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Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations

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DOCTRINE OF

LEGITIMATE

EXPECTATIONS

A Comparative and Analytical Study

III Year B.A., LL.B. (Hons.) Dharmendra Chatur 08D6015

VI Semester Administrative Law


2

CONTENTS

Contents ..................................................................................................................................... 2

Introduction to the Doctrine ....................................................................................................... 3

Judicial Development of Legitimate Expectations in the United Kingdom .............................. 6

How can a legitimate expectation arise? ................................................................................ 7

Standard of Review for breach of legitimate expectation ...................................................... 8

Judicial Development of Legitimate Expectations in India ....................................................... 9

Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................................ 13

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 14

Journal Articles .................................................................................................................... 14

Books and Treatises ............................................................................................................. 15

Caselaw ................................................................................................................................ 15



3

INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCTRINE

It cannot be overemphasized that the concept of legitimate expectation has now emerged as

an important doctrine. It is stated that it is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned

by the court to review an administrative action.1 It operates in public domain and in

appropriate cases constitutes a substantive and enforceable right.2 As a doctrine it takes its

place beside such principles as rules of natural justice, rule of law, non-arbitrariness,

reasonableness, fairness, promissory estoppel, fiduciary duty and perhaps, proportionality to

check the abuse of the exercise of administrative power. The principle at the root of the

doctrine is Rule of Law which requires regularity, predictability and certainly the

governments‟ dealing with the public.3

An expectation could be based on an express promise, or representation or by established past

action or settled conduct. It could be a representation to the individual or generally to a class

of persons. Whether an expectation exists is a question of law, but clear statutory words

override any expectation, however founded. However as an equity doctrine it is not rigid and

operates in areas of manifest injustice. It enforces a certain standard of public morality in all

public dealings. However, considerations of public interest would outweigh its application. It

would immensely benefit those who are likely to be denied relief on the ground that they

have no statutory right to claim relief.

Exercise of discretion is an inseparable part of sound administration and, therefore, the State

which is itself a creature of the Constitution, cannot shed its limitation at any time in any

sphere of State activity. A discretionary power is one which is exercisable by the holder of

the power in his discretion or subjective satisfaction. The exercise of discretion must not be

arbitrary, fanciful and influenced by extraneous considerations. In matters of discretion the

choice must be dictated by public interest and must not be unprincipled or unreasoned.

Reasonable and non-arbitrary exercise of discretion is an inbuilt requirement of the law and

any unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India,

1950. The discretion must be exercised reasonably in furtherance of public policy, public

1 Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993) 3 SCC 499.

2 M.P. Oil Extraction Co. v. State of M.P., (1997) 7 SCC 592.

3 Chanchal Goyal (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 3 SCC 485.



4

good and for public cause. This doctrine of legitimate expectation acts as a deterrent for those

in charge of public power from exercising it arbitrarily. It should not be capped, cabined or

confined in narrow, pedantic and lexographic approach; rather it should be given broadest of

interpretations so as to cover within its purview the dialectics and dynamics of fairness and

efficiency. The basic purpose for the same being the expectation in a rule of law society is

that holders of public power and authority must be able to publicly justify their action as

legally valid and socially wise and just. Under such circumstances, it becomes an inherent

right of the public in a democracy to prevent themselves from the abuse of discretion and do

not get susceptible to the deadly tentacles of arbitrariness and unreasonableness.

As the legitimate expectation doctrine gained acceptance, it was invoked in a wider range of

cases, which can be conveniently summarised into four categories:

1. The first was cases in which a person had relied upon a policy or norm of general

application but was then subjected to a different policy or norm.

2. The second category, which was a slight variation on the first, included cases in which

a policy or norm of general application existed and continued but was not applied to

the case at hand.

3. A third category arose when an individual received a promise or representation which

was not honoured due to a subsequent change to a policy or norm of general

application.

4. A fourth category, which was a variation on the third, arose when an individual

received a promise or representation which was subsequently dishonoured, not

because there had been a general change in policy, but rather because the decision-

maker had changed its mind in that instance.4

This doctrine has found acceptance not only in the U.K.5 (as this paper will elaborate in the

next chapter) where it originated, but also in Australia,6 South Africa,

7 Hong Kong,

8

Singapore,9 New Zealand,

10 Canada

11 and as this paper will examine, in India.

12

4 P P CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 641 (5

th ed, 2003).

5 PAUL CRAIG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 646-91 (6th ed, 2008); WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH,

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 446-457 (10th ed, 2009); Iain Steele, Substantive Legitimate Expectations: Striking the

Right Balance? (2005) 121 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 300; Mark Elliott, Legitimate Expectations and the

Search for Principle: Reflections on Abdi & Nadarajah [2006] JUDICIAL REVIEW 281; Melanie Roberts, Public

Law Representations and Substantive Legitimate Expectations, 64 (1) MODERN LAW REVIEW 112–122 (2001),

Sales & Steyn, Legitimate Expectations in English Law: An Analysis, (2004) PUBLIC LAW 564–653; Robert E.

Riggs, Legitimate Expectation and Procedural Fairness in English Law, 36 (3) AM. J. COMP. L. 395 (1988). See



5

The aim of this research paper is to make a comparative analytical study of the development

of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in England and India. The research materials

included both primary and secondary sources. The scope of this paper is limited to only case

law of England and India due to paucity of time and space. However, wherever occasioned,

relevant case law from different countries have been alluded to. The paper has been divided

into three main chapters. The first one is an introduction to the doctrine, the second contains a

judicial development of the doctrine in England and the third contains the development of the

doctrine in India, mainly cases from the Supreme Court of India.

generally, SCHØNBERG, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2000); ROBERT THOMAS,

LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2000).

6 See, Matthew Groves, Substantial Legitimate Expectations in Australian Administrative Law, 32 (2)

MELBOURNE UNIV. L. R. 470 (2008); John Hlophe, Legitimate Expectation and Natural Justice: English

Australian and South African Law, 105 S. AFRICAN L. J. 165 (1987); Cameron Stewart, Substantive Unfairness:

A New Species of Abuse of Power? 28 Federal Law Review 617 (2000); Cameron Stewart, The Doctrine of

Substantive Unfairness and the Review of Substantive Legitimate Expectations in MATTHEW GROVES AND H P

LEE (eds), AUSTRALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: FUNDAMENTALS, PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES 280 (2007).

7 Daniel Malan Pretorius, Ten Years After Traub:The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation in South African

Administrative Law, 117 S. AFRICAN L. J. 520 (2000); Geo Quinot, Substantive Legitimate Expectations in South

African and European Administrative Law, 5 (1) GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 65 (2004).

8 In Tung v Director of Immigration [2002] 1 HKLRD 561, 600 (Li CJ, Chan and Ribeiro PJJ and Mason NPJ):

“The doctrine recognizes that, in the absence of any overriding reason of law or policy excluding its operation,

situations may arise in which persons may have a legitimate expectation of a substantive outcome or benefit, in

which event failing to honour the expectation may, in particular circumstances, result in such unfairness to

individuals as to amount to an abuse of power justifying intervention by the court.” The circumstances of this

case and its use of the legitimate expectation doctrine are explained in Teresa Martin, Hong Kong Right of

Abode: Ng Siu Tung & Others v Director of Immigration — Constitutional and Human Rights at the Mercy of

China, 5 SAN DIEGO INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 465 (2004). See also, Benny Y T Tai and Kevin K F Yam,

The Advent of Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Hong Kong: Two Competing Visions,

[2002] PUBLIC LAW 688.

9 Re Siah Mooi Guat, [1988] 2 S.L.R. (R.) 165, H.C.; Borissik Svetlana v. Urban Redevelopment

Authority [2009] 4 S.L.R. (R.) 92, H.C.

10 See, Chandra v, Minister of Immigration, 1978 (2) NZLR 559, 572.

11 David Wright, Rethinking The Doctrine Of Legitimate Expectations In Canadian Administrative Law, 35 (1)

Osgoode Hall L. J. 139 (1997).

12 See generally, B. C. SARMA, THE LAW OF ULTRA VIRES, 299-312 (Eastern Law House, 2004); JAIN & JAIN,

PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 2660-264 (6th ed, 2010). See, Shantimal Jain, Legitimate Expectation-A

Confusing Cauldron, The Chartered Accountant, October 2003, 427-9.



6

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN THE UNITED

KINGDOM

The Courts in England have been faced with various situations in which they have had to deal

with the aspect of legitimate expectations. The developments that the Courts have brought

abut have lent a structural stability to the concept.

Types of Legitimate Expectations: 13

1. Procedural Legitimate Expectation-

Denotes the existence of some process right the applicant claims to possess as a result of

behavior by the public body that generates the expectation.14

2. Substantive Legitimate Expectation-

Refers to the situation in which the applicant seeks a particular benefit or commodity, such as

a welfare benefit or license. The claim to such a benefit will be founded upon governmental

action which is said to justify the existence of the relevant expectation.15

Some of the

arguments in favor of substantive legitimate expectations are: it creates fairness in public

administration,16

reliance and trust in government, principle of equality, upholds rule of

law.17

Reasons for protecting legitimate expectations

It is required by fairness;18

abuse of power has been considered the root concept justifying the

protection of legitimate expectations;19

in European context, legal certainty i.e. the individual

ought to be able to plan his or her action on the basis that the expectation will be fulfilled is

13

CRAIG, supra note 5 at 647.

14 See, R. v. Liverpool Taxi Fleet Association, [1972] 2 QB 299.

15 Ex. P. Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All. E.R. 714, 724; Hargreaves, [1997] 1 WLR 906. See

also, Coughlan, [2001] QB 213.

16 Id.

17 CRAIG, supra note 5 at 651. The Arguments against substantive legitimate expectations is on page 652. One of

them is that the existing policy should not be ossified and unduly fettered.

18 CCSU v. Minister for Civil Service, [1985] AC 374 (Lord Roskill).

19 Begbie, [2000] 1 WLR 1115 (CA).



7

also relied upon;20

the trust that has been reposed by the citizen in what he has been told or

led to believe by the official.21

When is an expectation legitimate?

First, it must be founded upon a promise or practice by the public authority that is said to be

bound to fulfil the expectation.

Second, clear statutory words override any expectation howsoever founded.22

Third, the notification of a relevant change of policy destroys any expectation founded upon

the earlier policy.23

Fourth, the individual seeking protection of the expectation must themselves deal fairly with

the public authority.24

How can a legitimate expectation arise?

In CCSU v. Minister for Civil Service, Lord Fraser identifies two ways by which a legitimate

expectation can arise: “legitimate expectation may arise from either an express promise given

on behalf of the public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the

claimant can reasonably expect to continue.”25

1. Express Promise: The most common way a legitimate expectation might arise is by an

express promise or specific representation to an individual or group. In R. v. Liverpool

Taxi Fleet Association,26

an express promise from the Liverpool Corporation that it

would not increase the number of taxi licenses in the area without consultation with

the Association was held to create a legitimate expectation of consultation.27

20

CRAIG, supra note 5 at 649.

21 WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 5 at 447.

22 R. v. DPP ex p. Kebilene, [1999] 3 WLR 972 (HL).

23 Fisher v. Minister of Public Safety, [1999] 2 WLR 349.

24 R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex. p. MFK Underwriting Agencies [1990] 1 WLR 1545.

25 [1985] AC 374, 401. See, CLIVE LEWIS, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN PUBLIC LAW, 272 (3rd edn, 2004).

26 [1972] 2 QB 299.

27 See also, R. v. Devon County Council ex.p. Baker, [1995] 1 All E.R. 73 (CA); R v. Secretary of State for

Transport, ex.p. Richmond-upon-Thames LBC, [1994] 1 WLR 74 (QB).



8

2. Existence of Regular Practice: In CCSU case,28

where continuous practice of

consultation before changes to conditions of service led to the legitimate expectation

there would be consultation before the Minister abolished the membership of the trade

union.

3. Certain Criteria must be satisfied for the promise or practice to gain legal

enforceability in public law:

The promise must be clear, unambiguous and precise.29

The promise of a

hearing before a decision is taken may give rise to a legitimate expectation

that the hearing will be given.30

The legitimate expectation must be legal. It should be within the powers of the

body to make the representation and fulfill it.31

Knowledge of policy but not reliance to one‟s own detriment.32

If the individual has suffered no hardship, there would be no reason to hold the

decision-maker to its promise.33

Standard of Review for breach of legitimate expectation

In R. (Bibi) v. Newham London Borough Council,34

the Court of Appeal gave guidance on

how the court should approach legitimate expectation cases with three practical questions:

First, what has the public authority, whether by promise or practice, committed itself to;

second, whether the authority has acted or proposed to act unlawfully in relation to its

commitment; third, what the court should do in this regard.

L. J. Laws in Abdi and Nadarajah v. Secretary of State for Home Department,35

advocated a

test of proportionality for judicial review of administrative action on the basis of legitimate

expectation. This precedent sheds some light on whether proportionality could be used and

adjusted to give due weight to the fact that the decision-maker nay have greater expertise

and/or democratic legitimacy than the court, and the court could apply the test with varying

28

Supra note 23.

29 Begbie and Kebilene, supra note 20.

30 Attorney General of Hong-Kong v. Ng Yeun Shiu, [1983] 2 AC 629.

31 Bibi, [2001] EWCA Civ 607; Hamble, supra note 14 at 731; Flanagan, [2002] EWCA Civ 690.

32 Rashid, [2005] EWCA Civ. 744.

33 Bibi, supra note 31.

34 Id.

35 [2005] EWCA Civ. 1363.



9

degrees of intensity by scrutinizing more or less closely a decision-maker‟s claims that it was

necessary to frustrate the applicant‟s expectation.36

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS IN INDIA

Some Supreme Court cases that have recently dealt with the doctrine of legitimate

expectation are:

In J.P.Bansal v State of Rajasthan,37

the Supreme Court while examining the doctrine

of legitimate expectation held that:

“The principle of legitimate expectation is at the root of the rule of law and requires

regularity, predictability and certainty in government’s dealings with the public. For

a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must

affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either:

(i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can

legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been

communicated to him some rationale grounds for withdrawing it or where he has

been given an opportunity to comment; or

(ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker that they will not be

withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for

contending that they should not be withdrawn.

The procedural part of it relates to a representation that a hearing or other

appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive

part of the principle is that if a representation is made than a benefit of substantive

nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit than it will

be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. An

exception could be based on an express promise or representation or by established

past action or settled conduct. The representation must be clear and unambiguous. It

could be a representation to an individual or to a class of persons.”

In another case, Punjab Communications Ltd v. Union of India (1999),38

the Supreme

Court cited British precedents (especially Hargreaves) to suggest that whether a

legitimate expectation can be legally frustrated on public interest grounds can only be

36

ELIZABETH GIUSSANI, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 329 (1st ed, 2008).

37 2003(3) SCALE 154.

38 1999 (4) SCC 727. Supreme Court of India judgment dated 04 May 1999. See also, M/S Sethi Auto Service

Station & Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors dated 17 October 2008.



10

judged by the very deferential standards of Wednesbury unreasonableness, and nor the

more demanding test of proportionality. It also went on to note that the doctrine of

legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted as part of [Indian]

law and that the decision maker can normally be compelled to give effect to his

representation in regard to the expectation based on previous practice or past conduct

unless some overriding public interest comes in the way.

In MRF Ltd Kottayam vs Asst Commissioner, Sales Tax,39

it was observed that the

protection of „legitimate expectation‟ does not require the fulfillment of such

expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. That is to say, the

public interest is overriding.

Therefore, what becomes clear is that legitimate expectations as a ground for challenging

administrative action can be done away with when there is an overriding public interest and

the immediacy of the situation required a change in policy, moving away from past promises

and practice.

Recently, a Constitution Bench of the SC in Secretary, State of Karnataka v.

Umadevi,40

referred to the circumstances in which the doctrine of legitimate

expectation can be invoked thus : “The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the

administrative authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or

advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to

enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until

there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on

which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance

from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an

opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn.”

Another Constitution Bench, referring to the doctrine, observed thus in Confederation

of Ex-servicemen Associations vs. Union of India:41

“No doubt, the doctrine has an

important place in the development of Administrative Law and particularly law

39

Supreme Court of India judgment dated 21 September 2006. See, Sukumar Mukhopadhyay, Legitimate

Expectation and Public Interest, Business Standard, 11 December 2006.

40 2006 (4) SCC 1.

41 JT 2006 (8) SC 547.



11

relating to 'judicial review'. Under the said doctrine, a person may have reasonable or

legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority

even though he has no right in law to receive the benefit. In such situation, if a

decision is taken by an administrative authority adversely affecting his interests, he

may have justifiable grievance in the light of the fact of continuous receipt of the

benefit, legitimate expectation to receive the benefit or privilege which he has enjoyed

all throughout. Such expectation may arise either from the express promise or from

consistent practice which the applicant may reasonably expect to continue. In such

cases, therefore, the Court may not insist an administrative authority to act judicially

but may still insist it to act fairly. The doctrine is based on the principle that good

administration demands observance of reasonableness and where it has adopted a

particular practice for a long time even in absence of a provision of law, it should

adhere to such practice without depriving its citizens of the benefit enjoyed or

privilege exercised.”

As to who can invoke the protection of legitimate expectation, the SC has observed, after

examining a list of authorities on the subject, that: “The doctrine of legitimate expectation

based on established practice (as contrasted from legitimate expectation based on a promise),

can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations with an

authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone who has a

recognized legal relationship with the authority-A total stranger unconnected with the

authority or a person who had no previous dealings with the authority and who has not

entered into any transaction or negotiations with the authority, cannot invoke the doctrine of

legitimate expectation, merely on the ground that the authority has a general obligation to act

fairly.”42

In Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries Ltd,43

the Supreme

Court has observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectation falls within the purview

of the principle of non-arbitrariness as incorporated under Article 14 of the

Constitution. It becomes an enforceable right when the Government instrumentality

fails to give due weight to it.

42

Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. v.State of Bihar & Ors., 2006 (8) SCJ 721.

43 AIR 1993 SC 1601.



12

However, as per the observations of the Supreme Court in Assistant Excise

Commissioner v. Issac Peter,44

the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be

invoked to alter the terms of a contract of a statutory nature. Similarly, in Howrah

Municipal Corporation v. Ganges Road Company Ltd45

it has been held that no right

can be claimed on the basis of legitimate expectation when it is contrary to statutory

provisions which have been enforced in public interest.

In Madras City Wine Merchants Association v. State of Tamil Nadu46

the doctrine of

legitimate expectation was held to become inoperative when there was a change in

public policy or in public interest as has been reaffirmed in some of the

aforementioned decisions.

In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation,47

the Supreme Court has

elaborately considered the reverence of this theory. In the estimation of the Apex

Court, the doctrine does not contain any crystallized right. It gives to the applicant a

sufficient ground to seek judicial review and the principle is mostly confined to the

right to a fair hearing before any decision is given.

It was held in Navjyoti Co-op Group Housing Society v. Union of India48

that the

doctrine of legitimate expectation imposes in essence a duty on the public authorities

to act fairly by taking into consideration all the relevant factors bearing a nexus to

such legitimate expectation. The concerned authority cannot act arbitrarily so as to

defeat the expectation, unless demanded by over-riding reasons of public policy.

Further, in another landmark judgment, M.P. Oil Extraction Co v. State of Madhya

Pradesh,49

the Supreme Court was dealing with the license renewal claims of certain

industries. It was held in this case that extending an invitation, on behalf of the State,

44

(1994) 4 SCC 104.

45 (2004) 1 SCC 663.

46 (1994) 5 SCC 509.

47 AIR 1994 SC 988.

48 AIR 1993 SC 155.

49 Supra note 2.



13

was not arbitrary and the selected industry had a legitimate expectation of renewal of

license under the renewal claims.

Lastly, in National Building Constructions Corporation v. S Raghunathan50

it was

held that legitimate expectation is a source of both, procedural and substantive rights.

The person seeking to invoke the doctrine must be aggrieved and must have altered

his position. The doctrine of legitimate expectation assures fair play in administrative

action and can always be enforced as a substantive right. Whether or not an

expectation is legitimate is a question of fact.

The development of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in India has been in line with the

principles evolved in common law English courts. In fact, it was from these English cases

itself that the doctrine first came to be recognized by the courts in India. It therefore creates a

new category of remedy against an administrative action and furthers the rule of law in India.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As Wade & Forsyth believe, the doctrine of legitimate expectations is a welcome addition to

the armoury of the courts ensuring that discretions are exercised fairly. The phrase „legitimate

expectation‟, which is much in vogue,51

must not be allowed to collapse into an inchoate

justification for judicial intervention.52

Academics have expressed skepticism as to whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation

should apply to substantive rights. Thio Li-ann argues that legitimate expectations should

relate only to procedural rather than substantive rights.53

Procedural protection only has a

minimal impact on the administrative autonomy of the relevant public authority, since the

court is only concerned with the manner in which the decision was made and not whether the

decision was fair. Thus, the ultimate autonomy of public authorities is never placed in

50

AIR 1998 SC 2776.

51 R. (EB Kosovo) v. Home Secretary, [2008] UKHL 41. (Lord Scott)

52 WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 5 at 447.

53 Thio Li-ann, Law and the Administrative State in KEVIN YEW LEE TAN (ed.), THE SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTEM,

190 (1996).



14

jeopardy.54

Conversely, as Mark Elliot posits, giving effect to a substantive legitimate

expectation impinges on the separation of powers.55

The authority has been entrusted by

Parliament to make decisions about the allocation of resources in public interest. Applying

legitimate expectation substantively allows the courts to inquire into the merits of the

decision. Such interference with the public authority's discretion would be overstepping their

role and exceeding their proper constitutional function.

The courts have been taking a more active role in controlling the exercise of discretionary

power and upholding the rule of law, while recognizing that in certain situations deference to

the Executive is necessary. The courts have to therefore maintain a balance between

legitimate judicial intervention and judicial interference violating the principle of separation

of powers, and as the concept of legitimate expectations continues to develop, maintaining

this balance will be at the forefront.56

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Journal Articles

1. Benny Y T Tai and Kevin K F Yam, The Advent of Substantive Legitimate

Expectations in Hong Kong: Two Competing Visions, [2002] Public Law 688.

2. Cameron Stewart, Substantive Unfairness: A New Species of Abuse of Power?

28 Federal Law Review 617 (2000)

3. Daniel Malan Pretorius, Ten Years After Traub:The Doctrine of Legitimate

Expectation in South African Administrative Law, 117 S. African L. J. 520 (2000)

4. David Wright, Rethinking The Doctrine Of Legitimate Expectations In Canadian

Administrative Law, 35 (1) Osgoode Hall L. J. 139 (1997).

5. Geo Quinot, Substantive Legitimate Expectations in South African and European

Administrative Law, 5 (1) German Law Journal 65 (2004).

6. Iain Steele, Substantive Legitimate Expectations: Striking the Right Balance? (2005)

121 Law Quarterly Review 300

7. John Hlophe, Legitimate Expectation and Natural Justice: English Australian and

South African Law, 105 S. African L. J. 165 (1987)

8. Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Modern Development of Public Law In Britain; and the

Special Impact of European Law, 11 Singapore Academy of L. J. 275 (1999).

9. Mark Elliot, Coughlan: Substantive Protection of Legitimate Expectations Revisited,

5 (1) Judicial Review 27 (2000).

54

Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Modern Development of Public Law In Britain; and the Special Impact of European

Law, 11 Singapore Academy of L. J. 275 (1999).

55 Mark Elliot, Coughlan: Substantive Protection of Legitimate Expectations Revisited, 5 (1) Judicial Review 27

(2000).

56 GIUSSANI, supra note 36 at 220.



15

10. Mark Elliott, Legitimate Expectations and the Search for Principle: Reflections

on Abdi & Nadarajah [2006] Judicial Review 281

11. Matthew Groves, Substantial Legitimate Expectations in Australian Administrative

Law, 32 (2) Melbourne Univ. L. R. 470 (2008)

12. Melanie Roberts, Public Law Representations and Substantive Legitimate

Expectations, 64 (1) Modern Law Review 112–122 (2001)

13. Robert E. Riggs, Legitimate Expectation and Procedural Fairness in English Law, 36

(3) Am. J. Comp. L. 395 (1988).

14. Sales & Steyn, Legitimate Expectations in English Law: An Analysis, (2004) Public

Law 564–653

15. Shantimal Jain, Legitimate Expectation-A Confusing Cauldron, The Chartered

Accountant, October 2003, 427-9.

16. Teresa Martin, Hong Kong Right of

Abode: Ng Siu Tung & Others v Director of Immigration — Constitutional and

Human Rights at the Mercy of China, 5 San Diego International Law Journal 465

(2004).

Books and Treatises

1. B. C. Sarma, The Law of Ultra Vires (Eastern Law House, 2004)

2. Bradley & Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (13th edn., 2003).

3. Cameron Stewart, The Doctrine of Substantive Unfairness and the Review of

Substantive Legitimate Expectations in Matthew Groves and H P Lee (eds),

Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, Principles and Doctrines 280 (2007).

4. Clive Lewis, Judicial Remedies in Public Law (3rd edn, 2004).

5. Elizabeth Giussani, Constitutional and Administrative Law (1st ed, 2008).

6. Harlow & Rawlings, Law and Administration (3rd edn., 2009).

7. Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law (1997).

8. Jain & Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (6th ed, 2010).

9. Michael T Molan (ed.), 150 Leading Cases in Constitutional and Administrative Law

(2nd edn., 2002).

10. Neil Papworth, Constitutional and Administrative Law (5th edn., 2008).

11. P P Craig, Administrative Law (5th

ed, 2003).

12. Paul Craig, Administrative Law (6th ed, 2008)

13. Peter Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law (3rd edn., 1996).

14. Robert Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law

(2000).

15. Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000).

16. Thio Li-ann, Law and the Administrative State in KEVIN YEW LEE TAN (ed.), THE

SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTEM (1996).

17. William Wade & Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th ed, 2009)

Caselaw

1. National Building Constructions Corporation v. S Raghunathan, AIR 1998 SC 2776.

2. R. (EB Kosovo) v. Home Secretary, [2008] UKHL 41.

3. Navjyoti Co-op Group Housing Society v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 155.

4. Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter (1994) 4 SCC 104.

5. Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2006 (8) SCJ 721.

6. Howrah Municipal Corporation v. Ganges Road Company Ltd (2004) 1 SCC 663.



16

7. M/S Sethi Auto Service Station & Ors. v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors dated

17 October 2008.

8. J.P.Bansal v State of Rajasthan 2003(3) SCALE 154.

9. Madras City Wine Merchants Association v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 5 SCC 509.

10. Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries Ltd AIR 1993 SC

1601.

11. Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, 1999 (4) SCC 727.

12. Attorney General of Hong-Kong v. Ng Yeun Shiu, [1983] 2 AC 629.

13. Bibi, [2001] EWCA Civ 607

14. Flanagan, [2002] EWCA Civ 690.

15. Rashid, [2005] EWCA Civ. 744.

16. R. v. DPP ex p. Kebilene, [1999] 3 WLR 972 (HL).

17. Fisher v. Minister of Public Safety, [1999] 2 WLR 349.

18. Ex. P. Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All. E.R. 714, 724

19. Hargreaves, [1997] 1 WLR 906.

20. Coughlan, [2001] QB 213.

21. Begbie, [2000] 1 WLR 1115 (CA).

22. CCSU v. Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 401.

23. R. v. Liverpool Taxi Fleet Association [1972] 2 QB 299.

24. Re Siah Mooi Guat, [1988] 2 S.L.R. (R.) 165, H.C

25. Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993) 3 SCC 499.

26. M.P. Oil Extraction Co. v. State of M.P., (1997) 7 SCC 592.

27. Chanchal Goyal (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 3 SCC 485.

28. Tung v Director of Immigration [2002] 1 HKLRD 561, 600 (Li CJ, Chan and Ribeiro

PJJ and Mason NPJ).

29. R. v. Devon County Council ex.p. Baker, [1995] 1 All E.R. 73 (CA)

30. R v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex.p. Richmond-upon-Thames LBC, [1994] 1

WLR 74 (QB).

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