THE EPISTEMIC REQUIREMENTS FOR MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Carl GinetCornell University

In this paper I will use the term action to mean a persons (voluntarilyand intentionally) moving their body in a certain way and thereby bringing abouta certain consequence. For example, Herman moves his arm and hand andthereby causes a car door to close on Sammys fingers. And I will use the termomission to mean a persons failing to prevent some event because they didnot move their body in a certain way at a certain time, that is, had they movedin that way at that time, their movement would have prevented the event; let uscall this event the consequence of the omission. For example, Herman fails topush a certain button on the dashboard before exiting his car, and, if he hadpushed that button then, his doing so would have closed the sunroof and therebyprevented the rain from soaking the interior of his car. (These are, I realize,somewhat artificial meanings for the terms action and omission, not in com-plete conformity with their ordinary use.)

What is required for a person to be morally responsible for such an actionor omission (or for the consequence involved in the action or omission)? Let usrestrict our attention to actions or omissions in which the consequence is un-deserved harm to someone, to their person or to their interests, and ask a morerestricted question: What is required for a person to be morally blameworthyfor a harmful action or omission?

I will assume here that one thing required is that the agent could haveavoided the action or omission. I will call this the could-have-done-otherwisecondition, or CDO condition for short. This assumption is controversial.(Harry Frankfurt has put forward a type of example which, as he and manyothers see it, shows that being able to avoid a harmful action or omission is notrequired for being morally responsible for it. Some who are persuaded byFrankfurt-type examples suggest that, instead of the CDO condition, somewould-have-done-otherwise-if condition is what is necessary.1) Ill not defendmy assumption here. The question I want to pursue in this paper is this: assum-ing that the CDO condition is necessary for being blameworthy for a harmfulaction, what else is necessary?2 (My answer to this question, or some adapta-

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tion of it, might well prove to be equally satisfactory if we were to replace theCDO condition with some would-have-done-otherwise-if condition, but Ill notexplore that possibility.)

I

We need to state the CDO condition more exactly. We are considering ac-tions where at a certain time t1 a person S moves their body in a certain way Mand thereby causes a harmful consequence of a certain sort H, and omissionswhere at a certain time t1 S does not move in a certain way M and thereby failsto prevent a certain sort of harmful consequence H. The specification of theCDO condition that may first come to mind is something like the following.

(A) For actions: until t1 it was open to S not to make movement M then orany other movement that would bring about H;for omissions: until t1 it was open to S to make movement M then orsome other movement that would prevent H.

But this is, unfortunately, too simple. It fails to cover cases where, al-though at t1 it was no longer open to S to make (or not to make) M at t1, atsome earlier time it was open to S to act (or not to act) in some way such that,had S so acted (or not so acted) at that earlier time, it would have been open toS until t1 to make (or not to make) M at t1. For example, Frank sets off on awalk at 7:00pm and is a mile from home at 7:30pm when he suddenly remem-bers that he promised his family to record a certain TV program that begins at7:30. Despite his being unable at 7:30 to turn on the TV and VCR, Frank canproperly be held accountable for failing to do so and, if he had no outweighinggood reason for bringing it about that he was unable to do so, he can be heldblameworthy for this failure.

In order to cover cases of this sort we must state the CDO condition nec-essary for Ss being blameworthy for an action or omission in the following,more complex way:

For actions: At some time t0 not later than t1, either (i) S acted in a certainway W such that it was open to S at t0 not to act in way W then and, had Snot acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not to make Mor any other movement then that would bring about H, or (ii) S did not att0 act in a certain way W such that it was open to S to act in way W thenand, had S acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not tomake M or any other movement then that would bring about H.For omissions: At some time t0, not later than t1, either (i) S acted in acertain way W such that it was open to S at t0 not to act in way W thenand, had S not acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 tomake M or some other movement then that would have prevented H, or

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(ii) S did not at t0 act in a certain way W such that it was open to her to actin way W then and, had S acted in way W then, it would have been open toS at t1 to make M or some other movement then that would have pre-vented H.

II

Let us first consider the restricted class of cases that satisfy condition (A)abovethat is, actions where S had it open to her at t1 not to make M or anyother movement that would cause H, and omissions where S had it open to herat t1 to make movement M or some other movement that would prevent H. Insuch cases I will say that the CDO condition is satisfied at t1.3

Ss harmful action may satisfy the CDO condition at t1 but still not be onefor which S deserves blame, if at t1 S did not know that then making move-ment M would bring about H and Ss failure to know this was not itself blame-worthy. For example, Simon enters the hotel room he has just checked into andflips what appears to be, and what he takes to be, an ordinary light switch, but,to his surprise and consternation, the flipping of the switch sets off a loud firealarm. It seems that, because he did not know that his flipping the switch wouldhave this unfortunate consequence, it would be wrong to feel indignant withhim for bringing about that consequence.

Similarly, Ss harmful omission may satisfy the CDO condition at t1 butstill not be one for which S deserves blame, if at t1 S did not know that thenmaking movement M would prevent H and Ss failure to know this was notitself blameworthy. Herb did not unlock the back door before leaving for work,and therefore later that day the plumber was unable to get in to repair the fur-nace and left a note saying that he would not be able to come again until nextweek. But Herb did not know that the plumber was scheduled to come thatdayhis wife made the appointment and forgot to tell himso Herb cannot bejustly reproached for not making the movements that would have prevented thepostponement of the furnace repairs.

Should we say, then, that, when an action (or omission) satisfies the CDOcondition at t1, S is blameworthy for bringing about harm H by making move-ment M at t1 (or for failing to prevent harm H by making movement M at t1)only if it is also the case that at t1 S knew that making movement M wouldbring about H (or knew that making M would prevent H)? No, this would be torequire S to know too much. Even though Herman, when he pushed the cardoor, did not know that he would thereby close the door on Sammys fingers,we are right to feel some indignation towards Herman for causing Sammyspain and injury, if Herman knew that Sammy was still emerging from the carand that there was a possibility that Sammy would put his fingers where thedoor could close on them. George tossed a rock over the edge of a cliff, whichstruck and injured someone on the trail below. Even though he did not knowthat it would hit someone, we are surely right to reproach George for a reckless

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act, if he knew that there were or might well be people on the trail below andtherefore knew that his tossed rock might hit someone. Such examples suggestthat we should not require for blameworthiness more than that at t1 S knewthat making movement M would or might cause H.

It will be convenient to use the verb know and cognate terms in a specialrestricted sense. Ill mark such uses with an asterisk (*). Let us stipulate thatat t1 S knew* that... implies that at t1 S actively believed (the truth) that... Tosay that George knew* that there might be people on the trail below when hetossed his rock is to imply, not only that he then believed this truth, but alsothat this consideration had not then slipped his mind: he was then sufficientlyaware of this possibility that it would not be correct to say that he threw therock only because he failed to recall (to think of ) the possibility of people be-low. He threw the rock while aware that it might hit someone below. This doesnot entail that he intended that it hit someone; he may not have cared whetherit did or even have hoped that it would not.

S must, of course, (and usually will) have had justification for believingthat causing H (or harm of that sort) by moving in way M was a non-negligiblepossibility. (In the case of Georges throwing the rock over the cliff, his beliefswould give him such justification if they merely lacked any basis for thinkingthat the area below was very unlikely to have any people in it.) It is not quiteenough, however, to require only that S have some justification or other forbelieving this: S must have a justification for believing it that is not also areason for believing a false proposition as to how her making movement Mwould or might cause H. Melanie shoots her gun and thereby causes the deathof her enemy, fully intending to do so. Her belief as she pulled the trigger thatby firing the gun she would cause her enemys death was correct and justified,for she is an expert marksman and just an hour ago she checked the operationof her gun and loaded it. But what happened was this: the bullet she fired wasdeflected by a flying bird; nevertheless the firing of the gun caused the deathof her enemy because the sound of the shot startled a passing driver and causedhim to lose control of his car which struck and killed her enemy. Here I amdisinclined to regard Melanie as blameworthy for the death of her enemy (thoughshe is, of course, to be blamed for acting with the intent of killing him). Sheseems no more culpable for that consequence than she would have been hadshe aimed her shot harmlessly into the sky and unintentionally caused her en-emys death in a similar way. What negates blameworthiness for the harmfulconsequence in both cases is that the justification Melanie has for her true be-lief that her firing the gun will cause the death of her enemy is also a justifica-tion for a false belief as to how it will bring about that consequence.

Let us say of justification that has this unfortunate property that it is notproper justification. And let us stipulate further that at t1 S knew* that mov-ing in way M then would or might cause a consequence of sort H implies, notonly that at t1 S actively believed this truth, but also that S had proper justifi-cation for this belief.

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Should we say, then, with respect to a harmful action, that what is addi-tionally necessary when the CDO condition is satisfied at t1, is this: at t1 Sknew* that moving in way M then would or might cause a consequence of sortH? No. This is still to require more than is necessary.

A person may be blameworthy for a harmful action, even if they fail torealize that their movement will bring about a harm, if the failure to realize thisis itself something for which the person is blameworthy. Consider a revisedversion of our example of Simon and the switch that set off a fire alarm. Sup-pose that the switch did not look at all like an ordinary light switchthe wholething was red, much larger than a typical light switch, and located fairly highup on the wall. Moreover, immediately below it in large white letters on a redbackground were the words FIRE ALARM. Simon is a normal adult whosenative language is English and he has been about in the world enough to knowabout the typical appearance of light switches and about fire alarms. But sointent was he on finding a light switch that he somehow failed to notice thewords FIRE ALARM, or to take in the significance of the conspicuous dif-ferences between the switch he pulled and a typical light switch, and thoughtthat the switch he flipped would just turn on a light. As Simon himself laterconfessed in making profuse apologies, his failure to notice or heed those thingswas inexcusable. A certain amount of indignation towards him, for his causingthe alarm to go off, would be deserved (though, of course, not as much as if hehad intentionally set it off ).

Similar observations hold for cases of harmful omissions. Consider a re-vised version of the case of Herbs not unlocking the back door. When Herbcomes down to make his breakfast, there is a note by the coffeemaker from hiswife. Herb puts the note aside without reading it, telling himself that he willread it as soon as hes poured his juice and coffee. But he starts thinking aboutsomething else and forgets the note. The note reads, Herb, Before you leaveplease unlock the back door so that the plumber can get in to fix the furnace.Herb goes off to work without unlocking the back door. Even though Herbdidnt know* as he was leaving for work that, if he then unlocked the backdoor, he would prevent the plumbers being locked out, his wife would be jus-tified in reproaching him for failing to prevent this, given that his failure toread her note before leaving was blameworthy.

It is clear that failure to realize that ones action or omission would or mighthave the harmful consequence can itself be culpable: the belief one lacked is abelief one should have had. And that being so, even if it is only because of thatfailure that one commits the harmful action or omission (i.e., one would nothave done so had one known* at the time that it might have the harmful con-sequence), one is blameworthy for the harmful consequence.

So we can say that, when the CDO condition is satisfied at t1 (the time ofmaking, or omitting to make, the relevant bodily movement), what is furtherrequired in order for S to be blameworthy for the harmful action or omission isthe following disjunctive condition: at t1, either S knew* that moving in way

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M would or might bring about the harm H (or, in the case of an omission, Sknew* that moving in way M would or might prevent H) or S should haveknown* this.

III

Let me here digress briefly to note an interesting question that arises aboutcases, like that of Georges throwing a rock over the cliff, where the agent knew*or should have known* that his act (or omission) might have a certain sort ofharmful consequence. Imagine two such cases which differ only in that in onethe agents act (or omission) does have the sort of harmful consequence heknew* or should have known* it might have, but in the other it does not. Withrespect to all other relevant circumstances, particularly with respect to the agentsmental state at the time of his potentially harmful act (or omission), the casesare exactly alike. The interesting question is this: Does the unlucky agent (theone whose action (or omission) does have the harmful consequence) deservemore blame for his action (or omission) than the lucky agent deserves for his?

Thomas Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams (1981) have argued that ouractual practice of moral assessment implies an affirmative answer to this ques-tion; our moral reactions in such cases show that we do take the degree ofblame an agent deserves to depend on sheer luck. Against this view, Brian Rose-bury (1995) has made a convincing case that examples that may seem to sup-port it do not actually do so. (Roseburys discussion covers cases where theagent neither knew* nor should have known* that her action (or omission) mighthave a harmful consequence, as well as the cases we are concerned with here,where the agent knew* or should have known* this.)

In some such examples, Rosebury argues, what is being described as ob-servers expressing or feeling a greater degree of moral condemnation towardthe unlucky action (or its agents feeling a greater degree of self-reproach) isbeing misdescribed, that it is actually some other feeling or attitude, such asdismay or regret or sadness. This may be the appropriate thing to say, for in-stance, about Hermans feelings after closing the car door on Sammys fingersas compared with Hermiones feelings after narrowly missing closing the dooron Sammys fingers: Herman of course feels a great deal worse than Hermionedid, but the additional negative feeling, insofar as it is rational and appropriate,is keen regret and dismay at having caused an injury rather than more severeself-reproach or heavier guilt.

But there are cases where our greater negative feeling towards the unluckyagent really is moral blame. About these Rosebury argues that our attitude doesnot reflect what would be our considered judgment were we to take adequateaccount of the agents epistemic responsibilities and limitations at the time ofhis action. So, for example, Sammys mother may initially be inclined to con-demn Herman a good deal more strongly for his carelessness when he slamsthe car door on Sammys fingers than the mild reproach she felt towards Her-

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mione for her earlier car-door slamming that luckily missed Sammys fingers.But when she reflects that Hermione was as heedless as Herman and that Her-man had as much excuse for being heedless as Hermione hadboth were pre-occupied with what they were about to do after getting out of the carthemothers feelings of indignation towards the two of them should tend to equal-ize. Or I might be initially inclined to feel greater outrage at a midnight bomb-ing of a shop that killed people than at one that did not kill or injure anyone.But after realizing that in neither case did the bomber intend to kill people (inboth they hoped that no one would be around when the bomb exploded) andthat in both cases the bomber knew* there was a non-negligible chance that thebomb would kill people, I become as outraged at the action of the luckybomber as I am at the action of the unlucky bomber.

IV

Returning now to our investigation of the epistemic requirements for blame-worthiness, can we find something general and informative to say about whatsort of circumstance will make true the judgment that at t1 S should have known*that his action (or omission) would or might have a harmful consequence ofsort H (in a case where at t1 S did not know* this)? We can, I think, say this:Ss failure to know* must have been a consequence of some earlier action oromission concerning which S then knew* or should have known* that it wouldor might lead to such an unfortunate failure of knowledge* as S in fact suf-fered at t1 (Holly Smith calls this the benighting action or omission). That is:at some time t0 earlier than t1, either S acted in a certain way W that broughtabout his failure to know* at t1, which was responsible for his harmful act (oromission) then, and at t0 S knew* or should have known* that his so actingthen would or might lead (risked leading) to that sort of failure to know*, or Somitted to act in a certain way W such that Ss acting in way W at t0 wouldhave prevented his failure to know* at t1 and at t0 S knew* or should haveknown* that his so acting then would or might prevent that sort of failure toknow*. Lets call the harmful act (or omission) at t1, which occurred becauseof Ss knowledge* failure at t1, the benighted act (or omission).

For example, Simons failure to realize that the switch he was flipping wasan alarm switch was (in one version of the example) culpable because, in theperiod between the time when the switch first caught his eye and the time heflipped it, he could and should have stopped to think what its unusual locationand appearance might mean and to attend more closely to the letters on theplaque below it, actions which would have made him realize what the switchwas and prevented his flipping it. Herbs failure to realize that by omitting tounlock the back door before he left he was preventing the plumber from fixingthe furnace that day was blameworthy (in one version of the example) becausehe could and should have avoided this failure by reading the note by the cof-feepot before laying it aside (or by putting it somewhere he could not avoid

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seeing it later). Or consider another, rather different example, where S knows*that there is a sort of action he could take that would prevent a certain harmbut S fails to know* which specific sort of action it is (and is blameworthy forthis failure): Herb neglected to memorize the combination to the lock on hislocker at the fitness center (or to take a copy of it with him), and so when heand his partner return to the locker after their squash game, he does not know*what manipulations of the lock would open the locker, manipulations which hecould then carry out if only he knew* what they were (and, of course, if he hadopened the locker then, he would have prevented much inconvenience for him-self and his squash partner).

Those were examples, of a benighted act and benighted omissions, wherewhat did the benighting was a prior omission. One would expect that blame-worthy failure to know* would typically come about through a prior omission.It is hard to think of realistic examples where what brings it about is a prioraction. Here are some unrealistic examples, which are variations on the exam-ple of Herbs failure to leave the back door unlocked. Suppose that Herbs wifetold him before she left the house that he should unlock the back door beforehe leaves so that the plumber can get in. Right after his wife leaves, Herb takesa certain drug in order to enjoy the hours worth of euphoria it induces on histrain ride to work, but he knows that this drug also induces memory lapses;and, sure enough, because of the drug he forgets to unlock the back door. He isblameworthy for this forgetting because he could and should have avoided thedrug-taking that induced it. Or suppose that normally Herb and his wife keepboth back and front doors unlocked while they are home, and so what Herbswife tells him is to not lock the back door before he leaves. Again, Herb takesthe drug with the result that, while locking the back door, he fails to recall thatby doing this he will be preventing the furnace from being fixed that day.

Suppose that at t0 S did not know* but should have known* that his actthen would or might bring about the relevant sort of subsequent failure to know*that occurred at t1 (or that the act he omitted at t0 would or might prevent therelevant sort of subsequent failure to know* that occurred at t1). Then the blame-worthiness of this knowledge* failure at t0 must be owing to a fact of just thesame form as was required to make the knowledge* failure at t1 blameworthythat is, a prior blameworthy act (or omission), at t-minus-1 earlier than t0, thatis benighting with respect to the benighted act (or omission) at t0. For exam-ple, before Horace leaves for work his wife tells him to telephone her before hecomes home from work in order to find out whether he needs to do a certainerrand on the way home; before leaving for work (t-minus-1) Horace neglectsto write a reminder to do call his wife in his daily diary, so that as he leaveswork for home (t0) he fails to recall that he should do this, and so on the wayhome (t1) he fails to know* that he should do the errand.

There is thus the possibility of a prior sequence of blameworthy benight-ing acts (or omissions), each member of which leads to a subsequent blame-worthy benighted act (or omission), that eventually comes to the benighted act

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(or omission) at t1. Such a prior sequence cannot, however, go back forever,given that Ss life does not go back forever. The sequence cannot be such thatit has no beginning, such that each member is an act (or omission) that is be-nighted by a preceding benighting act (or omission). It must begin with a blame-worthy act (or omission) that is not benighted, where S knowingly* brings about(or omits to prevent) the harm that consists of a subsequent benighted act (oromission). As Michael Zimmerman (1997, p. 417) says, culpability for igno-rant behavior must be rooted in culpability that involves no ignorance.

V

Lets now take stock. Weve established that, given that the CDO condi-tion is satisfied at t1, what more is necessary for S to be blameworthy for hisharmful act (or omission) at t1 is the following:

(K) either (i) S knew* at t1 that his moving in way M then would or mightbring about (or, in the case of omission, prevent) a harm of sort H, or(ii) S did not then know* this but there is a sequence of one or moreprior acts (or omissions) that ends with the act (or omission) at t1 andis such that (a) each member before this last member benights thesubsequent member, (b) the first (earliest) member of the sequencewas not a benighted act (or omission)at the time S knew* that heract (or omission) would or might lead to the sort of harm it in fact ledto, namely, the benighted act (or omission) that is the next member ofthe sequenceand (c) at the time of each benighted act (or omission)in the sequence S should have known* (was blameworthy for notknowing*) that it would or might lead to the sort of benighted act (oromission) that it in fact led to in the next member of the sequence.

Its time now to consider the case where the CDO condition is not satisfiedat t1 but only at some earlier time t0. That is, at t1 it was not open to S not tomake movement M then (or, in the case of omission, to make M then), but at t0earlier than t1 either (i) S acted in a certain way W such that it was open to S att0 not to act in way W then and, had S not acted in way W then, it would havebeen open to S at t1 not to make M or any other movement then that wouldbring about H (or, in the case of omission, it would have been open to S at t1 tomake M or some other movement that would prevent H), or (ii) S did not at t0act in a certain way W such that it was open to S to act in way W then and, hadS acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not to make M orany other movement then that would bring about H (or, in the case of omission,it would have been open to S at t1 to make M or some other movement thatwould prevent H).

In such cases, which satisfy the CDO condition only earlier than t1, whatmore is necessary for S to be blameworthy for her harmful act (or omission) at

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t1? To answer this we need only apply the K condition formulated above, buttake t0 in such a case to be the time referred to in the K condition as t1, theacting (or omitting to act) in way W at t0 in such a case to be what is desig-nated in the K condition as the harmful act at t1, and the benighted harmful act(or omission) at t1 in such a case to be what is designated in the K condition asthe harmful consequence H of the harmful act (or omission) at t1.

So, for example, Sheldon and his children arrived at the amusement parkat t1; Sheldon was unable at t1 to pay the fee necessary to gain admittance,because at an earlier time t0 he had omitted to put money in his wallet, some-thing he could have done then. Sheldon may still be blameworthy for his omit-ting to pay the admission fee at t1, even though he could not then have doneso. Whether he is, I suggest, depends on whether his omitting to put money inhis wallet satisfies the K condition, with t1 in it taken to be the time of thatomission, moving in way M taken to be whatever movements would have putthe money in his wallet, and the harm H that would have been prevented takento be the subsequent unavoidable failure to pay the entrance fees. And an analo-gous point holds when a prior avoidable omission renders unavoidable a lateraction (rather than omission) and when a prior avoidable action (rather thanomission) renders unavoidable a later omission or action. We simply take t1to be the time of the prior action or omission and that action or omission tobe what satisfies the CDO condition at its time, take its harmful consequenceto be the subsequent unavoidable harmful action or omission, and then applythe K condition to determine whether S is blameworthy for that harmfulconsequence.

We are now in a position to formulate a general statement of a necessarycondition for blameworthiness, which includes the CDO condition and the fur-ther, epistemic requirements that we have been investigating in this paper.

S is blameworthy for bringing about (or failing to prevent) harm H bymoving (or omitting to move) in way M at t1 only if: [the CDO condi-tion] at some time t0, not later than t1, either (i) S acted in a certain wayW such that it was open to S at t0 not to act in way W then and, had Snot acted in way W then, it would have been open to S at t1 not to make(or to make) M or any (some) other movement then that would bring about(prevent) H, or (ii) S did not at t0 act in a certain way W such that it wasopen to S at t0 to act in way W then and, had S acted in way W then, Swould have had it open to her at t1 not to make (or to make) M or any(some) other movement then that would bring about (prevent) H; and [theepistemic condition] either (i) S knew* at t0 that her acting (or omittingto act) in way W would or might bring about (or, in the case of omission,prevent) a harmful act (or omission) of the sort S subsequently commit-ted at t1, or (ii) S did not at t0 know* this but there is a sequence of oneor more acts (or omissions) that ends with the act (or omission) at t0 andis such that (a) each member before this last member benights the sub-

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sequent member, (b) the first (earliest) member of the sequence was not abenighted act (or omission)at the time of it S knew* that it would ormight lead to the sort of harm it in fact led to, namely, the benighted act(or omission) that is the next member of the sequence, and (c) at the timeof each benighted act (or omission) in the sequence S should have known*(was blameworthy for not knowing*) that it would or might lead to thesort of benighted act (or omission) that it in fact led to in the next mem-ber of the sequence.

I venture to suggest that this two-part necessary condition is also sufficient forSs being blameworthy for her harmful act (or omission).

Notes

1. The most well worked out suggestion of this sort that I know of is in Fischer andRavizza 1998.

2. Ive gained much insight on this topic from Holly Smith 1983.3. Actions in this restricted class satisfy part (i) of the more general condition for ac-

tions when t0 5 t1 and acting-in-way-W 5 making-movement-M; and omissions inthis restricted class satisfy part (ii) of the more general condition for omissions whent0 5 t1 and acting-in-way-W 5 making-movement-M.

References

Fischer, John and Ravizza, Mark, 1998, Responsibility and Control, Cambridge University Press.Smith, Holly, 1983, Culpable Ignorance, The Philosophical Review 97, p. 543571.Nagel, Thomas, 1976, Moral Luck, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 50; re-

printed in revised form in Nagel 1979.Nagel, Thomas, 1979, Moral Luck, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press.Rosebury, Brian, 1995, Moral Responsibility and Moral Luck, The Philosophical Review 104,

pp. 499524.Williams, Bernard, 1976, Moral Luck, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. 50;

reprinted in revised form in Williams 1981.Williams, Bernard, 1981, Moral Luck, in Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press.Zimmerman, Michael J., 1997, Moral Responsibility and Ignorance, Ethics 107, pp. 410 426.

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