The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 17 | Issue 2 | Number 4 | Article ID 5238 | Jan 15, 2019

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Governance and the Cycle of Violence in Papua: The NdugaCrisis:

Richard Chauvel

Abstract

Indonesia’s last regional conflict remainsintractable. We are reminded of this bydemonstrations and mass detentions in 2018around the 1 December anniversary of Papua’s‘Independence’ Day and the killing a day laterof at least 16 construction workers in thecentral highlands district of Nduga with themilitary operations that followed. These eventswill be discussed further in the paper after abrief outline of the conflict in Papua.

Keywords

Papua, Indonesia, Nduga Crisis, Violence,Autonomy Law

Introduction: Papua and the Indonesianstate

Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule hasexisted as long as there has been an Indonesianadministration. Indeed, the assertion of theright to establish an independent state pre-da tes the advent o f the Indones ianadministration in 1963. Resistance againstIndonesian rule and the struggle to establish anindependent state has been pursued by bothpeaceful political and armed means.

After the fall of President Suharto’s New OrderGovernment in 1998, there was a rapid andbroad mobilization of support for independencein Papua, as there was in Timor-Leste andAceh. In February 1999 a team of 100 Papuan

leaders met with President Habibie anddemanded that Papua’s independence berecognized. President Abdurrahman Wahid,more than any of the other Reformasi-eraPresidents, sought to accommmodate Papuanaspirations, when, on a visit to Papua towelcome the new Millennium, he agreed thatthe province could be called Papua and that thePapuan Morning Star flag could be flown.Abdurrahman Wahid funded the PapuaCongress, a pro-independence mass gatheringheld in mid-2000 by the Papua PresidiumCouncil (PDP), led by Theys Eluay. The“Papuan spring” of relatively free mobilizationand expression of opinion came to an end withthe detention of Theys Eluay and other PDPleaders in late November 2000 and theassassination of Theys Eluay by Kopassus(Special) troops a year later.

Under Presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri andSusilo Bambang Yudhoyono peaceful pro-independence activity was criminalized, withactivists like Filip Karma given long prisonsentences for raising the Morning Star Flag.This approach to the governance of Papua hasmeant that Papuans have not shared in thefreedoms of organization and expression thathave developed in the rest of Indonesia.

The Special Autonomy Law of 2001 was theGovernment’s response to Papuan demands forindependence. It provided for broaderautonomy, with greater authority and allocationof revenue, devolved to the province ratherthan provided under the nation-widedecentralization laws introduced by PresidentHabibie. Under Special Autonomy, theprovincial government had authority in all

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areas except foreign affairs, external defense,monetary policy, and the supreme court.Papuan advocates of Special Autonomy hopedthe law would facilitate extensive self-government within Indonesia. SpecialAutonomy supporters in the Jakartagovernment envisaged that the law woulddiminish support for independence. ThatSpecial Autonomy has failed is one of the fewissues the Jakarta Government and Papuanpoliticians agree on, even if for differentreasons and attributions of responsibility.

Although the Special Autonomy Law isconsidered a failure, together with theproliferation of new district governments andthe division of Papua into two provinces –Papua and West Papua – administrativestructures have been transformed. The numberof district governments has grown from 12 to42, with many of the new districts created inremote and impoverished regions in thehighlands, including Nduga, which wasestablished in 2008, The political elite hasbecome more reflective of the plurality ofPapuan society, in comparison with the mostlycoastal Papuan elite, which dominated both thePDP and provincial government in theimmediate post-Suharto years. In the provincialparliament in Papua elected in 2014, membersfrom the central highlands occupy 59% of theseats, roughly the same as the portion ofhighlanders in the Papuan population. Inelections for legislatures, Papuans competewith each other and with candidates from theIndonesian settler communities, who weresuccessful in winning 25% of the seats.

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Underthe provisions of the Special Autonomy Law,the Governor and Deputy Governor have to beindigenous Papuans. As will be discussedfurther, the demographic and electoraldominance of highlanders was reflected in there-election of Lukas Enembe as Governor ofPapua. Enembe commenced his political careeras head of Puncak Jaya, one of the newlycreated local government districts in thecentral highlands.

The demographic transformation Papua hasexperienced under Indonesian rule is one of thefactors that fuels support for independence.Papuans consider that they have beendispossessed and marginalized in their ownland. In the last census of the Netherlandsadministration in 1960 Papuans constitutedover 97% of the population.

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According to the2010 census there were 66.26% or 2,409,670Papuans out of a total population of 3,612,854in Papua and West Papua provinces.

As important as the overall demographictransformation is, the geographic distributionof Papuan and non-Papuan populations as wellas the economic inequalities between them iscritical. In Papua province over 84% of the non-Papua population is concentrated in the urbanareas of Jayapura, Merauke and Nabire,Keerom, between Jayapura and the border withPapua New Guinea, and Mimika around theFreeport mine. In these regions non-Papuansconstitute a majority. In contrast, Papuansmake up majorities of over 90% in the 14districts of the central highlands.

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There are inequalities between urban and ruralareas throughout Indonesia. In Papua they arestark and politically salient because they arealigned with and reinforce the differencesbetween the predominantly Papuan highlandsand the Indonesian settler majority urbanareas. Taking the UNDP’s Human DevelopmentIndex (HDI) as a broader measure, Jayapura,the capital of Papua, and Sorong, the majoreconomic centre in West Papua, have an HDI of78.3 and 76.73, respectively, which are not outof place in comparison with other urban areaselsewhere in the archipelago. In the centralhighlands of Papua HDIs are in the 40s and inWest Papua in the 50s. Nduga had the lowestHDI at 27.87. Despite the relatively generousallocation of government revenue under theSpecial Autonomy Law, Papua and West Papuahave the lowest HDI in Indonesia at 59.09 and62.99, respectively, compared with the nationalfigure of 70.81.5

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President Jokowi has shown more interest inPapua than any of his predecessors. Hecampaigned in Papua as a candidate in 2014.He won a strong majority of the vote in bothPapuan provinces, with levels of support amongthe highest in the country. As President, Jokowihas visited Papua more often than earlierPresidents and he has visited Papua morefrequently than any other province outsideJava.

There was little in his background in businessor as Mayor of Solo and Governor of Jakarta tosuggest why President Jokowi should show aninterest in one of Indonesia’s most intractableissues. During a visit to New Zealand in March2018, Fransiscus Orlando, a Papuan student,asked the President what motivated him tomake so many visits to Papua. Jokowi relatedhow Papua had been neglected for far too long,but it was part of the Unitary State of Indonesia(NKRI) and had to be paid attention. Herecalled his visit to the highland district ofNduga in December 2015.

“At the t ime the head of themilitary had advised against thevisit because Nduga was the mostdangerous region. I flew there byhelicopter because from Wamenato Nduga required 4 days andnights travel through the jungle. Inthe Nduga district there was notone meter of sealed road. Thismade me very sad. This is mymot iva t ion to deve lop thein f ras t ructure and humanresources to the same level asother provinces.”

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When President Jokowi related this story hecould not have envisaged that Nduga, itspoverty, isolation and support for armedresistance groups, would come to representmany of the problems his government confrontsin Papua.

Early in his presidency, President Jokowi madecommitments to resolve human rights abuses,remove restrictions on the access of foreignjournalists and release political prisoners.While political prisoners, including Filip Karma,have been released, little progress has beenmade on resolving human rights cases, and thepattern of abuses by the security forces is littlechanged. Foreign journalists still mustnegotiate Papua-specific regulationsadministered through a “clearing house”process by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Foreign journalists also have to obtain apermission letter (surat jalan) from policeintelligence, like other foreigners visitingPapua.7 President Jokowi’s approach to Papuahas increasingly been focused on economicdevelopment, particularly infrastructure,seemingly in the belief, like PresidentYudhoyono before him, that, if material welfarecan be improved, the difficult political, humanrights and historical issues, which Papuansconsider important, will somehow fade away.

During 2017 and 2018 Amnesty InternationalIndonesia (AII) and the International Coalitionfor Papua (ICP) produced detailed and highlycritical reports of ongoing human rightsabuses.

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The scope and focus of the two reportsis somewhat different, but the analysis isconsistent, showing the continuation of a long-established pattern of human rights abuses,frequently involving the security forces. Bothreports argue that the pro-independenceactivities have grown in influence and scale.Human rights abuses, restrictions on freedomof expression and organisation are an integralpart of Indonesian governance in Papua. Thegovernment restricts freedom of expressionand assembly as a means to control peacefulpolitical activity, particularly related to supportfor independence. The AAI report observed thatPapua is the only region of Indonesia wherethere is both a peaceful and armed struggle forindependence. It notes that while abuses by thesecurity forces continue in Papua, they havedeclined elsewhere in Indonesia.

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The ICP

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report argued there was an increase inpeaceful political civil society activityresonating with international pro-independencecampaigns, while the government attempted toshrink the permissible political space in Papua.

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The Cycle of Violence in Nduga

The killing of construction workers in Ndugaand the Indonesian security force’s subsequentmilitary operations impact quite differently onthe politics of the conflict in Papua. It iscontested whether the 16 construction workerswere unarmed civilians or members of thesecurity forces, but the event on 2 December2018 marked a depar tu re f rom thepredominantly peaceful, political struggle forindependence developed since 2000. In termsof numbers of those killed, it was the largestattack in recent years.

Location of the killings in the district ofNduga

However, the attack was not unprecedented.Between 2010 and 2014, armed resistancegroups were responsible for some 122 deaths,and most of the casualties were members of thesecurity forces.11 In Nduga, in June and July

2018 at the time of local elections, there wasconflict between the armed resistance, WestPapua Liberation Army (TPNPB) and thesecurity forces on four occasions. Just as wouldoccur after the violence in December 2018,some local figures asked the head of Police towithdraw the Brimob (Police Mobil Brigade)forces as the villagers had been traumatised.Samuel Tabuni, a Nduga youth leader, wascited as saying the government had providedspecial funds, but money would not solve thepolitical conflict that dated from the 1960s.

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TNI troops in Nduga in January 2019, witha Papuan hut (honai) and local communityin the background.

Over the past two decades the narrative ofhuman rights abuses by the Indonesian securityforces in Papua has been one of the mosteffective strategies of the independencemovement, both within Indonesia and ininternational diplomacy. The killing of theconstruction workers weakens this narrative.The military operations since the killings inearly December fall into the more familiarpattern of security force operations against thepro-independence groups and the communitiesin which they live.

The construction team attacked in earlyDecember was engaged in President Jokowi’ssignature infrastructure development project of

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the Trans Papua Road. The targeting of thisproject was not a coincidence. It representedIndonesia’s development program in Papua andthe military’s involvement therein. LukasEnembe understood that the armed pro-independence groups in Nduga associated theroad-building project with the military, seeingit as part of the campaign against them.13

Following the killing of the constructionworkers, President Jokowi ordered the militaryand police to seek out and destroy the armedresistance in the remote and poverty-strickenhighland district of Nduga. The President hadpreviously identified Nduga as the focus andmotivation of his commitment to developIndonesia’s poorest province. He affirmed thatthe killings will not deter him from thecommitment to develop Papua.14

The killing of the construction workers and themilitary operations against the armedresistance highlight the cycle of violence thathas characterized Indonesia’s administration ofPapua. While there has been a cycle ofviolence, in military terms, the conflict betweenthe armed pro-independence groups and theIndonesian security forces is highlyasymmetrical, with the overwhelmingpredominance of military capacity being withthe Indonesian security forces. For the mostpart, the armed resistance has been local,loosely-organized and sporadic. While it hasnever threatened Indonesian control, beingfaced with the deployment of much superiormilitary forces, the armed resistance has neverbeen el iminated. In 2013 Indonesianresearcher, Antonius Made Supriatma,estimated that there are about 37,000 militaryand police deployed in the Papuan provinces,with a ratio of one soldier or police officer forevery 97 residents. By comparison, in Indonesiaas a whole, the ratio is one security personnelfor every 296 citizens.

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In the context of theNduga crisis, the former head of the NationalIntelligence Body (BIN), Sutiyoso, estimatedthat there were 25 resistance groups in the

highlands, collectively numbering 685combatants with 232 weapons.16 The militaryare crucial in the maintenance of Indonesiancontrol of Papua, i ts governance anddevelopment strategies.

John Martinkus and Mark Davis reported inthe Saturday Paper that the Indonesian militarywas conducting a major military operationincluding the use of what appeared to be whitephosphorus bombs, chemical weapons bannedunder international law.17 The IndonesianMinistry of Foreign Affairs has vigorouslydenied this accusation: “The allegationhighlighted by the said media is totallybaseless, non-factual, and gravely misleading.Indonesia possesses no chemical weapons.”18

An independent military authority consulted forthis article considered that the victims’ burnsdiscussed and illustrated in the SaturdayPaper article and in photographs circulated onsocial media are consistent with the use ofwhite phosphorus bombs. He also questionedthe explanation by the military spokesman inPapua, Colonel Muhammad Aidi, that, becausethese bombs are used over long distances andcause widespread devastation, the destructionwould have been greater than depicted in thephotographs had white phosphorus bombs beenused. The same military spokesman confirmedthe grenades in the photographs from Ndugawere of the type used by the Indonesianmilitary.

Colonel Muhammad Aidi’s statement to thePapua-based media provided insights into thedifficulties the military confronted in itsoperations in Nduga. It is diff icult todistinguish the ‘armed criminals’ – the pro-independence fighters in the military’sterminology – from ordinary members of thecommunity. Few people have identity papers inNduga. An ‘armed criminal’, he argued, couldbe dressed up as a local government official,member of the local council or a human rightsactivist.19

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The military operations in Nduga have servedto unite and mobilize different segments of thePapuan elite – elected politicians, community,human rights and church leaders and theindependence activists – against Indonesia. Theon-going operations in Nduga have stirred upthe collective traumatic memories of earliermilitary operations, especially those in 1977and in 1996, and have galvanized hostility inPapuan society against the military. It shouldbe noted that President Jokowi’s rival in thisyear’s election, former General PrabowoSubianto, earnt his reputation for human rightsabuse in the 1996 campaign in neighbouringMapnduma.

E n e m b e ( w i t h m i c r o p h o n e ) w i t h

parl iamentarians and church leaders

announcing the appeal to withdraw security

forces from Nduga.

Governor Lukas Enembe urged PresidentJokowi to withdraw Indonesia’s military andpolice forces from the district of Nduga, so thatPapuans could celebrate Christmas inpeace.2 0 Enembe publicly recognized,moreover, that the demand for Independencewas long-standing and needed to be addressedby the Indonesian government.21

Lukas Enembe’s call for the security forces to

be withdrawn from Nduga has the support ofthe Provincial Parliament. The governor andparliament also decided to establish aninvestigation team of the parliament, churchesand community leaders.22 The Governor’sappeal was also supported by a Coalition of 41civil society organizations, including the majorhuman rights groups, in Papua.23

Papuan church leaders go further than theGovernor and Parliament to support thedemand made by the pro-independence groupsfor the government to hold a dialogue toresolve the conflict in Papua. The Churches donot support the killing of the constructionworkers, but they do endorse an internationaldialogue with the involvement of the UN. DrBenny Giay, the head of the Kingmi Church,which has significant congregations in Nduga,respects President Jokowi’s endeavors inPapua, but asserts that these do not addressPapua’s basic needs. “We want the resolutionof all the problems in Papua from 1962 to 2018,including the various forms of violence andhuman rights abuses that have not beenresolved until now.” 2 4 Few of the pro-independence groups support the killing of theconstruction workers, but the demand for aninternational dialogue with the involvement ofthe UN is an objective that unites the churchesand civil society leaders with the independenceactivists.

While the Governor’s call for the withdrawal ofthe security forces from Nduga was stronglysupported by civil society, it was rejected bythe military command in Papua. A spokesmanfor the military command, Colonel MuhammadAidi, argued that the Governor, as therepresentative of the central government andthe Indonesian state, has responsibilities todefend rather than oppose national policy. Thegovernor had sought to ban the security forcesfrom conducting what the military consideredits duty to protect society and defend the unityof the state. Through the military’s prism, theGovernor was viewed as a spokesman for the

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Papuan independence struggle.25 Colonel Aidi’sarguments were echoed in Jakarta by BahtiarBaharudin, a Ministry of Home Affairsspokesman, who described the Governor’scomments as “far-fetched and provocative. Heargued Enembe should support the police andmilitary’s endeavors “…guarding every inch of[the country] against armed separatists whocommitted crimes against humanity.”26

Lukas Enembe was caught awkwardly betweenthe opposing pressures of his constituents, whoexpected him to protect them against theabuses of security forces, and the provincialmilitary leadership, who asserted that theGovernor’s principal duty was to defendnational policy and the nation state.

Enembe is an important political figure inPapuan politics. He is the first politician fromthe central highlands to be elected asGovernor. His first election as Governor in2013 was heralded by one local newspaperwith the headline: “Akhirnya Anak KotekaPimpin Papua” (Finally, a highlander leadsPapua).

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He is one of a younger generation ofhighlanders who have come to dominateelectoral politics in the province. In July 2018,Enembe was re-elected as Governor withmajority of 67.54%, a significant increase insupport from 51% in 2013. Enembe won in 20of Papua’s 29 districts/municipalities, includingall but two of the districts in the highlands.

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Enembe’s re-election as governor occurreddespite evident ambivalence, if not oppositionto his candidature in Jakarta. In September2017, the heads of State Intelligence Agency(BIN) and the Police had tried to pressureEnembe, using the threat of corruptionallegations, to accept senior Papuan policeman,Paulus Waterpauw, as candidate for deputygovernor. This central government interventionwas not designed to prevent Enembe’s re-election but rather to make him a moreamenable and compliant governor. Enembewas persuaded to sign a 16-point statement

that included a declaration of loyalty to theUnitary State of the Republic of Indonesia(NKRI) and Pancasila and a pledge to give hissupport to President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo andthe Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle(PDI-P) in the 2019 elections. The corruptioninvestigations against Enembe would not bepursued.

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A year after signing the 16-pointstatement for BIN and the police, on theoccasion of his installation as Governor byPresident Jokowi, Enembe delivered on one ofhis commitments by pledging that all ofPapua’s 3 million votes would be given toJokowi in the 2019 election because he alone ofIndonesia’s Presidents understood Papua.

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Jakarta’s suspicions about the loyalties ofgovernors in Papua are not new. Enembe’s twoimmediate predecessors, Jacobus Solossa andBarnabas Suebu, were identified in a Ministryof Home Affairs intelligence document, alongwith well-known advocates of Papuanindependence, as part of a “Papuan politicalconsp iracy” . 3 1 Pres ident Megawat iSoekarnoputri’s instruction (Inpres 1/2003) tocreate a separate province of West Papua – adivide and rule strategy – reflected theintelligence community’s concern that specialautonomy, if properly implemented, riskedempowering a Papuan political elite whoseloyalty was suspect.32

As with Enembe’s call for the withdrawal ofsecurity forces from Nduga, some of Enembe’searlier public statements may have raisedconcerns about his loyalties to Indonesia innationalist circles in Jakarta.

Reflecting on the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorialelection and the growing influence of radicalIslam, Enembe said that the pro-independenceNational Committee for West Papua (KNPB)was preferable in a democracy to the IslamicDefenders Front (FPI). If Indonesia weredominated by “radical Muslims”, he said, Papuaw o u l d s e p a r a t e .(http://tabloidjubi.com/m/artikel-6701-lukas-ene

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m b e - - k n p b - l e b i h - b a i k - d a r i - f p i - d a l a m -berdemokrasi.html)

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In this statement Enembewas appealing to Papuans’ identification withChristianity, in distinction to Muslim majorityIndonesia. The majority of indigenous Papuansare Protestant or Catholic34 and, as is evident inthe Nduga crisis, Church leaders are influentialfigures in matters of politics as well as religion.

In l ine wi th the Papuan nat iona l i s tinterpretation of the history of Papua’sintegration into Indonesia, Enembe recalled in2016 that Papuans were promised their ownindependent state and the struggle for thisstate remains their objective. Enembe said thatdiscriminatory policies have made Papuans feelthat they are not Indonesians. Jakarta considersPapuans to be stupid, he said, and governsthem in an arbitrary manner. But, he added,Papuans unders tand th i s and the i rh i s t o r y . “ T h e y a r e v e r y c l e v e r . ”(https://nasional.tempo.co/read/734620/gubernur-papua-belum-ada-orang-papua-berjiwa-indonesia)35

Most directly relevant to Lukas Enembe’s callfor the withdrawal of security forces were thecomments he made on a visit to Port Moresbyin September 2018 to mark the 43 r d

anniversary o f Papua New Guinea’sindependence. He told Radio New Zealand:"Every day my people are being killed. That'swhy I think, the military of Indonesia, the policeof Indonesia, they've stopped thinking aboutthe humanity in Papua. Some people in theHighlands, and the coast, they come to me,they're crying, crying about what's happeningin Papua. Humanity is very important."

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These views are common among Papuans butwhen they are stated publicly by the governor,they become political, resonating with thegovernor’s supporters in Papua and raisingsuspicion in Jakarta.

Concluding remarks

The first section of this article touched on someof the trends in the Papua policies of thedemocratically elected governments sinceSuharto. Policies have vacillated between theaccommodative and the repressive. Theaccommodative approaches have not beenconsistently applied, nor have they enjoyed thesupport of the military and intelligencecommunity. The repressive approach is counterproductive. While the use of the security forcesserves to sustain Indonesian authority inPapua, the behavior of the security forces andthe human rights abuses fuels Papuans’ desirefor independence.

This article discussed how the militaryoperations in Nduga served to unite varioussegments of the Papuan elite. The collectivememories of the suffering associated withprevious military campaigns since the 1960swere recalled to mobilize support for theGovernor’s appeal to withdraw troops fromNduga. The influence of Church leadersthrough their congregations was crucial.

At the same time, the role of the Governor andother elected politicians has been critical.Elected politicians and senior officials are theprincipal Papuan benficiaries of the SpecialAutonomy Law. As Lukas Enembe hasdemonstrated in the Nduga case and in many ofhis previous public statements, he and hiselected politician colleagues have a Papuanconsitutuencey to consider, which includes thepoorest regions of Papua. Their interests andasp i ra t ions are not the same as theGovernment’s in Jakarta.

It is naïve to imagine, in the middle ofIndonesia’s Presidential election campaign,that Governor Enembe’s appeal to withdrawthe security forces from Nduga could beaccepted in Jakarta, let alone lead to the sort ofsubstantial withdrawal of Indonesian securityforces from Papua that helped bring aboutpeace in Indonesia’s other intractable regionalconflict in Aceh. Nor is it likely, in the heat of

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an election campaign, that the events in Ndugawill prompt a fundamental rethinking ofnational policy towards Papua.

Related articles

Jim Elmslie, The Great Divide: WestPapuan Demographics Revisited; SettlersDominate Coastal Regions but theHighlands Still Ovrewhelmingly Papuan(https://apjjf.org/2017/02/Elmslie.html)Camellia Webb-Gannon: SalvagingDemocracy for West Papuans in the Faceof Australia-Indonesia Obstruction(https://apjjf.org/-Camellia-Webb_Gannon

/4400)Camellia Webb-Gannon and Jim Elmslie:M S G H e a d a c h e , W e s t P a p u a nHeartache? Indonesia's MelanesianF o r a y(https://apjjf.org/2014/12/47/Jim-Elmslie/4225.html)D a v i d A d a m S t o t t : W o u l d A nIndependent West Papua Be A FailingS t a t e ?(https://apjjf.org/2011/9/37/David-Adam-Stott/3597/article.html)Dav id Adam Sto t t : Indones ianColonisation, Resource Plunder and WestP a p u a n G r i e v a n c e s(https://apjjf.org/2011/9/12/David-Adam-Stott/3499/article.html)

Dr Richard Chauvel is an Honorary Fellow at the Asia Institute of The University ofMelbourne. His research focuses on Indonesian history and politics, particularly on politicaland social change in Maluku and Papua. Two volumes of essays on Papua were published asThe Land of Papua and the Indonesian State, (Monash University, Centre of Southeast AsianStudies, Working Papers 120 & 121, 2003). His doctoral research was published asNationalists, Soldiers and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands from Colonialism to Revolt. Heis the author of two policy papers for the East West Center’s Washington project on “TheDynamics and Management of Internal Conflict in Asia”. Prior to joining the Asia Institute, hetaught at the University of Sydney, the University of Indonesia in the Departments of Historyand Politics, and Victoria University.

Notes1 Reflecting its contested history, the western half of the island of New Guinea has hadnumerous names. In the last decade of Dutch rule it was known as Netherlands New Guinea.In 1961 the Dutch accepted the Papuan proposal that it be called West Papua. UnderIndonesian rule it has been known as West Irian and Irian Jaya. In 2000 President Wahidaccepted the Papuan preference for Papua rather than Irian. Since 2003 the territory hasbeen divided into two provinces – Papua and West Papua – with capitals in Jayapura andManokwari respectively. Following common Indonesian usage, in this article ‘Papua’ will beused to refer to both provinces, except where the reference is to only one of the provinces.2 “Anggota DPR Papua Periode 2014-2019 Dilantik(https://apjjf.org/admin/site_manage/details/tabloidjubi.com/16/2014/10/31/anggota-dpr-papua-periode-2014-2019-dilantik)”, Tabliod Jubi, 31-10-20143 Netherlands Government Annual Report to the United Nations on Netherlands New Guinea,

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1960, The Hague, pp. 6-7. 4 Jim Elmslie, “The Great Divide: West Papuan Demographics Revisited; Settlers DominateCoastal Regions but the Highlands Still Overwhelmingly Papuan”, The Asia-Pacific Journal,Japan Focus Volume 15, Issue 2, Number 1, Jan 15, 20175 Badan Pusat Statistik, Pembangunan Manusia, Data Nasional(https://ipm.bps.go.id/data/nasional); Pembangunan Manusia, Provinsi Papua(https://ipm.bps.go.id/data/provinsi/metode/baru/9400). The HDI figures are from 2017. HDIis useful as it provides a broader measure than economic development, by incorporating lifeexpectancy and education indices as well as standard of living. HDI is also used in Indonesiangovernment policy making. 6 Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, “Presiden Jokowi Ceritakan Soal Papua hinggaDiaspora pada WNI di Selandia Baru(http://setkab.go.id/presiden-jokowi-ceritakan-soal-papua-hingga-diaspora-pada-wni-di-selandia-baru/)”, 20-3-2018.7 International Coalition for Papua (ICP), Human Rights in West Papua 2017(http://humanrightspapua.org/hrreport/2017), p. 178 International Coalition for Papua (ICP), Human Rights in West Papua 2017(http://humanrightspapua.org/hrreport/2017). The Coalition, established in 2003, consists ofthe major human rights organisations represented in Papua as well as local and internationalfaith-based organisations. Amnesty International Indonesia, "Don't Bother, Just Let Him Die":Killing with Impunity In Papua, 2018, 2 July 2018, Index number: ASA 21/8198/2018(https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa21/8198/2018/en/).9 Amnesty International Indonesia, "Don't Bother, Just Let Him Die": Killing with Impunity inPapua, 2018 P. 1610 International Coalition for Papua (ICP), Human Rights in West Papua 2017, Section 5, p. 611 Bobby Anderson, “A new take on violence in Indonesian Papua(https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/new-take-violence-indonesian-papua)”, TheInterpreter, 18-4-2018.12 Nety Dharma Somba,“Papuans ask police to withdraw from Nduga(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/07/13/papuans-ask-police-to-withdraw-from-nduga.html)”, Jakarta Post, 13-7-2018.13 “Gubernur Papua: Kalau Bicara Nduga, Orang Papua itu Minta Merdeka(https://kabarpapua.co/gubernur-papua-kalau-bicara-nduga-orang-papua-itu-minta-merdeka/)”, Kabar Papua.Co, 17-12-2018.14 “Jokowi: Tangkap Seluruh Pelaku Penembakan di Papua, Tumpas hingga Akar(https://news.detik.com/berita/4331103/jokowi-tangkap-seluruh-pelaku-penembakan-di-papua-tumpas-hingga-akar)”, News.Detik.Com, 5-12-2018.15 Antonius Made Tony Supriatma, “TNI/Polri in West Papua: How Security Reforms Work inthe Conflict Region”, Indonesia, No. 95 (April 2013), pp. 97-816 Dedy Priatmojo, “Eks Kepala BIN Ungkap Kekuatan Kelompok Separatis Papua(https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/1101762-eks-kepala-bin-ungkap-kekuatan-kelompok-separatis-papua)”, Viva Co id, 9-12-2018.17 John Martinkus and Mark Davis, “Exclusive: Chemical weapons dropped on Papua(https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/2018/12/22/exclusive-chemical-weapons-dropped-papu

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a/15453972007326?fbclid=IwAR1V2C4jBsSpy4cAsxTHkBK_9macL0nkuj-5guXZNOUsh4EPIyPSF7m3YZU)”, The Saturday Paper, Edition 236, 22-12-2018.18 Lisa Martin, “Indonesia denies using white phosphorus in West Papua(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/24/indonesia-denies-using-white-phosphorous-in-west-papua)”, The Guardian, 24-12-2018.19 “Kapendam XVII Cenderawasih: Kelompok Separatis Tantang TNI Perang, Tapi Tak TahuTentang Senjata(https://kabarpapua.co/kapendam-xvii-cenderawasih-kelompok-separatis-tantang-tni-perang-tapi-tak-tahu-tentang-senjata/)”, Kabar Papua. Co, 27-12-2018.20 Pemimpin Papua Minta Jokowi Tarik Mundur TNI/Polri dari Nduga, Jawa Pos(https://www.jawapos.com/internasional/dw/25/12/2018/pemimpin-papua-minta-jokowi-tarik-mundur-tnipolri-dari-nduga), 25-12-2018.21 “Gubernur Papua minta pemerintah Indonesia segera cari solusi soal tuntutan merdeka(https://tabloidjubi.com/artikel-22006-gubernur-papua-minta-pemerintah-indonesia-segera-cari-solusi-soal-tuntutan-merdeka.html)”, Tabliod Jubi, 17-12-2018. 22 “Gubernur dan DPR Papua sepakat tarik aparat keamanan dari Nduga(https://tabloidjubi.com/artikel-22111-gubernur-dan-dpr-papua-sepakat-tarik-aparat-keamanan-dari-nduga.html)”, Tabliod Jubi, 21-12-2018.23 “Operasi militer di Nduga langgar hak sipil,rusak taman Lorentz(https://tabloidjubi.com/artikel-22178-operasi-militer-di-nduga-langgar-hak-sipilrusak-taman-lorentz.html)”, Tabliod Jubi, 25-12-2018.24 “Gereja KINGMI Se Tanah Papua Serukan Doa Dukacita di Kabupaten Nduga(http://papuasatu.com/headline/gereja-kingmi-se-tanah-papua-serukan-doa-dukacita-di-kabupaten-nduga/), Papua Satu.Com, 22-12-2018.25 “Tanggapan Kapendam XVII/Cenderawasih Terhadap Pernyataan Gubernur dan DPRP(http://suarapapua.com/2018/12/23/tanggapan-kapendam-xvii-cenderawasih-terhadap-pernyataan-gubernur-dan-dprp/)”, Suara Papua, 23-12-2018.26 Dian Septiari, “Indonesia denies use of chemical weapons in Papua(https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/12/23/indonesia-denies-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-papua.html)”, The Jakarta Post, 24-12-2018.27 “Akhirnya Anak Koteka Pimpin Papua(http://bintangpapua.com/index.php/lain-lain/k2-information/halaman-utama/item/1573-akhirnya-anak-koteka-pimpin-papua)”, Bintang Papua, 14-2-2013.(http://bintangpapua.com/index.php/lain-lain/k2-information/halaman-utama/item/1573-akhirnya-anak-koteka-pimpin-papua)28 Roy Ratumakin, “Hasil pleno KPU Papua, Lukmen raih 67,54 persen suara(http://tabloidjubi.com/artikel-17564-hasil-pleno-kpu-papua-lukmen-raih-6754-persen-suara.html)”, 9-7-2018 29 “Beredar Kabar Kesepakatan Kepala BIN, Kapolri, Kapolda Sumut Dan Gubernur Papua(https://politik.rmol.co/read/2017/09/14/307113/Beredar-Kabar-Kesepakatan-Kepala-BIN,-Kapolri,-Kapolda-Sumut-Dan-Gubernur-Papua-)”, 15-9-2017, Politik rmol.co.30 Ihsanuddin, “Gubernur Lukas Enembe: 3 Juta Suara di Papua Kita Kasih Semua ke Jokowi(https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/09/05/12450511/gubernur-lukas-enembe-3-juta-suara-di-papua-kita-kasih-semua-ke-jokowi)”, Kompas.com, 5-9-2018, The significance of Enembe’s

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commitment to support Jokowi and the PDI-P in this year’s elections was that he is the Papuahead of the Democrat Party, which does not support Jokowi’s campaign for re-election.31 Nota Dinas, Direktur Jenderal Kesbang dan Linmas Ermaya Suradinata to Menteri DalamNegeri, June 9, 2000, 578/CD/Kesbang/D IV/VI/2000.32 Ermaya Suradinata, “Pemekeran Irian Jaya Merupakan Solusi Dalam mengatasi acamandisintegrasi Bangsa,” Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, January2002, p. 4.33 Alexander Loen, “KNPB lebih baik dari FPI dalam berdemokrasi(http://tabloidjubi.com/m/artikel-6701-lukas-enembe--knpb-lebih-baik-dari-fpi-dalam-berdemokrasi.html)”, Tabliod Jubi, 2-6-201734 Badan Pusat Statistik, Sensus Penduduk 2010 - Penduduk Menurut Wilayah dan Agamayang Dianut | Indonesia (https://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321&wid=0). Inthe context of the Papuan provinces, it is important to note that there are long-establishedMuslim Papuan communities in west coastal areas, including Raja Ampat, Fakak andKaimana. While the majority of the Indonesian settler communities in Papua are Muslims,there have been Christian communities from the neighboring Maluku islands resident inPapua since the Netherlands administration. 35 “Gubernur Papua: Belum Ada Orang Papua Berjiwa Indonesia(http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2016/01/10/078734620/gubernur-papua-belum-ada-orang-papua-berjiwa-indonesia)”, Nasional Tempo, 10-1-2016.36 “Papuan governor seeks to open up relationship with PNG(https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/programmes/datelinepacific/audio/2018663224/papuan-governor-seeks-to-open-up-relationship-with-png)”, Dateline Pacific, Radio New Zealand,19-9-2018.