Goal-directed and spontaneous self-talk in anger- and ...oars.uos.ac.uk/615/1/Goal-directed and...

Alexander T. Latinjak, School for Science, Technology and Engineering, University of Suffolk. James Hehir Building, University

Avenue, IP3 0FS Ipswich, UK. E-mail: [email protected]. Phone: 0044 7979343965

Goal-directed and spontaneous self-talk in anger- and anxiety-eliciting sport-

situations

Alexander T. LatinjakEUSES – School for Health and Sport Sciences, University of Girona

Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis & Nikos ZourbanosUniversity of Thessaly, Greece

The purpose of this study was to explore differences in the occurrence and in the content

of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk in anger- and anxiety eliciting situations. A

total of 62 male and 25 female athletes (Mage = 19.66, SD = 2.07) agreed to participate.

The results showed that in anger-eliciting situations, spontaneous self-talk was generally

negative and retrospective, whereas in anxiety-eliciting situations, spontaneous self-talk

was positive and negative as well as anticipatory. Goal-directed self-talk generally aimed

at creating activated states, regulating behaviour and focusing on positive predictions,

even though differences among both emotion-eliciting situations were also detected.

POST-PRINT VERSION

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Applied Sport Psychology on 30 June

2016, available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10413200.2016.1213330

mailto:[email protected]

GOAL-DIRECTED AND SPONTANEOUS SELF-TALK 2



Goal-directed and spontaneous self-talk in anger- and anxiety-eliciting sport-

situations

Self-talk plays a key role in performance and self-regulation (Tod, Thatcher,

McGuigan, & Thatcher, 2009; Zourbanos, Papaioannou, Argyropoulou, &

Hatzigeorgiadis, 2014). Hence, it is not surprising that in the last decade self-talk has been

receiving increasing research attention in sport psychology, and is, therefore, present in

almost all contemporary handbooks in this area (Brown, 2011; Hardy, Oliver, & Tod,

2009; Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Latinjak, & Theodorakis, 2014; Theodorakis,

Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2012; Van Raalte, 2010). Beyond sport psychology, self-

talk has also been considered an important aspect in other areas of psychology. For

instance, self-talk has been linked to the treatment of emotional disorders, with special

focus on anxiety (Kendall et al., 2016), communication apprehension and public speaking

anxiety (Shi, Brinthaupt, & McCree, 2015), and academic performance (Sánchez,

Carvajal, & Saggiomo, 2015).

Since publications related to self-talk have multiplied over the last few years,

some researchers have shifted part of their efforts to identifying different paradigms in

self-talk investigation (Hardy et al., 2009; Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014). Accordingly, one

identified line of research has focused on the effects of strategic self-talk interventions on

cognitive, affective and performance outcome measures (e.g., Cutton & Landin, 2007;

Latinjak, Torregrosa, & Renom, 2011; Weinberg, Miller, & Horn, 2012). Generally, these

studies have exemplified how to implement self-talk strategies and have evidenced their

positive effects in sport (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011). A

second identified line of research has examined the content of automatic self-talk (e.g.,

Burton, Gillham, & Glenn, 2011; Tovares, 2010; Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Chroni,

Theodorakis, & Papaioannou, 2009) as well as its antecedents and consequences (e.g.,

Oliver, Markland, Hardy, & Petherick, 2008; St Claire Gibson & Foster, 2007; Zourbanos

et al., 2011).

One main difference between the two research paradigms is the way distinct types

of self-talk are classified. In regard to self-talk interventions, strategically designed cue

words or phrases have usually been classified as either instructional or motivational,

based on their expected effects (Hardy, Gammage, & Hall, 2001; Theodorakis, Weinberg,

Natsis, Douma, & Kazakas, 2000). Nevertheless, other types such as anxiety-controlling





self-talk (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, & Theodorakis, 2007) or self-feedback (Latinjak

et al., 2011), have also been used. As for automatic self-talk, these emergent self-

statements have recurrently been classified into positive (e.g., well done) or negative (e.g.,

you will lose), based on their content (Hardy, 2006). Furthermore, finer distinctions

among different types of positive and negative self-talk have been established through the

development of research instruments assessing athlete self-talk (Hatzigeorgiadis &

Biddle, 2000; Zourbanos et al., 2009).

More specifically, Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (2000) developed the Thought

Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport (TOQS), consisting of three subscales assessing

worries related to performance, thoughts of escape, and task-irrelevant thoughts. More

recently, Zourbanos et al. (2009) developed the Automatic Self-Talk Questionnaire for

Sport (ASTQS), a more inclusive measure of athletes’ self-talk describing four types of

positive self-talk (psych-up statements, confidence building statements, instructional

statements, and anxiety controlling statements), three types of negative self-talk (worries,

statements about disengagement, and statements about somatic fatigue) and irrelevant

self-talk. Whereas, Oliver et al. (2008), based on autonomy-supportive versus controlling

environments using the ‘think aloud’ method of cognitive assessment, classified

automatic thoughts as positive task focused speech, negative task focused speech, and

non-task focused speech. Another classification of self-talk was based on the Structural

Analysis of Social Behavior model (Benjamin, 1973) and its two underlying dimensions,

affiliation and interdependence. Specifically, Conroy and Metzler (2004) described eight

categories of self-talk: self-emancipate, self-affirm, active self-love, self-protect, self-

control, self-blame, self-attack, and self-neglect (Benjamin, 1996). Nevertheless, despite

its theoretically sound underpinnings, to the best of our knowledge, this alternative

taxonomy has had little impact on the self-talk literature, with one notable exception

(Conroy & Coatsworth, 2007).

Recently, previous classifications of automatic self-talk (Zourbanos et al., 2009)

have been challenged by the distinction of thoughts between undirected and goal-directed

used in general psychology (e.g., Christoff, 2012; Ickes & Cheng, 2011). Further,

undirected thoughts can be categorized into mind-wandering, when the content is

unrelated to the concurrent context and task; stimulus independent thoughts, when the

content is related to the concurrent context but not the task; and spontaneous thoughts,

when the content is related to the concurrent context and task.





In a recent study about automatic self-talk, Latinjak, Zourbanos, López-Ros and

Hatzigeorgiadis (2014) used this previous taxonomy about thoughts to inquire into the

content and structure of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk. Based on previous

definitions (Christoff, Gordon, & Smith, 2011; Klinger, 2009), spontaneous self-talk

includes unintended, non-working, non-instrumental statements that come to mind

unbidden and effortless, but, nevertheless, linked to the task or activity at hand and

relevant contextual stimuli. In contrast, goal-directed self-talk consists of statements

deliberately employed towards solving a problem or making progress on a task.

According to Latinjak, Zourbanos et al. (2014), there are several differences

between both kinds of automatic self-talk. First, in their structure: spontaneous self-talk

varies in terms of valence (from positive to negative; e.g., “I am the best/ I am the worst”)

and time perspective (from past-related to future-related; e.g., “What did I do? / I will

win”), whereas goal-directed self-talk varies in terms of the time orientation (from past-

oriented to future-oriented; e.g., “everyone makes mistakes/ it’s easy, you can do it”) and

activation (from low to high; e.g., “relax/ give 100%”). Second, in their content:

spontaneous self-talk mostly describes, evaluates and explains past outcomes, and makes

predictions concerning upcoming events, whereas goal-directed self-talk involves

changing appraisals and affective states and promoting positive affective states, task

instructions and positive predictions. Lastly, in their wording: spontaneous self-talk is

formulated almost always in first person and rarely in second person (e.g., “I can win”),

whereas goal-directed self-talk frequently refers to the self in second person, and less in

first (e.g., “you can win”).

With regard to structure, the identification of the two time dimensions (one for

spontaneous, and one for goal-directed self-talk) is relatively new in sport psychology

literature, while valence and arousal have previously been used in research with self-talk

(Hardy, Hall, & Alexander, 2001). Therefore, Latinjak, Zourbanos et al. (2014) have

provided a more thorough description of these two time dimensions. Generally, the main

difference between the two time dimensions lies in their foundation. Time perspective

differentiates between statements based on their content; whereas time orientation reflects

the purpose or the function of the direction provided by the goal-directed statement.

Consequently, the categories placed on both time continuums are distinct. On the one

hand, time perspective discriminates between anticipatory (e.g., “I will win”) and

retrospective statements (e.g., “That was incredibly well played”), based on whether they

refer to something that happened in the past, or to something that is expected to happen





in the future. Moreover, those statements which refer to something that is happening at

the time the statement is made, and which, consequently, are neither anticipatory nor

retrospective, can be either present-related (e.g., “I am winning”) or contextual (e.g., “I

am a winner type”). On the other hand, time orientation, discriminates between past

oriented statements which are directed towards cognitions about events that lie in the past

(e.g., “Nothing happened”); past-present oriented statements which are directed towards

affective states that emerged at some point in the past and endure until the present (e.g.,

“Don’t be afraid”); present-future oriented statements which are directed towards

affective states that appear at the moment and endure until some point in the future (e.g.,

“Give a 100%”); and future oriented statements which are directed towards expectations

about the future (e.g., “You will succeed”). Altogether, the structure of spontaneous and

goal-directed self-talk presented by Latinjak, Zourbanos et al. (2014) has the potential to

accommodate all thoughts, and does not simply reflect some categories of self-talk.

Self-talk in emotion eliciting situations

The study of self-talk, in either research paradigm, has frequently been related to

the study of emotions. Spontaneous self-talk, which refers mostly to fast, automatic, or

unconscious processes (Evans, 2006), is an expressive of emotions (Van Raalte,

Cornelius, Copeskey, & Brewer, 2014), whereas goal-directed and strategic self-talk,

which refer to slow, effortful, and conscious processes (Evans, 2006), represent a reaction

to an emotion-eliciting situation and the spontaneous self-talk in it (Latinjak, Zourbanos

et al., 2014). The effects of strategic self-talk interventions, for instance, have been tested

in anxiety-eliciting situations (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2007). Moreover, emotional control

has been identified as one of the main self-talk functions (Theodorakis, Hatzigeorgiadis,

& Chroni, 2008). Regarding automatic self-talk, Conroy and Metzler (2004) explored the

relationship between different forms of cognitive anxiety and self-talk. They reported

strong relationships between fear of failure and sport anxiety with negative self-talk while

failing; yet while winning these relationships between anxiety and self-talk were week.

Moreover, Zourbanos et al. (2009) have described anxiety-controlling self-talk

and worries as two categories in the Automatic Self-Talk Questionnaire for Sports

(ASTQS). In a study employing the ASTQS, Latinjak, Viladrich, Alcaraz and Torregrosa

(2015) revealed a positive relationship between negative self-talk and sport anxiety.

Nonetheless, in sport there have been very few studies that have inquired into the patterns

of automatic self-talk in emotion-eliciting situations (e.g., Son, Oregon, & Feltz, 2012).

Notwithstanding, there is an extensive literature on the effects of some emotions, mostly





anxiety, on other automatic cognitive processes in sport psychology (e.g., Carson &

Collins, 2015), and on self-talk and emotions in clinical psychology (Winsler, 2009). The

former have evidenced the effects of emotion on perception, selection, motoric and action

in performance behaviour, whereas the latter have shown diverse connections between

self-talk and negative emotions and emotional disorders. For instance, studies framed

within the Cognitive Content-specificity Hypothesis evaluated the relationship between

automatic thoughts and subjectively perceived emotional states (Beck & Perkins, 2001).

These studies indicated that self-talk associated with danger, harm and threat is related to

experiences of anxiety; and that self-talk associated with loss and personal failure is

related to depression (e.g., Ambrose & Rholes, 1993; Laurent & Stark, 1993; Schniering

& Rapee, 2004). Similarly, within the framework, Ellis (1976) identified the links

between rational / irrational beliefs and emotions. Research has evidenced relationships

between irrational beliefs and emotional dysfunction, involving heightened anxiety,

feelings of anger and shame, and psychopathological conditions including social and test

anxiety and depression (for review see, Browne, Dowd, & Freeman, 2010). Subsequently

treatments have been developed for the regulation of emotion through rational self-

instructions.

The overall purpose of this study was to inquire into the content of automatic self-

talk in emotion-eliciting sport situations. In addition, we expect differences in the patterns

of self-talk between different emotions, based on two primary reasons: first, different

emotions are characterized by differences on a cognitive level, for instance, in terms of

appraisals (Lazarus, 2000); and different emotions require different emotion-regulation

strategies (Lane, Beedie, Devonport, & Stanley, 2011). Since it is impossible for focus

on all emotions, we focused on two that are mostly relevant for sport performance, anxiety

and anger (Jones, Lane, Bray, Uphill, & Catlin, 2005).

An adequate starting point for the exploration of self-talk patterns in emotion-

eliciting situations could be anxiety, because it is the emotion that has captured most

research attention in sport psychology generally (Jones et al., 2005; Woodman et al.,

2009), but also in the field of self-talk (e.g., Conroy & Metzler, 2004; Hatzigeorgiadis et

al., 2007; Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Mpoumpaki, & Theodorakis, 2009; Zourbanos et

al., 2009). Moreover, at times anxiety has been studied alongside other emotions, among

which anger has appeared most frequently (e.g., Campo, Mellalieu, Ferrand, Martinent,

& Rosent, 2012; Robazza & Bortoli, 2007; Stemmler, Aue, & Wacker, 2007; Vast,

Young, & Thomas, 2010). Overall, anger and anxiety seem an important set of emotions





within the sporting experience because both have been considered among the most

relevant emotions in sport and exercise (Jones et al., 2005), both have a large impact on

performance, their effect being positive or negative (Robazza & Bortoli, 2007) and both

have an important cognitive component associated to their typical psycho-physiological

characteristics (Lazarus, 2000). These characteristics include variables such as attention

(Vast et al., 2010), cognitive appraisals (Martinent & Ferrand, 2015) or attributions of

success and failure (Cantón & Checa, 2012).

Anxiety has been considered a key construct in sport-specific emotion research

(Jones et al., 2005), and the most influential and important psychological variable when

it comes to sport performance (Regalin & Hanin, 2000). From a differential emotion

theory perspective (Izard, 1977), anxiety would be considered to reflect uncertainty

regarding goal attainment and coping (Lazarus, 2000). Anxiety would further be typified

by feelings of apprehension and tension along with activation or arousal of the autonomic

nervous system (Spielberger, 1966). From a dimensional perspective (Russell, 2009), the

term anxiety is used to describe states characterised by negative valence, high arousal,

and an anticipatory perspective (Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007; Latinjak,

2012; Latinjak, López-Ros, & Font-Lladó, 2014).

Anger has been previously identified as an emotion that, similar to anxiety, can

impact performance either positively or negatively, (Lane, Davis, & Stanley, 2014). For

instance, both anger and anxiety are high-arousal emotions (Latinjak, López-Ros, & Font-

Lladó, 2015), and therefore potentially beneficial in gross tasks requiring effort, power or

endurance, and potentially disadvantageous in fine task requiring accuracy and precision

(Jones et al., 2005). Moreover, anger is deemed to merit special attention in other

cognitive research areas such as judgment or decision making (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).

From a differential emotion theory perspective, anger would be defined as an emotion

comprising high arousal (Kaufman, 1970) that results from an event perceived to be a

“demeaning offence against me and mine” (Lazarus, 2000, p. 234). From a dimensional

perspective, the term anger is used to describe states characterised by negative valence,

high arousal, and a retrospective perspective (Fontaine et al., 2007; Latinjak, 2012;

Latinjak, Cook, & López-Ros, 2013). In contrast to anxiety, anger has not been studied

in relation to self-talk in sport.

Overall, to extend the line of research based on the goal-directed / spontaneous

distinction, the purpose of this study was to explore differences in the occurrence, but

also in the underlying dimensions, of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk in anger-





and anxiety-eliciting situations. Specifically, we wanted to explore differences in the

frequency, the content of spontaneous, and the time-orientation of goal-directed self-talk

in anger and anxiety eliciting situations.

Regarding the content of spontaneous self-talk, we expected spontaneous self-talk

to be retrospective in anger-eliciting situations (e.g., “I messed up”), and more

anticipatory in anxiety-eliciting ones (e.g., “I will fail”). Regarding the time-orientation

of goal-directed self-talk, we expected to observe more past-oriented goal-directed self-

talk in anger-eliciting situations (e.g., “Nothing happened”), more future-oriented goal-

directed self-talk in anxiety-eliciting ones (e.g., “You will succeed”). The identification

of such differences will eventually contribute to the better understanding of self-talk

within the sport experience. Ultimately, taking into consideration that cognitive and

emotional control is one of the main functions of self-talk interventions (Theodorakis et

al., 2008), the findings will guide the development of effective interventions.

Method

Participants

A total of 62 male and 25 female Catalan and Spanish athletes (Mage = 19.66, SD

= 2.07) agreed to participate in this study. At the time of the data collection they were

actively involved in a wide variety of different sports, such as soccer (n = 35), basketball

(n = 23), handball (n = 4) or tennis (n = 3; thirteen other sports with n < 3). Moreover,

they were all competing at national level.

First year students of a local sport science faculty were approached to participate

in this study (recruitment rate: 93%). First year students were targeted because of two

reasons: first, the transition into university is recent, and, thus, the impact of university

on their sport participation is recent and limited; second, they have not yet attended any

sport psychology modules. Active sport participation on a competitive level was a

requirement for participation. Ethical approval was granted from the first authors’

university ethics board and all participants signed the informed consent form.

Procedures and Instruments

Stage 1: Recalling situations and thought listing. Participants were invited to

take part in a study about emotions and thoughts in sport which included a one-hour

seminar. Once all potential participants signed up for the seminars, five sessions were

planned for a maximum of 25 participants. On arrival, participants signed the informed

consent form and answered personal descriptive questions. Afterwards, they answered





the main questionnaire, involving the identification of anger and anxiety eliciting

situations in sport and the recall of self-talk in these situations.

First, participants were asked to describe an anger-eliciting and an anxiety-

eliciting situation in their sport which had occurred to them during the last two weeks.

Once they had described both situations, they were asked to write down any thoughts that

had occurred to them or things they had said to themselves. They were told that those

thoughts or statements could have occurred either unintentionally, or intentionally to

increase performance or regulate their emotions. Moreover, we made it clear that it could

be possible for them not to think about anything or not to remember any thoughts.

Henceforth, we asked them to write down only those thoughts or statements they actually

remembered. This approach to assessing self-talk content has been effectively used by

Latinjak, Zourbanos et al. (2014).

Stage 2: The self-talk seminar. Once the researchers collected the main

questionnaire, a seminar was given to the participants on spontaneous and goal-directed

self-talk and about their underlying dimensions, based on the conceptualization provided

by Latinjak, Zourbanos et al. (2014). The seminar contained the following topics: a brief

description of the conceptualization of thoughts and self-talk in general and sport

psychology; definitions of goal-directed and spontaneous self-talk; the structure and

content of goal-directed self-talk; and the structure and content of spontaneous self-talk.

Language and expression were adapted to the language commonly used by the

participants. First, the seminar was delivered in two regular sport psychology courses for

undergraduate sport science students, similar to the participants in this study. After

collecting feedback regarding the seminar, at random among students attending these

classes, the seminar was further adjusted to facilitate comprehension and retention of its

content.

Stage 3: Participant evaluation of self-talk. After a twenty-minute break and a

short summary of the seminar, including an open turn of questions, participants received

a copy of their completed main questionnaire and a second questionnaire where they were

asked to evaluate their previous answers. Latinjak, Zourbanos et al. (2014) used experts

to categorize the meaning units in their study. However, they recognized important

difficulties when it came to classifying statements as either goal-directed or spontaneous.

Similarly, Van Raalte et al. (2014) evidenced that self-talk ratings made by participants

in their study could be distinguished from those made by researchers, and they concluded

that researchers might want to consider methods for coding spontaneous self-talk that





involve participant self-categorization. Consequently, in the second questionnaire we

asked the participants to analyze their own answers. In order to offer the participants

support for the categorization task, this second questionnaire contained a brief description

about the self-talk types and their underlying structure, and at least one researcher was

present at any time to answer questions. Overall, there were few questions that were easily

addressed and fully comprehended by participants, indicating that both the lesson and the

brief description had worked well at instructing the participants in regard to the self-talk

categorization process.

In regard to the categorization task, firstly, the participants were asked to copy

each thought or statement they had written down in the main questionnaire in a designated

space. In case of long answers, composed by a combination of different meaning units,

we recommended our participants to split them up into smaller parts with one unique

meaning. However, most participants had autonomously tended to write simple answers

which could not further be divided.

There were several questions next to each designated space for an answer. Firstly,

they were asked to categorize their answer into spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk.

They were given the choice either or neither if they could not classify their previous

answer. If participants categorized their answer as spontaneous, they were asked to further

rate the statement on two separate single-item 7-point scales in terms of time perspective

(1= absolutely anticipatory, 4 = neither anticipatory nor retrospective, 7 = absolutely

retrospective) and valence (1 = absolutely positive, 4 = neither positive nor negative, 7 =

absolutely negative). If participants categorized their answer as goal-directed, they were

further asked to allocate the statement in one of the seven categories outlined by Latinjak,

Zourbanos et al. (2014): (1) controlling cognitive reactions, (2) controlling activated

states, (3) controlling deactivated states, (4) creating activated states, (5) creating

deactivated states, (6) regulating cognition and behavior and (7) focusing on positive

predictions. The participants could also choose a not sure/ none option.

In addition, once the data were collected, we contacted two sport science

university lecturers, specialized in sport psychology, with expertise in qualitative data

analyses. These judges analysed the participants’ answers of the first questionnaire

following the same guidelines as the participants received in questionnaire two. Both

judges were not involved with the elaboration of the manuscript.

Results





No participant reported any problems recalling and describing the relevant

emotion eliciting situations. Anger-eliciting situations usually included negative events

with important negative consequences for the athletes, caused either by oneself or others,

such as coaches, teammates, opponents or referees. (e.g., “I had a chance to score at that

precise moment, when I ran into the open space, but my teammate did pass the ball to

another player, even he saw me”). Anxiety-eliciting situations usually included important

upcoming events, with significant others watching, and a high uncertainty regarding goal-

attainment (e.g., “There were seconds left and I had that additional free through. Everyone

was looking at me. If I would score, we would be even with the ball in our possession”).

In relation to these situations, the participants recalled a total of 589 statements:

292 in the anger-eliciting situations and 294 in the anxiety-eliciting situations. Three

participants classified one of their statements as neither spontaneous nor goal-directed

and these statements were excluded from subsequent analyses. Chi-square analysis

showed there was no significant differences in the total number of statement between the

anger and anxiety eliciting situations (χ2 = 0.02, p = .901). Throughout the results and

discussion section, the examples offered of different types of self-talk are representative

of the answers most repeated by the participants. In the second questionnaire, we asked

the participants to classify their statements as either spontaneous or goal-directed.

Overall, 73.80% of the statements were classified as spontaneous (n = 433), and 26.20%

as goal-directed (n = 154). Chi-square analysis showed that the difference between

spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk in the two situations was statistically significant

(χ2 = 132.61, p < .001).

Participant-rater agreement

In order to assess to what degree the participants’ ratings resemble the ratings of

the two experts, we calculated the intra-class correlations coefficient (ICC2,1) with its 95%

confidence interval (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). We used the single-measure ICC and

interpreted results as excellent (0.75 - 1), modest (0.4 - 0.74), or poor (0 - 0.39) (Fleiss,

1986). In addition, Pearsons correlations were calculated for valance and time

perspective, and the percentage of coincidence between the participants and the two

independent raters was calculated for the type of goal-directed self-talk.

Three independent ICC scores were calculated, for valance and time perspective

in spontaneous self-talk ratings, and for the type of goal-directed self-talk. ICC scores

were modest in all three cases (for valance, ICC2,1 = .728, 95% CI: (0.69 – 0.76); for time

perspective, ICC2,1 = .578, 95% CI: (0.53 – 0.63); and for type of goal-directed self-talk,





ICC2,1 = .611, 95% CI: (0.53 – 0.69). In regard to the correlations between the rating of

the participant and the independent rates, values for valance were .726 and .722 (both p

< .001), and values for time perspective were .499 and .466 (both p < .001). Overall

percentage of agreement in the categorization of goal-directed self-talk was 75% between

the participant and each independent judge.

Self-talk in Anger-eliciting Situations

With regard to the anger-eliciting situations, 80.50% of the statements were

classified as spontaneous (n = 235), and 19.50% as goal-directed (n = 57). The difference

was statistically significant (χ2 = 108.51, p < .001). The participants rated their

spontaneous self-talk generally as slightly retrospective (Mtime perspective = 4.96, SD = 1.79)

and negative (Mvalence = 5.38, SD = 1.72). An inspection of the distribution of the ratings

on a two-dimensional grid (Figure 1a) indicates that most statements were rated as

negative in terms of valence and more retrospective (e.g., “We lost because of my fault”)

than anticipatory (e.g., “I want to quit playing”) in terms of time perspective. For goal-

directed self-talk (Figure 2), participants classified most of their answers as either

focusing on positive predictions (e.g., “I can fix this”) or regulating behaviour (e.g., “I

have to recover the ball”).

Self-talk in Anxiety-eliciting Situations

In the anxiety-eliciting situations, 67.10% of the statements were classified as

spontaneous (n = 197), and 32.90% as goal-directed (n = 97). The difference was

statistically significant (χ2 = 34.58, p < .001). The participants rated their spontaneous

self-talk generally as anticipatory (Mtime perspective = 2.85, SD = 1.73) and close to the

median point of the valence (positive-negative) scale (Mvalence = 3.73, SD = 2.10). An

inspection of the distribution of the ratings on a two-dimensional grid (Figure 1b)

indicates that most statements were rated as anticipatory in terms of time perspective, and

both positive (e.g., “I want to play well”) and negative (e.g., “I am going to make a fool

out of myself”), in terms of valence. For goal-directed self-talk (Figure 2), the participants

classified most of their answers as focusing on positive predictions (e.g., “We can do it”),

regulating behaviour (e.g., “I have to concentrate”) and creating activated states (e.g.,

“Come on!”).

Comparison between anger and anxiety-eliciting situations

A single 2 x 2 chi-square test indicated a significant association of the emotion-

eliciting situation (anger/ anxiety) with the type of automatic self-talk (spontaneous/ goal-

directed). When comparing the participants’ ratings between the anger- and anxiety-





eliciting situations, post-hoc 2 x 1 chi-squared analyses showed: a non-significant

difference in the number of spontaneous statements (χ2 = 3.16, p = .075); and a significant

difference in the number of goal-directed statements (χ2 = 10.39, p = .001); goal-directed

self-talk was reported more often in anxiety-eliciting situations than in anger-eliciting

ones.

Repeated-measures ANOVA was calculated to test for differences in the

dimension of spontaneous self-talk between the anger- and anxiety-eliciting situations.

The analysis yielded a significant and large multivariate situation effect, F(2, 423) = 113.25,

p < .001, partial η2 = .349. The effect was significant and large for both valence, F(1, 424)

= 79.60, p < .001, partial η 2 = .158; and time perspective, F(1, 424) = 152.05, p < .001,

partial η2 = .264. These results indicate that self-talk in anger-related situations was rated

as more negative and retrospective (e.g., “Why couldn’t he pass the ball to me”) than

compared to anxiety-related situations, where self-talk was rated as more positive and

anticipatory (e.g., “What if I fail? What if I am not up for the challenge”). Based on the

criteria outlined by Kirk (1996), partial η² values of .010, .059, and .138 were taken as

corresponding to small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively.

Cramer’s V statistic was calculated to provide a quantitative measure of the

strength of the association between the two emotion-eliciting situations and the type of

goal-directed self-talk (Figure 2). The magnitude of association measured by Cramer’s V

was interpreted following guidelines in Rea and Parker (1992). The results showed a

significant and moderate association between emotions-eliciting situations and the

different types of goal-directed self-talk (Cramer’s V = .384, p = .001). A comparison of

the distribution of goal-directed self-talk in the two emotion-eliciting situations showed

that in the anger-eliciting situation the percentages of statements classified as controlling

cognitive reactions (e.g., “These things happen to anyone; 14.0% and 1.0%, for anger and

anxiety, respectively), controlling deactivated states (e.g., “Don’t give up”; 7.2% and

2.1%, for anger and anxiety, respectively), and regulating behaviour (e.g., “Shoot the

ball”; 31.6% and 22.7%, for anger and anxiety, respectively), were larger compared to

the anxiety-eliciting situations. On the contrary, in the anxiety-eliciting situations the

percentages of statements categorized as creating activated states (e.g., “Give a 100%”;

25.8% and 15.8%, for anxiety and anger, respectively), controlling activated states (e.g.,

“Don’t be afraid”; 8.3% and 1.8%, for anxiety and anger, respectively), and creating

deactivated states (e.g., “Relax”; 8.3% and 0%, for anxiety and anger, respectively), were

larger compared to the anger-eliciting situations. Lastly, the percentage of statements





classified as focusing on positive predictions (e.g., “You can win”; 32.0% and 29.8%, for

anxiety and anger, respectively), was very similar in both emotion-eliciting situations.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to use the classification of automatic self-talk

outlined by Latinjak, Zourbanos et al., (2014), and its subordinate dimensions and

categories, and to compare automatic self-talk in anger and anxiety-eliciting situations.

Overall, the results showed that in both situations participants reported more spontaneous

than goal-directed self-talk. Generally, psychologists have focused more on goal-directed

thinking than on spontaneous thoughts, in areas such as decision making and problem

solving (Markman & Gentner, 2001), in spite of the evidence that indicates that

spontaneous thought is a ubiquitous phenomenon, occupying as much as a third of our

waking life (Christoff et al., 2011; Kane et al., 2007). In addition, several theorists have

hypothesized that spontaneous thoughts serve an adaptive function by helping the

individual to mentally explore and prepare for upcoming situations (Klinger, 1977;

Singer, 1966). The results of this study are in line with these findings and, partially,

support these hypotheses, as the number of spontaneous self-talk was significantly larger

compared to goal-directed self-talk, and as a larger number of anticipatory spontaneous

self-talk was observed in anxiety-eliciting situations.

Regarding spontaneous self-talk, a comparison between the anger- and anxiety-

eliciting situations, revealed differences in the valence dimension of self-talk. In

particular, spontaneous statements were rated as more positive in the anxiety- compared

to the anger-eliciting situations. This result is congruent with theoretical considerations

(Russell & Feldman-Barrett, 1999) and empirical findings in the area of affect (Fontaine

et al., 2007; Latinjak et al., 2013; Latinjak, López-Ros et al., 2014), suggesting that when

comparing these two negative states, anxiety could be experienced as more positive

compared to anger. The presence of both positive and negative statements in anxiety-

eliciting situations might represent the uncertainty regarding goal attainment and coping

that in the differential emotion theory has been identified as inherent to anxiety (Lazarus,

2000). In addition, the presence of positive and negative statements in the anxiety-

eliciting situations seem to coincide with the directional approach to anxiety

interpretation, that anxiety states can be perceived as either facilitative or debilitative

depending on individual characteristics and situational states (Jones, 1995). Interestingly,

Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (2008) reported that among middle-distance runners, those





interpreting their anxiety states as facilitating reported fewer negative interfering thoughts

than those interpreting their anxiety states as debilitating.

Differences between the anger- and anxiety-eliciting situations were also

identified for the time-perspective dimension of spontaneous self-talk. In particular, self-

talk was more anticipatory in anxiety-eliciting situations and more retrospective in anger-

eliciting situations. This difference is congruent with our hypothesis and partly consistent

with the dimensional definitions of the two emotions. According to Latinjak (2012), anger

is retrospective and anxiety anticipatory. Researchers in clinical psychology have

similarly related anxiety to future-oriented cognitive processes such as decision-making

(Hofmann, Alpers, & Pauli, 2009) or future thinking (Miloyan, Pachana, & Suddendorf,

2014).

With regard to goal-directed self-talk, statements were mostly categorized as

focusing on positive predictions, creating activated states, and regulating behaviour.

Moreover, self-confidence, in general (e.g., Woodman & Hardy, 2003), and confidence

cue words, in particular (e.g., Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2009), have been linked with

performance and well-being. Regarding statements creating activated states (let’s go!)

and statements regulating behaviour (hit the ball), these statements are closely related to

motivational and instructional self-talk respectively. These kinds of self-talk have been

extensively studied in the strategic self-talk interventions research paradigm. Research

has evidenced positive effects of both motivational and instructional cue-words on

performance and performance-related outcome measures in several sports and tasks (e.g.,

Hatzigeorgiadis, Galanis, Zourbanos, & Theodorakis, 2014; Kolovelonis, Goudas, &

Dermitzaki, 2011; Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Bardas, & Theodorakis, 2013). In

contrast to the plethora of studies examining the effects of strategic, intervention-based,

instructional and motivational self-talk on performance, there is a lack of evidence

regarding automatic motivational and instructional self-talk (i.e., statements classified as

creating activated states and regulating behaviour, respectively). In addition, there is a

dearth of knowledge about the links and interaction effects between automatic goal-

directed self-talk and strategic self-talk interventions. These issues may provide useful

grounds for future research.

Comparing anger- and anxiety-eliciting situations, the results indicated that more

statements were classified as goal-directed in the anxiety-eliciting situations than in the

anger-eliciting ones. One possible explanation would be that anxiety is often associated

to appraisals of one’s own weaknesses (Ruiz-Pérez et al., 2014), whereas anger is





associated with appraisals of others prejudicial and offending behaviour (Lazarus, 2000).

Consequently, goal-directed self-talk can more easily target one’s own weaknesses in

anxiety-eliciting situations than others discriminatory behaviour in anger-eliciting

situations. This finding also reflects the tendency of sport psychologists to focus on

coping with anxiety more than coping with other high-arousal emotions, such as anger

(Vast et al., 2010).

At this point, some methodological decisions require particular consideration as

they reflect potential limitations. First, the thought-sampling procedure, as the recall

protocol might have caused biased memory. The time elapsed since the actual situations

took place might have changed the way in which the participants appraised the events and

their thoughts at that time. As Nisbett and Wilson (1977) postulate, all thought-sampling

procedures have limitations as they rely on conscious awareness and memory. However,

such procedures provide access to cognitive activation and metacognitive knowledge that

cannot be obtained through other methods (Guerrero, 2005). That the data concur in

content with findings from previous studies regarding the content of self-talk (e.g.,

Latinjak, Zourbanos et al., 2014; Zourbanos et al., 2009), strengthen our confidence and

provide indirect support for the integrity of the thought sampling procedure. Taking into

considerations the limitations of all thought-sampling procedures, we believe that future

studies should opt for different methodologies (e.g., think aloud, microphones,

observation through video-recording, video-stimulated recall) which will enable the

verification of the present findings.

Another potential limitation may lie in the participant-dependent data-analyzing

procedure. The present study adopted a different strategy to that of Latinjak, Zourbanos

et al (2014). In their study, the categorization of the self-talk statements was performed

by the researchers. However, they admitted difficulties classifying some of the statements

based solely on content. Recently, Van Raalte et al. (2014) evidenced that self-talk ratings

made by participants in their study could be distinguished from those made by

researchers, and they concluded that researchers might want to consider methods for

coding spontaneous self-talk that involve participant self-categorization. Therefore, we

decided to ask participants to rate their own answers after receiving induction regarding

the conceptualization of the self-talk framework used in the study. The small number of

questions asked by participants before and during the administration of the second

questionnaire, and the small number of statements that participants were not able to

classify into spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, strengthen our confidence and





provide indirect support for the integrity of the data-analysis procedure. Nonetheless, the

ICC scores indicated modest agreement between participants and the judges. Thus, the

results correspond to the study of Van Raalte et al. (2014) as it indicates that there are

differences between participant and researcher ratings. These results could be explained

by the fact that there are interpretive elements associated with the content of self-talk

(Hardy, 2006).

Compared to the study conducted by Latinjak, Zourbanos et al. (2014), in this

study the participants successfully identified spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk

when remembering an emotion-eliciting situation. In the former study, the authors were

not able to identify goal-directed self-talk in their first attempt (Study 1), and the authors

conducted a second study, adjusting the question asked to the participants, to inquire into

goal-directed self-talk. This study succeeded to inquire into both spontaneous and goal-

directed self-talk, partly because the participants coded their own answers, and partly

because the question asked to the participants was a mixture between the two different

questions asked in Latinjak, Zourbanos et al. When comparing the results of both studies,

the categories of the former study were able to accommodate the statements listed in this

study. Hence, there is evidence to suggest that the structure proposed by Latinjak,

Zourbanos et al. is inclusive. Moreover, the former study failed to compare self-talk in

different emotion-eliciting situations, whereas this study advanced our understanding in

relation to the different thoughts that appear in different emotion-eliciting situations.

The present study attempted to investigate the links between self-talk and

emotions that have received relatively scant attention in the sport psychology literature.

As such, it is among the first studies exploring self-talk in relation to emotions in

competitive situations. The results supported the distinction between goal-directed and

spontaneous self-talk in athletes, and their underlying dimensions. Furthermore, the

findings provided preliminary evidence regarding the content of self-talk in anxiety- and

anger-eliciting situations, with references to the valence and the time-perspective

dimensions of self-talk. Summarizing these findings, in anger-eliciting situations,

spontaneous self-talk was generally negative and retrospective, whereas in anxiety-

eliciting situations, spontaneous self-talk was positive and negative as well as

anticipatory. Goal-directed self-talk generally aimed at creating activated states,

regulating behaviour and focusing on positive predictions, even though differences

among both emotion-eliciting situations were also detected. The present study provides

valuable preliminary evidence for the links between two salient emotions in sport and





self-talk, and encourages research to further explore such relationships between different

emotions and the self-talk of athletes.

Finally, from an applied perspective, the results suggest that practitioners should take into

consideration the role of emotions when addressing issues related to the self-talk of their

athletes. Moreover, coaches and applied sport psychologists would do well to

acknowledge the difference between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, since both

contain a different set of information relevant for coaching. Spontaneous self-talk informs

about general concurrent affective and cognitive processes, whereas goal-directed self-

talk contains the instructions directed towards the athlete from “the coach or psychologist

within”, embedded in his/her own mind. Importantly, these instructions can coincide

with, complement or contradict the coach’s and applied sport psychologist’s feedback.

Additionally, a goal-directed self-talk intervention has recently been developed to address

debilitative automatic self-talk and regulate emotions (Latinjak, Font-Lladó, Zourbanos

& Hatzigeorgiadis, in press). In this intervention, ineffective goal-directed self-talk in

problematic sport situations was challenged and replaced by the athlete with alternative

goal-directed statements.





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