCourt could

not itselfquestionthevalidity of the extantenforcementnotice,the Court would be

entitled toreviewthedecisionto initiate “default” action.

PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR TAKING DEFAULT ACTION

10.4 Default actionmust beplanned,organisedand implementedwith the utmostcare. While

suchactionmay well stimulatepublicity, which the LPA maywelcome(or even

encourage),on the groundthat theywill be seento be determinednot to toleratepersistent

contraventionof an enforcementnotice,theowneror occupierof the sitemaystrongly

resent,andpossiblytry to preventimplementationof, the authority’sdecision.Theremay

evenbe threatsof violenceor an anticipatedbreachof thepeace.If that is expected,the

co-operation ofthelocal constabularyshouldalwaysbesought.

10.5 Among the practicalmatterswhich theLPA needto considerwhenplanning defaultaction

are—

(1) exactly whatmustbe done (includingany necessaryoperational developmenton the

land) in orderto carry out the requiredstepsin the enforcementnotice;

(2) what is thebesttime ofdayto carry out theoperation andhow longit is likely to take;

(3) who is bestequippedto carryout theoperation—theCouncil’sstaffor aprivate

contractor;

(4) whetherany special powersof entry areneeded;

(5) whatother local authorityservicesneedto be involved, egthe Social Services

Department;

(6) if chattels(egcaravans,cars,working equipment)are to be removedfrom the land,wheretheycanbe storedsecurelyuntil their ownercanretrievethem.

If abreachof the peaceor any moreseriousdisturbanceis anticipated,it maybeadvisable

for theLPA to seekaninjunction undersection187Bof the 1990 Act as aprecautionand

to encourage any necessarypolice presence.

60

“Default” actionto securecompliancewith enforcementnotice

10.6 Section 178(6)of the 1990 Act creates anoffenceof wilful obstructionof any personwho

is exercisingtheLPA’s powerto take“default” enforcementaction.The offence is triable

summarilyin theMagistrates’Court, wherethemaximumpenaltyon conviction is £1,000.

In anyproceedings forthis typeof offence,theLPA will be requiredby the Courtto prove

their case“beyondreasonabledoubt” (the criminal standard ofproof). If the LPA

anticipate,in any casewheredefaultaction is to be taken,thereis likely to be wilful

obstructionby theowner oroccupiersof the enforcementnoticesite, it is asensible

precautionto warnthoseconcernedthat they will risk criminal prosecutionif obstruction

occurs.

THE LPA’S POWER TO RECOVER THEIR EXPENSES OF “DEFAULT” ACTION

10.7 Theprovisionsof section 178(1)(b)of the 1990 Act enabletheLPA “to recoverfrom the

personwho is thenthe owner ofthe land any expensesreasonablyincurredby them” in

taking defaultenforcementaction. Regulation14 of theTown andCountryPlanning

GeneralRegulations1992 (SI 1992/1492)applies theprovisionsof sections276, 289and

294 of thePublic HealthAct 1936 for this purpose.By virtue of regulation14(2) of the

GeneralRegulations1992,theLPA’s expensesin taking defaultactionbecomea legal

chargeon theland to which the enforcementnotice relatesuntil the expensesare fully

recovered.This chargeis bindingon successiveownersof theenforcementnotice land.

SUBSEQUENT REINSTATEMENT OF WORKS WHICH HAD BEEN REMOVED

10.8 The provisionsof section181 of the 1990Act dealwith thecircumstance where,in

contraventionof aneffectiveenforcementnotice,anydevelopmentis carriedouton land

by wayof reinstatingor restoringbuildings or works which have beenremoved oraltered in

compliancewith the notice.If the LPA proposeto take“default” action (in accordance

with section178of the 1990 Act) for thepurposeof removingor alteringthe buildings or

works resultingfrom this further reinstatementor restoration,theprovisionsof section

18 1(4) requirethem to give the ownerandoccupierof the enforcementnotice landnot

less than 28 days’notice oftheir intention to takesuchaction.There is no specific

requirementabouttheway this noticeshouldbe givento theownerand occupier:the

provisionsof section329of the 1990 Act thusapply in thenormalway. If notice is to be

givenby letter, it would be advisableto sendit by recordeddeliveryservice.It is

noteworthythat the only requirementto give notice ofan intention to take“default”

action,is in respectof suchaction taken intheseparticularcircumstances.

10.9 Section181(5)of the 1990 Act makesit an offencefor someoneto carry out, without

planningpermission,anydevelopmenton land by way of reinstatingor restoringbuildings

or works which have beenremovedor alteredin compliancewith an enforcementnotice.

On summaryconvictionfor this offencein the Magistrates’Court, themaximumpenaltyis

£5,000.Although thereis no statutorydefenceagainstprosecutionfor this offence,section

181(5)(b) providesthatno person shall beliable for a separateoffenceundersection

179(2)of the 1990 Act of failure to takeany stepsrequiredby an enforcementnoticeby

way of removalor alterationof whathasbeenreinstatedor restored.

61


CHAPTER 11


INTRODUCTION

11.1 Section 179 of the TownandCountryPlanning Act1990 providesthat acriminal offence

occurswhere therequirementsof an effectiveenforcement noticeare contravenedafterthe

dateon which the complianceperiodstated inthenotice expires.Onceacompliance

period in an enforcementnoticehasexpiredandthereis evidenceto show,“beyond

reasonabledoubt” (thecriminal standard ofproof), that anyrequirementin the noticehas

been,or is being,contravened,it is opento theLPA to initiate a prosecutionof theoffence.

Whetherprosecution inthe Court is the most appropriatewayto achievecompliancewith

• an effectiveenforcement noticeis for theLPA to decide.In somecases,it may suffice for

the LPA to warnof their intention to prosecuteif, during the complianceperiod,someone

is seento makeno seriouseffort to takethe stepsanenforcementnotice requires.

11.2 TheLPA shouldconsidercarefully what is likely to be themostefficient andcost-effective

wayof compelling someonewho is contraveningan enforcementnotice to comply with its

requirements.If it is knownthatprosecutionproceedingswill resultin substantialdelayin

remedyingthe effectsof a breachof control, theLPA may preferthe alternativecourseof

taking “default” actionundersection178 of the 1990 Act. Or it maybe expedient

simultaneouslyto initiate prosecutionproceedingsandtake“default” action,especiallyif

the offenceis blatantandcausesseriousenvironmentalharm.

11.3 Section179 of the 1990Act providesfor two separatecategoriesof enforcementnotice

offence,dependingon whetherthe defendantis theowner ofthe landor not. Thesetwo

categoriesaredescribed,respectively,in the following paragraphs11.4 to 11.6 and11.7 to 11.8.

OFFENCE COMMITTED BY THE OWNER OF LAND

11.4 Section179(1)and(2) of the 1990 Act providefor anoffenceto be committedby the

owner oftheenforcementnotice land,as follows—

“(1) Where,at anytime after the endof the period for compliancewith an enforcement

notice,any steprequiredby the notice to be takenhasnot beentakenor any activity

requiredby the notice to ceaseis beingcarriedon, the personwho is thenthe owner of

the land is in breachof thenotice.

(2) Wherethe owner ofthe land is in breachof an enforcementnoticehe shallbe guilty of

anoffence.”

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It is clearfrom theseprovisionsthat, to beguilty of an enforcementnoticeoffence,an

owner ofthe landmustbe thelegalownerthroughouttheperiod duringwhich theoffence

is allegedto haveoccurred.If ownershipof theland transfersto anotherpersonandthe

offencecontinues,or it is resumedby anotherpersonaftera successfulprosecutionof the

previousowner,the subsequentownerbecomesliable to prosecution.

11.5 Section 179(3)providesa defenceagainst prosecutionfor an owner ofenforcementnoticelandwho shows“that hedid everythinghe couldbe expectedto do to securecompliance

with the notice”.This defenceprovisionis availableto enableadefendantto submit to the

Court that, in the particular circumstancesof anyprosecutionproceedings,he or sheislegally or practicallypreventedfrom achieving compliancewith an enforcementnotice.

Forexample,the ownermayhavegranteda leasein specific termswhich preventhim orherfrom stoppingthelessee’sactivities in contraventionof the enforcementnotice.The

natureof this defencewasconsideredby theHigh Court inthe caseof Kent CC v JohnABrockman.In judgmentgiven on 10 October1993,[1994] JPL B27, theCourtheld that it

would becontraryto the tenetsof criminal law to find somebodyguilty of notdoing

something which theyweregenuinelyincapableof doing. If a defendantwasgenuinely

incapacitated,evenif hehaddonenothing,he could still makeouta defencebecausehe

couldnot be expectedto do anything.The Magistrates’Courtor CrownCourt shouldbe

fairly rigorousin the proof they demandedof adefendant,and“not allow itself to be

hoodwinkedby protestationsof impecuniosityon behalfof anindividual”. In giving hisjudgmentLord JusticeSimonBrown said—

“It is clearly imperativethat land shouldnot be left in an unsatisfactorystate,perhapsas a

public eyesore,unlessa landownerhastakenevery practicalstepto overcomehis financial

problemsin complyingwith the requirementsof the enforcementnotice,to the extentifneedbe ofselling his land, if that is possible,to ensurethat it will be put into a proper

state.”

11.6 The ownerof the land (andanyotherdefendant)hasa furtherdefence,in section179(7)

of the 1990Act, namelythat he or she hasnotbeenservedwith a copy of theenforcement

noticeandthe noticeis not containedin the enforcementnotice register(which the LPA

are requiredto keep,by virtue of section188 of the 1990 Act), if suchapersoncanshow

that he or shewasnot awareof theexistenceof the notice.

OFFENCE COMMITTED BY SOMEONE WHO CONTROLS OR HAS ANINTEREST IN THE LAND

11.7 Section 179(4) and(5) of the 1990Act providefor an offenceto be committedby

someonewho controlsor hasan interest inthe enforcementnotice land,asfollows—

“(4) A personwho hascontrol of or an interest inthe land to which anenforcement

noticerelates(other thanthe owner)mustnot carry on any activity which is required

by the notice to ceaseor causeor permit such anactivity to be carriedon.

(5) A personwho, at any time after theendof theperiod for compliancewith thenotice,

contravenessubsection(4) shall beguilty of anoffence.”

Thissecondcategoryof offencerelatesspecifically to someonewho exercises legalcontrol

over theenforcementnoticeland(eg. asub-tenantoperatinghis or her ownbusiness)orsomeonewho has aseparatelegal interest inthe landfrom theowner’s interest. These

63


provisionswereconsideredby the Queen’sBenchDivisionalCourt, on 11 May 1994,in the

case ofHolmesandAnother v Bradford MCC (Times Law Report,19 May 1994).The

Court held that anowner ofenforcementnotice land couldnot be properlychargedunder

section179(4)of the 1990Act.

11.8 The question whethera personwho is to beprosecutedfor this secondcategoryof offence

hasthepowerto permit acontraveningactivity to be carriedon (asin section179(4)of

the 1990 Act) maybe especiallydifficult for the LPA to addressin prosecutionproceedings.

Judicial authoritysuggeststhat apersonis unlikely to beheld by theCourt tohave

permitted someoneelseto carry onan activity unlesshe or she hasthe legalpowerto forbid

the activity and hasnot takenreasonablestepswhich are opento him or her to preventit.

THE NATURE OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE OFFENCE

11.9 In a judgment relating tothepreviousenforcementnoticeoffenceprovisions(in section

89(5) of the Town andCountryPlanningAct 1971) in the case of Rv Collett and Others

[1994] 2 All ER372, the Courtof Appealheld,on 21 October 1993,that this offenceis an

offenceof “absoluteliability”. Whilst, in the Court’s view, thepresumptionremainedthat a

“guilty mind” (“mens rea”)wasrequired foracriminal offenceto have occurred,that

presumptioncouldbe setasideif the properconstructionof the statutoryprovisions madeit

plain thatParliamentdid not intend that it should benecessaryto establisha “guilty mind”,

particularly if that approachwould appearto promotetheobject ofthestatute.It follows

from this judgmentthat, in bringingenforcementnoticeprosecutionproceedingsunder

what is now section179 of the 1990 Act, the LPA are not requiredto provethat the

defendantknewof theexistenceof theenforcementnotice beforehe or shecanbe

convictedof acriminal offence.The Courtof Appeal, in thecaseof R v Collett, also

specifically gaveits view that “the policy of the Act wasto imposeabsoluteliability so asto

encouragevigilanceon the partof the landownersandusers.”

CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE INPROSECUTION PROCEEDINGS

11.10 Theeffect of provisionsin section285 of the 1990 Act is to limit verygreatly the scope for

challengingthe validity of an enforcementnoticeby way of a defenceagainstprosecution

undersection179of the 1990 Act. The provisionsof section 285(1)and(2) are—

“(1) Thevalidity of anenforcementnotice shallnot, exceptby way of anappealunder

PartVII be questionedin anyproceedingswhatsoeveron anyof thegroundson which

such anappealmay bebrought.

(2) Subsection(1) shallnot applyto proceedingsbroughtundersection179 againsta

personwho—

(a) hasheld an interest intheland sincebeforethe enforcementnoticewas issued

under thatPart;

(b) did nothavea copy of theenforcementnoticeservedon him underthatPart;and

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(c) satisfiesthe Court—

(i) thathe did not know andcould notreasonablyhavebeenexpectedto know that

the enforcement noticehadbeenissued;and

(ii) thathis interestshave beensubstantially prejudicedby the failure to servehim

with a copyof it.”

Thus,apartfrom this very limited defenceavailableto someonewho canproveto the

Court thathe or sheis within thescopeof section285(2), theonly way to challengethe

validity of an enforcement noticeis by an appeal againstit (to the Secretaryof State)

undersection174of the 1990 Act.

11.11 How the validity of an enforcement noticemight be challengedwasconsideredby the

Court of Appeal’sjudgementin the caseof R v Wickson 11 April 1995,[1996] JPL 743.

The Courtheld that,so long as an enforcementnoticewasnotanullity, it wasan

enforcementnoticeandwould remainsountil quashed;and,for an offenceundersection

179(2)of the 1990 Act to be proved,therewasno requirementfor theprosecution to call

evidencethat the LPA’s decisionto issuethe noticehadbeen“intra vires”. Only theHigh

Court hadthepowerto quashan enforcementnotice (in judicial reviewproceedings);nocriminal court had such a power. If an allegation about the validity of a notice wasraisedin criminal proceedings,thecriminal court might thenhaveto considermattersof

planningpolicy, which werenot appropriate,whereassuchmatterswerethe everydayconcernof “Crown Office list” Judges,who dealtwith judicial review applications.And the

judicial reviewprocedureshouldnot bebypassedby someoneservedwith an enforcementnotice. Accordingly, it wasnotproperto challengethe LPA’s decisionto issuean

enforcementnotice,on thegroundof “Wednesburyunreasonableness”,by wayof a defence

to an indictmentallegingan offenceundersection179(1)of the 1990 Act.

11.12 Thepracticaleffect of the provisionsof section 285(1)of the 1990 Act is further illustrated

in theHigh Court’s judgement,on 22 February1996,in thecaseof ValeofWhiteHorse

DC v Treble-Parkerand Another[1996] EGCS40.The Magistrates’Court haddismissed

two informationslaid by theCouncil undersection179 of the 1990 Act. Thequestionfor

the High Court todecide,on the Council’sappeal,waswhethertheprovisionsof section

285(1)of the 1990 Act precludedthe Magistratesfrom allowingevidenceshowingstorage

of vehiclestaking place morethan 10 yearsbeforeserviceof the enforcementnotice; orwhetherthe Magistrateswererequiredto allow such evidenceto enabletherespondentsto

establishtheir defence.TheHigh Courtallowedthe Council’sappeal,setasidethe

acquittal,andremittedthecaseto the Magistrates’Court. TheHigh Court held that it wasnotopento the defendantsto arguein the Magistrates’Court that their useof land was

“immune” from enforcementaction.Theproperremedyhadbeenfor thedefendantsto

appealto theSecretaryof Stateagainsttheenforcementnotice; but theyhadpreviously

withdrawntheir appealandtheprovisionsof section 285(1)of the 1990 Act now

precludedthemfrom raisingthese argumentsin their defenceagainstprosecution.

PRESENTING THE PROSECUTION’S CASE EFFECTIVELY IN COURT

11.13 Some LPAsareconcernedthatcertainMagistrates’Courtsdo not appearfully to appreciate

the seriousnatureof theoffencefor which section179 of the 1990 Act provides.In

discussionbetweenofficials of the Magistrates’Associationandthe Departmentof theEnvironment, the Associationhaspointedoutthat eachMagistrates’Courthaslittle

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practicalexperienceof enforcement noticeprosecutions andit is thereforehelpful for theLPA’s prosecutorto explainfully to the Court the context inwhich the allegedoffencehas

occurred.

11.14 Dependingon thecircumstancesof thecase,the following approach shouldusuallyhelptheCourtfully to appreciatethe strength ofthe prosecution’scase—

(1) explain that the provisionsof section179 of the 1990Act makeit a criminal offence

to contravenethe requirementsof an enforcementnoticeafterthe reasonablyallowed

complianceperiodhasexpired;

(2) describetheprocedureadoptedby the Council to enforceagainstthe particular breach

of planningcontrol, including thetime it hastakensincethe dateof issue ofthe

enforcement noticeandtheresult of any appealto the Secretaryof State;

In the case of Rv Sandhu[1996],TLR 2 January1997,the Court of Appealheld,on 10

December1996,that toadduceevidencewhich wentbeyond proofof elementsnecessaryto

be established foranoffenceof strict liability wasnot an optionalextrafor the prosecution;andto adduceinadmissibleevidencewhich wasprejudicialto thedefendanthad tobe

objectionable.(Although this caseconcerneda listedprosecution,it appearsto be apt alsoto planningenforcementprosecutionproceedings.)In the light of this case,evidence

concerningsuchmattersaswhetherthe offenceis blatant,carelessnessor negligence, thedegreeof harmto amenityin the neighbourhoodof the site thathasresultedfrom the

offence;the maximumpenaltyavailableandan attemptto relatethepenaltyto theestimatedamountof profit accruingfrom theoffence,andthe prosecution’scostsin bringing

the caseto Court, is irrelevantto the issueof proving the offence,andinadmissible.

However,it might be relevantto the Court’s assessmentof theappropriatepenalty.

APPLICATION BY THE DEFENDANT FOR AN ADJOURNMENT

11.15 Sometimesanapplicationis madeto the Court on thedefendant’sbehalffor an

adjournment(whichmay bean adjournment ofthe hearingor of theCourt’s sentence

whenthe defendanthasbeenfoundguilty), on the groundthat a retrospectiveplanning

applicationhasbeensubmittedto the LPA andremains undecidedor the outcome ofaplanningappealto the Secretaryof Stateis awaited.Any suchapplicationshouldnormally

be resisted,citing in supportof theprosecution’scasethe judgement oftheQueen’sBenchDivisionalCourt, on 12 February1993,in the caseof R v BeaconsfieldMagistratesexparte

South BucksDC [1993] JPLB53. The Courtheld in that casethat “as a generalrule, theMagistratesmustdealwith the matterforthwith, unlessthereis aprospectthat the

planningapplication’sfatewill beknown shortly.” Section180(3)of the 1990 Act mayalso

usefully be cited.Thismakesclearthatasubsequentgrantof planningpermissiondoesnotaffect theliability of any personfor an offencein respectof failing, meanwhile,to comply

or securecompliancewith therequirementsof an enforcement(or breachof condition)

notice.

FURTHER APPEAL TO COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)

11.16 Occasionally,a convictedpersonappealsagainstconvictionfor anenforcementnoticeoffenceto the Court of Appeal (CriminalDivision). In that event,the casemust takeits

turn with otherappealsbeforethe Courtfor seriouscrime wherethe appellantmay be

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servinga termof imprisonment.However,the Courtof Appeal(Criminal Division) isawarethat an appellant convictedof anenforcement noticeoffencemay havea particular

incentive todefer,for as longas possible,thesuccessfulresolutionof thecasebecauseit will

effectivelyfrustratetheprosecutingLPA’s interest incompletingthe planningenforcementprocess.It is thusopento theLPA to request an“expeditedhearing”by theCourt. This

canbe doneby arrangingfor the LPA’s Solicitor to write personallyto the Court’sRegistrar,explaining thenatureof thebreachof control andits impacton amenityin the

neighbourhood.It is alsohelpful to inform the Registrar aboutanyotherproceedings

againsttheappellantwhich dependon theoutcome ofthe appealto theCourt of Appeal

(Criminal Division)..

THE PENALTIES ON CONVICTION OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE OFFENCE

11.17 Section179(8)of the 1990 Act specifiesthe penaltieswhich the Court may imposeon

convictionof an enforcementnoticeoffence.Theyare —

(1) on summaryconviction intheMagistrates’Court, a fine not exceeding£20,000;and

(2) on convictionon indictment intheCrown Court, a fine of an unlimitedamount.

Thereis no powerto sentencea convicteddefendantto a termof imprisonmentunder

section179 ofthe 1990 Act. But someonewho defaultson paymentof a fine imposed

undersection179(8)maybe imprisonedas afine defaulter,at theCourt’s discretion.

11.18 Section 179(9)of the 1990 Act providesthat, in deciding theamountof anyfine for an

enforcement noticeoffence,the Court shallin particular haveregardto anyfinancial

benefitwhich hasaccruedor appearslikely to accrueto the convictedpersonin

consequenceof the offence.Theseprovisionsare specificallyintendedto enabletheCourt

to takeinto accountthe profitability of an enforcementnoticeoffenceto theconvictedperson.It is thereforeadvisablefor the LPA’s prosecutorto drawtheCourt’s attentionto

the availability of this power and,whereverpossible,to offer theCourt someestimateofthe financial gainresultingfrom commissionof the offence.

11.19 Subsection(9) doesnot lessentheconcurrentobligationof the Court, whenimposinga

fine, to haveregardnotonly to the seriousnessof the offence,butalso thefinancial

circumstancesof the offender.(Sections18(2) and(3) of theCriminal JusticeAct 1991.)The Court of Appeal, on1 December1995,in the case of Rv Browning[1996] 1PLR61, in

substitutinga fine of £1,000for thefine of £25,000imposedin the Crown Court,emphasisedthat the amountof fine shouldnotbe fixed solely by referenceto the accrued

benefit,and thatregard shouldalsobehad tothequestion oftheability to pay.

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CHAPTER 12

• Efficient and EffectiveOrganisation of PlanningEnforcement

INTRODUCTION

12.1 Planningenforcementis the most technicallycomplexcomponentof thedevelopment

control régime. To beeffective, it requireswhole-heartedco-operationbetweenpeoplewith

experiencein a rangeof professionalandinvestigative disciplinesat eachsuccessive stageof

the enforcementprocess.Occasionally,thatprocess maybe prolongedandmakeunforeseen

demandson theLPA’s staffandfinancial resources.UnlesstheLPA’s enforcementfunction

is efficiently organised, resourceswill be wasted andthe authority’sperformancewill not

reachacceptablestandards.It maybedesirableto seekspecialistCounsel’sopinion when

dealingwith difficult casesinvolving problems/areasof law with which theauthority is not

familiar.

ACTION OR REACTION

12.2 Thetraditional approachto planningenforcementis to confinethe activity mainly to a

responseto neighbours’complaintsof allegedbreaches ofcontrol.Whetherthe LPA can

takea more positiveapproachwill dependon the resourcesmembersare willing to commit

to this function.To confinethe enforcementfunction to a reactiveresponsemay sometimes

storeup moredifficulty for thefuture. In allocatingthe Council’sresources,it must be

recognisedthatplanningenforcementactivity is almostalwayslabour-intensive.Thorough

investigationof therelevantplanning historyandpainstakingevaluation ofthefactsare

the foundationfor effectiveenforcement.Neithercanbe obtainedcheaply.

SETTING PRIORITIES

12.3 Enforcementcasesmustbe progressedquickly at every stage.Becausenotevery casecanbe

given toppriority, it is essentialto establisha setof prioritieswhich will enable

enforcementstaffto maximisetheir output.Settingpriorities is a matterfor eachLPA to

addressin their own development controlcontext. Anexample ofa possibleorderof

priorities might be on thefollowing lines—

(1) anyunauthoriseddevelopmentwhich causesimmediateand irremediableharmin the

locality;

(2) unauthorised demolitionor partial demolitionof a buildingwhich it is essentialto retain;

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Efficient andEffective Organisationof PlanningEnforcement

(3) breachof a conditionwhich resultsin seriousharmto amenity in the neighbourhood;

(4) unauthorised developmentin a NationalPark,AONB or ConservationArea;

(5) any unauthoriseddevelopmentwhere thetime-limit for enforcementactionwill expire

within thenext six months.

In someareas,theLPA maybe facedwith numerouscasesof onetype of particularly

harmfulor prevalentunauthoriseddevelopment, suchashome-workingwith noisy

equipment, mini-caboffices,or take-away food premises,making it essentialto establish

and maintainfirm control overevery incident ofthatcategoryof developmentas soonas it

appears.In this situation, enforcementactionmust bedetermined andwell-publicised.

TARGET TIME-LIMITS FOR PROGRESSING ENFORCEMENT ACTION

12.4 Whenformalenforcementactionfollows from a neighbour’scomplaint,the LPA should

havetargettime-limitswithin which they anticipatetaking eachstepof the enforcement

process.The time-limits will dependon the resourcesallocatedto planningenforcement

functions.Successivestepsmight be—

(1) acknowledgethe complaintandobtain any supplementaryinformationrequired to

investigateit;

(2) investigatethe current factsand the planninghistory;

(3) produceasituationreport, includingany legaladvice on issuesarisingfrom the

investigation;

(4) submit aconsideredrecommendationto the appropriatedecision-maker(usually the

PlanningCommitteeor anofficer with delegatedauthority);

(5) obtain andrecordthedecisionon enforcementaction;

(6) implementthe decision;

(7) reportthe decisionandinitial outcometo thecomplainant;

(8) monitor thepracticaleffectof implementingthedecision;

(9) reviewthe needfor possiblefurtherenforcementaction.

Whenthedecisionat sub-paragraph(5) aboveis to issueanenforcementnoticeandit results

in anappealto the Secretaryof State,eachstageof the appealprocessmustbe supervisedto

ensurethat the LPA’s responseto the appealis on time and,if appropriate,approvedby the

Planning Committeeor officer with delegatedpower.Whetherto servea stopnotice,if one

hasnot alreadybeenserved,shouldbe consideredas soonas anappealis notified to the LPA.

If the appealprocessproveslengthy,the needto serve astopnoticeshouldbe reviewedat

pre-arrangedintervals.

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DOCUMENTING THE CASE

12.5 Throughoutthe enforcementprocessit is essentialto maintaina complete,accurateand up-

to-daterecordof all investigationcarriedoutandassessmentof theresults.This is particularly

important incaseswherethe initial decisionisnot to initiate formal enforcementaction: if it

is necessaryto return to thatcasein future, officerswho will thenhaveto dealwith it will be

ableto establishthe relevantfactsquickly.

12.6 The case-recordshouldcontainthe following information—

(1) the alleged breachof control (asnotified to the LPA);

(2) thedate offirst notification;

(3) the identityof thecomplainant;

(4) theaddressof thesite;

(5) theidentity of the site’sownerandanyseparateoccupier;

(6) briefdescriptionof the site (including anyrelevant photographs, whichshouldalways

be dated);

(7) the allegedbreachof control (as establishedby theLPA’s officers,following initial

investigation);

(8) summaryof thefactual evidence;

(9) summaryof theplanninghistory;

(10) planningpolicies applicableto thesite;

(11) summaryof recommendationon enforcementaction;

(12) implementationof LPA’s decision;

(13) if an enforcementnotice is issued—

(a) date ofissue;

(b) intendedeffectivedate;

(c) datecomplianceperiodexpires;

(d) summaryof requiredsteps;

(e) dateon which any appealis notified;

(f) actualeffectivedate

[A similarrecord shouldbe maintained foranyotherformal enforcementactiontaken.]

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Efficient andEffectiveOrganisationof PlanningEnforcement

(14) resultof formalenforcementaction;

(15) summaryof anysubsequentmonitoring of the site.

12.7 Documentingand processinga casecanbecarriedout moreefficiently if computerisedand

word-processingsystemsare used.Computerisedsystemsare particularly valuable for

keeping enforcementrecordsup-to-date;enablingrecordsto be quickly accessed;and

providing informationwhich canbe usedto assesswhetherthe runningcost of the

enforcementprocessis beingkeptwithin budget.

THE ORGANISATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT TEAM

12.8 There is no “right” and“wrong” way to organiseanddeploy thepeoplewho are responsiblefor the LPA’s enforcementwork. It is generallytrue that the moreenforcementwork the

authority’sofficers areengagedin the moreefficient andeffectivetheybecome.Because

enforcing planningcontrol is becomingsteadilymorespecialised and publicexpectations

are moredemanding,it is usually preferableto maintaina specialised“enforcement team”

wherethevolume of case-workis sufficient to justify this approach.LPAs shouldensurethat legal advice is availableat short noticewhere required.

Printed in the United Kingdom for The Stationery Office

N34219 C15 8/97 (19585)

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