Getting As on the three Fs: The Educational and Fiscal Opportunities in Decentralization Lant...

Getting A’s on the three F’s: The Educational and Fiscal Opportunities in Decentralization

Lant Pritchett

Varad Pande

Outline (but with several big “asides”)

Fiscal issuesFiscal issues

Decentralization and Primary Education Reform in India: The Two Questions

Decentralization and Primary Education Reform in India: The Two Questions

An Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First Principles

An Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First Principles

A ‘Modest Proposal’ for ReformA ‘Modest Proposal’ for Reform

Decentralization And Primary Education Reform in India

India is Trying to Decentralize

Indian Needs Primary Education

Reform

73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution devolve political power to local governments

States modify Acts and hold elections to local governments

Functions in XI and XII Schedules devolved to local governments

73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution devolve political power to local governments

States modify Acts and hold elections to local governments

Functions in XI and XII Schedules devolved to local governments

Continued low enrolment, completion and achievement despite central and state schemes (and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)

Much lower educational indicators for poor, who suffer disproportionately



Question 1: How to Do Education Delivery in this

Decentralizing Context

Question 1: How to Do Education Delivery in this

Decentralizing Context

Question 2: Is Well-Designed Decentralization the

Right Model for Primary Education Reform?



0

5

10

UP Rajasthan MP AP Kerala Poland Chile Colombia

Fiscal

Administrative

Political

‘Unbalanced’ Decentralization

• Political Decentralization has happened (election of PRIs)but…

• Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization remains weak

• Political Decentralization has happened (election of PRIs)but…

• Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization remains weak

Source: World Bank (1999)

Decentralization in India Has to date been Unbalanced and Incomplete

Unbalanced Decentralization in India in an International Context

De

ce

ntr

ali

zati

on

In

de

x (

0-1

0)

Decentralization and Education

• Decentralization is no panacea—there are enormous risks to decentralization that could worsen service delivery

• Badly designed decentralization also has fiscal risks (and missed opportunities)

• Getting the “three F’s” properly aligned is difficult

Decentralization is Neither a Necessary nor Sufficient Condition for High Quality Education

0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0

children not reaching grade 5 (%), 1992-95

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Fis

cal d

ecen

tral

izat

ion

(S

chn

eid

er)

0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0


0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Po

litic

al d

ecen

tral

izat

ion

(S

chn

eid

er)

0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0


0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Ad

min

dec

entr

aliz

atio

n (

Sch

nei

der

)

Correlation between Decentralization Indicators and Primary Education Outcomes

Source: Analysis based on data from Governance and Service Delivery Indicators Dataset, Pippa Norris, Kennedy School of Government, (2004)

No evidence of high correlation between decentralization and education outcomes in cross-country analysis

No evidence of high correlation between decentralization and education outcomes in cross-country analysis

The problem that a State Finance Commission Faces

Assign

“vertical shares”

(revenues)• Central • State• Local

Assign functions

(across tiers)

• Education• Health• Roads• Water

Finance Finance FunctionsFunctions??

A plausible sounding procedure:

• Assign functions (across tiers of PRI) by sector and activity (including mandates for minimum standards—e.g. universal primary education)

• Cost those functions at the standards demanded/expected

• Calculate the vertical share to transfer adequate resources to each tier to carry out its functions—make revenue assignments

UnbundlingFunctional Allocation and Recommendations

Status quo Analysis

First Principles of Public Finance and Accountability

•Disaggregate into functions and activities:

- Logical, mutually exclusive and exhaustive (MECE) functional classification

- Consistent with Indian public administration delivery system

Who provides these functions and activities today in India?

What are the key functions and activities in Primary Education?

How to decide who should provide which functions and activities?

What changes are required to the current system of service delivery?

•Analyze de jure functional allocation of each tier by studying existing legislation

•Analyze de facto functional allocation (on-the-ground picture) by conducting surveys and interviews

•Based on this systematic analysis, propose changes to current system

•Develop a detailed proposal for reform of primary education that draws on the findings of our analytical approach

Our Analytical Approach To Effective Decentralization

•Use First Principles of Public Finance find optimal allocation from public finance perspective

•Use First Principles of Accountability to address the accountability issues

Step 1: Unbundling

Function Activity

Gra

m

Pa

nch

aya

t

Use

r G

rou

ps

Curriculum designLearning achievement standardsPlans for physical expansionPlans for quality improvementSocial CapitalPhysical CapitalBeneficiary SelectionChoice of students for targeting programsEnrolmentRecurrentTextbook choice/purchaseLearning materialsMaintenanceMaintenance of school buildings/facilitiesMonitoring of school processesHiringAssignmentTrainingSalarySupervisionDismissal

Monitoring and Evaluation

Tests of learning achievement

BlockCentral

Standards

Planning

Asset Creation

Operation - Non Teacher

Operation - Teacher

Responsibility

Se

rvic

e

Pro

vid

er

(sc

ho

ol)

Village

State District

Question: What are the Key Functions and Activities in Primary Education?Question: What are the Key Functions and Activities in Primary Education?

Functions and Activities in Government Primary Schooling in Rural India

Output: A Mutually Exclusive and Exhaustive Classification of Primary Education into Functions and ActivitiesOutput: A Mutually Exclusive and Exhaustive Classification of Primary Education into Functions and Activities

Function

Gra

m

Pan

chay

at

Use

r G

roup

s

Operation - Non teacherOperation - TeacherMonitoring and Evaluation little, not systematic

Responsibility

Service Provider (school)

Village

State Govt

District BlockCentral Govt

Standards Setting

Planning

Asset Creation

little, not systematic

Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE FACTO

Function

Gra

m

Pan

chay

at

Use

r G

roup

s

Operation - Non teacher

Operation - Teacher


BlockCentral Govt

Standards Setting

Planning

Asset Creation

Responsibility


Village

State Govt

District

Question: Who provides these functions and activities today?Question: Who provides these functions and activities today?

Step 2: Status Quo Analysis

Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE JURE

Lessons

• Current system is highly centralized with little role for PRIs / User Groups

• Schools / teachers have little or no autonomy… or accountability

• Current system is highly centralized with little role for PRIs / User Groups

• Schools / teachers have little or no autonomy… or accountability

Principle

What are the First Principles of Public Finance?

Explanation

Unit Cost of production declines as scale of production increases

Implication

Activities with significant economies of scale should be done by a higher level of government

The actions of one agent affects other agents

Activities with significant externalities should be done at a higher level of government, so that the ‘external’ effect can be ‘internalized’ in the system

Equity may imply financial support to education at a large enough geographic scope to allow for redistributive transfers to equalize across smaller units

Step 3: Use First Principles: Public Finance

Economies of Scale

Externalities

EquityNeed for equitable spread in inputs, process or outcomes

The more heterogenous the demand for the activity is likely to be, the more locally it should be done

Heterogeneity of Demand

Variation in local needs and preferences between regions

Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance

What is the size of ‘optimally sized catchments area’ of a service provider to jurisdiction?

State Population: 30-80 million

Zilla Parishad Population: 800,000-2 million

Block Panchayat Population: 60,000-600,000

Gram Panchayat Population: 2,000-20,000

Economies of Scale






Optimal Catchments Areas for LEVELS of Education

Primary schoolsSecondary Schools

Universities

Whereas the optimal catchments area for a primary school is at village level (GP jurisdiction)…

…the optimal catchments area for a University is district / state level (State jurisdiction)

Whereas the optimal catchments area for a primary school is at village level (GP jurisdiction)…

…the optimal catchments area for a University is district / state level (State jurisdiction)

Economies of Scale






Operation

Setting learning achievement standards

Monitoring and Evaluation (process and outcome)

Asset Creation

Planning

Primary School

Optimal Catchments Area for FUNCTIONS of Primary Education

Whereas the optimal catchments area for Operations is at village level (GP jurisdiction)…

…the optimal catchments area for a Setting Learning Standards is state level (State jurisdiction)

Whereas the optimal catchments area for Operations is at village level (GP jurisdiction)…

…the optimal catchments area for a Setting Learning Standards is state level (State jurisdiction)

Economies of Scale


Functional Allocation according to Economies of Scale Criterion`

Economies of Scale

Function

StateDistrictBlockGPSchool


Public Finance First Principle

Externalities / System-wide

EffectsEquity


Economies of Scale


Standards Setting

Operation - Teacher

Planning

Asset Creation

Equity Doesn’t Require Centralization

Equity Doesn’t Require Centralization

Equity Concerns are Important

Equity Concerns are Important

Major inequity / variations in primary education levels exists between districts within states

This creates equity rationale for centralization of education delivery


Equity

44.074.5

104.0

04080

120

Muzaffarnagar Lucknow Muradabad

59.885.6

120.0

04080

120

Kannur Kollam Idukki

Gross Enrolment Rate - UP (2003-04) Gross Enrolment Rate - Kerala (2003-04)

This does not imply all functions in primary education should be done by higher levels of government….

As long as Standard Setting and M&E are done by higher level of governments, AND redistributive equalizing fiscal transfers are done, goal of equity can be achieved

Source: DPEP MIS Database http://www.dpepmis.org/webpages/edatabase.htm

Function



-


Standards Setting

Operation - Teacher

Planning

Asset Creation

-



EffectsEquity

-

-


Economies of Scale


Functional Allocation according to Equity Criterion

Equity

Function





EffectsEquity

-

-

-


Economies of Scale

-


Standards Setting

Operation - Teacher -

Planning

Asset Creation

- -


Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Public Finance

Standard Setting and Monitoring by State Government, and Asset Creation and Operation by low-level PRIs is effective

Standard Setting and Monitoring by State Government, and Asset Creation and Operation by low-level PRIs is effective

What are the First Principles of Accountability?

Activities that require decisions to be made using individual judgment in local context

Activities that require several repeated transactions at the local level

Step 3: Use First Principles - Accountability

DiscretionaryTransaction-

IntensityInferring

PerformanceWhere can performance be better inferred – locally or technically

Examples

Does the service require many local transactions? (Transaction Intensive)

Does the service require decisions made in local context? (Discretionary)

No YesNo - Central BankingYes Immunization Ambulatory Care

ImplicationActivities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountability

Activities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountability

24.7%

85.5%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Bottom 40% Top 20%0

25

50

75

100

Karnataka Kerala Rajasthan WestBengal

65.4%

96.9%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Bottom 40% Top 20%

Aside on Accountability: Quality of Government Primary Schooling in India is very low…especially for the Poor

Enrolment

Framework for Judging Quality

AchievementCompletion

Percent of 6-14 yr olds currently in school

(1998-99)

Average78.8%

Percent of 15-19 yr olds completed at least Grade 8

(1998-99)

Average49.6%

Percent of children with Inadequate Primary Learning Achievement for

Math of Age for Class 5 or in Grade 5

Note: Framework adapted from Warwick and Reimers (1995); Enrolment and Completion data from ‘Educational Attainment and Enrollment Profiles’, Filmer (2004); test scores analysis for government and government aided schools only based on data from Singh, Jain, Gautam and Kumar (2005)

…+ Anecdotal Evidence of low quality (Pratichi Trust, PROBE Report, etc.)…+ Evidence of student migration from government to private schools

67.6%

81.7%

69.7%

53.8%

Not reaching Grade 5Scoring < 50% in Grade 5 (Govt School)

Mechanical learning to a large extent.

Single digit addition : 18% of students (for example 3+3)

Single Digit Subtraction: 12% of students (for example 9-2)

Counting Kites : 54% of Students

Highest percentage in any class is 77% of Students (which is low)

Best performances are in number concepts in maths and in following instructions and recognising letters/sounds associated in language

AOA: Learning achievement from Baseline study in AP

AOA: Learning by age

Math Level By Age

71%57%

44%34%

24% 25% 20% 20%

21%

26%

29%

33%

32% 32%33% 32%

6%10%

12%15%

19% 16%17% 17%

3% 7%15% 18%

25% 27% 30% 32%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Age

Per

cen

t in

Ag

e C

oh

ort

Math Level = 3

Math Level = 2

Math Level = 1

Math Level = 0

* Data based on the testing of 17,608 children in 4 random blocks in the District of Jaunpur, UP. Child tests are weighted by total number of children in village divided by number of children tested in village.

AOA: The low quality is caused by ‘systemic’ and not ‘managerial’ failures; and thus requires an institutional solution

Teacher Absenteeism

Teacher Absenteeism

19

15 1411

1617

2725

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Uganda India Indonesia Zambia Bangladesh Papua NewGuinea

Ecuador Peru

Source: Kremer et al (2004), pg 9

% Teacher Absence Rates by Country

Country

Level of Parental Satisfaction

Level of Parental Satisfaction

Other EvidenceOther Evidence

59.0%60.0%

0%

25%

50%

75%

with childprogress

with teacher

Source: The Pratichi Education Report (2002); Berliner and Biddle (1994) pg 113

Level of Parental Dissatisfaction (West Bengal)

Evidence

‘Non’ Teaching: “Teaching practices have been reduced to a

minimum…it has become a way of life” (PROBE) Growth of Private Schooling…which meets the differentiated

(quality) demand…even among the poor (Tilak et al.)

“Best practice” level of absence

7.0%

72.0%

21.0%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

A or B Grade C Grade D or F Grade

Grades given by Parents to Child’s school (USA)

Result: People voting with their feet (and pocketbooks) out of the sectors:

0

0.25

0.5

0.75

Uttaranchal

Kerala

Maharahstra

Tam

il Nadu

Uttar

Karnataka

Madhya

Andhra

Rajasthan

Him

achal

Chhattisgarh

Gujarat

West

Haryana

Orissa

Jharkhand

Bihar

Assam

Per

cen

t o

f st

ud

ents

in

urb

an a

reas

in

re

cog

niz

ed s

cho

ols

in

pri

vate

(ai

ded

or

un

aid

ed)

sch

oo

ls

More than half in private

2/3 or more in private

Chile's share of primary in private schools (with full privatization) is 45.5%

AOA: What is ‘Accountability’? – Demystifying the Elements of the Accountability Relations

DelegationDelegation

Feature

FinancingFinancing

EnforcingEnforcing

PerformingPerforming

InformingInforming

There are Five Features to Any Accountability Relationship

What

You give a task to the accountable ‘agent’

Example 1: Buying a Sandwich

You ask for a sandwich

Example 2: Going to a Doctor

You go to the doctor to be treated

You give the ‘agent’ the money to do the task

You pay for the sandwich

You pay the doctor for the treatment

The ‘agent’ does the assigned task

The sandwich is made for you

The doctor treats you to try cure your ailment

You find out how well the ‘agent’ has done the work

You eat the sandwich which informs you of its quality

You see if you are feeling better – you assess the performance of the doctor

You reward good performance and punish bad performance

You choose whether to buy a sandwich from the seller the next time, affecting his profits

You go to him next time (if he was good) or choose to go somewhere else if not

Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability

Relationship 1: VOICE – The Long Route, first leg

Citizens

Policy Makers

VOICE

VOICE

Citizens can elect Policy Makers based on quality of public services they receive (VOICE)…

But, Citizens…

- may vote along ethnic / ideological lines (DELEGATION)

- may not be able to attribute service to appropriate Policy-Maker (INFORMING)

- may think Policy-Maker tenure is too short (ENFORCING)

Citizens can elect Policy Makers based on quality of public services they receive (VOICE)…

But, Citizens…

- may vote along ethnic / ideological lines (DELEGATION)

- may not be able to attribute service to appropriate Policy-Maker (INFORMING)

- may think Policy-Maker tenure is too short (ENFORCING)


Service Providers

Policy Makers

COM

PACT

COM

PACT

Well-meaning Policy Makers can influence Service Providers to improve service delivery performance (COMPACT)…

But, Policy Makers…

- may not be able to specify exact contracts (DELEGATION)

- may not be able to monitor Service Providers (INFORMING)

- may not be able to alter incentives of Service Providers (ENFORCING)

Well-meaning Policy Makers can influence Service Providers to improve service delivery performance (COMPACT)…

But, Policy Makers…

- may not be able to specify exact contracts (DELEGATION)

- may not be able to monitor Service Providers (INFORMING)

- may not be able to alter incentives of Service Providers (ENFORCING)

Relationship 2: COMPACT, long route second leg


Citizens Service ProvidersCLIENT POWERCLIENT POWER

Clients can play major role in tailoring service-mix to their local needs and monitoring Service Providers (CLIENT POWER)

But, Clients…

- often do not have choice (lack of competition)

- often cannot infer provider effort (INFORMING)

- often do not have powers to discipline bad Service Providers (ENFORCING)

Clients can play major role in tailoring service-mix to their local needs and monitoring Service Providers (CLIENT POWER)

But, Clients…

- often do not have choice (lack of competition)

- often cannot infer provider effort (INFORMING)

- often do not have powers to discipline bad Service Providers (ENFORCING)

Relationship 3: CLIENT POWER – The Short Route

Pratichi Trust (A. Sen’s NGO) report on West Bengal:

“According to you what are the main problems of primary schooling?”

The Sabhapati of a Panchayat Samiti in Puruliya needed no time to reply:

“Teachers do not teach.”

AOA: Accountability at the local level…Pratichi Trust report:

We, the villagers, forced him to come to school at 10:30 and made him stay in the school until 3:30…”

Says a villager in Puruliya

AOA: local client power?

“We, the villagers, forced him to come to school at 10:30 and made him stay in the school until 3:30…”Says a villager in Puruliya

Result of this attempt at local accountbility? “He slept, got his body massaged by the

children, and read the newspaper. How long can you watch him leaving aside your own work?”

Source: World Development Report, 2004


The Three Relationships of Accountability in Service Delivery

Citizens Service ProvidersCLIENT POWERCLIENT POWER

Policy Makers

VOICE

VOICE

COM

PACT

COM

PACT

5.9

1.8

7.3

1.8

0

5

10

15

UttarPradesh

West andCentralAfrica

South andEasternAfrica

Asia LatinAmerica

8-13.5

37.824.723.721.721.2

10

25

40

Kerala Karnataka Rajasthan West Bengal Bihar

0%

50%

100%

Boy Girl

Yes 98%

AOA: The key missing accountability relations in Primary Educationbetween parents and teachers are Informing and Enforcing

DelegationDelegation

Feature of Accountability

FinancingFinancing

EnforcingEnforcing

PerformingPerforming

InformingInforming

Is this the Key Problem?

Somewhat: Diffused

objectives but Parents want to delegate (i.e., send children to school)

Yes, many teachers are not performing adequately

Evidence

Yes, no usable info on class performance; parents not actively involved in school / teaching matters

Is it important for your child to be educated?

Yes 89%

Source: PROBE Report, pg 14

No, teachers are paid very well relative to other countries

Average Salaries as multiple of Income per capita by Region

Average = 6.1 Note: Uttar Pradesh figure is for 1995-96; all others are quoted from Carnoy and Welmond (1996); Source: Mehrotra and Buckland (2001)

% Teacher Absence Rates by Indian States All India Average 25%

34.0% 29.0%0%

25%

50%

VECs PTAs/MTAs

% Households Aware of Existence and activities of Community Structures

Source: CAG Report (2001)

Yes, parents have little or no powers to discipline or reward teachers

Kremer et al (2004) find only one case of teacher dismissal ever in 3000 government schools surveyed

No monetary incentives possible for high performing teachers under current government teacher terms of employment

AOA: Alternative Explanations for Low Quality are Unlikely to be Sufficient

Lack of Adequate Public Expenditure

Lack of Adequate Public Expenditure

Presence and Demand for Child Labor

Presence and Demand for Child Labor

Lack of Parent InterestLack of Parent Interest

1

2

3

Child labor is not big enough – NSS (1993) shows only 8 percent

Most child laborers work as family labor, so their time is fungible

Even if child labor is ‘high’, direction of causality is not clear

Is it important for a boy to be educated?

Parents’ Attitude to Education in India

Yes 98%

No 1%No

Response 1%

Is it important for a girl to be educated?

Yes 89%

No Response

1%

No 10%

Source: PROBE Report, pg 14

Parents, even poor parents, seem keen to educate their children

Parents, even poor parents, seem keen to educate their children

65

70

75

80

1993 1999

%

Enrollment rate among 5-11 year olds

Budget expansion approaches don’t seem to have worked in India – e.g.: District Primary Education Program (DPEP)

Budget expansion approaches don’t seem to have worked in India – e.g.: District Primary Education Program (DPEP)

DPEP Districts

Non-DPEP Districts (with same criteria)

Source: Jalan and Glinskaya (2003)

End of long aside on accountability?

• Publicly provided primary education is not performing well

• Accountability is a key problem• Decentralization alone won’t improve

accountability• But possibly decentralization informed by

accountability analysis can improve services

What are the First Principles of Accountability?

Activities that require decisions to be made using individual judgment in local context

Activities that require several repeated transactions at the local level

Step 3: (back from long aside on accountability) Use First Principles - Accountability

DiscretionaryTransaction-

IntensityInferring

PerformanceWhere can performance be better inferred – locally or technically

Examples

Does the service require many local transactions? (Transaction Intensive)

Does the service require decisions made in local context? (Discretionary)

No YesNo - Central BankingYes Immunization Ambulatory Care

ImplicationActivities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountability

Activities that are Discretionary, Transaction-Intensive and Locally Observable require local input for accountability

Step 3: Use First Principles –Accountability

Discretionary, Transaction-intensive and Locally Evaluatable activities like Asset Creation and Operations should be decentralized to PRIs

Discretionary, Transaction-intensive and Locally Evaluatable activities like Asset Creation and Operations should be decentralized to PRIs

Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Accountability

Function

Operation - Non teacher High High Local

Operation - Teacher High High Local / Technical

Monitoring and Evaluation Medium Medium Local / Technical

Technical

Asset Creation High

Standards Setting

Planning Medium

Accountability First Principle

Transaction Intensive?

Who Can Best Infer Performance

(Technical or Local)?

Medium

Local /Technical

Local /Technical

Low

Medium

Low

Discretionary?

Function

Gra

m

Pan

chay

at

Use

r G

roup

sOperation - Non teacher

Operation - Teacher


Support

BlockCentral Govt

Standards Setting

Planning

Asset Creation Support

Support

Responsibility


Village

State Govt

District

Step 4: Optimal Allocation based on First Principles Analysis

Functional Allocation in Primary Education –Based on First Principles Analysis States do

Standards Setting and Monitoring

PRIs assume responsibility for actual Operation

- As much as possible as low as possible

- Higher PRI tiers back-up on professionalism, technical

States do Standards Setting and Monitoring

PRIs assume responsibility for actual Operation

- As much as possible as low as possible

- Higher PRI tiers back-up on professionalism, technical

First Principles of Public Finance First Principles of AccountabilityFunction

Operation - Non teacher Yes Yes Local

Operation - Teacher Yes Yes Local / Technical

Monitoring and Evaluation No Yes Technical

Accountability First Principle

Transaction Intensive?

Who Can Best Infer Performance

(Technical or Local)?

Yes

Bit Technical

Local

No

Somewhat

No

Discretionary?

Standards Setting

Planning Somewhat

Technical

Asset Creation Yes

Key Messages

Function




EffectsEquity

-

-

-


Economies of Scale

-


Standards Setting

Operation - Teacher -

Planning

Asset Creation

- -

As discussed, Many Models of Education Decentralization have not worked well

Decentralize without unbundling

Decentralize without unbundling

Decentralize Non-Teacher Operations (But not Teacher Operations)

Decentralize Non-Teacher Operations (But not Teacher Operations)

Decentralize Functions, concurrently, without

devolving F or F

Decentralize Functions, concurrently, without

devolving F or F

1

2

3

Indonesia Experience

Latin America Experience

India Experience (1995-2005)

-Pushed all functions to district level (below provinces)-Bad monitoring systems means that little information about regional performance is available to stimulate competition or disseminate good or bad practices

-Pushed responsibility to local governments…-…But without enhancing operational control at local level (e.g.: Argentina)

-Devolved functions (including primary education) to PRIs…-…But PRIs do not have adequate finance or control over functionaries to implement their mandate

Gra

m

Pa

nch

aya

t

Use

r G

rou

ps

StandardsPlanningAsset Creation Operation - Non TeacherOperation - Teacher

Hiring

Assignment

Training

Salary

Supervision

Dismissal -


Responsibility

Se

rvic

e

Pro

vid

er

(sc

ho

ol)

Village

State District

Function

BlockCentral

Greater Operational Responsibility to PRIs, especially forTeachers

Greater Operational Responsibility to PRIs, especially forTeachers

But our Analysis Avoids these Pitfalls by Suggesting

Countervailing Forces to build accountability via decentralization

Strengthen Centre and State for Standard

Setting and Monitoring

Strengthen Centre and State for Standard

Setting and Monitoring

1

2

Consistent Standard Setting is Critical To Provide the Guiding Framework for Local Governments to Operate and Manage

Uniform Monitoring is Essential for Quality Control, Designing Rewards & Recognition Systems and Generating Credibility

The Two Big Messages from Our Analysis

What we are not saying

“just turn schools over to GPs/SMCs”—without clear “delegation” and without strengthening the “information” and “enforcement” this just pushes the problem lower.

“Districts play no role”

Districts play key role at the technical level in planning and pedagogical support

Here is where it gets interesting for “finance”

• Suppose for a minute that a state government has decided to follow these recommendations and is going to devolve primary education to PRIs (for real).

• What does the “finance” F corresponding to this “function” F look like?

• It all depends on the “functionaries” F

Four alternatives:

• Full-on voucher scheme (a la Chile)—equal transfer per (weighted) student to all schools, public and private (not discussed).

• “Functionaries” remain a “state” problem so financing is dual (cash and in kind)

• “Functionaries” are transferred to schools with a cash budget but wages/employment conditions fixed

• “Functionaries” are transferred and “block grant” financing.

What is the key fiscal issue?

• How does one compute the per child “standard unit cost” of a year of school (ignoring capital costs)?

[That is, the formula for a block grant could have all kinds of weights—for girls, for SC/ST, for “marginality”—off of a standard unit cost]SUC=Teacher cost + non-teaching cost

Teacher cost/child= (wage per teacher)*(number of teachers)/(number of children)

Teacher wages: the key parameter

Desiderata: “Level and structure of compensation appropriate to attract, retain, and motivate teachers of desired quality.”

• Structure is awful (for all goals)

• Level of compensation?

Level of teacher compensation?

1.9 2.1

1.48 1.68

00.5

11.5

22.5

Publicsector toprivate-formal,1993/94

Publicsector toprivate-formal,1999/00

Publicsector toprivate-

formal, PSMcorrected,1993/94

Publicsector toprivate-

formal, PSMcorrected,1999/00

Ratio

of w

eekl

y ea

rnin

gs

• Gov’t vs. organized pvt sector is high.

• Teachers vs. private sector is high.

• Existing teachers vs. “contract” or “alternative” teachers is high.

• International comparisons is high.

Pluses and Minuses of Alternatives: GPs/SMCs don’t H/F/A teachers, teachers are “assigned” and come “in kind”

Pluses

• No political fight with teachers

• GPs/SMCs do control “operating” budgets and possibly some gains there.

Minuses

• Accountability won’t work—no gains from decentralization

• No cost savings

GPs/SMCs control teacher H/F/A, unit cost at current wages, wages

fixedPluses

• Accountability might work at the local level

Minuses:

• No fiscal savings• No reallocation to

more productive uses.• With complete control

and high wages corruption is inevitable.

GPs/SMCs control teacher H/F/A, unit cost at current wages, wages

market determined Pluses

• Accountability might work at the local level

• Reallocation to productive uses (within education, between education and other uses?)

Minuses:

• No fiscal savings to state

GPs/SMCs control Assignment, unit costs at “true” cost, wages

market determined

Pluses

Best chance for accountability

Fiscal savings shared state/PRI

Reallocation to other uses

Minuses

Enormous political battle with teachers/teachers unions

One integrated proposal: Functions

• Centre/state sets curriculum, learning achievement targets and takes responsibility for monitoring and evaluation.

• District takes responsibility for: planning asset creation (schools), hiring in eligible pool and promoting teachers, technical support (e.g. supervision, in service training) [with block].

• GP/SMC takes responsibility for all other aspects of the operation of schools (including assignment of teachers from eligible pool).

One integrated proposal:Finances

• Single block grant to GPs[SMCs] on a weighted per student basis with “efficient” SUC as the base (plus a transition fund to finance the gap of existing teachers)

• Set aside block grants to GPs/SMCs for “technical” functions (tied to district?).

• Slice for district to carry out its single responsibility functions (planning, assets)

• Slice for state for “high level” functions (especially for monitoring and evaluation).

One Integrated Proposal:Functionaries

• The “DTPC”—a mix between existing “contract” teachers and existing “state/district” cadres with eligibility at district level, assignment at GP/SMC level.

• Tricky issue of “who bears the cost of unassigned ‘permanent’ teachers?”

Big unresolved issues

• Block grant fungible across activities?

• Relationship between GP and SMC?

• Details of “transition fund”—reconciling supply/demand of existing teachers

55

63

33

42

51

60

46

52

0

20

40

60

Other RuralRajasthan

SK School

Evidence Suggests The “alternative” schools are Showing Considerable Success

64.0%51.0%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

PrimarySchool

SSK

Source: Analysis based on data from - West Bengal: Pratichi Education Report 2002; Rajasthan: World Bank PAD for Rajasthan DPEP, 1999, SIDA Evaluation Study and NSSO 52nd Round

Student Attendance on day of visit

Experiment One: SSK Schooling in West Bengal

25% higher

20.0%14.0%

0%

25%

50%

75%

PrimarySchool

SSK

43% lower

Teacher Absenteeism on day of visit

9.0%

24.0%

0%

25%

50%

PrimarySchool

SSK

Dissatisfaction with Teacher (Parent Response)

62% lower

Experiment Two: Shiksha Karmi (SK) in RajasthanTest Scores

15% higher

27% higher

16% higher

14% higher

Math LanguageGrade 1 Grade 4 Grade 1 Grade 4

83

72 71

85

51

63

0

20

40

60

80

100

Enrolment Rate Attendance Rate

SK

Rajasthan

All India

% Enrolment and Attendance

Higher Accountability can offset enormous other disadvantages

Greater autonomy for performance and local responsiveness works

Lower wages do not appear to reduce motivation

Higher Accountability can offset enormous other disadvantages

Greater autonomy for performance and local responsiveness works

Lower wages do not appear to reduce motivation

AOT: But the ‘Para-Teacher’ Model Is Not a Sustainable Systemic Solution to India’s Primary Education Crisis – Its Only a Quick Fix

Variance in Pay for Identical Work is Starkly

Visible

Variance in Pay for Identical Work is Starkly

Visible

Index of Primary School Teacher Salary in India

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

Index

‘Regular’ Government School Teacher(Rs 5000-9000)

Para-teachers(Rs 900-3500)

‘Regular’ Government Teachers get paid 3-6 times more than para-teachers

‘Regular’ Government Teachers get paid 3-6 times more than para-teachers

Note: Analysis of Teacher pay based on survey of para-teacher schemes in Govinda and Josephine (2004) and other studies of para-teacher systems in India

Pressure for ‘ex-post regularization’

Pressure for ‘ex-post regularization’

States under pressure to ‘regularize’ para-teachers when para-teacher lobby becomes substantial

Unplanned and ad hoc regularization can bankrupt already fiscally drained states

Variance in Quality of Training, Instruction and

Outcomes

Variance in Quality of Training, Instruction and

Outcomes

Quality of instruction varies immensely as no standards are established for hiring, training, performance evaluation and contract duration, e.g.:

- Qualification requirement for para-teacher varies across states from Grade 5 pass to Higher Secondary

- Training requirement for para-teachers varies across states from 12 days to 2 years

1

2

3

Rs.

We Make a Modest Proposal that Combines the Best Elements of the Current Formal and ‘Para-Teacher’ Systems

Apprentice (Shiksha Karmi)

Associate (Adhyapak)

Master (Maha-Adhyapak)

Phases of Teacher Professionalization

A District Professional Teacher Cadre (DPTC)

• Initial hiring done on renewable contract basis by ZP on GP recommendation

• Assignment to schools depends on GPs

• Permanence granted at end of contract periods, based on comprehensive evaluation- Technical Criteria: training, input indicators, teacher tests, peers Bottoms Up Criteria: Performance review and recommendation by GP/SMC

• Assignment still depends on GP (match S-D?)

• Few promoted to ‘Maha-Adhyapaks’ based on consistently exceptional performance evaluation ratings

Phases of Employment

Phases of Employment

Step jump when qualify for Adhyapak

1

Annual increment based on review, when Adhyapak

2

Step jump if qualify for Maha-Adhyapak

3

Compensation(Rs.)

Years of service

The DPTC will have an initially fixed, and then a performance and seniority based compensation system

Apprentice (Shiksha Karmi)

Associate (Adhyapak)

Master (Maha-Adhyapak)

Initially fixed pay, later performance and seniority-based

Big jumps in salary levels across phases to serve as incentive to perform

Jump to Maha-Adhyapak rare and controlled, most spend career as Adhyapaks

Initially fixed pay, later performance and seniority-based

Big jumps in salary levels across phases to serve as incentive to perform

Jump to Maha-Adhyapak rare and controlled, most spend career as Adhyapaks

Key Messages3 Elements of Performance Based Pay

3 Elements of Performance Based Pay

Low-performing teacher track

High-performing teacher track

How Does Our Proposal For Teachers Stack Up Against Existing Systems in India?

Hiring

Assignment

Training

Salary

Supervision

Dismissal

Existing Formal Government

Existing Para-teacher

Existing Private

Our Proposal (DPTC)

•Done by state government

•Done by state government

•Done by state government, and district-level line agency

•Fixed (and generous) scale for life

•Little or none in substance

•Almost never done

•Done by GP, criteria varies

•Stays within village

•Varies: district line agency or parallel agency

•Fixed and small (‘honorarium’)

•Closely monitored by SMC/VEC or GP

•At will for unsatisfactory performance

•Done by school management

•Done by school management

•Varies: states have guidelines + large unrecognised sector

•Usually fixed (and somewhere between formal and para-teacher scales)

•Closely monitored by school management

•At will for unsatisfactory performance

•Done by ZP on criteria + GP recommendation

•Done by ZP on GP recommendation (GP has veto)

•Organized by ZP based on guidelines for phased training

•Fixed when SK; seniority and performance-based when Adhyapak

•Closely monitored by GP/SMC + technical criteria

•At will when SK; For cause when Adhyapak stage reached

HRD Ministry (Elementary Education Bureau)

Project Approval Board

Policymaker (State and Central Government)

State Department of School Elementary Education

State Implementation Society

District Education Committee / Office

Block Education Committee / Center

School Management Committee (SMC) or

VEC

Parent Teacher Association (PTA)

Schools (Teachers)

Organizational Provider

Frontline Provider

COMPACT

Client Groups

State Government

VOICE

CLIENT POWER (?)

MANAGEMENT

‘Client Power’ is particularly weak in the present framework

‘Client Power’ is particularly weak in the present framework

Accountability Linkages in Existing System: The SSA Framework

COMPACT strengthened as PRIs get management of TTEs

VOICE gets strengthened as clients see importance of participation in governance and service delivery decision

CLIENT POWER gets strengthened as SMCs/PTAs are involved in meaningful performance evaluation

COMPACT strengthened as PRIs get management of TTEs

VOICE gets strengthened as clients see importance of participation in governance and service delivery decision

CLIENT POWER gets strengthened as SMCs/PTAs are involved in meaningful performance evaluation

Accountability Linkages in Our DPTC Proposal: Redefining Voice, Compact and Client Power

HRD Ministry (Elementary Education Bureau)

Project Approval Board

Policymaker (State and Central Government)

State Department of School Elementary Education

School Management Committee (SMC) or

VEC

Parent Teacher Association (PTA)

Schools (Teachers)

Organizational Provider

Frontline Provider

Client Groups

State Government

VOICE

Zila Panchayat

Taluk Panchayat

Gram Panchayat

Policymaker (PRIs)

Gram Sabha

CLIENT POWER

COMPACT

Our Proposal Addresses Many of the Central Concerns of the Political Economy of Reform and Transition

Issue / Concern How It is Dealt With in Our Proposal

• ‘Grandfathering’: i.e., TTEs of all existing regular government school teachers to remain unchanged – no one is dismissed + salary protection

Opposition from existing ‘Regular’ Government

Teachers

• Para-teachers no longer exploited, as they are given a clear track for tenure (career progression plan) as per technical and bottoms-up criteria

Unfair Exploitation of ‘para-teachers’

• State gives transitional funds to PRIs to bear premium wage cost of existing ‘regular’ teachers

• Large block grants to PRIs to fund their new role

Bakrupting the PRIs by making them pay the

teachers

• Balances local control with higher level support for training, professional standards and monitoring

Quality of Schooling Outcomes

Not Addressing Question 2: Is a well designed Decentralization the Right Model for Primary Education Reform?

Indian Needs Primary Education

Reform









Getting As on the three Fs: The Educational and Fiscal Opportunities in Decentralization Lant...

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