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Global trade and protection regimes in rice trade

Draft Report

Eric J. Wailes University of Arkansas

September 2003

Executive Summary

• Rice accounts for more than 20 percent of global calories consumed. This percent

is even higher for low income and food deficit developing countries.

• A relatively small share of global rice production is traded compared to other major grains and oilseeds. The low percent of rice traded is a result of highly protectionist policies found throughout the world, but particularly in Asia. Protectionist policies are the result of national policy objectives of food security, support for domestic producers, and price stability.

• Over 90 percent of rice production and consumption occurs in Asia. Three

countries—China, India, and Indonesia account for nearly two-thirds of global output. Much of the Asian rice production is subject to monsoon climates, resulting in uncertain rice yields and rice supplies.

• Global rice trade is highly segmented by rice type (long and medium), degree of

processing (milled, brown, and paddy) and quality (generally pertaining to the percent of broken kernels). As a staple food, the demand for rice is not responsive to price and income changes.

• The combination of a high degree of protection, geographic concentration, market

segmentation, and inelastic demand response to price and income results in volatile rice prices and volumes traded.

• Distortions in rice trade occur throughout the world. The highest levels of

protection are found in the high-income nations of Northeast Asia including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. State trading enterprises are used widely in rice trade most notably by China, Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and Australia. Thailand is a clear exception as rice trade is managed by a very competitive group of export companies.

• Domestic policy distortions exist in a number of major rice trading nations

including the United States, the European Union, and Japan. In the case of the US and the EU, domestic supports result in implicit or direct export subsidies. In Japan, the government’s commitment to support rice prices is based upon an

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aggressive rice land diversion program and a tightly managed tariff rate quota (TRQ).

• Tariff escalation occurs in many nations who desire to protect their rice milling

sectors. Tariffs are generally higher on processed (milled) rice, which distort rice trade and milling activities. Central American nations are particularly inclined to this approach to rice trade policy.

• Policy reforms to eliminate protection in the global rice economy are estimated to

result in an increase of economic welfare of over USD 7.4 billion per year. Most of these gains can be achieved through the elimination of tariffs on imports. Consumers in importing countries gain USD 32.8 billion while producers in importing countries lose USD 27.2 billion. Importing country governments lose USD 2.9 billion tariff revenue but gain USD 2.7 billion by eliminating domestic supports. The net welfare gain to rice importing countries is estimated to be USD 5.4 billion. Producers in exporting countries gain USD 70.2 billion while consumers in exporting nations lose USD 68.8 billion. Imports by the exporting countries result in a loss of tariff revenue of USD 5.3 million and elimination of domestic supports saves USD 598 million. The net welfare gain in importing countries is USD 2 billion.

• Rice trade is estimated to increase by 10 to 15 percent. Prices received by

exporters would be expected to be higher by 25 to 35 percent. Prices paid by importers would be expected to decline by 10 to 40 percent depending upon the type of rice.

• Rice trade despite the expansion would remain relatively thin. Complete policy

reform, would result in an increase from 6.5 percent of consumption to 8.4 percent by 2012. Thus, one of the major sources of world rice price instability is likely to remain after liberalization. The implications for lower income, net importing countries who become more reliant upon world rice trade are not attractive. Political and food security is likely to be reduced.

• Medium grain rice is the most protected rice type. Consequently, policy reform

would have its biggest impact on the countries that export and import medium grain rice. Japan is estimated to capture nearly 70 percent of the global economic welfare gains. Other developed countries such as the United States, Australia and the European Union who export medium grain rice would also be significant beneficiaries of trade policy reform.

• Ironically, countries that have little or no degree of protection are likely to be

harmed from policy reforms. This result is due to the large country impacts that countries like Japan’ increased imports would have, increasing the demand for medium grain rice and thereby increasing world prices especially for medium grain rice. Countries, such as Turkey and Russia, which have imported medium grain rice with moderate levels or no protection, would experience higher prices

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as a result of the increased volume of medium grain imports by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Benefits of removing moderate levels of tariff protection as in the case of Turkey are swamped by the price effect of free and expanded trade in medium grain.

• The impacts of domestic policy reforms in the United States and the EU are

estimated to reduce rice exports by less than 5 percent in the initial years and have no impact on trade in the longer term. Prices are estimated to be 5 to 10 percent higher initially but over the longer term the effect diminishes.

• Multilateral and regional trade policy reforms achieved over the past decade have

contributed to an expansion in rice trade and more stable prices. The achievements of the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement (URAA) include the opening of the previously closed Japanese and South Korean markets. Limits placed on domestic support and export subsidies have yet to have a significant impact. Regional agreements such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR have increased western hemisphere rice trade. The prospects for the Doha Round of the WTO hinge to a great extent upon continuing the expansion of market access, reduction of tariffs and limits on export subsidies that will be effective.

1. Rice trade and domestic policy regimes

1.1 Introduction Rice is one of the most important food grains in the world, accounting for more than

20 percent of global calories consumed (Table 1). The share of calories is even

higher for developing countries, 26.2 percent; for low-income countries, 29.2 percent;

and for low-income food-deficit countries, 27.9 percent. Over the past five years,

1997-2002, global rice trade has accounted for only 6.5 percent of world consumption

compared to wheat trade at 18.3 percent, corn at 11.9 percent, and soybeans at 34.5

percent (USDA, PS&D). The thinness of trade for rice is primarily a result of a

variety of protectionist mechanisms based on national policy objectives in major rice

producing and consuming countries to achieve desired domestic food security and

producer prices and incomes. Jayne (1993) has argued that the link between domestic

stabilization policies and instability in world rice prices has been exaggerated. His

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study emphasizes thin and fragmented markets along with other factors as being

major factors. Clearly however, domestic price stabilization policies have been

achieved by restricting imports, thus contributing in a substantial way to the

international market thinness. Therefore it is difficult to ignore the effect of domestic

stabilization policies achieved through import and export restrictions as a significant

cause of international rice price instability.

In addition to the thinness of rice trade, another structural characteristic important for

understanding the global rice market is the geographic concentration of production

and consumption in Asia. Over 90 percent of production and consumption occurs in

Asia and nearly two-thirds in just three countries – China, India, and Indonesia.

With as much as 40 percent of Asian rice cultivated under rain-fed systems, the

monsoon weather effects are magnified on rice trade.

Finally, there is substantial market segmentation by rice type and quality. One of the

key structural dimensions is the degree of end-use differentiation in rice. Substitution

among rice types and qualities is limited by differences in cooking and taste

preferences. An important end-use characteristic is stickiness. This is a particularly

important characteristic for the medium and short grain rice varieties. Long grain rice

is typically non-sticky, and cooks to greater grain separation. Low substitutability for

rice exists both on the demand (mill and end-use) and supply sides. On the demand

side, the closest substitute is wheat, particularly important in south Asia (Pakistan and

India). In many Asian nations, rice as a staple food has become an inferior good with

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respect to income and is being substituted out of the diets by meats, fruits and

vegetables. Different rice varieties require different climatic conditions and

production and milling technologies. This limits the ability of producers to respond

to price incentives as a guideline in selecting which type of rice to produce.

Production of rice generally benefits greatly from access to plentiful supplies of

surface or ground water and soils with poor drainage that can maintain a flood

condition. These biotic and abiotic characteristics limit the rice production area but

these conditions also limit the production of other crops that cannot withstand flood

conditions.

As the first major food crop to have its genomic structure fully described, rice

genomics and biotechnology is progressing rapidly (Khush and Brar). A drought-

tolerant gene, for example, has been identified and varieties with this expression are

in development. Development of rice varieties that will be much less dependent on

water will have the potential to greatly expand production areas suitable for

cultivation, changing costs of production and geographic areas of comparative

advantage and disadvantage.

Nevertheless, the current combination of high levels of domestic protection,

geographic concentration and erratic weather, inelastic price responses in production

and end-use markets, and relatively thinly traded volumes results in relatively volatile

rice prices and trade (Wailes, 2002).

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1.2 Progress in rice trade liberalization

Trade liberalization is having a profound impact on the international rice market

because of the very fact that rice trade has been highly protected in both industrialized

and developing nations (Wailes, 2002). The relatively modest terms of agreement in

the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) have contributed to global

rice trade growth experienced in the latter half of the 1990s (Figure 1). Compared to

rice trade in the 1970s and 1980s, post-Uruguay Round trade has essentially doubled

in volume and as a share of consumption. Nevertheless, rice remains, with sugar and

dairy products, as one of the most protected food commodities in world trade.

1.3 Trade and domestic policies in key countries

The following section discusses the trade and policy regimes of the key producing

and consuming nations. As shown in Table 2, the major producing countries are also

the major consuming countries. They also tend to be the leading exporting or

importing countries (Table 3).

1.3.1 China

As the largest rice producing and consuming country, China accounts for nearly

one-third of the global rice economy. Rice has been an important component of

China’s food grain security objectives and has been managed with the use of

procurement support prices to ensure stable supplies. As a result, government

stocks of rice increased in the late 1990s to a level approximately 100 mmt, 73

percent of domestic use. Consequently, in 1999 the government adopted a price

and procurement policy that eliminated government purchases of low quality

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early season rice and lowered procurement prices for rice that was purchased by

the government. Area planted to rice has declined from 1998 to 2002 (USDA,

PS&D). Rice stocks by the end of 2002 have been reduced by more than 30

percent to 67.6 mmt. In some selected coastal provinces the government has

more recently eliminated the procurement policy completely, leaving producers to

sell their rice on the open markets (Wade and Junyang). The government policy

now emphasizes quality over quantity, and rice producers are quickly adopting

improved quality varieties.

The rice TRQ negotiated by China was initially 2.66 mmt in 2002, equally

divided between long grain and medium-short grain or other rice (WTO, 2001).

Only 10 percent of the long grain TRQ is designated for private firms and 50

percent of the medium-short grain TRQ for private firms. In 2003, the TRQ for

long grain is 2.25 mmt and 1.53 for medium-short grain. The TRQ will increase

to 5.32 mmt by 2004 (Sun and Branson, Zhang et al.). Nearly all rice imports into

China are fragrant jasmine rice, primarily from Thailand. Domestic production of

fragrant rice however is increasing and displacing imports. In all likelihood,

without a significant weather event, China will not be expected to fill the rice

TRQ. In-quota tariffs are 1 percent for grains (including milled rice) and no more

than 10 percent for partially processed grain products. Over-quota tariffs will be

76 percent initially and reduced to 65 percent by 2004 (WTO, 2001).

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China is a significant exporter of low quality long grain with principal markets in

Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, and Cuba. Medium grain rice is exported competitively

into Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea (Hansen et al.). While most

rice exports are made by COFCO, the state trading agency, it is not believed that

export subsidies, except for out-of-condition stock liquidation, are necessary for

China’s rice export shipments.

1.3.2 India

As the second largest producer, consumer, and exporter of rice, India plays an

important role in the global rice economy. India is a major supplier of low quality

long grain rice and also fragrant basmati rice. As with China, rice in India is

viewed as a strategic commodity with regard to food security. Consequently, the

government actively intervenes in the market through grain procurement, price

supports and export subsidies. In recent years, the government has procured

approximately 25 percent of the annual harvested crop to replenish government

stocks. Since April 2001 the government has actively subsidized rice exports at a

rate of 50 percent of procurement prices, underselling Vietnam, Thailand, and

Pakistan in low quality long grain markets by $15 to $20 per ton. Major markets

for India’s low quality parboiled and regular long grain rice include: Indonesia,

Philippines, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire and South Africa. Major markets

for basmati rice include Saudi Arabia, European Union, Kuwait, United Arab

Emirates, and Iran.

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Commitments on rice import tariffs under the URAA for India are bound at zero

percent. Until May 1997, all rice was imported through the Food Corporation of

India. Under an agreement to privatize rice trade, the government negotiated

higher import tariffs that become effective April 2000. Current tariffs on paddy

and brown rice and broken are 80 percent and milled rice is 70 percent.

1.3.3 Indonesia

The third largest producing and consuming nation of rice, Indonesia is also the

largest rice importer. Rice policy, particularly price stabilization policy, was

historically implemented through quantitative management of imports by the state

monopoly, National Logistics Agency (BULOG). In late 1998, Indonesia agreed

to liberalize rice trade to private traders. Unable to sustain the domestic floor

price, the market powers were restored to BULOG. Following Indonesia’s

financial collapse and political instability, the government of Indonesia sought to

stabilize and support producer rice prices through the imposition of a specific rice

tariff of Rp 430/kg (equivalent to a 30 percent tariff). Non-tariff barriers and

trader response to risks and regulation including a 2002 requirement for an import

license and redlining, have resulted in as much as an additional 75 percent tariff

equivalent, such that the effective rate of protection for rice in Indonesia is

currently at 100 percent (Timmer, 2002). Average border prices of milled rice

were USD 200 per ton in 2002, while monthly rice retail prices in Jakarta

averaged USD 377 per ton (Katial-Zemany and Alam, 2003). Nevertheless, due

to a porous border, it is believed that as much as 30 percent of imports in 2002

were smuggled into the country in the face of the large difference between world

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and domestic prices. The tariff policy is currently under review and producers are

pressuring for an increase to Rp 510/kg, equivalent to a 36 percent tariff but well

below the WTO bound rate of 160 percent until 2004 (Katial-Zemany and Alam,

2003). Floor prices for paddy and milled rice will be increased by 13 percent in

2003. BULOG’s status has changed in early 2003 from an “agency” to a state

trading enterprise. BULOG (PERUM) continues in its role of distributing

subsidized rice to low-income consumers. Current import and domestic price

support policies clearly have negative consequences for Indonesia’s consumer and

especially those in poverty as well as negative consequences on real wages and

therefore economic growth.

1.3.4 Bangladesh

Bangladesh is the fourth largest rice producing and consuming nation. It is also a

significant but highly variable rice import market. Since much of the rice

production in Bangladesh is subject to monsoon weather, production can fluctuate

greatly from year to year. In 1998, Bangladesh was the world’s second largest

importer at 2.5 mmt but since 1998 has only imported an average of 500 thousand

tons annually. Bangladesh has experimented with a rice import tariff policy over

the past several years. In 2000, Bangladesh imposed an import tariff of 5 percent.

In 2001 the government of Bangladesh raised the tariff rate to 25 percent, added

an additional 10 percent regulatory duty mid-year, an advance income tax of 3

percent and a development surcharge of 2.5 percent. This set of import

protections along with a crop shortfall in 2001 and a nutrition policy shift of

distributing money instead of food grains in the national food distribution

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program resulted in a higher domestic price and a rise in smuggled imports from

India. As a result, the government withdrew the 10 percent regulatory duty in

2002 and more recently has reduced the Letter of Credit (LC) margins from 100

percent to 25 percent. Import restrictions that remain in 2003 include a tariff of

22.5 percent, an advance income tax of 3 percent, and a development surcharge of

3.5 percent. Bangladesh imposes no quantitative restrictions.

1.3.5 Vietnam

Vietnam produces the fifth largest rice crop and is also the fifth largest rice

consuming nation. Following the adoption of Doi Moi in late 1986, Vietnam’s

rice economy recovered and developed rapidly such that by the mid-1990s,

Vietnam became the world’s second largest rice exporter. No significant

production support policies or export subsidy programs are used by Vietnam.

Vietnam, along with other major Asian rice exporters, Thailand, China, India, and

Pakistan have discussed the formation of a rice export cartel in response to the

low world prices for rice over the past four years. India has rejected the concept

but the others are at this time meeting to develop the concept. Vietnam exports

both high and low quality long grain rice. Important export destinations include:

Iraq, Indonesia, Cuba, Malaysia and several African countries. Rice exports and

prices are under the control of the Ministry of Trade and Vietnam’s Food

Association (Vinafood).

1.3.6 Thailand

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Thailand has been the world’s leading exporter for the past several decades.

Private export companies supply world markets with a wide range in quality of

long grain rice, including the fragrant jasmine rice. The primary government rice

policy is the paddy mortgage scheme which is a loan program operated under the

Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). Participating

farmers obtain a loan from BAAC using their crop as collateral. The loan price is

set at 95 percent of a government determined target price. In 2002 loans prices

were in excess of market prices by $8 to $10 per ton (a 10 percent price support).

Nearly one-third of the Thai crop was pledged to the loan price support program.

Government stocks have increased as farmers default on their loans. The

government procured rice is milled and then exported through Government-to-

Government arrangements.

1.3.7 Japan

Japan’s rice economy is supported by high prices paid by consumers. Japan

controls rice imports through a TRQ with a prohibitive over-quota tariff. As the

traditional staple food, rice in Japan dominates the agricultural policy of the

government. Over the past five years, Japan has introduced reforms in the

domestic rice policy. In 1996, the government ended regulation over the

marketing of rice, freeing up wholesale and retail markets from government

supervision and licensing requirements. With market liberalization, prices to

farms have declined. In 1998, the government adopted the Rice Farming Income

Stabilization Program. If current year price falls below a 7-year moving average

standard rice price, producers are paid 80 percent of the difference between the

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current year price and the standard price calculation. Payments are made from the

Rice Farming Income Stabilization Fund of which 25 percent are contributions

from rice producers and 75 percent is from the government. Participation is

voluntary, but to participate for full benefits, producers must enroll in the

Production Adjustment Promotion Program (PAPP), which diverts land from rice

to other crops (wheat, barley, soybeans, forages, vegetables, and fruits). Since

payments in the Rice Farming Income Stabilization Fund are tied to diversion,

Japan claims “blue box” treatment. Income stabilization payments to rice

producers in the most recently reported year, 1999, were $815 million. Payments

under the diversion program in 1999 were $1.03 billion.

Until the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, Japan persisted over a

30-year period in banning rice imports. Under the minimum access agreement in

the URAA, Japan, under a TRQ, now imports 682 thousand metric tons annually,

7.2 percent of domestic consumption in the base period 1986-88. In-quota

purchases are controlled exclusively by the Food Agency, for which a markup of

up to 292 yen/kg ($2.41/kg in 2001) is allowed. Imports are purchased through

two systems, the Ordinary Market Access (OMA) and the Simultaneous-Buy-Sell

(SBS). Rice purchased under the OMA accounted for 85 percent of the total

imports in 2001. The Food Agency resells this rice into Japan’s domestic market

or donates to food assistance programs. The SBS purchases are made through an

auction where importers sell rice to the Food Agency and simultaneously buy it

back. The Food Agency selects bids that maximize the markup, which have

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averaged between 100 and 200 yen/kg or $1,000 to $2,000 per ton. Over quota

tariffs are 341 yen/kg, or $2,842 per ton in 2003. The average successful bid

price of imports in the OMA rice tender in December 2002 was $318 per ton.

1.3.8 South Korea

Similar to Japan, South Korea protected its rice sector with an import ban until

1995 when it agreed to a minimum access import commitment un the Uruguay

Round agreement. In 2004, the final year of commitment, South Korea will

import 205 thousand metric tons, 4 percent of domestic consumption in the 1986-

88 base period. Declining consumption coupled with rising minimum market

access imports has resulted in excessive stocks. In April 2002, the South Korean

government released “A Comprehensive Plan on the Rice Industry” to cope with

the structural problem of oversupply and to prepare for future restructuring.

Previously, the government has relied upon a procurement program to support

farm prices. In 2002, the government procured 789 thousand metric tons of a

total production of 4,927 thousand metric tons at a price of 2,097 won/kg,

equivalent to $1,667 per ton. Under the proposed comprehensive plan the

government intends to decouple payments from price supports to income support.

A Direct Payment System (DPS) payment in 2002 was made with a direct

payment of 500,000 won per ha ($398) in agricultural promotion areas and

400,000 won per ha ($319) in non-promotion areas. This program will be similar

to Japan’s income stabilization program in that is will be linked to production

adjustment system, shifting rice area to other crops (soybeans, forages and fallow)

and therefore will claim “blue box” WTO status. In 2003, the government has

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announced plans to pay producers to keep rice land fallow, 3 million won per ha

($2,531 per ha), on 27,500 ha or 2.6 percent of the South Korea’s total rice area.

The import regime is guided by the URAA minimum market access agreement.

Permitted imports under this quota agreement are also assessed a 5 percent import

tariff. Purchases are strictly controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture and have

typically been low quality made available through controlled channels to end

users.

1.3.9 European Union

The EU maintains an intervention price on paddy rice at 298.35 Euro/mt. Since

1996 the EU has accumulated intervention stocks as a result of increased

production and imports. Direct payments were introduced in 1997 with payments

made to a maximum guaranteed area (MGA) of 433,123 ha. The current direct

payment rate is 325.70 Euros per ha. Based on average yields, the direct payment

is equivalent to 52.65 Euros per ton. Therefore on a per ton basis, total EU

support to rice producers, taking into account the intervention price and direct

payment, is 351 Euros per ton.

Under the Uruguay Round agreement, the EU agreed to convert variable levies to

fixed tariffs and reduce them by 26 percent by 2000. Current tariff levels are 211

Euros per ton for paddy, 264 Euros per ton for brown rice, and 416 Euros per ton

for milled rice. The tariff escalation by degree of milling makes the tariff on

milled rice prohibitive. A variety of tariff concessions and preferences for EU

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rice imports exist. Brown basmati imports from India and Pakistan are given a

250 Euro per ton reduction, resulting in a tariff of 14 Euros per ton. A TRQ was

negotiated with accession of Finland, Sweden and Austria with zero tariff on 63

thousand metric tons of milled, 88 Euro per ton on imports of 20,000 tons of

brown rice and 28 Euros per ton on 80,000 tons of broken rice. Egypt has an

import concession for 39,000 ton at a 25 percent tariff reduction, and Bangladesh

has a 4,000 ton concession at a 50 percent tariff reduction on brown rice.

Preferences are given to a quota of 110,000 tons from ACP/OCT countries with a

35 percent reduction off normal tariff levels for ACP and zero duty for OCT

countries. Beginning in 2006, tariffs on imports from the 48 least developed

countries will be progressively reduced to zero by 2009 under the “Everything but

Arms” agreement negotiated in 2001. Import prices in 2003 of brown rice are

approximately 250 Euros per ton. The 264 Euro per ton tariff provides a rate of

protection of 105 percent.

The export regime for rice in the EU is based on Uruguay Round agreement

commitments, which limit refunds to 133,400 tons of milled rice equivalent and a

subsidy expenditure of not more than 36.8 million Euros ($39.4 million). Export

refunds are set by rice type and by destination. In 2003, export subsidies range

from 111 to 165 Euros per ton ($119 to $177 per ton).

1.3.10 United States

The United States is the world’s fourth largest rice exporter. Exports account for

nearly 45 percent of U.S. rice utilization. Under the 2002 Farm Bill, the U.S.

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government provides price support through a market loan rate of $143 per ton of

paddy rice. A market loan deficiency payment is made if the world reference

price falls below the market loan rate. An average payment of $73 per ton has

been paid for the 2002 crop. In addition, producers receive income support

through two payment programs, a fixed decoupled direct payment of $51.80 per

ton and a decoupled counter-cyclical payment, if the direct payment plus the

higher of the market price or market loan rate are below a target price of $231.48

per ton1. When the market price is below the market loan rate the maximum

counter-cyclical payment will be $36.68 per ton. Both direct payment and

counter-cyclical payment are made on 85 percent of a fixed historical production

level.

Rice imports into the U.S. are subject to tariffs of $14 per ton for milled (11.2

percent ad valorem for parboiled), $21 per ton for brown ($8.30 per ton for

basmati brown), and $18 per ton for paddy rice. In 2002 ten percent of exports,

380 thousand tons, were funded by government programs, all food aid shipments.

Export subsidies under the Export Enhancement Program have not been used for

U.S. rice exports since 1996.

2. Magnitude of distortions in key rice markets

1 The direct payment is paid on a historical base production, decoupled from both current production and current market conditions. The counter-cyclical payment is also paid on a historical base production and while payment is decoupled from current production, it is triggered by current market price conditions. The United States government claims both payments as “green box” in the WTO.

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The major types of distortion in world rice markets are import tariffs and tariff rate

quotas in key importing countries and price supports in key exporting countries as

discussed above. In 2000, the global trade weighted average tariff on all rice was

43.3 percent. Japonica rice markets are however far more distorted than indica rice

markets due to the TRQ and quotas in the major japonica rice importing countries of

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Global trade weighted average rice tariffs for

japonica rice markets were 217 percent compared to 21 percent for indica markets.

In addition to trade protection by rice type, an important dimension of world rice

trade is protection for the domestic rice milling industry. This form of protection is

expressed in tariff escalation and is especially prevalent in Central and South

American nations and the European Union. Tariffs on milled rice are higher than for

brown or paddy rice. Tariffs on milled rice imports into the EU are 80 percent

compared to only 46 percent for brown rice. In Mexico, paddy rice imports pay a 10

percent tariff while brown and milled pay a 20 percent tariff. The effect of tariff

escalation is seen in the trade flows of milled high quality long grain. Most of this

trade goes to nations with low tariffs. Most of the trade in brown and paddy rice

however goes to nations that have high tariffs on brown and paddy, but even higher

tariffs on milled rice. The trade weighted average tariffs by degree of milling for high

quality, long grain rice is estimated to be 4.3 percent for milled, 31.4 percent for

brown and 16.9 percent for paddy rice. This compares to simple non-trade weighted

averages for milled of 13.7 percent, brown 18.7 percent and paddy 25.4 percent.

Table 4 summarizes import protection on rice.

3. Influence of existing distortions, especially OECD policies, on diversification of agricultural output and trade in developing economies.

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The greatest degree of protection in world rice trade is in medium/short grain.

Prices of medium/short grain rice are reduced by approximately 100 percent as a

result of protection by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Currently very few rice

exporting countries produce medium/short grain rice. The clear beneficiary of trade

liberalization in medium/short grain rice in the near term will be those countries and

especially China, which has a competitive advantage in production costs and logistics

relative to other export competitors, the United States, Australia, and Egypt.

Trade liberalization would be expected to stimulate production of medium/short grain

in other countries but current varieties are currently suitable for temperate climates.

Thus South American exporters such as Argentina and Uruguay could develop

adapted varieties more quickly. Many other developing countries have tropical or

sub-tropical climates and would require over a decade, if ever, to develop varieties

that would be competitive into the liberalized medium short-grain markets.

Production capacity in Australia and the United States and to some degree China is

increasingly constrained by lack of water.

Long grain rice markets are far less protected than medium grain. Tariffs in major

low quality rice importing nations such as Indonesia and Bangladesh are estimated to

reduce prices by as much as 30 percent compared to full liberalization. The major

impact of protection in low quality rice markets falls on consumers in these low-

income developing nations and producers in low quality rice exporting nations such

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as Vietnam, India, Pakistan, and Thailand. Tariffs on high quality long grain markets

are low by comparison with medium/short grain markets and low quality long grain

markets. The most significant aspect of tariffs in high quality long grain rice trade is

tariff escalation, where countries, particularly the European Union and several Central

and South American nations have particularly high tariffs on milled rice relative to

brown or paddy rice. This pattern of protection depresses world prices for milled

high quality long grain relative to brown and paddy rice prices and places economic

hardships on the milling sectors of high quality, long grain exporting nations such as

Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States. Protection in high quality long grain

milled rice markets is estimated to reduce prices by 10 to 20 percent.

4. Results of trade liberalization in rice, volume traded and prices. Global rice trade liberalization results in significant expansion of rice trade and price

adjustments. Estimates of the impact of the elimination of import tariffs and export

subsidies were generated through the use of a spatial equilibrium model, RICEFLOW

(see Appendix 1 for a description). An earlier version of this model was used to

assess trade liberalization prior to the Uruguay Round (Cramer, Wailes, and Shagnan;

Cramer et al.). For this study, RICEFLOW was more completely disaggregated by

rice type and degree of milling and the baseline trade flows and elasticity estimates

were updated through the year 2000. The results reflect the effect of trade

liberalization applied to year 2000 trade flows and prices. Detailed analysis by

quantities traded and prices are presented in Table 5. The key results include:

• Complete trade liberalization in 2000 would have resulted in an expansion in global rice trade of nearly 3.5 mmt, a fifteen percent increase in trade.

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• Trade weighted average export prices would be 32.8 percent higher and

trade weighted import prices would be 13.5 percent lower.

Results by rice type and degree of milling also provide interesting estimates. • As noted above, protection in medium/short grain rice markets is

substantially greater than in long grain rice markets. Trade in medium/short grain with trade liberalization would increase by 73 percent. Producer export prices would rise by 91 percent and import prices would decline by 27 percent.

• In the most protected brown medium/short grain rice markets of Japan and

South Korea, trade increases by 141 percent, export prices increase by 200 percent and import prices decrease by 41 percent.

• Milled medium/short grain rice markets would expand by 59 percent, with

export prices higher by 71 percent and import prices lower by 25 percent. • Long grain rice trade liberalization results in a 7 percent increase in

volume traded. Export prices increase by only 2 percent but import prices fall by 18 percent, improving consumer welfare in rice importing nations.

• Most of the expansion in long grain trade occurs in the low quality markets

such as Indonesia, Bangladesh and Philippines. Traded volumes increase by 13 percent and import prices fall by 14 percent, improving consumer welfare in many low-income developing countries. Removal of protection in these markets also improves producer welfare in developing countries as export prices increase by 7 percent.

• In the fragrant rice market of basmati and jasmine rice, free trade results in

a 41.5 percent lower import price but only slight increases in the volume traded and the export price.

• Trade in the high quality long grain markets is subject to much less

protection and as a result, trade liberalization results in only slight increases in volume traded—4 percent more paddy, 7 percent more brown and 3 percent more milled rice. Price effects are primarily seen in lower import prices—10 percent less for paddy, 31 percent lower for brown and 4 percent lower for milled rice.

5. Welfare analysis of rice trade liberalization.

Consumer and surplus gains and losses are estimated using the results of the baseline

and free trade results of the RICEFLOW model. The welfare estimates for producers

22

and consumers are summarized in Table 6. The results are reported for the major

importing and exporting countries or regions by rice type and degree of milling.

Table 7 includes the producer and consumer welfare estimates with the impact on

government revenues lost due to tariff elimination and government expenditures

eliminated because of the elimination of domestic support programs. Global rice trade

liberalization results in a total economic surplus gain of USD 7.4 billion annually.

Importing countries, as a group, have a net gain of USD 5.4 billion and exporting

nations gain USD 2 billion. The magnitudes of the net gains vary considerably by

country and by rice type and degree of milling. The estimates are based on the

impact of full trade liberalization in year 2000. The key welfare results by rice type

and degree of milling are:

• Reform of trade in medium grain milled rice accounts for more than 60 percent of the total global welfare improvement at USD 4.3 billion, of which importers benefit by $3.4 billion and exporters by $905 million.

• Brown medium grain rice importers benefit by $1 billion and exporters gain

$449 million.

• Long grain trade liberalization generates total improvements of USD 1.14 billion. Importers gain $ 1.06 billion and exporters gain $ 80 million.

• High quality rice trade has welfare improvements of $218 million, with

importers gaining $195 million and exporters gaining $23 million. Most of these gains occur for high quality milled, $69 million and brown rice, $124 million. Paddy rice trade liberalization improves the welfare of exporters by $2.4 million and importers by $22.4 million.

• Low quality rice trade liberalization improves the welfare of importing nations

by $315 million and exporters by $52 million. Nearly all of these gains are captured by developing countries.

• Fragrant rice trade reform is estimated to improve importers welfare by $547

million, a result due primarily to Japan. Exporting nations of fragrant rice, India, Pakistan and Thailand gain only $6 million annually.

23

Results by country or region depend upon the type and degree of rice protection

that is liberalized. The results by country or region are discussed in order by

magnitude of impact of trade liberalization.

• Japan, the most protectionist nation in rice trade, gains the most from liberalization. Medium grain white rice prices decline from $3,098 per mt to $656 per mt. The volume of trade increases from 392 thousand mt to 2.18 million mt. A welfare gain of $ 3.6 billion per year would be achieved, accounting for over half of the total global net gain. Medium grain brown rice imports increase from 130 thousand mt to 676 thousand mt. Prices decline from $3,062 to $ 843 per ton. The annual net welfare gain for medium grain brown rice is $904 million. Should Japan continue to import jasmine rice from Thailand the volume would increase from 159 thousand tons to 277 thousand mt. Price of fragrant jasmine would decline from $3108 to $285 per mt. The welfare gain would be $471 million. For all rice, Japan’s total net welfare gain would be $5 billion annually, which more than 70 percent of total global welfare gains. While the net welfare gains are large the internal welfare transfers would be extraordinarily large. The change in Japanese consumer surplus is estimated at $24 billion, which offsets the losses to producer surplus of $19 billion.

• China is the world’s largest producer of medium grain rice and therefore

would be the largest beneficiary of medium grain rice trade liberalization. Exports of milled medium grain rice would more than double, increasing from 614 thousand mt to 1.47 mmt. Export prices would increase from $270 per ton to $647 per ton. The annual welfare gain would be $480 million. Brown medium rice trade would be expected to increase from 113 thousand mt to 403 thousand mt. Prices of brown medium grain increase from $233 per ton to $834 per ton. Net welfare gain from brown medium grain rice trade would be $155 million annually. China is a significant exporter of low quality long grain rice. Exports with trade liberalization would increase from 1.94 mmt to 2.3 mmt. Prices increase from $178 per mt to $190 per mt. The net welfare gain is $12 million annually. China’s high quality milled long grain rice exports and prices would increase slightly from 470 thousand mt to 476 thousand mt and price from $216 per mt to $224 per mt resulting in a small welfare gain of $2.2 million annually. China is an importer of fragrant jasmine rice from Thailand. The volume imported would not increase and the price would only fall by $2 per ton resulting in a net welfare gain of $625 thousand per year. Summing across all rice types, exports and imports, China’s net welfare gain is $649 million annually. As the world’s largest rice producer and consumer, changes in world prices have extremely large welfare effects on producers and consumers. With higher prices, consumer surplus losses are estimated at $63.6 billion but producers gain $64.2 billion.

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• As a significant export supplier of medium grain rice, the United States would be the next most important beneficiary of rice trade liberalization. Medium grain milled rice exports would increase from 226 thousand mt to 383 thousand mt. Prices increase from $270 per mt to $617 per mt. The net welfare gain would be $86 million annually. Brown medium grain exports increase from 292 thousand mt to 594 thousand mt. Prices increase from $296 per ton to $803 per mt. The welfare gain is $225 million. The United States is a major exporter of high quality long grain rice. Trade liberalization however only results in increases of high quality milled rice exports from 799 thousand mt to 834 thousand mt. Prices increase from $216 per ton to $223 per mt. The annual welfare gain is only $4 million. Long grain brown rice exports increase from 339 thousand mt to 401 thousand mt. Prices increase from $193 per mt to $220 per mt. Expanded trade results in a net welfare gain of $5 million annually. As the world’s dominant export supplier of paddy rice, U.S. exports increase slightly from 843 thousand mt to 881 thousand mt. Prices increase by only $5 per ton from $153 to $158 per mt. The welfare gain for paddy rice exports is only $3 million annually. The United States exported low quality milled long grain rice of 434 thousand mt in 2000. Trade liberalization increases this volume to 470 thousand mt. Prices increase from $184 per mt to $196 per mt. The welfare gain from low quality rice exports is $3 million annually. The United States is a significant importer of fragrant jasmine and basmati rice. Imports of fragrant rice increase from 278 thousand mt to 280 thousand mt. Prices decline from $314 per mt to $305 per mt. The net welfare gain is $2.5 million annually. The US is a significant exporter of medium grain but also imports small quantities of milled medium grain rice, 31 thousand mt at a price of $270 per ton. With liberalization of this market, world prices increase primarily as a result of increased demand from Japan. Consequently, the import price more than doubles to a price of $617 per mt. Higher prices reduce imports to only 30 thousand mt and the US has a net welfare loss of $11 million annually. Medium grain exports however generate large welfare gains for producers, and losses for consumers. The net impact across both exports and imports is $86 million for milled medium grain and $225 million for brown medium grain rice. Summing across all rice imports and exports, the net gain to the United States is $326 million annually. The net gain is generated by higher total change in producer surpluses of 2.2 billion and losses to consumers of 1.9 billion annually.

• South Korea would capture large net welfare gains from trade liberalization.

In 2000, South Korea imported only 106 thousand mt of brown medium grain rice. Border reform would increase imports to 306 thousand mt. Prices would decline from $1,952 per mt to $840 per mt. The net welfare gain to South Korea would be $231 million annually. South Korea also imported 35 thousand tons of fragrant rice. With liberalization, imports would increase to 43 thousand and prices would decline from $2,003 per mt to $288 per ton. Welfare gains from fragrant rice import reform would be $67 million annually. Total net welfare gains for South Korea would be $298 million

25

annually. Korean consumers have a net gain of 6.2 billion while South Korean producers would lose $5.9 billion.

• Australia is the third largest medium grain rice producer and exporter.

Consequently, rice trade liberalization greatly benefits Australia. Exports of milled medium grain rice increase from 475 thousand mt to 756 thousand mt. Prices increase from 271 per mt to 615 per mt. The net welfare gain for milled medium grain rice is $211 million. Brown medium grain rice export prices would increase from $235 per mt to $805 per mt. With an increase in volume exported from 78 thousand mt to 165 thousand mt, the net welfare gain will be $69 million annually. Australia also exported 30 thousand tons of high quality long grain milled rice in 2000. Trade reform does not increase this volume but Australia gets a price increase from $242 per mt to $249 per mt, but a welfare gain of $201 thousand. Total net economic welfare gains to Australia are $281 million annually. Producer surplus gain in Australia is $1.03 billion while consumers lose from higher prices by $745 million.

• The fourth major medium grain exporter is Egypt. Trade reform would result

in an increase in exports of milled medium grain rice from 326 thousand mt to 448 thousand mt. Prices increase from $298 per mt to $629 per mt. The annual net welfare gain to Egypt totals $128 million. Net gains are distributed with producer surplus of $1.39 billion and consumer losses of 1.26 billion.

• The Philippines is a major low quality long grain rice importer. Elimination

of import tariffs results in an increase of imports in 2000 from 787 thousand mt to 1.02 mmt. Prices decline from $276 per mt to $215 per mt. The annual net welfare gain would be $72 million. Consumers gain 701 million annually and producers lose from lower prices by $629 million.

• The European Union would have an overall net welfare gain from rice trade

liberalization of $145 million annually. As an importer of brown rice, the EU would increase imports from 451 thousand mt to 588 thousand mt. Prices would fall from $496 per mt to $260 per mt. The welfare gain for the high quality long grain brown rice imports would be $138 million annually. This gain is offset by the higher prices that the EU would pay for medium grain imports, raising from $372 per mt to $624 per mt. The volume of medium grain imports would decline from 645 thousand mt to 595 thousand mt. The net welfare loss for medium grain rice would be $14 million annually. EU rice is exported, primarily by two members, Italy and Spain. In this analysis, export subsidies are removed. The analysis shows that medium grain prices increase to compensate for the removal of the subsidies but the price increase for long grain is not sufficient to offset the removal of the subsidies. Exports of milled medium grain rice from Italy would increase from 707 thousand mt to 742 thousand mt. Price increases from $545 per mt to $616 per mt, for a net welfare gain of $52 million annually. Spain exports both milled medium grain and long grain rice. Medium grain exports would increase from 141

26

thousand mt to 148 thousand mt with a price increase from $545 to $617 per mt. Long grain exports would decrease from 129 thousand mt to only 83 thousand mt. The welfare gain to medium grain exports would be $2 million but the loss from long grain exports would be $55 million for a net negative impact on Spain of $53 million. In total, the distribution of EU net welfare change involves a gain to consumers of $254 million annually and a loss to EU rice producers of $109 million.

• Taiwan was a net exporter of medium grain rice in 2000 prior to WTO

accession. Exports were generated as a result of domestic price supports that resulted in surplus production. With WTO membership, Taiwan agreed to a TRQ. For this analysis we have assumed a 2000 level of imports of 115 thousand mt. With trade reform this quantity would increase to 332 thousand mt. Prices would decline from $1,033 to $643 per mt. The net welfare gain from medium grain trade liberalization to Taiwan would be $186 million. We also assumed an import quantity of fragrant rice of 13 thousand mt, which increases to 15 thousand. Prices of fragrant rice decline from $1,034 to $300 per mt. The welfare gain is $10 million annually. Total economic welfare gains for Taiwan would then be $196 million annually. Consumers gain $697 million while rice producers lose an annual total of $501 million.

• Nigeria has become a major rice importer as it has relaxed quantitative

restrictions and relies primarily on tariffs. Nigeria imports high and low quality parboiled milled rice. High quality imports would increase from 36 thousand mt to 144 thousand mt in 2000. Low quality imports would increase from 682 thousand mt to 877 thousand mt. Prices for high quality decrease from $378 per mt to $259 per mt and low quality prices decline from $321 per mt to $226 per mt. The annual net welfare gain for both long grain qualities for Nigeria would be $85 million. Rice producers in Nigeria would lose producer surplus of $186 million annually while consumers gain $271 million.

• Vietnam is the major low quality rice exporter. Therefore tariff reform by

importers of this rice type will most benefit Vietnam. Exports would be expected to increase from 2.7 mmt to 3.1 mmt. Prices would increase from $173 per mt to $185 per mt. The net welfare gain for low quality rice exports would be $16 million. Vietnam has steadily increased its volume of high quality milled long grain rice. Trade reform would increase this volume from the 2000 level of 786 thousand mt to 819 thousand mt. Prices would be expected to increase from $215 per mt to $223 per mt. The welfare gain would be $3 million annually. Total annual net welfare gains for Vietnam add up to $19 million. Vietnamese consumers would lose from higher price by $210 million annually but producers would gain $229 million.

• The largest rice importer, Indonesia benefits from tariff reform of its low

quality long grain rice imports. The volume of imports would increase from 1.3 mmt to 1.7 mmt. Prices would decline from $228 per mt to $196 per mt.

27

The economic welfare gain would be $50 million. Producers would lose $1.02 billion annually while the consumer surplus gain would be $1.07 billion.

• Thailand is the world’s dominant rice exporting nation. All Thai exports

however are long grain, which is the relatively less protected rice type in world trade. As a result, the benefits of rice trade liberalization for Thailand are disproportionately small at only $22 million annually. With trade reform, exports would be expected to increase. High quality milled long grain rice exports increase from 3.3 mmt to 3.4 mmt. Low quality milled long grain exports increase from 1.6 mmt to 1.8 mmt. Fragrant rice exports increase from 1.21 mmt to 1.23 mmt. High quality rice prices increase from $214 per mt to $221 per mt. Low quality prices increase from $173 per mt to $185 per mt. Fragrant rice prices increase from $260 per mt to $262 per mt. These relatively modest export price increases along with relatively small increases in export volumes results in an unremarkable net benefit for Thailand. Producers have a net gain of $123 million annually while Thai consumers lose $101 million.

• Central American paddy rice importers capture most of the gains associated

with liberalization of paddy rice. On the export side the analysis does not change current rules in most countries, which ban paddy export. Only Argentina and the United States currently export paddy. A net gain to these two countries is $2.4 million. The importers as a group have a net gain of $22.4 million. This is divided among Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua, which benefit from $1 to $7 million annually from lower paddy import prices and increased imports. The expanded trade benefits the domestic milling industries in the importing countries and the rice consumers at the expense of rice producers.

• A number of smaller African developing nations gain similar to Nigeria but on

a smaller scale. Cote d’Ivoire gains an annual net welfare benefit of $24 million, Senegal $11 million and Sierra Leone $16 million.

• A number of developing countries and regions however are estimated to lose

from rice trade liberalization. These are countries that have been importing rice without trade barriers. In a sense they have benefited from protection by other importers since this protection has depressed the export supply prices. As a result of removing trade barriers, export supply prices increase for all rice types by degree of milling. This has negative consequences for a number of countries and regions that have had no or little import protection in rice. The country most seriously affected will be Turkey, a major importer of medium grain rice, which after trade reform will face much higher export supply prices. The estimated net welfare loss for Turkey is $137 million. As shown in table 6, all importers of medium grain rice, except Japan, South Korea and Taiwan lose as a result of significantly higher post-reform import

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prices. The same situation will hold true for long grain rice importers who have little or no import protection. Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and others lose. South Africa, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, and Brazil are other countries that would not be expected to benefit from rice trade liberalization.

• In the aggregate, rice importing countries benefit from lower prices and

increased trade. Consumer surplus gains in importing countries are $32.76 billion, which exceeds the losses to producer surpluses of $27.23 billion. Rice exporting countries in the aggregate benefits with producer surpluses of $70.25 billion exceeding consumer surplus losses of $68.81 billion.

6. Dynamic analysis of trade and domestic policy reform impacts on rice trade.

The trade and welfare analysis presented above assessed trade reform based on

elimination of import tariffs and export subsidies. The results were generated

using the RICEFLOW model, a static spatial equilibrium framework of excess

supply and demand equations. This framework is limited to estimation of the

effects of policy reform pertaining to border protection such as import tariffs and

export subsidies. It is not possible to use RICEFLOW to assess the indirect effects

of domestic price support policies on world rice trade and prices. To examine this

additional effect, the Arkansas Global Rice Model (AGRM) was used. The

AGRM is a non-spatial dynamic econometric model of the global rice economy

(see Appendix 2 for a description). The AGRM structure is based on equations for

supply—expressed in terms of equations that estimate area harvested and yields;

and for demand—expressed in equations for domestic consumption, exports,

imports, and ending stocks. Rice prices are endogenized, with world reference

equilibrium prices for long grain and medium grain rice (Hansen et al). The

29

AGRM is used to generate baseline estimates for domestic and international rice

for the FAPRI model.

The effects of domestic price supports and trade policy are captured in the supply

and demand framework of AGRM. For this study, policy interventions in rice

supply that are trade-distorting (“amber box” in WTO parlance) were removed.

To place the impacts of the removal of domestic policies on rice trade in

perspective, the model was also simulated for the removal of import tariffs and

export subsidies as well. This exercise provides an additional analysis to evaluate

the trade impact results generated by RICEFLOW, the spatial equilibrium

modeling framework. Finally the AGRM was used to examine the net effect of

complete policy reform including domestic support, import protection and export

subsidies.

6.1 Baseline

6.2 Domestic policy reform

6.3 Export subsidy reform

6.4 Import tariff reform

Domestic, Subsidy, and Tariff Reform

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References

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Commission of the European Communities. 2002. Rice: Markets, CMO and Medium Term Forecasts. Commission Staff Working Paper. SEC(2002) 788. Brussels.

Cramer, Gail L., Eric J. Wailes and Shangnan Shui, "The Impacts of Liberalizing Trade in the World Rice Market," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (February 1993):219-226.

Cramer, G.L., E.J. Wailes, J. Goroski, S. Phillips. The Impact of Liberalizing Trade on the World Rice Market: A Spatial Model Including Rice Quality. Arkansas Experiment Station Special Report 153. University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, Nov. 1991.

Fan, Shenggen, Eric J. Wailes, and Gail L. Cramer, "The Impact of Trade Liberalization on China's Rice Sector," Agricultural Economics 11(1994):71-81.

Fukuda, Hisao, John Dyck, and Jim Stout. 2003. “Rice Sector Policies in Japan.” RCS-0202-01. USDA, Economic Research Service. Washington, DC.

Gulati, Ashok and Sudha Narayanan. 2002. “Rice Trade Liberialization and Poverty.” MSSD Discussion Paper NO. 51 Markets and Strucutural Studies Division, International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington, DC.

Hansen, J., F. Fuller, F. Gale, F. Crook, E. Wailes, M. Moore. 2002. “China’s Japonica Rice Market: Growth and Competitiveness.” Rice Situation and Outlook Yearbook. Market and Trade Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, November 2002, RCS-2002.

Jayne, T.S. 1993. “Sources and Effects of Instability in the World Rice Market.” MSU International Development Paper No. 13. Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University. East Lansing, MI.

Katial-Zemany, Anita and Niniek S. Alam. 2003. Indonesia Grain and Feed Annual, 2003. USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service GAIN Report #ID3008.

Khush, Gurdev S. and D.S. Brar. 2002. “Biotechnology for rice breeding: progress and potential impact.” The International Rice Commission. 20th Session. Bangkok, Thailand. http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/004AC347E/AC347E00.HTM

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Sun, Xiufang and Adam Branson. 2002. Food and Agricultural Import Regulations and Standards, Interim Rules and Regulations of Tariff Rate Quota 2002. USDA, FAS, GAIN Report #CH2007.

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Wade, John and Jiang Junyang. 2003. China Grain and Feed Annual 2003. USDA, FAS, GAIN Report #3010. Washington, DC.

Wailes, Eric J., Kenneth B. Young and Gail L. Cramer, "Rice and Food Security in Japan: An American Perspective," Chapter 19 in Luther Tweeten et al ed., Japanese & American Agriculture: Tradition and Progress in Conflict, Westview Press, Dec. 1992.

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Wailes, Eric, Kenneth Young and Gail Cramer. "The East Asian Rice Economy After GATT." Chapter in Luther Tweeten and Hsin-Hui Hsu, eds. Changing Trade Environment After GATT: A Case Study of Taiwan. Council of Agriculture, Republic of China, Taipei. 1995.

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Wailes, Eric, G. Cramer, E. Chavez, and J. Hansen. Arkansas Global Rice Model: International Baseline Projections for 2000-2010. Arkansas Agricultural Experiment Station. Special Report 200. October, 2000.

Wailes, Eric. “Trade Liberalization in Rice.” In Agricultural Trade Policies in the New Millennium, ed. P. Lynn Kennedy. Haworth Press, 2002.

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Young, Kenneth B., Eric J. Wailes, Gail L. Cramer and Nguyen Tri Khiem. Vietnam’s Rice

Economy: Developments and Prospects. Arkansas Agricultural Experiment Station, Research Report 968, April 2002.

Zhang, Jianping, Rachel Matthews and Adam Branson. 2002. Food and Agriucltural Import Regulations and Standards, Implementation Measures for 2002 TRQ Allocation. USDA,FAS, GAIN Report #CH2008.

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Table 1. Share of calories from rice by region, 2000.

Region Total Calories per Capita Rice Calories per Capita Percent Calories from Rice World 2,805 576 20.5% Africa 2,434 178 7.3% Asia 2,713 856 31.6% Developed 3,260 118 3.6% Developing 2,679 703 26.2% Europe 3,250 45 1.4% LIFDC* 2,625 732 27.9% Low Income 2,405 702 29.2% N C America 3,411 117 3.4% S America 2,838 315 11.1% Sub Sahara 2,226 174 7.8% Source: FAOSTAT * Low-income food-deficit countries

Figure 1. World rice trade and share of total use. Source: USDA PS &D. 2003.

0.0

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/76

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Table 2. Leading rice producing, consuming, exporting, and importing countries. Rank Producing Consuming Exporting Importing 1 China China Thailand Indonesia 2 India India India Nigeria 3 Indonesia Indonesia Vietnam Bangladesh 4 Bangladesh Bangladesh United States Iran 5 Vietnam Vietnam China Philippines 6 Thailand Japan Pakistan Brazil 7 Japan Thailand Uruguay Iraq 8 Myanmar Myanmar Argentina Saudi Arabia 9 Philippines Philippines Egypt European Union 10 Brazil Brazil Myanmar Senegal 11 United States South Korea Australia China 12 South Korea United States Japan South Africa 13 Pakistan Nigeria European Union Cote d’Ivoire 14 Egypt Egypt Guyana Malaysia 15 Cambodia Iran Ecuador Cuba 16 Nepal Pakistan Japan 17 Taiwan Cambodia Mexico 18 North Korea Nepal North Korea 19 Nigeria Taiwan South Korea 20 Sri Lanka North Korea United States 21 Hong Kong 22 Kenya 23 Papua New Guinea 24 Turkey 25 Ghana 26 Guinea 27 Colombia 28 Mozambique 29 Haiti 30 Canada Source: USDA, PS&D. 2003

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Table 3. Net rice trade, 1982-2002. Country Units / Year 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 NET EXPORTERS (1000 mt) 8,795 9,538 8,737 9,377 10,753 9,028 11,216 10,465 10,970 13,112 13,158 13,752 17,243 17,585 17,244 24,277 23,690 20,763 21,944 24,475 24,568 United States (1000 mt) 2,198 2,245 1,909 1,815 2,636 2,194 2,665 2,398 2,180 1,959 2,320 2,344 3,066 2,449 2,154 2,461 2,394 2,483 2,245 2,525 2,873 Thailand (1000 mt) 3,694 4,528 3,993 4,334 4,342 4,791 6,036 3,938 3,988 4,876 4,971 4,720 5,943 5,281 5,216 6,367 6,678 6,549 7,521 7,185 7,750 Pakistan (1000 mt) 1,146 1,172 836 1,297 1,300 999 792 749 1,274 1,419 918 1,232 1,660 1,632 1,834 2,099 1,837 2,104 2,429 1,450 1,000 Myanmar (1000 mt) 750 727 450 660 493 368 452 192 176 185 222 585 645 265 15 94 56 159 670 1,000 1,000 Vietnam (1000 mt) 110 -239 -276 -357 3 86 1,381 1,670 1,048 1,914 1,592 2,264 2,304 3,039 3,326 3,776 4,495 3,330 3,488 3,160 4,210 China (1000 mt) 267 994 818 605 872 277 -728 269 621 840 1,219 550 -1,966 -587 616 3,473 2,530 2,673 1,580 1,525 1,950 India (1000 mt) 120 -630 150 245 345 -450 -200 450 700 585 595 750 4,150 3,700 2,100 3,988 3,346 1,314 1,685 6,300 4,250 Australia (1000 mt) 246 326 454 380 365 420 476 433 491 576 496 472 469 514 620 499 611 564 545 320 300 Egypt (1000 mt) 21 65 13 31 94 93 31 82 159 209 135 265 161 337 201 410 274 500 694 350 350 Argentina (1000 mt) 71 140 165 148 97 43 36 49 74 205 275 197 322 359 521 535 726 402 337 185 260 Uruguay (1000 mt) 172 210 225 219 206 207 275 235 259 344 415 373 489 596 641 575 743 685 750 475 625 NET IMPORTERS (1000 mt) 4,923 4,547 5,519 4,730 4,167 4,478 4,520 5,405 5,095 5,825 5,944 9,564 10,315 10,230 9,348 16,110 16,641 11,337 12,155 15,119 15,139 Japan (1000 mt) -209 -61 18 20 18 16 16 18 17 18 18 2,623 -401 451 470 -75 344 439 198 550 500 Hong Kong (1000 mt) 361 376 323 305 409 372 384 363 418 378 351 336 334 349 341 305 316 274 292 320 320 Indonesia (1000 mt) 1,068 419 -339 -188 -19 50 280 77 192 539 -450 898 3,081 1,081 839 5,765 3,729 1,500 1,500 3,500 3,250 Malaysia (1000 mt) 383 388 424 420 212 195 289 378 298 367 470 390 319 402 563 637 630 617 596 633 600 Philippines (1000 mt) -11 -20 401 329 -110 25 179 575 350 0 0 215 0 975 682 1,288 1,725 665 1,410 1,100 1,000 Bangladesh (1000 mt) 317 180 690 39 261 691 120 324 11 39 10 100 1,300 1,140 46 1,200 2,500 400 672 325 450 Iraq (1000 mt) 280 448 405 373 515 547 448 388 268 548 647 64 99 234 744 630 779 1,274 959 1,250 1,100 Iran (1000 mt) 708 722 722 529 1,124 449 863 888 614 1,261 1,221 665 1,759 1,574 1,288 844 1,313 1,100 735 1,000 1,500 Saudi Arabia (1000 mt) 471 543 525 492 504 510 512 517 547 559 783 891 724 618 814 635 748 720 942 998 840 European Union (1000 mt) 274 368 250 216 267 226 145 185 60 5 176 323 381 498 486 492 500 506 641 475 575 Eastern Europe 10 (1000 mt) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 143 183 229 217 271 279 342 309 326 333 369 376 359 Turkey (1000 mt) 30 58 90 91 155 113 157 210 158 295 318 275 408 348 254 269 324 327 237 255 290 South Korea (1000 mt) 216 -128 0 0 0 1 2 10 -15 -1 -1 4 -147 115 0 75 96 98 93 121 -231 Taiwan (1000 mt) -546 -357 -107 -76 -173 -185 -100 -66 -75 -225 -185 -98 -182 -274 -112 -70 -52 -108 -117 -133 25 Brazil (1000 mt) 333 41 700 1,300 50 44 175 405 965 450 716 980 884 762 839 1,395 854 544 708 600 700 Mexico (1000 mt) 0 106 203 23 0 0 189 136 175 385 275 250 245 300 279 308 306 427 399 472 472 Canada (1000 mt) 99 105 108 87 85 113 115 155 189 175 184 187 217 225 240 245 248 250 262 235 250 Cote d'Ivoire (1000 mt) 349 308 291 23 217 401 160 386 263 169 322 384 298 405 399 574 537 515 496 575 700 Nigeria (1000 mt) 654 893 629 569 462 642 344 164 224 296 440 382 300 300 350 731 900 950 1,250 1,906 1,700 South Africa (1000 mt) 146 158 186 178 190 268 242 292 293 384 420 478 425 448 484 553 518 506 513 561 739 Rest of World (1000 mt) 3,872 4,991 3,218 4,647 6,586 4,550 6,696 5,060 5,875 7,287 7,214 4,188 6,928 7,355 7,896 8,167 7,049 9,426 9,789 9,331 9,429 Source: USDA, PS&D

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Table 4. Schedule of tariffs, tariff rate quotas and quotas in rice ________________Long grain______________ __Medium/Short__ TRQ Quota Country/Region __________Milled_________ Brown Paddy Milled Brown (tons) Non-fragrant Fragrant Bangladesh 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% 22.5% Brazil 15.0% 15.0% 13.0% 13.0% 15.0% 13.0% Canada 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% CARICOM 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% Chile 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% 9.0% China 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 5,320,000 Colombia 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 15.0% 20.0% 20.0% Costa Rica 35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 20.0% 35.0% 35.0% Côte d'Ivoire 32.0% 32.0% 12.0% 7.0% 32.0% 12.0% Cuba 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% Dominican Rep. 20.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% El Salvador 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% European Union 80.0% 71.0% 46.0% 146.0% 75.0% 64.3% Guatemala 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% Haiti 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% Honduras 45.0% 45.0% 45.0% 20.0% 45.0% 45.0% Hong Kong 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% India 70.0% 70.0% 80.0% 80.0% 70.0% 80.0% Indonesia 21.0% 16.1% 25.0% 35.0% 14.3% 15.6% Iran, Islamic 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Iraq 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Japan (yen/kg) 341 341 341 341 341 341 682,000 Korea, North 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Korea, South 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 204,000 Madagascar 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Malaysia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Mexico 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0% Nicaragua 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% 55.0% Nigeria 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% Other S. America 15.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% Other Africa 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% Other Asia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Other CIS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Other Europe 25.0% 25.0% 10.0% 10.0% 25.0% 10.0% Other Middle East 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Other Oceania 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Other South West Asia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Peru 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% Philippines 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% Russia 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% Saudi Arabia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Senegal 12.7% 12.7% 12.7% 12.7% 12.7% 12.7% Sierra Leone 32.0% 7.0% 12.0% 7.0% 32.0% 12.0% Singapore 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% South Africa 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Syria 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% Taiwan 0.0% 210.0% 0.0% 0.0% 210.0% 229.4% Turkey 35.0% 27.0% 35.0% 27.0% 35.0% 35.0% U. A. Emirates 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% United States ($/ton) 14 14 21 18 14 21 Yemen 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

Sources: AMAD (Agricultural Market Access Database), USDA, FAS GAIN reports.

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Table 5. Rice trade liberalization results from RICEFLOW model, 2000. Rice Type Baseline Free Trade % Change Long Grain High Quality Paddy Quantity (MT) 1,035,320 1,081,254 4.4% Export Price (USD/MT) 149.21 154.67 3.7% Import Price (USD/MT) 185.51 166.89 -10.0% Brown Quantity (MT) 856,798 916,721 7.0% Export Price (USD/MT) 223.75 219.25 -2.0% Import Price (USD/MT) 363.32 250.64 -31.0% Milled Quantity (MT) 7,495,594 7,704,482 2.8% Export Price (USD/MT) 225.97 225.58 -0.2% Import Price (USD/MT) 262.06 252.16 -3.8% Low Quality Milled Quantity (MT) 8,084,093 9,149,728 13.2% Export Price (USD/MT) 177.05 188.70 6.6% Import Price (USD/MT) 248.19 213.09 -14.1% Fragrant Milled Quantity (MT) 2,449,711 2,467,502 0.7% Export Price (USD/MT) 265.24 267.07 0.7% Import Price (USD/MT) 511.20 299.07 -41.5% All Long Grain Quantity (MT) 19,921,516 21,319,687 7.0% Export Price (USD/MT) 206.87 210.68 1.8% Import Price (USD/MT) 287.45 236.43 -17.7% Medium/Short Grain Brown Quantity (MT) 483,063 1,162,478 140.6% Export Price (USD/MT) 271.80 814.47 199.7% Import Price (USD/MT) 1438.54 842.75 -41.4% Milled Quantity (MT) 2,487,760 3,946,170 58.6% Export Price (USD/MT) 367.71 628.92 71.0% Import Price (USD/MT) 855.89 645.69 -24.6% All Medium/Short Grain Quantity (MT) 2,970,823 5,108,648 72.0% Export Price (USD/MT) 352.11 671.14 90.6% Import Price (USD/MT) 950.63 690.53 -27.4% All Rice Quantity (MT) 22,892,339 26,428,335 15.4% Export Price (USD/MT) 225.71 299.69 32.8% Import Price (USD/MT) 373.51 322.97 -13.5% Source: University of Arkansas, RICEFLOW Model. 2003.

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Table 6. Economic welfare estimates of global rice policy reform.(‘000 USD) Importer Long Grain Medium Grain Change from Baseline Country/Region High Quality Low Quality Fragrant Net Producer Consumer

Milled Brown Paddy Milled Milled Milled Brown Welfare Surplus Surplus Bangladesh -946 -946 52,078 -53,024 Brazil -1,522 -6,068 -714 -8,304 34,935 -43,239 Canada -1,300 -480 -4 -5,067 -8,967 -15,818 0 -15,818 CARICOM 1,761 1,017 1,450 4,228 -10,002 14,230 Chile 948 948 0 948 Colombia -376 -376 8,758 -9,133 Costa Rica 2,154 2,154 -7,694 9,848 Cote d’Ivoire -7 23,966 23,959 -32,023 55,982 Cuba 10,538 10,538 -4,247 14,785 Dom. Republic 1,260 863 2,123 -9,836 11,959 El Salvador 3,459 3,459 -4,063 7,522 EU 21,858 137,904 -623 -14,207 144,932 -108,960 253,892 Guatemala 1,196 1,196 -956 2,152 Haiti 4,845 4,845 -1,146 5,992 Honduras 3,274 3,274 -298 3,572 Hong Kong -1,988 -1,988 0 -1,988 Indonesia 49,569 49,569 -1,016,069 1,065,639 Iran -8,747 -8,747 6,660 -15,407 Iraq -8,191 -8,191 1,001 -9,192 Japan 470,648 3,623,857 904,399 4,998,905 -19,161,812 24,160,717 Korea, North -2,379 -16 -20,876 -23,271 264,779 -288,050 Korea, South 66,882 231,302 298,184 -5,937,849 6,236,033 Madagascar -1,105 -48,529 -49,634 53,663 -103,297 Malaysia -4,222 -4,222 9,741 -13,964 Mexico 1,522 5,995 -6,017 1,500 -3,934 5,434 Nicaragua 1,342 6,988 8,330 -11,802 20,132 Nigeria 10,744 73,974 84,719 -185,846 270,565 Other S.America -86 -86 0 -86 Other Africa 23,249 53,738 -41,218 35,768 -40,557 76,325 Other Asia -895 -1,928 -18,489 -21,313 29,543 -50,856 Other CIS -2,000 -22,587 -24,587 0 -24,587 Other Europe 11,155 -82 4,197 -27,586 -12,316 -733 -11,583 Other Mid. East -781 -29 -33,028 -33,839 0 -33,839 Other Oceania -917 -49,644 -50,561 0 -50,561 Other S.W. Asia -56 -368 -6 -430 0 -430 Peru 2,067 -20 2,048 -24,361 26,408 Philippines 72,331 72,331 -628,991 701,323 Russia 660 -470 -11,517 -11,328 648 -11,976 Saudi Arabia -2,875 -73 -2,948 0 -2,948 Senegal 11,413 11,413 -2,189 13,602 Sierra Leone 16,410 16,410 -11,342 27,752 Singapore -2,542 -2,542 0 -2,542 South Africa -4,064 -4,064 0 -4,064 Sri Lanka 1,160 1,160 -109,104 110,264 Syria 5,602 -27,984 -22,382 0 -22,382 Taiwan 10,235 186,264 196,499 -500,968 697,467 Turkey -43,349 -93,272 -136,621 127,438 -264,059 U.A. Emirates -1,661 -27 -1,689 0 -1,689 Yemen -1,066 -4 -1,070 0 -1,070

Total Importers 40,879 132,264 22,352 315,259 546,982 3,440,022 1,033,463 5,531,222 -27,225,538 32,756,760

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Table 6. continued Exporter Long Grain Medium grain Change from Baseline Country/Region High Quality Low Quality Fragrant Net Producer Consumer

Milled Brown Paddy Milled Milled Milled Brown Welfare Surplus Surplus Argentina 892 796 368 2,056 2,884 -827 Australia 201 211,313 69,320 280,835 1,025,805 -744,970 China 2,232 11,593 625 479,914 154,951 649,315 64,206,673 -63,557,358 Egypt 128,346 128,346 1,388,721 -1,260,375 Guyana -2,406 -21,208 -1,490 -25,104 -79,754 54,651 India 3,510 1,961 570 6,041 972,850 -966,810 Myanmar 884 884 128,494 -127,610 Pakistan 4,521 10,422 1,118 16,061 39,040 -22,979 Thailand 11,072 9,817 1,132 22,021 123,327 -101,306 United States 3,597 4,613 1,989 2,578 2,492 85,639 224,822 325,729 2,184,697 -1,858,968 Uruguay 1,778 7,675 9,453 22,237 -12,784 Venezuela 224 224 3,340 -3,116 Vietnam 2,652 15,894 18,546 229,127 -210,581

Total Exporters 28,274 -8,125 2,356 51,659 5,937 905,212 449,094 1,434,408 70,247,441 -68,813,033

Total Welfare 69,153 124,139 24,709 366,918 552,919 4,345,234 1,482,557 6,965,629 43,021,903 -36,056,274

39

40

Table 7. Net welfare estimates of rice policy reform including government costs and revenues. Importer Change from Baseline Country/Region

Producer Surplus

Consumer Surplus

Tariff Revenue

Domestic Support

Net Welfare

Bangladesh 52,078 -53,024 4,366 0 -5,313 Brazil 34,935 -43,239 16,140 0 -24,445 Canada 0 -15,818 0 0 -15,818 CARICOM -10,002 14,230 6,504 0 -2,276 Chile 0 948 1,517 0 -569 Colombia 8,758 -9,133 0 0 -376 Costa Rica -7,694 9,848 3,472 0 -1,318 Cote d'Ivoire -32,023 55,982 27,989 0 -4,031 Cuba -4,247 14,785 16,807 0 -6,269 Dom. Republic -9,836 11,959 2,940 0 -817 El Salvador -4,063 7,522 3,250 0 209 EU -108,960 253,892 98,171 211,766 258,527 Guatemala -956 2,152 2,074 0 -878 Haiti -1,146 5,992 9,259 0 -4,413 Honduras -298 3,572 4,002 0 -728 Hong Kong 0 -1,988 0 0 -1,988 Indonesia -1,016,069 1,065,639 67,981 0 -18,411 Iran 6,660 -15,407 0 0 -8,747 Iraq 1,001 -9,192 0 0 -8,191 Japan -19,161,812 24,160,717 1,918,947 2,550,037 5,629,995 Korea, North 264,779 -288,050 0 0 -23,271 Korea, South -5,937,849 6,236,033 239,700 0 58,484 Madagascar 53,663 -103,297 0 0 -49,634 Malaysia 9,741 -13,964 0 0 -4,222 Mexico -3,934 5,434 11,301 0 -9,801 Nicaragua -11,802 20,132 8,164 0 166 Nigeria -185,846 270,565 77,161 0 7,558 Other S.America 0 -86 412 0 -498 Other Africa -40,557 76,325 102,251 0 -66,484 Other Asia 29,543 -50,856 0 0 -21,313 Other CIS 0 -24,587 0 0 -24,587 Other Europe -733 -11,583 26,175 0 -38,491 Other Mid. East 0 -33,839 0 0 -33,839 Other Oceania 0 -50,561 0 0 -50,561 Other S.W. Asia 0 -430 0 0 -430 Peru -24,361 26,408 5,285 0 -3,237 Philippines -628,991 701,323 72,419 0 -87 Russia 648 -11,976 4,601 0 -15,929 Saudi Arabia 0 -2,948 0 0 -2,948 Senegal -2,189 13,602 19,077 0 -7,664 Sierra Leone -11,342 27,752 18,690 0 -2,280 Singapore 0 -2,542 0 0 -2,542 South Africa 0 -4,064 0 0 -4,064 Sri Lanka -109,104 110,264 1,172 0 -12 Syria 0 -22,382 4,817 0 -27,199 Taiwan -500,968 697,467 93,438 0 103,061 Turkey 127,438 -264,059 40,877 0 -177,498 U.A. Emirates 0 -1,689 0 0 -1,689 Yemen 0 -1,070 0 0 -1,070

Total Importers -27,225,538 32,756,760 2,914,210 2,761,803 5,378,814

41

Table 7. continued Exporter Country/Region Producer Consumer

Surplus Surplus Argentina 2,884 -827 0 0 2,056 Australia 1,025,805 -744,970 0 0 280,835 China 64,206,673 -63,557,358 788 0 648,527 Egypt 1,388,721 -1,260,375 0 0 128,346 Guyana -79,754 54,651 0 0 -25,104 India 972,850 -966,810 0 0 6,041 Myanmar 128,494 -127,610 0 0 884 Pakistan 39,040 -22,979 0 0 16,061 Thailand 123,327 -101,306 0 0 22,021 United States 2,184,697 -1,858,968 4,464 598,267 919,533 Uruguay 22,237 -12,784 0 0 9,453 Venezuela 3,340 -3,116 0 0 224 Vietnam 229,127 -210,581 0 0 18,546

Total Exporters 70,247,441 -68,813,033 5,252 598,267 2,027,423

Total Welfare 43,021,903 -36,056,274 2,919,462 3,360,070 7,406,237

Source: Arkansas Global Rice Model, University of Arkansas. 2003.

Figure 2. Policy Reform of the Global Rice Economy: Net Impact on Trade

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Source: Arkansas Global Rice Model, University of Arkansas. 2003.

Source: Arkansas Global Rice Model, University of Arkansas. 2003.

Figure 4. Policy Reform of the Global Rice Economy: Net Impact on California No. 2 Medium Grain Price

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Figure 3. Policy Reform of the Global Rice Economy: Net Impact on Thai 100% B Long Grain Price

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