God and Creativity in the Cosmologies of Whitehead and Bhāskara

7/28/2019 God and Creativity in the Cosmologies of Whitehead and Bhskara

1/27

God and Creativity in the Cosmologies of Whitehead and BhskaraAuthor(s): J. Bruce Long

Reviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Oct., 1979), pp. 395-420Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398812 .

Accessed: 19/11/2012 16:44

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophy

East and West.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.223 on Mon, 19 Nov 2012 16:44:42 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1398812?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1398812?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uhp


2/27

J. Bruce Long God and creativity in the cosmologies of Whitehead andBhaskara

This article is the result of a preliminary exploration of the cosmologies oftwo philosophies of extremely disparate cultural lineages and historicalsettings. The first is a ninth- or tenth-century Indian philosophy, traditionallyknown as bhedabhedavddaor the "philosophy of identity-and-difference,"formulated in the commentarial writings of Bhaskara1; the other, thetwentieth-century 'Philosophy of Organism' or 'Process Philosophy,' articu-lated in the writings of the Anglo-American philosopher, Alfred NorthWhitehead. No attempt has been made here to frame a comprehensive surveyof either philosophy, but rather to present a critical exposition and compara-tive analysis of the cosmologies of these two systems of thought as reflected inthe conception of God, the world, and the relationship between the two. Iintend to illuminate those points in each of the systems at which the views ofparticular issues are identical, convergent, or divergent.A major portion of the source materials for the discussion of Whitehead'sphilosophy has been taken from his magnum opus, Process and Reality2, withoccasional reference to other works where relevant. With regard toBhaskara's thought, the unfortunate lack of either a critical edition of theSanskrit version of the Brahmasuitrabhasya r of a complete English trans-lation of that work has forced me to draw upon a smaller percentage ofBhaskara'smagnum opus than in the case of Whitehead.3 Nonetheless, I havebeen able to consult most of the more relevant portions of Bhaskara'scommentary in the form of an unpublished English translation by J. A. B. vanBuitenen, and a most erudite exposition of Bhaskara's philosophy by P. N.Srinivasachari.4 My dependence upon the latter study will be evidentthroughout my article.I. PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGICAL DEPARTUREIf Whitehead's writings were to be adopted as the litmus test for defining thedegree of modernity of any given philosophy-a practice, incidentally thathas not gone untried-one would discover in Bhaskara's philosophy ofbheddbhedamany ideational features that reflect a distinctly modern ap-proach to the analysis of philosophical issues. I refer specifically to hisrejection of all extreme philosophical perspectives and all one-sided andreductionistic dogmas, in favor of a kind of philosophical cosmopolitianismwhich could embrace a variety of points of view under a single intellectualumbrella. This is not to say that bhedabhedavddarepresents a genuine andentirely successful philosophical ecumenism (whatever that might be) butmerely that, like the Philosophy of Organism, it champions a commodiousand flexible intellectual framework within which one can embrace andultimately reconcile the ideological postures at the two extreme poles (that is,J. BruceLong is Director of the BlaisdellInstitute, Claremont,California.PhilosophyEast and West29, no. 4, October, 1979. ( by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/27

396 Long

pluralistic materialism and monistic idealism) and, by extension, all the otherpositions in between.To speak more directly to this point, Bhaskara assumes his positionbetween and in critical opposition to both the dualist (dvaita) and the monistor nondualist (advaita)Vedantins.5 From the bheddbhedapoint of view, whenthese two extreme positions are allowed to stand alone, without the criticalferment of any kind of third, mediational position, they become caught in anunresolvable conflict of their own making, representing as they do a pair ofirreconcilable perspectives. While the Advaitin contends that Brahmanis thesole Reality, that the world is ultimately false (mithyd) and that the individualsoul is nondifferent (advaita) from Brahman, the Dvaitin adopts the equallyerroneous view that both Brahman and the world are real, (though they existat two different [dvaita]levels of reality) and that it is this state of difference-cum-relatedness between God and the creatures that makes salvation bothpossible and necessary.In the mind of the bheddbhedavddin, oth the dualist and nondualist viewsharbor internal contradictions which cannot be resolved by appealing toterms within the respective systems. The contradiction at the heart of Advaitais that if the world were illusory or false, as Sankara contends, then noeffective means of release (mukti) could be found, for the simple reason thatevery avenue of approach to salvation (from the injunctions and prohibitionsin scripture, to the teachings of learned pandits and gurus and the practice ofmeditational introspection) would be inherently and irredeemably false, aswell. Furthermore,Advaita, together with all other forms of radical idealism,is forced to fall back upon a realistic position at the empirical level in order toestablish a real experiential basis for the momentary and evanescent per-ceptions of the so-called dreamworld. The dilemma of Dvaita Vedanta andSamrkhyaderives from the untenable distinction between Brahman and thetemporal world (vyavahdra).By promoting the idea of ontological dualism,they reduce to absurdity man's hope of returning to his primal origins in theEternal Absolute because of the ontological disrelatedness of the divine andhuman orders of existence.For Bhaskara, then, the true nature of Reality in all its diverse modes ofmanifestation can be accurately reflected only in a philosophy of the 'middleway' (construed in the terms of bheddbhedavdda,not those of Buddhism)which mediates between monism and pluralism. By pursuing this route ofcoincidentiaoppositorum,he is confident that he has avoided the pitfalls ofboth absolutism (advaita)and relativism (dvaita).

Whitehead, likewise, forges his metaphysical system by making a criticalassessment of the contributions of his philosophical ancestors. He proceeds byappropriating those ideas which are congruent with his own metaphysicalvision and either rejecting or revising those notions which do not jibe with hisviews. Like his Indian counterpart, Whitehead assumes a critical stance



4/27

397

between two intellectual lineages which he sees as central to the developmentof contemporary philosophy: namely, the idealists and rationalists, exem-plified by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, on the one side, and suchempiricists as Bacon, Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, on the other. LikeBhaskara, he articulates his metaphysical vision within a framework that issufficiently capacious and flexible to accommodate both of these "extreme"positions, while rejecting those implication which are incompatible with hisown understanding of process philosophy.Whitehead employs the analogy of the flight of an airplane to represent themind of the philosopher ascending from the terrain of 'particular obser-vation', soaring into the atmosphere of 'imaginative generalization' andagain, returning to terra firma "for renewed observation rendered acute byrational interpretation."6 By means of this correlative pursuit of the "analyti-cal observation of components of ... experience" and "the elucidation ofimmediate experience" through rational analysis and imaginative recon-struction, the philosopher will be better able to interpret the world andhuman experience by capitalizing on the virtues and avoiding the vices of theother more extreme postures.II. WHITEHEADAND BHASKARAAS "PLURALISTIC-MONISTS"In recognition of Whitehead's appeal to a bipolar conception of the creativeprocess (that is, the fusion of many entities into a single concrete unity andthe fragmentation of manifold components into a diffused multiplicity), weare inclined to question Ivor Leclerc'sjudgment that Whitehead champions astrictly pluralistic cosmology.7 This assertion is rendered doubtful by the factthat Whitehead is severely critical of all expressions of both extreme monismand radical pluralism. He censures monistic philosophies (for example,Spinoza) for their failure to satisfy the criterion of coherence-that is, theirinattention to what William James has called "the rich thicket of reality" andtheir inability to provide a logically coherent account of the world of humanexperience in all of its variegated manifoldness. This fault is the result of acommitment to the correlative notions that the eternal Absolute alone is realand that the finite, created order is illusory, false or morally debased. In otherwords, he accuses monists of neglecting the multifariousness of the world andof ignoring the fact that "a multiplicity of modes is a fixed requisite, if thescheme is to retain any direct relevance to the many occasions in theexperienced world.8 Finally, he indicts all radical Dualists (for example,Descartes and Locke) for their inability to account for the continuity amongthe myriad of creative moments, exemplified in the natural order by thestrictly patternized movements of the stars and planets and the regularalternation of the seasons and, within the order of human experience, thepersistence of memories through time and the enduring features of self-identification.



5/27

398 Long

When viewing Whitehead's metaphysics at a glance, it becomes apparentthat a distinction must be made between the quantitative and qualitativefeatures of the system. While the philosophy of organism affirms a quantitativemonism by the insistence that there is only one actual entity (or genre ofentity) in the universe, it, at the same time, reflects a qualitativepluralism, byits insistence that each actual occasion comes into a state of concrescence bybringing into full realization its own subjective (that is, axiological) aim.9 Thistwofold nature of all actual entities is represented in two mutually com-plementary doctrines: the Ontological Principle and the Principle ofRelativity. Whitehead presents the essential meaning of both principles in theassertion that:'Actual entities'-also termed 'actual occasions'-are the final real things ofwhich the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to findanything more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity,and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. But, thoughthere are gradations of importance, and diversities of function, yet in theprinciples which actuality exemplifies all are on the same level. The final factsare, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience,complex and interdependent.10Whitehead joins Spinoza in holding that the manifold phenomena constitut-ing the finite order of existence are all modifications of a single universal"substance" (or "relatedness of actual entities," in Whiteheadian terms) butrejects the implication that the ultimate principle alone is real and thephenomenal world is illusory. He sides with Descartes in holding the world tobe dual in nature, in that it is to be construed as both transient and eternal,physical and mental, subjective and objective, while, at the same timerejecting the implications of Absolute Dualism that all entities in the universeare distinguishable into two separate ontological categories: cogens res andextensa res." By implication, it follows from this that the philosophy oforganism subscribes, at one and the same time, to a quantativemonism and aqualitative dualism, which, taken together, may ultimately issue into a qua-lifiedpluralism. 2I will conclude this section with a single quotation from Bhaskara'scommentary to demonstrate that he is in complete agreement with thePhilosophy of Organism regarding the question of the relationship betweenthe one and the many. As Bhaskara states the matter: "Diversity in so far asit is effect, identity in so far as it is cause, just as there is identity in so far as athing is gold and differencein so far as it is an earring, etc."III. CREATION AS A PROCESS OF 'EMERGENT EVOLUTION'

There is no question but that the concept of creation or, more accurately,"creativity," is the keystone of the Philosophy of Organism. I am prepared toargue that the related notion of "cosmic evolution" or "creative emanation"



6/27

399

forms the core of Bhaskara's bhedabhedavada,as well. Both thinkers employthe doctrine of creativity as an apologetic for a position that might bedescribed as 'critical realism' or 'causal immanentalism' in defending them-selves against the extreme expressions of monism and pluralism. As pre-viously indicated, they reject the assumption of both uncritical realism andidealism. Reality is to be understood as neither purely subjective nor purelyobjective in nature; not completely dependent upon either the internal qualityof human modes of consciousness or upon a state of externally existingobjects in divorcement from any and all states of consciousness. Bhaskarahimself maintains:Whether something is true or false [real or unreal] does not depend onwhether someone knows it or not. For it is not by human beings that entitiesare made so that they may exist by man's grace. Those who have eyes do trulysee the totality of visually perceptible objects which are there to see. If theywere not there, nothing would be seen.13He reinforces this claim by asserting (contra Safikara) that the subject-objectrelationship endures even in the state of meditation. 14It follows logically from this principle that the existence or nonexistence ofany particular entity, event, or existential state of affairs is not to bedetermined by appealing solely to scripture, inference, or intuitive apprehen-sion but to "experience through observation" within the realm of commonexperience. The perception of the world by means of empirical observationyields knowledge that causes and effects are both different and nondifferent,continuous and discontinuous. "Difference is a property of non-difference, asfor instance the non-difference of the ocean-which is called difference in sofar as ocean consists of waves, etc." 15 Consequently, every entity in thephenomenal realm stands in relation to all other entities and to the 'primor-dial entity' (that is, Brahmanor God) in a state of both unity and nonunity.In recognition of the centrality of the conception of creation in bothphilosophies, I will submit the idea to a detailed analysis before proceeding toconsider a number of subsidiary issues which emerge from the primaryconcept of creativity. For Whitehead, creation is not to be conceived as asolitary primordial event which propelled the cosmos into existence in aninstant, as it were, but rather as an extensive (and, perhaps, endless) processof the perpetual arising and perishing of concrete actualities or actual entitiesalong an "extensive continuum." Each single concrescent event which coa-gulates momentarily with other 'causally relevant' events to constitute theworld in each temporal juncture, is represented as the transition of the worldfrom the disjunctive many into the conjunctive one, from perpetual fluxuationof manifold forms into a momentary permanence of a single form, theinstantaneous integration of a multiple complex of entities into a unifiedactuality.16This organismic view of creation differs significantly from that of Vedanta,



7/27


8/27


9/27

402 Long

conditions (upadhis)which objectify the qualities of the eternal soul unreal orillusory. They are merely adventitious (aupddhika)or contingent (agantuka).35Bhaskara, together with Yadavaprakasa, Srikantha and other spokesmenfor the bheddbhedapersuasion, interprets the term parinama to mean thatBrahman literally modified or transformed itself (svayam) into the world ofthe actual (sat) and the beyond (tyat), and so on. By means of this self-differentiatingdeed (or process), Brahmanbecame the world of living entities.Hence, Brahmanis the seed of the universe (jagadblja) and the universe is thefruition (phala) of this primordial germ.BS II.1.14 asserts that Brahman,though perfectly unified in his causal form(kdranarupa),possesses the potential for manifold creation in his effected form(karyarupa). Even as a tree which presents itself to the observer as anintegrated organism, nonetheless, is composed of many branches, so alsoBrahman,though one in its causal or unmanifested (avyakta) state, is capableof transforming himself into multiple modes of phenomenal existence.36Therefore, unity and diversity, identity and difference are both true charac-terizations of Reality. Or, to return to the analogy of the tree, when a tree isregarded as a single composite object, it manifests itself as a unified form;when viewed as a composite of manifold parts, it appears as multifaceted. Byextrapolation, God and the world are neither wholly identical to nor whollydifferent from each other; or, to reverse the frame of reference, they are bothidentical to and different from one another, depending upon the mode ofconsciousness through which their relationship is apprehended.Finally, Bhaskara appeals to BS II.1.27 in support of his doctrine of "realtransformation" (parindmavdda) n contradistinction to Sankara's position of"apparent modification" (vivartavdda).This sutra, along with CU VI. 2 andTU II. 7, states that Brahman self-differentiates his internal essence into thephenomenal world, without thereby sacrificing or diminishing his primordialunity. This assertion stands in marked contrast to those in BS II.1.26 andsupportive statement in BAU 11.4.12; III.8.8, 9.26; MU 11.1.2;and SU VI.19,which Safikara marshals in support of his conviction that the world is amerely apparent conglomeration of names-and-forms. Sankara objects to thekind of position represented by the pari.ndmadoctrine on the basis of theassumption that if the whole of Brahman were to be transmuted into theworld, then Brahmanwould cease to exist upon the sublation of the illusoryworld with the advent of right knowledge (prajtda,vijndna).If, on the otherhand, the contention were affirmed that only a portion (amsa) of Brahmanwere to be so altered, then it would follow that Brahman would have beendivided into facets-a wholly unacceptable notion, given the belief in theultimate unity of Brahman shared by all Vedantins. Either way, the variousscriptural passages which declare Brahman to be impartite (niskala), in-divisible (acchedya), and free from all blemishes (niranjana) would becontravened.



10/27

403

Bhaskara's objection to Safikara's Advaita stance is essentially identical toWhitehead's case against all forms of Absolute Monism. Namely, a monisticview of the universe fails to provide a coherent explanation for the manifoldnature of the world of experience. According to Bhaskara himself, anyunequivocal affirmation of the essential impartiteness of Brahman abrogatesthe possibility of providing a basis for the interpretation of common ex-perience, the reality of which is confirmed by both scripture (sruti) and senseperception (pratyaksa). He bases his objection to the maydvddaidea on theargument that if the cognition of Being (sat = Brahman)be nondifferent fromthe knowledge of being (and, hence, likewise the knower and the act ofknowing) then it would follow that Being as such could not be apprehended,since there would be no apprehender and no distinctive means of apprehen-sion. He maintains: "If as the Advaitins claim the cause alone is real, theeffect unreal, the question arises, how can the practical operations of themeans of knowledge, perception, and so on exist? Or, how can the sdstras ofinjunctions and prohibitions be meaningful? Or, how can knowledge ofBrahmanarise from a sdstraof release which itself is untrue?"37 Consequentlythe champions of the view of "Being-only" (obviously a reference to Safikara)are bereft of any basis for verifying the reality of the necessary factors in everyact of cognition-knower, act of knowing and resultant knowledge.Therefore, the Advaitin claim that the falseness of the world is proved byscriptural authority is untenable, "since knowledge [of the injunctions whichpromote the lower vidyds]that arises in the student would [itself] be false. Thestatement 'That art Thou' consists in sounds and therefore, would benonexistent." 38

The fundamental differences between the Advaitin and the bheddbhedavddinpositions are exemplified in the differences in the types of metaphors em-ployed by the principal spokesmen of the two schools. Safikara appeals to theanalogy of the lump of clay and the earthenware pots as a basis for affirmingthe identity between the raw material and the various products fashionedfrom it. For him, clay alone is real; vessels are illusory or false products ofclay, the reality of which is based upon conventional designations for thething [see CU VI. 2]. For his part, Bhaskara appeals to the analogies of theone ocean and many waves, the single fire that ejects a multiplicity of sparks,the tree with many branches, and the single spider which spins a webcomposed of numerous separate but interconnected filaments. For Bhaskara,both ocean and waves, tree and branches, and so on are true, perceived fromdifferent visual and conceptual perspectives.IV. PARALLELSAND DISCONTINUITIESBETWEENTHE TWO COSMOLOGIESThus far, we have restricted ourselves to sketching the broad features of thesecosmologies with regard to the notions of God and creativity. These genera-lized characterizations can be more cogently delineated by submitting a select



11/27

404 Long

number of central doctrines to a closer comparative analysis. In support ofour conviction that no comparative study can yield an adequate view of itssubject that does not attend to both the similarities and dissimilaritiesbetween the systems under investigation, we shall attempt to illuminate thosefeatures which these philosophies share in common, as well as those facets thatare unique to each of them.A. The One and the ManyAccording to Bhaskara, the Absolute or Brahman is one in its causal state(karanarupa)but multiple in its effected state (kdryarupa).The bheddbheda-vddin expression of this notion is that God, though existing as the soleunchanging Reality in the universe, transforms (parinama) himself into theworld of substances and attributes or the experiencing subjects (bhoktr)andthe experienced objects (bhogya).

The Whiteheadian formulation of this idea is that God is at once immanentand transcendent, actual and potential, universal and particular.39 His'conceptual' nature (in Bhaskara, his causal nature) is changeless by virtue ofits existence in a state of complete satisfaction; but his 'consequent' nature(for Bhaskara, his effected nature) is derived from the creative emergence ofthe temporal world.40 With regard to his primordial nature, God is neither innor of the world, but is totally separate from and oblivious to it. But, withregard to his derivative nature, he is both in and of the world, completelyinvolved in every formative aspect of its creative process. To quoteWhitehead in this regard:God is primordially one, namely he is the primordial unity of relevance of themany potential forms; in the process he acquires a consequent multiplicity,which the primordial character absorbs into its own unity. The World isprimordially many, namely, the many actual occasions with their physicalfinitude; in the process it acquires a consequent unity, which is a noveloccasion and is absorbed into the multiplicity of the primordial character.Thus God is to be conceived as one and as many in the converse sense inwhich the World is to be conceived as many and as one.41

However, it must be observed that this transformation of primordial unityinto phenomenal multiplicity is executed by God without diminishing orotherwise altering the integrity of his essential unity. So conceived, God is theontological principle which manifests itself in the world as the cosmic process,as a unity-in-diversity or identity-in-diversity. [Consult the two charts onpages 22 and 23 for a skeletal representation of the twofold nature of God inthe two cosmologies. The terms placed in parentheses on the Whiteheadianchart indicate that each creative value contains its antithetical value inpotential.] This contention that God is bimodal in nature, finds conformation,for Bhaskara, in scripture, regarding the illustration of the fig tree (nyagrodha)[see CU VI. 12. 1-3]. As he says, "Modification (vikara) is defined as theprojection of power (viksepasakti)by Him who does not thereby lose his own



12/27

405

BIMODAL NATURE OF BRAHMAN IN BHASKARA'SBHEDABHEDA VADA

Causal State (karaarrupa)Causal principle of creativityPrimordial perfect unityAbsolute reality (paramarthika)Real-in-and-itselfInfinite (ananta)Formless or unlimited (amurta)Permanent and eternal (nitya)Natural (svabhdvika)Pure substance (avyakta)Intrinsically real (nisprapanca)Ground of all modificationsSelf-existent (dtmodbhava)

Effected State (karyarupa)World of manifold effectsSelf-generated multiplicityConditioned or relative reality

(vydvahdrika)Real-in-and-through-the-otherFinite (ddyantavdn)Formalized or delimited (murtavdn)Impermanent and transitory (anitya)Adventitious (aupddhika)Substance marked by attributes

(abhivyakta)Actualized by extrinsic forces(prapanca)Modifications expressive of theuniversal groundExistent by virtue of limitingconditions (upddhis)

nature, just as the modification of a spider and as in a piece of cloth."42According to the latter analogy, individual threads may be interwoven withother threads to form a fabric, without ceasing to be individual threads. Lateron, in the same section of his commentary, Bhaskara argues that even as themind gives rise to diverse qualities (such as desire, wrath, greed, bewilder-ment, and so on), while it itself remains unaffected by the various modifi-cations, so it is with Brahman and the manifold modifications constituting theworld.B. Godas Immanent CreativityBoth Bhaskara and Whitehead reject the idea that cosmic creativity isexecuted by a wholly transcendent divine agent. Phrased in bheddbhedavddinterms, the idea of a traitless Absolute Being (nirguna-brahman)who is,nevertheless, unique and ultimately Real, stands in contradiction to both thecanons of logical discourse and the dictates of common human experience.The primary motivation behind Bhaskara's polemic against Sankara is hiscommitment to demonstrating that saguna-brahmanor Isvara is the universalprinciple of creativity. It is He who evolves the temporal world out of his owneternal essence without sacrificing the integrity of his primordial unity to hiseffected multiplicity. His most telling argument against the Advaitins is the



13/27

406 Long

ANTINOMIES IN WHITEHEAD'S CONCEPTION OF RELATIONBETWEEN GOD AND WORLD

f Primordial Th W ld f DerivativeGod Derivative The World PrimordialPermanence

(fluency)Perfect unity(phenomenal multiplicity)Unlimited potentiality(limited actuality)

Conceptual appetition(physical enjoyment)

Principle of everlastingness(process of temporal concrescence)Foundation of cosmic order(reservoirof creative disorder)

Primordial basis of creativity(emergent creativity)Passive transcendence(active immanence)

Conceptual priority(physical posteriority)Causal principle(effected actualities)Perfect freedom(determined actuality)Primordial datum for the world

Realm of final satisfaction(efficaciousmeans)

Fluency(permanence)

Differentiated multiplicity(momentary unity)Limited actuality(unlimited potentiality)

Physical enjoyment(conceptual appetition)Process of temporal concrescence(principle of everlastingness)Creative ambiguity or limiteddisorder(principle of cosmic order)

Product of divine creativity(principle of self-creation)Active immanence(passive transcendence)

Physical priority(conceptual posteriority)Effected actualities(causal principle)Determined actuality(perfect freedom)

Physical datum for GodEfficacious means(realm of final satisfaction)

doctrine of causal immanence. According to this doctrine, Brahman is notonly the primal ground of being which emanates the manifold universe out ofits own perfectly unified nature, the causally efficacious power which activatesthe constitutive elements, and the raw materials which constitute the cosmos,but the final product of his own creativity. Hence, the world is to be viewed asreal, but transitory. Bhaskara, like Whitehead, rejects the implication ofphilosophical monism that transitoriness and unreality are coterminous con-cepts. He declares in this regard: "Therefore, the cognition of differenceis notnescience, nor false. The phenomenal world is a really existing entity, becauseit has an existent being for its essence."43 Affirmatively stated, Reality is



14/27

407

characterized by both continuity and discontinuity, of both 'eternal objects'and 'novel entities'.Because of his integral and pervasive involvement in the creative process,God actually undergoes the suffering and rebirth of individual selves

(Bhaskara) or the successive moments of concrescence in the life of thesubject-superject(Whitehead). He is that being who knows, understands, andcares about the multitudinous travails under which the entire creationcontinually groans in progressing toward higher and higher states of actuality.He is that "tender care that nothing be lost" and that "judgment oftenderness which loses nothing that can be saved."This same idea is reflected in Bhaskara's doctrine of immanent causality(satkaryavdda).Brahman for him, is a "super-personality devoid of all nameand form, but possessed of infinite metaphysical, moral and spiritual per-fections ... [assuming] a form to enable the self to transcend itself [with] thedivine purpose ... mainly realized in transfiguring the self and removing itsfiniteness."44 Brahman creates the manifold universe (ndmarupaloka) hroughthe projection of its inherent power (sakti) under the guiding constraint of the'limiting conditions' (upddhis) and, thereby, enters into, pervades, supportsand directs every phase of the cosmic process. He does this with properregard for the "moral and spiritual requirements of each individual soul."45Like Whitehead's God, Bhaskara's Brahman is a being who "knows, under-stands, and cares."C. Creation as a Webof Causal RelationshipsAccording to both of these philosophies, there is no such thing as a supra- orextrarelational experience or entity. All reality is relational or contextual incharacter. "All actual entities are prehensions which are relations," saysWhitehead. No thing or complex of things can be conceived in completeabstraction from an environing network of causal relationships which con-stitute the fabric of the universe.46 According to the principle of relativity, apure abstraction or a state of complete ontological isolation (such as the stateof sacciddnanda ascribed to nirguna-brahman), s a contradiction in terms.Whitehead declares: "There is nothing which floats into the world fromnowhere. Everything in the actual world is referable to some actual entity47;"... every actual entity is present in every other actual entity" 48; and, "... thepotentiality for being an element in a real concrescence of many entities intoone actuality, is the one general metaphysical character attaining to allentities, actual and non-actual, and that every item in its universe is involvedin each concrescence."49

In Bhaskara's terms, "The infinite is not a negation of the finite but is itspositive affirmation and fulfillment."50 Thus, according to both thinkers, thecreative process must be viewed as a complex system of intertwining causalforces, in which every ingredient exercises varying degrees of formative



15/27

408 Long

influence upon all the other forces and entities, according to the "principleofintensive relevance."51D. Interpenetrationof Universalsand ParticularsBoth the Philosophy of Organism and bheddbhedavddablur the traditionaldistinction between universals and particulars. According to these two sys-tems, these categories pertain to two levels of reality which interpenetrate andparticipate in each other's nature. Thus every so-called 'universal' is parti-cular in the sense of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; andevery so-called 'particular' is universal in the sense of entering into theconstitutions of other actual entities.52 Of primary importance at this junc-ture is the principle of "graded relevance," according to which each actualentity is both the product of a synthesis of other actual occasions and thepotentially relevant precondition for the formation of all other actual entitiesin the universe. As Whitehead asserts, an entity, once actualized, becomes a"potential" for all subsequent actualities. Hence, "the entire universe ofactual entities enters into the realization of each 'individual' entity, and everyactual entity is present in every other actual entity."53 This idea findsidiomatic expression in the notion that the whole is contained, microcosmi-cally, in each of its constitutive parts and each of the parts is present,macrocosmically, in the whole. According to the ontological principle, apartfrom a reference to one or more actual entities, nothing is real; each actualentity comes into concrescence somewhere within the spatial-temporal con-tinuum. At the same time, each actual entity emerges as the result of asynthesis of the "net deposits" (that is, those residual effects of other actualoccasions which exist in closest proximity to a concrescent entity and, for thatreason, provide the greatest degree of 'relevance' for its emergence) of allother actual entities in the universe and in so doing transcends its own finiteoccasion to embrace the whole which contributed crucially to its birth in thefirst place. In this sense, says Whitehead: "it [the actual entity] is everywherethroughout the continuum; for its constitution includes the objectifications ofthe actual world and, thereby, includes the continuum.... Thus the con-tinuum is present in each actual entity and each actual entity pervades thecontinuum." 54 Hence, even as the whole is always more than the sum of itsparts, for both Bhaskara and Whitehead, because of the eternal presence ofGod's primordial nature in every concrescent situation, even so, each part ismore than each preceding whole, because of the fact that in becoming a 'novelentity', the 'many' is augmented by one.55 Formulated according to theconcept of creativity, the emergence of novel entities is at once, "the highestgenerality at the base of actuality" and the universal principle which entersinto the formation of each and every particular.56Bhaskara echoes this notion by appealing to the doctrine of the self-differentiation (parinamavdda)of Brahman. By transforming its perfect Unity



16/27

409

into an abundance of differentiated forms, the universal is actively andorganically present within each particular. Since each particular is nothingbut a finite and evanescent expression or embodiment of the universal andsince each entity contributes to the life of the Divine in its effected mode ofexistence, each particular is the universal within each microsegment of thetemporal-spatial continuum (vydvahdra).In his customary fashion, Bhaskaraasserts: "For it cannot be demonstrated by any means that a certain thing isonly different or only non-different. Every thing is non-different in so far as itis a universal-being, knowable, substantive, etcetera, and the same thing isdifferentin so far as it is a particular, because as a particular it is defined fromother things by its individual characteristics."57 He argues that evidenceyielded by sense experience, logical inference, and scriptural testimony con-firms the validity of the dualistic-cum-nondualistic view of the world. Sincepure Being (that is, sacciddnandaor Brahman)can neither be grasped directlyby the sense organs nor experienced in abstraction from actually existingentities, the monists who "babble" about Being or Brahman being the solereality are victims of self-delusionment and should seek the services of aphysician. Were either of the earlier mentioned modes of cognition possible,then complete confusion would result-"a blind man could see color, thedeaf man could hear sound." Therefore, it must be recognized that because aparticular substance or substantive entity can be apprehended only through adualistic mode of perception, that object is to be viewed as the temporal-spatial locus of the features defining its membership in a class. It follows fromthis that all entities are both generic and specific, both universal andparticular. 58E. InterdependencebetweenGod and the WorldPhrased in the language of traditional theism, this same idea could be statedin the following manner: God and the world, the infinite Ground of Beingand the finite realm of beings, exist in a relationship of mutual interdepen-dence. Srinivasachari summarizes the cosmology of Bhaskara in terms thatare equally applicable to the Philosophy of Organism:Time and space are the stuff of reality, the divine naturefulfils itself throughcontingencyand the eternal is in and more than endless duration. In this waythe opposites like transcendency and immanence, mechanism and finalism arereconciled in a pervading identity and purpose. God is as necessary to theworldas the world is necessaryto God.59(Italics mine.)The categories of "process," "relativity," and "contingency" apply to Godjust as readily and fittingly as they do to the world. God is as inconceivablewithout the world to serve as the object of his creative actions, as the world isnothing without God to serve as the primordial and everlasting agent ofcosmic creativity. God's "being" is constituted by and realized through his



17/27

410 Long

"becoming" within the realm of contingent things. His nature, insofar as itstill aspires toward completion within the temporal-spatial order, requires aphysical reaction from the world. For this reason, God demands the creativepresence of and stimulative responsefrom all the other actual entities withinthe finite world, as radically as they requirehis creative support andjudgmentof 'loving care.' The reality of a supreme being "is founded on the infinitudeof its conceptual appetition and its form of process is derived from the fusionof this appetition from the data received from the world-process."60 Inrecognition of the fact that the Whole and each of its constituent parts areintertwined in the composition of the phenomenal world, Whitehead con-cludes that "the doctrine [of the Laws of Nature] involves the negation of'absolute being'. It presupposes the essential interdependence of things."61Since God is the chief exemplification of all metaphysical principles, theinterdependence of God and the world must necessarily be taken as a naturalcorollary of the principle.F. Godas Immanent and TranscendentWhitehead and Bhaskara declare in unison that God's nature is to beconceived in conformity with a bimodal pattern. Whitehead's notion of the"conceptual" nature of God correlates roughly with Bhaskara's idea of the"causal" nature and, likewise, the 'consequent' nature correlates with the'effected' nature. According to Whitehead's reformulation of the Platoniccosmology in conformity with the requirementsof modern European thought,temporal entities come into being by the ingression of eternal things which arepotential contributors to the realization of every actuality. The realm ofeternal objects and that of finite actual entities are connected by an agency ofmediation which partakes of both eternality and temporality, transcendentpotentiality and immanent actuality. That mediating principle is the bimodalGod of Process Philosophy. Further, God is "the divine element in the world,by which the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtainsprimordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization." As the basis forthe "ideal realization of potentialities in a primordial actual entity," God is"the metaphysical stability whereby the actual process exemplifies generalprinciples of metaphysics and attains the ends proper to specific types ofemergent order."62

Hence, any depiction of the generation of an actual entity must includeeverything from God to the most trivial object or event. It should berecognized at the same time, that "there is a specific difference between thenature of God and that of any occasion." 63 God himself is an actual entityimmanent within the world process and transcendent to every finite epoch-abeing, at once temporal and eternal, the basis of all concretion and the mostextensive form of abstraction.64

Srinivasachari interprets Bhaskara's position in much the same manner, by



18/27

411

declaring that God is "absolute or the true infinite that is the informing spiritin all things." In other words, God is "the infinite [that] is revealed in andthrough the finite and the finite in and through the infinite and yet the infiniteis more real than the finite self and all the finite selves taken together.Brahmanhas infinite perfections and though it evolves itself into the universe,it still exceeds its content...." 65

For both Whitehead and Bhaskara, then, God is not merely an abstract ora universal ideal, existing prior to the initiation of the cosmic process andwholly transcendent to its progressive operations. In his primordial or causalnature, He is the absolute and eternal Creative Potentiality for the concretemanifestation of actuality. In his 'consequent' or effected nature, He is theelan vital that shapes, invigorates, and directs the life course of all finitecreatures.

There is one crucial distinction in the two conceptions of God that must betaken into account. Bhaskara could, without hesitation, accept Whitehead'sassertion that God "is something individual for its own sake" and the oneabsolutely unique 'entity' in all the universe, that exists transcendent to theuniverse. It is questionable, however, whether he could accept the idea that"every actual entity, including God, is a creature transcended by creativitywhich it qualifies," or that just as God in his infinite being and powertranscends the world, even so that ever-changing world transcends God. If,for Bhaskara, God is the material as well as the efficientcause of the universe,then there can be no question of God's being transcended by the worldprocess or any part of it. By inverting Whitehead's valuation of God, wecould say that Brahmanis the one and only exception to every metaphysicalcategory that obtains in the cosmic process.On the other hand, given the element of relativity that is at the heart ofBhaskara's theology, there does not seem to be any logical reason why God,in his effected nature, could not be said to be transcended by each novel lifeform that emerges from his causal nature. One might enquire of Bhaskara inthis regard, why, if God projects his eternal changeless nature into the finiteuniverse, it could not be said that He is transcended by the emergent worldorder, insofar as his effected nature has not yet achieved full consummation?On Whitehead's side of the ledger, the question could be raised, why, giventhe fact that "there is a specific difference between the nature of God and thatof any actual occasion," 66in that God alone prehends every augmentation ofthe world "everlastingly," it could not be concluded that he transcends allother actual entities in a unique and preeminent fashion?67 The point is, giventheir common commitment to the philosophy of 'both ... and,' if they were toshift the values of their respective systems to one side or the other, in order toemphasize first the universal and later the particular dimensions of the world,there is no obvious reason why their views could not be rendered compatible,if not synonymous on all issues.



19/27

412 Long

G. The Worldas the Offspringof Divine SportAnother seminal notion that informs the writings of Whitehead andBhaskara, is the idea that God creates, sustains, and directs the course of theuniverse, either for no reason at all other than his own delight or for purelyaltruistic motives, that is, in promotion of the welfare of his creatures. Insofaras He is complete and self-sufficient in his primordial nature, there is nohedonistic gain that God seeks to realize through his creativity. No less anauthority on Vedantathan Safikara declares that "the activity of the Lord[saguna-Brahmanor Isvara] ... may be viewed to be mere sport out of Hisspontaneity without any extraneous motive." 68Bhaskara articulates the bheddbhedavddin otion of divine indifferencewithregard to self-aggrandizing values, by appealing to the same philosophicalidiom of divine playfulness or creative spontaneity (svabhdva,devalihd).69Tothe objection raised by an opponent that the Supreme Deity does not activelycreate because it is completely satisfied and perfect within its own nature and,hence, devoid of any purposefulness with regard to that order, Bhaskarareplies:As follows from the use of the particle tu, this proposition is overruled. Hehas no purpose in acting; but there is 'exclusiveness of sport.' Sport is thatbehavior which is essentially play. 'Exclusiveness' of that means: that there isonly that sport. Just as in this world kings, etc. who have nothing left to desiredo act for sport, similarly the Lord, though having no desires left, isestablished as engaging in creation with reference to the karmanof creatures.And no blame can be imputed to his nature.70Even as the same rain falls upofi the just and the unjust and upon bothradiantly blossoming plants and parasitic weeds, even so the love of Godoperates in all alike, its form of expression determined only by the moralrequirements(karman)of each individual self. 71

Bhaskara rejects the implication which many of his detractors have drawnfrom the doctrine of brahmall7d.Namely, that God, like his creatures, isvulnerable to the whims of preference and taste, that He favors somecreatures while disfavoring others in a spirit of reckless capriciousness. Thesafeguard against this accusation is Brahman'sever-watchful care to providesuch benefits for each creature as is required by his karman. Hence, thephysical, moral, social, and spiritual variety among the creatures is duewholly to their karman and not to any preferential treatment on God'spart.

Nor, on the other hand, should it be concluded that the doctrine ofbrahmalild implies that the universe was created devoid of purpose andmeaning. Not so, says Bhaskara, for "the creation has as its purpose theprovision of the basis for experience and knowledge to the conscientdtmans."72Therefore, while God does not project the world into being out ofa self-serving motive, he does so to provide the creatures with the means to



20/27

413

augment and purify their knowledge of their divine source in god and,thereby, to transcend their finite existential condition.

According to Charles Hartshorne, this Vedantin concept of devalild (or,"The Dance of Siva" as Natardja, in theistic terms) seems entirely com-mensurate with the intentions of Process Philosophy.73 He has elaborated thispoint by stating that, during any given cosmic epoch, God makes an arbitrarydecision as to what world is to be created. He is constrained, so to speak, onlyby his requirement of a world, that is, some world or other, though notnecessarily the existing world. He created this particular world for nodiscernible reason but rather by means of his divine spontaneity, for the sakeof his own delight and for the promotion of his own self-expression."Whitehead himself appears to have had the same notion in mind when hespeaks of God's indifference toward the creation, preservation, or destructionof any particular entity or value. He contends that the primordial strivingsexpressive of God's purpose move toward greater and greater intensities ofexperience, without regard to or preference for any specific thing. God is"indifferent alike to preservation and novelty." He aims rather for "depth ofsatisfaction," in pursuance of the fulfillment of his own being. His purpose inpromoting the creative advance of the universe is the "evocation of in-tensities".74 Furthermore, "His unity of conceptual operations is a freecreative act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things. Itis deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass." 7H. TheSummum Bonum of Human ExistenceConcerning the question of the final objective of human life and the ultimateend toward which the universe is progressing, the thinking of Whitehead andBhaskara take somewhat divergent courses. But the differences which at firstblush may appear to be fundamental and irreconciliable, on further con-sideration, may turn out to be nothing more than a differencein emphasis andnot a difference in ideological content. We hasten to add, however, that thedivergencies in accent, though subtle in nature and degree, should not bedismissed out of hand. For they may signify the qualitative disparity in therespective estimates of the capacity of the human mind to determine its owndestiny. We turn now to a delineation of the continuities and discontinuitiesbetween the two systems regarding the question of the final goal of life, beforeconcluding with a general summary of our findings.

According to Bhaskara, the supreme goal of life is the achievement ofliberation (mukti) through the realization of the essential identity of everyfinite object with the eternal Brahman. This state of perfect freedom isachieved by transcendence of the limiting conditions (upddhis) and thedissociation of the natural essence (svabhdvika)from the adventitious factors(aupddhika) n his own nature. Like Hegel, Bhaskara defined freedom as self-determination. The fully realized person gains perfect liberation because he is



21/27

414 Long

no longer constrained or prodded by the promptings of a higher will that isdistinct from his own. Furthermore, this freedom is realized in and throughthe natural order, though it does not come to full fruition until after death.The eternal nature of God is not antagonistic to the temporal process. Theeternal realizes itself through the temporal. To quote Srinivasachariagain:The universe is not a mere fact but an eternal act, in which the end isimmediately divined. Time, therefore, does not vanish in the absolute, butenters into it and gets transfigured. The freed self does not become a merestatic absolute, but realizes whatever it wills in the world of relativity.76Although the self becomes one with the absolute, the world process continuesand the Brahmanized self realizes its divine nature in its cosmic functioning.

Thus, Bhaskara (like Whitehead) is intensely concerned to delineate the"shape" of the creative process; for to understand the nature of creation-theidentity of its source and origin, the operative and material agency of itsactualization and the means of its annihilation, is to grasp all that is to beknown about the world and its grounding in God. The apprehension of thenature of the universe and so on is achieved by meditating on the cosmogonicprocess in reverse-from phenomenal diversity back to noumenal unity, fromthe world of manifold effects to the primordial causal principle.The question must be addressed whether mukti involves complete disso-lution of the empirical self or, perhaps, a higher and more unified form ofrelationship which transcends the states of unity and diversity as conceived inthe world of ordinary cognitive discourse. Bhaskara, once again, adopts theview of the "middle may" by rejecting both the Advaita of Saikara (whichholds that avibhdgais the state of perfect and unqualified unity in which thefinite self is totally submerged in the impartite Supreme Self) and theVisistddvaitaposition, later given systematic exposition by Ramanuja (whichholds that avibhaga entails the preservation of the features of the finitepersonality but now in pure, undivided ecstatic communion with God).Bhaskara sees the doctrines of absolute identity and absolute distinctness asstanding in blatent contradiction to the truth of bheddbheda.This truth mustbe taken to hold good for the state of mukti, as it does for the state ofsamsara. He is opposed to eternal distinction (svarupabheda)on the one handand to dissolution of all distinctions in absolute nonduality (aikya) on theother. No analogy taken from commonsense experience can adequately depictthe paradoxical nature of the experience of the supernal bliss achieved byunity-in-diversity within Brahman. In contrast to Safikara's characterizationof the experience ofjnadna-mukti s the instantaneous and total evaporation ofthe illusory world and the submergence of the finitejiva into the infinite self,Bhaskara conceives of the spiritual life as the gradual expansion of the finiteconsciousness by means of the progressive realization of the essential identityof the finite self with the infinite self and the ultimate achievement ofekFbhava."Mukti is not the abolition of consciousness nor its aloneness; it is



22/27

415

not communion with a personal god nor the absolute identity with theindeterminate. But it is oneness with Brahman(ekFbhdva)which results fromthe abolition of the idea of duality (bhinnatva)."77In a word, mukti is thespiritual liberation which results from the identification with and dependenceupon God but without the dissolution of the element of difference that isdemanded by Advaita. It is "the security of this absolute dependence on theabsolute will of God and not the attainment of the absolute itself. It issdvadhikaand not niravadhika-aisvarya." 8Whitehead's most extensive discussion of the summum bonum towardwhich the created order seems to be tending, is to be found in the concludingchapter of Adventuresof Ideas, entitled "Peace."79It is also in this particulardiscussion of the ideal goal of human life that the Philosophy of Organismverges most closely with the philosophy of bheddbheda. According toWhitehead, viewing the concrescent process in the widest possible context,everything is discovered to be responding to an irresistible urge toward peace,a condition defined as the 'Harmony of Harmonies'. This urge, which lurkson the edge of consciousness, incites progression beyond the contempo-raneous state of the world toward larger and larger realms of actualization. Itis a search for the maximization of order and equilibrium among the manyconstitutive occasions within the actual universe and the realization of thismaximum order without suffering a dimunition of sensitive awareness, ofvigorous activity and of a commitment to the enrichment of life. From auniversal perspective, the vigorous and often ruthless struggle of the multitu-dinous centers of life-power to actualize their own inherent possibilities,ultimately issues into a steady movement toward a larger, more enduring andmore peaceful state of amity among the competing members of the world-order. This is a state where opposition among competitors, ultimately, givesways to a complementarity of functions and, perhaps, a final general state ofharmony.This quest for peace, harmony, and proper proportion among thingselevates the individual beyond the level of consciousness where the pre-servation of the privacy and integrity of the individual personality is theprimarymotivation of all activity. It moves the individual beyond the narrowboundaries of finite selfhood to embrace the totality of the universe, to theend that "a wider sweep of conscious interest" comes to the fore. Thisenterprise is fostered by "a trust in the efficacy of Beauty," or the perfectionof Harmony which is the achievement of projected ideals in thought anddeed, combined with the adventurous search for novel perfections. It is theweaving of the universal ideal upon the expressions of individuality and thecoordination of "the generality of harmony and the importance of theindividual." 80

The achievement of such a state provides for "the mutual adaptation of theseveral factors in an occasion of experience" by removing all tendencies



23/27

416 Long

toward mutual inhibition among the various prehensions. This dissipation ofall causes of reciprocal hindrance "results in the enlargement and enrichmentof the mode of consciousness and the confirmation of "selfcontrol at itswidest-at the width where the 'self' has been lost and interest has beentransferredto coordinations wider than personality." 81In conformity with Plato's ideal of 'universal harmony', Whitehead feelscompelled to stop short of Bhaskara's ideal of complete and enduring unionof the finite personality with the infinite 'preter-personal'Brahman.It must besaid, nonetheless, that he has laid the groundwork in the chapter on "Peace"for the development of a program of spiritual discipline of the sort promotedby bheddbhedavdda.His notions of the urge toward harmony "lurking on theedge of consciousness," "the subsidence of turbulence which inhibits," "thegrasping of infinitude," which "carries with it a surpassing of personality,""self-control at its widest," "the extreme ecstasy of Peace," all resonatedeeply with the description of the goals of the spiritual life in the philosophyof bheddbheda.Whitehead's declaration that "the sufferingattains its end in aHarmony of Harmonies,"82 suggests the same state of existence as thatdescribed by Bhaskara as one in which "This dtman [which is fully unitedwith Brahman]has no need to create, for his desires are fulfilled ... his desiresand thoughts [are] perfectly efficient and his nature is therefore one ofincomparable bliss,"83We must be on our guard, however, against insensitivity to the differencesbetween the conceptions of the final goal of life in the two philosophies.Leaving aside within this context the more troublesome issues pertaining tothe basis for an authentically unitary experience of God, we press theargument that for Whitehead, in contrast to Bhaskara, the optimum intensityof experience to which one could aspire, is the achievement of a relationshipof camaraderie or communion rather than union with God. We must recallthat, for Whitehead, God remains "the great companion-the fellow-suffererwho understands,"84 not the Eternal universal Ground of Being into whichall things are merged as the termination of the cosmic epoch.

Indeed, as John Cobb has observed, "in Whiteheadian terms, ontologicalunion with God is impossible."85 For all their existential proximity andexperiential relatedness, human beings and God belong to two separate andnonfusable orders of existence. At no point does Whitehead give seriousconsideration to the possibility of a complete merger between the creaturesand their Creator, either through solitary unitive experiences or by a totalcosmic amalgamation of the world at the 'end of time'. In reflecting onexperiences that are described in mystical literature as 'ecstatic self-transcendence' or 'unio mystica', Cobb concludes that "experientially speak-ing, it may well be understood as an experience of union with God, eventhough, philosophically speaking, actual identity must be denied."86 Giventhe ontological distinctness of God and the universe, communion with God is



24/27

417

the most satisfactory experience toward which a person can aspire. To pineafter a more intimate relationship with God, is to confuse two orders ofexistence which must be kept distinct. To fail to keep them separate, is to fallvictim to an extreme monism, or, in Whiteheadian terms, misplacedconcreteness-the bete noire of Process Philosophy.V. CONCLUSIONIt is at this juncture, where the definition of the final destiny to which eachactual entity or Jiva comes or can hope to come, in its relationship to theAbsolute, that a clear distinction between the thinking of Bhaskara andWhitehead assumes paramount importance. Both assert that God or theAbsolute possesses two natures-the one passive, unified, and self-sufficient,the other, vigorously active, multiform and, as yet, unfulfilled. They agreethat the Absolute and the world stand together in a relation of difference-and-nondifference and that the only adequate conception of Reality rests on theproposition that God is as dependent upon the world for the satisfaction ofhis subjective aims, as is the world dependent upon him for its subjectivesatisfaction. In the end, however, we have begun to sense (especially with thediscussion of their concepts of eschatology) that the vector qualities of thetwo philosophies diverge rather significantly. Each system appears to 'tilt'slightly to one extreme or the other. Bhaskara finally surrenders to theallurements of a mystical monism which many another Indian sage has foundirresistible;Whitehead, for his part, opts for a kind of functional pluralism.It would appear that, despite the numerous points at which these twophilosophical visions converge, the Vedantin enterprise begins at the pointwhere Whitehead's metaphysical analysis comes to consummation. Or, tophrase the same contention in Kantian terms, whereas Whiteheadian religion,for all its excursions into the realms of intuitive experience and God-consciousness, remains, in the end, a "religion within the limits of reason"and thus, a rational religion; the religion of Bhaskara, for all its forays intothe terrain of rational argumentation and dialectical disputation, remains a"religion beyond the limits of reason."

NOTES1. This writer has also been known traditionally as Bhattabhaskara and Bhaskaracarya.Thebibliography of writings on the bheddbheda ystem is far from vast due to the relative neglect ofthe study of this philosophy by modern scholars, both Indian and Western. This paucity ofscholarly works on Bhaskara is due, in large part, to the lack of a critical edition of the Sanskrittext and of a translation of the extant text into any one of the European languages. There exists

only a highly corrupted Sanskrit text of Bhaskara's Brahmasitrabhasya, edited by V. P. Dvivedin(Benares: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 20, 1915ff.). The short list of titles whichfollows will assist the reader in finding his way into the modest bodies of writings that arecurrentlyavailable: S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge University Press,



25/27

418 Long

1932), II, pp. 198ff.;Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Bhaskara the Vedantin," PhilosophyEast and West,17, (1967): 61-67; M. Hiriyanna, "Bhaskara's View of Error," Journal of the Ganganatha JhaResearch Institute 1 (1943-1944): 39-44; A. Sastri. "A Critique of Bhaskara's Doctrine ofSimultaneous Difference and Non-Difference," Calcutta Review 65 (1937): 41-46; B. N. K.Sharma, "Bhaskara-a Forgotten Commentator on the Gita," Indian Historical Quarterly 9(1933): 663-667; C. Sharma, A CriticalSurveyof Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,1960), pp. 340-341; M. L. Sircar, "The Philosophy of Bhaskara," Philosophical Quarterly(Amalner) 3 (1927): 107-139; P. N. Srinivasachari,"The Philosophy of Bhaskara,"Journalof theUniversityof Madras 1 (1928): 114-124; P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Bheddbheda(Adyar Library and Research Center, 1972); J. Tarkavedantatirtha, "The World as a RealModification of the Absolute (Bhaskara's Theory of Brahmaparinamavada)," Our Heritage 1(1953): 309-318.2. All referencesin this article to Process and Reality carrytwo differentpaginations. The firstnumber refers to the 1969 edition, published by The Free Press; the second number, placed inbrackets, refers to the appropriate page in the first edition, published by The MacmillanCompany in 1929. Hereafter this work will be cited as PR.3. According to the National Union Catalogue, the single extant copy of the Sanskrit text ofthe Brahmasutrabhdsyaby Bhaskara is in the South Asia Collection at the University ofPennsylvania. Unfortunately, in searching for the volume, I discovered that it has apparentlybeen lost. For this reason, I have been forced to depend entirely upon the relevant portions of anunpublished English translation by J. A. B. van Buitenen. I am most grateful for his generosity inmaking this text available to me.4. See referenceunder note 1.

5. The most relevant portions of Bhaskara's Brahmastutrabhdsyao the discussion of hiscosmology are: 1.1.4; 1.13.30; 1.4.20-21; 1.4.25-26; 2.1.14; and 2.1.27.6. PR, p. 7 [7].7. Whitehead'sMetaphysics. An Introductory Exposition (New York: Macmillan, 1958),pp. 55-56.8. PR, p. 9 [10].

9. I am grateful to David Griffin of the Claremont School of Theology for calling myattention to this important distinction in Whitehead's philosophy and for his generosity inproviding numerous other critical comments on various troublesome issues encountered in thepreparationof this article.10. PR, p. 23 [27-28].11. Adventuresof Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 190. Whitehead apparentlywishes to distinguish between a 'vicious' and a 'benign' dualism by identifying the former asdevoid of the element of self-reflexivecriticism and the latter as including such a critical element.12. PR, p. 130 [168].13. BSbh. 1.4.22.14. BSbh. 1.1.3.

15. Ibid., 2.1.18.16. PR, p. 25 [31].17. See BAU II.1.20; 11.4.10;MaitrlUpan. VI.32;Mundaka Upan. 1.1.7.18. Consult BAU 1.4.7; Chdnd.Upan. VI.2.3; Tait. Upan. 11.6;Ait. Upan. I.1.19. PR, p. 407 [524].20. PR, p. 37 [47].21. PR, p. 38 [48].22. PR, p. 83 [104].23. PR, p. 106 [134].24. PR, p. 406 [523].25. PR, p. 405 [521].26. PR, p. 408 [526].27. Among the many English translations of this text that are readily available, seeS. Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Sutra. The Philosophy of the Spiritual Life (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin, 1960);Swami Gambhirananda, Brahma-sutra-bhdsya f SarikardcdryaCalcutta:



26/27

419

Advaita Ashrama, 1966, 1972); George Thibaut, The VeddntaSutras of Bddardyana(Oxford,1890, 1896;New York: Dover Publications, 1962).28. Chdnd.Upan.VI.2.3; Tait. Upan.11.6:so 'kdmayatabahusydmprajdyeyeti.29. BSbh. 1.1.2.30. Chdnd. Upan. 1.9.1. Akdsa or ether is defined in various schools of Indian philosophy as asubtle, ethereal, and nonquantifiable 'fluid' substance, which is believed to pervade the universeand to serve as an invisible vehicle of all living forms. Sound (sabda)is supposed to be its primary

quality and from the Upanisadson, it is equated with the unmanifested (avyakta) Brahmanas theimperceptibleessence of the universe. Compare BAU 3.2.13.31. Both Sankara and Bhaskara draw upon Tait. Upan 11.1 for the scriptural source of thisdoctrine, where a kind of "Great Chain of Being" is traced from the self or dtman in unbrokensuccession through space, air, fire, water, earth, plants, and food to the person (purusa). Hisindictment against Saikara's doctrine of illusion (mdydvdda),reads as follows: mahdydnikabaudd-hagdthitamn dydvddamt ydvarnayantookan vydmohayanti.32. BSbh. 1.1.3.

33. See BSbh. 1.1.4; 1.4.22; 2.1.14.34. yasydh kdryamtidamt krtsnamtvyavahdrdyakalpate nirvaktamtsa na sakyeti vacanamtvacandrthanm.35. na caupddhikanmartrtvamaparamartham:BSbh. 2.3.40.36. Consult BrahmasutraII.1.24.37. BSbh. 2.1.14.38. Ibid.39. PR, p. 112 [143].40. Ibid., p. 407 [524].41. Ibid., p. 411 [529-30]. Compare p. 407 [524].42. BSbh. 2.1.19.43. Ibid., 2.1.14.44. Ibid., 2.1.14. See also Srinivasachari,ibid., p. 65.45. BSbh. 2.1.33, 34.46. AI, p. 157; PR, pp. 39 [50],41 [53], 107 [136].47. PR, p. 60 [73].48. Ibid., p. 65 [79].49. Ibid., p. 27 [33].50. Srinivasachari, ibid., p. 28.51. PR, p. 38 [48], 65 [79].52. Ibid., p. 62 [76].53. Ibid., p. 65 [79].54. Ibid., p. 83 [105].55. Ibid., p. 26 [32].56. Ibid., p. 37 [46].57. BSbh. 1.1.4.58. Srinivasachari,ibid., p. 50.59. Ibid., p. 50.60. Modes of Thought(New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 128.61. AI,p. 11.62. PR, p. 53 [63-64].63. Ibid., p. 130 [168].64. MT, p. 128; PR, p. 410-411 [528].65. Srinivasachari, ibid., p. 68.66. PR, p. 130 [168].67. PR, p. 106 [135],260 [340].68. BrahmastitrabhasyaI.1.33.69. BSbh. 2.1.32-34.70. BSbh. 2.1.33.71. Srinivasachari,ibid., pp. 44-45.



27/27

420 Long

72. BSbh. 2.1.14.73. Communicated to me in private conversation.74. PR, pp. 125 [159], 137 [177], 172 [224];MT, p. 128.75. PR, p. 405 [523].76. Op. cit., p. 132.77. Srinivasachari,ibid., p. 138.78. Ibid., p. 135.79. New York: The Free Press, 1967.80. Al, chapter XVII.81. Ibid., p. 285.82. Ibid., p. 296.83. BSbh. 1.3.30, translated by D. H. H. Ingalls, op. cit., p. 63.84. PR, p. 413 [532].85. A ChristianNatural Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1965), pp. 233ff.86. Ibid., p. 234.

God and Creativity in the Cosmologies of Whitehead and Bhāskara

Documents

Transcript of God and Creativity in the Cosmologies of Whitehead and Bhāskara