Global Civil War Duffield

8/3/2019 Global Civil War Duffield

1/21

Global Civil War: The Non-Insured,

International Containment and

Post-Interventionary Society1

M A R K D U F F I E L D

Department of Politics, University of Bristol, 10 Priory Road, Bristol BS8 [email protected]

The focus of this paper is a global civil war being fought not between armies

but at the level of existence itself. In order to explore such a war, development

and underdevelopment are reinterpreted as a distinction between insured and

non-insured life. That is, between populations supported by regimes of social

protection as opposed to those expected to be self-reliant. While the com-

plementarity of development and security is commonly asserted, from this

perspective the nexus is incomplete without the additional term containment.

The connection then becomes: you cannot have either development or security

without containing the circulation of underdeveloped or non-insured life. Since

decolonization, containment has been at the heart of an expansive internationalsecurity architecture that both separates and reproduces the life-chance divide

between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. The paper explores the

origins, contours and implications of this global civil war, including the place of

development and humanitarian assistance within it.

Keywords: biopolitics, civil war, counterinsurgency, decolonization, development,

immigration control, liberal interventionism, racism, security, terrorism,

underdevelopment

Introduction

A liberal problematic of security is well illustrated in the contemporary idea

of human security. As its advocates claim, it prioritizes the security of people

rather than states and, as such, is often seen as a progressive turn in inter-

national relations. Since the beginnings of modernity, however, a liberal

rationality of government has always taken the protection and betterment

of the essential processes of life associated with population, economy and

society as its object. In this respect, liberalism embodies the idea of

government of the population and the imperatives that are derived from

such an idea (Dean 1999: 113). Development and liberalism are different but

interconnected. While both take life as their referent object, development is

more concerned with life experienced as somehow incomplete or lacking in

Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 21, No. 2 The Author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press.All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]:10.1093/jrs/fem049 Advance Access publication 18 April 2008


2/21

the essentials for a proper existence (Mehta 1999); for example, through being

in a state of human insecurity. In relation to such life, developments

enduring institutional form is that of a moral or educative trusteeship (Cowen

and Shenton 1996). Development as trusteeship aims to bring incomplete or

underdeveloped life to its full potential. Rather than development as usually

understood, for example, as the outcome of aid interventions to reduce

poverty, encourage voice and consequently expand freedom, development is

examined as a way of governing through these same acts of education,

betterment and empowerment. In attempting to make what is incomplete a

wholesome and known part of society, development functions as a liberal

technology of security. Development as security is used to explore the possi-

bility of a global civil war between developed and underdeveloped species-

life. Rather than competing ideologies, such a waror rather tableau of

warspitches contrary ways of life against each other. Instead of conven-tional armies, both sides mobilize opposing assemblages of state and,

especially, non-state actors that blur and operate across the national/

international dichotomy. It is a war that is characteristically fought on and

between the relations and modalities of life itself. The military analyst Rupert

Smith (2006) has called this phenomenon war amongst the people. In this war

conventional military force has little utility. Indeed, rather than securing an

unequivocal victory, it is more likely to entrench and internationalize the

resistance it encounters.

It is now commonplace for policy makers to assert that development andsecurity are interconnected in the sense that you cannot have security without

development or development without security. Indeed, this nexus has become

an accepted truth of the post-Cold War period. However, it remains

incomplete without a third category that is here called containment. That is,

those various interventions and technologies that seek to restrict or manage

the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially threatening life, or return

it from whence it came. An expanded nexus would add the proviso that you

cannot have development or security without containing the mobility of

underdeveloped life. Besides increasingly stringent visa and immigrationcontrols, this includes the transformation of the international refugee regime

into one of restriction, return and reintegration (Barnett 2002). In policing

the state of exception surrounding irregular circulation, industrialized

countries now regularly spend more on immigration and asylum control

than they do on development. As will be discussed below, the origins of

global containment lie in decolonization. It emerges both as the heir of earlier

colonial technologies of population management (see Mitchell 2002) and, at

the same time, provides the backstop against which local practices of restric-

ting and modulating circulation through zoning and architectural design have

subsequently proliferated.

In a global civil war being fought at the level of existence, containing

the circulation of underdeveloped life is strategically vital. While hopelessly

breached by history, containment functions as a global perimeter fence both

146 Mark Duffield


3/21

separating and reproducing the generic life-chance divide between the

developed and underdeveloped worlds. Compared to the regimes of social

protection that characterize the former, underdeveloped life is expected to be

essentially self-reproducing in terms of its basic biological, economic and social

requirements. This biopolitical rather than geopolitical divide has been widen-

ing since the end of the nineteenth century and has deepened following

decolonization. While trying to make self-reproduction sustainable at the

level of population is developments enduring aim, self-reliance is ambiguous.

Through the will to live beyond the limited basic needs ascribed to it, incomplete

life is minded to make the wrong choices and, as such, to become dangerous.

Radical self-reproduction equates with threatening forms of innovation and

circulation, including the ability to survive beyond states and sap the walls they

erect. Autonomous self-reproduction continually challenges attempts to achieve

security through development as international containment. In examining thepossibility of a global civil war at the level of life itself, the strategic nature of

development is first discussed.

The Strategic Nature of Development

In grappling with our present security predicament, it is common for

politicians and policy makers to assert that the traditional dichotomy between

the national and the international has collapsed. At stake in this new and

radically interconnected world is defending people with work to do, familylife to balance, mortgages to pay, careers to further [and] pensions to provide

(Blair 2001). Such visions of liberal order are validated by the very challenge

of predatory international forces that, like the object they menace, are largely

non-state and networked in character. While development has a long history

as a strategic response to such threats, this role is not widely appreciated.

One reason is that as a practical technology of security, development exists in

the here and now. Its benefits are always cast as a future yet to be realized

(Easterly 2002). If one steps back for a longer view, however, it is possible to

see development operating more strategically.Since decolonization the regularly promised annulment of global poverty,

for example, has proven elusive. More familiar has been a recurrent and

indignant rediscovery not only of its persistence but the growing wealth gap

between the developed and underdeveloped worlds (Myrdal 1957; OECD

1972; Brett 1985; UNDP 1996). After more than fifty years of strenuous

development efforts, it is estimated that up to a third of humanity still lives in

chronic poverty (CPRC 2005). Rather than simply focus on the reasons why

poverty persists, it is important to examine the political function that its

constant rediscovery serves; especially how it validates liberal order. While

poverty did not directly cause, for example, the Third Worlds attraction to

communism during the 1950s; or the refugee crisis of the 1970s; or the new

wars of the 1990sor even todays threat of international terrorismin each

case it has been discovered to lie at the root of the problem (Wilson 1953;

Global Civil War 147


4/21

Morawetz 1977; DAC 2003). From communism to terrorism, through its

marginalizing effects, and its ability to foster resentment and alienation

amongst ordinary people, poverty has been monotonously rediscovered as

a recruiting ground for the moving feast of strategic threats that liberal order

is constantly menaced by.

As a liberal technology of security, development has a long history. Its

essential features can be detected, for example, in its first fanciful imagining

on the edge of a dawning modernity: the civilizing tutelage that, at the begin-

ning of the eighteenth century, Robinson Crusoe exerted over his manservant

Friday. In practice, development inflected the later abolition of slavery

(Duffield 2007: 1216) as well as the social effects of the rise of industrial

capitalism in Europe (Cowen and Shenton 1996). Development emerges as

a moral trusteeship over life experienced as either incomplete, redundant

or somehow surplus to requirements (ibid.; Mehta 1999). In seeking toameliorate the destructive effects of progress, liberal regimes of development

typically attempt to re-establish acceptable forms of existence on the

foundation of a reconstituted community life. Based upon Enlightenment

views of progress, it appears as a set of educative technologies bringing

surplus population to completion through training in the art of manners and

freedom while, at the same time, assisting its aggregate self-reproduction.

Through the trusteeship of experts (Mitchell 2002), historically this has

favoured the encouragement of community self-reliance and local entrepre-

neurship based upon the small-scale ownership of land or property (Cowenand Shenton 1996: 266267). While today this is recognizable as sustainable

development, it is also discernable in the abolitionist plans for the communal

self-reliance of the freed slaves that struggled to found Sierra Leone in the

1780s (Hochschild 2006: 146147). The design of development can also

be seen in the Baptist free villages in the Jamaica of the 1830s (Hall 2002:

120139). As an educative trusteeship, development operates as a fitness test

in relation to incomplete life; when the wrong choices are made development

can easily blur into states of emergency and exclusion.

For development, decolonization is a site of both continuity and departure.As a liberal trusteeship development animated English colonial bureaucracy

(Arendt [1951]; Shenhav and Berda 2007) and found expression in such

practices as indirect rule (Lugard [1922]) and subsequently participatory

community development (Batten 1957). The anti-colonial struggle, however,

gave birth to the world of territorial nation-states; and this world of states

necessarily called forth a world of peoples. In a project still only four or five

decades old, for the first time Indians, Nigerians, Jamaicans, Sudanese and

Ghanaians existed as citizens within their own national borders. During

decolonization, development was reconfigured as an inter-state relation of

governance; it moved from the colonial bureaucracy into the institutions of

external expertise now lined up to help and support the newly discovered

underdeveloped state. As a global design of power, this reconfigured

development generically divides humanity into developed and underdeveloped

148 Mark Duffield


5/21

species-life; and through the cultural and racial sub-divisions made possible

it seeks to govern the world of peoples. The strategic importance of

decolonization is examined from two interconnected perspectives. First, it

fixed the biopolitical division of humanity into what can be metaphorically

called insured and non-insured life and, as such, established the possibility of a

global civil war at the level of species-existence itself. Second, in initiating a

ban on the international circulation of underdeveloped life it also established

an expansive risk-based security architecture that both separates and

reproduces the life-chance divide upon which this civil war is based.

Insured and Non-insured Species-life

To understand the intrinsic rather than contingent relationship between

development, security and containment, Foucaults work on biopolitics isimportant (Foucault [1976], [19751976], [19771978]). Within the more

familiar frame of geopolitics, states control territories. Territories, however,

also have populations and modern states define their effectiveness in terms of

how well they support the life and well-being of their populations. The con-

temporary idea of human security, for example, is an essentially biopolitical

concept; while it prioritizes the security of people rather than states, it privileges

the state as vital for providing the public goods that constitute human security

(Duffield and Waddell 2006). Consequently, implicit within the idea of human

security is a distinction between effective and ineffective states in terms of howlife itself is supported and secured. Encouraging life by enhancing a

populations resilience, however, is not the same as promoting the active

participation of citizens in political society. Biopolitics acts upon population as

the disenfranchised object of policy. It animates those technologies and

interventions that seek to discipline and regulate life at the mass level of

population, that is, at the level where life appears in the form of aggregates,

trends and statistical norms. In so far as biopolitics seeks to reduce the risks of

collective existence, or compensate for their unavoidability, it functions in the

interests of security. At the same time, the technologies used to support life alsoprovide the means of its governance. Foucaults work, however, focuses on

Europe; he did not specifically write on colonialism or development for that

matter (Stoler 1995). Understanding development as a regime of biopower

consequently requires interpretation.

In distinguishing developed and underdeveloped life biopolitically, one is

concerned with the concrete technologies that support and maintain collective

life in their different ideal settings. Developed life is sustained primarily

through regimes of social insurance and bureaucratic protection historically

associated with industrial capitalism and the growth of welfare states. As a

solution to the problem of an industrial surplus population, contributory

social insurance first appeared in Europe towards the end of the nineteenth

century (Thane 1989). It was more effective than coterminous attempts to

promote community self-reliance through local entrepreneurship (Cowen and



6/21


7/21

and community operates relatively well as an informal social security scheme

obviating the need for the urgent introduction of large-scale public pensions

(Kopits 1993 quoted by Deacon et al. 1997: 64). Echoing this thought, we are

told that in the global South, experience [. . .] reminds us of the central

contribution of personal and family resources to the universal need for

security (Wood and Gough 2006: 1697). One practical consequence of this

ingrained assumption is that durable solutions for the problem of refugee

return and reintegration have for decades aimed no higher than a

reconstituted self-reliance (Betts 2004). Conveniently for neo-liberalism, a

large part of humanity apparently exempts itself from the need for expensive

systems of social protection through its own communal resilience.

Since the emergence of an interconnected world market at the end of

the nineteenth century, however, self-reproduction has been increasingly

impossible (Davis 2001). If the stubborn statistics on global poverty andimmiseration are themselves insufficient, since decolonization the back-to-

back humanitarian emergencies amongst the world of peoplesindeed, the

permanent emergency of existence in the global Southsuggests that self-

reliance is a deadly, if convenient, chimera. In the real world, those hapless

populations fated to be self-reproducing survive on the threshold of society-

wide humanitarian emergency. In delineating a biopolitics of underdeveloped

or non-insured life, one is confronted with a recurrent duality. On the one

hand, there are those technologies of poverty reduction, local entrepreneur-

ship and voice that aim to make self-reliance sustainable while, on the other,there is the constant reality of humanitarian assistance which functions for

the non-insured as an international insurance of last resort. Compared to

developed life supported by regimes of social protection, since decolonization

a biopolitics of underdevelopment has been located in the essential circularity

or mutual conditioning of relief and development. An expansive humanitarian

assistance constantly invokes the need for a consolidating developmental

self-reliance. Self-reliance, however, regularly collapses into humanitarian

emergency which again enjoins a repeat of the governmental process of

expansion and consolidation (Duffield 2007: 4251).The division between insured and non-insured life, and their contrasting

regimes of social protection and critical infrastructure versus self-reliance and

livelihoods respectively, constitutes the terrain of a global civil war fought

at the level of existence. Self-reliance in this context, however, is ambiguous.

While summarizing the defensive aims of Western aid agencies, as a lived

reality it constantly blurs into the realm of actually existing development

(Duffield 2002); that is, those autonomous and resistant forms of self-reliance

where the will to live compels underdeveloped life to constantly transcend the

comportment and forms of stasis ascribed to it. This dangerous restiveness,

together with its penchant for innovation and unpredictability, highlights

the importance for liberal order to contain and manage the circulatory flows

linking the developed and undeveloped worlds in the interests of international

security.



8/21

Globalizing Containment

Threats to critical infrastructure in the global North and livelihood wars in

the South interconnect. Containing the circulatory effects of the latter, such

as state failure, the emergence of transgressive international shadow econo-mies or surges of irregular migration, is now routinely accepted as necessary

for the defence and stability of mass consumer society. If only as a risk

factor, politicians frequently assert that, in an interdependent world, unless

stability exists abroad is it unlikely to exist at home (Blair 2001). As will be

discussed below, the medium that is capable of translating external instability

into attacks on mass societys critical infrastructure is the presence of non-

integrating minorities of migrant origin within the social body. While the

need for containment in the face of international non-state threats is

recognizable in the war on terrorism, a strategic architecture that so bracketstogether the developed and underdeveloped worlds has a longer genealogy:

it first emerges with decolonization.

Balibar (1991) has drawn attention to the importance of decolonization

in changing the direction and perception of global migration. Previously it

had largely followed a North-to-South dynamic, and was associated with

exploration, escape and fortune. Following decolonization, however, the

direction of global migration reformed along a South-to-North axis. From a

Northern perspective, migration became the blow-back of immigration.

Decolonization gave birth to the world of states, and the world of statescalled forth a world of peoples that, for the first time, had the potential to

circulate globally. Rather than being associated with opportunity, immigra-

tion is more ambiguous; while providing a source of cheap labour, it also

constitutes a locus of threat. In confirming the generic division of humanity

into complete (or developed) and incomplete (or underdeveloped) species-life,

development is intrinsic to the new or culturally-coded racism that moved

into the political foreground with decolonization (ibid.; Barker 1981). Here,

cultures or ways of life, while not ranked hierarchically, are nonetheless dif-

ferent and able to impact upon potentials for social existence and inclusion.In mid 1960s Britain, with the emergence of a political consensus to restrict

immigration from its former colonies, one can detect the opening moves of

what would become a global ban on the circulation of underdeveloped life.

Reflecting todays concerns over asylum seekers (Fekete 2001a; Kundnani

2001), containment was presented as a legitimate response to the genuine fears

of ordinary people over the destabilizing effects of cultural difference on

community cohesion and the strain that immigration was placing on jobs,

housing, schools and hospitals (Duffield 1988: 3637). Amongst other things,

immigration was seen as a threat to what was then Europes main critical

infrastructure: the welfare state.

The Labour Partys 1964 election manifesto The New Britain contains a

premonition of a planetary security architecture. It signals a willingness to

connect the states readiness to act pre-emptively on the basis of genuine fears

152 Mark Duffield


9/21

to contain international circulation, with a wish to improve community

cohesion at home while, at the same time, justifying defensive development

abroad. Within this architecture, containment is the lynch-pin that establishes

and interconnects state-led regimes of internal development, aimed at inte-

grating already settled migrant communities, and external development

geared to bettering underdeveloped life and hence improving its ability to

survive in situ. As a reaction to the fears over the asymmetric demands of

non-insured life on the scarce resources of the welfare state, The New Britain

also promised to give special help to local authorities where immigrants had

settled (Labour Party 1964). Rather than improving universal welfare

provision, the approach was to create special funds and targeted measures to

compensate local authorities and communities for the effects of cultural

difference. Section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act, for example, gave

local authorities additional funding to take on specialist staff. This wasfollowed by special funding for schools trying to cope with non-English

speaking pupils. Under the new 1969 urban renewal programme, a dozen

Community Development Projects were initiated. This directed small grants

to voluntary and community organizations (or internal NGOs) working in

immigrant communities (Duffield 1988: 101). In this manner, the state

quickly established itself as a source of funding for legal advice centres, self-

help groups, adventure play grounds, youth clubs, training programmes and

hostels. In order to compensate for containment, and in response to the

dangers to social fabric and the critical infrastructure of the welfare state, aregime of state-led internal development was inaugurated.

Although earlier external development initiatives had existed, these were

essentially ad hoc colonial measures that, at best, sought to secure a continu-

ing special relationship with the metropole (Hewitt 2006). The New Britain

proposed something different, that is, a modern state-led regime of defensive

development cognisant of a world of independent nation-states. This involved

creating a new and centralized Ministry of Overseas Development which

eventually became the Overseas Development Administration, the forerunner

of todays Department for International Development (DFID). With theclaim that more than half the worlds population was living in poverty, the

manifesto warned that the growing tensions between rich and poor nations

were in danger of accentuating differences of race and colour (Labour Party

1964). Not only did it promise to increase government aid spending, the

manifesto also pledged to support the UN and encourage the work of NGOs.

The proven enterprise of the latter, it was argued, must be matched with

Government action to give new hope in the current United Nations

Development Decade (ibid.). The interconnections between internal and

external development are returned to below.

During the 1970s, such early restrictions on immigration vectored into

the beginnings of an EU-wide immigration policy (Huysmans 2000: 755).

Measures to establish the internal market in jobs and welfare provision were

accompanied, for example, by the strengthening of the EUs external border



10/21

controls and alignment of member state visa policies (ibid.: 759). By the end

of the 1980s, perceptive commentators were already warning of an emerging

Fortress Europe with the restriction of immigration moving into the

constitutional architecture of the EU. Less than a decade latter, the policing

of immigration was being based upon criteria of security and efficiency rather

than the law, with detention on administrative rather that judicial grounds

becoming common (Ho rnqvist 2004: 44). Refugee, asylum seeker, economic

and even criminal identities have tended to blur into an indistinct and

negative category of irregular migration (Zetter 2007). This process is

synonymous with a sharp deterioration in reception standards, growing levels

of social control, heightened policing and stricter detention policies, and

the growing sophistication of expulsion procedures (Barnett 2002: 14).

Administered by an army of private security companies, irregular immigrants

now find themselves subjects of an extensive prerogative state that has quietlyappeared within the folds of mass consumer society. In making containment

more effective, the management of immigration has also been externalized:

for example, placing EU liaison officers at airports in critical countries to

police points of embarkation (Fekete 2001a: 27); or instituting active

measures to prevent immigration from countries such as Afghanistan,

Kosovo, Morocco, Somalia and Iraq. Aid conditionalities, for example,

have been used to encourage the compliance of underdeveloped states. In

2003 the British government announced plans for extra-territorial processing

and protection centres in regions of migratory surges. It is argued that centresin such locations would prevent genuine refugees having to travel halfway

around the world to have their case held (Noll 2003). While the original

proposal has been modified several times and has yet to be fully imple-

mented, the principle of processing and protection in regions of origin is

symptomatic of the great strengthening of the Europes perimeter defences

since decolonization.

States within the global South, on whose territories the vast majority of all

refugees, internally displaced and irregular migrants exist, have followed a

similar path of containment (Crisp 2003). Compared to the highs of the mid1990s, during the Cold War refugee flows were relatively small and host

states more effective. Superpower rivalry also meant that, comparatively, the

volume of international assistance for refugees was better. Today, countries

that traditionally accepted large refugee in-flows such as Guinea, Malawi and

Pakistan are now unwilling to do so. Not only are numbers larger, inter-

national commitment to long-term assistance has declined. Reflecting the

trend in the West, pluralist politics have also often reduced refugees and

irregular migrants to objects of xenophobic excess. The closure of previous

open-door policies and forced repatriation has become common. Pakistans

November 2001 decision to close its borders with Afghanistan, thus prevent-

ing refugees leaving a war zone, is symptomatic of the current dispensation.

Being dependent upon states both financially and politically, UNHCRs

changing refugee policy has reflected the global turn towards containment.

154 Mark Duffield


11/21

While voluntary repatriation has always been the ideal solution, until the mid

1980s there was a general acceptance that in most cases resettlement within

the host country was the only realistic option. Since then, policy has shifted

progressively from resettlement to home-country return; involuntarily if

necessary (Chimni 1999). From a concern with protection, activity now

focuses upon reintegrating returned refugees. UNHCRs direct involvement

with humanitarian assistance and livelihood support has consequently grown;

including measures to incorporate refugees within existing country develop-

ment programmes (Betts 2004). In other words, to return them to a putative

state of self-reliance.

The security architecture that interconnects regimes of internal and external

development via the containment of circulation is episodic in nature. It

expands and deepens with each crisis of international circulation and the

consequent threat of irregular migration. Beginning with the originary crisisof decolonization, this architecture has matured in response to such events as

the growing Third World crisis of the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, the

early 1990s peak in the number of civil wars, and the effects of 9/11. The

overall direction of this risk-based architecture has been towards more

defensive and interventionary technologies of developmentboth internal

and externaltogether with more restrictive and expansive forms of national

and international containment. At the same time, in working across the

national/international dichotomy, the need for security threatens to bring

insured and non-insured life within a unitary framework of strategiccalculation.

Connecting Internal and External Development

As a regime of internal development, multiculturalism involved meeting the

special needs of migrant communities while encouraging the acceptance of

cultural difference. During the 1990s, it entered a period of deepening crisis.

In the summer of 2001, some weeks before the terrorist attacks in America,

a number of northern towns in England experienced outbreaks of inter-community violence between youths of white and Asian origin. These

disturbances highlighted the high degree of ethnic and social segregation in

many deprived inner-city areas, as well as the cultural radicalization of

Muslim youth that had been developing over the previous decade (Burnett

2004). The violence also brought to a head doubts over multiculturalism, with

many commentators arguing that it had encouraged communities to live

separate lives (Cantle 2001). Multiculturalism is premised upon the belief that

threats from the insurmountability of difference can be neutralized through

educational programmes aimed at normalizing such differences plus compen-

satory initiatives to ameliorate those differences most judged to prevent social

integration (Duffield 1984). The growing cultural radicalization of trans-

national Muslim communities, however, problematized this regime of internal

development. Rather than occupying an allotted space within a typology of



12/21

acceptable difference, it signalled the appearance of a radically cultured

non-integrating enemy within (Fekete 2004). Over the intervening decades,

moreover, the threat to critical infrastructure has widened. With the advent

of mass consumer society, critical infrastructure has moved beyond the

welfare state to encompass the nodal points of an increasingly centralized

transport, energy and retailing matrix; a complex but open circulatory system

that is vulnerable to enemies within.

In relation to societal vulnerability, radically cultured minorities function

as potential conduits for dangers originating abroad; they represent a weak

point in the perimeter defences of containment. Such concerns have prompted

a new regime of internal development in Britain, including the formation in

May 2006 of a Ministry of Communities and Local Government. While still

respecting cultural difference, under the rubric of community cohesion this

new regime encourages local authorities and voluntary groups to bring whiteand ethnic minority communities together to foster a greater sense of shared

belonging and identity. Improving community cohesion largely rests upon

NGO technologies of conflict resolution pioneered in the livelihood wars

of Africa and the Balkans (CMI 1997). That is, the highly malleable tactic of

co-operative integration where, rather than meeting the special needs of one

group, external aid is used to create an over-arching goal or shared aim that

brings different groups together. Whether encouraging Muslims and Serbs in

Bosnia to collectively repair their war-damaged homes, or establishing a

twinning relationship between ethnically segregated schools in Bradford, theaim of co-operative integration is similar. That is, to use external aid or

resources to bring together what has been divided, to break down artificial

barriers, to foster confidence and reinforce shared needs and understandings

in the interests of security. As with all development trusteeships, however,

co-operative integration is also a fitness test to isolate the good from the bad;

in this case, the life which can integrate as opposed to that which remains

suspicious and self-segregating.

In a radically interconnected world, defending liberal order through

strengthening and externalizing mass societys perimeter defences alone is notenough. The mobility of cultural radicalism has meant that the search for

community cohesion at home has been accompanied by the radicalization of

development abroad. Of great strategic importance in this respect has been

the reproblematization of political violence in the global South. That is, from

being acceptable during the Cold War, and often justified in national

liberation terms, to becoming universally unacceptable today (Tama s 2000).

This reproblematization has had two main effects. First, the delegitimation of

political violence has underpinned a resurgence of state-led humanitarian,

development and peace interventionism within the worlds crisis zones. Not

only has the number of UN peacekeeping missions significantly increased,

for example, their size and responsibilities have also expanded. Second,

delegitimation has transformed existing forms of community development

based on self-reliance into technologies of conflict resolution. Without

156 Mark Duffield


13/21

significantly changing what is done, and reflecting the intrinsic link between

development and security, liberal practices of development traditionally

associated with NGOs have been rediscovered as essentially civilian forms of

counterinsurgency (Slim 2004). That is, through the deployment of such

techniques as co-operative integration, development promises ways of

changing the balance of power between social groups to produce desired

political outcomes irrespective of military involvement. The radicalization of

development has been largely dependent upon drawing in and orchestrating

such NGO forms of non-state sovereign power within interventionary state-

led assemblages of aid.

Since the end of the Second World War, internal or civil war has been the

most common form of global warfare. Fuelled by superpower rivalry, the

number of civil wars in the Third World rose inexorably during the Cold War

to reach a peak of around 50 or so in the early 1990s (HSC 2005). Giventheir geopolitical functionality, during much of this growth period inter-

national attitudes towards civil war were ambivalent. Viewed in relation to

the left/right political categories of the time, warring parties were often cast in

a progressive light: for example, as the vanguards of national liberation

struggles. This was despite such wars contributing to state failure and

growing refugee numbers. With the ending of the Cold War this mode of

problematization quickly lost its immediacy just as the depth of the crisis of

containment encouraged by superpower rivalry was revealed. This situation

required a new and more functional way of experiencing political violence.The main intellectual thrust of this reproblematization is contained in the

new war discourse that grew to dominance from the early 1990s (Kaldor

1999). Civil war was reinterpreted in terms of irrationality, the breakdown of

order, deliberate violations of human rights, the growth of criminality and

the erosion of aggregate self-reliance. Having comprehensively displaced

earlier solidarist positions by the mid 1990s, this process of delegitimation

was formally confirmed, as it were, in Britains 2000 Terrorism Act. For

the first timeand before 9/11the Act proscribed a named list of mainly

Middle Eastern and Asian political groups as terrorist organizations.A decade earlier many of the same groups would have been regarded as

legitimate organizations struggling for self-determination or against religious

or cultural oppression (Fekete 2001b).

In changing the parameters of perception, new war discourse also helped

reveal a hidden dimension of civil conflict. In terms of the resources they

require, insurgents have become self-provisioning and effectively independent

of either state sponsorship or a reliance on the people amongst whom they

fight (RAND 2001). The classic Maoist doctrine of insurgency, for example,

likens the insurgent to a fish that swims in a sea constituted by the people.

The insurgent was reliant for food, shelter and information upon the people;

in return, he or she identified with them and supported their struggles. This

dependent relationship has changed, even reversed, as self-provisioning has

internationalized. As the literature on war economies (e.g. Le Billon 2000)



14/21

suggests, through the development of adaptable transborder shadow econo-

mies, insurgents have become radically self-reliant. Actually existing devel-

opment has forged means of survival that, while able to work with and

through states, can also exist outside and beyond them. It is a dangerous self-

reliance forged, for example, from extra-legal trade in all manner of

commodities and services. These economies have created new powers of

resistance and, importantly, forms of local protection and legitimacy.

Exploiting the public welfare vacuum within the underdeveloped state,

some insurgent groups have taken on humanitarian and social support roles.

Hamas, for example, provides the most comprehensive social safety net in

the West Bank and Gaza (Goldenburg 2001). This is but one example of a

wider phenomenon: compared to the classical insurgencies of decolonization,

the economic relationship between insurgents and the population is exactly

the opposite in some modern emergencies (Kilcullen 2006: 119). Supportedby internationalized shadow economies, remittances and diaspora networks,

many insurgents now routinely have access to more wealth, hardware and

information than the impoverished populations amongst whom they are

embedded; a factor that has considerably bearing upon the struggle for hearts

and minds within an emergent global civil war.

As a response to the dangers of autonomous forms of actually existing

development, the delegitimation of political violence has prompted the

radicalization of an already defensive development. If poverty, or rather the

alienation and dissatisfaction that it encourages, can exacerbate conflict andterrorism, it follows that development agencies, in attempting to reduce

poverty through strengthening self-reliance, are able to play a strategic role.

Through the smart management of aid, for example, by selecting and

encouraging social forces conducive to peace, NGOs rediscover themselves as

potentially able to alter the balance of power within societies in the interests

of stability (Anderson 1996). In this manner, liberal development has been

transformed into conflict resolution, that is, an essentially civilian technology

of counterinsurgency. The end of the Cold War has marked a period of rapid

growth of conflict resolution. New NGOs have formed while, at the sametime, established multifunctional agencies have widened their portfolio of

activities (Duffield 1997). Such innovation, however, has drawn them

inexorably towards the heat of the flame.

The Advent of Post-interventionary Society

Since the end of the Cold War, the step-change in Western humanitarian,

peace and reconstruction interventionism has had a significant effect. Since

the peak of 1992, it has been instrumental in more than halving the total

number of ongoing civil wars in the world (HSC 2005). Even in Africa, the

trend has been downwards. However, ending open warfare within ineffective

states has proven relatively easy. As Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq suggest,

more difficult is winning the peace. According to the strategic analyst

158 Mark Duffield


15/21

Rupert Smith, all the major post-Cold War military interventions have failed

to achieve the results intended: namely, a decisive armed victory which in

turn would deliver a solution to the original problem, which is mainly

political (Smith 2006: 4). While such interventions may have reduced the

incidence of civil war, a some policy advisers have argued, the reduction in

ongoing conflict is due to its suppression or containment rather than its

resolution (Strategy Unit 2005: 22). From this perspective, the statistical

decline in civil war is actually an inversely expanding zone of international

pacification. Occupation is the corollary of containment and the externaliza-

tion of the Wests sovereign frontier. Within the past decade what could be

called a post-interventionary society has emerged in the global borderland.

Within such societies, pacifying low-intensity insurgency is a long-term

policing problem for the international community. Compared to the classic

insurgencies of decolonization, conflict within post-interventionary societiesresembles more the small wars of earlier colonial occupations (Kilcullen

2006). For Smith (2006), this constitutes a new paradigm of conflict which he

calls war amongst the people. They are insurgencies in which military force

has little utility; in fact, it entrenches and internationalizes the resistance

encountered. In such wars, development as soft power finds itself at a new

premium.

In terms of periodizing the post-Cold War era, the modalities of soft power

fall into two discernable assemblages reflecting the shift from an interven-

tionary to a post-interventionary logic. Although this shift involves agenciesand networks beyond the UN family, as a servant of states the changes in

the nature of UN system-wide operations reflects this shift in the wider

environment. Until the mid 1990s, the main form of UN intervention within

ongoing war was negotiated access. In places like Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola,

Mozambique and Bosnia, a UN lead agency would secure agreement between

the warring parties on the humanitarian terms and conditions whereby

civilians could be accessed (Duffield 1994). On the basis of the agreement

reached an assemblage of donors, UN specialist agencies, NGOs and,

sometimes, militaries would emerge. Apart from its fragility, intrinsic tonegotiated access was the implicit recognition conferred on rebels and other

non-state political actors.

Toward the end of the 1990s, reflecting the downward trend in the number

of open civil wars, a tipping point was reached whereby intervention gave

way to a post-interventionary condition. Rather than negotiated access, the

key UN system-wide institution became the integrated mission (Eide et al.

2005). The nature of the intervention, and its associated assemblage of aid

and security actors, is now shaped by the peace accord and how it was

brokered or imposed. In addition to humanitarian assistance, aid actors have

expanded into a wide range of demobilization, reintegration and reconstruc-

tion activities. During the Cold War, NGOs were at pains to position

themselves outside states. Within todays integrated missions, however, they

are more likely to be strengthening state capacity or acting as its surrogate.



16/21

Compared to negotiated access, the integrated mission represents a relative

closure of political space. Whereas humanitarian operations had recognized

oppositional non-state actors as the price of access, the integrated mission

closes ranks around support for the peace accord. In places like Haiti,

Burundi, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and East Timor, for example, the UN is

now prepared to take sides in support of the recognized transitional

governmenteven to the extent of militarily confronting spoilers trying

to undermine the transition process (ibid.: 6). This widespread institutional

trend within zones of crisis, while relatively low key, resonates with the more

visible instances of regime change, coalitions of the willing and political

polarization in such places as Afghanistan and Iraq.

The political architecture of the Cold War was based upon respect for

territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs. While territorial

integrity is still respected, sovereignty over life within the worlds crisis zonesis now internationalized, negotiable and contingent (Elden 2006). Post-

interventionary society is synonymous with contingent sovereignty and the

competition between national and international actors over who controls a

population conceived as self-reproducing. In response to the crisis of

containment, and especially as a means of capturing and securing non-

insured life, the underdeveloped state has once again moved to the centre of

development policy. The need to reconstruct fragile states, for example, is

high on the international security agenda (DFID 2005). During the classical

insurgencies of decolonization, it was the communists or nationalists thatstruggled to seize the state and remake it the name of the people. Today, it is

the West that appears radical with its utopian visions of transforming whole

societies (Stiglitz 1998: 3). In the interests of equality, for example, NGOs

regularly challenge the patrimonial and gender relations associated with a

backward underdevelopment. Confronted by such liberal radicalism, it is

tempting to see contemporary insurgency as essentially conservative; as a site

where the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces,

or to repel an occupier (Kilcullen 2006: 113). In practice however, the

responsibility to protect and reconstruct (ICISS 2001) usually translates intonothing more radical than the fragmented, contradictory and under-resourced

attempts to invest underdeveloped states with the minimum capacity neces-

sary to meet basic needs and launch their citizens on the uncertain path of

self-reliance. Compared to such radicalism, actually existing development

looks an attractive alternative.

An important characteristic of war amongst people is that when the

underdeveloped state moves to the centre ground of development policy,

insurgents come to regard it with ambiguity and equivocation. Since it

assumes its citizens are self-reproducing, the underdeveloped state has never

provided much in the way of social protection. A related concern of the

counterinsurgency lobby is that insurgencies today no longer appear directed

at taking over a functioning body politic, but dismembering or scavenging

its carcass, or contesting an ungoverned space (Kilcullen 2006: 112).

160 Mark Duffield


17/21

With dismemberment forming one possible extreme, movements such as the

Zapatistas, who seek non-violent ways to ignore or organize around the state

(Olesen 2004), constitute the other. Traditional interstate war subordinated

people to the nation-state for the purpose of mobilizing them for military

victory; total war built on the inevitable logic of this mobilization, with states

wantonly attacking populations, thus rendering the civilian and the soldier

indistinct. In war amongst the people, the people have

turned on the nation state, whether through terrorist attacks or the use of force

outside the framework of the state [. . .]. Whether we are living in a post-nation-

state world remains to be fully clarified, but it is possible to believe that the

nation state is fighting for its supremacy (Smith 2006: 305, emphasis added).

Perhaps one of the problems is that for the non-insured humanity,

international intervention in support of the underdeveloped state promises

little. What are being reconstructed are human security rather than forms of

social security states. Compared to the welfare safety-nets and social

insurance of consumer society, the future being scripted for the larger part

of humanity is a more basic non-material stasis of self-reliance within a world

market that knows only constant change and sets no limits on its own

appetites.

Concluding Remarks

This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between

development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the

sense that you cannot have development or security without containing

the circulation of underdeveloped life. Rather than emerging with the end of

the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, the origins of this nexus can

be traced to decolonization. While its constituent parts have an even longer

history, decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind

into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of adeveloped life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social

insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant. While the

former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state,

the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an append-

age of this new world of states, decolonization also called forth a volatile

world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally.

In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has

been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the

circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political

instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening

decades, containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual

global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration.

This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community



18/21

cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. Spurred by the threat of

terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical

energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society.

The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization

interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to

integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at

the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance

and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has

deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a

global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and

between the modalities of life itself. Through their associated modalities of

circulationand the need to police themglobal civil war connects the

livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure

in the North. Since the end of the Cold War, the radical interdependence of

world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion

at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad

to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake

in this war is the Wests ability to contain and manage international poverty

while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its

means. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business,

there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world

with others will be defended to the death. Certainly, that a large part of

humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainableif limited

to basic needsmust give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a

lived reality, however, it is less convincing. Reflected within the globalization

of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become

increasingly violent and coercive. In one way or another, we are all involved

in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole,

including policy makers and academics. Because this war is being conducted

in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree

and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish

our own terms of engagement.

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Elizabeth Colson

Lecture, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, 16 May 2007. I would like to

thank Roger Zetter for his encouragement and helpful comments on the draft.

Naturally, all errors, omissions and gross generalizations are my own.

ANDERSON, M. B. (1996) Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid.

Cambridge, MA: Local Capacities for Peace Project. The Collaborative for Development

Action.

ARENDT, H. (1994 [1951]) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt.

BALIBAR, E. (1991) Is There a Neo-Racism ? , in Balibar, E. and Wallerstein, I. (eds) Race,

Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, London: Verso, pp. 1728.

162 Mark Duffield


19/21

BARKER, M. (1981) The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe. London:

Junction Books.

BARNETT, L. (2002) Global Governance and the Evolution of the International Refugee

Regime. New Issues in Refugee Research: Working Paper No 54. Geneva: UNHCR,

Evaluation and Policy Unit.BATTEN, T. R. (1957) Communities and Their Development. London: Oxford University Press.

BETTS, A. (2004) International Co-operation and the Targeting of Development and Assistance

for Refugee Solutions: Lessons from the 1980s. New Issues in Refugee Research: Working

Paper No 107. Geneva: Evaluation and Policy Unit, UNHCR.

BLAIR, T. (2001) This is the Battle with Only One Outcome: Our Victory, Guardian 3 October:

45.

BRETT, E. A. (1985) The World Economy Since the War: The Politics of Uneven Development .

London: Macmillan.

BURNETT, J. (2004) Community, Cohesion and the State, Race and Class 45(3): 118.

CANTLE, T. (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team. London:

Home Office.CHIMNI, B. S. (1999) From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical

History of Durable Solutions to Refugee Problems. New Issues in Refugee Research: Working

Paper No. 2. Geneva: Centre for Documentation and Research, UNHCR.

CMI (1997) Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict: Report Prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Development Studies and Human

Rights.

COWEN, M. P. and SHENTON, R. W. (1996) Doctrines of Development. London and

New York: Routledge.

CPRC (2005) The Chronic Poverty Report 20042005. University of Manchester, Institute for

Development and Policy Management: Chronic Poverty Research Centre.

CRISP, J. (2003) A New Asylum Paradigm? Globalization, Migration and the Uncertain Futureof the International Refugee Regime. New Issues in Refugee Research: Working Paper

No. 100, Geneva: Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, UNHCR.

DAC (2003) A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for

Action. Paris: OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

DAVIS, M. (2001) Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third

World. London: Verso.

DEACON, B., HULSE, M. and STUBBS, P. (1997) Global Social Policy: International

Organisations and the Future of Welfare. London: Sage.

DEAN, M. (1999) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage.

DFID (2005) Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States. London: Department for

International Development.DUFFIELD, M. (1984) New Racism . . . New Realism: Two Sides of the Same Coin, Radical

Philosophy 37: 2934.

DUFFIELD, M. (1988) Black Radicalism and De-Industrialisation: The Hidden History of Indian

Foundry Workers. Aldershot: Gower.

DUFFIELD, M. (1994) Complex Emergencies and the Crisis of Developmentalism, Institute of

Development Studies Bulletin: Linking Relief and Development 25: 3745.

DUFFIELD, M. (1997) Evaluating Conflict Resolution: Context, Models and MethodologyA

Discussion Paper Prepared for the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway. Birmingham:

School of Public Policy.

DUFFIELD, M. (2002) War as a Network Enterprise: The New Security Terrain and Its

Implications, Cultural Values 6(1/2): 153165.

DUFFIELD, M. (2007) Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of

Peoples. Cambridge: Polity Press.

DUFFIELD, M. and WADDELL, N. (2006) Securing Humans in a Dangerous World,

International Politics 43: 123.



20/21

EASTERLY, W. (2002) The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign

Aid, Journal of Policy Reform 5(4): 223250.

EIDE, E. B., KASPERSEN, A. T., KENT, R. and VON HIPPEL, K. (2005) Report on

Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, Independent Study for the

Expanded UN ECHA Core Group.ELDEN, S. (2006) Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders,

SAIS Review of International Affairs 29: 1124.

FEKETE, L. (2001a) The Emergence of Xeno-racism, Race and Class 43(2): 2340.

FEKETE, L. (2001b) The Terrorism Act 2000: an Interview with Gareth Peirce, Race and Class

43(2): 96103.

FEKETE, L. (2004) Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State, Race and Class

46(1): 329.

FOUCAULT, M. (1998 [1976]) The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume 1.

London: Penguin Books.

FOUCAULT, M. (2003 [19751976]) Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France

19751976, London: Alan Lane, The Penguin Press.FOUCAULT, M. (2007 [19771978]) Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Colle ge de

France 19771978, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

GOLDENBURG, S. (2001) Islamists Fill Vacuum Left by Arafats Waning Star, Guardian 6

December: 15.

HALL, C. (2002) Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 18301867.

Cambridge: Polity Press.

HEWITT, V. (2006) A Cautionary Tale: Colonial and Post-Colonial Conceptions of Good

Government and Democratisation in Africa, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics

44(1): 4166.

HOCHSCHILD, A. (2006) Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empires

Slaves. Boston and New York: Houghton and Mifflin Co.HSC (2005) The Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century. University of

British Colombia: Human Security Centre.

HUYSMANS, J. (2000) The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, Journal of

Common Market Studies 38(5): 751777.

HO RNQVIST, M. (2004) The Birth of Public Order Policy, Race and Class 46(1): 3052.

ICISS (2001) The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on

Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

KALDOR, M. (1999) New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era . Cambridge: Polity

Press.

KILCULLEN, D. (2006) Counter-insurgency Redux Survival 48(4): 111130.

KOPITS, G. (1993) Towards a Cost-Effective Social Security System. In The Implications forSocial Security of Structural Adjustment Policies. Studies and Research 34. Geneva: ISSA.

KUNDNANI, A. (2001) In a Foreign Land: the New Popular Racism, Race and Class

43(2): 4160.

LABOUR PARTY (1964) The New Britain, 1964 Labour Party Manifesto. London: Labour

Party.

Le BILLON, P. (2000) The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know.

Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) Paper 33. London: Overseas Development Institute.

LUGARD, L. (1965 [1922]) The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa. London: Frank Cass.

MCKINNON, R. (2004) Promoting Social Security Worldwide: The Role of the ISSA,

International Social Security Review 57(3): 323.

MEHTA, U. S. (1999) Liberalism and Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.MITCHELL, T. (2002) Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity. Berkeley: University

of California Press.

MORAWETZ, D. (1977) Twenty Five Years of Economic Development. Washington: World

Bank.

164 Mark Duffield


21/21

MYRDAL, G. (1957) Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions. London: Gerald

Duckworth.

NOLL, G. (2003) Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues Raised by Transit

Processing Centres and Protection Zones, European Journal of Migration and Law 5: 303341.

OECD (1972) Development Cooperation, 1972 Review. Paris: Organisation for EconomicCooperation and Development.

OLESEN, T. (2004) Globalising the Zapatistas: from Third World Solidarity to Global

Solidarity? Third World Quarterly 25(1): 255267.

RAND (2001) The New Face of Insurgency. RAND Research Brief (RB07409OTI).

REID, J. (2006) The Species versus the Rogue: Liberal Strategies of Governance and Security in

the War on Terror. Paper presented at Workshop on London in a Time of Terror, December.

London: Birkbeck College.

ROUSSEAU, J.-J. (1984 [1755]) A Discourse on Inequality. London: Penguin Books.

SHENHAV, Y. and BERDA, Y. (2007) The PoliticalTheological and Racial Foundations

of Colonial State Bureaucracy: Juxtaposing the Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Territories

with Colonial History. Paper presented at International Workshop on Power, Rule and

Governmentality in Zones of Emergency, 35 June. Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem

Institute.

SLIM, H. (2004) With or Against? Humanitarian Agencies and Coalition Counter-Insurgency.

Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/shaping%

20opinion/With%20or%20Against%20.pdf

SMITH, R. (2006) The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin

Books.

STIGLITZ, J. E. (1998) Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, and

Processes. Paper presented at 1998 Presbich Lecture, 19 October. Geneva: UNCTAD.

STOLER, A. L. (1995) Race the Education of Desire: Foucaults History of Sexuality and the

Colonial Order of Things. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

STRATEGY UNIT (2005) Investing in Prevention: an International Strategy to Manage Risks

of Instability and Improve Crisis Response, A Strategy Unit Report to the Government.

London: Prime Ministers Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office.

TAMA S, G. M. (Summer 2000) On Post-Fascism. Boston Review http://boston.review.net/

BR25.3/tamas.html.

THANE, P. (1989) The British Welfare State: its Origins and Character, in Digby, A. and

Feinstein, C. (eds) New Directions in Economic and Social History, Basingstoke and London:

Macmillan, pp. 143156.

UNDP (1996) Human Development Report 1996. New York: Oxford University Press/United

Nations Development Programme.

WILSON, H. (1953) The War on World Poverty. London: Victor Gollancz.

WOOD, G. and GOUGH, I. (2006) A Comparative Welfare Regime Approach to Global Social

Policy, World Development 34(10): 16961712.

ZETTER, R. (2007) More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of

Globalization, Journal of Refugee Studies 20(2): 172192.

http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/shaping%http://boston.review.net/http://boston.review.net/http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/shaping%

Global Civil War Duffield

Documents

Transcript of Global Civil War Duffield