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Review: [untitled]

Author(s): Gerald SegalSource: The China Quarterly, No. 86 (Jun., 1981), pp. 360-361Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/653953 .

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360 The China Quarterly60 The China Quarterly

world. Yalta had shown Roosevelt's hopes coupled with Stalin's self-

centred, crafty determination. The agreements reached at Yalta plainly

gave China second place. Certainly by then Roosevelt had realized thatChina could not be a stabilizing force in Asia for years to come; a Soviet-American partnershipin bolstering a strong unified regime under ChiangKai-shekwas thought to be the best answer.

Chern suggests that either all-out support for Chiang in 1945 or,

alternatively, support for Chiang in south China and de factorecognition of the Communists in north China were possibilities. Anyonewith experience of China at that time might question both. The realalternative would have been a link with the Communists such as Mao

Zedong and Zhou Enlai wanted and the China specialists urged. But

Mao's letter never got to Roosevelt and the possibility that, despitecommunist success in 1949, there need have been no Sino-Soviet treaty in1950 remains one of the ifs of history. What is more, the China

specialists were never called upon to give evidence before the Committee,not because Hurley's charges were believed but because their conclusionswould have led to a complete reversal of Roosevelt's wartime

assumptions.China: U.S. Policy since 1945 is a useful quarto-sized compilation of

texts and documents, extracts from speeches, and summaries and tables

running from the Korean conflict to the Rabbit Meat bill (affecting

China) by way of the Sino-Soviet split, a chart of Chinese history andmuch else to interest the general reader or to remind the specialist. Themain substance is a chronology of events, strongest on the later period.

There is less nourishment to be had from the compilation edited byBenson Lee Grayson of extracts of opinions about China stretching fromSamuel Shaw, who led the first commercial mission to China in 1784, to

Cyrus Vance and President Carter on the most recent links. The

American Image of China does not emerge very clearly. There are too

many quotes from ill-informed presidents or other officials. A superiorsmile might greet the U.S. Consul General's observation from Hong

Kong in 1900that " the Chinamen of 3000 BCare the identical Chinamenthat greeted us at the opening of the treaty ports "; not very

illuminating, though.A lengthy introduction by the editor summarizes, Chinese relations

with America from the 18th century to the 1980s, serviceable enough,though marred by some errors of which the most egregious is the

statement that President Roosevelt, in March 1945, shortly before his

death, " sent a cordial letter to Mao Tse-tung responding to comments

by the communist leader concerning the post-war situation in China."

No sign of the text, alas, in either of the other two books.

RICHARDHARRIS

The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American

Triangleand the National Security Problematique. By RICHARDK.

ASHLEY.London: Frances Pinter, 1980. 384 pp. ?15 00.]

The title for his book is brilliant. It is more revealing about the content

world. Yalta had shown Roosevelt's hopes coupled with Stalin's self-

centred, crafty determination. The agreements reached at Yalta plainly

gave China second place. Certainly by then Roosevelt had realized thatChina could not be a stabilizing force in Asia for years to come; a Soviet-American partnershipin bolstering a strong unified regime under ChiangKai-shekwas thought to be the best answer.

Chern suggests that either all-out support for Chiang in 1945 or,

alternatively, support for Chiang in south China and de factorecognition of the Communists in north China were possibilities. Anyonewith experience of China at that time might question both. The realalternative would have been a link with the Communists such as Mao

Zedong and Zhou Enlai wanted and the China specialists urged. But

Mao's letter never got to Roosevelt and the possibility that, despitecommunist success in 1949, there need have been no Sino-Soviet treaty in1950 remains one of the ifs of history. What is more, the China

specialists were never called upon to give evidence before the Committee,not because Hurley's charges were believed but because their conclusionswould have led to a complete reversal of Roosevelt's wartime

assumptions.China: U.S. Policy since 1945 is a useful quarto-sized compilation of

texts and documents, extracts from speeches, and summaries and tables

running from the Korean conflict to the Rabbit Meat bill (affecting

China) by way of the Sino-Soviet split, a chart of Chinese history andmuch else to interest the general reader or to remind the specialist. Themain substance is a chronology of events, strongest on the later period.

There is less nourishment to be had from the compilation edited byBenson Lee Grayson of extracts of opinions about China stretching fromSamuel Shaw, who led the first commercial mission to China in 1784, to

Cyrus Vance and President Carter on the most recent links. The

American Image of China does not emerge very clearly. There are too

many quotes from ill-informed presidents or other officials. A superiorsmile might greet the U.S. Consul General's observation from Hong

Kong in 1900that " the Chinamen of 3000 BCare the identical Chinamenthat greeted us at the opening of the treaty ports "; not very

illuminating, though.A lengthy introduction by the editor summarizes, Chinese relations

with America from the 18th century to the 1980s, serviceable enough,though marred by some errors of which the most egregious is the

statement that President Roosevelt, in March 1945, shortly before his

death, " sent a cordial letter to Mao Tse-tung responding to comments

by the communist leader concerning the post-war situation in China."

No sign of the text, alas, in either of the other two books.

RICHARDHARRIS

The Political Economy of War and Peace: The Sino-Soviet-American

Triangleand the National Security Problematique. By RICHARDK.

ASHLEY.London: Frances Pinter, 1980. 384 pp. ?15 00.]

The title for his book is brilliant. It is more revealing about the content

7/28/2019 Gerald Segal

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Book Reviews 361ook Reviews 361

and above all the style of the work than any reviewer could hope to be in

the opening sentences. Let us allow the author to continue the

description in his own words. " This book is about the source of conflictand violence " among the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China. " It focuses uponthe long-term process entangling these three major powers in a common,

nearly ineluctable problematique." The book is also " a study ininternational political economy " and is an example of " world

modelling research " using econometrics. One of its main concerns is the

"socio-economic limits to growth " and to this end develops the

"Proto-theory " of Choucri and North in order to tell " a story "

about " the ultimate failure of technical-rationality." Just in case thereaderthought that the author had already placed quite a bit on his plate,

Ashley adds that the book " is an experiment in social scientificcommunicative praxis " (all excerpts quoted taken from the Preface).

Several points are apparent from the author's own description of hiswork. Most strikingly there is an attempt to cover a vast array of

complex subjects and although the reviewer is unable fully to judge such

areas as " econometrics," some of the other aspects, such as Chinese

foreign policy or decision-making in the great power triangle are plainly

unsatisfactory. It should also be apparent that this book has some of themost appalling jargon, renderingthe reader's task immensely difficult.

The book covers more than 20 years (1950-72) of interaction between

the three great powers and in passing makes some interesting points. Thenotion that the uneven pace of growth of the three states can have lethal

consequences suggests that we need to pay attention to more thanrational calculation or careful crisis management. The notion that thethree bilateral axes of communication in the triangleare all intertwined is

equally important. There are other, far more dubious assertions. Theidea that China " tended to avoid isolation by reducing peak levels ofconflict is one dyad when engaged in high thresholds of violence inanother " is not a valid description of Chinese foreign policy during theCultural Revolution. Ashley's failure to consider factional and

bureaucraticpolitics as well as his glossing over of the fundamental lackof reliable economic data for China, upon which his econometric studiesare based, raises important questions as to the usefulness of hisconclusions. The author admits that this book " places harsh demands

upon the reader " (p. xiv) and this is indeed true. One wonders whether itis worth the effort.

GERALDSEGAL

The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977. By YITZHAKSHICHOR. [London: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 268 pp.?12 00.]

Using Arab, Chinese and western sources, Dr Shichor, an Israeli scholar,has filled a pressing need for a well-documented analysis of China's rolein the Middle East.

Dr Shichor traces the evolution of Beijing's perception of the region asa field of contention between outside powers from the Second World

and above all the style of the work than any reviewer could hope to be in

the opening sentences. Let us allow the author to continue the

description in his own words. " This book is about the source of conflictand violence " among the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China. " It focuses uponthe long-term process entangling these three major powers in a common,

nearly ineluctable problematique." The book is also " a study ininternational political economy " and is an example of " world

modelling research " using econometrics. One of its main concerns is the

"socio-economic limits to growth " and to this end develops the

"Proto-theory " of Choucri and North in order to tell " a story "

about " the ultimate failure of technical-rationality." Just in case thereaderthought that the author had already placed quite a bit on his plate,

Ashley adds that the book " is an experiment in social scientificcommunicative praxis " (all excerpts quoted taken from the Preface).

Several points are apparent from the author's own description of hiswork. Most strikingly there is an attempt to cover a vast array of

complex subjects and although the reviewer is unable fully to judge such

areas as " econometrics," some of the other aspects, such as Chinese

foreign policy or decision-making in the great power triangle are plainly

unsatisfactory. It should also be apparent that this book has some of themost appalling jargon, renderingthe reader's task immensely difficult.

The book covers more than 20 years (1950-72) of interaction between

the three great powers and in passing makes some interesting points. Thenotion that the uneven pace of growth of the three states can have lethal

consequences suggests that we need to pay attention to more thanrational calculation or careful crisis management. The notion that thethree bilateral axes of communication in the triangleare all intertwined is

equally important. There are other, far more dubious assertions. Theidea that China " tended to avoid isolation by reducing peak levels ofconflict is one dyad when engaged in high thresholds of violence inanother " is not a valid description of Chinese foreign policy during theCultural Revolution. Ashley's failure to consider factional and

bureaucraticpolitics as well as his glossing over of the fundamental lackof reliable economic data for China, upon which his econometric studiesare based, raises important questions as to the usefulness of hisconclusions. The author admits that this book " places harsh demands

upon the reader " (p. xiv) and this is indeed true. One wonders whether itis worth the effort.

GERALDSEGAL

The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977. By YITZHAKSHICHOR. [London: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 268 pp.?12 00.]

Using Arab, Chinese and western sources, Dr Shichor, an Israeli scholar,has filled a pressing need for a well-documented analysis of China's rolein the Middle East.

Dr Shichor traces the evolution of Beijing's perception of the region asa field of contention between outside powers from the Second World