GLOBALIZATION

AND CULTURAL

DIPLOMACY

CENTER FOR ARTS AND CULT U R E

GlobalCVR 1/2/02 1:04 PM Page 2

GLOBALIZATION ANDCULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Harvey B. FeigenbaumThe George Washington University

CENTER FOR ARTS AND CULTUREArt, Culture & the National Agenda

Issue Paper

ART, CULTURE ANDTHE NATIONAL AGENDA

The Center for Arts and Culture is an independentnot-for-profit organization dedicated to examiningcritical issues in cultural policy. The Center initiated,in the Spring of 2000, a project called Art, Culture andthe National Agenda. With generous support from anumber of foundations, the Center solicited back-g round papers on arts and cultural issues fro mdozens of scholars and practitioners over an 18-monthperiod. The aim of Art, Culture and the National Agendais to explore a roster of cultural issues that affect thenation’s well-being -- issues that should be on thehorizon of policymakers, public and private, and atnational, state and local levels.

This issue paper, Globalization and Cultural Diplomacy,is the fourth in the Art, Culture and the NationalAgenda series. Written by Dr. Harvey Feigenbaumfrom George Washington University, Globalization andCultural Diplomacy looks at trade, cultural diploma-cy, and foreign policy implications of globalization.This issue paper, like others in the series, reflects theopinions and research of its author, who was informedby commissioned background papers and the assis-tance of the Center’s Research Advisory Council. Thepaper does not necessarily represent the views of allthose associated with the Center.

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Cover photo: City lights around the world from theGoddard Space Flight Center satellite image collection.To see more go to: www.gsfc.nasa.gov/

Kevin MulcahyProfessor of Political ScienceLouisiana State University

Shalini VenturelliProfessor of International CommunicationsAmerican University

Additional information about the Center and the Art,Culture and the National Agenda project can be foundon the Center’s web site at www.culturalpolicy.org.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, ournational conversation has assumed a new tenor.Americans now better understand how culture affectsthe way we are viewed by some people in other partsof the world. As we struggle to recover from theattacks, we must ask how we can nourish a truer pic-t u re of American values, American culture, andAmerican democracy. The Center for Arts andCulture hopes that this issue paper will contribute toa deeper understanding of culture’s role in globalinteractions, and that its proposals will spur the fed-eral government to devote additional resources andattention to the critical contributions of culture in theconduct of foreign affairs.

Gigi BradfordExecutive Director

November 2001

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The Art, Culture and the National Agenda project wassupported by the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation,the Nathan Cummings Foundation, the Thomas S.Kenan Institute for the Arts, the Ford Foundation, theOpen Society Institute, the David and Lucile PackardFoundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and theAndy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts. We aregrateful for the time and resources provided by eachof these foundations.

We would like to thank, in particular, HarveyFeigenbaum for his hard work in producing this issuepaper. We also thank Research Advisory Councilmember William Glade, of the University of Texas, forhis advice and counsel in the paper’s development.Finally, we thank the following individuals for theircontribution in providing necessary backgro u n dinformation for Globalization and Cultural Diplomacy:

Richard T. Arndt Past PresidentFulbright AssociationRetired from United States Information Agency

Harvey FeigenbaumProfessor of Political Science and International AffairsAssociate Dean of the Elliott SchoolThe George Washington University

William GilcherDirector of Media Projects US/CanadaThe Goethe-Institut, Washington DC

William GladeProfessor of EconomicsUniversity of Texas, Austin

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Culture can be the glue that binds civil societies; it canprovide for the common assumptions which under-gird markets, laws and regulations. Conversely, cul-tural divisions can tear a society apart, and make itsmarkets, laws and regulations unworkable, at least inpart. Thus, the configuration and production of cul-ture is a legitimate concern of public policy, for it com-prises both public and private goods. Additionally,understanding the culture of other peoples andnations is essential to international cooperation andsuccessful commerce in today’s increasingly globalmarkets.

Cultural products and services are incre a s i n g l yimportant to American competitiveness, as nationaland global economies are more and more based oninformation and the means of its exchange. This issuepaper focuses on the significance of globalization andits policy implications for education, the regulation ofintellectual property and monopolies, and the financ-ing of new creative enterprises.

The nation states of the world have moved from thebi-polar system of the Cold War to a global system --integrating markets, nation states, and technologies toa degree never witnessed before. Globalization hasstimulated world-wide growth, and for some,incomes are rising at unprecedented rates. But thereis a backlash from those who have been, or think theyhave been, left behind. For some people, local, region-al, or national cultures seem to be eroding under thepressure of global markets.

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satellites and digital compression tend to moder-ate or even blunt the impact of cultural protec-tionism. Moreover, maintaining diverse sources ofcultural products and services, on a global as wellas national level, provides value added forAmerican consumers and producers while allow-ing other countries to produce their distinctivecultures as a valued public good.

America’s long term international competitive-ness in the “Knowledge Economy” will dependon improved education, modernized regulation ofintellectual property and knowledge monopolies,and micro-financing of small, creative enterprises.These efforts will need to concentrate, in part, onthe cultural ingredients intrinsic to theKnowledge Economy.

The U.S. may be able to live with some culturalexceptions through existing flexibilities in theGeneral Agreement on Trade Services (GATS), butthere is also no need to adopt a pose of rigid oppo-sition to the forms of exception advocated by theEuropeans and Canadians. Generally speaking,the US should show more sympathy with the cul-tural dilemmas that other countries experience inthe face of American popular culture.

State Department programs in support of educa-tional and cultural affairs, on the one hand, andpublic diplomacy, on the other, must be kept care-fully distinct, even though they are fundamental-ly compatible. Furthermore, both culturalexchanges and public diplomacy need theresources and administrative muscle to carry out

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The United States tends to dominate internationaltrade in cultural goods and services. Even though anumber of the world’s major cultural producers anddistributors are not owned by Americans, the pre-dominance of U.S. content results in tension betweenU.S. foreign economic and trade objectives and thedesire of other countries to preserve their culturalidentities and foster indigenous cultural industries.Historically, U.S. government policies have tended tofavor free trade in cultural products and services.Other nations, however, have restricted such tradebecause they are concerned by the dominance of U.S.cultural goods and services, particularly in the audio-visual sector.

Outside of commercial trade in cultural goods andservices, the U.S. government has a long-term com-mitment to promoting mutual understanding by fos-tering international cultural relations. U.S. govern-ment programs to this end have taken the form ofexchanges, on the one hand, and public diplomacy, onthe other. Exchanges allow people from differentcountries and cultures to get to know and understandeach other. Public diplomacy, in the service of whichcultural diplomacy has sometimes been enlisted, getsAmerica’s word out – in a hopefully persuasive wayto hopefully receptive publics in other nations.

This paper suggests:

America’s trade advantages in cultural productsand services can be maintained even if the U.S. isless adamant about opposing cultural exceptionsto free trade. The technologies of direct broadcast

8 Executive Summary Executive Summary

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE

The end of World War II set the stage for dramaticchanges in the world – politically, economically, andculturally. Yet, it would take almost half a century forthese changes to play out. In the West, political, eco-nomic, and cultural nationalism became discredited.On the other hand, in the developing world – whethernewly emerging states from ex-colonies or long inde-pendent countries – nationalism in all its forms spreadand intensified. In these developing countries, gov-ernments resorted to a multitude of controls, regula-tions, and promotional policies that supported state-managed industrialization and restricted internation-al trade and investment.

In addition, a large portion of the world parted com-pany with the open societies of the West and their pre-f e r red trade and investment policies. Centrallyplanned economies were installed in the Sovietsphere, on the Chinese mainland, and elsewhere.Political pluralism was systematically eliminated inthese countries. And, cultural imports were con-trolled and held to a minimum, while cultural exportswere harnessed to expansionist political aims.

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their particular mandates. Cultural offices abroadneed to be tailored to fit each country’s specific sit-uation and be staffed with Americans of highachievement. Distinguished university profes-sors, arts and educational administrators, journal-ists, trade union officials, and artists should berecruited for temporary assignments. U.S. gov-ernment programs should facilitate exchanges fortheir long-term intellectual, artistic, and educa-tional value, rather than tie them to often transientpolicy objectives.

10 Executive Summary

changes dramatically facilitating transport and com-munications, companies could locate each stage ofproduction in areas where factor costs were cheapest,allowing them to optimize sales of finished goods inthe most lucrative markets. This expansion of trade,together with the geographical integration of produc-tion, came to be a significant piece of what came to beknown as “globalization.”

As Margaret Wyszomirski points out, globalization isa “process in the works.”

Economically, globalization is seen—various-ly—as a process by which business expandsinto markets around the world; as the increas-ing integration of world markets and theparceling out of different stages of productionto areas with the most obvious competitiveadvantage; or the increasing interdependenceof business and financial systems.

Te c h n o l o g i c a l l y, the internationalization ofcommunications, media, and informationdelivery and distribution systems both sup-ports and drives the emerging global econo-my. Multinational and transnational commu-nication and media corporations use wireless,fiber optic, and web-based technologies tomanage and market their products globally.The Internet and associated activities havemade information access easier and fasterthan ever before. And technology keepsevolving at a rapid pace.1

Globalization is clearly about more than commerce.Thomas Friedman notes in The Lexus and the Olive Tree:“Globalization. . .is the overarching international

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Notwithstanding these factors, the United States wasable to use its post-war industrial preeminence andinfluence to construct, with the support of theInternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank, aworld economy with generally diminishing trade andinvestment barriers and open markets. Although theprocess of trade liberalization launched by the indus-trially advanced countries was long, often laborious,and fraught with contradictions, it nonetheless con-tinued through the eight consecutive rounds of nego-tiations that composed the General Agreement onTariffs and Trade (GATT) and that culminated in theestablishment of the World Trade Org a n i z a t i o n(WTO). Exchange of goods (and increasingly services)skyrocketed, creating previously unknown levels ofwealth and prosperity for many.

Alongside the institutional framework provided firstby the GATT and then by the WTO, regional arrange-ments, such as those that eventuated in the EuropeanUnion and the Southern Cone Common Market(Mercosur) in Latin America, were harbingers of thedevelopment of a global economy. By the 1980s, eventhe developing countries were turning to the kind ofmarket-based policies that the advanced nations hadbeen espousing. The collapse of communism after1989 further extended the reach of this system to thecountries of Central and Eastern Europe. A decade orso earlier, a shift in Chinese economic policy hadgradually opened a large portion of Asia to growingparticipation in world markets.

In economic terms, the huge increase in the volume oftrade went hand in hand with major changes in theorganization of economic production. With barriers totrade effectively dismantled and technological

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the United States would appear to cut against theargument that most workers are not better off. Andmany of the poor in the developing world are muchbetter off. Still the onset of recession may activate thepersisting concern that liberalized trade may worsenincome distribution in both advanced and developingeconomies. Even so, so long as world trade is expand-ing, there appears to be some reduction of poverty inthe developing world.

Other critics see globalization as undermining envi-ronmental and worker protections. Firms in advancedcountries with these protections see themselves at acompetitive disadvantage in relation to rivals fromcountries with less costly regulations. Some academ-ics with no obvious political ox to gore stress that thetendency toward globalized production allows eco-nomic actors to escape not only the control of govern-ments, but also the discipline of markets. As Prakashand Hart point out:

In an international economy, cross-nationaltrade and investment flows are regulated bythe state, or supra-national institutions estab-lished by states. In contrast, production in aglobal economy is organized in cross-bordernetworks or value-chains largely out of thecontrol of states. Since a significant propor-tion of cross border trade takes place withinfirms, cro s s - b o rder networks supersederesource allocation by markets as well.4

On the other hand, Friedman argues:

[T]hanks in large part to increasing globaliza-tion more than one quarter of humanity is

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system shaping the domestic politics and foreign rela-tions of virtually every country…” It “involves theinexorable integration of markets, nation-states, andtechnologies to a degree never witnessed before – in away that is enabling individuals, corporations andnation-states to reach around the world farther, faster,deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a waythat is also producing a powerful backlash from thosebrutalized or left behind…” We have gone from“How big is your missile?” to “How fast is yourmodem?”2 We have gone from a variety of economicideologies to a choice between “free market vanillaand North Korea.”3

Many stress the benefits of this new world order –increased efficiency, development, and income, as thenewly industrialized countries expand their exportmarkets and attract inward investment. By and large,globalization has been received positively by nationalgovernments, and in some quarters enthusiastically.Standards of living are, by and large, higher.

Critics worry, however, about the impact of globaliza-tion on workers and the environment, and publicprotests at meetings of the World Trade Association inSeattle and Genoa are a measure of their concerns.Some argue that the rise of manufacturing in develop-ing economies has occurred at the expense of labor inthe developed countries. It is suggested that the lossof low and semiskilled jobs in advanced countries hasleft the more poorly educated in those countries inp recarious circumstances, without the training tocompete for new jobs in the high technology indus-tries.

On the other hand, recent low unemployment rates in

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society and economy, including specialists at theWorld Bank, argues that the cultural wealth of nationsis key to the New Economy. She urges that this cul-tural wealth can no longer be regarded as

something fixed, inherited, and mass distrib-uted, but as a measure of the vitality, knowl-edge, energy, and dynamism in the produc-tion of ideas… The challenge for every nationis not how to prescribe an environment of pro-tection for a received body of art and tradition,but how to construct one of creative explosionand innovation in all areas of the arts and sci-ences.7

The pursuit of knowledge and the encouragement ofcreativity, while related, are not identical. Nor is thevenue for these efforts limited to higher education.The entire educational sector is crucial. As Venturelliargues:

Basic literacy skills and imitative learning ade-quate for following instructions on the assem-bly line, the workshop, or desktop terminalare simply inadequate to the demand of a cre-ative and innovative society. Not basic educa-tion, but advanced intellectual and creativeskills that emphasize interdisciplinary andindependent thinking, should be required atearlier stages of the educational process andextend from preschool to grad school. 8

The “Creative Economy” (as Venturelli calls it) hasanother set of issues concerning intellectual propertylaws and practices. “The nation that can accuratelybalance ‘fair use’ with property rights in expressionwill experience unforeseen and unpredictable spurts

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now enjoying growth at rates at which theirliving standards will quadruple within ageneration. . . . That is unprecedented in eco-nomic history. And far from coming at theexpense of the United States, this worldwidegrowth has led to the lowest unemploymentrate in America in nearly fifty years.5

CULTURE AND THE NEW ECONOMY

The much-heralded “New Economy” is more thanjust a recently deflated stock-market bubble. The termdescribes a fundamental shift in economic activityfrom repetitive mass production requiring modestskills to the modern work environment where intel-lectual and creative judgments are primary. The NewEconomy is knowledge-based, and knowledge isacquired through institutions that are shaped by cul-ture. Not the least of these is the educational system,especially universities. 6

In the United States, public funding has been nowheremore effective than in the promotion of higher educa-tion and research. Connecting universities with theworld expands their knowledge base and improvesthe quality of research. This is often accomplishedthrough what are, in effect, public-private partner-ships. Encouraging international exchange of schol-ars and university students under the auspices of theFulbright program should continue. So should thefacilitation through the tax code of the funding of uni-versity exchanges.

Professor Shalini Venturelli of American University,along with other thoughtful analysts of contemporary

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THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON CULTURE

If some have viewed the economic impact of global-ization with a jaundiced eye, the cultural impact of thephenomenon has been even more disquieting to oth-ers. Changes in the economy are linked with otheraspects of a society: e.g., social and political structures,the organization of civil society, pre f e rences andbeliefs, patterns of consumption, and the repertory ofcultural expression.

Communications technologies are speeding up glob-alization and affecting cultural differences. Treasuredfeatures of societies and their cultural expressions areundergoing profound changes. This has led a numberof countries to express concern that culture is becom-ing “too global,” in the sense that it is becoming toohomogenized.

For a European or Canadian the impact of culturalglobalization is clear: one need simply flick on one’stelevision, purchase a CD, thumb through the“Amusements” section of the daily newspaper, orwalk past the local McDonald’s. The problem formany Europeans, Canadians, and Latin Americans, tosay nothing of millions in the Islamic world, is thatglobalization means Americanization. The uniformity ofmass cultural offerings around the world has led cul-tural critics to see globalization as an international ori-entation toward the worst aspects of mass consump-tion and American cultural products pitched to thelowest common denominator.

These critics are not completely wrong. Popular cul-ture (including software), according to some reckon-ings, rivals aviation and agriculture as one of

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in the growth of creative ideas, placing it at a compet-itive advantage in the Information Society.”9 She alsoargues that the finan-cing of creative enterprises mayneed to move from mechanisms available only to thefew (e.g., bank loans, venture capital investments,IPOs) to mechanisms available to the many (e.g.,micro credits and loans), encouraging a wide varietyof entre p reneurs from which a few winners willemerge. Finally, Venturelli urges policy frameworksthat discourage knowledge monopolies.10

On this issue of monopoly, it needs to be noted thatcopyrights and patents are crucial to the encourage-ment of innovation. At the same time, some thoughtneeds to be given to our current concepts, laws andregulations involving intellectual property. Whilenew knowledge can lead to more new knowledge,encouraging the production and distribution of ideasmay require a greater attention to “fair use,” in con-tradistinction to immediate property benefits.

In the long run, as innumerable studies of technologi-cal advancement reveal, the most substantial elementsin virtually all advances are those that come from thecommon cultural heritage. The net contribution to thec reative environment should also be considere dwhere regulators are confronted with mergers of theowners and producers of cultural content. Market-distorting mergers, coupled with policies that empha-size deregulation, can add to societal cost, and candampen the vitality of the emerging economic frame-works.

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the size and aggressiveness of American cul-tural industries such as movies, television,and publishing have, in various periods andamong certain audiences, stimulated a strongsense of fear about the ‘Americanization’ ofCanada. 13

There have been similar reactions in France, Korea,Norway, Australia,14 and other countries.

This fear of dominance by U.S. art and culture is com-pounded by the American approach to cultural trade.Sensitivity to the cultural concerns of our allies is notour strong suit. In the American view, Europeans orCanadians should put up no barriers to the entry of“cultural products” any more than they should beallowed to discriminate against other types of tradedgoods. Michael Boskin, chief economics advisor toPresident George H. W. Bush, famously noted thatthere was no difference between “silicon chips andpotato chips,” and cultural goods and services shouldbe viewed in the same way.15 This position ranklesour trading partners. As Mulcahy notes:

In Canada (as in many European nations), cul-ture is an expression of national identity, andas such is to be promoted and protected as apublic responsibility. To the degree to whichculture for Americans is about the profit-mak-ing entertainment industry and for Canadiansabout the politics of national identity, thereshould be little doubt about the propensity formutual misunderstanding concerning anyexempt status for cultural industries in free-trade agreements.16

The result has been a series of efforts by many

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America’s biggest exports. In 1996 the U.S. exportedover $60.2 billion in sales of software and entertain-ment products, and total U.S. exports of intellectualproperty have risen over 94 percent since 1991.11

These figures do not count illegal copies and otherforms of piracy. Meanwhile, MacDonald’s restaurantsare opening at a rate of six a day around the world,12

and children who may never have seen a hoop canidentify Michael Jordan or the logo of the NBA.

The global impact of U.S. culture is not a recent phe-nomenon, but one that has become incre a s i n g l yevident – especially over the last 50 years. Alongsideexports of popular culture, the works of Americanwriters have gained increasing readership abroad.And, the impact of abstract expressionism and itsaftermath gave New York in particular and the U.S. ingeneral the defining role in new vocabularies of paint-ing and architecture. American musicians, not just inpopular music, have gained world-wide recognitionas composers and performing artists.

However, the reaction to the impacts of globalizationin popular culture is irrefutable. A number of coun-tries have decried that influence and instituted meas-ures that favor cultural nationalism and cultural pro-tectionism. Canada, as Professor Kevin Mulcahy ofLouisiana State University notes, has had a longtimefear of becoming a U.S. “vassal state.” For example, inCanada, Hollywood feature films (many shot inCanada) account for 95 percent of screen time. Bycontrast, through extensive subsidy, France keeps theU.S. market share to 70 percent. Kevin Mulcahy, ofLouisiana State University writes:

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Thus, the issue is not simply the protection of a coun-try’s culture, although this is perhaps both the mostemotional element of these policies and the best argu-ment politically. Cultural protectionism has an eco-nomic purpose as well. Some would suggest that eco-nomics are the principal purpose. And, beyond thecultural industries themselves, Shalini Ve n t u re l l iargues that the cultural sector will become the leadingedge of most economies in the 21st Century, as the“Information Economy” becomes the “Cre a t i v eEconomy.”20 In a world where innovation is crucial,where the providers of “content” become the key pro-ducers for the Internet and other media, where cre-ativity has multiple applications, cultural industriesthat might have been merely luxuries in an earlier erabecome more central.

In the Bush Administration’s 2001 International TradeLegislative Agenda, the intent is for the US to achieveg reater trade liberalization for all service sectors.Article XX(f) of the General Agreement on Trade andTariffs (GATT) provides an exemption from all GATTobligations where a country imposes trade barriers topreserve treasures of historic, artistic, or archaeologi-cal significance to a country’s heritage. Thus, coun-tries are at liberty to restrict access to their “treasures.”

The principal cultural trade disputes involve what arecalled “audiovisual and related services” whichinclude theatrical motion pictures, television, homevideo entertainment, transmission services, andrecorded music. This is an essentially commercialarena in which there have been long standing dis-putes, particularly with the Europeans andCanadians. There are few real trade disputes in the

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countries, including those who are members of theWTO, to shield their domestic cultures from the influxof American movies, television shows, books, andpopular music. At the same time these countries haveintervened in their domestic markets to support localcultural industries. Venturelli says:

Mechanisms of cultural revival include, forexample: lottery systems to subsidize filmproduction (UK), taxes on cinema receipts(France), differential postal rates to encouragedomestic magazine content (Canada), taxlevies on commercial publishers to subsidizesmall-scale independent publishers(Germany), and structural funds and taxbreaks to encourage private investment incontent enterprises (Canada, France,Australia, India, among others).17

As Frances Cairncross concludes in The Death ofDistance, the fear of being overwhelmed by the outputof Hollywood is “greatest in Europe.” Two trends, shesays, worry Europeans: “the collapse of the localmovie industries and the rise of American imports.”18

Cairncross points out that, by the early 1990s, the boxoffice take of European-made films in their home mar-ket had dropped to one-sixth of its 1957 level in realterms. And, this was so notwithstanding the fact thatEuropean films cost on average 10 percent of whatAmerican films cost and were 80 percent subsidizedby the State. As Angus Finney in The State of EuropeanCinema quotes British film producer David Puttnam:“If we make a film that nobody comes to see, who dowe seek to blame?” Finney also quotes French actressJeanne Moreau: “If carpenters made chairs the waythat [French] screenwriters produce scripts, we would

all be sitting on the floor.” 19

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The bottom line here appears to be a mixed one. Onthe one hand, American audiovisual content domi-nates world audiences because world audiences likeit. It does so without direct subsidy. On the otherhand, European and the Canadian governments havecreated restrictions on the free entry of foreign cultur-al products for what they deem larger national goals.Yet, much of their own heavily subsidized content haslittle broad appeal, even in their own countries.Further, communications technology is challengingthe capacities of governments everywhere to enforcesuch restrictions, and in any case, most other countrieslack the vast domestic primary and secondary mar-kets from which they might recoup a substantial per-centage of their investments in such endeavors.

CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The tension between trade and culture should lead usto examine more broadly the role of culture in theinternational relations of the United States. Culturehas been important to America’s relations with therest of the world in a number of ways. While thestakes for trade in cultural goods and services haverisen, access to, and understanding of, the cultures ofothers offer as many opportunities for cooperation asfor conflict. Culture’s capacity to foster understand-ing among peoples is especially true in the area ofeducational exchange and cultural diplomacy. Ouroldest relations with Europe and Latin America havebeen cultural.

William Glade, of the University of Texas at Austin,writes:

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not-for-profit part of the arts sector, although laborunion induced immigration restrictions on foreignartists in U.S. productions impede the ability of U.S.producers to develop the best possible fare.

By the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995, theE u ropean Union (EU) had withdrawn its marketaccess commitment which the US had sought. Thefinal General Agreement on Trade Services (GATS)did not contain a “cultural exception” as the EUdesired. In addition to the United States, eleven othercountries (Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya,South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua,Singapore, and Thailand) ensured continued access totheir markets. Prior to the North American Free TradeA g reement (NAFTA), the Canada-U.S. Fre e - Tr a d eAgreement contained provisions that applied to allthree NAFTA countries (Canada, Mexico, and theU.S.) whereby trade in cultural goods and servicescould have been restricted, providing any countryaffected by such measures applied counter-measuresof equivalent commercial effect.

The Office of the US Trade Representative argues that:access to international markets is necessary to recouphigh production costs; that the GATS has flexibility toaccommodate special cultural concerns (including thepossibility of partial as opposed to full commitmentsto it); and that the GATS does not prevent govern-ments from subsidizing audiovisual services on anon-discriminatory basis (with the subsidies open toforeign as well as domestic producers). The U.S. saysit is seeking “negotiated commitments for the audio-visual sector that establish clear, dependable, and pre-dictable trade rules with due account taken of the sec-tor’s specific sensitivities.”21

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took place after the Second World War under the aus-pices of the program initiated by Senator J. WilliamFulbright. It is perhaps the most prestigious programof its kind. Although the participation of the arts inthese exchanges has been overshadowed byexchanges in the social sciences and the humanities,the latter having been strengthened by government’sconcurrent promotion of American Studies abroad,other exchange programs have been initiated to pro-vide for a modest increase in resources available toexchanges involving the arts.

The Fulbright and related exchange programs con-tribute not only to a genuine opening up of the partic-ipating countries; they also have had a beneficial eco-nomic impact. Richard J. Arndt, longtime diplomatand former president of the Fulbright Association, hasnoted that the “dividends for American society andthe economy are not always obvious, since “ invest-ments will not pay off in foreign relations terms for adecade or two…”23 But they do pay off:

students return to their countries and beginalmost immediately to shape attitudes, createnew demands, launch new needs and opennew markets for U.S. experience and prod-ucts….Cultural exchanges are certainly notdesigned to boost the economy, but economicadvantage—like propaganda—flows as a nat-ural by-product.24

The U.S. government’s strategy has almost alwaysbeen to provide seed money and to encourage theprincipal burden of the exchange to be taken over bythe private sector—for reasons quite different fromthose that have driven cultural diplomacy. Thus it is

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Of the two sets of policies [educationalexchange and cultural diplomacy], trans-bor-der educational interactions are much older,dating back to the late 1700s when newlyestablished learned societies, in the spirit ofthe age, institutionalized communicationbetween their members and those of similarorganizations in Europe and Latin America.Benjamin Franklin, for instance, was the firstAmerican selected for membership in theSpanish Academy of History, and theAmerican Philosophical Society (est. 1743)was the first learned society to electEuropeans and Spanish Americans as corre-sponding members. Before the mid-1800s,many privileged Americans, or those with therequisite calling, set off for Europe to write,paint, perform, and to study the humanities,the visual arts, music, and architecture. By1900, American universities and museumswere sponsoring overseas expeditions, someto the Mediterranean littoral, others to LatinAmerica where American artists and writerswere already roaming with easel and pen.

By the mid-1800s, too, American missionarieswere fanning out over Asia and the MiddleEast, sending the earliest foreign studentsback to the States. …After World War I, bilat-eral and multilateral assistance pro g r a m spoured resources into institution building ineducation, thereby providing expandedopportunities for students and establishedscholars to move across borders.22

The most important advance in educational exchange

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leadership of the indomitable Elihu Root andNicholas Murray Butler, the American LibraryAssociation, the American Council of LearnedSocieties, and the American branch of the Committeeon Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations.The system also included initiatives that sprang,directly or indirectly, from such gatherings as the 1936Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance ofPeace. Indeed, it was out of this Inter- A m e r i c a nConference and the general aura of Pan Americanismsurrounding the Good Neighbor Policy that the StateDepartment, somewhat diffidently because of the pio-neering role of the private sector in international cul-tural relations, went on to establish in 1938 its firstDivision of Cultural Relations.2 6 Thus was theenlightened cosmopolitanism of the East CoastEstablishment institutionalized into explicit publicpolicy.

As World War II engulfed more and more countries,U.S. national security interests seemed, in fact, torequire a more overt attention to cultural diplomacy.In particular, the attempted seduction by the Axispowers of our allies in Latin America led Americandecision makers to involve the cultural aspects ofdiplomacy as yet another means of counteracting theinfluence of Fascism in that region. This effort pro-vided the basis for post-war uses of cultural diploma-cy to support the spread of Western democraticnotions. Glade states:

A course-altering decision was taken in 1938when the Division of Cultural Relations wasset up in the Department of State. Thus beganthe new function of cultural diplomacy, withwhich education exchanges were joined.

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no surprise that from the dawn of the 20th Centurythe biggest players have been large foundations, non-profit organizations, and academic institutions. Gladenotes:

Not long into the twentieth century, mission-ary funders were joined (then overshadowed)by secular foundations in promoting educa-tional development and exchanges. The first,the Rockefeller Foundation, was only a yearold when in 1914 it set up the China MedicalBoard to introduce Western medicine. 25

A multitude of other good works followed, as foun-dations funded education, research, artistic touringcompanies and international exchanges of all kinds.Coupled to the fact that constant flows of immigrantscontinuously added to the American cultural mix,nongovernmental educational exchanges were themost important cultural link between the U.S. and therest of the world until the period preceding WorldWar II.

Of central importance for the long-term configurationof international cultural relations was the growinginvolvement, in the inter-war period, of learned soci-eties and other institutions related to higher educa-tion. Indeed, this system — private, voluntary, sup-ported by philanthropy, and juxtaposing idealisticobjectives with an elite perspective that recast the oldmissionary impulse in secular terms — rested upon avariety of organizations and events.

Coming of age in the 1920s, this system of exchangesconsisted of several intersecting networks that includ-ed the Institute for International Education under the

28

cy uses the techniques of public relations (andsometimes psychological warfare) while cul-tural diplomacy is rooted in education andexample. In sum, cultural diplomacy rests onthe premise that allowing American culturalactivities and leaders to speak for themselvesabroad is the best advertising for the virtues ofa free society. That the goal is political—pro-jecting a favorable image of American societyabroad—must be appreciated; but, that themethods of cultural diplomacy—the fre eexchange of ideas, events, and peoples—are[in some sense] nonpolitical has been lesswell-understood and perhaps even less appre-ciated.28

The inter-mixture of these two aspects of America’sforeign cultural relations has aggravated some of thetrade tensions mentioned above. The situation is com-plicated further by the fact that the participating insti-tutions and individuals generally bring still otherobjectives to the table. Supporting a U.S. culturalpresence as part of America’s overall Cold War strate-gy led many Europeans and Latin Americans to sus-pect that any cultural activities involving Americans,no matter how innocent, were linked to the CIA. Insome part, the fears that many of our friends expressabout Americanization may be linked to these earliersuspicions.

31

A secular replay of the old missionaryimpulse, cultural diplomacy was conceived aspersuasively telling the story of America’s cul-tural accomplishments, and social, political,and economic procedures, to the world—and,secondarily, promoting greater knowledge offoreign cultures.27

The new emphasis on cultural diplomacy was not anAmerican innovation. France and Britain had beguntheir initiatives earlier, but as America became a glob-al power, cultural diplomacy became an importantpart of U.S. foreign policy.

The origins of the U.S. State Department’s first foraysinto cultural diplomacy involved both the short-termattempt to counter Axis propaganda and longer rangesupport for exchanges. The exchange effort was con-ceived as increasing the receptivity of others to ourpropaganda effort. But these two aspects of culturaldiplomacy should not be confused. Kevin Mulcahywrites:

[E]xchanges must be distinguished from propa -ganda. Both are legitimate activities of gov-ernments as they seek to project their interestsabroad. Propaganda has an admittedly nega-tive connotation, but as used here simplyrefers to the range of information and psycho-logical activities (such as films, news storiesand broadcasts) that seek to explain to otherpeople what American foreign policy is about.Such informational diplomacy has an explicit,immediate political content; cultural diploma-cy does not: its methods are indirect and itsgoals are long-range. Informational diploma-

30

Intellectual Property. There is a historic bal-ance between the rights of “fair use” withthose of “ownership” in U.S. Copyright Law.This balance may have eroded as the majorcopyright owners have secured incre a s e drights to lock up access to their property forlonger periods and in expanded circ u m-stances. Congress needs to examine the prac-tical results that now ensue from its enactmentof the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of1998.

Financing. There is a need to expand theavailability of credit for smaller enterprisesthat often spur the new technologies and busi-ness models of the future. The federal gov-ernment should examine its current programsto see whether new creative enterprises areaccomplishing optimal results in relation tothe stimulation of capital for these purposes.

P reventing monopolies. Competitivenessdepends on free and open markets. Anti-trustand other regulatory policies developed in anindustrial age need to be examined in order todetermine whether they are assuring fair andopen pipelines for a variety of intellectual andcultural content, particularly in light of thelarge conglomerates that dominate distribu-tion channels, and in some instances produc-tion, in the electronic, audio/visual, and printmedia.

Culture and Trade

The United States has tended to view cultural prod-ucts and services in the same way as other traded

33

POLICY PROPOSALS

American interests, in the context of globalization, canbe optimally promoted if we adopt an activist stancein public policies involving the arts and culture. Thisrequires, first, an understanding of how culture affectsour relations with other countries and our competi-tiveness in the world economy. Second, we need toacknowledge our allies’ concerns about culture whennegotiating our international economic intere s t s .Finally, we need to be attentive to how we organizeour cultural diplomacy.

Culture and the New Economy

America’s international competitiveness will dependon the capacity of its people and its institutions tomanage the intrinsic elements of the New Economy.The US currently enjoys a lead over others. But thateconomic advantage will dissipate if we do not con-tinue and enhance our individual and corporatecapacities to invent and manage creatively intellectu-al and cultural assets.

Education. Advanced intellectual and cre-ative skills, emphasizing interdisciplinary andindependent thinking, need to be taughtbeginning in pre- school and continuingthrough graduate school. The methods fordoing this (including testing) need to be eval-uated in the classroom. Education in, andthrough, the arts can be instrumental in reach-ing this national goal.

32

The European Commission permits national enforce-ment of quotas legitimized by its “Television withoutB o rders” Directive. And, European courts haveextended the reach of national quota legislation tosatellites. But the reality is different. There is very lit-tle a country can do to prevent DBS transmissions.Jamming transmissions, a practice associated withnon-democratic governments, has become onerouspolitically.

The second technology that favors Hollywoodinvolves digital compression, which greatly reducesthe amount of information that needs to be carried ona television spectrum. This technology expands thecapacity many hundreds of times, making possible“television on demand.” Viewers are able to choose aprogram or film from a library and to be able to see itat anytime. National quota legislation in the face of“television on demand,” could well become meaning-less as the technology proliferates.

Foreign government officials responsible for telecom-munications policy are also proving themselves to beallies of Hollywood. Since the 1980s, an internationalwave of privatizations31 has seen countries that hadknown only public service broadcasters, or a handfulof independent channels, accommodate dozens of pri-vate companies offering television shows. These pri-vate companies are financed by advertising ratherthan by taxes.32 This proliferation of television broad-casters has resulted in a rapid increase in the numberof channels, while the growth in the television watch-ing audience has remained steady. Fewer viewersper channel means that markets have become frag-mented. Confronted with diminished audiences onwhich to base their advertising rates, companies have

35

goods and services. This has been the U.S. policy inmultilateral and bilateral trade negotiations. We maywish to re-examine this policy.29 The American enter-tainment industry’s general competitiveness, newtechnologies, and the policies of other countries maywell neutralize protectionist measures even if weaccede, as we often must, to excepting cultural prod-ucts and services from free trade agre e m e n t s .Moving in the direction of the Europeans and otherswould remove a source of irritation while not neces-sarily damaging our general trade interests, at least inculture. Such movement might, however, create neg-ative precedents in other areas where we seek freetrade in services.

The two technologies most likely to vitiate culturalprotectionism are direct broadcast satellites (DBS) anddigital compression. These technologies will essen-tially make it impossible for countries to limit thenumber of U.S.-produced programs shown in primetime. Such limits were, of course, already problemat-ic: is a television show produced by TriStar Television(owned by Japan’s SONY corporation, but located inCalifornia) American or Japanese?30 Even if one couldclearly define the national origin of such products, thedays of television quotas could soon be over.

Available for over a decade, DBS allows consumersto put up a satellite dish not much larger than a din-ner plate, and receive programming from a number ofprivate companies. For many European and Asiansubscribers, these DBS companies are often based incountries different from those of their customers.They offer mixed programming, with much of it, dueto price and customer demand, coming fro mHollywood.

34

that can appeal to these diverse publics. The fortunatebonus effect is that these stories also appeal to manypeople outside the United States.36 This factor, alongwith the evident investment in production values,explains much of the success of American fare in for-eign markets.

Diversity has also been beneficial as Hollywooddraws much of its talent from around the world.37 It isa matter of conventional economics that the larger thepool of potential employees one can tap, the better thequality of the workers one can hire. This has recentlybeen recognized by the U.S. networks, which havenow made greater efforts to recruit minorities for bothsides of the camera.38

Cultural diversity on a global scale has real economicand non-economic advantages. It can encourageinnovation. New ideas abroad can stimulate newideas here. The “Western” The Magnificent Seven wasa direct imitation of Kirosawa’s “Eastern” S e v e nSamurai. And, French comedies can become middle-brow American fare like Three Men and a Baby.Foreign films are, of course, most useful when theyare different, when they set new trends. In countrieswhere the tradition of film is art, rather than industry,innovation provides, at the very least, variety.Moreover, ideas from the art house often can getincorporated into the next round of commercial prod-ucts from Hollywood. In this way, innovation thatcomes from abroad can end up benefiting U.S. pro-ducers and consumers.

37

become sensitive to the cost of programming (knownas the licensing fee).33

In a world of fragmented markets and shrinkingadvertising revenues, the U.S. has a clear advantage.While American films and television programs havemuch higher production (and marketing) costs thanthose of their foreign competitors, the licensing feesare actually cheaper. This is because U.S.-made prod-ucts are amortized over much larger markets.America not only has a huge domestic primary mar-ket; it also has a broad secondary domestic market.Television shows are sold once to networks and a sec-ond time to local channels as reruns. Finally, bothfilms and television shows are sold to a substantialinternational market. The only companies that cantoday readily distribute to the entire world market(and not just regions) are American.34

In addition to the fact that we have little to lose eco-nomically, at least in the area of cultural products, wealso have an historically given interest in a diversity ofcultural products and services. Economists often seea heterogeneous population as simply adding totransaction costs.35 However, diversity can also be anadvantage. Part of the reason for Hollywood’s successis not just that it produces for a huge domestic market.It also produces an extremely diverse market.

Discovering the kinds of stories that interest variouscombinations of midwesterners, southerners, Jewishurbanites, Latin immigrants, African- and A s i a n -Americans, is no mean feat. In Hollywood the taskhas become internalized, even though producers oftenthink of their projects only in terms of whether or notthey are good stories. Implicitly, a good story is one

36

form a corps of specialists with distinctiveexpertise in aesthetic and humanistic dimen-sions of foreign relations. This rich resource ofknowledge about broad cross-cultural forces— not just in the arts and education but also inreligion, ideology, the media, and popular cul-t u re — risks being diminished, with itsfunctions distributed among line agenciesprincipally concerned with immediate devel-opments in regional politics.

The creation of the post of under secretary forpublic diplomacy could also be an opportuni-ty to add a distinctive voice to the foreign pol-icy making process. As a politically account-able senior State Department official respon-sible for an autonomous bureau of culturaland informational officers, the under secretarywould be uniquely positioned to explain thecultural perspectives of foreign peoples toother policy makers and to the American peo-ple. With the advice of cultural and informa-tional experts, the under secretary for publicdiplomacy could also “tell America’s story tothe world” as well as “tell the world’s story toAmerica.”41

Richard Arndt notes the “deplorable decline in budg-ets” for the cultural dimension of diplomacy whichpeaked in constant dollars in 1966. He reports that allbut a few American libraries abroad have been closed,that formal programs in the performing and the visu-al arts have been dropped, that cultural centers arestarving for support, that exchanges have held firm inthe abstract but have done badly in constant dollarterms, that staffing of embassy cultural offices hasbeen slashed, and that positions targeted to cultureand education have been taken over by generalists.

39

Culture and International Relations

The area of cultural diplomacy is one where Americahas the luxury of building on success. What appearsto be important, argue both Mulcahy and Arndt, is theneed to reconcile the conflicts that occasionally arisef rom trying to accommodate both long-term andshort-term goals.39 This conflict has become a greaterchallenge because the needs of public diplomacy andcultural diplomacy are not always complementary. Inthe latter half of the 20th century, the United StatesInformation Agency dealt with both cultural and pub-lic diplomacy. In 1999, when the agency was foldedback into the Department of State under the Office ofPublic Diplomacy, some called for a reconsideration ofits purposes.

Dick Arndt asserts that:

The new office of educational and culturalaffairs in State, under the Undersecretary forPublic Diplomacy, must define its purposesand goals clearly and separately from those ofPublic Diplomacy. At the same time, the sep-arate definitions of Public Diplomacy and itscultural-educational sibling must mesh.

And Mulcahy notes:

Ideally, the educational, cultural, and informa-tional activities specialists formerly housed atthe US Information Agency (USIA) shouldremain together as a distinct operating unitwithin the State Department, but the person-nel and functions of USIA are being distrib-uted among the department’s re g i o n a lbureaus. Practitioners of cultural diplomacy

38

History suggests … a set of principles and val-ues that emerge from the US experience of cul-tural diplomacy, public and private, since the18th century. They are indispensable values, ifa decent cultural diplomacy is to help linkAmerican culture and education with theworld at large. In a restless period of irre-versible globalization and interdependence,yet in a time of neo-nationalism as nationalsseek identity in the post-colonial period, adecent cultural diplomacy will affect the wel-fare and the long-range security of our plan-et.44

Recommendations

This paper suggests:

America’s trade advantages in cultural productsand services can be maintained even if the US isless adamant about opposing cultural exceptionsto free trade. The technologies of direct broadcastsatellites and digital compression tend to moder-ate or even blunt the impact of cultural protec-tionism. Moreover, maintaining diverse sources ofcultural products and services, on a global as wellas national level, provides value added forAmerican consumers and producers while allow-ing other countries to produce their distinctivecultures as a valued public good.

America’s long term international competitive-ness in the “Knowledge Economy” will dependon improved education, modernized regulation of

41

He urges budgetary increases, arguing that culture isnow more important than ever.

The task of cultural diplomats is a challenging one. Itrequires staffing by America’s most talented individu-a l s .4 2 Quite apart from their regular duties thatrevolve around the exchange programs, culturalaffairs officers are often invaluable links with intellec-tuals, artists, and student groups. Those groups areoften influential in shaping public opinion and are toooften anti-American in their opinions. Given theimportance of many cultural postings, the tradition ofassigning prominent non-c a reer people should beexpanded with additional funding for such temporaryassignments. Among those who might be consideredare university professors, arts and educational admin-istrators, journalists, trade union officials, and artists.With established reputations in their fields, suchappointees could both open doors closed to regularo fficials and stimulate the career officers in anembassy.

Additionally, career cultural affairs officers should begiven opportunities to enhance not only their linguis-tic skills, but also their familiarity with literature, his-tory, science, and music in other nations. Cultural offi-cers should have an all-inclusive knowledge ofAmerican culture — to communicate its significanceto other nations and to their fellow Americans. Now isthe time to invest in a corps of cultural diplomatsresponsible for sensitizing the American public toother cultural viewpoints and for portraying abroadthe diversity of American culture.43

The stakes for cultural diplomacy are high. It is notoverly dramatic to conclude with the words of careerdiplomat Richard Arndt:

40

NOTES

1 “Negotiating the Global Maze Artfully,” Going Global:Proceedings of the 2000 Barnett Arts and Public PolicySymposium, p. 75.

2 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree(Farrar Strauss Giroux 1999), pp. 7 and 9.

3 Id, p86.4 Asseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart, “Introduction,”Globalization and Governance (London and New York:Routledge, forthcoming), p. 4 (manuscript). As Coaseand others have shown, however, the allocationalprocesses internal to firms are indirectly constrained bymarkets as they are internalized chiefly when this lowerstransaction costs to below market-generated outcomes.

5 Friedman, p.356.

6 Recent changes in the European economies, whichhave increased competitiveness and dynamism, have alltaken place around centers of higher learning. SeeWilliam Drozdiak, “Old World, New Economy,” TheWashington Post, 18 February 2001, p. H-1, H-5.

7 Shalini Venturelli, “From the Information Economy tothe Creative Economy: Moving Culture to the Center ofInternational Public Policy,” paper prepared for theCenter for Arts and Culture, p. 12..8 Ibid, p. 19.

9 Id., p.20.

10 Id., p.21.

11 Paul Farhi and Megan Rosenfeld, “American PopPenetrates Worldwide,” The Washington Post, 25 October1998, p. A1.

43

intellectual property and knowledge monopolies,and micro-financing of small, creative enterprises.These efforts will need to concentrate, in part, onthe cultural ingredients intrinsic to theKnowledge Economy.

The US may be able to live with some culturalexceptions through existing flexibilities in theGeneral Agreement on Trade Services (GATS), butthere is also no need to adopt a pose of rigid oppo-sition to the forms of exception advocated by theEuropeans and Canadians. Generally speaking,the US should show more sympathy with the cul-tural dilemmas that other countries experience inthe face of American popular culture.

State Department programs in support of educa-tional and cultural affairs, on the one hand, andpublic diplomacy, on the other, must be kept care-fully distinct, even though they are fundamental-ly compatible. Furthermore, both culturalexchanges and public diplomacy need theresources and administrative muscle to carry outtheir particular mandates. Cultural off i c e sabroad need to be tailored to fit each country’sspecific situation and be staffed with Americans ofhigh achievement. Distinguished university pro-fessors, arts and educational administrators, jour-nalists, trade union officials, and artists should berecruited for temporary assignments. US govern-ment programs should facilitate exchanges fortheir long-term intellectual, artistic, and educa-tional value, rather than tie them to often transientpolicy objectives.

42

23 Richard Arndt, “Cultural Diplomacy and the PublicAgenda,” paper prepared for the Center for Arts andCulture, p. 9.

24 Ibid..

25 Glade, p. 2.

26 Frank Ninkovitch, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. ForeignPolicy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1981.

27 Glade, pp. 3-4.

28 Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy”, p. 4.

29 Patricia Goff, “Culture Industries: Moving Beyondthe State vs. Market Debate,” Paper presented at theAmerican Political Science Association Annual Meeting,Atlanta , Georgia, September 1999.

30 Even countries as sensitive to American productionas France, gave up grouping films by country of originin the Cannes Film Festival because of they are so fre-quently produced by people from more than one coun-try. See Cari Beauchamp and Henri Béhar, Hollywood onthe Riviera (New York: William Morrow, 1992).

31 For an analysis of the reason for this broad interna-tional movement, see Harvey B. Feigenbaum, Jeffrey R.Henig, and Chris Hamnett, Shrinking the State: thePolitical Underpinnings of Privatization (Cambridge,England: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

32 See Richard Collins, “The Screening of Jacques Tati:Broadcasting and Cultural Identity in the EuropeanCommunity,” Cardozo Arts and Entertainment LawJournal, 11. 2 (1993).

45

12 Id., p. A26.

13 Kevin Mulcahy “ Cultural Protectionism v. CulturalImperialism: U.S.- Canadian Cultural Relations” paperprepared for the Center for Arts and Culture.

14 Mulcahy, “Cultural Protectionism”; Sanghyung Yoonand Harvey B. Feigenbaum, “Global Strategies forNational Culture: Korean Media Policy in InternationalPerspective,” Seoul Journal of Business, 3, 1 (Fall 1997).

15 There is considerable debate as to whether moviesand TV shows are “products” or “services”. The latterdesignation obviates “local content” regulations. I amgrateful to Chris Maule on this point.

16 Mulcahy,, “Cultural Protectionism,” p 4..

17 Shalini Venturelli, “From the Information Economy tothe Creative Economy: Moving Culture to the Center ofInternational Public Policy,” paper prepared for theCenter for Arts and Culture, pp. 14,15.

18 Frances Cairncross, The Death of Distance. (HarvardBusiness School Press, 1997) pp. 249-51.

19 Angus Finney, “The State of European Cinema”(Cassell 1996), pp. 13,16.

20 Ibid., 16.

21 STR Paper “Audiovisual and Related Services” (STRWeb Site).

22 William Glade, “Art, Culture, and the NationalAgenda,” paper prepared for the Center for Arts andCulture, pp. 1-7.

44

WORKS CITED

Andreeva, Nellie. “Color TV,” Hollywood Reporter,May 23-29, 2000

Arndt, Richard. “Cultural Diplomacy and the PublicAgenda.”Unpublished paper on file at the Center forArts and Culture, Washington, D.C., 2000.

Beauchamp, Cari and Henri Béhar. Hollywood on theRiviera. New York: William Morrow, 1992.

Cairncross, Frances. The Death of Distance.Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press,1997.

Collins, Richard. “The Screening of Jacques Tati:Broadcasting and Cultural Identity in the EuropeanCommunity,” Cardozo Arts and Entertainment LawJournal, 11. 2 (1993).

Farhi, Paul and Megan Rosenfeld, “American PopPenetrates Worldwide,” The Washington Post, 25October 1998, p. A1.

Feigenbaum, Harvey. “Accepting the CulturalException: A No-Cost Policy for Cultural Diversity.”Unpublished paper on file at the Center for Arts andCulture, Washington, D.C., 2000.

Feigenbaum, Harvey, and Jeffrey R. Henig, and ChrisHamnett. Shrinking the State: the PoliticalUnderpinnings of Privatization. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Finney, Angus. The State of European Cinema. Cassell,1996.

4733 Not to be confused with Britain’s “television license,”which is a tax on households. Broadcasters pay the“licensing fee” to companies owning the rights to a pro-gram.

34 Farhi and Rosenfeld, op.cit.

35 I have been greatly impressed by the thoughts of mycolleague Stephen C. Smith on this topic. Some of theargument below derives from his “Does America ‘DrawStrength from Diversity’? Economic Institutions andCultural Heterogeneity,” Department of Economics, TheGeorge Washington University, June 1994, unpublished.

36 The Greco-French filmmaker Costa-Gavras expresseda similar idea to me in an interview with him in Paris,January 1999.

37 The world, however sees this as a form of “braindrain.”

38 Nellie Andreeva, “Color TV,” Hollywood Reporter, May23-29, 2000, pp. 18-20.

39 Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy”, p. 14; Arndt, passim.

40 Arndt, p. 12.

41 Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy,” p. 15. The positionof Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and PublicAffairs was established in the U.S. Department of Statein October 1999.

42 Arndt, p. 13.

43 Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy,” p. 16.

44 Arndt, p. 10.

46

Venturelli, Shalini. From the Information Economy tothe Creative Economy: Moving Culture to the Center ofInternational Cultural Policy. Center for Arts andCulture, February 2001.

Wyszomirski, Margaret. “Negotiating the Global MazeArtfully,” Going Global: Proceedings of the 2000 BarnettArts and Public Policy Symposium. Ohio Arts Counciland OhioState University, Columbus, OH, 2000.

Yoon, Sanghyung and Harvey B. Feigenbaum, “GlobalStrategies for National Culture: Korean Media Policy inInternational Perspective,” Seoul Journal of Business, 3, 1(Fall 1997).

49

Friedman, Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree.Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1999.

Gilcher, William. Unpublished paper on file at theCenter for Arts and Culture, Washington, D.C., 2000.

Glade, William. “Enhancing International Dialogue.” Unpublished paper on file at the Center for Arts andCulture, Washington, D.C., 2000.

Goff, Patricia. “Culture Industries: Moving Beyondthe State vs. Market Debate,” Paper presented at theAmerican Political Science Association AnnualMeeting, Atlanta , Georgia, September 1999.

Mulcahy, Kevin. “Cultural Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World.” Unpublished paper on file at theCenter for Arts and Culture, Washington, D.C., 2000.

-----. “Cultural Protectionism v. Cultural Imperialism:U.S. - Canadian Cultural Relations.” Unpublishedpaper on file at the Center for Arts and Culture,Washington, D.C., 2000.

Ninkovitch, Frank. The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S.Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “Audiovisualand Related Services” at http://www.ustr.gov/sec-tors/services/audio.pdf.

Prakash, Asheem and Jeffrey A. Hart, “Introduction,”Globalization and Governance (London and New York:Routledge, forthcoming).

48

CENTER FOR

ARTS AND CULTURE

The Center for Arts and Culture is an independent think tank which

seeks to broaden and deepen the national conversation on culture.

Founded in 1994, the Center began its work by establishing the

Cultural Policy Network, a confederation of scholars working on cul-

tural policy research at 28 colleges and universities.

Through its cultural policy reader, The Politics of Culture (The New

Press, 2000), the Center set out to provide the foundation for a

national conversation on issues in cultural policy. The Center’s sec-

ond full-length set of essays, Crossroads: Art and Religion (The New

Press, 2001), provides the context for understanding the relation of

religion and the arts in the United States.

A public series, Calling the Question, examines the intersection of cul-

tural and other national public policy areas. The Center has also

sponsored critical inquiry into arts and cultural policy through its

support of the annual Social Theory, Politics and the Arts conference

and a 2001 grants program to individual scholars and graduate stu-

dents. Most recently, the Center has sponsored symposia on preser-

vation and on the First Amendment. Through its web site and list-

serv, the Center provides news, information, and ideas about art and

culture to a wide public.

5150

STAFF

Ms. Gigi Bradford, Executive DirectorMs. Laura BeckerMs. Allison BruggDr. Keith Donohue Dr. Glenn WallachMs. Sharon Kangas Associate Scholar

The Center is advised by a Research Advisory Council, comprised ofleading scholars in the field of cultural policy.

RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL

Dr. Margaret J. Wyszomirski, ChairDirectorArts Policy & Administration ProgramOhio State University

Milton Cummings, Jr. Dan J. MartinProfessor DirectorDepartment of Political Science Master of Arts Management ProgramJohns Hopkins University Carnegie Mellon University

William Glade Clement PriceDirector, Mexican Center ProfessorProfessor of Economics Department of HistoryUniversity of Texas-Austin Rutgers University-Newark

Stanley Katz Ruth Ann StewartDirector Research Professor in Cultural PolicyCenter for Arts & Center for Urban Policy Research

Cultural Policy Studies Rutgers University-New BrunswickPrinceton University

53

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Mr. Frank Hodsoll, ChairPrincipal, Hodsoll and Associates

Ms. Marcia Sharp, Vice ChairPrincipal & CEO, Millennium Communications Group

Mr. James Fitzpatrick, TreasurerSenior Partner, Arnold & Porter

Dr. Alberta Arthurs Dr. John RomanoAssociate Writer/ProducerMEM Associates

Mr. James Early Dr. James Allen SmithDirector Senior Advisor Cultural Heritage Policy to the PresidentCenter for Folklife and J. Paul Getty Trust

Cultural HeritageSmithsonian Institution

Mrs. Judith O. Rubin Mr. Harold WilliamsChairman President EmeritusPlaywrights Horizon J. Paul Getty Trust

52

www.culturalpolicy.org

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