Goodwood text

60The Final Battle for Normandy

Northern France9 July – 30 August 1944

ANNIVERSARY

TH

‘The decisive defeat of the German forces in Normandy’

SECOND WORLD WAR

No.5

The Final Battlefor Normandy

CAEN, LOWER NORMANDY, NORTHERN FRANCE

Cover image: A Sexton 25-pounder Self-Propelled (SP) Howitzer crosses the River Seine

Caen is:• Situated on the banks of the

River Orne• 238 km (148 miles) NW of Paris• 342 km (212 miles) SW of Calais

KEY FACTS

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London•

GERMANY

FRANCE

BELGIUMBerlin•

NETHERLANDS

•ParisCaen•

London•

•Calais

Cherbourg•

Southampton•

• Caen

• Dover

• Le Havre

• Portsmouth

NORMANDY

ENGLISH CHANNEL

FRANCE

Foreword by theUnder Secretary of State for Defenceand Minister for Veterans, Don Touhig MP

This series of 60th anniversary commemorative booklets aimsto highlight battles and operations fought during the Second WorldWar. Through the booklets, readers have an opportunity to gain anunderstanding of the campaigns and the hardships endured by thosewho were there.

Booklet number 5 focuses on the actions of Operation Goodwood,Operation Bluecoat and the advance towards Falaise. Through thecoalition of the Allied forces, all operations were successful and resultedin the encirclement of German troops to the south of Falaise. However,although the war in Normandy was transformed, the forces involvedencountered determined enemy resistance, which resulted in manycasualties on both sides.

Sixty years later, we have the opportunity to pay tribute tothe self-sacrifice, discipline and dedication of all involved in theFinal Battle for Normandy. Through commemoration, remembranceand education, we can honour the generations who served andtry to gain an understanding of the sacrifices made for the freedomswe have today.

THE FINAL BATTLE FOR NORMANDY | 1

Having captured the northern part of Caenduring Operation Charnwood, GeneralMontgomery, on 9 July 1944, began planninga new offensive. Operation Goodwood aimedto capture the southern half of Caen and theBourguébus Ridge. Seizing these locationswould allow further Allied operations to unfoldto the south across the excellent tank terrainof the Falaise plain. Securing the Falaiseplain would provide the Allies with adequatespace to establish airfields on Norman soil, adevelopment considered critical by the SecondTactical Air Force Commander, Air Chief MarshalConingham. It would also allow the Allies todevelop their supply lines. Montgomery wanted toinitiate an offensive to tie down German armour

in the east, thus assisting with the AmericanOperation Cobra offensive. However, theBritish Army was struggling to replace the largenumber of infantry casualties already sustained inNormandy. Consequently, Montgomery decidedto use armoured units in this offensive, as he couldafford to lose tanks but not infantrymen.

The German defences south of Caen wereformidable, consisting of four defensive beltsup to 16 km (10 miles) deep. These comprised:(1) infantry, (2) panzer grenadiers, (3) fortifiedvillages with anti-tank guns and mortars, and(4) defensive positions running across higherground from the Bourguébus Ridge in the south-west to Troarn in the east. Beyond the fourth

| THE FINAL BATTLE FOR NORMANDY2

Operation Goodwood (18–20 July 1944)

Operation Goodwood, 18–20 July 1944

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belt was an armoured reserve of Panther andTiger tanks from the 1st and 2nd SS PanzerDivisions. Montgomery could not start OperationGoodwood until 18 July because he neededto assemble a large force to overcome thiswell-established German defence. He also reliedheavily on aerial bombardment. However, giventhe depth and dispersal of the German defences,Montgomery probably appreciated that it wasoptimistic to expect bombing to be very effective.

For Montgomery to secure the maximumbombing support possible, it seems he had toconvince senior air commanders that OperationGoodwood would be a decisive breakthroughoffensive. The Second (British) Army commander,Lieutenant-General Dempsey, who originallyconceived the offensive, certainly believed thisto be the case. Montgomery privately had heldmore modest and realistic expectations for theoffensive. It would appear Lt-General Dempsey,to an extent, convinced Montgomery that, duringOperation Goodwood, British armoured forcescould secure the ground required to answer the

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Allied commanders: US General Hodges, Lt-General Crerar, General Montgomery, US General Bradleyand Lt-General Dempsey

List of senior Allied commanders21st Army GroupGeneral B MontgomerySecond (British) ArmyLt-General M DempseyFirst Canadian ArmyLt-General H CrerarI (British) CorpsLt-General J CrockerII Canadian CorpsLt-General G SimondsVIII (British) CorpsLt-General R O’ConnorXII (British) CorpsLt-General N RitchieXXX (British) CorpsLt-General G BucknallLt-General B Horrocks (from 4 August 1944)

KEY FACTS


mounting criticisms made by Coningham andthe Americans concerning the lack of Britishprogress. In addition, Dempsey argued,Operation Goodwood would tie downGerman strength in the east, aiding the AmericanOperation Cobra and minimising infantry losses.The controversy that subsequently surrounded theextent to which Operation Goodwood could bedeemed a success stemmed from the differingunderstanding of the objectives of the offensive.

Given that the previous attempt to outflankCaen from the west (Operation Epsom) hadfailed, in mid-July Montgomery now decidedto attempt an outflanking move from the east.The three armoured divisions of VIII (British)Corps commenced Operation Goodwood fromthe bridgehead east of the River Orne whichhad been captured on D-Day (6 June 1944).

These divisions would strike south to securethe dominating Bourguébus Ridge betweenVerrieres and Troarn. To their east, I (British)Corps was to mount a flank protection attacktowards Troarn. At the same time, OperationAtlantic, led by II Canadian Corps, struck south-east from its positions around Caen to securethe western fringes of the Bourguébus Ridge.

However, the bridgehead east of the RiverOrne was narrow and this caused VIII (British)Corps serious problems in starting the offensive.The three armoured divisions could only belaunched one behind the other into the attack,restricting the combat power that could bedeployed against the enemy.

Additionally, the fact that so few bridgesexisted over the River Orne made it difficult for

Battalion (Bn) move to concentration (conc) area EAST of River ORNE near RANVILLE.

Bn arrived at conc area complete.Commencement of great armoured thrust SOUTH from EAST of CAEN. Bn is spearheadof all infantry (inf) in 2nd Army’s attack. Attack preceded by 2000 bomber force.Bn crosses Start Line, and is assisted by artillery (arty) barrage of six medium andsix Field (Fd) Regiments (Regts). First objective was CUVERVILLE.Village captured and prisoners taken. Opposition slight; most trouble being machinegun (MG) posts. One position of 6 MG posts wiped out by Lieutenant C.G. SHORT(Canadian Infantry (Cdn Inf)) and one section. This day was a momentous one inthe history of the unit, and everyone is thrilled by the sight of our first prisoners.Major (Maj) W.P. SWEETMAN, Second in Command (2IC), wounded.

Coulomns16th 2000Ranville17th 010018th

0745

0845

Extract from 3rd Battalion Monmouthshire Regiment war diary, 16–18 July 1944

National Archives WO 171/1349

VIII (British) Corps to move these spearheaddivisions forward. Indeed, much of VIII (British)Corps’ supporting artillery had to be kept backon the western side of the River Orne as therewas insufficient room for them on the otherside. This meant that some of the supportingartillery was deployed further back than wastactically desirable.

Additionally, the Germans could observe thisbridgehead from high ground, which madeit very difficult for VIII (British) Corps to preserveany degree of surprise.

These considerations meant that OperationGoodwood could not be ‘teed-up’ as tidilyas the Allies would have wished. OperationGoodwood, therefore, was an offensive that waslaunched for strategic and political reasons, inspite of the attack’s unpromising tactical potential.

Operation Goodwood commenced beforedawn on 18 July, initiated by aerial supportoperations. The air plan that Dempsey’s staffformulated for Operation Goodwood wassignificantly more complex than in OperationCharnwood and involved over 1850 heavy

and medium bombers striking 11 target zones.The offensive began between 0530 and0615 hours, when over 850 RAF heavybombers attacked in good weather conditionsand delivered over 15,500 bombs onto threetargets – the Colombelles–Mondeville andTouffreville–Emiéville areas on the flanksof the offensive, as well as Cagny. By 1944standards of accuracy, this was an effectivebombing strike, which successfully neutralisedthe German flank defences.

At 0700 hours, over 340 American andBritish medium bombers struck the Germandefences in Giberville, Cuverville, Démouvilleand Manneville. By the time that these aircraftarrived over the battlefield, visibility haddeclined. Many of the target areas wereobscured by the smoke and dust thrown upfrom the recent British heavy bombing strikes.Consequently, nearly 25 per cent of themedium bombers had to abort their missions.These medium bombing strikes were lessaccurate than the previous Allied sortiesand achieved only about 12 per cent of theenvisaged bombing density. Simultaneously,fighters and fighter-bombers from 83 and 84RAF Groups attacked various enemy positions.

From 0830 to 0930 hours, over 640American Liberator heavy bombers attackedthree locations – two areas located along thenorthern face of the Bourguébus Ridge and the

A Welsh Guardsman’s perspective ofOperation Goodwood

‘The whole northern sky was filled with them[bombers] for as far as the eye could see –wave upon wave, stepped up one abovethe other and spreading out east and westtill it seemed that there was no room for more.Everyone was out of their vehicles now, staringin awed wonder until the last wave droppedits bombs and turned away. Then the gunstook up in a steadily increasing crescendothe work which the bombers had begun.’


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The bomb-damaged Normandy town of May surOrne, south west of Cagny

Bures–Saint-Pair region on the extreme easternflank. Approximately 570 aircraft droppedsome 13,000 45-kg (100-lb) bombsand 76,000 9-kg (20-lb) fragmentationbombs. These strikes were not particularlyaccurate because of declining visibility.Aircrews delayed bomb release to avoidinflicting friendly casualties on the groundand consequently many bombs fell to thesouth of their target areas. The Germanforces that remained in this sector later playeda major part in halting the British advance.

As these attacks developed, Allied artilleryengaged known German gun positions andselected enemy defensive locations. At 0745hours the artillery began a creeping barrage,behind which the 11th Armoured Divisioncommenced its attack south. This initial phase ofOperation Goodwood proved highly successful.The powerful aerial and artillery strikes inflictedtremendous damage on the forward enemydefences. This allowed the following spearhead ofBritish armour to advance rapidly through the initial

German defences in the Cuverville–Démouvillearea. It reached the embanked Caen–Vimontrailway at around 0930 hours. The restrictedspace in the Orne bridgehead continued to causetraffic congestion and did more to slow the Britishadvance than enemy resistance in those first fewhours. Enemy resistance did however increase andthe British made slow progress south during the restof the morning.

All afternoon, the Germans launched counter-attacks against the Allied advance, and thisintense series of battles continued into theevening. It was not until late on 18 July thatthe spearhead British armoured forces reachedthe foot of the northern slope of the BourguébusRidge. The bypassed pockets of enemyresistance prevented the supporting Britishinfantry from keeping up with the armour, whichtogether with the inability to get artillery gunsthrough the traffic congestion meant that thespearhead forces had only limited artillerysupport and were therefore vulnerable. TheBritish armour now encountered a largely intact


Allied bombing targets during Operation Goodwood

German anti-tank gun screen deployed acrossthe northern face of the Bourguébus Ridge,which repulsed the Allies and inflicted heavylosses. As dusk approached, numbers ofGerman all-arms counter-attacks drove theBritish armour back with further heavy losses.

On 19 July, Montgomery’s forces resumedthe attack. On the eastern flank, after intensefighting, the British 3rd Infantry Division closedin on Troarn and Emiéville. In the afternoon, inthe centre, the British armour resumed their attacksouth. The Guards Armoured Division capturedLe Poirier but was halted short of Frénouville byintense enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the 7thArmoured Division captured the village of Fourand all but encircled Bourguébus. Finally, the11th Armoured Division battled its way southagainst bitter enemy resistance to capture Brasand Hubert-Folie. On the western flank, theCanadian forces captured Fleury-sur-Orneand Hill 67. Success had been achieved, buteverywhere German resistance was extremelystrong. This was not the economical operationthat Dempsey had anticipated.

On 20 July, the Allied forces tried to consolidatetheir gains by securing a few key locations.During that day, the British forces captured

Bourguébus and Frénouville. The Canadianssecured Beauvoir and Troteval Farms; thesubsequent drive on Verrières encounteredextremely heavy enemy resistance and wasrepulsed with high numbers of casualties. On21 July, the Allied forces held off repeatedGerman counter-attacks, but by now both sideswere exhausted, and a lull descended over thebattlefield. Operation Goodwood was over.

The success of Operation Goodwood remainsdebatable. The employment of massed armouragainst intact German defences brought hightank losses. Operation Goodwood accountedfor more than one-third of the entire Britishtank strength in Normandy. While OperationGoodwood gained additional ground and heldsome German reserves on the Caen front, theseachievements were won at a high price which theBritish forces could not afford to repeat. On theother hand, Operation Goodwood did assist withthe success of the American Operation Cobraoffensive initiated on 25 July. The heavy defensivefighting during Operation Goodwood compelledthe enemy to send most of their supplies tothis sector. This emptied the Saint-Lô front ofvital supplies during the crucial days beforeOperation Cobra, and these German logisticalshortages assisted the American offensive.

Allied military personnel move past a destroyed tank in the Normandy town of Villers Bocage


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Operation Cobra (25 July –1 August 1944)

Operation Cobra, 25 July – 1 August 1944

On 25 July, First United States Armycommenced Operation Cobra. This wasconceived as a concentrated operationmounted by three infantry divisions on anarrow front, supported by intense air andartillery attack. Afterwards, three mechaniseddivisions would advance through the rearenemy defences.

The heavy bombing strike was one of themost effective air attacks on ground forcesyet seen in the war. It crippled German

communications and so battered the defendingGerman forces that the US VII Corps successfullyadvanced 3.2 km (2 miles) during that first day.During the next 48 hours, American speedand mobility turned this attack into a decisiveoperation which secured a 27-km (17-mile)advance. During 29–31 July, with the Germanfront broken, Bradley expanded the scopeof Operation Cobra. His forces crossedthe River Sélune at Pontaubault, openingthe gateway to Brittany and central France.The war in Normandy had been transformed.


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Operation Bluecoat (30 July – 7 August 1944)

A wrecked German Tiger tank in the Normandy town of Villers Bocage, east of Caumont

On 30 July, General Montgomery’s forcesresumed the offensive by launching OperationBluecoat. Striking the weak German frontaround Caumont, Montgomery hoped theattack would prevent the Germans fromtransferring their armour from the Britishsector to the American front. Deploying threearmoured and three infantry divisions, theBritish VIII and XXX Corps attacked a sectorof the front that was held by a single Germaninfantry division. Given the need for speed,Lt-General Dempsey had to launch the attackbefore VIII (British) Corps had managed tofully assemble.

The hasty preparations meant the attacking forcelacked the artillery support usually available forMontgomery’s offensives. Allied heavy andmedium bombers, and fighter-bombers ofthe Second Tactical Air Force, supported theground attack, although at first poor weatherseverely hampered air operations. In addition,the Bocage landscape comprised numeroussmall fields bordered by thick and tallhedgerows, between which ran narrow sunkencountry lanes. The terrain provided excellentcover for the defending German forces.

The British forces quickly penetrated theGerman defences and successfully drewinto battle the enemy armour that was en routeto the American sector. However, the failure ofBritish forces to secure the nearby high groundat Amaye slowed their progress. During31 July, British forces successfully attackedand secured a vital bridgehead over the RiverSouleuvre west of Le Bény-Bocage, a successthat left a 3.2-km (2-mile) gap in the Germanline. Unfortunately, by the time the Britishhad commenced an attack, the Germans hadmanaged to move up reserves to close the gap.

As Operation Bluecoat unfolded, one of itsprincipal objectives became the capture of thekey road junction at Vire. If the Germans hadlost this town, their withdrawal south-east fromthe Mortain area would have been seriouslycompromised. The town was located just insidethe American sector, adjacent to the boundarybetween the American and British sectors of thefront, and this hampered the British forces’ drivesouth towards Vire. The 11th Armoured Divisionmade steady progress south during 31 July, butthe advance of the 7th Armoured Division andGuards Armoured Division, in the XXX Corps’sector, was slowed by German resistance.


On 1 August, German armoured reinforcementsarrived and began to threaten the exposed flanksof the 11th Armoured Division. On 6 August,German armoured counter-thrusts overranthe 11th Armoured Division’s spearheads. Onthe same day, elements of the 43rd (Wessex)Division overcame fierce German resistanceto secure the high ground of Mont Pinçon.

On 7 August, further east, the 59th(Staffordshire) Division seized a bridgeheadover the River Orne near Brieux and foughtoff repeated German attacks.

However, the forward momentum of OperationBluecoat had slowed. The situation at the frontbecame more fluid, with the German forcesin this area withdrawing south-east in a seriesof phased operations, in response to theoutflanking threat by the advancing Americanforces. The weary British forces continued tofollow up these retreating German forces.

As Operation Bluecoat commenced, the newoperational 12th US Army Group took control ofFirst US Army and General George Patton’s new

Third US Army. Given the collapse of the westernpart of the German front in Normandy, thesetwo American armies raced south-east to occupyMortain and thrust west deep into Brittany.

Hitler’s response to this strategic threatinadvertently condemned the German ArmyGroup B to total defeat. He ordered thelaunching of a major counter-offensive torecapture Avranches and thus cut off to the souththose American divisions that had broken outfrom Normandy. During the night of 6–7 August,the XLVII Panzer Corps attacked west towardsMortain and Avranches. The forces of GeneralHans Freiherr von Funck, General of theArmoured Troops, made some initial progress,but then failed to secure Hill 317. During thenext 48 hours, the combination of Allied fighter-bomber attacks and newly arrived Americanreinforcements halted the German counter-strike.

The unwise offensive simply pushed the Germanarmoured forces west. To their south, Americanforces steadily outflanked them by advancingrapidly east and south-east towards Alençonand Le Mans.

A breakdown gang working on wrecked vehicles in the centre of Cahagnes, 2 August 1944

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During early August it became both strategicallyand politically important for the Anglo-Canadianforces still bogged down along the BourguébusRidge to drive south towards Falaise. Thisadvance would assist the British attacks takingplace further east. The task fell to Lieutenant-General Simonds’ II Canadian Corps, partof Lieutenant-General Henry Crerar’s newlyoperational First Canadian Army.

Simonds’ plan was codenamed OperationTotalize. It envisaged that, after BomberCommand heavy night raids had strucktargets on the flanks of the attack, two infantrydivisions would start the operation during thenight of 7–8 August. In this, mobile columnswould infiltrate between the forward enemypositions. Then, a little after noon on 8 August,a second strategic heavy bombing run by theUnited States Army Air Force (USAAF) wouldstrike the reserve German defensive position.Afterwards, in the offensive’s second phase,two armoured divisions would break throughthis second enemy line. With the Germandefences torn apart, these two formationswould then move to exploit the situation bymounting a rapid 16-km (10-mile) advancedeep into the German rear area during the

final phase to seize the key high groundsituated north of Falaise.

The initial attack secured significant success,despite the inevitable confusion that affectsnight operations. After a pause for the daylightbombers to arrive, Simonds’ two armoureddivisions struck south into the reserve Germandefensive line. These forces managed to secureonly modest forward momentum that afternoon,advancing no more than 3 km (2 miles).

In an attempt to kick-start the flaggingoffensive, a frustrated Simonds orderedWorthington Force – a battle group builtaround the 28th Canadian ArmouredRegiment (the British Columbia Regiment) andthe Algonquin Regiment – to mount a daringnight attack deep into enemy defences andcapture the vital high ground of Hill 195.That night the ill-fated battle group becamelost, and around dawn it secured a hill whichit believed was its objective. Sadly, neither thebattle group nor the Allied High Commandhad realised that they had secured Hill 140,some 6 km (4 miles) north-east of Hill 195.German armoured forces counter-attacked theisolated task group and all but annihilated it.


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Operation Totalize (7–21 August 1944)

Allied tanks moving forward into battle on 8 August 1944


Despite the benefit of effective tactical airsupport, the other Allied attacks mounted thatday also made only modest progress againstincreasing enemy resistance. A final assault onthe powerful German Quesnay Wood positionduring the night of 10–11 August failed, andSimonds terminated Operation Totalize.

While Operation Totalize unfolded during 8–10August, the strategic situation in Normandy haddeveloped rapidly. During this period, US forceshad advanced north from Le Mans to Alençon.The Americans were just 40 km (25 miles) awayfrom Simonds’ spearheads. If the two could linkup in the Falaise–Argentan area, the entireGerman Seventh Army would be caught ina large pocket. If they could be successfullyeliminated, the Allies would have secured adecisive victory over the German Army in thewest. This context led Simonds, on 14 August,to mount another attempt to advance south toFalaise, this time an improvised offensivecodenamed Operation Tractable.

This offensive was similar to that of OperationTotalize. Both operations employed mobilespearheads and strategic heavy bombing, aswell as exploiting restricted enemy observation.Simonds switched his Corps’ axis of advance tothe east of the main Caen–Falaise road to avoidthe dangerous Quesnay Wood position. He thenenvisaged a two-phase attack.

Simonds’ two break-in infantry divisions wouldstrike south in tightly packed groupings througha dense artillery-delivered smokescreen. Despitechaotic scenes similar to the first phase ofOperation Totalize, Simonds’ forces successfullyadvanced 8 km (5 miles) that first day. In theprocess, they crossed the inconspicuous RiverLaison, which turned out to be a bigger tankobstacle than Allied intelligence had predicted.During 15 August, the forward momentumof Simonds’ forces dwindled in the face ofstiffening enemy resistance. By the end of thesecond day, much of the high ground north ofFalaise – which the offensive had been intendedto secure – was still in German hands.

A description of the actions of CaptainBoardman’s Sherman tank crew duringpart of Operation Totalize at St. Aignande Cramesnil on 8 August 1944

‘Captain Boardman … moved to the left ofNo.3 Troop, towards the gully. Imagine thesurprise felt by his crew to see the turret ofa [German] Mark IV [tank] suddenly appearin the gully a hundred yards away, so closethat they could clearly see the GermanCommander’s face, with his head stuckover the top of the cupola. Tpr. [Trooper]Rutledge, the gunner, could not resist suchan invitation. One shot from his 75-mm[gun] into the turret and the Mark IV beganto burn. Those who could baled out andvanished into some corn on the far sideof the gully; Tpr. Rutledge encouraged themwith bursts of Browning [machine gun]. Thisset the corn on fire and Tpr. Buck, the driver,says that he distinctly saw the last Hun turnand, as he vanished into the smoke, shakehis fist at the hated, decadent, British.’Source: R F Neville, The 1st and 2nd Northants Yeomanry1939–1946 (Brunswick Joh Heinr Meyer, 1946).

An army chaplain reads the last rites over afallen comrade’s grave beside the road to Lisieuxas colleagues pay homage, 19 August 1944

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Lt-General Simonds was saved from having tobreathe renewed vigour into his stalled OperationTractable offensive due to the rapidly developingstrategic situation. By 15 August, the FalaisePocket was well formed, with just the 16-km(10-mile) neck between Morteaux-Couliboeufand Chambois still remaining unsecured by Alliedforces. The imperative need to close the neck ofthis all-but-formed pocket – to stop the Germanforces breaking out – led Simonds to shift hisCorps’ axis of advance further east.

During 16–18 August, Simonds’ two armoureddivisions pushed south-east towards Trun, wherethey aimed to link up with US General Patton’sforces and close the pocket. On 19 August,

Simonds’ armour did link up with Americanforces at Chambois, then pushing north-eastbeyond Argentan.

This weak Allied blocking position was unableto withstand the intense enemy attacks it faced.For as the remnants of the German SeventhArmy desperately attempted to fight their wayout of the pocket, elements of the German II-SSArmoured Corps attacked the Allied blockingposition from ‘outside’ the pocket.

The simultaneous attacks overran parts ofthis blocking position, leaving isolated Alliedenclaves still holding on tenaciously to keyground. Similarly, isolated elements of the

The Falaise Pocket (16–20 August 1944)

The Falaise Pocket, 16–20 August 1944


Allied 1st Polish Armoured Division withstoodall enemy attacks to keep hold of the key Hill262 near Coudehard. These courageousactions helped to ensure that fewer of theenemy escaped from the Falaise Pocket.

As the German retreat gathered momentum,the Second Tactical Air Force and the US IXthAir Force were presented with exceptionallylarge concentrations of ground targets to theeast of Falaise. Confined to a few narrow,open roads, and compelled to move in broaddaylight, the German columns were relentlesslyattacked from the air by Typhoons, P-47sand other fighter-bombers using machine gunsand rockets, as they edged slowly eastwards.So great was the damage inflicted that thearea between Trun and Chambois, wherethese attacks occurred, became known asthe ‘Shambles’.

However, as many as 40,000 enemy troopsdid manage to escape encirclement, althoughmost of their equipment and vehicles wereabandoned. After the battle was over, Alliedinvestigators counted no fewer than 3000German vehicles in the pocket. Thus, whilemany German troops escaped the FalaisePocket, the German Seventh Army was nolonger a cohesive fighting force. With theAmericans racing into the interior of France, theGermans now had no choice but to conduct astrategic withdrawal back to the River Seine.

Even before the Falaise Pocket had been closed,Montgomery had initiated his own offensivetowards the River Seine. This reflected his desireto enact the ‘long envelopment’ of the GermanSeventh Army against the obstacle of theSeine, rather than the ‘short envelopment’at Trun–Argentan, which closed the so-calledFalaise Pocket on 19 August. By 21 August,three British and one Canadian corps had struckeast towards the upper Seine, north of Paris,seeking to catch up with the American drive forthe French capital. Indeed, the US XV Corps hadsecured the first bridgehead over the River Seineat Mantes-Gassicourt as early as 20 August – at

precisely the time that the battle for Saint-Lambertraged some 97 km (60 miles) further west.

During the last 10 days of August, the barelycohesive remnants of the German Army GroupB successfully executed a phased withdrawalback to the northern bank of the River Seine.While Allied air attacks inflicted heavydamage on the retreating German army, theirimpact was restricted because the Germanforces made good use of available cover,dispersed their forces widely along the river,tried to restrict their evacuation to the hoursof darkness, and took advantage of a periodof cloudy weather, which restricted Allied airoperations between 20 and 25 August.

At Vernon on 26 August, the 1st WorcestershireRegiment (part of 43rd (Wessex) InfantryDivision) became the first British unit to cross theSeine. During the next three days, Montgomery’sforces secured other bridgeheads across theupper Seine. By 30 August, therefore, whenGerman resistance west of the Seine ceased,the Normandy campaign was over. By then,Paris had fallen and the Americans had racednorth beyond the Seine and east into the interiorof France. The Allies had so decisively won theBattle of Normandy that it remained hard to seehow the German Armed Forces could recoverfrom such a setback.

Damaged German tank near Bretteville, southof Caen

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Victoria CrossesSQUADRON LEADER IAN BAZALGETTERoyal Air Force Volunteer ReserveExtract from the Citation for the Victoria Cross:

On 4 August 1944 at Trossy Saint-Maximin,France, Squadron Leader Bazalgette wasone of the marking formation spearhead ona daylight raid. When he was near his target,his Lancaster came under heavy anti-aircraftfire; both starboard engines were put out ofaction and serious fires broke out. In spite ofthis, the Squadron Leader pressed on to thetarget, marking and bombing it accurately.He then attempted to bring the burning aircraftto safety, having ordered those of the crewwho were able to do so to bale out. Usinghis skill, he avoided a vulnerable Frenchvillage and managed to land the Lancaster,but it immediately exploded, killing him andhis two wounded crew members.

CORPORAL SYDNEY BATESThe Royal Norfolk RegimentExtract from the Citation for the Victoria Cross:

On 6 August 1944 near Sourdeval, France,when the enemy had penetrated deeply intothe area occupied by his section, CorporalBates seized a light machine gun and charged,moving forward through a hail of bullets.Although wounded twice, he was undauntedand continued firing until the enemy startedto withdraw before him. At this moment hewas wounded for a third time, mortally. Hestill went on firing, however, until his strengthfailed him, but by this time the enemy hadwithdrawn and the situation had beenrestored. He died two days later.

The Victoria Cross (VC) is the British realm’shighest award for gallantry in the face ofthe enemy. It has precedence over anyother of our Sovereign’s awards orCommonwealth decorations.

The Victoria Cross was founded by RoyalWarrant on 29 January 1856. The Crossitself is cast from the bronze of cannonscaptured at Sevastopol during the CrimeanWar. The design, chosen by Queen Victoria,consists of a cross with the Royal Crest restingupon a scroll bearing the words ‘For Valour’.

Since its inception, the Victoria Cross has beenawarded 1355 times. The youngest recipientwas 15 years old and the eldest was 69 yearsold. Three cases exist where both father andson have won the Victoria Cross; four pairsof brothers have also been recipients.

One hundred and eighty-one members ofthe British and Commonwealth forces wereawarded the Victoria Cross during the SecondWorld War.

About the Victoria Cross:• It was founded by Royal Warrant on

29 January 1856• It has been awarded 1355 times• The youngest recipient was 15 years

old and the eldest was 69 years old• Five Victoria Crosses were awarded

following operations mentioned inthis booklet.

KEY FACTS


MAJOR DAVID CURRIE29th Canadian Armoured ReconnaissanceRegiment (The South Alberta Regiment)Extract from the Citation for the Victoria Cross:

During the period 18–20 August 1944 atthe Battle of Falaise, Normandy, France,Major Currie was in command of a smallmixed force of tanks, self-propelled anti-tankguns and infantry which had been orderedto cut one of the main escape routes. Havingattacked the village of Saint-Lambert-sur-Divesand consolidated a position halfway insideit, for 36 hours he repulsed repeated enemyattacks. Despite heavy casualties, Major Currienever considered the possibility of failure andin the final assault seven enemy tanks, 12 88-mm guns and 40 vehicles were destroyed, 300Germans were killed, 500 wounded and 1100captured. The remnants of two German armieswere thus denied this escape route.

CAPTAIN DAVID JAMIESONThe Royal Norfolk RegimentExtract from the Citation for the Victoria Cross:

On 7–8 August 1944 south of Grimbosq,Normandy, France, Captain Jamieson was incommand of a company which established abridgehead over the River Orne. The enemymade seven counter-attacks on the company’sposition, but throughout 36 hours of bitterand close fighting Captain Jamieson showedsuperb qualities of leadership and greatpersonal bravery. There were times whenthe situation appeared hopeless but oneach occasion it was restored by his coolnessand determination. He personally was largelyresponsible for holding the bridgehead overthe river and although wounded twice herefused to be evacuated until the enemyhad withdrawn defeated.

LIEUTENANT TASKER WATKINSThe Welch RegimentExtract from the Citation for the Victoria Cross:

On 16 August 1944 at Barfour, Normandy,France, Lieutenant Watkins’ company cameunder murderous machine-gun fire whileadvancing through corn fields set with boobytraps. The only officer left, Lieutenant Watkinsled a bayonet charge with his 30 remainingmen against 50 enemy infantry, practicallywiping them out. Finally, at dusk, separatedfrom the rest of the battalion, he ordered hismen to scatter and, after he had personallycharged and silenced an enemy machine-gunpost, he brought them back to safety. Hissuperb leadership not only saved his men, butdecisively influenced the course of the battle.


Since 1945, both Caen and Falaise haveincreased in size, taking over small hamletsin the region with the construction of buildings,highways and railways. Although the battlefieldhas altered and much of the city has beenrebuilt, the basic geography of Caen remainsas it was in 1944. The rolling slopes ofthe Bourguébus Ridge to the south dominatethe landscape and, in the hamlets of theBourguébus Ridge and the Falaise Plain,evidence of battle can still be seen. Also,there are several Commonwealth War GravesCommission cemeteries that commemorate theCommonwealth forces who died in the region.Two are the Banneville-la-Campagne WarCemetery, which contains 2170 burials, andBretteville-sur-Laize Canadian War Cemetery,which contains 2957 burials.

The battlefield today

Banneville-la-Campagne War Cemetery

CWGC

The Commonwealth War GravesCommission maintains over 1,147,192war graves (which does not include thegraves of some 40,000 foreign nationals)at 23,203 burial sites in 149 countriesaround the world. It also commemoratesa further 759,597 Commonwealth wardead on memorials to the missing.

Commonwealth governments share the costof maintenance in proportion to the numberof graves of their war dead: UK – 79%;Canada – 10%; Australia – 6%;New Zealand – 2%; South Africa – 2%;India – 1%.

KEY FACTS


Army 21st Army Group

Second British ArmyFirst Canadian Army

CorpsI (British) CorpsII Canadian Corps VIII (British) CorpsXII (British) CorpsXXX (British) Corps

DivisionsArmouredGuards Armoured Division7th Armoured Division11th Armoured Division79th Armoured Division4th Canadian Armoured Division1st Polish Armoured Division

Infantry3rd British Infantry Division6th Airborne Division15th (Scottish) Infantry Division43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division49th (West Riding) Infantry Division50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division51st (Highland) Infantry Division53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division59th (Staffordshire) Infantry Division2nd Canadian Division3rd Canadian Division

BrigadesArmoured and Tank4th Armoured Brigade5th Guards Armoured Brigade6th Guards Tank Brigade8th Armoured Brigade22nd Armoured Brigade27th Armoured Brigade29th Armoured Brigade30th Armoured Brigade31st Tank Brigade33rd Armoured Brigade34th Tank Brigade2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade4th Canadian Armoured Brigade10th Polish Armoured Brigade

Air ForcesBomber Command (RAF)Air Defence of Great Britain (previously andlater known as Fighter Command) (RAF)Second Tactical Air Force (RAF)8th United States Army Air Force (USAAF)9th United States Army Air Force (USAAF)

Formations assigned to the Final Battlefor NormandySpace limitations mean that we cannot list all the units and formations involved in the operationsmentioned in this booklet.


60th anniversary of the Final Battle for Normandy

Hill 112 Association


This booklet is intended to be of interest toyoung people as well as veterans. As theformer may not be acquainted with basicmilitary terminology, a simple glossary of

1944 British Army terms relating to variouslysized commands is included here. Thesecommands are listed in descending order of sizewith the rank of the commander shown in italics.

Glossary

TERM DESCRIPTION

Army Group The largest military command deployed by the British Army, comprising General or Field Marshal two or more armies and containing 400,000–600,000 troops.Army A military command controlling several subordinate corps, plus Lieutenant-General supporting forces, amounting to 100,000–200,000 troops.Corps A military command controlling two or more divisions, as well as other Lieutenant-General supporting forces, amounting to 50,000–100,000 troops.Division The standard 1944 British Army formation, an infantry or armoured Major-General division, containing 10,000–20,000 personnel.Brigade A formation that contains several battalions or regiments that amount toBrigadier 3000–6000 personnel, which exists either independently or else forms

part of a division.Regiment A unit typically of armoured or artillery forces, amounting to 500–900 Lieutenant-Colonel soldiers, that equates in status and size to an infantry battalion.Battalion A unit usually comprising 500–900 soldiers (such as an infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel engineer or signals battalion).Squadron Typically, a sub-unit of an armoured or reconnaissance regiment that Major equates in status and size to an infantry company.Company A small sub-unit of a battalion. A typical infantry company could Major contain around 150–180 soldiers.Battery A small sub-unit, usually of artillery, that forms part of a regiment.MajorUnit A small military grouping that ranges in size from a section (of 10

soldiers) up to a battalion or regiment (500–900 personnel).Formation A large military grouping that ranges in size from a brigade up to an

army group.Spearheads The leading forces in a military attack.Anti-tank gun screen Line of guns organised to destroy or damage oncoming tanks.Operation Charnwood The British offensive between 7 and 9 July 1944 that captured the

northern half of Caen.Operation Atlantic An Allied offensive by the II Canadian Corps that formed an adjunct to the

British Operation Goodwood offensive of 18–20 July 1944.Operation Epsom The British offensive between 25 and 30 June 1944 to try and capture Caen.Flank The side of a military formation.Outflank To go around the side of a military formation.Creeping barrage A barrage in which the fire of all units participating remains in the same

relative position throughout and which advances in steps of one line at a time.

Bridgehead An area of ground held or to be gained on the enemy’s side of an obstacle.

The envelopment, 1–16 August 1944

AcknowledgementsAuthor: Dr Stephen A Hart MA, Department of War Studies, Royal MilitaryAcademy SandhurstCommonwealth War Graves CommissionConfederation of British Service and Ex-Service Organisations (COBSEO)Department for Education and SkillsImperial War MuseumNational ArchivesNormandy Veterans AssociationRoyal British LegionVeterans Agency

Photography and mapsPhotography reproduced with the permission of the Imperial War Museum, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission and the Ministry of Defence Air HistoricalBranch (Royal Air Force).Maps in the text taken from the Official History Series: Victory in the West, Volume 2,The Defeat of Germany, Major L F Ellis (HMSO 1968).

© Crown copyright 2005. Designed and produced by COI, xxx 2005.

‘A nation that forgets its past has no future.’ These words by Winston Churchill could not be moreapt to describe the purpose of this series of booklets,

of which this is the fifth.

These booklets commemorate various Second World War actions,and aim not only to remember and commemorate those who

fought and died, but also to remind future generations of the debt they owe to their forebears, and the inspiration that

can be derived from their stories.

They will help those growing up now to be aware of the veterans’sacrifices, and of the contributions they made to our security

and to the way of life we enjoy today.

Goodwood text

Documents

Transcript of Goodwood text