Global Environmental Governance: A Reform AgendaAdil Najam • Mihaela Papa • Nadaa Taiyab Global...

Global Environmental GovernanceA Reform Agenda

Adi l Najam • Mihaela Papa • Nadaa Taiyab

Global Environmental GovernanceA Reform Agenda

Global Environmental Governance (GEG) is the sum of organizations,policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, procedures and normsthat regulate the processes of global environmental protection. Sinceenvironmental issues entered the international agenda in the early1970s, global environmental politics and policies have been developingrapidly. The environmental governance system we have today reflectsboth the successes and failures of this development. It has becomeincreasingly clear that the GEG system, as we know it, has outgrown itsoriginal design and intent.

The system’s high maintenance needs, its internal redundancies and itsinherent inefficiencies have combined to have the perverse effect of dis-tracting from the most important GEG goal of all—improved environ-mental performance. The system needs reform not because it has“failed” but because it has outgrown its own original design. Much likechildren who outgrow their clothes as they mature, the GEG systemneeds to be rethought so that it can meet the challenges of its owngrowth, respond to future issues, and move from its current emphasison awareness-raising and treaty creation to actual environmental actionand implementation.

This book identifies a number of practical steps that can foster moreefficient and effective global environmental governance, making betteruse of the resources available and designed in a way that will be morehelpful to the implementation of international environmental agree-ments for developing as well as developed countries.

Adil Najam is an Associate Professor of International Negotiation andDiplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University,and an Associate of the International Institute for SustainableDevelopment (IISD). Mihaela Papa and Nadaa Taiyab were both graduateresearchers at the Center for International Environmental and ResourcePolicy (CIERP) at the Fletcher School, Tufts University.

Global Environm

ental Governance: A

Reform

Agenda

http://www.iisd.org http://www.um.dk/da

Global Environmental Governance

A Reform Agenda

Adi l Najam • Mihaela Papa • Nadaa Taiyab

This book is an output of the “Mapping Global EnvironmentalGovernance Reform” project of the International Institute for

Sustainable Development (IISD). The initiative was conceived of andfunded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Denmark.

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© 2006, International Institute for Sustainable Development

The International Institute for Sustainable Development contributes to sus-tainable development by advancing policy recommendations on internationaltrade and investment, economic policy, climate change and energy, measure-ment and assessment, and sustainable natural resources management.Through the Internet, we report on international negotiations and shareknowledge gained through collaborative projects with global partners, result-ing in more rigorous research, capacity building in developing countries andbetter dialogue between North and South.

IISD’s vision is better living for all—sustainably; its mission is to championinnovation, enabling societies to live sustainably. IISD is registered as a chari-table organization in Canada and has 501(c)(3) status in the United States.IISD receives core operating support from the Government of Canada, pro-vided through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), theInternational Development Research Centre (IDRC) and EnvironmentCanada; and from the Province of Manitoba. The Institute receives projectfunding from numerous governments inside and outside Canada, UnitedNations agencies, foundations and the private sector.

International Institute for Sustainable Development161 Portage Avenue East, 6th FloorWinnipeg, ManitobaCanada R3B 0Y4Tel.: +1 (204) 958-7700Fax: +1 (204) 958-7710Web site: http://www.iisd.org

Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda

By Adil Najam, Mihaela Papa and Nadaa Taiyab

ISBN 1-895536-91-x

ii Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda

Printed on 100% post-consumer recycled paper.

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Preface

by Carsten Staur

Is the system of global environmental governance a success or a failure?What are the salient features of the system and what are the challengesit faces? And given the history of the debate and attempts to restructureand improve global environmental governance, what would be the ele-ments of reform that are both practical and realistic?

These are some of the key questions addressed in this study, which wasprepared under the auspices of the International Institute forSustainable Development (IISD) and led by Professor Adil Najam fromthe Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, drawing on the advice froman international group of experts.

The study shows that an impressive institutional machinery has actuallybeen built, but also that the overall state of the global environmentseems not to have improved as a consequence of this. Numerous multi-lateral environmental agreements have been concluded; many meetingsare held each year to advance implementation; and significant amountsof human resources are spent to produce national reports on the effortsundertaken. Yet, as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and thework of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have shownus, ecosystem decline and global warming continue, representing realdangers to our planet.

The study attempts to show us a way out of this paradoxical situation.Rather than getting bogged down by the findings of fragmentation andincoherence, insufficient cooperation and coordination, inefficiencyand lack of implementation, the study sees these features as an expres-sion of a system that has outgrown itself in the wake of its own success.And, rather than proposing grand organizational reforms, the studyproposes to work with the existing pieces.

It is refreshing to see an attempt to link the smallest, most specific itemof short-term change with an overall longer-term vision. As the studypoints out, there seems to be broad international support of the fivegoals, which constitute the basis of a vision for the global environmen-tal governance system. These are leadership, knowledge, coherence,performance and mainstreaming.

Within such a longer-term guiding framework, the study proposes spe-cific steps of reform which are meant to mutually support each otherand pave the way for more far-reaching reform.

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Without attempting to comment on each of the goals within thelonger-term vision, the need to integrate global environmental objectivesin national sustainable development and poverty reduction strategiesshould be highlighted. Without such integration in broader policyframeworks, including the identification of concrete win-win situa-tions and informed decisions on how to manage trade-offs betweendiffering objectives, it is difficult to imagine how to overcome the para-dox of institutional success and environmental degradation.

The study is published at an important juncture. Reforms of the insti-tutional framework for environmental governance at the global levelare subject to renewed deliberations at the UN General Assembly, whenreforms leading to system-wide coherence across the UN familyinvolved in humanitarian, development and environment operations atthe country-level are being proposed by a distinguished panel of headsof state and government, ministers and other eminent persons.

I want to thank the President and CEO of IISD, David Runnalls, thestaff at IISD, Professor Adil Najam and his colleagues Mihaela Papa andNadaa Taiyab, as well as the members of the international expert advi-sory group for all the efforts made in preparing this important study. Isincerely hope that the study will get the attention it deserves and thatit will prove useful in the ongoing reform processes.

Carsten StaurState Secretary, AmbassadorMinistry of Foreign AffairsDenmark

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Preface

by David Runnalls

The first global conference on the environment, held in Stockholm in1972, set in motion three decades of discussion, negotiation and ratifi-cation of a whole series of international environmental agreements. Mylate colleague, Konrad von Moltke, had a list of more than 500 differ-ent agreements and even he was not sure that he had identified all ofthem.

The Stockholm Conference spawned the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme. The Earth Summit, held in Rio 20 years later, broughtwith it the Conventions on Biological Diversity, Climate Change andDesertification and created another UN political institution, theCommission on Sustainable Development. And the desire to host aprestigious international institution led to the decisions to locate thesmall and underfunded secretariats of many of these agreements inmany geographically diverse homes—from Montreal to Bonn to Romeand some places in between. In a sense, we have been embarrassed byour own success. Major institutions, such as the World Bank as well asthe World Trade Organization, claim sustainable development as theiroverarching goal. A similar growth of interest is also seen within non-UN international and regional institutions in terms of environmentaland sustainable development concerns.

The international environmental institutions have each evolved differ-ently, but they all have something in common. They are unusuallyopen, both to civil society actors and to the business community. Myown Institute is proud to have contributed to this openness and trans-parency through our publication of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin,which is present at virtually every meeting of the Conferences of theParties.

The immense growth of the system of global environmental gover-nance signifies the world’s growing appreciation of the scope and scaleof the problems. However, this growth has also made the systemunwieldy and increasingly incoherent. There is now a general agree-ment that this system is more cumbersome and less effective than itmust be if we are to confront the serious environmental challenges laidout in such international reports as those of the IPCC and theMillennium Ecosystem Assessment. Although many of these institu-tions remain small and fragile, their tasks are vital and they can oftenbring substantial financial resources to bear.

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There have been lots and lots of proposed schemes and solutions to theglobal environmental governance “problem.” These range from thereform of UNEP to the creation of a World or Global EnvironmentalOrganization. They involve “clustering” some of the secretariats by spe-cialty, or even merging some or all of them.

The Danish Government approached IISD and asked us if we couldhelp make some sense out of this debate, to summarize the options andto make some recommendations for progress. The timing has beenpropitious, as there is a major UN reform process well underway, whichincludes global environmental governance as one of its prime goals.

The work has been directed by IISD Associate, Adil Najam, a Professorat the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, andby two of his Fletcher colleagues, Mihaela Papa and Nadaa Taiyab. Itwas reviewed by an international Advisory Group which I had the priv-ilege to chair. The group included eminent experts from diverse back-grounds, all serving in their individual capacities. The Advisory Groupmet twice, once in Boston, courtesy of the Fletcher School, and once inthe Conference Room of the Danish Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen.

We have made some recommendations which we think can be taken upwithin the practical politics of the moment and which we think wouldmake the system work much better. We have drawn inspiration fromKonrad von Moltke who never gave up on this system despite its fre-quent failures, and who constantly reminded us of just how complexthe art of environmental governance can be. As Konrad put it in anIISD paper, it is “The Organization of the Impossible.”

I want to thank the Danish Government for supporting this project andcontinuing to fund its publication and follow-up. And I would like tocongratulate Dr. Najam and his colleagues on a job well and promptlydone.

David RunnallsPresident and CEOInternational Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)

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Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter 1 7

A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate 9

An Evolving System of Global Environmental Governance 9

Models of Global Environmental Governance Reform 17

GEG Reform Initiatives and Why They Don’t Succeed 21

Chapter 2 27

Key Challenges to Effective Global Environmental 29Governance

Challenge #1. Proliferation of MEAs and Fragmentation 29of GEG

Challenge #2. Lack of Cooperation and Coordination 36Among International Organizations

Challenge #3. Lack of Implementation, Compliance, 45Enforcement and Effectiveness

Challenge #4. Inefficient Use of Resources 52

Challenge #5. GEG Outside the Environmental Arena 57

Challenge #6. Non-state Actors in a State-centric System 62

Chapter 3 69

Elements of a Reform Agenda 71

Goal #1. Leadership 73

Goal #2. Knowledge 75

Goal #3. Coherence 78

Goal #4. Performance 83

Goal #5. Mainstreaming 87

A Last Word 89

Annex 91

Endnotes 97

Bibliography 101

Contents vii

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viii Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda

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Introduction

▲

“We understand global environmentalgovernance (GEG) as the sum of organi-zations, policy instruments, financingmechanisms, rules, procedures andnorms that regulate the processes ofglobal environmental protection.”

▼

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▲

“There is great awareness of environmental threatsand numerous efforts have emerged to addressthem globally. At the same time—and partlybecause of the rather spectacular growth inawareness and initiatives—the GEG system hasoutgrown its original design and intent.”

“Even though the GEG system has achieved muchin the way of new treaties, more money and amore participatory and active system than anyonemight have imagined three decades ago, environ-mental degradation continues.”

▼

2 Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda

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Introduction

We understand global environmental governance (GEG) as the sum oforganizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, proce-dures and norms that regulate the processes of global environmentalprotection. Since environmental issues entered the international agen-da in the early 1970s, global environmental politics and policies havebeen developing rapidly. The environmental governance system wehave today reflects both the successes and failures of this development.There is great awareness of environmental threats and numerousefforts have emerged to address them globally. At the same time—andpartly because of the rather spectacular growth in awareness and ini-tiatives—the GEG system has outgrown its original design and intent.The system’s high maintenance needs, its internal redundancies and itsinherent inefficiencies have combined to have the perverse effect of dis-tracting from the most important GEG goal of all—improved environ-mental performance.

Even though the GEG system has achieved much in the way of newtreaties, more money and a more participatory and active system thananyone might have imagined three decades ago, environmental degra-dation continues. Indeed, because we know so much more about envi-ronmental conditions and environmental processes, we also knowmore about what is not going well with the global environment. Thisstate of affairs is well documented in the Millennium EcosystemAssessment (2006). For example, despite the feverish discussions aboutglobal climate change, carbon emissions continue to rise; global atmos-pheric CO2 levels that were around 300 parts per million (ppm) in theearly 1900s have now reached approximately 380 ppm. The MillenniumEcosystem Assessment also found that approximately 60 per cent of theecosystems that it examined were either being degraded or used unsus-tainably. Since 1980, 35 per cent of the world’s mangroves have beenlost and 20 per cent of the world’s precious coral reefs have beendestroyed. A decade after the signing of the Biodiversity Convention,the species extinction rate is still 1,000 times higher than what wouldbe occurring naturally, without human impact. Despite the dozens ofglobal and regional fisheries treaties, an estimated 90 per cent of thetotal weight of large predators in the oceans—such as tuna, sharks andswordfish—have disappeared over the last few decades. Estimates sug-gest that we may still be losing as much as 150,000 square kilometres offorest each year.1

Given increasing evidence of environmental degradation, the systemneeds reform urgently. However, it should be noted that the system

Introduction 33

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needs reform not because it has “failed,” but because it has outgrown itsown original design. Much like children who outgrow their clothes asthey mature, or small towns that need new infrastructure as they blos-som into large cities, the GEG system needs to be rethought so that itcan meet the challenges of its own growth, respond to future issues andmove from its current emphasis on awareness-raising and treaty cre-ation to actual environmental action and implementation.

This book seeks to identify a number of practical steps that can fostera more efficient and effective environmental regime, making better useof the resources available and designed in a way that will be more help-ful to the implementation of international environmental agreementsfor developing as well as developed countries. The project objectivesare:

(a) to analyze past and current efforts at GEG reform;

(b) to outline a practical overall direction for rationalized GEG in abottom-up reform of the international environmental governancesystem; and

(c) to propose a set of realistic and desirable steps to achieve meaning-ful reform.

We begin from the obvious but important premise that the objective ofGEG reform is not simply institutional harmony and efficiency; it is tobring about tangible environmental improvement and positive move-ment towards the ultimate goal of sustainable development. In identi-fying our recommendations, we have consciously sought ideas thatmight lead us to: (a) a balance between short-term incrementalimprovements and deeper-rooted, longer-term institutional change;(b) improved implementation of existing environmental instrumentsand improved effectiveness of existing institutions, including bettercoordination among them; (c) better incorporation of non-stateactors; (d) meaningful mainstreaming of the environmental and sus-tainable development agenda into other policy streams; and (e) greaterprominence and confidence in global environmental institutions andinitiatives among international leaders and within public opinion.

To make this a manageable exercise, we will focus on environmentalgovernance. However, we understand and very much identify with theneeds to contextualize environmental governance within the frame-work of sustainable development. We believe that global environ-mental governance is a key component of sustainable developmentgovernance, but the latter is larger than the former. Our focus is on theformer within the context of the latter. Similarly, we are convinced that


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the efficacy of global environmental governance will ultimately dependon implementation at global and domestic levels. National implemen-tation is the ultimate key, both to the efficacy of the GEG system and tomeaningful environmental improvements. However, for the purpose ofthis study, we will focus principally on the global and institutionalaspects of GEG reform, including efforts to create the support fordomestic implementation, but not including the considerable chal-lenges of domestic implementation. That is a very important issue—one worthy of serious study—but lies beyond the scope and mandateof this current research.

The analysis and recommendations contained in this book are theresult of literature reviews and consultations with an Advisory Groupof experts who brought a wealth of experience from internationalorganizations, governments, civil society and academia. The AdvisoryGroup met twice—in Boston, USA, in October 2005, and inCopenhagen, Denmark, in March 2006—to discuss issues related toreforming the GEG system.

Members of the Advisory Group have all served in their individual capac-ities and their insights and inputs have informed and influenced allaspects of this study. However, the content of the study is entirely theresponsibility of the authors and no other institutional or individualendorsement is either implied or intended. Members of the AdvisoryGroup included: Adnan Amin (Kenya); Pamela S. Chasek (USA); ErikFiil (Denmark); George Greene (Canada); Mark Halle (USA/Italy);Benoît Martimort-Asso (France); William Moomaw (USA); KilapartiRamakrishna (India); Philippe Roch (Switzerland); David Runnalls(Canada); Mukul Sanwal (India); Youba Sokona (Mali); and DetlefSprinz (Germany).

This book seeks to do three things.

First, Chapter 1 seeks to organize some of the lessons from the recentdebates on GEG reform, including how the system has evolved, thetypes of problems that have been identified, the various models forreform that have been proposed, and a snapshot of previous and ongo-ing initiatives for GEG reform.

Next, Chapter 2 builds upon the above and analyzes in much greaterdetail the six key areas of concern, or challenges that have been gener-ally identified as priorities for GEG reform. We approach this diagno-sis with the goals of (a) identifying the extent of the challenge (whetherthe identified problem is, in fact, critical); and (b) highlighting avail-able best practice in dealing with the challenge.

Introduction 5

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Finally, Chapter 3 begins outlining a menu of reform proposals thatbuild upon the diagnosis and seeks to identify short- and long-termrecommendations that are both doable and worth doing and are likelyto bring about meaningful and practical reform of the global environ-mental system.


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Chapter 1

▲

“Within the context of the evolution ofglobal environmental politics and policy,the end goal of global environmentalgovernance is to improve the state of theenvironment and to eventually lead tothe broader goal of sustainable develop-ment.”

▼

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▲

“Although the debate on GEG has focused over-whelmingly on reform of the UNEP (UnitedNations Environment Programme), the issue is farmore expansive.This is largely because, since 1972,the business of global environmental governancehas grown in many new directions.“

“…it is clear that while the system of globalenvironmental governance has grown in sizeand scope, it has not been entirely effective inachieving its larger goal of actually improvingthe global environment, of achieving sustain-able development, or even of reversing themajor trends of degradation.”

▼


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Chapter 1

A Primer on the GEG Reform Debate

This chapter is a primer on the global environmental governance(GEG) reform debate to date. The chapter is neither a critical assess-ment of the debate nor an exhaustive summary of its various strands.We do not seek to assess the viability of particular proposals, nor toprescribe the desirability of particular directions. Instead, the goals ofthis chapter are to (a) briefly highlight the key aspects of the evolution ofGEG; (b) identify the challenges that have accompanied this evolution; (c)categorize broad archetypes of reform packages that have been proposed;and (d) provide a snapshot of some of the ongoing and recent GEG reforminitiatives. This will be followed in Chapter 2 by a more analytical diag-nosis of the key strands of concern identified in this first chapter andthen Chapter 3 offers a set of recommendations.

An Evolving System of Global Environmental Governance

GEG refers to the sum of organizations, policy instruments, financingmechanisms, rules, procedures and norms that regulate global envi-ronmental protection. Within the context of the evolution of globalenvironmental politics and policy, the end goal of global environmen-tal governance is to improve the state of the environment and to even-tually lead to the broader goal of sustainable development. The focus ofthis book, as mentioned earlier, is on environmental governance in thecontext of sustainable development.

The major institutional decision coming out of the United NationsConference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972) was theestablishment of the United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP), which was created to play the lead role in GEG by coordinat-ing environmental activities within the UN agencies and acting as a cat-alyst for new initiatives. Since then, the world has seen hectic activity inglobal environmental policy (and, more recently, in sustainable devel-opment policy) and a host of treaties, organizations and mechanismshave emerged. The 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the 2002 JohannesburgSummit on Sustainable Development mark just two of the many policylandmarks of this rapid evolution of the GEG system.2


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EMG Membership: Who deals with the Environment A measure of the diversity of actors within the United Nations system whose activitiessomehow impact the environment is the membership of the UN EnvironmentalManagement Group (EMG) which was established by the UN Secretary General to“enhance UN system-wide inter-agency coordination” and whose membership consists of“programmes, organs and specialized agencies of the UN system, and all of the secretariatsof multilateral environmental agreements.”Each of these organizations has a defined envi-ronmental mandate and many have specified environmental activities.The membership ofthis group gives a still incomplete but impressive, picture of the breadth of actors that influ-ence global environmental governance.

Basel Convention Secretariat

Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) Secretariat

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) Secretariat

Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) Secretariat

Economic and Social Commission for Africa (ECA)

Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)

Economic and Social Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)

Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (ESCWA)

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Global Environment Facility (GEF)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

International Labour Organization (ILO)

International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) Secretariat

International Trade Center (ITC)

International Telecommunication Union (ITU)

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)


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Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Ramsar Convention on Wetlands Secretariat

Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) Secretariat

UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Division for Sustainable Development

(UNDESA/DSD)

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (HABITAT)

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)

United Nations University (UNU)

Universal Postal Union (UPU)

World Food Program (WFP)

World Health Organization (WHO)

World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)

World Meteorological Organization (WMO)

The World Bank

World Trade Organization

(WTO)

World Tourism Organization (WTO)


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Over the last few years a heated debate has emerged among policy-makers as well as scholars on the possible need and potential directionsof a reform in the GEG system so that it can keep up with its own rapidevolution. Although the debate on GEG has focused overwhelminglyon reform of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),the issue is far more expansive. This is largely because, since 1972, thebusiness of global environmental governance has grown in many newdirections. Much of this evolution is, in fact, quite positive and pointsto an expanded (certainly busier) global system of environmental gover-nance. In particular, the GEG system has expanded in three ways:3

More Actors

• There has been a proliferation of international environmental insti-tutions within the UN system, such as the Commission onSustainable Development (CSD) and the EnvironmentalManagement Group (EMG). Over 30 UN Agencies and programsnow have a stake in environmental management. Major institu-tions, such as the World Bank as well as the World TradeOrganization (WTO), now claim sustainable development to becentral to their their overarching goals. A similar growth of inter-est is also seen within non-UN international and regional institu-tions in terms of environmental and sustainable developmentconcerns.

• The proliferation of multilateral environmental agreements(MEAs) has also led to a mushrooming of specialized MEA secre-tariats and epistemic communities dealing with and providingintergovernmental forums for different pieces of the global envi-ronmental agenda.

• The interest in the global environment has been spurred by, andhas also led to, an increasingly active and larger contingent of civilsociety actors influencing global environmental governance. Notonly has the number of non-state actors influencing the GEG sys-tem increased, but these actors have also become more diverse andvaried in their interests and in the ways in which they influence thesystem. They now include not only large international non-gov-ernmental organizations (NGOs), but also networks of more com-munity-based organizations, businesses and knowledge communi-ties.

More Money

• Multiple sources of funding for international environmental actionare now available. These not only include the operational budgets


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of the various organizations but also specialized funding mecha-nisms created either as part of specific treaties or in general. Forexample, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), created in 1991has financed US$4.8 billion in projects and generated co-financingof US$15.6 billion.4

• In addition, there are also substantial amounts available fromdonor aid flows, international organizations, UN agencies and inter-national NGOs for environmental projects.

• While the sum of these monies probably pales in comparison to theenormity of the global challenges, the amounts are fairly largenonetheless. The sources of funds vary greatly as do the destina-tions.

More Rules and Norms

• According to some estimates, over 500 MEAs have been signed.While most of these are regional and minilateral arrangements, asignificant number are truly global in nature. Arguably, environ-ment is the second most common area of global rule-making afterinternational trade (although environmental treaties tend to bemore declaratory than most trade agreements which are more rule-based). In particular, there was a burst of activity in terms of newhigh-profile agreements in the immediate aftermath of the 1992Rio Earth Summit; these agreements are only now reaching matu-rity and many are still in the pre-implementation phase.5

• Rules and norms on the environment are being created withincreasing frequency by non-environmental regimes, including, forexample, the World Trade Organization, the MillenniumDevelopment Goals, lending policy safeguards of the InternationalFinance Corporation and of major private banks, etc.

• The greater buy-in into the concept of sustainable development frominternational organizations, civil society, national governmentsand the private sector has also led these organizations to beginarticulating norms and (sometimes) policies aimed at global envi-ronmental improvement and the quest for sustainable develop-ment.6

The expanded engagement in GEG along these various dimensions isgenerally a positive development. However, in spite of the considerableincrease in institutional, human and financial resources dedicated toGEG and despite environmental quality achievements in a few areas,the global commons continue to degrade at an alarming rate. Given thereality of increasing carbon emissions, dwindling forest cover, declin-


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ing fish stocks and disappearing biodiversity, it is clear that while thesystem of global environmental governance has grown in size andscope, it has not been entirely effective in achieving its larger goals ofactually improving the global environment, of achieving sustainabledevelopment or even of reversing the major trends of degradation. Infairness, it may be too soon to seek such results from a system that isstill evolving. Yet, it seems that the very evolution of the GEG systemmight have created new institutional challenges for the system itself. Inother words, the rapid evolution of global environmental governance hasled the system to outgrow itself.

Through a review of the now sizeable literature on GEG and discus-sions with the project Advisory Group, we have identified six broadareas of concern that are usually cited as needing attention:

(a) Proliferation of MEAs and fragmentation of GEG

(b) Lack of cooperation and coordination among international organ-izations

(c) Lack of implementation, enforcement, and effectiveness in GEG

(d) Inefficient use of resources

(e) GEG outside the environmental arena

(f) Non-state actors in a state-centric system

Here we will briefly identify the concerns that are usually cited undereach of these headings. Chapter 2 will then be organized around thesesix themes and will analyze each of these areas of concern separately.

(a) Proliferation of MEAs and fragmentation of GEG. There are toomany organizations engaged in environmental governance in toomany different places, often with duplicative mandates. The MEAsecretariats are located in disparate parts of the world, have vary-ing levels of autonomy and focus on separate, but interrelated,environmental problems. For example, the climate secretariat isadministered by the UN secretariat whereas the ozone and biodi-versity secretariats report to UNEP. The Convention onBiodiversity is located in Montreal; Desertification and the UNFCCCin Bonn; CITES and the Basel Convention in Geneva.Fragmentation can lead to conflicting agendas, geographical dis-persion and inconsistency in rules and norms, as the different sec-retariats have limited opportunity to interact and cooperate.Geographical dispersion leads to higher travel and personnel costs,larger reporting burdens and “negotiating fatigue.” In particular,this drains scarce human and institutional resources in developing


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countries and tends to distract the best resources towards globalgovernance rather than towards national implementation.

(b) Lack of cooperation and coordination among international organ-izations. The concern here is about the absence of any meaningfulcoordination mechanisms for GEG. Theoretically, such coordina-tion is part of UNEP’s natural mandate. However, UNEP has neverbeen given the resources or the political capital to fulfill this man-date. UNEP’s ability to “coordinate” other UN agencies is furtherhampered by the sheer number of agencies and programs in theUN that have some stake in environmental protection. The cre-ation of the GEF as the main financing mechanism, the variousMEA secretariats, and the Commission on SustainableDevelopment (CSD) have detracted from UNEP’s authority andled to fractious turf wars and inter-agency politics. A climate ofinter-agency distrust, uneven resource endowments and unclear(and sometimes contradictory) mandates from the Member Stateshas not been conducive to either institutional cooperation or coor-dination.

(c) Lack of implementation, enforcement and effectiveness in GEG.The GEG system has turned into a “negotiating system” that seemsto be in a perpetual state of negotiation and is obsessed with contin-uing negotiations rather than thinking about the implementation ofexisting agreements. The implementation deficit is compoundedby the fact that there is a dearth of enforcement mechanisms andlittle to no focus on ensuring that the instruments are effective inmeeting their original objectives. The environmental system con-tains no meaningful dispute settlement body and few options areavailable to ensure or enforce compliance. As with many otherinternational processes and institutions, consensus building inMEA negotiations is driven more by political feasibility than by sci-ence. This problem, of course, is endemic to international organi-zations and is not unique to the GEG system. However, ignoringscience in the case of complex and long-term environmentalprocesses can have much higher costs and more lasting effects thanin many other arenas.

(d) Inefficient use of resources. The concern that is usually raised hereis that the system as a whole seems to have significant (even ifinsufficient) resources, but the duplication and lack of coordina-tion within the system can mean that resources are not always usedmost efficiently. In 2000, for example, the World Bank had an activeportfolio of over US$5 billion in environmental projects, theUNDP’s portfolio was over US$1.2 billion in the same year, and the


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GEF has funded over US$4.5 billion of projects since its inception.7National governments, civil society and the private sector in aggre-gate also expend significant financial resources on environmentalprojects. In spite of this impressive pool of money, particular ele-ments of the system remain chronically under-funded. Geographicfragmentation and duplication of activities can result in higheroperational costs and inefficient use of resources. With greatercoherence in the system of governance and financing, a great dealmore could be achieved with the existing resources.

(e) GEG outside the environmental arena. An increasing number ofimportant decisions affecting environmental governance now takeplace outside the environmental arena, in areas such as trade,investment and international development. While institutions likethe WTO, UNDP and the World Bank have begun to pay muchmore attention to environment and sustainable development thanin the past, they still remain largely outside the discussions onglobal environmental governance. Or, rather, environmental actorsremain at the periphery of decisions about environmental gover-nance. For the most part, environmental decision-makers tend totalk only to each other and are neither invited to be, nor make aneffort to be, meaningfully involved in broader development deci-sion-making. Additionally, health and security issues are increas-ingly being linked to GEG. For the system of global environmentalgovernance as a whole to be effective, it needs to find ways to linkmore meaningfully to other areas on global policy, to mainstreamenvironmental considerations into economic and security deci-sions, and to ensure meaningful coherence between environmentaland other global public policy spheres.

(f) Non-state actors in a state-centric system. The institutions engagedin global environmental governance are designed to be state-cen-tric. However, civil society actors, such as environmental NGOsand business, are playing an increasingly large role in global envi-ronmental policy-making. Environmental NGOs have playedimportant roles in stimulating international conventions, draftingtreaties, providing scientific information and monitoring imple-mentation. NGOs can also be critical in environmental implemen-tation. The private sector is becoming increasingly engaged in GEGthrough voluntary commitments and public-private partnerships.The GEG system, however, was not designed to accommodate thesemyriad non-state actors. The challenge for GEG is to create theinstitutional space to allow non-state actors to realize their fullpotential.


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There is much debate among scholars and practitioners about the actualimportance of these various “deficiencies.” However, there is a generalconsensus among policy-makers and scholars that we should invest somethought into improving the system as it now exists. There is also anemerging sense that the discussion of GEG reform must go beyond sim-ply reform of UNEP, to envision a system wherein the many differentparts can interact more efficiently and effectively in realizing the ultimategoals of environmental protection and sustainable development.

In reviewing the evolution of the GEG system and the emergence ofthese challenges, it seems that the problem is not so much that the sys-tem is deficient, but rather that the system has outgrown its own designand is no longer able to cope with new realities. Indeed, many of theconcerns we have identified are there precisely because the system hasbeen successful in growing very fast and because of the resultantincrease in the number of instruments and institutions for GEG. Sucha perspective suggests that the challenge is not one of “fixing” a systemthat is broken; rather it is one of updating the system to meet the real-ities and challenges of its own evolution.

Models of Global Environmental Governance Reform

Improving global environmental governance has been an issue ofdynamic debate in academic and policy-making circles ever since envi-ronmental issues entered the international agenda in the 1970s. Sincethen, both environmental threats and international responses to themhave increased in their number and complexity. The key challenge ofglobal environmental governance has, however, remained the same:how to design an institutional framework (system) that would best protectthe global environment.

Model #1. The Compliance Model

Description: Advocates creation of a body that could provide bindingdecisions to hold states and private actors accountable for non-compli-ance with MEAs and resulting environmental damage.

Designs: Several potential bodies with such enforcement powers havebeen proposed. First, a World Environment Court8 is envisioned as apermanent institution along the lines of the European Court of HumanRights, to ensure compliance with MEAs and upholding the new rightto a healthy environment. Second, upgrading the Trusteeship Council9 tohave authority over global commons and also represent interests ofpotential beneficiaries of the trust, especially future generations. Third,reinterpreting the mandate of the Security Council10 to include envi-ronmental security, when it has already accommodated non-traditional


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threats such as humanitarian emergencies and gross violations ofhuman rights.

Potential: Ideally, the compliance model would solve the free riderproblem, ensure care for the global commons, match judicial enforce-ment available elsewhere (especially in the WTO), enhance predictabil-ity and intergenerational concern of environmental law and directlyimpact compliance with MEAs. In practice, states are reluctant toexpose themselves to the compliance body’s oversight and value judg-ments. There is a history of avoiding third party adjudication in inter-national environmental law; inability to punish global commons’ vio-lators by exclusion or fines; and low support for the exercise of“enforcement” provisions. Finally, the probability of all states voluntar-ily accepting the compliance model is extremely low.

Model #2. The New Agency Model

Description: Refers to creating a new organization outside UNEP withconcentrated environmental responsibilities and the ability to steer UNagencies in relation to environmental issues.

Designs: The most ambitious designs of the new agency require joiningenvironmental and development programs and agencies (UNEP, CSD,UNDP and others) within a World Organization for Environment andDevelopment11 or a World Sustainable Development Organization.12Other proposals include creating a Global EnvironmentalOrganization,13 modelled after the WTO, with broad rule-makingauthority to address market failures and facilitate negotiation of inter-national standards to be implemented by all countries. Other designsuse the Global Environment Facility as a role model14 for governance;advocate strengthening the role of ECOSOC and CSD15 in discussingand overseeing system-wide coordination; propose an organization forenvironmental bargaining16 to trade environmental goods for money;or aim to reinforce G8 with leader-level G2017 to serve as a platform forbuilding the new agency.

Potential: Creation of a new agency is an opportunity to put togetherthe best features of existing agencies and guide global environmentalpolicy-making. Such an agency could address the problems of frag-mentation and weakness of environmental governance within the UNsystem. However, putting all environmental agreements under oneumbrella would be a major challenge, because the current system isstrongly decentralized and individual environmental entities stronglyresist takeovers. Putting Bretton Woods institutions under the sameumbrella seems even less realistic. Benefits of the new agency remainuncertain: it can potentially promote cooperation and increase states’


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environmental concern, but it risks being another big bureaucracy withmodest civil society influence and no additional financial and technol-ogy transfer to developing countries.18

Model #3. Upgrading UNEP Model

Description: Takes UNEP as a departure point for improving environ-mental governance and suggests upgrading it to a specialized agency tostrengthen its status.

Designs: This model is similar to the previous but distinct in that itseeks the strengthening of UNEP rather than its replacement by a dif-ferent super-organization. UNEP itself has been both an active partici-pant and a focus of the reform debate.19 It has faced significant chal-lenges since its creation (limiting legal mandate, lack of funds, loca-tion). The most broadly discussed proposal is upgrading UNEP to aspecialized agency20 so that it can adopt treaties, have its own budgetand potentially use innovative financial mechanisms. UNEP wouldstrengthen its role as an “anchor” institution21 for global environmentby drawing on its ability to serve as information and capacity clearing-house and set broad policy guidelines for action within the GlobalMinisterial Environment Forum (GMEF). Similarly, it has been sug-gested that UNEP could be upgraded into a decentralized UnitedNations Environment Organization22 (UNEO). UNEO would have itsown legal identity, and would comprise general assembly, executivestructure and secretariat. It would incorporate UNEP and GMEF; takeup UNEP’s mandate with respect to its normative function; and serveas the authority for environment within the UN system.

Potential: The current debate on environmental governance seems toconverge around the proposal to upgrade UNEP into a specializedagency as a middle ground between making a major change in the sys-tem and doing nothing. Upgrading UNEP requires less financial anddiplomatic investment than adding a completely new organization.While UNEP has a record of institutional success and learning, itspotential to perform when given better legal status, more funds andmore staff is promising. On the downside, focusing reform debate onlyon UNEP distracts us from the broader institutional challenges, and itis not yet clear just how much of a difference specialized agency statuswill actually give.23

Model #4. Organizational Streamlining Model

Description: Addresses the need for improved coordination and syner-gies among various entities within the system of global environmentalgovernance.


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Designs: Improving coordination is work in progress and an ongoingchallenge within the UN system. Integrating environmental institu-tions into clusters (or clustering24) has been discussed as a way toachieve goals of environmental conventions, while also pursuing effi-ciency gains and improving coherence of environmental governance.Clusters can be issue-based, functional/organizational, or they can havea particular regional scope (co-location and “merger” of secretariats).Another way to achieve synergies involves addressing duplication andoverlaps by clarifying mandates of different entities, addressing theirconflicting agendas and building upon their interlinkages.25 The incon-sistencies between global trade rules and MEAs illustrate the need fororganizational streamlining. Finally there is implementation streamlin-ing with states to develop plans for coordinating the implementation ofthe Rio Conventions on climate change, desertification and biologicaldiversity.

Potential: Institutional fragmentation is not without its advantages:26 itincreases visibility of environmental protection, promotes specializa-tion and innovation, and increases commitments of states that hostsecretariats. Some degree of redundancy is also desirable as it functionsas insurance against institutional decline.27 However, fragmentationhas many disadvantages including institutional overlap, high financialand administrative costs, and increased reporting demands felt espe-cially in developing countries. The effect of these disadvantages isreduction of state participation and decrease in implementation ofenvironmental law. All organizational streamlining proposals need tobe well designed in order to contribute to the solution of the problem.Otherwise they may worsen the current situation.

Model #5. Multiple Actors Model

Description: Argues that the system of governance comprises multipleactors whose actions need to be mutually reinforcing and better coor-dinated. Without better integration of these multiple actors, organiza-tional rearrangement cannot resolve institutional problems.

Designs: Multiplicity of actors and interactions form a multidimen-sional “system” of global environmental governance.28 It includesstates, international environmental organizations, related internationalorganizations, civil society organizations, and public concern andaction. Focus on organizations as a single dimension of governance dis-tracts attention from the fact that institutional will is required to affectdecision-making procedures and change institutional boundaries.29First reform proposal is to integrate environment into the larger contextof sustainable development and to allow multiple organizations to flour-


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ish but create venues for these organizations to interact and “transact.”Preferring environmental to sustainable development governance mayresult in further marginalization of environmental problems on theinternational agenda, alienation of developing countries, and continu-ing regime clashes between environment and other relevant interna-tional regimes. A General Agreement on Environment and Developmentshould be negotiated to codify universally accepted sustainable devel-opment principles and serve as an umbrella for existing MEAs.30 Thesecond reform proposal is to create multiple channels of implementa-tion. The quality of global environmental governance will be increas-ingly determined by the interaction among five entities in implemen-tation and the ability of the system to facilitate their interaction, e.g.,through global public policy networks.31

Potential: This model adopts a broad definition of the problem ofglobal environmental governance. Accordingly, the solutions proposedare broad and offer directions the system should follow, rather thanspecific organizational improvements. While organizational thinkingleaves an illusion of control over governance, systems thinkingacknowledges the messiness and uncertainty of the system. The com-plexity of today’s environmental threats like climate change andresponses to them prove that multiple channels of implementation nat-urally emerge but can lack direction if one is not provided by the sys-tem. Whether the system is mature enough to reverse environmentaldegradation via strategic directions and normative guidance remains tobe seen.

GEG Reform Initiatives and Why They Don’t Succeed

The United Nations appears to be in a continual state of reform. In fact,the earlier attempts at reforming the United Nations started literallymonths after the organization was created. Yet, it is not easy to bringabout change in international organizations. Adding new elements andorganizations has tended to be easy; changing existing ones next toimpossible.

The story of attempts to reform global environmental governance hasbeen exactly the same. The current wave of calls to reform UNEP canbe traced back to the Nairobi Declaration of 1997, which attempted torevitalize an ailing UNEP whose authority had steadily diminished inthe 1980s and 1990s (historians, however, could argue that reform wasbeing sought even before that and in fact within months of the organi-zation’s creation in 1972 there were discussions about how it could bechanged).


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In focusing on the recent demands for GEG reform, we find that callsfor reform have been consistent over the last decade and have been con-sistently growing in intensity, both from within the UN and fromnational governments, academics and civil society. The following listprovides an incomplete but representative sampling of some recentGEG reform initiatives:

• UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, launched a UN-wide reform ini-tiative (1997). Kofi Annan placed the issue of improving the coor-dination and effectiveness of environmental institutions on theinternational political agenda by releasing his 1997 program forreform Renewing the United Nations.32

• The Nairobi Declaration on the Role and Mandate of UNEP (1997)restated UNEP’s role as the leading authority in the field of theenvironment. The Declaration was adopted by the UNEPGoverning Council and endorsed by the UN General Assembly torevive UNEP and reestablish its authority, which had diminishedsince the creation of the Commission on Sustainable Development(CSD).33

• The UN Task Force on Environment and Human Settlements (1997)was appointed by the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to focus oninter-agency linkages and the revitalization of UNEP. The TaskForce’s recommendations were adopted by the General Assembly,leading to the creation of two new coordinating bodies: theEnvironmental Management Group (EMG) and the GlobalMinisterial Environment Forum (GMEF).34

• The Inter-agency Environment Management Group (1999) wasestablished as a mechanism to provide UNEP with an effective andstrong coordinating role within the UN system on environmentalmatters.

• The Malmo Declaration (2000) was adopted by the GMEF. Itrequested that the World Summit on Sustainable Development(WSSD) review the requirements for an enhanced institutionalstructure for GEG, including how to strengthen UNEP and broadenits financial base and how to better incorporate non-state actorsinto the GEG system.35

• The Cartagena Process (2000–2002) was initiated to assess optionsfor reforming GEG. The 21st Session of the UNEP GoverningCouncil/Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GC/GMEF) con-vened the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of Ministers orTheir Representatives on International Environmental Governance


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(IGC/IEG) to assess the options for strengthening UNEP, improv-ing the effectiveness of MEAs and improving international policy-making coherence. The report from the process was transmitted tothe CSD and to the WSSD.36

• The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (2002), adopted by theWSSD, called for the full implementation of the Cartagena decision.

• The Eighth Special Session of the UNEP Governing Council/GlobalMinisterial Environment Forum Jeju, Republic of Korea met to dis-cuss progress on the Cartagena decision.37

• French President, Jacques Chirac, calls for creation of a UnitedNations Environmental Organization (UNEO) at the UN GeneralAssembly (2003). In response to President Chirac’s presentation, aninformal working group was set up to facilitate dialogue amonggovernments on UNEP reform.

• The Bali Strategic Plan for Technical Support and Capacity-buildingwas adopted by the GC/GMEF (2004). The Bali Plan outlined pro-posals for improving the capacity of developing countries andeconomies in transition to implement MEAs.

• The UN Summit (2005) called for strengthening coordinationwithin the framework of international environmental governanceand for the integration of environmental activities at the opera-tional level into the broader sustainable development framework.38

• A High Level Panel on UN-wide Coherence in the Areas ofHumanitarian Assistance, the Environment, and Development(2006) was created after the World Summit in New York (2005).

In addition, environmental NGOs and scholars have also been for-warding various recommendations on GEG reform. The WorldResources Institute (WRI) in the USA, the Institute of SustainableDevelopment and International Relations (IDDRI) in France, Ecologicin Germany and the Global Environmental Governance Project at YaleUniversity are just a few examples of institutes that have devoted con-siderable resources to examining this question. Numerous books havebeen published and journals launched on the issue of global environ-mental governance in the past decade. More recently, leaders such asthe French President and the UN Secretary-General have all highlightedthe need for GEG reform.

In spite of this long history of attempts to reform the GEG system andthe obvious appetite for reform, real change remains elusive. There area number of possible reasons for this, including:


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• There is inertia within the system and a desire to maintain the sta-tus quo. Although the UN has engaged in many self-reform initia-tives, actors in the system have an incentive to maintain the statusquo. Neither national delegates nor international environmentalbureaucrats seem motivated to allow meaningful change in theterms of the GEG system; a system in which, despite all its faults,they feel comfortable and have learned to use to their individualand institutional advantage. The proposals that do emerge, such asthose originating from the IEG Working Group, tend to advocate asoft approach and incremental change.

• Lack of leadership. While those within the GEG system seem ham-strung by inertia, there is also an apparent lack of will and leader-ship by political leaders to take the initiative. Occasionally therehave been a few calls for action, but these have mostly not gonebeyond the declaratory phase.

• Developing country concerns. Developing countries have legitimateconcerns about the state of the international system. They arealready distrustful of the international system in general and areespecially concerned about the rapid growth of environmentalinstruments and its possible impacts on their economic growth.Although developing countries are not necessarily beholden to thestatus quo, they fear that any change will necessarily make thingseven worse from their perspective.

• Institutional fiefdoms. UN institutions are often loath to let go ofany part of their authority or competence even where overlap andduplication are obvious. Having already created a complex systemof myriad interlocking and overlapping institutions we now find,not surprisingly, that each institution is passionately committed toits own perpetuation.

• Lack of political will and the balance of national interests versusglobal environmental problems. National economic and securityinterests can often run counter to environmental concerns and,consequently, not all nations wish to have a strong system of GEG.Indeed, even when the logic of a stronger global environmentalsystem is apparent, it tends to be overwhelmed by the fact thatactors within the system are primarily charged with safeguardingtheir narrower national and institutional interests.

• There is a marked retreat in the importance attached to environ-mental issues by the international community. This has been par-ticularly apparent in the last few years as the new emphasis oninternational security has distracted attention from a host of other


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issues, including those related to the state of the global environ-ment.

In spite of these constraints, the momentum for reform is present. Wefind at least three reasons why, despite these chronic problems, thesearch for GEG reform should continue and why there might even besome ripeness in the possibility of real reform:

• First, there is a confluence of opinion between NGOs, academics andpolicy entrepreneurs within the system that reform is inevitable.Slowly, but perceptibly, the demand for reform is growing and withthis growth the ability of the system to resist reform is also eroding.Indeed, the mounting level of activity and frustration in the reformdebate may itself be providing a window of opportunity in whicha set of practical and doable recommendations may have thechance to come to fruition.

• Second, not only the number, but the nature of those calling forreform has changed. Such calls have recently begun to come fromthe highest levels of national government and many governmentshave become consistent in raising these calls at the highest levels.Additionally, high-level reform attempts that seek UN-wide as wellas GEG reform are beginning to gather relatively greater politicalsupport and traction. This does not mean that new initiatives forsystem-wide reform would necessarily be any more successful thanprior ones, but it does demonstrate that there are consistent andimportant demandeurs for change. The most recent among themany such processes is the recently launched High-Level Processfor United Nations System-Wide Coherence in the areas ofHumanitarian Assistance, Environment and Development.

• Third, and most important, the collective and accumulated experi-ence of numerous reform attempts have given the champions ofreform a much clearer and better sense of which reform packages are,in fact, politically possible as well as conceptually desirable. One sensesa moment of practical sobriety where “wild” proposals are nolonger being thrown about, but also a setting in of the realizationthat change has to be more than just cosmetic if it is to bear thefruits of an improved global environment and a shift towards sus-tainable development.


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Chapter 2

▲

“The proliferation of MEAs, and theresulting fragmentation of internationalenvironmental institutions, is oftendescribed as one of the key challenges ofGEG.”

▼

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▲

“The very ability of GEG to address complex inter-connected environmental threats is questionedbecause the incoherent system of solutions isbecoming even more complex than the problemsit was meant to address.”

“States, especially developing countries, struggle tomeet institutional demands as the number of insti-tutions increases.Participation in GEG represents achallenge for all states,especially developing coun-tries,which use very scarce resources to participatein negotiations and meetings,and to satisfy report-ing requirements and other MEA demands.”

▼


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Chapter 2

Key Challenges to Effective GlobalEnvironmental Governance

In this chapter we take the six key areas of concern that were identifiedearlier and analyze each of them in greater depth to determine theextent of the challenge and the emerging trends in terms of how it isbeing managed. We are particularly interested in figuring out just howimportant each of these challenges is and which actions, among theactions that are already being taken, are most effective in responding tothe concerns.

Some of these challenges are, in fact, endemic to the international sys-tem and not specific only to global environmental governance.However, each has a potentially important impact on the future ofGEG. The remainder of this chapter will diagnose each of the follow-ing six challenges: (a) proliferation of MEAs and fragmentation ofGEG; (b) lack of cooperation and coordination among internationalorganizations; (c) lack of implementation, enforcement and effective-ness in GEG; (d) inefficient use of resources; (e) GEG outside the envi-ronmental arena; and (f) non-state actors in a state-centric system.

Challenge #1. Proliferation of MEAs and Fragmentation ofGEG

The proliferation of MEAs, and the resulting fragmentation of interna-tional environmental institutions, is often described as one of the keychallenges of GEG. The rapid growth of environmental agreements,MEA-related instruments and geographically dispersed institutions hasleft environmental governance in disarray. There are inconsistencies inrules and norms, and the hectic pace of activities can overwhelm andfinancially drain some, particularly the poorest, countries.

All of this feeds into the concerns that the GEG system is operating ata suboptimal level: its agreements, institutions and resources are unableto achieve their full potential and possible synergies remain unexploited.The very ability of GEG to address complex interconnected environ-mental threats is questioned because the incoherent system of solutionsis becoming even more complex than the problems it was meant toaddress.

Key Challenges to Effective Global Environmental Governance 29

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Diagnosis

Five interrelated concerns are often identified as parts of the MEA pro-liferation problem. They are: treaty congestion; institutional fragmen-tation; states’ struggle to meet institutional demands; duplication andconflicting agendas in GEG; and the diminishing role of science inGEG. However, there are also some positive aspects of proliferation andfragmentation that also need to be acknowledged.

Treaty congestion39 is a common description of the state of GEG asthere are more than 500 MEAs registered with the UN, including 61atmosphere-related; 155 biodiversity-related; 179 related to chemicals,hazardous substances and waste; 46 land conventions; and 196 conven-tions that are broadly related to issues dealing with water.40 It is arguedthat the large number of MEAs creates messiness, incoherence andconfusion in GEG, and incites demands for order and central decision-making authority. However, the three-digit MEA number may be mis-leading as it does not acknowledge that many of the MEAs are institu-tionally linked, e.g., come clustered in institutional packages like TheLaw of the Sea or are protocols nested under the same framework con-vention. Furthermore, many are regional in nature, only some MEAshave the full support of the international community and/or bindingprovisions that go beyond reporting requirements. There has also beena tendency to assume that the autonomy of legal agreements impliesautonomy of secretariats. This has led to an institutional congestionthat is actually more disturbing than MEA proliferation. As a result,MEA secretariats have developed an institutional interest in furtherexpansion of their work. Even more disturbing is the proliferation ofnew subsidiary bodies and ad hoc working groups within MEAs.41 It isthese that eventually clutter and overwhelm the MEA negotiating cal-endar and can eventually distract from actual implementation. Oneshould note here that there is a distinction to be made between themore recent post-Rio conventions that are still in their formative stagesand the more established older conventions that tend to be far morefocused and circumscribed in their substantive and institutional ambi-tions.

Institutional and policy fragmentation takes place as separate conven-tions address related environmental threats, while convention secre-tariats become geographically dispersed and operate in different polit-ical, normative and geographical contexts.42 For example, while it iswidely recognized that there is a complex system of interrelated cause-and-effect chains among climate, biodiversity, desertification, waterand forestry, each responding convention has its own defined objectsand commitments that fragment institutional commitments and create


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artificial issue barriers.43 Moreover, the institutional arrangements thathave the ability to establish better coordination and synergies, tend tobe geographically dispersed. Climate and Desertification Secretariatsare in Bonn, the Biodiversity Secretariat is in Montreal, CITES inGeneva, etc. Whether reorganization of the system and eventual clus-tering based on issues/themes, governance functions or location canimprove GEG is continuously discussed. Most seem to believe that suchclustering will be beneficial, and some headway is already being made.Such clustering could also have significant financial benefits. For exam-ple, a rough estimate of the cost-efficiency gains of hosting seven bio-diversity-related convention COPs back-to-back could be more thanUS$50 million.44 However, significant practical and political hurdlesremain in making this a reality.

States, especially developing countries, struggle to meet institutionaldemands as the number of institutions increases. Participation in GEGrepresents a challenge for all states, especially developing countries,which use very scarce resources to participate in negotiations andmeetings, and to satisfy reporting requirements and other MEAdemands.45 Overstretched human and financial resources needed forglobal governance leave developing countries with fewer resources forimplementation or to mitigate environmental threats of most concernto them. Harmonizing national reporting on biodiversity-related con-ventions has been pursued, but the process has been difficult and giventhe structure of the “harmonized” process, it remains unclear exactlyhow it improves the implementation of conventions at the nationallevel or saves national resources.46

Duplication and conflicting agendas occur because new treaties oftentend to be negotiated from scratch and have different stakeholders thanthe pre-existing MEAs. Building upon previous treaties in the similarissue-area or making sure that the new treaty smoothly fits into thecurrent system is not necessarily a priority for negotiators.Furthermore, as MEAs are a product of time- and energy-consumingmultilateral negotiations,47 their text is frequently left ambiguous orunclear from the operational perspective, or simply does not representa common body of law. For example, while both CITES and CBD havea conservation focus; in practice they put a different emphasis onpreservation and sustainable living. Similarly, while the MontrealProtocol proposed HFCs as alternatives to CFCs, they were consideredgreenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol, sending opposite policysignals to countries that had signed both agreements. Finally, the pro-liferation of international courts and tribunals raises a concern aboutmultiple tribunals addressing the same dispute without adequate rules


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for dealing with overlapping jurisdiction,48 e.g., the InternationalCourt of Justice or the Law of the Sea Tribunal. Eventual overlapsbetween the environment and trade have been under consideration atthe Doha round of WTO negotiations.

The role of science in GEG is diminishing because of the proliferation ofMEAs and fragmentation of GEG and the difficulties of coordination.Namely, science needs to be credible and to cross political barriers toinfluence policy, while its own influence decreases as it is spread thinthrough multiple scientific bodies, each looking at a small piece of theenvironment puzzle rather than looking at the larger picture of inter-connections. International policies for managing the global atmos-phere are a case in point: science clearly calls for a comprehensive pol-icy response, while the existing approach is highly dysfunctional, as itlocks policies in sub-issue specific solutions.49 The force of scientificarguments has reemerged through integrated assessments like theMillennium Ecosystem Assessment. Still, without authoritative science—including relevant expertise from both developed and developing coun-tries—and clear avenues for knowledge to influence policy processes, therole of science in GEG is likely to be further marginalized.

There are, however, positive aspects of proliferation of MEAs that needto be acknowledged. For example:50

• Visibility and awareness of environmental threats rises with thenumber of MEAs and more conversations about these threats inmultiple forums allow all actors multiple opportunities for action.

• Some degree of redundancy is desirable. Duplication can be benefi-cial as it can be an insurance against institutional decline andmakes the system more robust.51

• Competition can bring about better, more innovative results. As agen-cies compete for limited funds and attention they are continuouslytrying to build up their core competencies, reassess and furtherdevelop their mandates and improve their performance.

• Secretariats develop pockets of expertise and their hosts have the prideof ownership. A positive impact of geographic fragmentation ofGEG includes the opportunity for secretariats to evolve into com-petence centres and form “epistemic communities” that can thenpush both knowledge and policy.52 States hosting the secretariatscan act as sponsors of agreements (e.g., host contributions throughBonn Fund) and develop a special stake in their success.

• Cooperation benefits go beyond environment. Cooperation in the inter-national system is often celebrated per se because it contributes to


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peace. Environmental cooperation can spill over to other areas ofinternational affairs. The “rule of law” in the international systemincreases predictability of state relations and established workingrelationships promote peaceful settlement of eventual disputes.

• Numerous entry points for global civil society are provided by a sys-tem with many institutions. A reduction or centralization of insti-tutional structures may close some of the windows of opportunitythat allow for more meaningful civil society participation in whatremains a state-centric system. It may also reduce the ability ofsmall countries to influence global agenda-setting.

Trends

The issue of proliferation and fragmentation has been hotly debatedfor a number of years. Partly as a result of this debate, some things havebegun to change and at least some of the key trends suggest that thingsare happening—albeit slowly—to respond to this challenge.

• Proliferation and fragmentation may be slowing because of negotia-tion fatigue and as international environmental law matures. Theproblem of MEA proliferation and fragmentation is largely a resultof the evolving system of international environmental law and itsexplosive growth between the Stockholm and Rio conferences. Adecrease in the rate of emergence of new conventions in the late1990s has sometimes been described as “negotiation fatigue.”53Struggling to meet current MEA obligations, states become lessinterested in creating new MEAs. Thus, the GEG system may bebeginning to regulate its own growth. As international environ-mental law matures there is also a trend towards relatively moresophistication of instruments, including:54 enlargement in thescope of agreements (treating entire ecosystems rather than partic-ular species, and treating global rather than transboundary pollu-tion); moving focus from liability for harm towards prevention;increasing the use of detailed procedural and substantive require-ments; and establishing innovative legislative and regulatory mech-anisms (provisional application pending full ratification, movingbeyond unanimity).

• Treaties are recognizing the problem. The three “Rio MEAs” (cli-mate, biodiversity and desertification) have all come to recognizethe problem of fragmentation and advocate synergistic approaches.They call for greater information exchange and recognize the issueconnections and there is even movement towards joint meetings oftheir scientific bodies. This is a useful step, but certainly notenough.


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• Some proactive treaty secretariats reaching out to coordinate. Someproactive parts of the system are beginning to respond to the prob-lem. For example, the Ramsar Bureau has taken a number of stepstowards establishing linkages with other instruments—includingthe CBD, Convention on Migratory Species, CCD, CITES, WorldHeritage Convention, etc.—in recognition of the overlaps andcooperation needed for implementation. These are still early stepsand mostly focused around information exchange. However, theo-retically, these could be a model for better interaction betweenmultiple treaties. Importantly, the questions remain: Is this form ofinformational exchange enough? Would other, larger, secretariatshave the incentive or interest to follow Ramsar’s lead?

• Some promising efforts towards clustering conventions are takingplace. Ambitious clustering efforts have been undertaken bytreaties relating to chemicals management. Clustering of three con-ventions is being pursued by the secretariats of the BaselConvention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastesand Their Disposal, the Rotterdam Convention on the PriorInformed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicalsand Pesticides in International Trade and the StockholmConvention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.55 The expected endresult is a coherent legal framework to support environmentallysound management of hazardous chemicals and wastes throughtheir whole lifecycle, including production, use, trade and disposal.The short-term clustering focus is enhanced by programmatic andfunctional cooperation (capacity-building, science and technology,legal affairs, institutional matters, monitoring and reporting, infor-mation and awareness-raising) and longer-term measures wouldinclude integration of program support services and developingcommon services within the chemicals/wastes cluster and also withother co-located Convention secretariats or UNEP units. A signifi-cant milestone in the process was the decision to appoint a jointhead of the secretariats of both the Stockholm and Rotterdam con-ventions.56 Another significant aspect of chemicals management isthe recent global agreement on a Strategic Approach toInternational Chemicals Management (SAICM).57 However, theclustering experiment is also showing that the process is going tobe far from easy. For example, as of September 2005, the parties tothe Rotterdam Convention concluded that no further action couldtake place without more detailed identification of financial andadministrative arrangements.58 That, possibly, is where the rubberwill hit the road.


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Assessment

As we look at other parts of the international system we find that issuesof proliferation of instruments and actors and fragmentation of finalresponse have been often discussed in human rights, humanitarian aid,and peace-building communities.59 The very existence of multipleinternational institutions is not necessarily a problem because it givesactors within the system multiple opportunities to articulate valuesthey hold in common. Multiplicity of institutions becomes a problemwhen institutions siphon off resources towards institutional mainte-nance rather than implementation, or when they begin coming in eachother’s way because of duplication or working at cross-purposes.

The problem of proliferation and fragmentation within the GEG sys-tem is sometimes overemphasized by those who want to have a systemgoverned or controlled from the top down. In the past this has led to callsfor grand “super-organizations” for the environment. This approach isdangerous because it calls for mechanical fixes that themselves have noguarantee of working, and where the failure of that single super-organi-zation could spell disaster for the entire system. In this light, proliferationprovides the current system with a certain resilience to institutionaldecline. There also seems to be a tacit consensus that all instruments thatare present in GEG are needed. Namely, there is no major initiative bya large number of states to remove a particular body of environmentallaw or deny funding to a particular secretariat to the extent that itwould disappear. Finally, it should be noted that, over time, prolifera-tion tends to slow down, especially as treaties mature and move fromthe negotiation phase into the implementation phase; this may bebeginning to happen with the three Rio Conventions.

The central issue in the debate should be whether environmental protec-tion at the international and national levels is supported or underminedby the multiplicity of institutions. To what extent does the diversity ofGEG instruments and fragmentation of its institutions help countriesaddress their national environmental priorities by allowing them mul-tiple opportunities to benefit from the GEG system? Furthermore, doesthis diversity help the system respond to global environmental prob-lems? From this perspective, proliferation of MEAs and fragmentationof GEG should be addressed because they significantly underminecountries’ interests and, by extension, the whole GEG system in threekey ways:

• Perverse incentives in GEG weaken policy-making. The system hasturned into a negotiating system and there is an incentive to keepadding new instruments. Consequently, not enough attention is


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paid to continuously build upon previous knowledge and existinginstruments and institutions. Secretariats have an incentive tostrengthen and proliferate within their issue areas and no require-ment to prove their efficacy and relevance to the GEG system as awhole.

• GEG resource demands leave fewer resources for environmental protec-tion at home. The system extracts a high cost in terms of sappingvaluable human resources, particularly from capacity constraineddeveloping countries. While awareness of the problem has been highfor years, surprisingly little has been done to rationalize the demandson countries or at least provide evidence of potential savings.

• Science as a driver of environmental cooperation is undermined,which decreases countries’ commitment to and the credibility ofGEG. To the extent that science does play an important role in indi-vidual issue areas, the importance of cross-sectoral knowledge toinfluence the overall shape of the GEG system is minimized.

Against this background, the most important emerging trends areadvances in chemicals management: achieving a global and compre-hensive policy response for all types of chemicals, appointing a jointhead for conventions as an incentive to achieve synergies and exploringfinancial savings.

Challenge #2. Lack of Cooperation and Coordination AmongInternational Organizations

Because of its cross-cutting nature, coordination was always an impor-tant goal of environmental governance. UNEP was designed to be thecoordinator-in-chief; however, from the very beginning, it had to con-tend with much bigger, better endowed and politically more powerfulorganizations that had significant environmental impact but no inter-est and no incentive to be “coordinated” by UNEP which was (and is)one of the youngest and least-endowed of all international organiza-tions. To make matters worse, the Member States have never honestlyattempted to give UNEP the political capital or the resources to meetthe mandate of coordination they so generously lavished upon it. It isnot surprising that some have argued that the Member States, particu-larly the more powerful ones, have actually wanted UNEP to fail in thisparticular task.60 In its original design, the Environment Fund was sup-posed to give UNEP “clout”—and for as long as there were realresources with UNEP for deployment, it did enjoy influence.

The rapid growth in the number of actors that now impact global envi-ronmental governance has made coordination more important, but


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