Gilgit Baltistan A Battleground For A Future War

By Dr Shabir Choudhry

01 April, 2011Countercurrents.org

http://www.countercurrents.org/choudhry010411.htm

Gilgit Baltistan A Battleground For A Future War

By Dr Shabir Choudhry

01 April, 2011Countercurrents.org

Speech of Dr Shabir Choudhry in a Seminar held in House of Commons (the British Parliament) organised by The Democracy Forum on 31 March 2011.

Madam Chair, friends and colleagues Aslamo Alaykam and good afternoon. I am grateful to The Democracy Forum for arranging this seminar and for providing me this opportunity to express my views on this important topic.

I was once asked to speak on a topic of Mangla Dam upraising. This dam was built in Mirpur, Pakistani Administered Kashmir in 1967, to cater for power and water needs of Pakistan. After failing to build Kalabagh Dam in Pakistan, Pakistani authorities decided to upraise the Mangla Dam. In my speech I explained why Pakistan was upraising this dam and what its implications were.

After the speech one man said, ‘Your entire speech was against Pakistan and you have not said a single word against India’. I said to him, the topic was upraising of the Mangla Dam and Pakistani government was responsible for that, how could I drag India into this debate. But the man insisted that I should have, somehow, criticised India otherwise people would regard you pro India and anti Pakistan.

Unfortunately, over the years a political culture has been established that one has to overlook what Pakistani governments have done to the Kashmiris and continue to do so, but should actively and forcefully criticise India; in order to get a ‘certificate’ of being loyal to the cause of people of Jammu and Kashmir.

The topic of this seminar is Gilgit Baltistan, a region which is legally part of former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir; and which is illegally occupied by Pakistan. I don’t know how to criticise India for what Pakistan and China are doing in Gilgit Baltistan.

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Perhaps, I can criticise India for having a contradictory policy on Gilgit Baltistan; and for remaining a silent spectator over the plight of people of this region who are oppressed and deprived of fundamental human rights.

Madam Chair

Areas of Gilgit Baltistan have great strategic importance; and are also full of natural resources. Because of the strategic importance, these areas were very shrewdly separated from the rest of the State. Some parts of this region were leased by the British in 1935 to keep watch on advance of the Soviet Russia. Before the end of the British Raj, these areas were returned to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir; but the British ensured that these areas didn’t get in to wrong hands.

William Alexander Brown, known as Major Brown played an important role in Gilgit Rebellion, and ensured that these areas remain under control of Pakistan. Major Brown must have done something worthwhile that he was awarded MBE by the British government; and a medal from Pakistan known as Star of Pakistan.

Let us briefly look at the role of Major Brown.

· He was born on 22 December 1922 and came to India in December 1941;

· He became an officer of Frontier Force Regiment which was later converted to Gilgit Scouts in 1943.

· He served Gilgit Scouts for 3 years and also learnt Pashto and Sheena languages;

· He was appointed Assistant Political Agent for Chilas;

· Between 1946 and July 1947 he served as an officer in Tochi Scouts and Chitral Scouts;

Because of his good rapport with the Gilgit Scouts, knowledge of the region and importance of these areas he was made a Commander of Gilgit Scouts on 29th July 1947; He was an employee of the Jammu and Kashmir government up till 1st November 1947 when the Gilgit Rebellion took place.

Colonel Bacon who was a Political Agent of Gilgit met Major Brown and told him that Lord Mountbatten has decided to return areas of Gilgit Baltistan to the Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir on 1st August 1947. It was possible that the Maharaja could have appointed his own man as a head of Gilgit Scouts, but the British wanted to ensure that their trusted man is in control of the Gilgit Scouts – the only military force in the region.

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Major Brown in his book ‘The Gilgit Rebellion’ notes, and I quote: ‘All Gilgit wanted was the peace and security afforded under the Pax Britanica and the method by which this could have been continued, despite partition, would have been to have made the Gilgit Agency an agency of the North West Frontier Province, directly under HE Governor. This would have ensured continuity in administration, peace, security, and unity: unfertile ground for Soviet seed. My duty was obvious. I must return to Gilgit and lead, advise and help the people over the transition period.’ Unquote

Source: Independence of Gilgit Baltistan, by Ghulam Rasool, page 122

So one can see his mission was clear. Although he was an employee of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir but his loyalty was not with him. On 30th July 1947 Briagdier Gansara Singh as a Governor of the area and accompanied by General Scott and Captain Saeed Durani reached Gilgit by air. A large crowed consisting of army officials, Gilgit Scouts, rulers of different regions and other notables welcome them.

Major Brown very quickly re-established his contacts with all important rulers of different regions and officers of the Gilgit Scouts, some of them were his personal friends and trusted colleagues. He also strengthened communal sentiments within the Gilgit Scouts, Jammu and Kashmir Army and among the ruling elite. In his book, The Kashmir Rebellion, Major Brown writes an account of a meeting with a son of Ruler of Nager, Raja Muzaffar Ul Din Shah who said, and I quote:

‘If Kashmir remains independent, well and good. We shall be independent here but we can also keep friendliest relationship with our brothers in Pakistan. If Kashmir accedes to Pakistan even better. But if the Maharaja through pig – headedness, bad advice, political pressure or attractive remuneration accedes to Hindustan, then there will be trouble here.’ Unquote

Raja Muzaffar Ul Din Shah further advises Major Brown, as to how he should handle the Gilgit Scouts – the only local armed force in the event of Kashmir joining India, because some units of the Gilgit Scouts were unpredictable and 6th Battalion of the Kashmir Infantry stationed at Bunji ‘would soon put an end to an insurrection of any sort.’

Major Brown also secretly won over support of some Muslim officers of the Maharaja army, which included Captain Hassan, Captain Saeed Durani, Captain Mohammed Khan and Lieutenant Ghulam Haider. One night during a drink session Captain Saeed and Captain Mohammed Khan said: ‘the Maharaja should remain independent, but if he joins India then as a true Muslims he will resign from the Kashmir Army.

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The last straw was Major Brown’s disagreement over some administrative issue with Governor’s staff that came from Srinagar. The Governor sided with his staff; and Major Brown got extremely angry and locked himself up in a room to analyse the situation and plan his future action. In his book, The Gilgit Rebellion, Major Brown writes, and I quote:

‘I, therefore, felt it was my duty, as the only Britisher left, to follow a course which would prevent this. And further, as a liberal member of the world’s paragon of democracy, I considered that the whole of Kashmir, including Gilgit Province, unquestionably go to Pakistan in view of the fact that the population was predominantly Muslim. Partisan, traitor, revolutionary, I may have been, but that evening my sentiments dictated that if the Maharaja acceded to India, then I would forego all the allegiance to him and I would not rest content until I had done the utmost in my power to ensure that not only the Gilgit Province joined Pakistan, but the whole of Kashmir also.’ Unquote

Source: Independence of Gilgit Baltistan, by Ghulam Rasool, page 13

On 30th October 1947, Colonel Bacon, after his farewell party gave briefing to Major Brown, and concluded: “I give the Kashmir Administration three months in Gilgit. Then something will happen.”

Source: Independence of Gilgit Baltistan, by Ghulam Rasool, page 124

That something happened as predicted or planned; and sequence of events is very important in this. The Pakistani government, which included the British officials on key posts, hoped that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir would join Pakistan, but once they realised that the Maharaja was not prepared to accede to Pakistan they managed the Tribal Invasion.

· Pakistani officials violated the Standstill Agreement with the Maharaja and the Tribal Invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October 1947;

· Realising threat to his throne and his people, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir asked India for help;

· Indian government asked the Maharaja to accede to India, which he did under pressure;

· The accession was provisionally accepted and the Indian forces landed in Srinagar on the morning of 27th October.

During all this time nothing happened in Gilgit Baltistan. Those who didn’t want Kashmir to become a part of India, or at least, Gilgit Baltistan to go to India, planned the tribal invasion hoping that they will have strategically important areas of the State under their control.

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The plan didn’t work because the Tribesmen wasted 3 valuable days in Baramullah looting, raping women and celebrating their success. If they had proceeded to Srinagar they could have easily captured the capital before the arrival of the Indian troops, as there was no one to defend the city.

After the ‘Provisional accession’ on 26th October the Indian forces reached Srinagar on the morning of 27th October; but those who planned and controlled the tribal invasion did not do anything in Gilgit Baltistan because they hoped that Srinagar would be captured. Once they realised that the tribesmen were only good against the civilians, and they quickly retreated after encountering the Indian army, they gave a green signal to Major Brown and the much talked the Gilgit Rebellion took place on 1st of November 1947.

This region, as we all know, is legally part of former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has ruled this region with an iron fist and deprived people of their fundamental rights. Pakistan has virtually annexed these areas.

Role of China

Madam Chair

Kashmir National Party sent a delegation to Pakistani Administered Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan to find out what was going on there. During our visit, we conducted a sample survey and have compiled a report on the visit, copies of which are available here.

It was reconfirmed that the people of Gilgit Baltistan were not happy with the rule of Pakistan. They were treated like colonised people; and their resources were looted and plundered; and in this regard government of China is also helping Pakistan.

Government of Pakistan and their proxies are trying to make China a part of the Kashmir Dispute. To me and my colleagues this is very dangerous move and could endanger peace and stability of Gilgit Baltistan and South Asia.

Some pro Pakistan Kashmiris claim that China is already a part of the Kashmir dispute, because China made some suggestions for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute in 1948. This is ridiculous argument. Many countries have, one way or the other, supported resolutions on Kashmir or opposed them; does that mean they are all part of the Kashmir dispute?

Apart from that China of 1948 is different to the China of today. Republic Of China joined the UN in October 1945; and under Article 23, became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. But in October 1949 the Communist Chinese took over China and informed the UN on 18 November 1949.

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The Communists ruled China as Peoples Republic of China, but they were not a member of the UN. However, the Republic Of China was relocated to Taiwan and enjoyed all the powers as the Permanent Member of the Security Council.

The present day China, which holds a veto power in the Security Council and has a large army in Gilgit Baltistan became a member of the UN in October 1971. So we can see that China and the people who made some suggestions about the resolution of Kashmir have no role in the Kashmir dispute.

I acknowledge we have one of the best Polo grounds in Gilgit Baltistan and people like to play and watch Polo matches, but believe me Chinese are not there to play Polo game. Their game is very dangerous and needs to be understood.

In the past danger to these areas and the Indian Sub continent was from the Russians; and now that danger is from China. It is unfortunate that this time government of Pakistan is very keen to provide helping hand to the Chinese to have a foothold in this region; which could be extremely disastrous to Gilgit Baltistan and South Asia. Pakistani government is playing this dangerous game, as they face instability and a bleak future. Pakistani governments want to ensure that if they go down, then these areas are taken over by China, and India or another power doesn’t step in.

For this purpose they want to make China a party to the Kashmir dispute, but they need to understand that if China becomes a party to the dispute they will also be a party to resolution of the Kashmir dispute; and that will create enormous problems for Gilgit Baltistan and the region.

China has its own agenda, not only related to Gilgit Baltistan but it goes far beyond the shores of Gawadar; and this is where China and India could be in direct competition with each other for markets and energy resources. This cold war or competition could attract other players in the region; and our region could become a battleground for a future war with disastrous consequences for Gilgit Baltistan and the entire region.

India wants to use Chabhar port of Iran, which is only 44 miles away from Gawadar Port, to have access to markets of Central Asia; and for this purpose they have completed 200 Kilo Meters of road in Afghanistan province of Nimroz, which will reduce its dependence on trucking goods through Pakistan.

What people of Gilgit Baltistan say?

Madam Chair, as pointed above we conducted a sample survey in Gilgit Baltistan and Pakistani Administered Kashmir during our visit; and found the views of the people quite interesting. We have published a complete report including the survey and it is available for the people to take away. However, I produce

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answers to 2 questions, which will give you an indication what is included in the report.

Q8.Who would you vote for, if there was an internationally arranged referendum with no threat of intimidation or coercion, and you were given only two options either to join India or Pakistan?

A. 45% said they will vote for Pakistan

B. 30% said they will boycott it

C. 15% said they will decide on the day

D. 10% said they will vote for India as they have seen what Pakistan is like

Q9. And if a Third Option of an independent Jammu and Kashmir is also included then who would you vote?

A. 60% said they will vote for the Third option of independence

B. 30% said they will vote for Pakistan

C. 10% said they will vote for India

Madam Chair, in conclusion, I want to say that those forces which planned the Tribal Invasion and the Gilgit Rebellion to cut off these areas from the rest of the State are back in action. This time their game plan is different. They want to drag in China and other powers in Gilgit Baltistan which will create enormous problems for the people of Gilgit Baltistan and the entire South Asia.

Madam Chair

I thank you for your patience.

http://www.vifindia.org/article/2012/february/22/The-Game-in-Gilgit-Baltistan

‘The Game’ in Gilgit-Baltistan

Maj. Gen (retd) Umong Sethi

According to some observers, “The significance of the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) in terms of geo-strategy only seems to be rising given the fluidity of strategic equations in South Asia”.1 The Chinese ‘strategic patience’, Indian ‘reticence’, Pakistani ‘opportunism’, political ‘activism’ of the indigenous people of the area and economic ‘imperatives’ abetted by

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‘relative decline and dysfunctional politics’ of the ‘super powers of yesteryears’ define the current geo-political scenario in the area. A strategic design is unfolding that has great implications for the region and indeed the world.

Situated between the mountain ranges of Hindu Kush, Karakoram and Western Himalayas, Gilgit-Baltistan lies at the confluence of Central Asia, China and South Asia. It borders Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan; Xinjiang Province of China, Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. Its geography offers the advantage of being the vital hub for trans-region exchanges. Predictably, Pakistan and China, have exploited the importance of this region to further their geo-strategic and economic objectives while India has watched from the side-lines assessing the magnitude and impact.

The 1949 ceasefire line resulted in the division of J&K with Pakistan gaining control over approximately 85,793 sq km of area. The government of Pakistan illegally ceded a large part of territory of the Shaksgam Valley measuring 5,180 sq km to China in 1963. Pakistan administered region of J&K was subsequently divided in 1970 into two administrative zones: Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Federally Administered Northern Regions.

Covering a total area of 74,600 sq km, the Gilgit-Baltistan Region is administratively divided in two divisions of Gilgit and Baltistan. The Gilgit Division is divided into five districts, namely, Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Astore, and Hunza Nagar; and the Baltistan Division has two districts of Skardu and Ghanchi under its administrative control.

Gilgit-Baltistan is home to more than one million people who belong to Balti, Shin, Burushu, Khowar and Wakhi ethnicity. They consider themselves different from predominant Pakistani groups and share strong cultural links with the Tibetans, Kashmiris, Tajiks, Uighurs and Mongols. Ethnically and linguistically, the people of Baltistan are related to the Ladakhis while the people of Gilgit, Chitral and Kashmir are Dardic, who speak related languages.

Gilgit-Baltistan is a resource rich region where uranium, copper, gems and gold are found in abundance; and glaciated water bodies cover a catchment area equal to the size of South Carolina. 2

The long-standing and continuing political alienation of Gilgit-Baltistan has been the prime cause for discontent among the local populace of Northern Areas. In a bid to resolve the politico-constitutional gridlock, Pakistan's federal government unanimously approved and passed the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Ordinance in 2009 as a replacement of the Northern Areas’ Legal Framework Order 1994. It was a façade to grant autonomy to the Northern Areas through a Presidential decree. The move has under-addressed the anxiety of the people of the Northern Areas. The move will impact Pakistan’s stand on the

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wider Jammu and Kashmir dispute with India. Pakistan has always emphasized on ‘resolving the J&K dispute according to the wishes of the people of J&K’, making unilateral transformation of the politico-legal status of the Northern Areas amounts to implicit change in oft proclaimed stand. Complete silence on the part of the international community and India on the issuegives the impression that the LOC has been accepted as fait accompli and Pakistan sovereign right over Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas is implicitly accepted.3

This development acted as a precursor to much increase in on-going Chinese involvement in Gilgit-Baltistan. The Chinese investments and involvement in infrastructure development project have seen a steady increase over the last few years. It is interesting that both the countries have remained evasive and non-committal while explaining ever-increasing Chinese presence in GB and POK. It is believed in some quarters that Chinese are following an aggressive expansionist approach to step forward and secure their interests of protecting vulnerable Muslim minorities against ‘Jihadi’ influence, promoting economic interests and jockeying to be the major power in the region.

Viewed from the stand point of Pakistan in the strategic context, both Kashmir and Afghanistan remain the pieces of the same puzzle. The Chinese recent forays both in Afghanistan and Gilgit-Baltistan may be explained as endeavours to fill in the vacuum likely to be caused by the projected US-NATO withdrawal, to seek a broad spectrum protection from the consequences of a beleaguered Pakistan and to challenge India’s influence in the region.

Investing billions of dollars in various infrastructure and other projects in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of PoK involving several thousand Chinese personnel belonging the People's Liberation Army (PLA) have caused much suspicion and uneasiness both among the indigenous people and the strategic community. There have been reports of protests and clashes in Hunza and other places between locals protesting against the ‘stealing of jobs’ by the Chinese. 4

China's Western Highway, also known as the Lhasa-Kashgar Highway connects Xinjiang to Tibet. From Quilanaldi, the road branches off to the Khunjerab Pass and, subsequently, becomes the Karakoram Highway right up to Gilgit. The 1,300 km long Karakoram Highway remains the only all-weather road linking Gilgit-Baltistan with the rest of Pakistan. Upgrading the Karakoram Highway is of critical significance to China, since this region offers Beijing a window to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

It has been reported that as per a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in June 2006 between China and Pakistan, the Karakoram Highway is being widened from 10 metres to 30 metres — resulting in its operational capacity going up threefold catering for heavy vehicular movement. In July 2010, during the visit of Pakistan's President Zardari to China, MoUs with China were signed

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for Karakoram Highway Project Phase-2 that includes widening the Jaglot-Skardu road to be completed by end of 2012.

The infrastructure investment announced by Beijing includes construction of a railway link with Pakistan. The proposed railroad will connect the town of Havelian in Abbottabad district in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the Khunjerab Pass. Chinese are thus involved in a huge infrastructure development exercise in Gilgit-Baltistan and PPOK involving construction of expressway, tunnels, railways, several dams, telecommunication facilities, industrial zones in Gilgit and Muzaffarabad, bridges, developing mines etc. China possibly shares the responsibility with Pakistan to manage the telecommunication system of GB. So by implication the Chinese control over the telecommunication and transportation network in an indirect manner may be complete already. 4

With the reported considerable presence of PLA in POK and Gilgit-Baltistan, the garb of undertaking developmental activities and protection duties, has serious implications for India. Not only the capability of Pakistan Army to create mischief in J &K stands considerably enhanced, in case of a crisis or a conflict situation, it allows the Chinese to exploit the Western flank in conjunction with its military operations from East against Ladakh and J&K.

From the strategic perspective, the Chinese "development projects" in Gilgit-Baltistan are a reflection of pursuance of an aggressive engagement of the Afghanistan, Pakistan, PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan region to alter the geo-strategic equations and to expand her sphere of influence in South Asia and Afghanistan. This should be seen as a part of a design to marginalise India taking advantage of her focus on internal consolidation and growth as well as hesitation to step out and assume a leadership role in the strategic milieu.

A major consequence of China extending its reach into Gilgit-Baltistan and POK is that the J &K dispute has become more complex which is likely to complicate any potential long-term resolution of Jammu and Kashmir.

According to Mumtaz Khan, director for the International Centre of Peace and Democracy in Toronto, “Many Western analysts who view China's stance merely as a bargaining chip against India will unfortunately soon realize that China is redefining its priorities and interests in South Asia and beyond. The current involvement of China in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan administered Kashmir consists of more than just providing military and diplomatic support to Pakistan. Soon, Pakistan will swap its role to take the backseat as China exerts itself as a major player in the Kashmir issue.” 5

While addressing a Seminar held in House of Commons, Dr Shabir Choudhry said, “It is unfortunate that this time government of Pakistan is very keen to provide helping hand to the Chinese to have a foothold in this region; which could be extremely disastrous to Gilgit Baltistan and South Asia. Pakistani government

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is playing this dangerous game, as they face instability and a bleak future. Pakistani government wants to ensure that if they go down, then these areas are taken over by China, and India or another power doesn’t step in.” 6

Chinese expansionist moves to ‘economically engage the periphery’ and guard her core interest need to be viewed by India as attempts to reduce her influence in the neighbourhood. Indian polity needs to take matured and measured steps to secure her future ambitions. While taking appropriate steps to protect herself, India needs to ensure that the boundary question with China does not get enlarged and attempts at making her become a party to the Kashmir dispute is not allowed. The good will and the advantage of being ‘a step away’ India enjoys in Afghanistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, Central and South East Asia should be leveraged to counter any attempts to limit her to the sub-continent.

References

1. Monika Chansoria in Guardian http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/gilgit-baltistan

2. Testimony of Senge Sering, Institute for Gilgit Baltistan Studies (IGBS) before the ‘Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission’, United States Congress July 26, 2011

3. Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment Ordinance: A Change in Nomenclature Only by Madhavi in the Trajectory.http://thetrajectory.com/blogs

4. Senge Hasnan Sering, the director of the Gilgit Baltistan National Congress In an interview to Ramananda Sengupta. http://www.sify.com/news/Pakistan-China-must-leave-Gilgit-Baltistan-imag...

5. ‘Gilgit Baltistan a battleground for a future war.’ Speech of Dr Shabir Choudhry in a Seminar held in House of Commons (the British Parliament) organised by The Democracy Forum on 31 March 2011.

http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/gilgit-baltistan-is-of-immense-geo-strategic-significance

Gilgit-Baltistan is of immense geo-strategic significance

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A woman stands in queue to cast her vote during an election of the Legislative

Assembly for Northern Areas in Gilgit-Baltistan on 12 November 2009.

REUTERS

he significance of the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir

(PoK) in terms of geo-strategy only seems to be rising given the fluidity of

strategic equations in South Asia. Beginning with Pakistan's first war with India

over Kashmir in 1947, wherein the ceasefire of 1949 resulted in Islamabad

illegally taking over a portion of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

The area of J&K under the control of Pakistan sizes up to approximately 85,793

sq km and was further divided in 1970 into two separate administrative divisions,

namely, Mirpur-Muzaffarabad (commonly referred to as Azad Jammu and

Kashmir, AJK, by Pakistan) and the Federally Administered Gilgit-Baltistan.

Being the northernmost part of PoK, Gilgit-Baltistan was earlier referred to as the

"Northern Areas" in Pakistan. Thereafter, the government of Pakistan illegally

ceded a huge portion of territory of the Shaksgam Valley of PoK, worth 5,180 sq

km to China in a border agreement of 1963. It needs to be noted here that all this

while, the erstwhile Gilgit Agency constitutes and remains an integral part of the

undivided princely state of J&K, which rightfully belongs to India.

Situated between the Hindu Kush and Karakoram Range of mountains in the

north and western Himalayas in the south, the geo-strategic placement of Gilgit-

Baltistan makes it ever more significant for Pakistan. The region borders

Pakistan's Dir, Swat, Kohistan and Kaghan districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in

the west, the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan in its northwest, Xinjiang Province

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of China to its east and northeast, Azad Jammu and Kashmir under control of

Pakistan to the southwest, and a 480 km-long Line of Control (LoC) running

alongside India in the southeast. Covering a total area of 74,600 sq km, the

Gilgit-Baltistan region is administratively divided in two divisions of Gilgit and

Baltistan respectively.

The Gilgit division, in turn has further been divided into five districts, namely,

Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Astore, and Hunza Nagar; and the Baltistan division holds

two districts of Skardu and Ghanchi under it.

Gilgit-Baltistan is home to an unusual intersection of Asia's massive landmass,

as it connects parts of West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia and China. The

economic linkages and benefits established through this region are visible

especially in reference to nations including China, Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

The region provides for a passage to the critical trading routes stretching from

West Asia and Africa through to China.

In order to access the mineral and energy-rich markets of Central Asian countries

including Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Gilgit-Baltistan has

established itself as a focal point. It is only natural that Pakistan and for that

matter, even China, have underscored the consequence of this steep corridor to

further their geo-strategic objectives in the region.

China's western highway, known as the Lhasa-Kashgar or Xinjiang Highway

connects Xinjiang to Tibet, by linking Kashgar and Lhasa (3,105 km). From

Quilanaldi, the road branches off to the Khunjerab Pass and, subsequently,

becomes the Karakoram Highway right up to Gilgit. Owing to the high altitude

and the vagaries of climate, the 1,300 km-long Karakoram Highway took nearly

two decades to be completed.

Comprehending the long-term importance of the highway, the Pakistan Highway

Administration and China's state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration

Commission (SASAC) signed an agreement in 2006 to upgrade and widen the

width of the highway from 10 to 30 metres. However, what perhaps can be

termed as Beijing and Islamabad's grand design, to be realised by a joint

consortium of Pakistan and Chinese Railways is the proposed Karakoram Rail

Corridor. The reported linkage will be provided by the Khunjerab Pass in the

Karakoram Range through a 700 km rail corridor. This corridor shall link Kashgar

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in Xinjiang to Havelian (adjoining Abbottabad) near Rawalpindi in northern

Pakistan.

n order to curtail the continuing revolts against political suppression and

long-standing alienation, the Pakistan government granted what it termed as

"self-rule" to the Northern Areas in August 2009. Pakistan approved the "Gilgit-

Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order" which makes way for

provisions for an elected Legislative Assembly and elected government.

However, the Ordinance has failed to bring about any legitimate political reform

to a region which has no politico-constitutional status or fundamental rights.

Although, currently Pakistan seems focused to enhance and benefit from the

geo-strategic placing of Gilgit-Baltistan, it might just be a matter of time when the

region's political subjugation shall become its Achilles' heel.

This is the first part of a continuing series focusing on various politico-strategic facets of the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir

http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/gilgit-baltistan-governance-is-about-political-subjugation

GEOPOLITICS

MONIKA CHANSORIAwww.sunday-guardian.com/profile/monika-chansoriaDr. Monika Chansoria is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, where she heads the China-study project.

Gilgit-Baltistan governance is about political subjugation

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A natural dam caused by a landslide is seen in Attaabad village in Hunza district of northern Pakistan’s Gilgit Baltistan in May last year. REUTERS

he long-standing and continuing political alienation of Gilgit-Baltistan has

been the prime cause for growing discontent among the local populace in this

Federally Administered region (formerly referred to as Northern Areas) of

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In an apparent bid to resolve the politico-

constitutional impasse of the region, Pakistan's federal government unanimously

approved and passed the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance

Ordinance in 2009.

This ad hoc ordinance promulgated by President Asif Ali Zardari paved way for

alterations in terms of nomenclature, with Northern Areas being referred to as

Gilgit-Baltistan in the future. The Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC) was

replaced by the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA), the region's elected

legislature, with no tangible powers at hand. The Council, whose chairman is the

Prime Minister of Pakistan and members are appointees of the government wield

the real authority. While the "self-governance reforms package" announced the

grant of "full internal political autonomy" to the region, it lacked parliamentary

backing. Although provision for a local administration headed by a Chief Minister

has been made, both the Chief Minister and the Legislative Assembly essentially

essay the role of being rubber stamps. Besides, the executive authority continues

to rest with the federal agencies — in form of the governor of Gilgit-Baltistan,

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appointed by the President of Pakistan, based on the advice of the Prime

Minister.

More significantly, the ordinance has failed to resolve the politico-constitutional

stalemate of the region. It needs to be recalled here that Pakistan's Supreme

Court declared Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the former state of Jammu & Kashmir

and not a part of Pakistan. Later, in September 1994, the Supreme Court held

that since the Gilgit-Baltistan region was not part of Pakistan, the judicial matters

pertaining to it were considered to be outside the purview of the Pakistani courts.

This resulted in people belonging to Gilgit-Baltistan being denied the right to

appeal or for that matter, even access to Pakistan's apex court. The new judicial

structure has created chief courts; however, the decision of appointing judges

continues to rest with the chairman of the Council, i.e., the Prime Minister of

Pakistan. This has led to a palpable sense of cynicism among the native

population vis-à-vis denial of their fundamental right to seek justice.

In fact, the constitutional deadlock of the region seems to be becoming

interminable, with Pakistan's Constitution too, not including the formerly known

Northern Areas as part of Pakistan. The population of Gilgit-Baltistan does not

possess voting rights during the national and provincial elections in Pakistan, and

resultantly has no representation in Pakistan's National Assembly or even the

Council of Ministers.

It needs to be mentioned here that until 1994, Gilgit-Baltistan did not even have

an elected assembly or municipal body. It was in the same year that former

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto promulgated the Northern Areas Governance

Order. This was rechristened as the Legal Framework Order in 2007 by former

President Pervez Musharraf. The ordinances in question here essentially remain

ad hoc in nature, not provided for with any constitutional cover.

Governance in Gilgit-Baltistan has failed to offer a sense of belonging to the local

population, rather, it only mirrors political subjugation. There is a serious paucity

in terms of employment opportunities, with more than half the region's population

living below the poverty line. The locals require an exit permit for moving out of

the area, coupled with a ban on indigenous languages and scripts of Gilgit-

Baltistan in the educational institutions, branding them as profane. Following

construction of the Karakoram Highway in 1978, Pakistan had set up a customs

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post at Sost, south of the Khunjerab Pass leading from China. The local

population sternly resented this move and adopted the slogan "no taxation

without representation".

he 2009 ordinance appears to be Islamabad's latest administrative hammer to buttress its control over the strategic hotspot. During the process of drafting the ordinance, inputs from the local population were not invited. Rejection of basic and fundamental socio-political rights and modicum of actual political authority has accumulated over a period of time and has given rise to acute sectarian strife in the region.

Revamped "self-governance" submitted by Pakistan for Gilgit-Baltistan cannot

serve as an alternative political panacea unless issues such as constitutional

abandonment and political non-representation are addressed by Pakistan's

decision-making elite. Only by virtue of providing a protective layer to the ethnic

and religious composition of the region, shall true self-governance achieve

meaning.

This is the second part of a continuing series focusing on various politico-strategic facets of the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-makes-its-presence-felt-in-pak-occupied-kashmir

China makes its presence felt in Pak occupied Kashmir

The Karakoram Highway in Gulmet village. REUTERS

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hina's shrill objections over India's oil exploration project in the

Vietnamese columns of the South China Sea remain in stark contrast to it being

coy and non-committal while explaining its ever-increasing presence in Pakistan

occupied Kashmir (PoK). Since the past few years, Chinese strategy vis-à-vis

PoK appears to be heading toward gaining tacit control of the region — both

militarily and politico-diplomatically.

By increasing investments and sponsoring various "development projects" in the

Gilgit-Baltistan region of PoK, the activities involving several thousand Chinese

personnel belonging to the construction corps of the People's Liberation Army

(PLA) seem to point towards an expansionist Chinese geo-strategic agenda in

the region.

China's Western Highway, also known as the Lhasa-Kashgar/Xinjiang Highway

connects Xinjiang to Tibet. From Quilanaldi, the road branches off to the

Khunjerab Pass and, subsequently, becomes the Karakoram Highway right up to

Gilgit. The significance of the Karakoram Highway lies in the fact that it cuts

through the zone between Asia and the Indian subcontinent, wherein China,

Tajikistan, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan come within 250 km of each other.

The 1,300 km long Karakoram Highway remains the only all-weather road linking

Gilgit-Baltistan with the rest of Pakistan, besides connecting China and Pakistan

at an altitude of 4,693 metres, through the Khunjerab Pass. Upgrading the

Karakoram Highway is of critical significance to China, since this region offers

Beijing a window to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

According to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in June 2006

between China's state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration

Commission and the National Highway Authority (NHA) of Pakistan, the

Karakoram Highway is being widened from 10 metres to 30 metres — resulting in

its operational capacity going up threefold, accustomed for military/heavy

vehicular movement in extreme weather conditions. Subsequently, in July 2010,

during the visit of Pakistan's President, Asif Ali Zardari to China, NHA signed

MoUs with China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) for the Karakoram

Highway Project Phase-2, connecting Thakot Bridge to Sazin and widening the

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Jaglot-Skardu road. The repair and upgrade of the highway is slated for

completion in 2012.

It was only recently that China's State Council released guidelines to further

augment the Kashgar and Korgas economic development zones located in

western and southern Xinjiang, which borders Pakistan. The infrastructure

investment announced by Beijing includes construction of a railway link with

Pakistan. Acknowledging the decision of the State Council, Pakistan's

ambassador to China, Masood Khan, underscored the 411-mile-long railroad,

which will connect the town of Havelian in Abbottabad district in Pakistan's

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the Khunjerab Pass.

With the reported stationing of a unit of PLA soldiers near the Khunjerab Pass

and Chinese military officials frequenting the Field Command Office of Gilgit,

which happens to be Pakistan's military headquarter in the region, a pervasive

Chinese intent of establishing a military edge in India's northern sector cannot be

negated. Amidst growing pressure following a report published in the New York

Times last year, regarding Chinese military presence in Gilgit-Baltistan, Beijing

issued a very disinclined and delayed response. The discomforting part of the

entire exercise was when the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu,

declined to issue a "categorical denial" over PLA troop presence in the region.

Instead, Jiang chose to comment on the larger dimension of "attempts being

made by a few" to fabricate stories so as to jeopardise China-Pakistan or China-

India relations.

The Chinese-sponsored "development projects" in Gilgit-Baltistan render the

strategic calculus of the region as being far more precarious. That China is

pursuing an aggressive engagement strategy in the region, cannot be more

apparent. What perhaps is of greater consequence is Beijing's aspiration of

expanding and buttressing its reach, which is only likely to complicate any

potential long-term resolution of Jammu and Kashmir. By issuing stapled visas to

Indian passport holders from Jammu and Kashmir, rather than stamping the

visas on their passports, Beijing's crass move is aimed at questioning the status

of J&K vis-à-vis the Indian Union, thereby providing diplomatic support to

Pakistan unambiguously.

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he political leadership in China is quick to interpret any movement in and

around its areas of "core interest" as an attempt to contain (ezhi), what it

interprets as, China's "peaceful rise". However, the approach is diametrically

opposite while explaining wily strategies put in place by Beijing in so far as

dealing with significant regional challengers is concerned. Notwithstanding the

debate surrounding the actual number of Chinese PLA soldiers present in PoK,

the fact of the matter remains that Beijing has firmly perched itself in PoK

alongside the 772 km long Line-of-Control between India and Pakistan.

This is the third part of a continuing series focusing on various politico-strategic

facets of the Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-is-expanding-its-footprint-in-afghanistan

Afghan National Army soldiers take part in a training exercise at the Kabul Military Training Centre in Kabul on Friday.

China's policy in Afghanistan could be described as one wherein it has sought to,

and to a large extent, managed to, secure substantial gains primarily at the

expense of the security cover provided by the ISAF/NATO allies. As opposed to

the ISAF and NATO forces, China has chosen to assume a minimalistic role in

the security sector, refusing to get involved in direct military operations. Given

China's refusal to contribute troops or monetarily assist military operations in

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Afghanistan, there is considerable umbrage in the West with Beijing getting hold

of lucrative investment deals whose continued development rests with the

security cover provided by the ISAF.

Chinese involvement in Afghanistan was negligible through the 20th century.

However, with Beijing's growing appetite for energy and natural resources, and

consequent opening up of Afghanistan's energy, mineral and raw materials to

foreign investors, an escalatory pattern in the graph of Sino-Afghan ties has been

established in the past decade. From being among the first few nations to

establish official ties with the Karzai administration and the Afghan Transitional

Authority post 2001, China has emerged as Afghanistan's single-largest foreign

investor garnering practical advantages. Although Chinese investments in

Afghanistan have ignited considerable debate, it needs to be underlined that in

the span of the past eight years, the total foreign aid granted by Beijing to

Afghanistan is rather petite at $200 million. This constitutes a minuscule fraction

of its global foreign aid that amounts to approximately $25 billion.

The Chinese are likely to harvest maximum benefits by concentrating in the

economic investment sector. China is fast seizing a substantial share of

Afghanistan's natural resources with the China Metallurgical Group Corp., Jiangxi

Copper Corporation, and Zijin Mining Group Company winning a joint bid worth

$3.5 billion meant to develop what's touted to be the largest undeveloped copper

field in the world.

The Aynak copper field situated in the Logar province in central-east Afghanistan

became the largest foreign direct investment in the history of Afghanistan,

although marred by reports of corruption and bribery. According to estimates, the

28-square-kilometre Aynak copper field could contain up to $88 billion worth of

ore in addition to other vital copper fields situated in Jawkhar and Darband in the

relatively stable northern and northwestern regions.

Moreover, Afghanistan is home to large iron ore deposits stretching across Herat

and the Panjsher Valley, and gold reserves in the northern provinces of

Badakshan, Takhar and Ghazni. Employment opportunities for the Afghans has

received a boost with the Chinese investment projects by virtue of electricity-

generation projects for mining and extractions and a freight railroad passing from

western China through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan.

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Afghanistan's Minister for Mines, Wahidullah Shahrani, recently declared that

following the upcoming Hajigak project, a two billion-tonne deposit of high-grade

iron ore in the central province of Bamiyan, Afghanistan will likely put three

copper, two gold deposits and a massive oil basin in Mazar-e-Sharif up for

tender. Envisioning Afghanistan as a secure channel for roads and energy

pipelines, China would likely be eyeing the unexplored Afghan oil reserves now

standing at 1,596 million barrels, and natural gas reserves placed at 15,687

trillion cubic feet.

Based on these facts, Beijing's placement in Kabul's strategic calculus and vice-

versa comes across lucidly. The present Chinese leadership has placed greater

emphasis on the Western Development Strategy and the ongoing and upcoming

projects in Afghanistan supplement Beijing's plans for the development of

western China and its regional trade links. With America putting to plan its

decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, China would be weighing its

options vis-à-vis its consequent role/strategy in Afghanistan, given its discomfort

with long-term American presence in the region.

However, post the US' withdrawal, a plausible scenario of the Taliban capturing

areas such as Kandahar cannot be negated altogether, resultantly hampering

Chinese plans for an energy and commodities passage through South Asia. In

order to secure its western front by providing limited training to the Afghan police

forces and mine-clearing teams, Beijing eventually seeks a safer border along its

restive Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. China has circumspectly aimed at

projecting itself as a responsible player on the international stage to bolster its

global ambitions. Going by this argument, the Afghan case provides a test for

Beijing to play a far more crucial and balanced role as a regional player which

simply does not limit/concentrate upon economic benefits, but also contributes

towards the overall socio-political stability in the war-torn nation.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/sunday-edition/sundayagenda/cover-story-agenda/31873-no-end-to-himalayan-rivalry.html

No end to Himalayan rivalry

SATURDAY, 31 DECEMBER 2011 20:18

MONIKA CHANSORIA

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The year 2012 marks the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian war, which at one stroke led to the demise of the idealistic Nehruvian foreign policy. How did it happen? What were the lessons learnt — or not learnt? Should we be ready for another war with China?

 The remnants of the India-China war, fought in October 1962, have left an indelible impression on the Indian psyche as we enter the 50th year of that war. Shattering a myriad of myths and leaving room for nothing but guarded suspicion for the People’s Republic of China, the war saw the Chinese troops launching a full-blown attack in sectors of India’s northwest and northeast — the Ladakh sector and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), which is present-day Arunachal Pradesh. By means of launching calibrated punitive strikes in both these sectors, Beijing handed over to Delhi its worst defeat ever.

China attacked India due to several unconcealed as well as covert reasons. Relations between Beijing and New Delhi had taken the downward spiral — set off by the Dalai Lama fleeing to India following a failed uprising in Tibet in March 1959. This, in fact, has been indicated in a document of China’s premier military research institute, Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, which states that Tibet was an important factor leading to the 1962 war.

More importantly, the evolving regional geostrategic permutations, with Mao Tse-tung and Nikita Khrushchev going on a collision course by early 1959, need to be kept in mind. Transcripts of the Mao-Khrushchev summit illustrate sharp exchanges between the Soviets and the Chinese over the Sino-Indian border conflict. Beijing accused Khrushchev of siding with Delhi against a communist ally and tried to convince the Soviet leader that it was India which had initiated the attack first. Rebuffing the Chinese position, Khrushchev responded, “Do you really want us to approve of your conflict with India? It would be stupid on our part.”

Khrushchev believed that by instigating a war against India, the Chinese had a larger game plan — to sabotage the Soviets’ détente with the United States. Beijing’s  grievance against the Soviets in general, and Khrushchev in particular, became lucid when on November 7, 1962, at the sixth national foreign affairs working meet, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu alleged that the Soviet attitude on the Sino-Indian border dispute was pro-Delhi.

It is essential to understand Mao’s foreign policy which allowed a pivotal place for “revolution”. He never really distinguished foreign policy from China’s internal political policy-making dynamic. His select writings mirror this statement as he constantly analysed the “current situation” so as to classify the tasks for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), both internally and externally.

From Mao’s viewpoint, the 1962 war was proposed with a larger aim of preventing a Soviet-infused fundamental change in the global political agenda. As 1961 drew to an end, a meeting of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) was convened in which Mao took charge of the “struggle with India” under

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his personal control. The objective was not a local victory, but to inflict a defeat so crushing that India might be “knocked back to the negotiating table”, as Mao asserted.

Ancient Chinese military strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu advocated that all warfare is based on deception. This was demonstrated amply by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during his negotiations with India. The Indian political ruling elite was convinced during the decade preceding 1962 that having woven China into the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, New Delhi had managed to craft a China policy which envisioned a simultaneous emergence for both. Conversely, the Chinese appeared to have had other plans. The debacle in the 1962 war was the result of a failure of India’s strategic vision and military capabilities. For that matter, the decision not to use combat air power proved to be a severe error of judgement, further adding to India’s woes. The events of 1962 led to an inquiry that ultimately came out in the form of the Henderson Brooks Report in 1963; this report has not been declassified till date.

 CONSTRAINED COOPERATION

Today, as we enter the 50th year of the Sino-Indian war, which uncovered gaping lacunae in India’s defence preparedness and strategic priorities, the conditions are far-off from being congenial, with the arrangement being that of “constrained cooperation”.

While on the face of it, India and China have in place a cordial bilateral relationship with burgeoning economic cooperation (which is heavily tilted in Beijing’s favour), deep down wide fissures threaten to upstage the relationship. Given that till date there is no mutually agreed upon Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries, sporadic incidents of border transgressions appear to be a covert Chinese strategy of asserting its claims in the Western Sector, especially in north-eastern Ladakh. Similarly, in the Eastern Sector too, the LAC is not physically demarcated on the ground, including that on military maps. India is faced with a two-lane highway built by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to drive up to the border in this sector.

The tiring 14 rounds of talks between Special Representatives of India and China to resolve the boundary dispute have failed to provide any tangible breakthrough. The Chinese reluctance, or for that matter refusal, to show its version of the LAC points towards a larger ploy of progressively building up a case of its claims over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. India needs to maintain a vigilant posture in the backdrop of Beijing’s ongoing military modernisation campaign. Chinese claims of a ‘peaceful rise’ are only meant for public consumption. Its actions on ground, including the Chinese inroads in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood, aim to counter Delhi and assert maritime dominance in the northern Indian Ocean, thus painting a contrary picture to those claims.

Increased Chinese deployments in and around the Tibet Autonomous Region bordering India reportedly include placing of advanced Dong Feng-21 medium-range ballistic missiles, coupled with plans to shift airborne forces at short notice

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to the region. These developments echo China’s long-term military and strategic motives, in which Beijing is keeping a wide array of options available, including that of military coercion. The objective is to press for politico-diplomatic advantage as it stands to resolve impending disputes in its favour while bargaining from a position of strength.

Chinese decision-making has always sought to retain the initiative, and the politico-military intensity displayed by China in the past few years through its decision-making elite and state-controlled media only seems to conform to the above intent. This brings to attention the definitive shift in Beijing’s Kashmir policy. The Middle Kingdom chooses to remain non-committal when it comes to explaining its position vis-à-vis the nuclear arming of Pakistan and the influx of Chinese soldiers in the disputed territory of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). In an apparent bid to gain tacit control of the region — both militarily and diplomatically — Beijing has exponentially increased its investment and sponsorship of various ‘development projects’ in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of PoK. The projects involve several thousand Chinese troops belonging to the construction corps of the PLA, providing a whiff of an expansionist Chinese geostrategic agenda in the region. Besides, by issuing stapled visas to Indian passport holders from Jammu & Kashmir, Beijing aims at questioning the status of the State vis-à-vis the Indian Union, thereby providing diplomatic support to Pakistan’s position on the issue.

Managing the LAC is an immediate requirement. After all, India’s land border with China stretches to 3,488 km, displaying complex topography, high-altitude climate and affiliated logistic difficulties. At this stage, China holds the benefit of heights, easier acclimatisation and capabilities for rapid build-up of forces along the border — thus ensuring a smooth chain of supply and supplementing its power projection capacity in the region.

India needs to invest heavily in developing border infrastructure, especially roads of operational significance alongside the Sino-Indian border. With as many as 73 all-weather roads identified for construction along the LAC with China, only 15 (covering approximately 600 km) have been completed so far. Effective border management is the instant prerequisite to prevent/counter Chinese intrusions. For this, the country needs to put in place synergised border management operations that include intelligence-sharing, patrolling, joint-operational training and alert.

In the long-term, if it is prudence that drives India’s current policy of accentuating economic engagement and collaboration with China, would it not be equally circumspect for our decision-making elite to accord highest priority to political realism in so far as dealing with Beijing is concerned? After all, economic convergence cannot take the liberty of putting at risk issues pertaining to national interest and security.

The 21st century is likely to witness China as a primary variable that would determine trends in international politics. With an ever-growing appetite for a

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major chunk of the regional geostrategic pie, changing trends in Beijing’s politico-diplomatic and military strategy merit close scrutiny and apposite responses.

-- The writer is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/China-Checkmating-India-in-Afghanistan.html

China: Checkmating India in Afghanistan By B RamanIssue: Net Edition | Date: 18 September, 2011

China has shown interest in the construction of two railway lines—-one in Pakistan via the Gilgit-Baltistan region and the other in Afghanistan. While the railway line through Gilgit-Baltistan, ultimately extending up to Gwadar on the Mekran coast, will meet the external trade requirements of Chinese-controlled Xinjiang and other regions of Western China, the proposed line in Afghanistan will meet the requirements of a copper mine which China is developing in the Aynak area in Afghanistan.

The total value of the Chinese investment in the copper mine alone will be almost three times the total value of the Indian investments in all projects in Afghanistan.

A pre-feasibility study by a Chinese company has already been done in respect of the railway line through Gilgit-Baltistan and an agreement was reached during the visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China in July to undertake a joint feasibility study by the railways of the two countries. In Afghanistan a joint feasibility study is to be undertaken by the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), which is developing the copper mine, and the Ministry of Mines of the Government of Afghanistan.

On September 22,2010, representatives of the Afghan Ministry of Mines and the MCC signed at Kabul an agreement to undertake the feasibility study. The MCC has, however, cautioned that a final decision on the construction of the railway line would depend on the security situation in Afghanistan. If the security situation deteriorated, the MCC may not go ahead with the proposal. While the Chinese do not anticipate any security problem in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they do anticipate problems in Afghanistan.

Till now, the Taliban has not come in the way of the development of the copper mine. But, in January last, the Taliban kidnapped two Chinese road construction workers. One does not know what happened to them. Probably, the Chinese got them back after secretly paying a ransom.

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Chinese enterprises have hired many armed security guards and tightened security measures to ensure safety for Chinese employees there.

The Chinese Communist Party-controlled “ Global Times” wrote on January 19 last as follows: “The situation in war-torn Afghanistan is deteriorating as Taliban gunmen and suicide bombers attacked buildings across the heart of Kabul , killing at least five people and claiming that they had kidnapped two Chinese engineers working in the country. The kidnappings indicate that China must prepare to cope with crimes targeting overseas Chinese citizens as the country’s presence expands worldwide, especially in some trouble spots, experts say. The engineers, who had been helping to build a road, were seized in the northern province of Faryab with four Afghans.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the abductions. A spokesman of the militia said that a Taliban Islamic court would decide their fate. ….The Taliban’s demands for the latest kidnapping are not clear. Reuters reported that the Taliban often kidnap foreigners as part of their campaign against coalition forces, but abductions have also become a lucrative business for criminal gangs and rival tribes.

A Chinese observer with years of experience working in Afghanistan told the Global Times that Chinese nationals had not been specifically targeted by the Taliban and the kidnapping may be in response to growing Chinese economic interests in the neighboring country. “Chinese enterprises have hired many armed security guards and tightened security measures to ensure safety for Chinese employees there,” said the source, who asked to remain anonymous. “However, potential threats cannot be eliminated amid such a chaotic situation in the country.” As China builds up its interests in Afghanistan, it faces a dilemma, the observer suggested. “Western nations raised their voice to call on China to offer military assistance.

The Chinese policy in Afghanistan has two objectives—-to enhance its strategic presence and influence and to checkmate the Indian strategic presence and influence.

Afghanistan is a thorny issue for the US. It might be one for China in the future,” he warned. Afghan Minister for Mines Muhammad Ibrahim Adel told the Daily Telegraph in November that China has a growing role in the country. He said Chinese projects are likely to triple the Afghan government’s revenues within five years. China Metallurgical Group and China’s top integrated copper producer, Jiangxi Copper Corporation, in July started work in Logar, a province southeast of Kabul, to explore and develop the vast Aynak copper mines. The $4 billion investment was the biggest in Afghanistan’s history and provided thousands of Afghans with jobs.”

A question worrying the Chinese is whether the Taliban, which has close relations with the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET), will honour the

27

agreements signed by the Hamid Karzai Government with China if it comes to power after the withdrawal of the US-led NATO troops. The Chinese are hoping that the Pakistan Government would persuade the Taliban to honour the agreements.

It has been stated that the railway line proposal is to connect China with Uzbekistan through Kabul and Aynak, which is to the south of Kabul. It is not clear wherefrom the proposed line will enter Afghanistan from China. The construction of the line, which is unlikely to start for another three years, might require the stationing of troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Afghanistan to protect the Chinese construction personnel. It is not clear how this could affect the functioning of Indian-aided projects in Afghanistan.

Speaking on the occasion of the signing of the agreement on the feasibility study, Mr.Zou Jianhui, President of the MCC, is reported to have stated as follows: . “We are still at an early stage. This feasibility study will take two, or two-and-a-half years. If over this period the Afghan security situation gets more stable, and the feasibility study results are good, then we can move ahead with the investment immediately. If the security situation gets worse, then at that time the investors will have to assess how to go forward. The MCC has to ensure the security of investors’ assets, but felt the project would help Afghanistan’s stability and economic development, and is keen to push ahead.”

The Chinese are hoping that the Pakistan Government would persuade the Taliban to honour the agreements.

According to the Reuter’s news agency, a commitment to building the railway was included in a contract that the MCC won in 2008 to develop the Aynak copper deposit. China’s top integrated copper producer Jiangxi Copper has a 25 per cent share holding in the project and the MCC the remaining 75 per cent. The two firms started construction of the project in July last year and expect it to produce 320,000 tonnes of copper concentrate annually, with production to begin in 2013 or 2014.

In his address to the London Conference on Afghanistan held in the last week of January,2010, Mr.Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, said that since 2002, China has provided more than 900 million RMB yuan (132 million U.S. dollars) in grants to the Afghan Government and canceled all its mature debts. China announced in 2009 that an additional 75 million U.S.dollars in concessional loans which it had previously committed would also be converted into grants, to be provided over a five-year period. The first instalment of 15 million dollars was given in 2009.The remaining 60 million U.S. dollars will be made available in the coming four years.

By the end of 2009, China had trained over 500 Afghan government officials in areas such as diplomacy, economy and trade, medical and health care, finance, tourism, agriculture and counternarcotics. On August 16,2009, Mr.Karzai

28

inaugurated at Kabul a 350-bed hospital called the Republic Hospital costing US Dollars 25 million constructed by the Chinese.

The US, which has strongly opposed any Indian role in training the ANA, has no such objection to a Chinese role.

Since 2002, President Hamid Karzai has visited China four times. He paid his fourth visit in March last, accompanied by 20 businessmen. Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly told Mr. Karzai in their meeting that China would continuously provide aid to Afghanistan and pledged to enhance security and economic cooperation. In a joint statement issued at the end of the visit, China reiterated its support for peaceful reconstruction in Afghanistan. The two countries also agreed to expand economic cooperation and trade, increase mutual investment and technology transfer, and deepen cooperation in areas of transportation, agriculture and irrigation, energy, mining and infrastructure.

During the visit, Mr.Karzai and President Hu Jintao witnessed the signing of three documents on economic and technological cooperation, favorable tariffs for Afghan exports to China and bilateral training programs. The two way trade between the two countries reached 155 million US dollars in 2008.

The total value of the Chinese investment in the copper mine alone will be almost three times the total value of the Indian investments in all projects in Afghanistan. Pakistan, which has been repeatedly expressing concern over the Indian role in helping the Karzai Government, welcomes the Chinese role and would like it to increase further. It even wants the Chinese to join in training the Afghan National Army. The US, which has strongly opposed any Indian role in training the ANA, has no such objection to a Chinese role. But, Beijing itself, despite prodding from the US, is reluctant. It wants to see how the ground situation develops. It does not want to incur the wrath of the Taliban by any major role in training the ANA despite Pakistani assurances that there would be no retaliation from the Taliban.

Addressing a meeting at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington DC on September 20, Mr.James Steinberg, the US Deputy Secretary of State, reportedly said that China could play a role in bringing stability to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Indian role in Afghanistan—-yes, but. Chinese role in Afghanistan—yes, absolutely. That is the policy of the Obama Administration. The Chinese policy in Afghanistan has two objectives—-to enhance its strategic presence and influence and to checkmate the Indian strategic presence and influence. The US support for the Chinese policy will be to the detriment of India.

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About the author

B Raman is presently Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai & former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat. He is also the author of The Kaoboys of R&AW, Mumbai 26/11,Terrorism: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow, Intelligence: Past, Present & Future   and A Terrorist State as a Frontline Ally .

http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=103439

Chinese mega projects in PakistanM a l i k M A s h r a f

China has played a significant role in the economic progress of Pakistan ever since the establishment of diplomatic ties between them. The first major initiative in this regard was the setting up of Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila; a project of immense importance that nudged the process of industrial development in Pakistan and continues to contribute to the overall progress of the country in a big way. The construction of KKH Highway, termed as the eighth wonder of the world not only laid the foundation for an infallible and eternal friendship between the two neighbours but also generated tremendous economic activity in Gilgit-Baltistan besides boosting trade between the two countries. 

Currently China is working on a plan for the up-gradation of KKH at an approximate cost of $500 million and in building 165 Km Jaglot-Skardu and 135 KM Thakot-Sazin roads in Gilgit-Baltistan at a cost of Rs.45 billion. China would pay 85% of the cost while Pakistan will contribute 15%. A rail link between the two countries is also envisaged to be built. Besides these monumental projects, China is also helping Pakistan to tide over the energy crisis. Currently the Chinese are working on 15 mega projects in the energy sector in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. A very significant project in hand is the upraising of the Mangla Dam reservoir by sixty feet. As part of resettlement of the dam affectees, the Chinese firm, International Water and Electric Corporation ( CIW&EC) is also working on the construction of a bridge over Jhelum river in the same area. Another very vital project is Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Power Project which aims at diversion of the water of Neelum river through a tunnel into Jhelum river, at a cost of US$12.6 billion. 

The Chinese are also entrusted with the responsibility to commission Kohala Power Project at a cost of US$ 2.155 billion with a capacity to generate 1050 MW of electricity. China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation is constructing Diamir-

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Bhasha Dam on the Indus river with a total investment of US$ 12.6 billion. In addition to these undertakings the Chinese firms are also working on six other mega power projects in Gilgit-Baltistan that include : US$7.8 billion Dasu Hydropower Project, US$ 70 million Phandar Project, US$ 40.01 million Bashu Hydropower Project, US$ 44.608 million Harpo Hydropower Project and US$ 6 billion Yulbo Hydropower Project. China is also investing an amount of US$ 300 million in housing, communication sectors. The Indians are very wary of Chinese involvement in development projects in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir and view it as a calculated move to build Chinese influence in these areas, a charge vehemently dismissed by China. China is also helping Pakistan in the nuclear power sector. A nuclear power plant at Chashma with a power generating capacity of 330 MW of electricity has already been completed and integrated with the National Grid recently and two more similar plants are scheduled to be completed by 2016-17. The agreement for these projects was signed on June 8, 2010 during President Zardari’s visit to China, notwithstanding the fact that US raised objections on the nuclear cooperation between the two countries. The Chinese brushed aside the apprehensions on this account by informing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) during its meeting at Christchurch, of its decision to build Chashma IV and V in Pakistan. In the backdrop of US-India agreement for cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear technology, which Pakistan views as a discriminatory act, the Chinese help assumes a great significance and reflects the strength of friendship between the two countries. These two plants are part of the PAEC programme to generate 8800 MW of nuclear power for the country to supplement other sources of power generation. An arrangement for soft Chinese loan to fund the construction has also been inked. The participation of China in exploiting copper reserves at Sandak and the development of Gawadar Port in Balochistan, though not liked by some regional and international powers, are undertakings of immense economic benefit to the people of the province and the overall development of Pakistan. 

The trade between the two countries has also been expanding. China is the fifth largest source for Pakistani imports. The bilateral trade between the two countries touched US $7 billion mark in 2008.Under a five year programme lunched in 2006 this volume is proposed to be enhanced to $ 15 billion by 2012. In the past few years, the Chinese have made an investment of US$ 1.3 billion in Pakistan. A number of Chinese companies are working in the oil and gas, IT, Telecom, Engineering, and mining sectors.

As is evident, China has made an unfathomable contribution to the economic progress of Pakistan and with the completion of the new ventures, especially in the energy sector, Pakistan can rightly aspire for an era of sustainable economic growth in the country. It is an irrefutable reality that relations between Pakistan and China have been growing from strength to strength irrespective of who was in power in Pakistan. However the exponential expansion in these relations during the present regime reflects a marked departure from our perennial

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propensity to look up to the West, particularly US for our security and economic progress. 

The enhanced economic, political and strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan will contribute immensely to warding off the lurking dangers and consolidating the gains of the efforts made for changing the economic situations of the people of both the countries. This renewed and vigorous engagement between the two countries is an encouraging development as it will greatly benefit Pakistan by re-invigorating commercial and industrial activities and creating new jobs. This might also restore the confidence of the international community in Pakistan as a safe place to invest.

http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-05/20/content_22605398_2.htm

The Pakistan-China strategic partnership

By Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan

China.org.cn, May 20, 2011

Pakistan and China share a rare unanimity of views on regional and international issues and the two countries enjoy a robust relationship in the defence, political and diplomatic fields. However, the extent of relationship in these areas is not reflected in economic and commercial ties.

Realizing the need to expand trade and economic relations, the two countries have taken initiatives to promote cooperation through investment and joint projects. As a result, economic cooperation between Pakistan and China has shown spectacular progress during the last 10-15 years. Between 2000 and 2010 the volume of bilateral trade grew sevenfold. The two sides plan to increase trade to $10 billion within five years. But that is still far below the potential figure. Currently Chinese companies are working on 250 projects in Pakistan. Some of these are mega projects jointly undertaken by Pakistan and China, including the Thar coal project, the Bhasha Dam, the widening of Karakoram Highway, the Gwader deep sea port and the Saindak gold and copper project.

During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's recent visit to Pakistan, he was accompanied by 260 Chinese business executives. During the visit the two sides concluded deals worth $35 billion. The agreements covered the energy sector, bilateral trade, exploration of natural resources and development of the agriculture, livestock, finance and banking sectors. An important achievement of Premier Wen's visit was the signing of a MoU between China's Three Gorges Corporation and Pakistan's Alternative Energy Development Board for a joint venture on wind power and solar energy projects. The Joint Statement issued at the end of Premier Wen's visit talked of the determination to "enhance their

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strategic coordination, advance pragmatic cooperation and work together to meet challenges in pursuit of common development."

One of the most significant signals of long term strategic partnership is the Gwader deep sea port built with Chinese technical and financial help. Gwader lies at the mouth of the Persian Gulf – the source of 40 percent of the world's oil. The port will allow China to secure oil and gas supplies from the Persian Gulf and project its power in the Indian Ocean. China has financed 80 percent of the $300 million cost, and is also funding the construction of a rail-road network connecting China with the port through Central Asia and Pakistan, turning Pakistan into an energy and trade corridor for China. The oil and gas supply line through Pakistan is a safer, shorter and cheaper alternative route to the Malacca Straits, which is vulnerable to attacks by pirates and passes through a region dominated by the United States. The importance of Gwader for China can be gauged from the fact that China is the largest consumer of oil after the United States. Its consumption is expected to double by 2025 with 70 percent coming from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Gwader offers the closest access point to these regions for China. Gwader will provide an overland energy corridor to the western Chinese region of Xinjiang, shortening the journey by 12000 miles. The route will also bring substantial benefits to Pakistan, making it one of the region's largest energy players. According to one estimate, Pakistan will be earning $60 billion a year in transit fees in 20 years time.

There is vast potential for deepening the Pakistan-China strategic partnership. The current trends in relations show a greater focus on promoting cultural exchanges, people-to-people contacts, and expanding trade and investment ties and economic cooperation. This will, in turn, further strengthen the security and defence links between the two countries, which are a firm guarantee for peace and security in the region.

Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan is a professor and chairman of the Department of International Relations/Political Science and also dean, Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences and Law, University of Sargodha-Pakistan.

http://japanfocus.org/-kenneth-pomeranz/3195

http://gmediacenter.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=128:gilgit-baltistan-paradise-on-fire&catid=55:asia&Itemid=98

Gilgit Baltistan: Paradise on Fire

Written by ZAFAR IQBAL Sat, 14 Apr 2012 19:43

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Recent spate of target killings in Gilgit Baltistan (GB) has caused a great political instability and sectarian unrest in this volatile region which is surrounded by three countries---including two major powers--- Afghanistan, China and India. Its distinctive geo-strategic context builds the possibilities of wider regional implications of major internal occurrences. Consequently, fresh outbreak of murder of innocent civilians has exacerbated various social, political and religious processes in Gilgit Baltistan society.

Religious gaps

Contrary to rest of the Sunni-dominated country, Shias are in majority in the GB where Pakistani establishment has been accused of the denial of legitimate rights of this vast majority by imposing pro-Sunnis policies and practises. For instance, Shias has been forced to study the Sunni syllabus, which has caused violent clashes in January 2005. [i]

Like rest of the country, Shias has been a soft target for unprovoked bloodshed. In 1988, hundreds of Shias were killed in Giligit by thousands of armed Sunni invaders from Khyber Pakthunkhwa. It is widely believed that the killers had support of General Zia’s regime. [ii]

Sadly, the successive democratic governments could not stop the target killing of the Shias. Even after the 28 February, 2012 Khostan massacre in which 18 Shia passengers were killed on the KaraKoram Highway (KKH), agitators of banned sectarian organisations continue to propagate hate messages and slogans like “Sunni Raj in a Sunni state” and “Shia Kafir”.[iii] In a series of incidents, dozens of people, mostly Shias, have been killed or wounded and their properties are burnt.

Yet 2009 partial autonomy, which gave more powers to the region, has not curtailed the religious hostilities. Disproportionate power sharing on the higher in present PPP -led government level has been considered a bone of contention between the both sects. It is believed that due to the possession of key administrative and political posts by the Shias due to their overwhelming majority in the population, Sunni minority feels somewhat left out or unheard in the mainstream structure.

Today, suspicions or lack of trust for the other sector rivals prevail in neighbourhood communities where frightened Shias and Sunnis are disinclined to enter ‘others’ territories.

Ejaz Karim, a student, describes his wariness about the changing social fabric:

“There are ‘no-go-areas’ for both communities. You cannot go to the Sunni area, if you are a Shia and you cannot go to the Shia area, if you are a Sunni.” In this

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situation, both communities have started their own transport system in various parts as they feel insecure to travel in an area dominant by the fanatical followers of other sect.[iv]

Similar sectarian segregations are common in other civic amenities like markets, hospitals, educational institutes and so on. Above all, it is the only place in the country where prisoners are locked on the sectarian affiliations.[v] Senseless extremism and counter vengeance worries citizens who predict more bloodshed, if authorities fail to respond swiftly.

Socio-economic marginalization

Socio-economic deprivation is another key factor to expand the religious and sectarian rifts in the area. The GB is the poorest and highly marginalized region of Pakistan where the average household income is $0.50 per capital per day.[vi] As 85 per cent of the population do not have access to safe drinking water, 60 per cent of inhabitants rely on water from open channels where water contamination is 500 times higher than WHO standards. As a consequence, poor water and sanitation takes 50 percent of all deaths of children between 1 and 5 years of age.[vii]

Economically, tourism has been a major contributor of local livelihood, however, terrorism wave in the country and representation of Pakistan troubled Khabyer Pakthun Khwa (KPK) in international media as ‘Northern Pakistan’, which equates with the former name of the GB region has devastatingly damaged the local tourism industry.[viii] Unemployment has increased alarmingly. In the GB 70% of the population is under 25 years of age and 70 per cent suffer from under/unemployment.[ix]

Public sector job recruitment process is compromised on sectarian and party affiliation basis and few available positions are mostly occupied by influential elite, consequently, poor and marginalized sections suffer from alienation and gross discrimination. There have been various controversial recruitments in higher judiciary and government departments.[x]

Recalling historical bonds 

The incidents of brutal murder of blameless and innocent people in the GB have triggered sentiments of alienation among public vis -a -vis their socio-economic links with Islamabad. Demands of local population for resumption of bus service between Sakrdu and Kargil and other travel and trade linkages with the adjoining areas under Indian and Pakistani control has attained massive support from different segments of society.

The demand of alternate routes has been forwarded by people due to a highly

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insecure travel all along the KKH. Growing sense of insecurity has made locals to avoid travel on the KKH, which is the only road connection between Pakistan and China and remains as the lifeline of the area.[xi]

Over 5,000 passengers per day travel on the KKH to reach capital city Islamabad to perform their routine matters.[xii] Before the partition of India in 1947 the region was connected with Ladakh and other adjourning regions with land routes. The division of Indian subcontinent between India and Pakistan ceased these routes for ever.

The 1947 Partition also divided a large number of families in Gilgit Baltistan, Kargil, Laddakh and adjacent areas. For decades chances of reopening of such historical routes remained blurred because of long-lasting animosity between Pakistan and India which controlled the regions.

However, ongoing- India Pakistan peace process and starting of Intra-Kashmir trade and travel arrangements and reunion of divided Kashmiris over Line of Control (LoC) have raised the hopes of divided Ladakhis and other separated families in the GB.

The Kohastan massacre has resulted into obvious unwillingness to travel on the KKH that has underscored significance of reopening traditional routes of the region. In a string of demonstrations people of the region have urged India and Pakistan to re-open Astore-Srinagar, Chorbat-Nubra, Sham-Skardo, Drass-Gultari and Kharmang-Kargil routes to reunite them with Kargil and other areas in Indian administered Kashmir.

Articulation for identity 

Growing call for re-configuration of political identity of the region is another key factor behind on-going public anger. This emerging voice has stunned Pakistani establishment which believed that 2009 Self Rule will recompense the grievances of the people; however, the reinstatement of State Subject Rule (SSR) is unanimous demand of the local agitators.

The SSR is the law that protected the local demographic composition till in the 1970s when Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto abrogated it to encourage settlements and property allotments of outsiders.[xiii] The abolition of the SSR in the GB has caused worse demographic change from local ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural perspectives.

China factor 

Mounting Chinese geo-strategic influence in Giligit Baltistan is another cause of instability not only for neighbouring India but for people of the territory as well. As

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Islamabad- Shanghai cooperation is increasing, bilateral trade between China and Pakistan has increased 28 per cent[xiv] in the past year to approximately $10. 8 billion compared with US $ 8.7 billion in 2010.[xv]

Currently China is working on a Karakoram Highway (KKH) Improvement Project at an approximate cost of $500 million and 18 mega projects in the energy and mining sectors in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistani controlled Kashmir.[xvi]

Chinese firms have been accused of ill-treating and exploiting local workers or ignoring indigenous populations. Therefore, presence of alleged 4,000-7000 Chinese troops/workers in Gilgit Baltistan and Pakistan’s consideration of leasing the GB to China for the next fifty years have also estranged public and deepen the sensitivities of the region.[xvii]

Conclusion 

No doubt, the repercussions of these developments are wide ranging not only for India, Pakistan and China but also for the people of the area. Pakistani establishment should address the legitimate concerns of the people immediately. And the composition of political, legal, administrative and constitutional arrangements of the region should be aligned with the aspirations of the general public, otherwise simmering instability and violence will continue.References: 

[i] Samer et al (2011) The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education, UNISCO, France, page 169

[ii] Haroon, A (2012) Why not Kohistan? (Online) available at:http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-98790-Why-not-Kohistan

[iii] Kharal , A (2012 ) ASWJ calls for protest against 'curriculum change' in Gilgit-Baltistan(Online) available at:http://tribune.com.pk/story/349396/aswj-calls-for-protest-against-curriculum-change-in-gilgit-baltistan/

[iv] Daily Pamir Times, Gigilgit, 4 and 5: the routes to sectarian divisions and disharmony (online) available at:http://pamirtimes.net/2012/03/31/4-and-5-the-routes-to-sectarian-divisions-and-disharmony/

[v] Daily Mahasib(Urdu) Gilgit, April 1, 2012

[vi] United Nations Development Group (2012) MDG-7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability (online) available at:http://mdgpolicynet.undg.org/ext/MDG-Good-Practices/mdg7/MDG7C_Pakistan_Water_and_Sanitation_Extension_Programme(WASEP).pdf

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[vii] Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) (2011) Supporting the next generation of leaders in Pakistan (online) available at:http://www.akfc.ca/fr/images/stories/files/SupportingTheNextGenOfLeadersInPakistan_FINAL.pdf

[viii] Nawaz et al. (1211), “Impact of Terrorism on Tourist Industry: a point to ponder”, International Journal of Academic Research, (Vol. 3. No. 4. , I Part )

[ix] Ibid,2012

[x] Mir, S (2012) Chief judge’s appointment: Baltistan bar terms decision illegal(online) available at:http://tribune.com.pk/story/339876/chief-judges-appointment-baltistan-bar-terms-decision-illegal/

[xi] Parwana, H.(2012) Skardu Kargil road :Tear down the Berlin Wall of Asia (online) available at :http://kashmirwatch.com/opinions.php/2012/03/27/skardu-kargil-road-tear-down-the-berlin-wall-of-asia.html

[xii] Parwana, H. (2012) The Joyride to Death in Pakistan (online) available at:http://www.expertclick.com/NewsReleaseWire/The_Joyride_to_Death_in_Pakistan,201239821.aspx

[xiii] Singh, P. ( 2012 ) Gilgit Baltistan: Neither ‘in’ Pakistan Nor ‘of’ it? (Online) available at:http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/GilgitBaltistanNeitherinPakistanNorofit_psingh_060212

[xiv] Geoffrey F. Gresh (2012 ) Russia, China, and stabilizing South Asia (Online) available at:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/12/russia_china_and_stabilizing_south_asia

[xv] Pakistan-China trade reaches US $ 10.6 billion mark; Pak exports register 23% growth; total volume US $ 2.12 billion (Online) available at:http://www.pakbj.com/more_media.php?cont=%2033[xvi] Malik M Ashraf (2012) Chinese mega projects in Pakistan (online) available at:http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=103439

[xvii] Ojuland, K (2012) The dangerous presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan (online) available at :http://www.neurope.eu/blog/dangerous-presence-chinese-troops-gilgit-baltistan  

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Photo courtesy: Daily Pamir Times

Zafar Iqbal is a freelance writer and campaigner. He writes on political, environmental and geo-strategic dimensions of contemporary South Asia. He could be accessed via : www.pressforpeace.org.uk Copy right  http://www.viewpointonline.net/gilgit-baltistan-paradise-on-fire.html

http://www.neurope.eu/blog/dangerous-presence-chinese-troops-gilgit-baltistan

The dangerous presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit-BaltistanFEBRUARY 21, 2012 - 10:22AM

China has been deploying troops in the area of Gilgit-Baltistan for quite some time. In October 2011, the Indian Army Chief General V K Singh had mentioned the unease created by the presence of thousands of Chinese soldiers in the area. Some 4,000 Chinese were known to be in Gilgit-Baltistan - this number included the troops of People’s Liberation Army of China.

Indian Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne had also raised the same issue in an interview saying that China’s increasing presence in Pakistan Administered Kashmir warrants India’s attention. New Delhi has been voicing concerns over China’s presence and activities in Gilgit-Baltistan, quite frequently. Especially, since last year, when about 11,000 Chinese troops were reported to be in the Azad Kashmir region.

China’s deployment of troops in a highly contentious region of Pakistan and India is a worrisome factor not only for India but for the world at large. Gilgit-Baltistan region is festering with revolt against the Pakistani rule and the direct involvement of Beijing in this issue makes any hopes for future negotiations or understanding between India and Pakistan, all the more tenuous. It can only contribute to creating more distrust and unease between the two nations, which have historically been suspicious of each other’s moves.

China’s cooperation with Pakistan is nothing new, Pakistan literally handed over slice of Jammu and Kashmir to China on a silver platter and China had supported the 1970s Pakistani attempts to acquire the nuclear capabilities. There have been numerous other exchanges and reciprocal moves by both China and Pakistan, but, the presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit-Baltistan should indicate a worrying alliance. It is an alliance that has the potential of threatening the stability of the region.

In the words of the Director for the International Center of Peace and Democracy, Mr. Mumtaz Khan in Toronto, “The current involvement of China in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan administered Kashmir consists of more than just providing

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military and diplomatic support to Pakistan. Soon, Pakistan will swap its role to take the backseat as China exerts itself as a major player in the Kashmir issue"

China’s intentions are not hard to fathom. In the opinion of New York Times "China wants a grip on the strategic area to assure unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan," Beijing wants a corridor from Chinese province of Xinjiang to the Indian Ocean. It has already cast the corner stone by constructing the Gwadar Port, which is a deep sea, warm-water port in Balochistan province of Pakistan at the mouth of the Persian Gulf and at the height of the Arabian Sea. It is close to the shipping routes that are used by the mainline vessels and enjoys high strategic and commercial significance.

The Chinese soldiers are apparently working on the infrastructure of the region and there are reports that China is plotting the construction of a high speed rail system, bridges and roads, as well as, near about twenty four tunnels. Gilgit-Baltistan area is closed to foreign observers and news cannot be obtained freely. It can only be gathered through intelligence information or satellite imagery, which shows construction activities taking place throughout the region.

The presence of Chinese soldiers is also supposed to have a deterring effect on possible disturbances to Pakistani rule by the local population, which is seething with rebellion against the Pakistani government.

The presence of Chinese troops on the Gilgit-Baltistan region also gives rise to the question that since Pakistan has always objected to the presence of US troops on its soil then why is it so happy with the presence of Chinese soldiers.

Both China and Pakistan have territorial disputes with India. The total population of China and India constitutes about forty percent of the world population. Both countries are striving for strategic supremacy. China is establishing a foothold in a very volatile area. It probably has designs on gaining a strategic stronghold in the trade as well as the geopolitics in the Central Asia, as well as, Indian Ocean Region. But, there is a lot at stake here, what is not visible right now may be that China is also using its presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area as a deterrent to India’s opposition to its territorial claims to border areas with China.

Whatever the intentions may be on both China and Pakistan side but one thing is pretty clear - there is CLEAR and PRESENT danger in the entire situation.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Kristiina Ojuland MEPKristiina Ojuland was Estonia foreign minister from 2002-2005. In June 2004, she ran for the post of secretary-general of the Council of Europe but was defeated.

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She is a member of the Estonian Reform Party and since 2009 has served as one of the six Estonian MEPs in the European Parliament.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-98790-Why-not- Opinion Why not Kohistan?  Ayesha HaroonWednesday, March 21, 2012 After the article on social media was printed, a reader asked: Why did the Maya Khan issue result in action but not the Kohistan and Mastung killings, despite social media crying hoarse about them? Why, indeed? We protest the horrible civilian killings by a US soldier in Afghanistan and continue to follow the news: what will the US government charge him with, how will the case unfold, etc. So when dozens of equally innocent people get killed in Kohistan and Mastung, why is there no concrete action? We expect the US to follow legal procedure to investigate and punish its soldier, but not Islamabad to catch the killers and punish them. What a very sorry state of affairs. It is easier for us to talk of matters related to the war on terror, the environment, women’s rights, child labour, and so on, but not sectarian militancy. Sometimes, we are afraid of antagonising the religious sentiments of those who belong to a different sect. Other times, the crime is physically far removed (Kohistan) and does not impinge on our everyday life more than the usual culture of violence in which we live. Oftentimes, however, we do not have enough information to make up our mind – and do not make the effort to look beyond the official construct of events. We have heard about sectarian strife in Gilgit-Baltistan, where the ill-fated passengers were bound. We also recall curfews being imposed at times. So here are a few facts: In 1974, the annual Muharram procession was banned in Gilgit, generating a sectarian clash which is believed to be the first such conflict in the area. The procession is not banned in Lahore, why was it banned in Gilgit which has a bigger Shia community than a Sunni community? In 1988, Sunni militants from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa attacked almost a dozen Shia-dominated villages, killing hundreds. Hundreds. It is largely believed that the militants had the support of Gen Zia’s regime. An inquiry into the killings is still awaited.

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 In 2000, protests started in Gilgit over changes in textbooks. The Shia community believed the changes were politically motivated and were aimed at erasing their religious identity. The imam leading the protests was gunned down, and the protests became violent. It took many lives, businesses, and much heartbreak, before peace was restored. Evidently, then, there is a history of political manipulation and provocation, of deepening and widening sectarian differences in the region. But none of that is discussed when a sectarian clash or, in this case, massacre takes place. Do we not depoliticise an issue by saying that it is “sectarian” conflict? Even “targeted killing” is a way of depoliticising a crime based on power-politics – as well as relegating a blanket explanation to cold-blooded murder, especially when these words are used by state representatives. Simple differences have been cultivated into huge divides by power interests – whether its Jhang, Gilgit-Baltistan, Quetta or Karachi. This sense of difference is cultivated in the social sphere we inhabit, with curriculum being one such tool. By broad-brushing a crime by calling it sectarian and implying that all problems stem from a difference in sect is both simplistic and disingenuous. Struggle for political control, control over local resources, aggrandisement of patronage/feudal networks, land mafia, and other explanations based on socio-political and economic reasons have higher explanatory power than just calling something a sectarian issue. It is very simplistic to reduce multiple layers of a person’s identity solely to a “sect-based” one. A Sunni/Shia woman from Lahore – who is a sister, a daughter, a wife, a mother – and has attended school X and college Y and university Z, shares all these cultural identities with a Shia/Sunni woman from Lahore – who is a sister, daughter, wife, mother – and has attended school X, college Y and university Z. Both root for the same cricket team and listen to the same songs. Half my family follows one sect and half the other. I can tell you a dozen reasons why many problems and tiffs exist in our family, but none of them have to do with the sects we follow. For the state, treatment of citizens cannot be based on sects or on whether one is a “majority” or a “minority.” The word “minority,” which should only be a numerical reference, is, instead, a cultural construct that devalues the existence, needs, and demands of those belonging to a group that is smaller in number. Gen Ziaul Haq’s hardline religiosity project, together with the West’s support for bringing in fighters from the Middle East to wage their war with Russia, resulted

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in turning our country into a quasi-religious security state where debate became synonymous with treason. Discussion and negotiation were replaced by unilateral decisions enforced through the gun. Later, encouraged by the government’s inaction, various non-state actors were to use the same strong-arm tactics against the citizenry. There is a need to discuss militancy – whether by religio-political parties or ethnic organisations. We need to see it for what it is: crime. We have to discuss what it means to be a pluralistic society – and what do we have to agree on to become one. Gilgit’s “textbook controversy” proves how the state messed up when it tried to force a particular religious identity over everyone. Ironically, its high-handedness only resulted in further alienating Shia youth. They mobilised around the textbook issue and it became a symbol of their political disenfranchisement. Distressingly, as they rallied to be accepted as equal citizens of the state, the authorities reacted with force. Our seldom democratically-led state has historically termed political protests as “danger” to the federation, even though these protests actually strengthen it. When people demand equal rights, they want to stay in the federation and enjoy their rights. For an unbearably long time, we, as a society, have been letting the state off the hook by saying Pakistan is being used as a proxy sectarian battlefield. Even now, the interior minister blamed “foreign hands” out to destabilise the country through these killings. There might be truth in that, but a crime remains a crime and every citizen has a right on the state to provide her security. Too many have died a violent death for us to keep waiting while the state looks for foreign hands. The writer is a former editor of The News Lahore.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-105772-China-to-link-investment-in-water-power-sector-with-direct-award-of-projects

China to link investment in water, power sector with direct award of projects

Khalid MustafaTuesday, May 01, 2012

ISLAMABAD: Beijing has clearly informed Islamabad to set aside the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) rules and sign an agreement with the Chinese companies for initiating the mega project in water and power sector by declaring energy emergency in Pakistan for at least four to five years, a senior official at the Private Power Infrastructure Board (PPIB) said.

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The high-powered delegation, which is due in Pakistan on May 6 for Pakistan-China Joint Energy Working Group (JEWG) to be held on May 7-9, is to clearly ask Pakistan to sign an agreement with China’s government to help cope with the energy and water crises and hand over the projects to Chinese companies without holding the international competitive bids (ICBs), the official, quoting the indications from Beijing, said. In case China agrees with the proposal of setting up $10 billion energy infrastructure development fund it will again link with the contracts of the projects without participating in ICB, he said. This will be the follow up meeting of Pakistan-China JEWG that was held in Beijing on August 1-2, 2011 and in that meeting China had linked its investment in water and power sector with suspension of PPRA rules, saying that it would provide 100 percent funding to the projects only after the projects are handed over to its companies, ensuring that there would be no international competitive bidding (ICB). China had also sought protection against exchange rate variation with respect to Chinese Currency (RMB) from the Pakistani authorities. Beijing is of the view that since the dollar is fast depreciating against its currency, it would lend the loan to Pakistan and its repayment in its own currency. The official said in case the government sets aside the PPRA rules and directly gives the projects of paramount importance to the Chinese government, then there will be a lot of hue and cry, particularly from the opposition parties in the current politically charged atmosphere. “On top of it, the Transparency International, Pakistan (TIP) will raise the issue.” “We are practically in the lurch and have no other option, but to move the parliament and seek waiver from the PPRA rules for handing over the projects to China as when we call ICB, no reasonable response from other developed countries, particularly from the European Union (EU) countries and the United States trickles down because of the well-known, but bitter fact that the country is faced with the law and order situation coupled with deadliest spate of terrorism.” Mentioning about the Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project, Nandipur and Cheechuki Malian projects, the official said that the projects got delayed by six-eight years just because of the fact that the projects were earlier denied to Chinese companies. However, when other companies from developed countries did not takeover the projects, the authorities had to again move the Chinese companies. And the Chinese companies because of the wastage of time came up with upward revised rates for the construction of the projects. “We will have to calculate the impact of indecisiveness and inordinate delay in making the decision, which is 10 times more than the corruption some quarters fear if the projects are handed over to Chinese companies without holding the ICB.”

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The official said that in the upcoming meeting, the government will tell the Chinese delegation headed by energy minister that it is not possible for Pakistan to suspend PPRA rules, but now we are working to ink some memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on some important projects with China after it rejected the agenda earlier decided by the Pakistani authorities. There is another main issue of currency, which may prove as a bottleneck in the way of investment by China in the power and water sector, as Beijing has told Pakistan that it will extent credit lines in its currency and ensure repayment also in its currency as the US dollar is losing its value against the yuan. The Finance Division has also refused to provide China the protection against exchange rate variation with respect to Chinese Currency (RMB), the official said, adding that this means the upcoming dialogue may hit snags and could not advance as Pakistani authorities have failed to fulfill the demands of the Chinese government. During the three-day dialogue, Pakistan will pitch the projects of national importance for Chinese help that include Sindh Engro mining and power project, Sonda-Jherruk coal project, AES imported coal project, Diamer-Bhasha hydropower project, Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project, Kohala hydropower project, Bunji hydropower project, Suki-Kinari hydropower project, Kotli hydropower project, Madian hydropower project, Nandipur combined cycle thermal power project, Chichoki Mallian combined cycle thermal power project, 500kV transmission line for evacuation of power from 747MW Guddu power project, 220kV transmission line to transmit power from 404MW Uch-II thermal power project, 500kV transmission line project for dispersal of power from Sindh Engro Thar coal power project, 500kV transmission line project for Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project, 500kV transmission line project for evacuation of power from Tarbela hydropower fourth extension project, mapping of renewable energy resources such as wind, solar, biomass, waste to energy, geothermal, small and micro hydro in new geographical areas of Pakistan, technology transfer for wind and other RE projects, support, technology transfer, standardisation, of off-grid and decentralised RE applications and geo-thermal mapping of Pakistan, and Geological Survey of Pakistan’s project “Geological mapping of Pakistan–China border at 1:50,000 scale.

http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=103439

Chinese mega projects in PakistanMalik M Ashraf

China has played a significant role in the economic progress of Pakistan ever since the establishment of diplomatic ties between them. The first major initiative in this regard was the setting up of Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila; a project of immense importance that nudged the process of industrial development in Pakistan and continues to contribute to the overall progress of

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the country in a big way. The construction of KKH Highway, termed as the eighth wonder of the world not only laid the foundation for an infallible and eternal friendship between the two neighbours but also generated tremendous economic activity in Gilgit-Baltistan besides boosting trade between the two countries. 

Currently China is working on a plan for the up-gradation of KKH at an approximate cost of $500 million and in building 165 Km Jaglot-Skardu and 135 KM Thakot-Sazin roads in Gilgit-Baltistan at a cost of Rs.45 billion. China would pay 85% of the cost while Pakistan will contribute 15%. A rail link between the two countries is also envisaged to be built. Besides these monumental projects, China is also helping Pakistan to tide over the energy crisis. Currently the Chinese are working on 15 mega projects in the energy sector in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir. A very significant project in hand is the upraising of the Mangla Dam reservoir by sixty feet. As part of resettlement of the dam affectees, the Chinese firm, International Water and Electric Corporation ( CIW&EC) is also working on the construction of a bridge over Jhelum river in the same area. Another very vital project is Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Power Project which aims at diversion of the water of Neelum river through a tunnel into Jhelum river, at a cost of US$12.6 billion. 

The Chinese are also entrusted with the responsibility to commission Kohala Power Project at a cost of US$ 2.155 billion with a capacity to generate 1050 MW of electricity. China’s Three Gorges Project Corporation is constructing Diamir-Bhasha Dam on the Indus river with a total investment of US$ 12.6 billion. In addition to these undertakings the Chinese firms are also working on six other mega power projects in Gilgit-Baltistan that include : US$7.8 billion Dasu Hydropower Project, US$ 70 million Phandar Project, US$ 40.01 million Bashu Hydropower Project, US$ 44.608 million Harpo Hydropower Project and US$ 6 billion Yulbo Hydropower Project. China is also investing an amount of US$ 300 million in housing, communication sectors. The Indians are very wary of Chinese involvement in development projects in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir and view it as a calculated move to build Chinese influence in these areas, a charge vehemently dismissed by China. China is also helping Pakistan in the nuclear power sector. A nuclear power plant at Chashma with a power generating capacity of 330 MW of electricity has already been completed and integrated with the National Grid recently and two more similar plants are scheduled to be completed by 2016-17. The agreement for these projects was signed on June 8, 2010 during President Zardari’s visit to China, notwithstanding the fact that US raised objections on the nuclear cooperation between the two countries. The Chinese brushed aside the apprehensions on this account by informing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) during its meeting at Christchurch, of its decision to build Chashma IV and V in Pakistan. In the backdrop of US-India agreement for cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear technology, which Pakistan views as a discriminatory act, the Chinese help assumes a great significance and reflects the strength of friendship between the two countries. These two plants are part of the PAEC programme to generate 8800 MW of nuclear power

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for the country to supplement other sources of power generation. An arrangement for soft Chinese loan to fund the construction has also been inked. The participation of China in exploiting copper reserves at Sandak and the development of Gawadar Port in Balochistan, though not liked by some regional and international powers, are undertakings of immense economic benefit to the people of the province and the overall development of Pakistan. 

The trade between the two countries has also been expanding. China is the fifth largest source for Pakistani imports. The bilateral trade between the two countries touched US $7 billion mark in 2008.Under a five year programme lunched in 2006 this volume is proposed to be enhanced to $ 15 billion by 2012. In the past few years, the Chinese have made an investment of US$ 1.3 billion in Pakistan. A number of Chinese companies are working in the oil and gas, IT, Telecom, Engineering, and mining sectors.

As is evident, China has made an unfathomable contribution to the economic progress of Pakistan and with the completion of the new ventures, especially in the energy sector, Pakistan can rightly aspire for an era of sustainable economic growth in the country. It is an irrefutable reality that relations between Pakistan and China have been growing from strength to strength irrespective of who was in power in Pakistan. However the exponential expansion in these relations during the present regime reflects a marked departure from our perennial propensity to look up to the West, particularly US for our security and economic progress. 

The enhanced economic, political and strategic cooperation between China and Pakistan will contribute immensely to warding off the lurking dangers and consolidating the gains of the efforts made for changing the economic situations of the people of both the countries. This renewed and vigorous engagement between the two countries is an encouraging development as it will greatly benefit Pakistan by re-invigorating commercial and industrial activities and creating new jobs. This might also restore the confidence of the international community in Pakistan as a safe place to invest.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-106011-World-Bank-agrees-in-principle-to-fund-Diamer-Bhasha-DamWorld Bank agrees in principle to fund Diamer-Bhasha Dam Khalid MustafaWednesday, May 02, 2012 ISLAMABAD: The World Bank has agreed in principle to fund the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, a senior official at the Ministry of Finance told The News.“The Finance Minister had written a letter to the president of the World Bank seeking funding for the project,” he said.

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“The Asian Development Bank (ADB) - the lead financial institution in providing funds for Diamer-Bhahsa dam - had asked the government of Pakistan to arrange more funds from big donors such as World Bank, as it cannot arrange the required funding alone,” the official elaborated. The Islamic Development Fund and the Kuwait Funds are also ready to provide financing for the project.Earlier, the World Bank had refused to provide financing the project arguing that the site of the project is in the disputed territory. The donor bank had taken the stance keeping in view the assertion of India as the neighbouring country says the site of the project is a disputed territory. “Now the ice has melted and the World Bank has agreed in principle to fund the project. This agreement came on the sidelines of the annual meetings of IMF at Washington,” the official said. In that particular meeting of top economic managers of the country headed by Dr Hafeez Shaikh held on April 22-23, the top man of World Bank, agreed in principle to finance the project. The Bank, however, seems more interested in funding Dasu Dam, but it has no comparison with Diamer-Bhahsa Dam. Pakistan wants World Bank to fund Diamer-Bhahsa dam. Dasu Dam will generate the same amount of electricity Diamer-Bhasha Dam has, but Dasu Dam has negligible water storage capacity, whereas Diamer-Bhasha Dam has capacity to store 8 million acre feet of water that will help the country in having a water storage capacity of 15 million acres feet of water similar to that in 1976. The country has lost the 30 percent water storage capacity in the wake of the silt depositing in Tarbela and Mangla dams reducing the storage capacity to just 11.27 MAF, which is not enough for even 30 days for irrigation. However, India has increased its water storage capacity up to for 400 days irrigations. The cost of the project of Diamer-Bhahsa Dam stood at $12 billion, which will be recovered in six years after the commissioning of the project. The dam will generate 20 billion units in a year and would ensure $5 million per day benefit to the economy just in the head of cheap electricity. This means if the said project of paramount importance gets delayed, then the country will continue to brave the loss of $1.825 billion in every year. On top of it, downstream, Ghazi Barotha Hydropower project and Terbela Dam will both increase one billion units of electricity in one year in result of cascading affects of the Diamer-Bahsha Dam. Moreover, the life of Terbela Dam will also increase by additional 35 years, as the pace of piling of sit will reduce manifold, the official said.

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http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-103686-Delay-in-Chinese-loan-puts-Neelum-Jhelum-project-in-doldrums

Delay in Chinese loan puts Neelum-Jhelum project in doldrums  Khalid MustafaThursday, April 19, 2012  ISALAMABAD: The Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project is facing shortage of funds that could slow the pace of construction providing an edge to India, which is building Kishanganga project on the same Neelum river on its side of Kashmir, a senior official of Ministry of Water and Power said. According to the Indus Water Treaty the country that first completes its project on Neelum tributary will have the priority rights on the water of Neelum River. The financial situation of the project got worse as Pakistan did not get the expected credit line of $448 million from China, the official said. The Chinese were delaying the credit line either on pressure from India or to exert pressure on Pakistani authorities to revise the financing rates of the project, the official said quoting the assessment of the EAD officials. If Pakistan fails to complete its project before India, then it will lose the water rights to the upper riparian country. Keeping in view the importance of the project, the official revealed EAD secretary Dr Waqar Masud dashed to China for two days last week to get the loan of $448 million, which the top man of China had committed during the visit of President Zardari to Beijing in 2009. The Chinese Exim bank did not entertain Masud saying it would give the loan at appropriate time, although three years have elapsed since the commitment of China to Pakistan. The Chinese Exim bank is delaying the disbursement of the loan since 2009 despite the fact bank’s team came to Islamabad in 2011 and visited the site of project where in it expressed satisfaction. However, the Chinese bank is still evasive in funding the project knowing the fact that Chinese contractor is completing the project. It is pertinent to mention that China has already refused to provide funding for Iran Pakistan gas line project. The officials are surprised that Beijing has immediately released $130 million for the Chilas Road in Sakrdu, whose PC-I is even not approved just because of the

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fact the said road would connect border of China, but when it comes to the country’s strategic project, it is delaying the disbursement of the loan. When asked as to how the construction work is underway on the site of the project on main components keeping in view the acute financial constraints, the official said the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Company has acquired the loan of Rs6 billion from Wapda, which itself is a cash-strapped entity and if Pakistan fails to manage funding for the project, it is quite obvious that the pace of construction will alarmingly slow down. “We are in contact with Islamic Development Bank, Saudi Development Bank, Abu Dhabi Fund, Kuwait Fund for the required funding,” the official said. He said that IDB has committed $200 million, Saudi Fund $337 million, Abu Dhabi Fund $100 million and Kuwait Fund $30 million and the government is pursing the said donors to expedite the disbursement of their credit line for the timely completion of the project.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-104269-Zardari-seeks-details-on-delay-in-Chinas-loan-disbursement

Zardari seeks details on delay in China’s loan disbursement  Khalid MustafaSunday, April 22, 2012 

 ISALAMABAD: President Asif Ali Zardari has asked for the details regarding the delay on part of EXIM Bank of China to release $448 million for the construction of Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project, a senior official at the Ministry of Water and Power told The News. He is believed to take up the issue with Chinese leadership for immediate release of the funds that the Chinese EXIM bank is hesitant to release since 2009, the official said. The president has taken note of the situation following a story printed in The News on April 19 under the headline ‘Delay in Chinese loan puts Neelum-Jehlum Project in doldrums’, the official said.

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 “We are preparing the summary for President Asif Ali Zaradri to inform him about the financial constraints the project is facing, we hope that he will intervene and talk to his Chinese counterpart on the subject,” the ministry official asserted. To a question he disclosed that the Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project needed $700 million foreign funding to complete the project by 2016. In case required funding gets delayed, the pace of construction will slowdown providing an edge to India, which is building Kishanganga project on the same Neelum river on its side of Kashmir. If Pakistan fails to complete its project before India, then it will lose the water rights to the upper riparian country. According to the Indus Water Treaty the country that first completes its project on Neelum tributary will have the priority rights on the water of Neelum River. The official said that in the current financial year Rs31 billion were allocated, but 20 billion are spent with shortfall of Rs11 billion. The project however, needs around Rs15-16 billion next year. The financial situation of the project got worse when Pakistan did not get the expected credit line of $448 million from China. “There is an impression that Chinese were delaying the credit line either on pressure from India or to exert pressure on Pakistani authorities to revise the financing rates of the project,” the official said. Keeping in view the importance of the project, the official revealed EAD secretary Dr Waqar Masud dashed to China for two days last week to get the loan of $448 million, which the top man of China had committed during the visit of President Zardari to Beijing in 2009. The Chinese Exim bank did not entrain Masud saying it would give the loan at appropriate time, although three years have elapsed since the commitment of China to Pakistan. “We are in contact with Islamic Development Bank, Saudi Development Bank, Abu Dhabi Fund, Kuwait Fund for the required finding,” the official said. He said that IDB has committed $200 million, Saudi Fund $337 million, Abu Dhabi Fund $100 million and Kuwait Fund $30 million and the government is pursing the said donors to expedite the disbursement of their credit line for the timely completion of the project.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-3-103902-Japan-may-aid-Gilgit-Baltistan-horticulture

Japan may aid Gilgit-Baltistan horticulture

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Khalid MustafaFriday, April 20, 2012 

 ISLAMABAD: Japan has agreed to provide around Rs437 million in aid for promoting manufacture of value added fruit products in Gilgit-Baltistan, a senior official of the Planning Commission told The News. “The main strength of the economy of the Gilgit-Baltistan is the fruits and horticulture and Japan International Cooperation Agency has extended the firm commitment to fund value addition of apples and apricots,” he said. The total cost of the proposed project stands at Rs465.966 million with local component of Rs28.533 million and foreign aid of Rs437.433 million. The local component will be provided from the annual development plan of GB. The sponsoring agency is Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan and the executing agency is GB agriculture department. The objective of the project is to introduce and promote improved technologies.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-6-103071-Glacier-surge-not-avalancheburied-soldiers-at-Siachen-expert

Glacier surge, not avalanche,buried soldiers at Siachen: expert  Khalid MustafaSunday, April 15, 2012  Islamabad Neither it was the cloudburst nor the avalanche but the “glacier surge” that buried the men stationed at Siachen, Arshad H Abbasi, an expert on water and climate changes, told The News. 

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“Glacier surge is phenomena caused either by rise in temperature or some tectonic movement, where a glacier advances substantially, moving at velocities up to 100 times faster than normal,” he said. Keeping in view the record of tremors occurring in the last one month, Abbasi insists that rise in temperature caused “the increase of melt-water at the base of a glacier that untimely reduced the frictional restrictions to glacial ice flow and transfer of large volumes of ice on Pakistan’s Army Camp.” “The rising temperature is directly proportional with huge number of military presence in area. That is fundamental cause of melting glacier at an unprecedented rate,” he argued. “The actual retreat is not only evident by the snout of the glacier, but the real concern is the reduction of the glacier’s mass balance, which is the difference between accumulation and ablation (melting and sublimation).” Having received the latest images of the glacier, Abbasi says it shows “visible cracks in the midst of glacier and above all the number of glacial lakes that have formed.” ‘Voodoo Science’ practitioners are justified in saying that Indian Army is playing pivotal role in global warming, causing the fast melting of Siachen Glacier. Those claiming Siachen is melting due to global warming are advised to look into the report titled ‘Advancing Glaciers and Positive Mass Anomaly in the Karakoram Himalaya’ published by NASA. The report says of the glaciers in Karakoram, more than 65 percent are growing. They term abnormality as “Karakoram anomaly”. Therefore, it’s just a myth that Siachen is melting because of global warming, as it’s case of direct human interference, climate change. During Track-II dialogues, Abbasi said, he had again been raising the question of the audit of Siachen Glacier to know the reduction of its volume, which was always declined by the Indian government. The climate change is by far the biggest threat ever encountered by humankind. “It is time that the global leadership and community work with Pakistani and Indian leaders to save Himalayan glaciers by solving the longstanding Siachen dispute. This conflict is adding to environmental degradation, sea level rise and changing climate pattern but it is also depriving the poor of both countries of close to one billion dollars every year that these countries spend to maintain troops there,” he said.

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