Getting the Most Out of Life: An Examination of Appreciation, Targets of Appreciation, and...

TUCKERGETTING THE MOST OUT OF LIFE

GETTING THE MOST OUT OF LIFE:AN EXAMINATION OF APPRECIATION,TARGETS OF APPRECIATION, ANDSENSITIVITY TO REWARD IN HAPPIERAND LESS HAPPY INDIVIDUALS

KARI L. TUCKER, PH.D.Irvine Valley College

The purpose of the present study was to examine the relationships among happi-ness, appreciation, and sensitivity to reward. The hypotheses were that happier in-dividuals would report greater appreciation and show a lower “threshold” toexperience appreciation than would less happy individuals. In Study 1, partici-pants completed questionnaires assessing their levels of happiness, appreciation,and sensitivity to reward. In Study 2, self–rated “happy” and “unhappy” partici-pants recalled and listed observations from their lives that they either appreciatedor were frustrated by during a 1–day period. Results showed that happier individu-als, compared to less happy ones, reported greater sensitivity to reward, greater ap-preciation in general, and greater appreciation for hypothetical stimuli andreal–life observations that were recalled from their personal lives. Implications ofthese findings are discussed.

Whether through effort or by chance, most people have experienced thejoy that comes from rewarding events and the grief that comes from

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Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 7, 2007, pp. 791–825

Kari L. Tucker, Department of Psychology, Irvine Valley College. This research wasconducted at the University of California, Riverside, as part of a doctoral dissertation. I amgrateful to Sonja Lyubomirsky whose countless hours and dedication provided the train-ing necessary to complete this project; to Howard Friedman, David Funder, and DanielOzer for their valuable comments on this research; and to Nick, Natalie, and Kamryn forproviding endless opportunities for my appreciation. Lastly, I would like to thank the edi-tor, Dr. Maddux, and two anonymous reviewers for their extremely insightful andthoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kari L. Tucker, Depart-ment of Psychology, Irvine Valley College, 5500 Irvine Center Dr., Irvine CA 92618.E–mail: [email protected].

aversive ones. Achieving a promotion at work, earning a good grade onan exam, or winning a lottery might be sources for great happiness; andbeing demoted, flunking an exam, or receiving a speeding ticket mightbe sources for much unhappiness. However, some individuals appear tomaintain high levels of happiness or unhappiness, despite their objec-tive circumstances. That is, some individuals see the “silver lining in ev-ery cloud”—they recognize, attend to, and value the positive aspects ofsituations, respond very positively to even trivial rewards, and bounceback quickly after aversive outcomes. In contrast, other individualsview life pessimistically—they attend to the negative aspects of situa-tions, react very strongly to even trivial disappointments, and wallow intheir misery for long periods of time.

Happiness is a complex emotion and includes a combination of highpositive affect, low negative affect, and a positive appraisal of one’s lifein general (see Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). Research shows thathappiness is relatively stable over time and across situations (e.g., Costa,McCrae, & Zonderman, 1987; Diener, 1994; Diener et al., 1999; Lykken &Tellegen, 1996; Sandvik, Diener, & Seidlitz, 1993) despite objective cir-cumstances (e.g., income level, age, objective health). Although lifeevents have the potential to influence one’s happiness (see Diener &Fujita, 1995), studies show that the emotional impact is only tempo-rary—that is, after an emotion–eliciting event, people return to theiroriginal levels of happiness in short periods of time (Headey & Wearing,1989; Suh, Diener, & Fujita, 1996). Thus, in understanding happiness as ageneral concept, researchers have shifted away from a focus on objectivecircumstances or life events faired much better overall (e.g., Wilson,1967) and have moved toward enduring characteristics of the individ-ual, which have fared much better to explain individual differences inhappiness (Costa & McCrae, 1980; Costa et al., 1987; McCrae & Costa,1991; see also Brebner, Donaldson, Kirby, & Ward, 1995; Diener et al.,1999).

In a review of the literature, Diener and his colleagues (1999) notedthat although personality has proven to be the most consistent predictorof happiness, researchers have not explained well the relation betweenpersonality and happiness, or the processes involved in happiness.Thus, understanding the mechanisms underlying happiness is a currentchallenge to researchers in this area (Diener & Diener, 1996). However,studies comparing happy and unhappy people are beginning to offer usa glimpse of possible mechanisms that underlie individual differencesin happiness. For example, recent research has found that happy and un-happy individuals seem to respond in ways that maintain or even pro-mote their affective well–being (or ill–being; Lyubomirsky, 2001), sug-gesting that motivational processes are involved in the maintenance of

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individual differences in happiness (see also Lyubomirsky, Kasri,Zehm, & Kim, 2000; Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997, 1999; Lyubomirsky &Tucker, 1998).

Supporting this notion (although not addressing happiness per se),Gray (1970) proposed a model that describes motivational processesthat appear to be involved in chronic affective states, as well as transientreactions to many kinds of events. This model specifies two biologicallybased motivational systems in the brain that are directly linked to chronic, aswell as transient, affective experiences. According to Gray, some indi-viduals are particularly sensitive to rewards in their environment (seeGray, 1990, for discussions of the BAS—i.e., the Behavioral ApproachSystem). Consequently, these individuals will react more positively torewarding stimuli than will individuals who are less sensitive to re-wards. In contrast, others are relatively more sensitive to punishment (seeGray, 1990, for discussions of the BIS—i.e., the Behavioral InhibitionSystem). As a result, these individuals will react more negatively toaversive stimuli than will those who are less sensitive to punishment.Thus, perhaps happiness, or the lack thereof, may be linked to thesemotivational systems outlined by Gray.

An increasing number of studies provide evidence for the relationshipbetween happiness (specifically, positive and negative affect) and theBAS and the BIS. In correlational studies, positive and negative affectlevels have been indirectly and directly linked to Gray’s concepts of re-ward–signal sensitivity (BAS) and punishment–signal sensitivity (BIS;Carver & White, 1994, Study 2; Tellegen, 1985; see also Strelau, 1984), re-spectively. For example, biological test data have shown that the balancebetween the BAS and the BIS is related to particular brain activity in hu-mans, and those with relatively greater sensitivity of the BAS demon-strate greater left–frontal brain activation (believed to be a biologicalsubstrate of positive affect), whereas those with relatively greater sensi-tivity of the BIS demonstrate greater right–frontal activation (believed tobe a biological substrate of negative affect; Sutton & Davidson, 1997; seeDavidson, 1995, for reviews). Furthermore, in laboratory studies, sensi-tivity to reward has been related to greater positive affect reactivity topositive mood inductions, but not to greater negative affect reactivity tonegative mood inductions (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; see also Gross,Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998), and to happiness in anticipation of an impend-ing reward for a successful performance (Carver & White, 1994, Study4). In contrast, sensitivity to punishment has been related to greater neg-ative affect reactivity to negative mood inductions, but not to greaterpositive affect reactivity to positive mood inductions (Larsen &Ketelaar, 1991; see also Gross et al., 1998), and to negative emotions inanticipation of impending punishment for an unsuccessful performance

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(Carver & White, 1994, Study 3). Thus, these biologically basedmotivational systems described by Gray might provide much–neededanswers to existing questions regarding motivational processesunderlying individual differences in happiness.

Other studies comparing responses of happy and unhappy individu-als further support Gray’s hypothesis that sensitivity to reward is re-lated to positive reactivity to rewarding stimuli. For example, happy in-dividuals, compared to their unhappy peers, react more positively andintensely (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Lyubomirsky & Tucker,1998; Seidlitz & Diener, 1993; Seidlitz, Wyer, & Diener, 1997) and withlonger duration (Seidlitz et al., 1997) to positive life events, and less neg-atively and intensely (Lyubomirsky & Tucker, 1998; Seidlitz & Diener,1993; Seidlitz et al., 1997) and with shorter duration (Seidlitz et al., 1997)to negative life events. These studies support many of Gray’s hypothe-ses and suggest that even before an event has occurred, happy people,compared to unhappy ones, might be predisposed by the BAS to experi-ence greater (and longer) positive affect and less (and shorter) negativeaffect, and to react more positively to favorable life events and less nega-tively to unfavorable ones. Thus, this biologically based system (i.e., theBAS) is one mechanism by which one could explain happier individuals’greater emotional advantages.

Although much of the literature on the BAS and the BIS in humans hasfocused on their relationship with affect (Carver & White, 1994), Gray(1970, 1985, 1987a) has acknowledged the importance of cognition in thesignal–sensitivity systems as well. However, the link between cognitiveprocesses and the BAS has not been examined in the psychological liter-ature. This is the focus of the present study. Happy individuals havegreater emotional advantages than do unhappy individuals, but do theyhave cognitive advantages as well? That is, do they appreciate aspects oftheir lives more than do unhappy individuals? And, is one’s general ap-preciation related to sensitivity to reward? These questions are exploredin the present study.

Appreciation as a general construct involves cognitive processes (andmay include emotional processes as well) whereby one recognizes thevalue or importance of a stimulus or event (see Bertocci & Millard, 1963;Storm & Storm, 1987), construes, appraises, or perceives the stimulus orevent as positive or meaningful (see Weiner, 1985; see also Emmons &Crumpler, 2000; Emmons & McCullough, 2003), and possibly feelsgrateful or thankful in response to perceived benefits (see Emmons &McCullough, 2003; Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). It is conceivable, however,that one may feel appreciative without feeling grateful (i.e., without ex-periencing an “emotional response to a gift;” Emmons & Crumpler,2000, p. 56); however, the reverse seems more unlikely—that is, it seems

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unlikely that one could feel gratitude without the recognition or percep-tion that the stimulus or event is valuable, important, positive, or mean-ingful. For example, when one witnesses a “boy scout” assisting an el-derly person across a street, this may lead to the witness’s appreciationof this kind act without including gratitude per se. Thus, appreciation isa unique construct that may or may not include gratitude, but it seems anecessary consequence of rewarding stimuli or events. And, perhaps in-dividuals’ tendency to appreciate aspects of their lives may be related totheir levels of sensitivity to reward.

There is partial support for the anticipated relationship between ap-preciation and sensitivity to reward. According to Gray (1994), the rela-tive sensitivity of one or both of the signal–sensitivity systems orients in-dividuals toward particular stimuli in environments that present bothrewarding and aversive stimuli. In other words, in environments thatpresent many different stimuli (which is typical of “real” life), those whoare more sensitive to rewards (compared to those who are less sensitiveto rewards) are expected to have a greater cognitive orientation towardthe rewarding stimuli in the environment. Research comparing re-sponses from happier and less happy individuals indirectly supportsthis idea. For example, in one study (Bower, 1981), after reading a storythat described ongoing events in the lives of two men (one who washappy and one who was sad), happier individuals paid greater attentionto (and recalled more about) the happy character, and less happy indi-viduals paid greater attention to (and recalled more about) the unhappycharacter. In another study, Ahrens (1991) found that when happy stu-dents were given mixed outcome information (i.e., that one other personperformed better and one other person performed worse), they re-sponded as positively as when they only received the information thatone other person performed worse. The effect was reversed for lesshappy individuals—that is, they responded as negatively to the mixedoutcome information as when they only received information that oneother person performed better. These results suggest that the BAS ori-ents happier individuals toward more positive stimuli, but the questionremains as to whether happier individuals, compared to less happyindividuals, will have greater appreciation for them.

Happiness and appreciation are expected to be positively related be-cause of the relationship they share with sensitivity to reward. Evidencefor a link between happiness and appreciation is tangentially related to arelatively new line of research that examines gratitude in particular. Forexample, several studies have shown a direct relationship between hap-piness (subjective happiness, positive affect, life satisfaction) and grati-tude (Emmons & McCullough, 2003; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang,2002; McCullough, Tsang, & Emmons, 2004). Because it is believed that


one cannot have gratitude without recognizing the value, importance,or meaningfulness of the stimuli or event, it is expected that happinesswill also be related to levels of appreciation as well.

While most people do not require great sensitivity to appreciatehighly rewarding stimuli in their lives (e.g., the birth of a child, earning amuch-desired promotion, receiving an A+ on an exam, or winning a lot-tery), only those who are relatively more sensitive to rewards (e.g.,happy individuals) are hypothesized to appreciate relatively more am-biguous stimuli or those that might be relatively trivial or simple—e.g.,five dollars, a pat on the back, or a “thumbs up.” Moreover, those whoare less sensitive to rewards (for example, unhappy people) might takesimple or trivial rewards for granted, or even construe them negatively,believing that they deserve more. Lastly, happy individuals are ex-pected to report relatively greater appreciation for even negative eventsor experiences, as long as doing so would be beneficial to them(otherwise they may lack the motivation to appreciate these negativeevents).

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES

The aim of the present study was to examine the relationships amonghappiness, appreciation, and sensitivity to reward. The general hypoth-esis guiding this research was that happiness and appreciation would bepositively related because of the relation that they share with sensitivityto reward. An additional aim was to examine the relation between hap-piness and targets of appreciation—that is, appreciation for specificstimuli or events (both hypothetical and real–life). Because of their sensi-tivity to reward, happier individuals (compared to less happy individu-als) were expected to report greater appreciation for both hypotheticalstimuli (from a constructed list) and real–life stimuli (recalled from theirpersonal lives). In addition, happier individuals’ appreciation was ex-pected to be relatively less dependent on the nature of the stimuli orevent. That is, unlike less happy individuals, happier ones were ex-pected to report similar levels of appreciation for many different types ofstimuli, including those that most others would consider less positive(e.g., someone holding the door for you or winning free french fries or asoft drink, as compared to receiving a promotion at work or beinghealthy), more simple or trivial (i.e., less “materialistic,” more commonor ordinary, and easier to attain), and those that most others would typi-cally appreciate less. Lastly, because of their sensitivity to reward, hap-pier individuals (compared to less happy individuals) were alsoexpected to report greater belief in the idea that one can benefit fromeven aversive situations.

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Two studies were conducted. In Study 1, participants completed sev-eral questionnaires assessing their subjective happiness, levels of posi-tive and negative affect, satisfaction with life, appreciation, levels of ap-preciation for specific stimuli, sensitivities to reward and punishment,and agreement with belief–system adages. In Study 2, self–rated“happy” and “unhappy” participants recalled and listed observationsfrom their personal lives that they either appreciated or were frustratedby during a 1–day period. Happy and unhappy participants’ apprecia-tion for, affective and cognitive reactions to, and perceptions of, theseobservations were then compared.

STUDY 1

METHOD

OverviewIn a purported study about personality, attitudes, and interests, partici-pants completed a series of questionnaires assessing their levels of hap-piness (including subjective happiness, positive and negative affect, andsatisfaction with life), appreciation, and sensitivities to reward and pun-ishment. Next, participants rated the extent of their appreciation for 155different hypothetical stimuli.

ParticipantsTwo hundred and six Introductory Psychology students at the Univer-sity of California, Riverside (47 men and 159 women) signed up on a bul-letin board to participate for course credit.

Design and ProceduresThe present study was a correlational design. Students participated ingroup–administered questionnaire sessions, which were led by one fe-male experimenter. First, participants were told that they would be com-pleting a series of questionnaires assessing personality, interests, andattitudes. At this time, participants read and signed consent forms. Afterconsent forms were returned, participants were given the question-naires and asked to read each question carefully and to choose the an-swers that best described how they feel most of the time. Participantswere given as much time as they needed to complete the questionnaires,which took approximately 1 hour to complete. After participants com-pleted and returned their questionnaires, they were debriefed andthanked for their time.

MeasuresSubjective Happiness Scale (SHS; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). Happi-

ness was measured using the SHS, which is a 4–item measure of subjec-


tive and chronic happiness. The first item on the SHS asks students tocharacterize themselves using absolute ratings (1 = not a very happy per-son, 7 = a very happy person). The second item asks students to character-ize themselves relative to their peers (1 = less happy, 7 = more happy). Thethird and fourth items, respectively, characterized happy people (i.e.,“Some people are generally very happy; they enjoy life regardless ofwhat is going on, getting the most out of everything”) and unhappy peo-ple (i.e., “Some people are generally not very happy; although they arenot depressed, they never seem as happy as they might be”), and asksparticipants to rate the extent to which each characterization describesthem (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal). The last item on this scale was reversecoded. All items were averaged to create a single composite score,whereby higher scores reflected greater levels of subjective happiness.

Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,1988). Positive and negative affect was measured using the PANAS,which measures two primary dimensions of transient or currentmood—positive affect and negative affect. Positive affect (PA) refers tothe experience of pleasurable mood states (e.g., interested, excited,strong), and negative affect (NA) refers to the experience of aversive ornegative mood states (e.g., distressed, upset, guilty). Participants wereasked to rate how they were feeling “right now” on each descriptor, usinga 7–point scale (1 = very slightly or not at all, 7 = extremely). All items on thePA and NA scales were averaged to create two separate compositescores for positive affect and negative affect, respectively.

Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin,1985). Satisfaction with life was measured using the SWLS, a 5–itemglobal assessment of life satisfaction, which has been conceptualized asthe cognitive component of happiness. All items asked participants torate the extent of their agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree)with several statements (e.g., “In most ways, my life is close to my ideal,”“The conditions of my life are excellent,” “I am satisfied with my life”).Items on the SWLS were averaged to create an aggregate score, wherebyhigher scores reflected greater satisfaction with life.

Behavioral Inhibition System and Behavioral Activation System (BIS/BAS;Carver & White, 1994). Sensitivity to punishment and reward were mea-sured using the BIS/BAS scale, which is a 24–item measure of individualdifferences in sensitivities to aversive stimuli (measured by the BIS) andrewarding stimuli (measured by the BAS). The BIS and the BAS are con-ceptualized to be two motivational systems that underlie behavior. Be-cause the BIS/BAS scales have been linked to Gray’s conceptualizationof the specific brain activity and affective experiences involved in thesignal–sensitivity systems (see Sutton & Davidson, 1997; see alsoDavidson, 1994, 1995, for recent reviews), these scales were considered

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indirect biological measures of the two motivational systems—sensitiv-ity to punishment (i.e., the BIS) and sensitivity to reward (i.e., the BAS).

The BIS/BAS asks participants to rate the extent that a number ofstatements (e.g., “Criticism or scolding hurts me quite a bit,” “I feel wor-ried when I think I have done poorly at something important,” and “Ihave very few fears compared to my friends” on the BIS; and “When I’mdoing well at something, I love to keep at it,” “I go out of my way to getthings I want,” and “I’m always willing to try something new if I think itwill be fun” on the BAS) are true for them (1 = very false for me, 4 = verytrue for me). For a complete list of the specific items constituting the BISand the BAS scales, see Carver and White (1994). Items on the BIS and theBAS were averaged to create single composite scores for sensitivity topunishment and reward, respectively.

General Appreciation Scale (GAS). To develop this measure of generalappreciation, 25 separate items pertaining to appreciation were enteredinto a principal components analysis. The scree plot indicated the pres-ence of one strong factor (eigenvalue for the first factor = 6.05). Next, theitems were entered into factor analysis with a promax rotation to allowfor correlation among the factors. The first factor comprised six items, allloading above .70. The second factor comprised items that were onlytangentially related to general appreciation (e.g., “I react strongly to therewarding things in life”). To obtain a measure that was conceptuallydistinct from the components of happiness—specifically, life satisfac-tion—one of the items was dropped (i.e., “It would take me all day to listthe things that I appreciate in my life”). Appreciation was measured us-ing five items (“I am a person who tends to appreciate things,” “I tend tobe thankful for even the smallest things,” “People often notice how oftenI appreciate things,” “In general, I tend to feel very fortunate,” and“Compared to others, I probably tend to appreciate things more”). Par-ticipants were asked to indicate how true each statement was of them (1= not at all true of me, 7 = extremely true of me).

Targets of Appreciation. Next, participants were asked to indicate theirlevels of appreciation (1 = I do not appreciate this at all, 7 = I have a great dealof appreciation for this) for 155 different hypothetical stimuli (e.g., a smilefrom a stranger, receiving a promotion at work, working out an argu-ment with a friend, and winning $500 in a lottery). To develop this list,four research assistants were asked to generate stimuli, events, or expe-riences that were positive or negative, unique, common, ordinary, sim-ple, or materialistic, as well as easy and difficult things to attain. Further-more, the assistants were asked to think of “big” things and “small”things and to include as many things as they could. Next, items fromeach assistant were counted. Items that at least two assistants listed were


included on the list, and the remaining items were discussed and agreedupon for inclusion on the list.

Judges’ Ratings. The 155 hypothetical stimuli were rated by seven in-dependent judges on the extent to which they were positive, “materialis-tic,” common or ordinary, and easy to attain. All ratings were made on7–point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal), and showed excellentinterjudge agreement—Cronbach’s alphas were .89 for positivity, .94 formaterialism, .91 for commonality, and .88 for attainability. Judges’ rat-ings were then standardized and averaged to create single indices ofeach description (i.e., positivity, materialism, commonality, andattainability).

Belief System Adages. Lastly, participants rated the extent of theiragreement with adages related to adversity: “every cloud has a silverlining” and “with every seed of adversity comes with it an equal orgreater benefit.” Ratings were made on 7–point Likert-type scales (1 =highly disagree, 7 = highly agree).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Summary of PredictionsBecause happiness and appreciation are assumed to share a common in-fluence (i.e., reward–signal sensitivity system), they were expected to bepositively related, as well as each being positively related to the BAS.Furthermore, because of their relatively greater sensitivity to reward,happier individuals were expected to report relatively greater overallappreciation for hypothetical stimuli, and their levels appreciation wereexpected to be less influenced by the positivity and simplicity or trivial-ity of the stimuli. Lastly, because happier individuals were expected tohave greater recognition of the benefits from even the more aversive sit-uations, happier individuals, compared to less happy individuals, wereexpected to report greater agreement with adages such as “every cloudhas a silver lining” and “every seed of adversity comes with it an equalor greater benefit.”

All analyses were initially performed with sex of subject as an addi-tional factor; however, the results were essentially identical. Thus, in theinterest of efficiency, the results are reported collapsing over thisvariable.

Overview of Statistical AnalysesTo test for the relationships among happiness, appreciation, targets ofappreciation, and sensitivities to reward and punishment, bivariate cor-relations were computed. To test whether happy and unhappy partici-pants’ appreciation differed depending on the positivity of the stimuli,

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several steps were taken. First, each participant’s appreciation for thestimuli was predicted by the judges’ ratings of the positivity of the stim-uli. From these regressions, slope values were obtained, which indicatedthe degree of relation between the participant’s appreciation and thepositivity of the stimuli. Thus, when evaluating a participant’s apprecia-tion for the stimuli that varied in terms of its positivity, positive slopevalues would indicate that the participant has greater appreciation forstimuli that are more positive (e.g., going on an all–expense–paid vaca-tion for two vs. a sunny day). That is, these individuals would be makingmore discriminations among the stimuli, depending on their positivity,when rating their levels of appreciation. Nonsignificant slope valueswould indicate that the participants’ appreciation does not depend onthe stimuli being highly positive. Indeed, negative slope values wouldindicate that the participants appreciated stimuli that are less positive(however, few such correlations occurred). Finally, participants’ regres-sion coefficients were then correlated with their happiness status to testwhether the degree of relation between their appreciation for the stimuliand the positivity of the stimuli is different for happier and less happyindividuals. The prediction for a negative correlation between partici-pants’ happiness levels and the slope values (obtained from predictingparticipants’ appreciation from the positivity of the stimuli) would indi-cate that happier and less happy individuals’ appreciation is differentlyinfluenced by highly positive stimuli (this interpretation is possible be-cause only four participants in the sample obtained negative correla-tions that exceeded values of .10). No correlation between participants’happiness levels and slope values would indicate that happier and lesshappy individuals’ appreciation were similarly influenced (or notinfluenced) by the positivity of the stimuli. This procedure was repeatedfor each quality on which judges rated the hypothetical stimuli—namely, positivity, materialism, commonality, and attainability.

Relationships Among Happiness, Appreciation,and Sensitivity to RewardThe means, standard deviations, and reliabilities (i.e., internal consisten-cies) of the happiness, appreciation, and sensitivities to reward and pun-ishment scales are presented in Table 1. The reliabilities of all scales weregood (all Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .64 to .90).

As shown in Table 2, the results supported several hypotheses. First,the results revealed significant positive relations between chronic hap-piness and appreciation, as well as between appreciation and each of theseparate positive components of happiness (i.e., positive affect and lifesatisfaction; all rs ≥ .32, ps < .01). There was an inverse relation betweenappreciation and negative affect. Thus, as predicted, those who were


chronically happier, as well as those who experienced greater currentlevels of positive affect and life satisfaction (and to a smaller degree, lessnegative affect), were also those with greater appreciation in general.

Second, the results showed that happiness (chronic happiness, posi-tive affect, life satisfaction) and appreciation were positively related tothe BAS (see Table 2; all rs ≥ .19, ps < .01). However, the BAS was unre-lated to negative affect.1

Targets of AppreciationOverall Appreciation. Participants’ levels of reported overall apprecia-

tion for 155 hypothetical stimuli further support the hypotheses thatthere are positive relationships among happiness, appreciation, andsensitivity to reward. Results showed a positive relation between happi-ness and overall appreciation for the hypothetical stimuli (see Table 2).That is, happier individuals—tthose with higher levels of subjectivehappiness, positive affect, and life satisfaction—reported relativelygreater overall appreciation for the 155 different stimuli (all rs ≥ .24; ps <.01. Moreover, as expected, participants’ appreciation for these hypo-thetical stimuli was also related to their levels of sensitivity to reward (as

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TABLE 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliabilities of the Appreciation, Happiness,and Sensitivity to Reward and Punishment Scales (Study 1)

Scale MeanStandard

DeviationChronbach’s

Alpha

Appreciation 5.13 1.05 0.84

SHS 5.13 1.10 0.85

PA 4.09 1.29 0.90

NA 2.00 1.01 0.87

SWLS 4.53 1.39 0.87

BIS 2.79 0.44 0.64

BAS 3.08 0.46 0.83

Note. N = 206. SHS = Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999). PA = Positive Affectscale, and NA = Negative Affect scale, on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson,Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985).BAS = Behavioral Activation System scale (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994).

1. The correlations among the Carver and White’s (1994) BAS scale and happiness mea-sures were small; however, this might be expected given that the BAS scale is believed to bean indirect measure the reward–sensitivity system in the brain (i.e., left–frontal brain acti-vation; see Sutton & Davidson, 1997).

measured by the BAS; all rs ≥ .17; ps < .05), but it was not related to theirlevels of negative affect or sensitivity to punishment (as measured by theBIS).

To illuminate these findings further, a series of multiple regressionswere conducted to examine whether sensitivity to reward uniquely pre-dicts appreciation for the hypothetical stimuli, over and above partici-pant’s happiness levels. Results confirmed this hypothesis. That is, theresults showed that sensitivity to reward, β(1, 189) = .21, p < .01, signifi-cantly predicted appreciation for the hypothetical stimuli when chronichappiness was included in the model, β(1, 189) = .28, p < .001. Onceagain, this pattern of results was also found when examining the sepa-rate positive components of happiness—positive affect and life satisfac-tion. For example, the results revealed that sensitivity to reward, β(1,189) = .23, p < .01, uniquely predicted appreciation for the hypotheticalstimuli when positive affect was included in the model, β(1, 189) = .17, p< .03. Also, sensitivity to reward, β(1, 189) = .24, p < .01 uniquely ex-plained participants’ appreciation when life satisfaction was included inthe model, β(1, 189) = .19, p < .01. These findings suggest that beyond theinfluence of current positive mood and chronic levels of happiness, sen-sitivity to reward has an impact on one’s appreciation for situations andevents that might be encountered in one’s life.

Dependency of Appreciation on the Positivity of the Stimuli. An exami-nation of students’ appreciation for specific stimuli as a function of thestimuli’s positivity revealed several interesting findings. The mean


TABLE 2. Intercorrelations Among the Appreciation, Happiness, and Sensitivities toReward and Punishment Scales (Study 1)

ScaleGeneral

AppreciationStimuli

Appreciation SHS PA NA SWLS BBAS

Stim. Appr. .38

SHS .48** .33**

PA .32** .24** .38**

NA –.22** –.11 –.44** –.07

SWL .43** .25** .67** .27** –.40**

BAS .19** .28** .31** .31** .00 .22**

BIS –.02 .04 –.17* –.08 .11 –.07 .02

Note. N = 206. Stim. Appr. = Stimulation Appreciation. SHS = Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky& Lepper, 1999). PA = Positive Affect subscale, and NA = Negative Affect subscale, of the Positive andNegative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). SWLS = Satisfaction With Life Scale(Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). BAS = Behavioral Activation System scale (BIS/BAS; Carver &White, 1994). *p < .05. **p < .01.

slope value for predicting students’ appreciation from the judges’ rat-ings of the positivity of the stimuli was .00 (SD = .07), and the valuesranged from –.35 to .18. Negative slope values were rare (i.e., only fourstudents obtained negative slope values that exceeded –.10). The resultsshowed that there was a negative correlation between participants’ hap-piness levels and their slope values, indicating that happier students’appreciation for the specific stimuli was less influenced by highly posi-tive stimuli, r(192) = –.16, p < .03. That is, unlike less happy students,happier ones reported greater appreciation for stimuli that were judgedas relatively less positive. Interestingly, additional analyses revealedthat happy students, compared to unhappy ones, reported greater ap-preciation for stimuli that most others would appreciate less, r(192) =–.23, p < .01, and would react with less happiness in response to them,r(192) = –.16, p < .01.

To illuminate these findings further, post–hoc analyses revealed thathappier individuals reported greater appreciation for the most negativehypothetical stimuli (i.e., those that were 1.5 standard deviations belowthe mean on positivity, as rated by independent judges). For example,happier individuals reported greater appreciation for “waking upearly,” r(192) = .22, p < .01 “being told what to do,” r(192) = .26, p < .01“painful lessons,” r(192) = .20, p < .01, and “discipline from your par-ents,” r(192) = .27, p < .01, and to a lesser extent, “standing in line,” r(192)= .15, p < .05. However, happier and less happy individuals did not sig-nificantly differ on the extent that they appreciated “grumpy people,”r(192) = .07, ns. These results suggest that happier individuals havegreater appreciation for negative stimuli only when it might benefitthem to do so—that is, only when the lack of these negative experiences(i.e, not waking up early, not being told what to do, no painful lessons,no discipline from parents, and not standing in line) might deprive themof potentially significant benefits (in contrast, perhaps everyone couldbenefit from the failure to encounter grumpy people).

The Relation Between Appreciation for Specific Stimuli and Their Character-istics (i.e., Commonality, Materialism, and Attainability). When examin-ing participants’ appreciation for the hypothetical stimuli, the resultsshowed that less happy individuals’ appreciation was relatively less afunction of the stimuli’s simplicity or triviality. That is, happier individ-uals reported greater appreciation for stimuli that were judged as rela-tively more common or ordinary, r(192) = .14, p = .05, and easier to attain,r(192) = .15, p < .04, than did unhappy individuals. However, happierand less happy students did not differ in the degree to which their appre-ciation was a function of the materialism of the stimuli, r(192) = –.09, ns.

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AGREEMENT WITH BELIEF SYSTEM ADAGES

When examining students’ agreement with common adages that pro-mote positive thinking and that imply that rewards can be gained fromeven negative situations, results showed that happier individuals re-ported greater agreement with such adages. That is, happier individu-als, compared to less happy ones, reported higher agreement with theadages “every cloud has a silver lining,” r(192) = .26, p < .01, and “withevery seed of adversity comes with it an equal or greater benefit,” r(192)= .32, p < .01. These results support the notion that happier individualshave greater appreciation for many different stimuli, including thosethat might be relatively more negative or aversive, perhaps because theybelieve that these negative situations or events might be beneficial tothem in some way in the future.

STUDY 2

METHOD

The aim of Study 2 was to examine self–rated “happy” and “unhappy”individuals’ appreciation, affective reactions, and perceptions of the re-warding and aversive experiences in participants’ own lives. Specifi-cally, Study 2 was an attempt to examine whether chronically happy andunhappy individuals differ in the number and type of stimuli that theyappreciate (or that they find frustrating for comparison). A final aim wasto examine responses given by happy and unhappy individu-als—namely, whether independent judges would perceive differencesin how positive the stimuli listed by happy and unhappy individualswere, and whether the stimuli listed by happy and unhappy individualswere different in the extent that “most people” would appreciate them.

OverviewIn a purported study about “daily events,” participants were randomlyassigned to write about people, events, or objects that they appreciatedor that were frustrating to them during the previous day. Participantsalso made a number of other ratings such as the extent and duration oftheir appreciation and happiness in response to their observations, andthe extent of their appreciation for their observations on most otherdays.

ParticipantsIntroductory psychology students (N = 84) participated in this study inexchange for course credit. Participants were selected based on their re-sponses to the SHS (Cronbach’s α = .89), which was mass–administered


during the first week of the quarter. Those above and below the upperand lower quartiles (5.75 and 4.25 on the 7–point composite score, re-spectively) on this scale were classified as “happy” and “unhappy” stu-dents, respectively, and recruited by telephone. As part of thisquestionnaire, participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory(BDI; Beck, 1967). Students with scores that were above 16 on the BDI(i.e., those classified as mildly–to–moderately dysphoric or depressed)were excluded from selection in this study (to eliminate the confound ofpessimistic thinking as a result of a possible mood disorder). The finalsample included 42 happy and 42 unhappy students. The happy stu-dents’ group mean was 6.08 (SD = 0.37) and the unhappy students’group mean was 3.68 (SD = 0.58). The correlation between the BDI andthe SHS was strong (r(82) = –.62, p < .05).

DesignThe present study was a 2 × 2 between–subjects design with two levels ofhappiness (happy, unhappy) and two levels of response (appreciation,frustration). Happy and unhappy participants were randomly assignedto either the appreciation or frustration condition. It should be noted thatall participants during a given experimental session received the samemanipulation—that is, all participants were given the same set ofinstructions.

Procedures and MeasuresIntroduction and Consent Forms. As in Study 1, one experimenter led

each experimental session, which included 8 to 20 students per group.Students were told that they would be participating in a study aboutdaily experiences. Specifically, they were informed that the purpose ofthe study was to examine how people recall and respond to daily events,and that they would be completing a series of questionnaires designedto tap into their experiences and reactions. Participants then read andsigned consent forms. Next, participants were told they would be givena 3 × 5 card with a random number printed on the front. This number,they were informed, would be used throughout the study, and that theywould be asked to write their number at the top of each questionnairepacket to identify their responses. Participants were reminded not towrite their personal names on any of the printed material. One 3 × 5 cardwas then given to each participant.

Preliminary Questionnaire. After receiving their 3 × 5 cards, partici-pants were given a preliminary questionnaire and then asked to writetheir number (on the 3 × 5 card) at the top right–hand corner. Partici-pants were asked to complete their questionnaires and then to put their

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pencils down and remain quiet when they were finished so as not to dis-turb other participants.

The preliminary questionnaire included two general questions re-garding the extent of appreciation and frustration that they have for peo-ple, events, and things in their lives (1 = none at all, 7 = a great deal). Thisquestionnaire also included questions about how good their memory isfor recalling events that occurred within the last 24 hours; how muchtime they spend thinking about these events; how much they enjoy re-calling events that occurred within the last 24 hours; and how much oftheir day includes experiencing positive and negative events. After par-ticipants were finished, their questionnaires were collected and placedin an envelope.

Recall Task. Next, participants were told that they would be doing a“recall task.” They were given the questionnaire and instructed to thinkabout the previous 24 hours of their life. They were asked to think aboutthe things that they had appreciated during the previous 24 hours (“ap-preciation” condition), or things that had frustrated them (“frustration”condition), and then to write them down in spaces provided in column“A” of their questionnaires.2 Participants were told that it did not matterhow small or large the things were that they included.

After participants were finished making their lists, they were asked toelaborate on each item separately by writing in column “B” of their ques-tionnaires whatever came to mind when thinking about each one, one ata time.2 After elaborating on each item, participants were then instructedto assess their appreciation for each item that participants recalled—thatis, they were asked to use column “C” to indicate, one at a time, the de-gree of their appreciation for each item on their lists by using a 7–pointscale (1 = none at all, 7 = a great deal).4

Next, participants were told that they would be making more ratingsof each item that they listed. All participants were asked the same seriesof questions regardless of whether they were in the appreciation or frus-tration conditions. Specifically, all participants were asked to considereach item, one at a time, and then to indicate how long their appreciationlevel for it would last (1 = not long at all, 7 = a very long time); how


2. Because the primary purpose was to examine the characteristics of targets (not howquickly they come to mind), participants were not given a time limit on recalling the task.

3. This was intended to stimulate thinking and to give both happy and unhappy partici-pants time to reflect on each item, although participants only had space to write one or twosentences next to each observation.

4. It is important to note that it is conceptually consistent for participants to rate their ap-preciation for their items even in the frustration condition—that is, one could report that afriend had frustrated them, yet still rate high levels of appreciation for this person.

happy/unhappy it makes them (1 = very unhappy, 7 = very happy); howlong they think their happiness/unhappiness will last (1 = a very shorttime, 7 = a very long time); how frustrating it is to them (1 = not at all frus-trating, 7 = very frustrating); how long they think their frustration levelwill last (1 = not long at all, 7 = a very long time); how much they appreciateit on most other days (1 = not at all, 7 = very much); and how much they arefrustrated by it on most other days (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).

Postrecall Questionnaire. After participants were finished with the re-call task, their questionnaires were collected and placed in an envelope.Next, participants were told that they would be answering questionsabout the task and experiment. All participants answered the same se-ries of questions about their impressions of the task and experi-ment—that is, how difficult it was for them to generate their list (1 = notdifficult at all, 7 = very difficult); how much they liked doing the task (1 =not at all, 7 = very much); the extent that they thought the task was usefulin some way (1 = not useful at all, 7 = very useful); how much they wouldlike to do the task again (1 = not at all; 7 = very much); how many morethings they could have added to their lists (1 = none at all, 7 = very many);how much they liked participating in the study (1 = not at all, 7 = verymuch); how much they would like to participate in this study again ifthey had the chance (1 = not at all, 7 = very much); and how much they ap-preciate (or are frustrated by) the people, events, and things in their life(1 = not at all, 7 = very much).

After participants were finished, their questionnaires were collectedand placed in an envelope. Participants were then debriefed andthanked for their time.

Judges’ Ratings. Two independent observers (i.e., judges), who werenot aware of the hypotheses of the study, made assessments of partici-pants’ responses. Judges were first instructed to respond to the same se-ries of questions about each observation, as did the participants. That is,they were to consider each observation listed by participants, one at atime, and then to indicate how much the average person would appreci-ate this observation, how happy and frustrated this observation wouldmake most people, and how materialistic, common or ordinary, andeasy to attain this observation was. Lastly, judges were asked to rereadparticipants’ elaborations and then to estimate how appreciative andhappy the participants seemed compared to most people. All ratingswere made on 7–point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal). Thereliabilities of the judges’ ratings were good to excellent (Cronbach’s αsranged from .70 to .94). Each set of ratings made by the judges wasstandardized and averaged.

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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Summary of Predictions and Primary Statistical AnalysesThe general aim of this study was to compare happy and unhappy indi-viduals’ appreciation for rewarding and aversive stimuli in their per-sonal lives. Specifically, this study examined whether happy andunhappy individuals differed in their appreciation for the rewardingand aversive stimuli in their own lives. First, happy individuals were ex-pected to report greater appreciation for their observations (even thosethat were frustrating) than were unhappy individuals. Also, due to theirgreater sensitivity to reward, happy individuals, compared to unhappyones, were expected to list more things that they appreciated and to re-port less difficulty in doing so. Second, due to their relatively greatersensitivity to reward, happy individuals were hypothesized to reportgreater liking for the task and study, and stronger desires to repeat thetask after recalling things that they appreciated than were unhappy indi-viduals. Third, because happy individuals were expected to have lowerthresholds to perceive events as positive (due to their greater sensitivityto rewards), happy individuals were expected to include observationsthat are more simple or trivial (i.e., less materialistic, more common orordinary, and easier to attain) than were unhappy individuals. Fourth,and last, because students’ appreciation was expected to be more a func-tion of their perceptions than the objective nature of the stimuli, the ob-servations given by happy and unhappy individuals were expected tobe ones that most people would similarly appreciate and would react towith similar levels of happiness.

These hypotheses were tested with planned pairwise comparisons, aswell as with 2 (happy vs. unhappy) × 2 (appreciation vs. frustration)analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Because of the directional nature of thehypotheses, pairwise comparisons were conducted using Fisher’s leastsignificant difference (LSD) one–tailed test (p < .05). Also, because of thelarge number of dependent variables and possible pairwise compari-sons, the results are reported according to how they bear on specific hy-potheses. The effect sizes for these pairwise comparisons (i.e., those thatrelate to the hypotheses of this study) are also reported.

Premanipulation MeasuresHappy and unhappy participants were compared on several baselinemeasures. The results showed no between–group differences in how ac-curate participants believed their memory was recalling positive andnegative events and in how much they enjoyed recalling negative eventsthat occurred within the previous 24 hours (All Fs (1, 80) < 2, ps = ns).However, happy participants, compared to unhappy ones, reported


spending more time thinking about positive events (Ms = 5.80 vs. 4.87;SDs = 1.17 vs. 1.20), F(1, 80) = 12.48, p < .01, r = .36, and less time thinkingabout negative events (Ms = 3.97 vs. 4.92; SDs = 1.54 vs. 1.16), F(1, 80) =9.60, p < .01, r = .32, more enjoyment for recalling positive events that oc-curred within the last 24 hours (Ms = 6.22 vs. 5.12; SDs = 1.06 vs. 1.10),F(1, 80) = 8.58, p < .01, r = .31, more frequent daily experiences of positiveevents (Ms = 5.68 vs. 4.33; SDs = 1.11 vs. 0.90), F(1, 80) = 35.70, p < .01, r =.56, and less frequent daily experiences of negative events (Ms = 2.54vs.3.49; SDs = 0.84 vs. 1.10), F(1, 80) = 19.05, p < .01, r = .44. Additionally,supporting the primary hypothesis, happy participants reported greaterappreciation for the people, events, and things in their lives in general(Ms = 6.80 vs. 5.69; SDs = 0.50 vs. 1.34), F(1, 75) = 25.14, p < .01, r = .49, andbeing less frustrated by them as well (Ms = 2.82 vs. 4.43; SDs = 1.36 vs.1.35), F(1, 75) = 28.06, p < .01, r = .51.

Recall of Daily ObservationsBecause students were free to list as many observations as they could,the numbers of observations across students’ lists were unequal. Thus,all analyses were repeated using the number of observations as acovariate. The findings were essentially identical, thus the results are re-ported collapsing over this variable. Also, although the presentation ofthe results reflects relevant pairwise comparisons (i.e., as they relate tospecific hypotheses), the results of all pairwise comparisons arepresented in Table 3.

Initial results showed that students who recalled and listed observa-tions that they appreciated included more observations on their liststhan did those who recalled and listed observations that frustratedthem, F(1, 80) = 35.02, p < .01. Comparisons of happy and unhappy stu-dents’ responses within conditions revealed differences only in the ap-preciation condition. That is, happy students who listed observationsthey appreciated included relatively more observations on their liststhan did unhappy ones who were in the same condition; yet happy andunhappy students who listed observations that frustrated them in-cluded similar numbers of observations on their lists.

Appreciation in Response to Reported StimuliAs expected, happy students who recalled and listed observations thatthey appreciated reported greater appreciation for their observations,and greater appreciation for their observations on most other days, thandid unhappy students who were in the same condition; however, happyand unhappy individuals who were in the appreciation condition didnot differ in their assessments of how long they thought their apprecia-tion for their observations would last. Happy and unhappy students

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TABLE 3. Means (and Standard Deviations) on the Dependent Measures for Happy andUnhappy Participants in the Appreciation and Frustration Conditions (Study 2)

Appreciation Condition Frustration Condition

Dependent Measure Happy+ Unhappy+ Happy+ Unhappy+

Recall Task Responses

Number of observations 15.20a (4.83) 11.20b (4.20) 7.52c (4.18) 7.34c (3.67)

Overall appreciation 6.34a (0.71) 5.82b (0.68) 4.09c (1.19) 4.04c (1.52)

Duration of appreciation 5.00a (1.38) 4.96a (0.96) 3.28b (1.16) 3.46b (1.08)

Appreciation on most otherdays 5.54a (1.20) 4.76 b (1.13) 2.88c (1.48) 3.15c (1.49)

Happiness in response totheir observations 5.91a (0.77) 5.30b (0.97) 3.01c (0.97) 2.78c (0.68)

Duration of happiness 5.16a (1.40) 4.44b (1.30) 2.68c (1.41) 2.80c (0.96)

Postrecall Task Responses

Task difficulty 1.65a (0.88) 3.00b (1.59) 2.67b (1.65) 2.42ab (1.57)

Ability to include additionalobservations 4.55a (2.16) 3.30b (1.34) 2.62b (1.72) 2.42b (1.26)

Liking for the task 5.40a (1.54) 4.50b (1.15) 3.76c (1.18) 4.00bc (0.67)

Desire to repeat the task 4.35a (1.79) 3.35b (1.62) 3.09b (1.34) 3.53b (1.22)

Assessment of task utility 5.25a (1.68) 4.30b (1.22) 4.33b (1.24) 4.42b (1.46)

Liking for the study 5.05a (1.43) 4.00b (1.29) 4.52b (1.44) 4.32b (0.67)

Desire to repeat the study 4.40a (1.73) 3.70a (1.45) 4.14a (1.59) 4.11a (0.94)

Judges’ Ratings

Elaboration –0.07a (0.94) –0.15a (0.97) 0.16a (1.02) 0.06a (1.11)

Materialism of theobservations –0.24a (0.91) 0.38b (0.95) –0.05ab (1.03) –0.11ab (1.07)

Commonality of theobservations 0.65a (0.86) 0.31ab (0.72) –0.76c (0.96) –0.14b (0.88)

Attainability of theobservations 0.38a (0.81) 0.07a (1.00) –0.54b (1.04) 0.15a (0.94)

Average person’sappreciation forparticipants’ observations 0.65a (0.46) 0.99b (0.56) –0.82c (0.58) –0.82c (0.58)

Average person’s happinessin response to participants’observations 0.68a (0.51) 0.98a (0.54) –0.79b (0.60) –0.79b (0.60)

Perceived appreciationlevels 0.94a (0.76) 0.29b (0.91) –0.54c (0.71) –0.54c (0.71)

Perceived happiness levels 0.90a (0.73) 0.19b (0.89) –0.48c (0.82) –0.48c (0.82)

Note. Means that have the same subscript are not significantly different at p < .05 using Fisher’s least sig-nificant difference (LSD), one–tailed test.

who were in the frustration condition reported similar levels and dura-tions of appreciation for their observations, and similar levels ofappreciation for their observations on most other days.

Participants’ reports of how happy their observations made them mir-rored their assessments of their overall appreciation for their observa-tions, and appreciation for their observations on most other days.Happy participants, compared to unhappy ones, in the appreciationcondition reported greater and longer durations of happiness in re-sponse to their observations. Happy and unhappy individuals whowere in the frustration condition, however, did not differ in theseassessments.

Assessments of the Appreciation and Frustration TasksComparing responses given by happy and unhappy students withinconditions, once again, further confirmed the hypotheses. That is, happystudents who recalled and listed observations that they appreciated,compared to unhappy students who were in the same condition, re-ported that the task was relatively easier for them, and that they couldhave included more additional observations on their lists, liked the taskmore, had a greater desire to repeat the task, and perceived the task itselfas more useful. Additionally, happy participants who recalled observa-tions that they appreciated reported greater liking for the study and agreater desire to repeat the study than did unhappy participants in thesame condition. Happy and unhappy participants in the frustration con-dition did not significantly differ on these assessments of the task.

Judges’ Ratings of Participants’ ObservationsSimplicity or Triviality of Participants’ Observations. Examinations of

happy and unhappy students across conditions supported several hy-potheses. Comparisons of happy and unhappy students’ observationswithin conditions revealed that the observations listed by happy stu-dents who recalled and listed observations that they appreciated wereless materialistic, but similarly common or ordinary, and attainable, aswere the observations listed by unhappy students who were in the samecondition. Interestingly, the observations listed by happy students whorecalled and listed observations that frustrated them, compared to thoselisted by unhappy students who were in the same condition, were simi-larly materialistic, but less common or ordinary, and attainable.

Additional Ratings of Participants’ Daily Observations. Examination ofthe judges’ reports of “the average person’s” appreciation and happi-ness in response to participants’ observations revealed interesting pat-terns of results. As expected, comparing happy and unhappy students’observations of appreciation revealed that those listed by happy stu-dents were judged as ones that the average person would appreciate less

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than were those listed by unhappy students. Additionally, the observa-tions listed by happy students who listed observations that they appreci-ated were judged as making the average person similarly happy as werethose listed by unhappy students who were in the same condition.Lastly, judges rated the observations of happy and unhappy partici-pants in the frustration condition as ones that the average person wouldsimilarly appreciate and respond to with similar levels of happiness.

Perceptions of Participants’ Appreciation and Happiness Levels. A f t e rjudges were finished with their ratings, they were asked to make addi-tional ratings on how appreciative and happy each participant seemedto them. After reading participants’ elaboration on each item, judgesperceived happy students who recalled and listed observations thatthey appreciated as more appreciative and happy, “compared to mostothers,” than unhappy students in the same condition. However, judgesperceived happy and unhappy students who recalled and listed obser-vations that frustrated them as similarly appreciative and happy,compared to most others.

These results supported the general hypothesis that there is a relationbetween appreciation and happiness. That is, happier individuals re-ported greater appreciation for the people, events, and objects in theirown lives than did unhappy individuals. In fact, with three exceptions,happy and unhappy students’ responses were generally distinguishableonly when they recalled observations that they appreciated, not whenthey recalled observations that frustrated them. Supporting the link be-tween appreciation and happiness, happy and unhappy students’ as-sessments of how happy their observations made them paralleled ex-actly their assessments of their appreciation. For example, after recallingand listing observations that they appreciated, happy individuals re-ported relatively greater happiness in response to their observations andthat their happiness would last for longer periods of time. Indeed,merely thinking about and listing things they appreciated appeared tohave a more positive emotional impact on happy students than onunhappy ones.

Additionally, results from independent judges illuminated the possi-ble sources of the differences between happy and unhappy students’ ap-preciation. For example, although happy students reported experienc-ing relatively more frequent daily occurrences of positive events at theoutset of the study, as well as relatively greater appreciation and happi-ness in response to their observations, independent observers reportedthat the events generated by happy students, compared to those gener-ated by unhappy students, were ones that would elicit less appreciationand happiness in the average person. However, despite their greaterperceived appreciation and happiness overall, as well as time spent on


(and enjoyment for) thinking about their targets of appreciation, happyindividuals’ observations were judged as similarly common or ordi-nary, and attainable, but less materialistic, than those listed by unhappystudents. Interestingly, an opposite pattern of results was found forhappy and unhappy students who recalled and listed observations thatfrustrated them—that is, the observations listed by happy students werejudged as relatively less common and attainable, but similarly material-istic. Therefore, happy and unhappy students’ appreciation and emo-tional reactivity appears to be a function of their attention to differenttypes of stimuli. Perhaps because happy individuals are relatively moresensitive to rewards than are unhappy ones, they are able to overlooksmall annoyances (i.e., frustrating or aversive events that are commonand attainable). Moreover, what is considered rewarding may be moreinternally defined by happy, compared to unhappy, individuals. Thus,because happy individuals might attend to more intrinsically rewardingstimuli (i.e., those that are less materialistic), they are afforded relativelygreater and more consistent opportunities in their day to experienceappreciation.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The results presented here offer support for the hypothesis that happi-ness and appreciation are related. Whether in self–descriptions or in re-ports on hypothetical or real–life stimuli, situations, and events, theresults were essentially the same. Happier individuals reported rela-tively greater appreciation in general and relatively greater appreciationfor hypothetical rewarding events (Study 1) and for real–life rewardingevents that were freely recalled from their personal lives (Study 2).Moreover, the results from Study 1 showed that happier individuals’ ap-preciation was relatively less influenced by the positivity of the stimuli(e.g., “a free $1,000 shopping spree at your favorite store” vs. “finding apenny on the sidewalk”). In fact, happier individuals, compared to lesshappy ones, reported greater appreciation for stimuli that most otherswould appreciate less (e.g., “looking at the stars”), that most otherswould respond to with relatively less happiness (e.g., “a smile from astranger”), and that were more trivial (e.g., “riding a bike”; Studies 1 and2) and negative (e.g., “standing in line” or “discipline from your par-ents”). Furthermore, even when participants freely generated observa-tions that they appreciated from their personal lives (Study 2), happierparticipants, compared to less happy ones, listed observations for whichthe average person would hold less appreciation (e.g., “seeing how nicemy room looks when my bed is made”). Thus, these results are in oppo-sition to the argument that happier individuals attend to or recall

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happier or more positive things, at least when recalling sources of theirappreciation.

The results of these two studies also provide support to theory (e.g.,Gray, 1970, 1972) and research (e.g., Carver & White, 1994; Davidson,1994; Gross, et al., 1998; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Sutton & Davidson,1997; Tellegen, 1985) that suggest a relation between sensitivity to re-ward and happiness, and they offer new evidence regarding the link be-tween these constructs and appreciation. The results of Study 1 revealedsignificant positive relations among appreciation, happiness (chronichappiness and the positive components of happiness—positive affectand life satisfaction), and sensitivity to reward5. Moreover, participants’levels of appreciation were uniquely predicted both by their levels ofsensitivity to reward and by happiness. That is, the findings suggest thatparticipants’ biologically–based motivational system of sensitivity to re-ward explains individuals’ appreciation for both hypothetical andreal–life events and situations over and above their chronic and tran-sient levels of affect. It is interesting to note that sensitivity to punish-ment was related only to subjective happiness; that is, appreciation, cur-rent levels of positive and negative affect, and life satisfaction were notsignificantly related to sensitivity to punishment. Therefore, these find-ings suggest that, rather than being influenced by the relative sensitivityof reward over punishment (see Gray, 1987a), appreciation and the sep-arate components of happiness might only correspond to the one moti-vational system—that is, sensitivity to reward.6 Because appreciationwas conceptualized as primarily a cognitive form of an “emotional” be-havior (i.e., behavior elicited by reinforcing events—see Gray, 1972) andas a cognitive consequence of the motivational system of sensitivity toreward, it was important to show, first, that the act of appreciation ismore pleasurable to happier individuals than to less happy ones. The re-sults from Study 2 support this idea. For example, after recalling and list-ing observations from their personal lives that they appreciated, happierparticipants, as compared to their unhappy counterparts, reported that


5. Carver and White’s (1994) BAS scale, which was used in this study, has been linked toGray’s conceptualization of the brain activity involved in the motivational system of sensi-tivity to reward (i.e., left–frontal brain activation; see Sutton & Davidson, 1997). Thus, al-though the biologically based motivational system of sensitivity to reward was not directlymeasured, the BAS is conceptualized as an indirect measure of this signal–sensitivity sys-tem.

6. This does not contradict Gray’s (1972, 1975, 1987b, 1987c) claim that emotional behav-ior (i.e., behavior elicited by reinforcing events) could result from the balance of the BASand the BIS. In this study, only recollections of events and situations were measured. Reac-tivity to immediate events was not assessed.

the task was more useful to them, indicated greater liking for the taskand study, and reported a greater desire to repeat the task. Thus, becauseappreciation is more pleasurable to happier participants than to lesshappy ones, they might be relatively more likely to engage in thisbehavior on a day–to–day basis. This might also explain why happierparticipants in the appreciation condition reported that the appreciationtask was relatively less difficult and that they could have includedrelatively more additional observations on their lists.

With their greater appreciation, reactivity, and recall of rewardingstimuli, happier individuals might have an advantage for sustainingtheir happiness over relatively longer periods of time. Once individualshave encountered stimuli or events that they perceive as rewarding, ap-preciation might serve them well by allowing them to replay the reward-ing aspects of these stimuli or events over and over again in their minds,and to think more deeply about them. These processes that involvegreater rehearsal and elaboration time might be a mechanism by whichindividuals retain the positive aspects of rewarding situations andevents in their working memory (see Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971;Baddeley, 1986; see also Awh, Jonides, & Reuter–Lorenz, 1998), and as aconsequence, happier individuals might be able to preserve the emo-tional benefits from their positive experiences for relatively longer peri-ods of time. This is supported by earlier findings that happy studentsspend more time thinking about positive events, and have greater enjoy-ment for recalling positive events, than do unhappy students. Moreover,if it is the case that happier individuals, compared to less happy ones,have increased memory rehearsal and elaboration time, as well as hav-ing greater emotional reactivity to rewarding events, happier individu-als might be more likely to transfer their positive experiences to theirlong–term memories (see Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971; Glanzer, 1972;Murdock, 1962; see also Cahill, Prins, Weber, & McGaugh, 1994). Conse-quently, happier individuals might have the additional advantage ofcontinually benefiting from the same rewarding experiences over time.That is, long after the event has occurred, happier individuals, com-pared to less happy ones, might be better able to access their positive ex-periences from their long–term memories and, thus, be more likely toderive continued pleasure from the event. Future research wouldbenefit from exploring these relationships among memory processesand appreciation in happier and less happy individuals.

Rooted in the data, these results suggest that rather than experiencingsituations and events that are relatively more positive, happier individ-uals attend to more events that they perceive as more positive. As a result,they have greater opportunities to experience greater appreciation, andgreater and longer durations of happiness, in response to rewarding

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events. Moreover, because of their greater sensitivity to reward, happierindividuals might be better able to cognitively extract positive meaningfrom even the worst situations or events. This might explain the findingsfrom Study 1 that suggested that happier individuals are inclined to be-lieve that positive experiences can come from negative situations, thusendorsing the adages, “every cloud has a silver lining” and “that everyseed of adversity comes with it an equal or greater benefit.”

These results have strong implications for clinical or counseling set-tings. Specifically, the findings from the present study are conducive tocognitive therapeutic approaches that emphasize the importance of in-dividuals’ interpretations of their experiences. Two cognitive styles thatare problematic for individuals who are at the worst end of unhappiness(i.e., those who are dysphoric or depressed) are negative thinking (aboutmany areas such as the self, their current situation or experiences, andthe future; see Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) and rumination (a con-tinual focus on one’s negative emotions; see Lyubomirsky &Nolen–Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999). These patterns maylead to a continual spiral down—that is, to even lower motivation,greater depression, and further negative thinking. Thus, learning tothink differently or to recognize the value or importance, and to see thebenefits or meaning in one’s experiences (i.e., learning to broaden one’sappreciation) might interrupt the negative spiral down, and might evenhave substantial direct and positive effects on other perceptions andsubsequent emotions (see Beck, 1991) and positively affect the impactthat emotions have on subsequent attitudes and behaviors (see Lazarus,1991; see also Lyubomirsky & Nolen–Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky etal., 1999; Rholes, Riskind, & Lane, 1987, for evidence and discussions ofthe influence of cognitive processes on emotional states). Because todate, there are relatively no studies examining the relations amongappreciation, emotion, and sensitivity to reward, these findings are animportant addition to the literature.

LIMITATIONS

The most serious limitation of the studies reported here was that appre-ciation, happiness, and sensitivity to reward and punishment were as-sessed exclusively by self–report. Consequently, these measurementsare subject to similar, and perhaps confounding, sources of error (e.g.,social desirability, current mood, and normative beliefs; see Diener,Sandvik, Pavot, & Gallagher, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). However,the possibility of these sources of error, while important to consider,does not invalidate the current findings. For example, social desirabilityis not considered to be an artifactual source of error in the measurement


of happiness (Diener et al., 1991); rather, it appears to be an importantfactor in happiness, as well as in traits that are closely related to happi-ness (McCrae, 1986; McCrae & Costa, 1985; see also Furnham, 1986). In-cidentally, social desirability is not exclusive to self–report measures,but is related to non-self–report measures of happiness as well (Diener etal., 1991). Furthermore, current mood is also an important component ofhappiness—indeed, positive and negative affect comprise two of thethree components of happiness. Thus, controlling for current moodwould have altered the entire meaning of the happiness construct, leav-ing only the cognitive component (life satisfaction). As a result, this newhappiness construct might have led to spuriously high correlations withappreciation (given that appreciation was more highly correlated withlife satisfaction than with positive or negative affect). Lastly, normativebeliefs (i.e., implicit beliefs of members of a culture about the importanceor appropriateness of happiness) are expected to be evenly distributedacross individuals. Thus, such beliefs should only introduce a randomsource of error, which, if operating, would only serve to reduce the effectsizes found, rather than to artificially inflate them. Finally, alternativenon–self–report approaches (e.g., behavioral observations, informantreports, and other indirect test measures) would not have captured thesubjective nature of happiness (see Diener, 1984; Lyubomirsky &Lepper, 1999) and other internally experienced processes or events.After all, who is better to judge the experience of one’s happiness andappreciation than the individual being judged?

A second limitation concerns the methodology of the two studies re-ported here. Because both studies were conducted in the laboratory, it isunknown whether the participants’ appreciation and happiness in re-sponse to rewarding situations and events would generalize to a natu-ralistic setting. Although Study 2 attempted to examine affective reac-tions to real–life rewarding events from the participants’ personal lives,these reactions (captured in the laboratory) were by no means expectedto duplicate the reactions that had occurred at the time of each event.Also, the question remains as to whether forcing people to elaborate ontheir observations of appreciation changes the dynamics among theirlevels of appreciation, happiness, and sensitivity to reward. However,this possibility does not pose a significant problem for the findings inthis study for two reasons. First, the results of Study 2 essentially repli-cated those of Study 1 (using different sources of appreciation), whichdid not use an “elaboration” procedure. Second, because all participantscompleted the same elaboration procedure, the comparison of happierand less happy individuals is still interesting and informative. However,future research is needed to examine the relations among appreciation

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and happiness in response to rewarding experiences in the laboratory,as well as to rewarding stimuli in more naturalistic settings.

Lastly, because the bulk of the findings were correlational, the presentdata do not allow us to test for causal relations among appreciation, hap-piness, and sensitivity to reward. It is unlikely that there are unidirec-tional causal arrows from appreciation and happiness to the biologicallybased motivational system in the brain; rather, appreciation and happi-ness are likely to be outcomes of this system. The possibility remains,however, that these constructs could reciprocally influence one an-other—this opens a door for individuals to have some control in main-taining or enhancing their own emotional well–being. For example, if in-deed there were reciprocal influences, then individuals could learn or beprompted to broaden their appreciation, which might positively affectthe BAS and increase happiness in response to events. Research showsthat cognitive processes (although different from appreciation) can in-fluence affect (see Lyubomirsky & Nolen–Hoeksema, 1995;Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999; Rholes et al., 1987), andperhaps appreciation might be one tool to be utilized in this process.However, it should be noted that pattern of means in these studies doesnot provide insight into the ultimate cause of participants’ changes in af-fective responses, nor does it provide clues into the nature of the relationbetween appreciation and happiness and how they relate to sensitivityto reward.

FURTHER QUESTIONS

The two studies on appreciation reported here are important contribu-tions to the psychological literature; however, much more work isneeded in this relatively less investigated area of research. Several ques-tions remain. For example, in what ways, and under what circum-stances, do appreciation and happiness reciprocally influence oneanother? With more sophisticated technologies, researchers may bebetter able to closely observe the chain of events that occur between ap-preciation, happiness, and sensitivity to reward. Only then will it be pos-sible to answer questions about exact processing times and causalpathways from one’s first encounter with rewarding stimuli to one’seventual appreciation and happiness in response to it.

Appreciation might be influenced by social or situational compari-sons. Research shows that comparisons with others who are relativelyworse off make people feel better about themselves (and comparisonswith others who are relatively better off make people feel worse aboutthemselves; see Hakmiller, 1966; Morse & Gergen, 1970; Salovey & Ro-din, 1984; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985).


However, individual differences in happiness appear to moderate theeffect of these comparisons (see Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997;Lyubomirsky et al., 2001)—that is, happier individuals are less influ-enced by comparison information, especially unfavorable comparisoninformation, than are less happy individuals. It has been proposed thathappy individuals use cognitive and motivational strategies to maintaintheir levels of happiness (see Abbe, Tkach, & Lyubomirsky, 2003;Lyubomirsky, 2001), which makes them less vulnerable especially to un-favorable comparison information. Nevertheless, comparisons with lessfortunate others (e.g., the homeless, physically or mentally ill, starving,or the poor) may assist or prompt both happy and unhappy individualsto recognize the value or benefits of their current situation, thus enablingthem to feel happier and more appreciative for their current position orsituation. Additionally, thinking about or comparing one’s current situ-ation with worse–off possible outcomes or alternatives (e.g., getting an“F” rather than the “C,” and being “fired” rather than experiencing a re-duction in pay, redirection, or transfer) may similarly help individualsto be more appreciative—that is, recognize some value, importance, ormeaningfulness in their current situation rather than the alternative,perceive it as relatively more positive or beneficial, and be thankfulbecause their situation could have been worse.

Appreciation plays a significant role in many cultures. Thus, an im-portant question concerns the role of learning. One of the first lessons achild learns is to say “thank you” in response to others’ efforts. Foradults, the failure to express timely appreciation has social ramifica-tions. That is, a person would be considered rude or inconsiderate if heor she failed to acknowledge and express appreciation for favors, assis-tance, or gifts performed or given by others. When asked about thelength of time that one should let pass before sending “thank you” notesfor presents given by wedding guests, Judith Martin (i.e., “Miss Man-ners”) replied, “Enough time to get paper and a pen in hand—abouttwenty minutes” (Martin, 2000). Thus, successful social development in-cludes learning the importance of acknowledging the value, importance,or meaningfulness of others’ efforts or contributions, and showinggratitude.

Parents who teach their children the valuable lesson of expressingtheir appreciation and the importance of being “thankful” for what theyhave might not only be setting their children up for success in their socialrelationships, but also be making an impact on their long–term happi-ness. As suggested by an unknown author, “A happy life does not dependon good fortune or indeed on any external contingencies, but also, and even to agreater extent, on a man’s cast of mind. The important thing is not what a manhas, but how he reacts to what he has.” How individuals react—that is, how

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appreciative and “thankful” they are—may depend on first recognizingthe value of their experiences and perceiving the benefits or contribu-tions to their lives. Although there may be a predisposition toward rec-ognizing the value and benefits of experiences, it does not negate thepossibility that this tendency could be in part shaped by the environ-ment—whether it is in childhood or later life. Therefore, even later inlife, the possibility remains that individuals may be able to get the mostout of life and perhaps even increase their baseline levels of happinessover time by developing this tendency to appreciate all that life has tooffer.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the present study lead to two general conclusions. The firstconclusion is clearly and consistently rooted in the data. Whether for hy-pothetical events or for events that occur in their daily lives, whether forevents that are largely rewarding or only trivially so, happier individu-als appreciate things more than do less happy individuals. Importantly,the appreciation of happier individuals is less a function of the positivityor importance of the event than that of their unhappy peers. The secondconclusion is more speculative. Appreciation appears to be related to abiologically based motivational system of sensitivity to reward, and lev-els of happiness do not explain this relation. That is, over and above theeffects of happiness on appreciation, sensitivity to reward uniquely ex-plains variation in appreciation in general, as well as in appreciation forhypothetical and real–life situations and events. The results of the pres-ent research suggest the importance of examining the nature of the rela-tions among appreciation, happiness, and sensitivity to reward. That is,whether experiences of appreciation and happiness are unique and sep-arate consequences of sensitivity to reward, or whether one precedes theother after activation of sensitivity to reward, are questions that remainto be answered.

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