Georgetown Louvis Knez Neg Kentuckycollege Round3

7/23/2019 Georgetown Louvis Knez Neg Kentuckycollege Round3

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1NC


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OFFTopical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense legalizing one of thetopic areas.

Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

AH !"(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#esolved implies a polic$

%ouisiana House &(http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and

making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally requiredenacting clause a resolution uses the term !resolved!. "ot sub#ect to a time limit for introduction nor to

governor$s veto. % &onst. Art. III, '()%*+ and ouse Rules -.(( , (.( , /.- , and ).0+

'nited States means federal( state( and local governments

The )ureau of *nternational *nformation +rograms ,About America: Ho the !nite" #tates is $overne"%&http://photos.state.gov/libraries/'orea/2*+/"oa,+22*0/!#,$overne".p"page+1oomauto-+00*+*3 //

As a federal system of government,the 1nited 2tates has several layers of government ranging from the

federal government at the national level, to state and local governments. Two of theselayers3the national

and state3areaddressed in the 1.2. &onstitution.

#educe is to diminish in size( amount( or num-er

erriam /e-ster Online 1&re"uce% &http://.merriam-ebster.com/"ictionary/re"uce3 Accesse" August 2 20+4 //b (+) : to "iminish in si1e amount e5tent or number 6re"uce ta5es7 6re"uce the li'elihoo" o ar7 (2) :to "ecrease the volume an" concentrate the lavor o by boiling 6a"" the ine an" re"uce the sauce orto minutes7

+resence is troops and infrastructure

Ne"oomaram 08a"an !# military presence in oreign countries e5cee"s rest o orl"%&http://.topi5.com/orum/orl"/china/9$!A;?+4@=!A3 ovember +0 //9he !nite" #tates has military presence in over +B0 countries according to a epartment o eensereportor 200C. o other nation in the orl" has such i"esprea" global military presence.

Accor"ing to 9he Eenter or Fesearch an" $lobali1ation an in"epen"ent research organi1ation9he!nite" #tates >ilitary is currently "eploye" to more locations than it has been throughout history.% otonly "oes the !.#. have military in a signiicant number o countries but it also has "iplomatic relationsith almost every country. A ;une 2 200 report rom the #tate Department in"icate" that there are+2 countries in the orl". 9he !.#. has "iplomatic relations ith all but our: Ghutan Euba =ran an"orth ?orea. #imply put oreign policy "ecisions ma"e by lea"ers electe" in the !nite" #tates"irectly impact the rest o the orl". hile the eects o our military "eployment impact those ho'no someone in uniorm many !.#. citi1ens rarely see the conseIuences unless they ma'ehea"line nes. !.#. troops to"ay are statione" throughout the >i""le ast inclu"ing =raI

Aghanistan 9ur'ey an" ?uait. hile some countries are home to military bases others reIuiremilitary "isaster relie ater a crisis li'e a tsunami. Jthers have become battleiel"s resulting in the"eaths o !.#. sol"iers an" oreign civilians. ilitar$ presence is "eine" by any nation here the
http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htmhttp://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm


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!.#. has a military base here the !.#. is provi"ing military ai" active "uty military personnel orhere !.#. sol"iers are engage" in combat theaters.

First is unified stasis The$ explode the num-er of potential affs removing the incentive for theneg to conduct in2depth pre2round research 3hich is de-ate4s primar$ -enefit. 5xternall$constrained discussions force creativit$( 3hile preserving avenues for non2traditional forms ofevidence.

Stasis is the internal lin" to solving the aff de-ate has the a-ilit$ to change people4s attitudes-ecause it forces pre2round internal deli-eration on a focused topic of de-ate

6oodin and Nieme$er 7K Australian ational !niversity(Fobert an" #imon hen Does Deliberation GeginL =nternal Felection versus Mublic Discussion inDeliberative Democracy% Molitical #tu"ies Nol 40 p


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impetus or i5ing onePs attention on a topic an" retrieving reasons rom store" memory might come romany o a number sources: group "iscussion is only one. An" again even in the conte5t o a group"iscussion this shit rom OonlineP to Omemory-base"P processing is li'ely to occur earlier rather than laterin the process oten beore the ormal "iscussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that on a greatmany mo"els an" in a great many "ierent sorts o settings it seems li'ely that elements o the pre2discursive process are li'ely to prove crucial to the shaping an" reshaping o peoplePs attitu"es in aciti1ensP Qury-style process. 9he initial processes o focusing attention on a topic provi"ing inormationabout it an" inviting people to thin' har" about it is li'ely to provi"e a strong impetus to internal-relective"eliberation altering not Qust the inormation people have about the issue but also the ay people processthat inormation an" hence (perhaps) hat they thin' about the issue. hat happens once people haveshite" into this more internal-relective mo"e is obviously an open Iuestion. >aybe people oul" thencome to an easy consensus as they "i" in their attitu"es toar" the Daintree rainorest.B4 Jr maybepeople oul" come to "ivergent conclusionsR an" they then may (or may not) be open to argument an"counter-argument ith tal' actually changing min"s. Jur claim is not that group "iscussion ill alaysmatter as little as it "i" in our citi1ensP Qury.B< Jur claim is instea" merely that the earliest steps in the Quryprocess K the sheer ocusing o attention on the issue at han" an" acIuiring more inormation about itan" the internal-relective "eliberation that that prompts K ill invariably matter more than "eliberative"emocrats o a more "iscursive stripe oul" have us believe. Hoever much or little "ierence ormalgroup "iscussions might ma'e on any given occasion the pre-"iscursive phases o the Qury process illinvariably have a consi"erable impact on changing the ay Qurors approach an issue. @rom Eiti1ensP

;uries to Jr"inary >ass MoliticsL =n a citi1ensP Qury sort o setting then it seems that inormal pre-group"eliberation K O"eliberation ithinP K ill inevitably "o much o the or' that "eliberative "emocratsor"inarily ant to attribute to the more ormal "iscursive processes. hat are the precon"itions or thathappeningL 9o hat e5tent in that sense can in"ings about citi1ensP Quries be e5ten"e" to other larger orless ell-or"ere" "eliberative settingsL ven in citi1ensP Quries "eliberation ill or' only i people areattentive open an" illing to change their min"s as appropriate. #o too in mass politics. =n citi1ensP

Quries the nee" to participate (or the anticipation o participating) in ormally organi1e" group "iscussionsmight be the OpromptP that evo'es those attributes. Gut there might be many other possible OpromptsP thatcan be oun" in less ormally structure" mass-political settings. Here are a e ays citi1ensP Quries (an"all cognate micro-"eliberative processes)B* might be "ierent rom mass politics an" in hich lessons"ran rom that e5perience might not thereore carry over to or"inary politics: S A citi1ensP Quryconcentrates peoplePs min"s on a single issue. Jr"inary politics involve many issues at once. S A citi1ensP

Qury is oten supplie" a bac'groun" brieing that has been agree" by all sta'ehol"ers (#mith an" ales

2000 p. 4C). =n or"inary mass politics there is rarely any eIuivalent common groun" on hich "ebatesare con"ucte". S A citi1ensP Qury separates the process o acIuiring inormation rom that o "iscussing theissues. =n or"inary mass politics those processes are invariably intertine". S A citi1ensP Qury is provi"e"ith a set o e5perts. 9hey can be Iuestione" "ebate" or "iscounte". Gut there is a strictly limite" set oOcompeting e5pertsP on the same subQect. =n or"inary mass politics claims an" sources o e5pertise otenseem virtually limitless alloing or much greater Oselective perceptionP. S Marticipating in somethingcalle" a Ociti1ensP QuryP evo'es certain very particular norms: norms concerning the OimpartialityPappropriate to QurorsR norms concerning the Ocommon goo"P orientation appropriate to people in theircapacity as citi1ens.BC 9here is a very "ierent ethos at or' in or"inary mass politics hich are typically"riven by lagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter "isinterest an" voter apathy). S =n aciti1ensP Qury e thin' an" listen in anticipation o the discussion phase 'noing that e soon ill haveto "een" our vies in a "iscursive setting here they ill be pro-ed intensivel$.B =n or"inary mass-political settings there is no such incentive or paying attention. =t is perectly true that citi1ensP Quries are

OspecialP in all those ays. Gut i being special in all those ays ma'es or a better K more OrelectivePmore O"eliberativeP K political process then those are "esign eatures that e ought try to mimic as beste can in or"inary mass politics as ell. 9here are various ays that that might be "one. Grieing boo'smight be prepare" by sponsors o American presi"ential "ebates (the 8eague o omen Noters an" suchli'e) in consultation ith the sta'ehol"ers involve". Agree" panels o e5perts might be Iuestione" onprime-time television. =ssues might be seIuence" or "ebate an" resolution to avoi" too muchcompetition or peoplePs time an" attention. Nariations on the Ac'erman an" @ish'in (2002) proposal or aO"eliberation "ayP beore every election might be generali1e" ith a "ay every e months being givenover to small meetings in local schools to "iscuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary perhaps. An"(although it is clearly beyon" the scope o the present paper to e5plore them in "epth) there are "oubtless


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many other more-or-less visionary ays o intro"ucing into real-orl" politics analogues o the elementsthat in"uce citi1ensP Qurors to practice O"emocratic "eliberation ithinP even beore the Qury "iscussion getsun"eray. Here e have to content ourselves ith i"entiying those eatures that nee" to be replicate" inreal-orl" politics in or"er to achieve that goal K an" ith the Opossibility theoremP that is establishe" bythe act that (as s'etche" imme"iately above) there is at least one possible ay o "oing that or each othose 'ey eatures.

Second is decision ma"inge-ate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis8that4s "e$ to avoid adevolution of de-ate into competing truth claims( 3hich destro$s the decision2ma"ing -enefits ofthe activit$

Stein-erg and Freele$ 917Davi" Director o Debate at ! >iami @ormer Mresi"ent o EDA oicer American @orensic Associationan" ational Eommunication Association. 8ecturer in Eommunication stu"ies an" rhetoric. A"visor to>iami !rban Debate 8eague >asters in Eommunication an" Austin ;D #uol' !niversity attorney hoocuses on criminal personal inQury an" civil rights laArgumentation and DebateCritical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making 9hirteen "itionDebate is a means o settling "ierences so there must be a controvers$ a "ierence o opinion or aconlict o interest beore there can be a "ebate. = everyone is in agreement on a eet or value or policythere is no nee" or opportunity or "ebateR the matter can be settle" by unanimous consent. 9hus ore5ample it oul" be pointless to attempt to de-ate :#esolved; That t3o plus t3o e


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toar" a center or consensus position. =t is rustrating an" usually unproductivetoattempt to ma'e a"ecision hen "eci"ers are unclear as to hat the "ecision is about.9he proposition may be implicit insome applie" "ebates (Note or meU4)R hoever hen a vote or conseIuential "ecision is calle" or (as inthe courtroom or in applie" parliamentary "ebate) it is essential that the proposition be e5plicitlye5presse" (5the "een"ant is guiltyU4). =n aca "emic "ebate the proposition provi"es essential guidanceor the preparation o the "ebaters prior to the "ebate the case buil"ing an" "iscourse presente" "uringthe "ebate an" the "ecision to be ma"e by the "ebate Qu"ge ater the "ebate. #omeone "isturbe" by theproblem o a groing un"erclass o poorly e"ucate" socially "isenranchise" youths might observeMublic schools are "oing a terrible QobU 9heyV are overcro"e" an" many teachers are poorly Iualiie" intheir subQect areas. ven the best teachers can "o little more than struggle to maintain or"er in theirclassrooms.T 9hat same concerne" citi1en acing a comple5 range o issues might arrive at an unhelpul"ecision such as Te ought to "o some thing about this% or orse =tPs too complicate" a problem to "ealith.T $roups o concerne" citi1ens orrie" about the state o public e"ucation coul" Qoin together toe5press their rustrations anger "isillusionment an" emotions regar"ing the schools but ithout a ocusor their "iscussions they coul" easily agree about the sorry state o e"ucation ithout in"ing points oclarity or potential solutions. A gripe session oul" ollo. Gut i a precise Iuestion is pose"Wsuch asWhatcan be "one to improvepublic e"ucationL4Wthen a more proitable area o "iscussion is opene" upsimply by placing a ocus on the search or a concrete solution step.Jne or more Qu"gments can bephrase" in the orm o "ebate propositions motions or parliamentary "ebate or bills or legislativeassemblies 9he statements TFesolve": 9hat the e"eral government shoul" implement a program o

charter schools in at-ris' communities% an" Fesolve"R 9hat the state o @lori"a shoul" a"opt a schoolvoucher programT more clearly i"entiy speciic ays o "ealing ith e"ucational problems in amanageable orm suita-le for de-ate. 9hey provi"e speciic policies to be investigate" an" ai""iscussants in i"entiying points o "ierence. 9his ocus contributes to better an" more inorme" "ecisionma'ing ith the potentialor -etter results.=n aca "emic "ebate it provi"es -etter depth ofargumentationan" enhance" opportu nity or reaping the e"ucational beneits o participation. =n the ne5tsection e ill consi"er the challenge o raming the proposition or "ebate an" its role in the "ebate. Tohave a productive de-ate hich acilitates eective "ecision ma'ing by directing and placing limitson the decision to -e made the basis or argument shoul" be clearl$ defined. = e merely tal' about atopic such as OThomeless ness% or abortion% Jr crime% or global arming% e are li'ely to have aninteresting "iscussion but not to establish a proitable basis or argument. @or e5ample the statementFesolve": 9hat the pen is mightier than the sor"% is "ebatable yet by itsel ails to provi"e much basisor "ear argumentation. = e ta'e this statement to meanIliadthe ritten or" is more eective than

physical orce or some purposes e can i"entiy a problem area: the comparative eectiveness oriting or physical orce or a speciic purpose perhaps promoting positive social change. (ote thatloose4propositions such as the e5ample above may be "eine" by their a"vocates in such a ay as toacilitate a clear contrast o competing si"esR through "einitions an" "ebate they become% clearlyun"erstoo" statements even though they may not begin as such. 9here are ormats or "ebate that otenbegin ith this sort o proposition. Hoever in an$ de-ate at some point eective an" meaningul"iscussion relies on i"entiication o a clearly state" or un"erstoo" proposition.) Gac' to the e5ample othe ritten or" versus physical orce. Although we no have a general sub#ect, we have not yet stated a problem. =t isstill too -road, too loosely worded to promote weII6organi7ed argument. hat sort o riting are e concerne" ithWpoems novels government "ocuments ebsite "evelopment a"vertising cyber-arare"isinormation or hatL hat "oes it mean to be mightierT in this conte5tL hat 'in" o physical orce isbeing compare"Wists "ueling sor"s ba1oo'as nuclear eapons or hatL A more speciic Iuestionmight be oul" a mutual "eense treaty or a visit by our leet be more eective in assuring 8aurania o

our support in a certain crisisL% 9he basis or argument coul" be phrase" in a "ebate proposition such asFesolve": 9hat the !nite" #tates shoul" enter into a mutual "eense treaty ith 8aurania.% egativea"vocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that leet maneuvers oul" be a better solution. 9his isnot to say that "ebates shoul" completely avoi" creative interpretation o thecontroversyby a"vocates or that goo""ebates cannot occur over competing interpretations o the controversyR in act these sorts o "ebatesmay be very engaging. 9he point is that "ebate is -est facilitated -$ the guidance provided -$ focuson a particular point of difference hich ill be outline" in the olloing "iscussion.

ecision2ma"ing is the most porta-le and flexi-le s"ill8"e$ to all facets of life and advocac$

Stein-erg and Freele$ 917


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Davi" Director o Debate at ! >iami @ormer Mresi"ent o EDA oicer American @orensic Associationan" ational Eommunication Association. 8ecturer in Eommunication stu"ies an" rhetoric. A"visor to>iami !rban Debate 8eague >asters in Eommunication an" Austin ;D #uol' !niversity attorney hoocuses on criminal personal inQury an" civil rights laArgumentation and DebateCritical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making 9hirteen "ition=n the spring o 20++ facing a legacy o problematic !.# military involvement in Gosnia =raI an"

Aghanistan an" criticism or hat some sa as slo support o the !nite" #tates or the people o gyptan" 9unisia as citi1ens o those nations ouste" their ormerly American-bac'e" "ictators the a"ministrationo Mresi"ent Garac' Jbama consi"ere" its options in provi"ing support or rebels see'ing to overthro thegovernment o >uammar el-Xa""ai in 8ibya. 8ublic de-ate 3as ro-ustas the a"ministration sought to"etermine its most appropriate action. 9he presi"ent ultimately "eci"e" to engage in an internationalcoalition enorcing !nite" ations #ecurity Eouncil Fesolution +*B through a number of measuresincluding establishment of a no6fly 7one through air an" missile stri'es to support rebels in 8ibya but stoppingshort of "irect !.#. intervention ith groun" orces orany occupation o 8ibya. hile the action seeme" toachieve its imme"iate obQectives most notably the "eeat o Xa""ai an" his regime the Americanpresi"ent receive" both criticism an" praise or his measure" yet assertive "ecision. =n act the past"eca"e has challenge" American lea"ers to ma'e many "iicult "ecisions in response to potentiallycatastrophic problems. Mublic "ebate has rage" in chaotic environment o political "ivision an" apparentanimosity 9he process o public "ecision ma'ing may have never been so conseIuential or "iicult.Geginning in the all of 9- Mresi"ents Gush an" Jbama ace" a groing economic crisis an" respon"e"

in part ith VPbailoutsVV o certain all #treet inancial entities a""itional bailouts o Detroit automa'ersan" a maQor economic stimulus pac'age. All these actions generate" substantial public "iscourseregar"ing the necessity is"om an" conseIuences o acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011 thepresi"ent an" the Eongress participate" in heate" "ebates (an" attempte" negotiations) to raise thenationVs "ebt ceiling such that the !.#. @e"eral $overnment coul" pay its "ebts an" continue governmentoperations. 9his "iscussion as lin'e" to a "ebate about the si7e o the e5ponentially groing national"ebt government spen"ing an" ta5ation. @urther in the spring o 20+2 !.#. lea"ers sought to prevent=ran rom "eveloping nuclear eapon capability hile gas prices in the !nite" #tates rose 9he !nite"#tates consi"ere" its ongoing military involvement in Aghanistan in the ace o nationi"e protests an"violence in that country+spar'e" by the allege"burning o ?orans by American sol"iers an" Americansobserve" the actions o Mresi"ent Gashir Al6Assa" an" #yrian orces as they 'ille" #yrian citi1ens inresponse to a rebel uprising in that nation an" consi"ere" the role o the !nite" #tates in that action.>eanhile public "iscourse in part generate" an" intensiie" by the campaigns of the $JM can"i"ates

for presi"ent an" conseIuent me"ia coverage a""resse" issues "ivi"ing Americans inclu"ing healthcare omenVs rights to repro"uctive health services the ree"om o churches an" church-run organi1a-tions to remain true to their belies in provi"ing (or electing not to provi"e) health care services hich theyoppose the groing gap beteen the ealthiest + percent o Americans an" the rest o the Americanpopulation an"continue" high levels o unemployment. >ore "ivision among theAmerican public oul"be har" to imagine. Yet through all the tension conlict as almost entirely ver balin nature aime" at"iscovering or a"vocating solutions to groing problems. =n"ivi"uals also ace" "aunting "ecisions. Ayoung couple un"erater with their mortgage an" struggling to ma'e their monthly payments consi"ere"al'ing aay rom their loanR elseherea college sophomore reconsi"ere" his maQor an" a senior herchoice o la school gra"uate school or a Qob an" a teenager "eci"e" beteen an iMhone an" an iMa".5ach of these situations called for decisions to -e made. ach "ecision ma'er or'e" har" to ma'eell-reasone" "ecisions. Decision ma'ing is a thoughtul process o choosing among a variety o optionsor acting or thin'ing. It reIuires that the "eci"er ma'e a choice. 8ie demands"ecision ma'ing. e ma'e

countless in"ivi"ual "ecisions every "ay. To ma'e some o those "ecisions e or' har" to employ care an"consi"eration: others scorn to Qust happen. Eouples amilies groups o rien"s an" coor'ers cometogether to ma'e choices and "ecision-ma'ing bo"ies rom committees to Quries to the !.#. Eongress an"the !nite" ations ma'e "ecisions that impact us all. 5ver$ profession re


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An" upon hat inormation shoul" = rely to ma'e my "ecisionL Eertainly some o these "ecisions aremore conseIuential than others. hich amen"ment to vote or hat television program to atch hatcourse to ta'e hich phoneplan to purchase an" hich "iet to pursue3all present uniIue challenges. Atour best e see' out research an" "ata to inorm our "ecisions. Yet even the choice of 3hichinformation to attend to reuch o hat suices as inormation is not reliable or even ethicallymotivate". 9he ability o every "ecision ma'er to ma'e goo" reasone" an" ethical "ecisionsV reliesheavily upon their ability to thin" criticall$.Eritical thin'ing enables one to brea' argumentation "on toits component parts in or"er to evaluate its relative vali"ity an" strength An" critical thin'ing oers toolsenabling the user to better un"erstan" theV nature an" relative Iuality o the message un"er consi"eration.Eritical thin'ers are better users o inormation as ell as better a"vocates. Eolleges an" universitiese5pect their stu"ents to "evelop their critical thinking skillsan" may reIuire stu"ents to ta'e "esignate"courses to that en". 9he importance an" value of such stu"y is i"ely recogni1e". 9he e5ecutive or"erestablishing EaliorniaVs reIuirement statesR =nstruction in critical thin'ing is "esigne" to achieve an

un"erstan"ing o the relationship o language to logic hich oul" lea" to the ability to analy1e critici1ean" a"vocate i"eas to reason in"uctively an" "e"uctively an" to reach actual or Qu"gmental conclusionsbase" on soun" inerences "ran rom unambiguous statements o 'nole"ge or belie. 9he minimalcompetence to be e5pecte" at the successul conclusion o instruction in critical thin'ing shoul" be theability to "istinguish act rom Qu"gment belie rom 'nole"ge an" s'ills in elementary in"uctive ari""e"uctive processes inclu"ing an un"erstan"ing o "ie ormal an" inormal allacies o language an"thought. Eompetency in critical thin"ing is a prere


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customer or our pro"uct or a vote or our avore" political can"i"ate. #ome people ma'e "ecision bylipping a coin. Jthers act on a him or respon" unconsciously to hi""en persua"ers.% = the problem istrivialWsuch as hether to go to a concert or a ilm3the particular metho" use" is unimportant. @or morecrucial matters hoever mature a"ults reIuire a reasoned methodso "ecision ma'ing. Decisionsshoul" be Qustiie" by goo" reasons base" on accurate evi"ence an" vali" reasoning.

Third e-ate2-ased simulations are "e$ to the process of national securit$ decision2ma"ing promotes agenc$ and it4s the -est guard against rash action

)a"er Ehie ;u"ge o the !nite" #tates Eourt o Appeals or the Arme" @orces an" an a"Qunctproessor at $eorgeton !niversity 9he !niversity o =oa an" ashington !niversity in #t. 8ouis 91,(;ames . Mrocess Mractice an" Mrinciple: 9eaching ational #ecurity 8a an" the ?nole"ge that>atters >ost% 2* $eo. ;. 8egal thics +AV=9FL?nole"ge o process is essential to the stud$ and practice of national securit$ la3.=t is moreimportant to teach process than it is to teach the substance o the la although one shoul" o courseteach both in an integrate" manner. hyL As an initial matter the layer ho 'nos all the la in theorl" is o little value i she is not literall$ and metaphoricall$ in the roomhen policy is ormulate"an" "ecisions are ma"e. 9hat reIuires 'nole"ge o process an" an un"erstan"ing o bureaucracy.

9here is no annotate" co"e to consult to in" out here an" hen targeting cells meet or here an"hen counter-terrorism or'ing groups convene or ho to insist that you atten" a meeting. 9he ren"itionmeeting is not poste" on the bulletin boar". 9he traine" layer ill un"erstan" bureaucracy an" agencyculture an" thus sense here "ecisions are actually ma"e hen an" by hom inclu"ing hether theyare ma"e in inormal settings or ormal settings. 9he eective layer gets there irst ith meaningul legala"vice in a orm that is accessible to the client.=n a""ition 3ithout a sophisticated understanding of processthe layer is less li'ely to effectivel$communicate ith "ecision-ma'ers at critical moments. A memoran"um ill sit unrea" hen an urgenttelephone call is nee"e". 9he layer ill sen" an email or perhaps even a 9eet hen a hallinterception is reIuire". >oreover here the traine" layer 'nos ho to loo' up the la the master oprocess ill 'no ho to eectively engage the bureaucracy. 9he master o process ill also in" thee5pert ithin the government on the area o la in Iuestion an" "o so on the "ecision-ma'erVs timeline. =tis the e5pert an" not the co"e that ill tell the layer ho the la has been interprete" an" applie" in thepast as ell as provi"e any classiie" nuance. >oreover the stu"ent o process ill ensure the a"viceren"ere" is authoritative and accounta-le. =n other or"s the "epartment an" the layers involve" illstan" behin" the a"vice ren"ere" even hen the pressure mounts to "o otherise.An un"erstan"ing o process also entails 'nole"ge o culture. ill a layer at the Department o ;ustice respon" in the same manner to the same a"vice as a layer at theE=A or in the militaryL ill the clientL =s one client or agency more incline" to rea" beteen the lines or run o the page than anotherL = so ho shoul" that 'nole"ge shapea"viceL 9hese are o course rhetorical IuestionsR those ho practice in the iel" alrea"y 'no that a >arine a "iplomat an" a layer ill li'ely respon" "ierently to the samereIuest or a"vice. Another reason that 'nole"ge o process is essential to teaching la is that goo" process generally lea"s to better policy an" legal outcomes. ote that theemphasis here is not on process per se the mere mention o hich ill scare most security operators o especially hen layers are involve". 9he ocus is on teaching an"un"erstan"ing goo" process.

$oo" process is timely conte5tual an" meaningul. A goo" process is one that among other thingsfuses information rapidl$ and accuratel$R invites dissent so as to -etter identif$ 3ea"nesses3hich in tum invites mitigationR an" results in a clear an" accounta-le decision that is transparent tothose ith a nee" to 'no or to implement the "ecision. =n a legal conte5t that means a process thatinclu"es relevant legal actors relates la to act an" i"entiies the pros an" cons o each argument asell as the legal policy implications o choosing beteen laully available options.$oo" process an" lea"ership are also the antidote to the endemic pathologies of national securit$

decision2ma"ing. 9hese pathologies may an" no "oubt "o occur in other iel"s but nohere are theymore pronounce" than in the iel" o national security. The$ include secrec$( speed( the nationalsecurit$ imperative +C an" the innate ten"ency o the 5ecutive to ocus on the imme"iate versus thelong-term eects o policies an" legal Qu"gments. +9he inal reason that process is essential to learning national security la is that layers more oten thannot are the "eepers and guardians of process to the e5tent anyone is at all . =t is layers ho ill 'nothat a classiie" "irective e5ists. =t is layers ho are traine" in constitutional processes. An" it is layersho shoul" operate ithout the bur"en o a policy portolio an" thus operate ith the obQective to gui"e"ecision-ma'ers to an eective conte5tual process ithout the conscious or subconscious bur"en ohaving that process result in a particular outcome.


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). HO/ O >O' T5ACH +#OC5SS?A number o points bear emphasis. 9he irst point is recognition that national security process is a coresubQect Qust as civil proce"ure an" criminal proce"ure are central to the stu"y o civil or criminal la. A laschool oul" har"ly Qu"ge a stu"ent to be traine" in criminal la or civil la i she "i" not 'no the Qu"icialstructure at the state an" e"eral level ho many ;ustices sit on the #upreme Eourt or un"erstan" therelative Quris"iction beteen courts. #imilarly a 'ey aspect o national security practice is un"erstan"ingthe variety o proce"ures an" processes that apply. Here a comparative stud$ of process is useful as-et3een su-@ect areas( -et3een institutions( and -et3een countries. >oreover in contrast tocriminal proce"ure or civil proce"ure or e5ample national security processes are not as a generalmatter initiate" or run by layers. Hoever it is the layer ho oten has to e5plain an" articulate thebeneit o goo" process to the "ecision-ma'er.#econ" comparative analysis an" case studies are also useful methods for conve$ing real23orldprocess points in the absence o e5perience. 9hus a national security la course shoul" consi"er thenormative processes by hich the Mresi"ent an" other 'ey actors ma'e national security "ecisionsincluding the militar$ chain of command and the NSC process. =t shoul" also inclu"e consi"eration oa" hoc an" inormal mechanisms. ho is in the room an" ho is notL =n this regar" hite Housepictures are a useul assetR hoever agency "ecision-ma'ing can be even more opaIue in the absenceo the pictures an" narrative that sometimes accompanies #E "ecision-ma'ing. ach process oers"ierent perspectives on vertical an" hori1ontal input an" "ecisionma'ing. 9hey also i"entiy the criticalactors an" thus by e5tension the critical layers involve".A comparison to parallel mo"els o "ecision-ma'ing is also helpul in highlighting 'ey "istinctions. =n the #E conte5t this might be "one by comparing the #E mo"els a"opte"in the !? an" Australia hich are inorme" by but not copie" rom the !.#. system. Ease stu"ies can serve this purpose as ell such as: ssence o Decision $rahamAllisonVs account o 5ecutive branch "ecision-ma'ing "uring the Euban >issile ErisisR20 Dereliction o Duty a stu"y o the ;oint Ehies "uring the Nietnam conlictR2+ or >ar'Go"enVs 9he @inish: 9he ?illing o Jsama Gin 8a"en covering process "uring the or'-up an" e5ecution o the 20++ Gin 8a"en rai".22 =nspector $eneral (=$) an"Eommission reports-such as those covering the use o national security letters or the Geirut Gombing (8ong Eommission)-can be use" to encourage stu"ents in i"entiying theelements o successul process as ell as hat or'e" an" hat "i" not.ith respect to bureaucratic culture an" internal agency process guest spea'ers serve ell--especially hen as'e" uniorm Iuestions-to "ra out "istinctions in culture. @ore5ample THo oul" the typical case oicer or >arine respon" to legal a"viceLT

@inally experiential learning is essential. 9his soun"s ancy especially hen "escribe" as pe"agogy. =tis not. 9he military has been teaching this ay or "eca"es.2B >oot court or national security layers ise5periential learning using moc' meetings an" e5ercises ith stu"ents playing every imaginable type orole: rom line attorneys to the Attorney $eneralR rom lance corporals to the Ehairman o the ;oint EhiesRan" rom irst respon"ers to governors. !n"er this approach students get a -etter idea of 3hat 3or"sand 3hat does not 3or" and 3h$. Thiscan be "one on a micro scale ith ocus on in"ivi"ual s'ills an"processes or on a macro scale in the orm o tabletop e5ercises.@or e5ample Mroessor Da'ota Fu"esill (ormerly at $eorgeton 8a an" no at Jhio #tate) has

stu"ents ta'e turns preparing a moc' to-page Mresi"ential Daily &=ntelligence3 Grie (MDG) beore classeaturing the most important nes stories an" their sources. #tu"ents then orally brie a guest TMresi"entTat the beginning o each class.2 9he e5ercise accomplishes our teaching goals. @irst it emphasi1es theimportance o ritten an" oral nuance. #econ" it trains stu"ents to sit through an" con"ensevoluminous complex information into concise polic$ intelligence an" legal tal'ing points in a ay thatriting bries an" papers an" e5ams assure"ly "o not. 9hir" it exposes students to the sort of cross2examination that intelligence and legal specialists encounter.An" inally by using an array o guestTMresi"entsT the e5ercise e5poses stu"ents to a range o personalities as ell as the necessity o thelayer a"apting his or her personality to the nee"s an" sty le o the client.

At the other en" o a continuum $eorgeton Mroessor 8aura Donohue runs a multi-"ay simulationinspire" by the $overnmentVs 9op-J 5ercises.24 #tu"ents role-play members o Eongress the me"iathe 5ecutive the military an" so on hile conronting a constantly evolving national security crisis. 9hisational #ecurity Erisis simulation is part o a semester-long ive-cre"it course immersing stu"ents in thesubstance an" process o the la. @ace" ith a series o rolling acts an" conseIuences stu"entscon"uct press conerences appear beore Eongressional Eommittees "rat legislation see' Eourtor"ers an" consult ith state an" local authorities. hat is more the scenario plays out as many crises"o continuously through the night. =n this ay students get a feel for ho3 process affects outcome(and ho3 la3 relates to facts.9hey also get Qust a hint about the importance o endurance in thepractice o national security. 9hey also encounter the la an" layers rom the policyma'erVs perspectivehich-"epen"ing on personality an" conte5t-can be an asset or an obstacle. @urthermore they aree5pose" to the sorts o time management choices that layers an" "ecision-ma'ers ace on a "aily basis.


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OFF

'.S. presence sta-le no3 plan "ills alliances and em-oldens *ran

6olden-erg 1&(=lan #enior @ello an" Director o the >i""le ast #ecurity Mrogram Eenter or ae American #ecurity. Mrepare" #tatement o =lan $ol"enberg 9estimony beore the House @oreign

Aairs Eommittee =mplications o a uclear Agreement ith =ran% ;uly 2Br"20+4"ocs.house.gov/meetings/@A/@A00/20+40*2B/+0BC0*/HHF$-++-@A00-state-$ol"enberg=-20+40*2B.p")Hoever part o the $ul #tatesP criticism is Qustiie". =n recent years the Jbama a"ministration has beenso ocuse" on the nuclear Iuestion that it has largely ignore" the Iuestion o =ranian regional inluence.hile the a"ministration has "one a reasonable Qob o managing one crisis ater another in the region an"avoi"e" entangling the !nite" #tates in ne conlicts it has not articulate" a clear strategy an"commitment to the >i""le ast that coul" reassure partners. 9he !nite" #tates has clearly recogni1e"this problem an" begun to move to a""ress it ith the $ul Eooperation Eouncil ($EE) summit hoste" byMresi"ent Jbama at Eamp Davi" in >ay 20+4. 9his summit as the irst step in hat is li'ely to be a longprocess o attempting to convince the $ul states that the 'nite" States is not pivoting to =ran an"remains committed to their security. =mpact on the !.#.-=srael Felationship A nuclear agreement ith =ran may also have signiicant implications orthe !.#.-=srael relationship. =t coul" un"ermine trust beteen the !nite" #tates an" =srael as it alrea"y has ith the very open an" public "isagreements beteen Mresi"entJbama an" Mrime >inister GenQamin etanyahu. $iven their history o close cooperation against common threats in the region particularly in the intelligence an" securityarena this coul" hurt both countriesP interests. =ranPs regional activities an" its e5treme rhetoric threatening the e5istence o the ;eish state are causes o concern or =sraelis.Hoever =sraelPs greater concern lies ith the nuclear agreement itsel. 9he most signiicant issue or the =sraelis is not necessarily the "etails o the agreement such as thenumber o centriuges or the overall inspections regime but the Iuestion o enorcement. 9hey believe that hile =ran is li'ely to respect an agreement "uring the early years oimplementation at some point =ran ill cheat or ait out the +0K+4 year time perio" at hich point many o the provisions sunset. Gy this time the international communityPsattention ill be "iverte" to other matters there ill be no orceul response eventually the "eal ill ero"e an" =ran ill be let ith e limits on its nuclear program an" nosanctions. ven as they e5press their concerns about the nuclear agreement an" the policies o the Jbama a"ministration many in the security establishment in =srael areuncomortable ith the public conrontational approach ta'en by Mrime >inister etanyahu in opposing the agreement. 9here is a i"ely hel" vie among =sraeli securityproessionals that the best ay or the !nite" #tates an" =srael to or' out their "ierences through private consultations in hich =srael coul" shape an" inluence Americanthin'ing an" try to improve the contents o the agreement. =nstea" by pursuing this "irect conrontation an" trying to use Eongress to un"ercut the "eal the prime >inister hasturne" support or =srael K a tra"itionally bipartisan issue K into a politically contentious e"ge issue that has orce" Democratic legislators to choose beteen the presi"ent an"lea"er o their party an" the prime minister o =srael. 9he goo" nes is that even as political tensions have risen security cooperation has remaine" strong. 9he !nite" #tatescontinues to provi"e billions in security assistance to =srael inclu"ing support or the =ron Dome #ystem anti-roc'et system hich "ramatically improve" the security o =sraelPspopulation in recent years. =n the imme"iate atermath o the agreement the Mrime >inister is li'ely to continue to strongly oppose an agreement both publicly an" privately.Hoever once the political conrontation has en"e" many in both the !nite" #tates an" =srael hope that relations can begin to improve an" that the to tra"itional partners can

return to operating as they use" to. 9he ay @orar": Fegional an" on-Mrolieration Molicy in the Atermath o the Agreementhile the agreement itsel iscritical hat 3ill -emore decisive or its success or ailure is the set o non- prolieration an" regionalpolicies that the 'nite" States pursues in the atermath o the "eal. =n +0K+4 years the orl" coul" see amore mo"erate =ran re"uce" instability in the >i""le ast a stronger global non-prolieration regime an"an environment in hich AmericaPs prestige an" inluence has increase" as a result o the nuclearagreement. Jn the other han" ith poor e5ecution an" the rong policies the !nite" #tates coul" ace avery "ierent orl" in 2024: a more hostile an" aggressive =ran on the verge o nuclear eaponsR a>i""le ast still "roning in sectarian violence an" civil arR a "amage" non- prolieration regimeR an" an international perception thatthe nuclear agreement ith =ran as a historic mista'e that signiicantly harme" American interests. Eongress or'ing ith the e5ecutive branch can e5ercise its oversightresponsibilities by trying to promote policies that put the !nite" #tates on the right path such as strengthening the agreement ith mechanisms outsi"e o the "ealR pushingbac' on =ranPs support or surrogates an" pro5ies in the regionR reassuring !.#. regional partnersR an" loo'ing or ays over time to improve communication ith =ran an" in"some areas o common interest. #trengthen the nuclear agreement by ta'ing steps outsi"e o the M4[+ negotiations ith =ran to set con"itions or eective long-termenorcement an" implementation 9he !nite" #tates shoul" or' ith 'ey sta'ehol"ers inclu"ing Eongress =srael an" the M4[+ on a series o measures outsi"e the "irectnegotiations ith =ran to strengthen the "eal. 9he !nite" #tates shoul" "erive rom the inal agreement a clear an" speciic set o criteria to Qu"ge potential =ranian violations.9hese violations shoul" then be tie" to proportional punitive steps that the presi"ent coul" ta'e to respon" in the event o a violation. stablishing internal criteria an" clearlyarticulating it to =ran ill increase the !nite" #tatesP ability to "eter =ranian violations an" re"uce the ris' that =ran is able to sloly ero"e the agreement through minor violations.9he e5ecutive branch shoul" consult ith Eongress on this approach an" together negotiate legislation that inclu"es some o these metrics an" provi"es the presi"ent thenecessary authorities to impose punishments in the event o violations. 9he legislation shoul" also inclu"e rigorous reporting criteria an" the reIuirement or the e5ecutivebranch to provi"e Iuarterly high-level classiie" brieings to members o Eongress or the "uration o the agreement. =n an i"eal orl" Eongress shoul" establish asubcommittee speciically "e"icate" to this issue as it has or other high proile arms control agreements to ensure long-term monitoring an" implementation. 9he legislationshoul" inclu"e increase" un"ing or the =AA giving it the necessary resources to implement the agreement in the most robust ay possible K particularly by a""ing moreinspectors an" technology or monitoring. 9he =AA is "eveloping estimates o ho much it ill cost it to implement the "eal: arly in"ictions rom Director $eneral Yu'iyaAmano suggest an a""itional cost o appro5imately \+0 million per year K a small price to pay or greater transparency into =ranPs nuclear program. >ore orceully counter

=ranian actions that are against !.#. interests most notably their support or surrogates an" pro5ies in the >i""le ast 9he !nite" #tates shoul" signiicantly increase its eortsto counter =ranPs regional surrogates an" pro5ies.#uch an approach is inten"e" to "eter =ranian me""ling in the region bysignaling to =ranPs lea"ership particularly some o the har"liners an" lea"ers o the =F$E-X@ that =ran isnot ascen"ant in the region an" that i it pushes too ar it ris's a "irect conlict ith the !nite" #tates.9hese actions oul" also signal to America4s Ara- partners especially #au"i Arabia that the 'nitedStates is not a-andoning the region to =ran or pursuing the eare" Mersian Mivot.% 9his means ma'ing clear to =ranthat even though it might receive sanctions relie through a nuclear "eal it ill not be ully elcome" bac' into the community o nations or receive relie rom terrorism-relate"sanctions until it stops playing a "estructive role in #yria =raI Yemen an" 8ebanon. 9he !nite" #tates shoul" also "ramatically increase cooperation ith regional partners tocounter the threat pose" by =ran. 9his shoul" start ith a high-level strategic "ialogue ith #au"i Arabia an" other 'ey partners that is ocuse" on coor"inating a Qoint policy tocounter =ranPs support or surrogates an" pro5ies. =t shoul" inclu"e the creation o a multi-national Qoint tas' orce that targets unconventional threats rom the =F$E an" #unnie5tremists. 9his tas' orce coul" Qointly or' on a number o tas's inclu"ing increasing inter"ictions o =ranian eapons shipments improving intelligence cooperation beteenthe !nite" #tates an" its partners increasing the emphasis o training an" Qoint e5ercises o special operations orces an" pursuing more aggressive Qoint covert actions against


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=ranian supporte" terrorism. Jne o the greatest challenges in this approach ill be not to ina"vertently sto'e sectarianism an" increase regional instability by bac'ingIuestionable policies o our partners. 9he most eective ay to "o this oul" be or the !nite" #tates an" its $ul partners to begin a robust strategic "ialogue on ho to Qointlycounter most eectively the unconventional threats pose" by =ran an" hat the ultimate political obQectives o such an eort may be. At a minimum there nee"s to be anagreement that AmericaPs regional partnersP un"ing o #unni e5tremism is not the anser to ighting #hia e5tremism. Geyon" that cooperation coul" inclu"e training an" Qointintelligence programs ocuse" on buil"ing partner capacity an" using American e5periences in countering unconventional threats in =raI an" Aghanistan to steer Arab partnersin a more eective "irection as oppose" to pursuing scorche" earth policies that alienate local populations an" "eepen the sectarian "ivi"e. #uch an approach ill be "iicultan" ta'e years to implement but the alternative o leaving our Arab partners to their on "evices to pursue ineective an" sectarian policies ithout American inluence is not a

solution. >aintain an" "eepen !.#. commitments to regional partners to "eter =ranian aggression an" "issua"e American partners rom ta'ing "estabili1ing steps9he!nite" #tates shoul" in" ays to signal to its regional partners that it remains committe" to their security.

=t is still important to maintaina ro-ust conventional militar$ presence in the >i""le ast ater anagreement to deter *ran rom aggressively pursuing itsdesta-ilizing activities in the region violatingthe nuclear agreement an" threatening ree"om o navigation an" the lo o energy resources. Despitethe regional ocus on the unconventional =ranian threat a conventional presence 3illalso reassurepartners that the 'nite" States remains committe" to their security. Mrovi"ing the Arab states greaterconi"ence in American commitments ill be a useul tool or dissuading them rom lashing out moreaggressively at =ran in ays that may e5acerbate the sectarian "ivi"e. =t coul" also re"uce the li'elihoo"that the Arab states oul" pursue their on "omestic enrichment capability in response to =ran. =npursuing this approach the !nite" #tates ill have to maintain a careful -alance. A maQor inlu5 o !.#.assets to the region coul" be provocative un"ermine both =ranPs coni"ence in the agreement an"

American intentions an" re"uce the li'elihoo" o increase" cooperation over time. Gut an$ significant3ithdra3al o assets oul" sha'e the coni"ence o both the Arab states an" =srael. The guidingprinciple should -e to maintain an American force posture that is essentiall$ the same or slightlyenhance". 9he !nite" #tates coul" consi"er orar" stationing a limite" number o more a"vance"manne" an" unmanne" aircrat an" missile "eense assets in the region but shoul" not go too arbeyon" that. = the agreement ta'es hol" an" over time =ranPs behavior mo"erates there is the potentialor a peace "ivi"en"% in the long term.

6CC2*ran 3ar escalates

c*nnis( 1& (;. >atthe >c=nnisFesi"ent @ello-American nterprise =nstitute */+ 9he Mersian$ul ars to Eome http://.the"ailybeast.com/articles/20+4/0*/+/the-persian-gul-ars-to-come.htmlith a potential \+40 billion in imme"iate sanctions relie to spen"Wan" billions more on ne business an" energy proits to bema"e in the years to comeW=ran is acing a elcome problem o ho to use all this money. 9ehranPs list o economicinvestment an" energy inrastructure proQects is un"oubte"ly long an" ill consume the maQority o the ne "ollars. =ran ill stillhave plenty o sanctions relie un"s though to put toar"s its partners an" pro5ies un"er its =slamicFevolutionary $uar" Eorps(=F$E). An" it ill nee" to. 9he =F$E oversees political paramilitary an" covert operationsorl"i"e but our arenas "ominate =ranPs attention. >aintaining Mresi"ent Gashar al Assa"Ps government in #yria coul" no be

costing =ran as much as \24 to \B4 billion a year accor"ing to !nite" ations oicials. 9ehranPs premier pro5y group 8ebaneseHe1bollah is in constant nee" o ne recruits cash an" eapons as their ighters are increasingly the primary orce hol"ingAssa"Ps ront lines. =ranPs =slamic Fevolutionary $uar" EorpsP (=F$E) has a massive stalle" eort to help lea" an" assist the =raIisecurity orces an" #hia militia groups in their ight against =#=#. @inally 9ehran provi"es support or YemenPs Houthi rebels "espitethe logistical challenges o moving any large amount o resources to the southest corner o the Arabian Meninsula un"er threat o anaval bloc'a"e. 9hese are ith the e5ception o Yemen ights =ran must in. 9ehran li'ely un"errites them through a""itional o-the-boo's bu"getary sources (implicitly estimate" by the hite House to be at aroun" \+4 billion) on top o =ranPs \+< billion or so inoicial "eense spen"ing. 9hen there are the proits o the maQor multi-billion "ollar in"ustrial conglomerates an" hol"ing companiesone" by the =F$E or #upreme 8ea"er Ali ?hamenei rom hich most o Assa"Ps survival money li'ely originates. =ranPs militaryalso nee"s a massive modernization o its conventional air groun" an" naval orces to catch up to itsregional competitors(ac'nole"ging o course the =ranians are usually more proicient ith their eIuipment no matter ho ol"it is). =H# ;anes estimates =ran may nee" \0 billion or a military reresh.% ?hamenei recogni1es this problem an" has as'e" orincrease" spen"ing on the arme" orces inclu"ing ballistic missile an" cyber capabilities in his latest @ive-Year economic plan.9he nuclear "eal ill go a long 3a$ in helping to pay these huge bills. Jnly a small portion o the "irect an"in"irect sanctions relie can alleviate much o this imme"iate bu"getary pressure. 9he apparent removal o many o the internationalinancial restrictions on the =F$EPs organi1ations an" personnel ill also be a huge boon to these operations. Gut the =F$E is 'nee-

"eep in #yria an" =raI an" struggling to 'eep Yemen rom becoming another resource blac' hole. =n tan"em ith broa"er nationalbu"get pressures these regional challenges mean =ran is currently unli'ely to un"erta'e maQor ne initiatives to e5pan" its inluenceor urther "estabili1e the region. Gut hat o the utureL Feports in"icate the conventional arms embargo ill be lite" ithin iveyears an" restrictions on ballistic missiles ithin eight. Assuming =#=# has been "eange" by that time hat happens i =ran is ableto get the situation un"er relative control ith Damascus an" Gagh"a"L 8onger-term hat ill the orl" loo' l i'e ater 2020 henall the restrictions have been lite"LA largely unshac'le" =ranian military ill be able to more rapidl$ modernize.Iuippe" ith ne Fussian an" Ehinese eaponry =ran coul" reely sen" munitions an" eIuipment to itspartner orces throughout the region. 9his oul" "ramatically escalate the pro5y ars an" conventionalarms race beteen =ran an" the Arab stateso the $ul Eooperation Eouncil ($EE). =ran ill almost certainly have a nesupreme lea"er by then but it is not a sae bet to e5pect a mo"erate oreign policy rom 9ehran. >ost li'ely a mo"iie" version o?hamenei ill lea" =ran. ven un"er the optimistic scenarios here =ranPs government shits aay rom its har"er core anti-


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American anti-]ionist an" =slamic i"eological un"erpinnings the regime ill li'ely be "riven by nationalistic impulses. 9he Arabstates ill still be acing at best a pric'ly =ran see'ing a "ominant position in the region an" closely aligne" ith these statesPminority #hia populations. !n"ermining #au"i ArabiaPs lea"ership role in the >uslim orl" an" amongst the $ul states ill remaincentral to 9ehranPs calculations an" planning. =ran ill also have a battle-har"ene" e5pe"itionary army o #hia pro5ies an" militiasstretching rom 8ebanon to =raI at its "isposal. 9he ull overhaul o =ranPs conventional orces ill ta'e some time. Hoever smartacIuisition o ne generations o a"vance" over-the-hori1on ra"ars air "eense systems cruise missiles torpe"oes an" precisiongui"ance technologies or its ballistic missiles coul" have a "ramatic eect on =ranPs ability to target an" "eter !.#. an" $ul orces.=ranPs capability to e5pan" i ts oensive an" "eensive cyber capabilities ill li'ely surpass any other regional poer. 9ehran ill

atch the $ul states or any reaction to =ranPs groing conventional position an" its illingness to ta'e military action an" =ran illa"Qust then accor"ingly. 9he $EE countries ill be ocuse" on shoring-up their imme"iate security hileensuring that they are not over-stretche" regionally. #au"i Arabia vies =ran as both an internal threat to its rule an" ane5ternal threat to its regional lea"ership. 9he ?ing"om ill push or event urther "omestic security integration ithin the $EEbeyon" the alrea"y "eepening political an" economic ties. hile the !A may eel uncomortable ith Fiya"hPs perceive"e5pansiveness in its "omestic aairs the precarious threat environment ill "ampen such resistance. 9he $EEPs porous bor"ersith Yemen an" JmanPs ragility ater the passing o #ultan Xaboos ill re-enorce this nee" or e5pan"e" "omestic securitycooperation. 9he $EE ill also consoli"ate its collective e5ternal security posture by moving toar"integrate" an" collective "eense responsesin vie o a more assertive =ran an" a less active !nite" #tates. #uchintegration ill re-enorce Fiya"hPs heightene" illingness to ta'e ris's an" the $EEPs illingness to ta'e aggressive action tocounter-regional threats. = the !.#. navy pulls bac' insecurity in the Mersian $ul may orce these states to"evelop more naval capacities. #uch capabilities ill urther contribute to the $EEPs inevitablydefensive scale"-bac' securit$ posture leaving fe3er resources to pursue as many e5pe"itionaryoperations as they once "i" in 8ibya an" recentlyin #yria to counter2*S*S. =n this >i""le ast o the 2020s li'ely lash-points inclu"e: Ehallenge to !.#. naval poer: 9ehran ill li'ely continue to assert that >i""le ast security shoul" be let to local

poers an" that the !.#. navy shoul" not be in the Mersian $ul. As =ran mo"erni1es its cruise missile an" naval arsenals "uring thene5t "eca"e 9ehran ill test !.#. military vulnerabilities an" illingness to remain in the region. Arab-=ranian conlict in the Mersian$ul: 9he 6ulf states ma$ feel compelled to contest *ran4s a-ilit$ to control the +ersian 6ulf andStrait of Hormuz if America4s presence decreases.9his contestation coul" inclu"e the Arab #tatesamassing the latest generation anti-ship cruise missiles an" mines in a""ition to becoming more proicientin surace naval operations. Gac'e" up by groing ballistic missiles arsenals on both si"es o the $ulthis is an environment rife for miscalculation and escalation. Mro5y ar in the 8evant: 9he civil ar in #yriamay not en" or another "eca"e. hen it "oes en" it may leave a bal'ani1e" 8evant. #au"i Arabia is unli'ely to tolerate a #hiapro5y orce un"er =ranPs control "irecting the aairs o both #yria an" 8ebanon especially i this inclu"es a long-term "eployment o=F$E combat troops. Fiya"h coul" see' through covert actions to "isrupt an" "egra"e =ranPs operations in the region perhaps eventhrough a ne #au"i-le" Arab paramilitary orce. Moer contest in =raI: 9he $ul #tates have alrea"y shon some illingness toinally compete or inluence in Gagh"a". #au"i Arabia ill not tolerate an =ranian-"irecte" pro5y an" #hia militia army on its northernbor"er especially i it becomes integrate" ith the =raIi army. 9he $EE states may invest in #unni pro5y orces otheir onto un"ermine =ranian activities in =raI urther ueling sectarian conlictJman: #ultan XaboosP "eath may lea" toinstability in Jman. 9he countryPs strategic position in the #trait o Hormu1 ill invite #au"i mirati an" =ranian competition or

"ominant inluence. 9he Arab states may escalate to using orce i they thin' 9ehran is gaining the upper han". =ranian eorts to"estabili1e #au"i Arabia: 9he $ul states see the =F$EPs covert activities in Gahrain ;or"an Yemen an" #au"i ArabiaPs maQority#hia astern Mrovince as an attempt by =ran to surroun" an" strangle Fiya"h. !nless there is signiicant change in the regime in9ehran these ears ill only increase as =ran puts even more resources toar"s its pro5ies ith the aim o soing "iscor" ithin the?ing"om. All o these scenarios ill ta'e on a more ominous tone as e approach 20B0 hen =ran ill li'ely achieve a threshol"capability to pro"uce a "ecent si1e nuclear arsenal i it choses to "o so. 9his is a uture the !nite" #tates can certainlyshape.9he announce" nuclear "eal ill gra"ually ith"ra important international authorities to sanction the =F$E an" itsassociate" inance procurement an" logistics netor's. =n "een"ing the "eal Mresi"ent Jbama has ta'en great pains to assertthat ashington ill continue its unilateral an" multilateral eorts to target =ranPs support to pro5y an" terrorist groups. 5nhancedcommitment to help the 6ulf State to in" better ays to roll bac' =ranPs "isruptive activities couldprevent most o these outcomes. #imilarly the !nite" #tates nee"s to actively "evelop strategies to constrain =ranPsability to acIuire the eapons systems most threatening to the !.#. navy an" air orceWor be able to mitigate them i unsuccessul.9he continue" !.#. presence in the $ul ill also -e essential to prevent the escalation o $EE-=ranconlicts. = =ran "oes not cheat the nuclear agreement may have ma"e ar over =ranPs nuclear program

less li'ely. Gut the 'nite" States cannot aor" to rest on its laurels. 9he comprehensive nuclearagreement ill have its on secon" or"er eects. Jther ars may no have become more li'ely.

6reat po3er 3ar

Stavridis 17(;ames #tavri"is is a retire" our-star !.#. avy a"miral an" A9J supreme allie"comman"er ho serves to"ay as the "ean o the @letcher #chool o 8a an" Diplomacy at 9uts!niversity. #tavri"is is a +*< "istinguishe" gra"uate o the !.#. aval Aca"emy. He earne" a MhD an">aster o Arts in 8a an" Diplomacy rom 9he @letcher #chool o 8a an" Diplomacy at 9uts !niversityin =nternational Felations in +C here he on the $ullion Mri1e as outstan"ing stu"ent. He is also a+2 "istinguishe" gra"uate o the !nite" #tates ational ar Eollege. He is an Associate @ello o the


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$eneva Eentre or #ecurity Molicy&3 @lash Moint in the astern >e"iterranean% ;uly +th20+Bhttp://oreignpolicy.com/20+B/0*/+/lash-point-in-the-eastern-me"iterranean/)@lash Moint in the astern >e"iterraneanill conlict in the >i""le ast trigger the ne5t great po3er 3arL=n the mi"st o such rustration an" seemingly intractable hatre"s it may eel li'e time to simply "isengage an" al'aay. 9here is enormous >i""le ast atigue in the !nite" #tates W the maQority o Americans oppose intervening in #yria an"e even try to comprehen" it all: Malestinians an" =sraelis #unnis an" #hiites Arabs an" ;es =ran an" =raI Aghanistan an" the

$ul Ehristians an" Dru1e. 9o analysts the region is an arc o crisisR to the public it is Qust a mess. Gut sailing aay oul" bea huge mista"e. 8i'e the Gal'ans in the years lea"ing up to orl" ar= the 8evant an" the astern>e"iterranean are a pile of tinder that coul" ignite a much 3ider conflict. As ith the assassinPs shot that 'ille"

Arch"u'e @ran1 @er"inan" it is "iicult to pre"ict precisely hat coul" broa"en the conlict but it is impossibleto ignore the possibility. Eonlicts beteen #unnis an" #hiites are -u--ling over. Jl" tensions persistan" ne3 ones have arisen over economic resources notably natural gas iel"s W portions o hich areclaime" by Eyprus =srael $a1a #yria an" 8ebanon. An" great po3er interest remains as high as ever ithFussia an" the 'nite" States routinely operating arships in the region. Ehina an" =n"ia have also sentnaval assets to the astern >e" here they Qoin tra"itional A9J "eployments rom the navies o the 2C-nation alliance.9he ships merely relect a broa"er military presence. 9o"ay the #yrian civil ar is groun" 1ero ith =ran Fussia an"Ehina on one si"e an" the !nite" #tates #au"i Arabia the $ul #tates an" much o A9J on the other.9he spar' coul" come ith a confrontation -et3een 3arships a maQor terrorist attac" by =ranian-sponsore" He1bollah or the use o chemical 3eapons either in the civil ar itsel or orse in urope.

#o the Iuestion ith hich the !nite" #tates must grapple is hat is our strategyin this comple5 part o theorl" lying as it "oes ne5t to one o our closest allies =srael an" on the e"ge o our strongest alliance system A9JL
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/19/flash-point-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/19/flash-point-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/


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OFF

Their


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Nolume = (hich Halperin calls the Iueer bible). Hoever or Iueer theory class conlict turns out to be@ust another set of pro-lems marginal at best hich have no "eterminate relation to se5ual politics.A"mitte"ly Iueer theory opposes some aspectso bourgeois lie: hat it opposes hoever is onl$ theoppressiveness of homopho-ia as a set of attitudes and discourses. Gy neglecting to a""ress an"attac' homophobia-as @iel" "oes-as a structure o oppression ine5tricably boun" up ith the classstructure Iueer theorists/critics become Tsex re-els:rather than revolutionariescommitted to radicalsocial transformation. 9he problem ith Iueer theory is that (contrary to its on sel-un"erstan"ing) it3or"s basically not against but in the interest of the DeconomicB status ar'e" +4:0* ^ guaranteeing a "emocratic inclusiveness hichthey ish either to see hel" to its TagreementT or replace" by a ne (an" TbetterT) Iueer "emocracy.@rom @iel"Vs point o vie the problem ith the liberal state lies not in its ailure to live up to its claims noris the solution to "isplace l iberal "emocracy ith a Iueer libi"inal "emocracy. @or nee"-theory the liberalstate is merely a mas" for the in@ustices of capitalism or covering over economic e5ploitation by tryingto put a Thuman aceT on capitalism by means o social security elare programs an" so on. 9o"ayhen !# capitalists are engage" in the most intense global competition since the en" o the #econ"orl" ar multinational corporations an" their political spo'espersons in all mainstream parties have"eclare" that e can no longer aor" the TnicetiesT o that Thumane aga"eT an" have unceremoniouslyshove" the in"o"ressing o TliberalismT asi"e. Hence the pro-lem toda$ is not li-eralism( -ut anincreasingl$ deregulatedan" rapacious capitalism.

Capitalism causes inevita-le crises( ine


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those ho enQoy opulent aluence an"those ho languish in "ehumani1ing con"itionsan" economic misery. =n everycorner o the globe e are itnessing social "isintegrationas reveale" by a rise in abQect poverty an" ineIuality.Atthe current historical Quncture the combine" assets o the 224 richest people is roughly eIual to the annual income o the poorest *percent o the orl"Vs population hile the combine" assets o the three richest people e5cee" the combine" $DM o the C poorestnations (EEMA 2002 p. B). Appro5imately 2.C billion peopleWalmost hal o the orl"Vs populationWstruggle in"esperation to live on less than to "ollars a "ay(>cXuaig 200+ p. 2*). As many as 240 million chil"ren areage slavesan" there are over a billion or'ersho are either un- or un"er-employe". 9heseare the concrete

realitieso our timeWrealities that rear5Vs en"uring relevance lies in his in"ictment o capitalismhich continues to rea' havoc in the lives o most. hile capitalismVs cheerlea"ers have attempte" to hi"e its sor"i" un"erbelly>ar5Vs "escription o capitalism as the sorcererVs "ar' poer is even more apt in light o contemporary historical an" economiccon"itions. Father than Qettisoning >ar5 "ecentering the role o capitalism an" "iscre"iting class analysisra"ical e"ucators must continue to engage >ar5Vs oeuvre an" e5trapolaterom it that hich is useulpedagogicall$( theoreticall$( and most importantly politicall$in light o the challenges that conront us. 9heurgencyhich animates AminVs call or a collective socialist vision necessitates as e have argue" moving

beyon" the particularisman" liberal pluralism that inorms the Opolitics o "ierence.P =talso rear5Vs historical materialism an" his revolutionary socialist humanism hich must not be conlate" ith liberalhumanism. @or let politics an" pe"agogy a socialist humanist vision remains crucial hoseun"amental eaturesinclu"e the creative potential o people to challenge collectively the circumstances that they inherit.9hisvariant o humanism see's to give e5pression to the pain sorro an" "egra"ation o the oppresse" those ho labor un"er the


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ominous an" ghastly cloa' o Oglobali1e"P capital. =t calls or the transormation o those con"itions that have prevente" the bul' ohuman'in" rom ulilling its potential. =t vestsits hope or change in the "evelopment o critical consciousness an"social agents ho ma'e history although not alays in con"itions o their choosing. 9he political goal o socialist humanismis hoever Onot a resting in "ierenceP but rather Othe emancipation o "ierence at the level o human mutuality an" reciprocity.P9his oul" be a step orar" or the O"iscovery or creation o our real "ierences hich can only in the en" be e5plore" in reciprocalaysP (agleton +


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CAS5

Alternative causes to insta-ilit$

6ordon 1&K senior ello _ the Eouncil on @oreign FelationsMhilip 9he >i""le ast is alling apart% &http://.politico.eu/article/the-mi""le-east-is-alling-apart/3;une //

As nes out o the >i""le ast goes rom ba" to orse W the humanitarian "isaster in Yemen 8ibyaPs"isintegration the all o Fama"i to =#=8 ta'e your pic' W the inevitable American ten"ency especially inthe political season is to attribute all these "evelopments to !.#. policy choices. @ormer Deense#ecretary Fobert $ates sai" in >ay the !nite" #tates has no >i""le ast #trategy at all% theashington Most e"itorial page e5plains the all o Fama"i not as the result o an =raIi "ynamic but as aconseIuence o !.#. strategy an" Fepublican can"i"ates are o course tripping over each other toattribute the regionPs unraveling to the ea'ness% an" lac' o resolve o the Jbama a"ministration.egative outcomes certainly reIuire critical e5amination o policy choices an" no one in their right min"oul" suggest the outcomes in the >i""le ast to"ay are anything but negative. 9hat sai" hat mostothe current critii""le ast to"ay is going through a perio" otectonic an" "estructive change. = = too' aay anything rom to years as the hite HousePs coor"inatoror >i""le ast policy itPs that !.#. policy is not the main source o this change an" the !.#. has no goo"options or "ealing ith it. #ome o the propose" reme"ies or the regionPs oes such as !.#. militaryintervention in an eort to transorm% or rema'e% the region or simply to impress our oes oul" li'elyma'e things orse. 9his shoul" be clear rom the !.#. eort to "o so in =raI Qust over a "eca"e ago. 9helessons o that ar seem to have been bi1arrely orgotten by many to"ay (though almost all theFepublican presi"ential can"i"ates seem to ant to "ison the results o the =raI ar hile embracingthe policy approach that pro"uce" it). hereas in other iel"s o human en"eavor W ta'e me"icine ore5ample W e seem to accept that there are certain problems an" challenges that e "i" not create an"cannot entirely resolve (an" that trying to "o so sometimes ma'es things orse) the !.#. policy "ebateabout the >i""le ast suers rom the allacy that there is an e5ternal American solution to everyproblem W even hen "eca"es o e5perience inclu"ing recent e5perience suggest that this is not the

case.Accepting that the !nite" #tates is not to blame or an" cannot resolve every problem in the>i""le ast is not a prescription or inaction or resignation. 9he !nite" #tates remains the orl"Ps mostimportant poer an" has uniIue capabilities that give it an unmatche" ability an" responsibility to play a'ey role in a region here critical !# interests are at sta'e. !nortunately e cannot master thehistorical forcesthat probably mean the region 3ill -e plagued -$ insta-ilit$ for $ears or evendecades to come.Gut e can an" shoul" manage this instability as best e can an" protect our coreinterests hich inclu"e "een"ing our allies preventing regional ar 'eeping sea lanes open avoi"ingnuclear prolieration an" preventing a terrorist sae haven rom hich the !nite" #tates or its allies coul"be attac'e". #uch an approach might not soun" li'e a path to presi"ential glory an" it "oes not ma'e ormuch o a campaign bumper stic'er. Gut itPs both the least an" the most e can "o. e shoul" 'no byno that trying to "o much more oul" li'ely come at great human an" inancial cost pro"uce uninten"e"conseIuences an" ail to or'. 9he $reat !nraveling hat e5plains the historic "isor"er ePre seeing inthe >i""le ast to"ayL @our interrelate" tren"s are most relevant. hat e shoul" un"erstan" is that the

!nite" #tates is not primarily responsible or any o them an" can "o little to reverse their course. Thecollapse of state authorit$ and erosion of -orders. @or nearly +00 years the mo"ern >i""le ast hasbeen organi1e" aroun" a state system put in place by the estern poers ater the Jttoman mpirecollapse". 9he bor"ers o ne states li'e =raI ;or"an #yria an" 8ebanon ma"e little sense but theyere internationally recogni1e" an" W or all the ne statesP internal tensions W or many "eca"es theyremaine" intact. 9hese states ere relatively stableR they ha" agree" upon territories (save or somebor"er "isputes) lags anthems an" authoritarian lea"ers some o hom (>ubara' Assa" #a""amHussein $a""ai Gen Ali #aleh etc.) staye" aroun" or a very long time. 9hat post-Jttoman or"er isno alling apart W largely "ue to the conseIuences o the Arab #pring hen Arab publics inally rose upin protest against this artiicial "ivision. 9he !nite" #tates embrace" the Arab #pring but it certainly "i"


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not create it an" it ha" little to "o ith the "emocratic tren"s rise in political aareness or rustration iththe aile" governance that le" to the revolt. =n that sense = alays oun" it strange hen some criticscomplaine" about our throing >ubara' un"er the bus% as i the !nite" #tates Qust one "ay "eci"e" tochange gyptPs lea"ership or coul" have prevente" it hen the gyptian public "eci"e" to "o so. =n anycase the result of this revolution hasnot -eenthe increase" ree"oms many hope" to see but ratherthe collapse of state authorit$ and the unraveling of national -orders. 9he state calle" #yria% nolonger correspon"s to its oicial bor"ers an" li'ely never ill again. A real map o #yria to"ay W li'e theones pro"uce" on a regular basis or policyma'ers W oul" sho something more li'e Assa"istan%=#=#stan% usrahstan% ?ur"istan% etc. but not a political entity calle" #yria.% 9he state o =raI hasalso essentially bro'en apart an" Gagh"a" has little say in the ?ur"ish region or in the #unni-maQority

Anbar or inea provinces. 9he state structures o 8ibya an" Yemen no longer e5ist an" may not ever beput bac' together again. 9his particular tren" is capture" ell in an only slightly e5aggerate" recenthea"line in 9he Jnion: veryone in >i""le ast $iven Jn Eountry in B+*000000-state solution.%ePre not there yet. Gut as much as e can an" shoul" try to avoi" it itPs no more li'ely that other statesill collapse than it is that the no-bro'en states ill be put bac' together again. The Sunni2Shia split.9he #unni-#hia split is har"ly a ne tren" W itPs been going on since the *th century hen the Mrophet>ohamma"Ps olloers aile" to agree on his rightul successor. or it is necessarily orse than ever Wthe tensions to"ay still all short o perio"s li'e the late +Cth century hen ahhabi tribes rom the

Arabian Meninsula ere sac'ing #hia cities li'e ?erbala an" aQa in to"ayPs =raI. Gut there is no Iuestionthat this historic phenomenon that has risen an" allen in intensity over the years has entered a ne3 andparticularl$ dangerous phase. 9he latest escalation starte" ith the +* revolution in =ran an" thesubseIuent =ran-=raI ar but it as given its real near-term emphasis by the 200B =raI ar hich put themaQority #hia bac' in charge in Gagh"a" an" thus tippe" the sectarian balance in the region. (=ronicallythis as one o the e maQor tren"s e "i" have a maQor role in pro"ucing.) Gy "oing so it both spurre"an" alloe" the "evelopment o e5tremist #unni groups li'e al-Xae"a in =raI an" its successor =#=8hose attac's on #hia only reinorce this literally vicious circle. 9he Arab #pring in 20++ an" the collapsein state authority it pro"uce" urther e5acerbate" sectarianism: As insecurity rose in the post-authoritarian chaos people have gravitate" to their 'inWpro"ucing the horrible sectarian violence e nosee in #yria =raI an" Yemen. 9he groing #unni-#hia "ivi"e W an" the groing #unni ear o #hia =ranW is summe" up by the narrative hear" by any traveler to parts o the #unni orl" that =ran an" the #hiano control our Arab capitals% W Gagh"a" Damascus Geirut an" #anaPa W an" are loo'ing to controlmore. 9he narrative is e5aggerate" (9he #unnis have not calle" the shots in Damascus an" Geirut or along time) but relects a genuine ear o =ranian (#hia) hegemony that the #unnis are "etermine" to resist

W as e see in the #unni coalitions no at ar "irectly or in"irectly in #yria =raI an" Yemen. 9he #au"i-le" intervention in YemenWsupporte" by all the #unni states in the region W is best seen not as a plan tobring peace to Yemen but simply to put "on a mar'er to =ran. 9he #unni orl" ill not tolerate urther#hia encroachment in the region. 9he #unni-#unni #plit. >ost o the ocus in the region hasun"erstan"ably been on the real "ivi"e beteen #unni an" #hia but the #unni-#unni split may be Qust asimportant. Al Xae"a ater all an" no =#=8 are #unni groups ho target the #unni regimes they believeare behol"en to the est an" not true to =slam. 9he #unni regimes are thus ighting bac' inclu"ing bybombing =#=8 in #yria an" 8ibya. =n #unni countries that "o not have large #hia populations such asgypt an" ;or"an itPs not the #hia threat% but the #unni-#unni split that has lea"ers an" populationsorrie".An even more signiicant #unni-#unni split is a groing i"eological battle beteen the regionPs#unni regimes an" the #unni version o political =slam. 9he al-#isi regime in gypt or e5ample bac'e"by #au"i Arabia an" the !nite" Arab mirates vies the (#unni) >uslim Grotherhoo" as a mortal enemyW one it is "etermine" to crush at all costs. Jther #unni states hoever W 9ur'ey an" Xatar W are

sympathetic to the Grotherhoo" an" thus entirely at o""s ith their #unni brethren in Fiya"h an" AbuDhabi. 9hey oppose" #isiPs ta'eover in gypt (a ta'eover 9ur'ey still reuses to recogni1e) an" supportrival =slamist groups in 8ibya an" 9unisia that the #au"is an" miratis see as a"versaries. The resultingsets of alliances across the region isthus hugel$ complicated but i youPre olloing this at home: =nplaces "ivi"e" among #unni an" #hia (li'e #yria =raI or Yemen) the #unni states (inclu"ing 9ur'ey an"Xatar) all line up in a coalition against the #hia. Gut here there are no or e #hia li'e in gypt or 8ibyathe #unni harmony brea's "on an" the #unnis are "eeply "ivi"e" amongst themselves. Gecause othis Xatar an" 9ur'ey are ighting a sort o col" ar ith #au"i Arabia Gahrain an" the !A. =n >arch20+ those three $ul countries ith"re their ambassa"ors rom Doha to protest hat they consi"ere"to be XatarPs support or threatening =slamist movements inclu"ing through DohaPs hosting o the Al


21/47

;a1eera broa"cast netor' an" its support or the >uslim Grotherhoo" in gypt. 9he ambassa"ors havesince returne" but "eep tensions remain as "o the violent pro5y conlicts in 8ibya an" gypt. #uchconlicts are har" enough to manage hen there is unity among outsi"e poers or at most an e5ternalsectarian "ivi"e W they become almost impossible hen the #unni states themselves are "ivi"e".

'S and international arms sales ma"e insta-ilit$ inevita-le

)eaumont 1&Meter 9he \+Cbn arms race helping to uel >i""le ast conlict%&http://.theguar"ian.com/orl"/20+4/apr/2B/the-+Cbn-arms-race-mi""le-east-russia-iran-iraI-un3 April2B //9he >i""le ast is plunging "eeper into an arms race ith an estimate" \+Cbn e5pecte" to be spent oneapons this year( a development that experts 3arn is fuelling serious tension and conflictin theregion. $iven the unprece"ente" levels o eapon sales by the est (inclu"ing the !# Eana"a an" the!?) to the mainly #unni $ul states Nla"imir MutinPs "ecision last ee' to allo the controversial "eliveryo #-B00 anti-aircrat missiles to =ran K voluntarily bloc'e" by Fussia since 20+0 K seems li'ely toaccelerate the prolieration. 9hat ill see agree" arms sales to the top ive purchasers in the region -#au"i Arabia the !nite" Arab mirates Algeria gypt an" =raI K surge this year to more than \+Cbn uprom \+2bn last year. Among the systems being purchase" are Qet ighters missiles armoure" vehicles"rones an" helicopters. 9he Fussian "eclaration came only to "ays beore =raIPs prime ministerHai"er al-Aba"i "isclose" that he as see'ing arms orth billions o "ollars rom ashington K ithpayment "eerre" K or the battle against =slamic #tate (=sis). 8ast ee' @rancePs oreign minister8aurent @abius "isclose" progress in tal's to sell Faale ighter Qets to the !A one o the >i""le astPsbiggest an" most aggressive arms buyers. #tates in the >i""le ast are no more prepare" to use theeapons they are buying ith conlicts raging in #yria =raI 8ibya an" Yemen an" ith gypt alsobattling =slamist e5tremists in the #inai the signs that Fussia is preparing to increase its on arms sales Kan" to the $ul statesP biggest rival =ran K are raising ears that tensions ill be sto'e" urther still . =nparticular #au"i Arabia an" =ran are acing o in the conlict in Yemen here "espite the announcementby Fiya"h on 9ues"ay that it ha" halte" its month-long bombing campaign Qets continue" to stri'e Houthirebel positions close to the capital #anaa aroun" the thir" city 9ae1 an" in the central ton o Yarim.

Accor"ing to the e Yor' 9imes "eence in"ustry oicials have notiie" Eongress that they aree5pecting a""itional reIuests rom Arab states ighting =sis K #au"i Arabia the !A Xatar Gahrain;or"an an" gypt K or thousan"s o ne !#-ma"e eapons inclu"ing missiles an" bombs to rebuil""eplete" arms stoc'piles. =ronically among the 'ey eapons suppliers in the arms race are permanent

members o the ! security council ho have been at the centre o to unconventional arms controlinitiatives K "isarming the #yrian governmentPs stoc'piles o chemical eapons an" negotiating or a "ealon =ranPs nuclear programme. 9he scale o the arms race as reveale" this year in reports publishe" by=H# ;anePs $lobal Deence 9ra"e Feport an" the #toc'holm =nternational Meace Fesearch =nstitute(#ipri). 9hey shoe" ho #au"i Arabia ha" become the orl"Ps largest importer o eapons an" ourthlargest military spen"er an" that other >i""le ast states ere sharply increasing their arms purchases.

A""ing to the concern is the act that the spen"ing spree on arms comes against the bac'groun" o amar'e" increase in military interventions by countries in the region since the Arab spring in 20++. #au"i

Arabia has intervene" in Gahrain (at the reIuest o that 'ing"omPs ruler "uring the so-calle" Mearlrevolution) in Yemen in 200 an" again in Yemen this year. =n a""ition a ne #au"i-le" an" largely#unni military alliance K announce"this year an" "ubbe" the Arab ato% K appears primarily "esigne" asa ne oil to =ran in the i"ening pro5y conlict beteen Fiya"h an" 9ehran. An" among thoseconcerne" by #au"iPs ne military assertiveness - on the bac' o its arms buying spree - as the =raIi

prime minister Aba"i. 9he "angerous thing is e "onPt 'no hat the #au"is ant to "o ater &theirintervention in Yemen3% Aba"i tol" !# reporters last ee'. =s =raI ithin their ra"arL 9hatPs very very"angerous. 9he i"ea that you intervene in another state unprovo'e" Qust or regional ambition is rong.#a""am has "one it beore. #ee hat it has "one to the country.% An" i the #au"i intervention in Yemenhas been overt no less real has been the pro5y conlict that has set =ran an" the $ul states against eachother in #yria here 9ehran has bac'e" the government o Gashar al-Assa" ith military assistance an"eapons an" $ul states have bac'e" "ierent rebel groups inclu"ing =slamist ones. =tPs cra1y% saysGen >oores author o =H# ;anePs annual report on arms buying tren"s. 9he one Eana"ian "eal alone Kto supply #au"i Arabia ith light armoure" vehicles K ill account or 20 o the military vehicles sol"globally in years covere" by the contract. An" this is Qust the thin e"ge o the e"ge. #au"i has boo'e"


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enough arms imports in 2 months or them to be orth \+0bn a year.% hile some countries such as?uait are in the process o mo"ernisation a 'ey tren" i"entiie" by >oores is ho states are retoolingto ight insurgency conlicts in the same ay the !# military has in Aghanistan an" =raI. 8oo' at !A#au"i Arabia gypt an" Algeria. 9hey ere all countries that bought a lot o conventional arms in the pastthat are no use in a sectarian ar or an insurgency.

#oot cause of 3ar claims are academic gar-age

%ev$ and Thompson 17;ac' #. 8evy is Goar" o $overnorsV Mroessor o Molitical #cience at Futgers !niversity an" Ailiate atthe #alt1man =nstitute o ar an" Meace #tu"ies at Eolumbia !niversity an" illiam F. 9hompson isFogers Mroessor o Molitical #cience at =n"iana !niversity an" >anaging "itor o =nternational #tu"iesXuarterly T9he Decline o arL >ultiple 9raQectories an" Diverging 9ren"sT =nternational #tu"ies Fevie20+B +4 pp. BesIuita (+0) argue" that an e5pecte" utility rameor' can e5plain all 'in"s o ars9hompson (+0) argue" that system-level structures o poer an" ealth "ierentiate big ars romsmall ars.++ 9he closely relate" Iuestion o hether the outbrea' an" sprea" (e5pansion) o ar are"riven by the same or "ierent variables an" processes as the subQect o another recent symposium(NasIue1 Diehl @lint an" #cheran 20++).Jur s'epticism about the utility o a uniie" theory o violence or ar is reinforced -$ the s$stematic

and rigorous evidence +in"er provides a-out the trends in different forms of violence over timeEar"ed 1&;0 E . As his "etaile" an" inormative graphs ma'e clear different forms ofhuman violence -egan to decline at different times and proceeded at different rates .+2 >any o thetren"s are not monotonic an" sometimes point in "ierent "irections. 9he gra"ual "ecline in the reIuencyo great poer ar as interrupte" in the irst hal o the tentieth century but then continue" rom +40sto the present hile the reIuency o civil ars began to increase signiicantly ater +


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The aff4s criti


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than a :natural: characteristic. Jn the contrary social constructions as that o gen"er or se5uality maye5hibit an e5traor"inary capacity to shape i"entities se5ual interactions social movements an" politicalhistories as a hole. As Gutler hersel airms gen"er i"entity - i even a strategic iction - is not simplyta'en up or "iscar"e" at ill: T9here is no volitional subQect behin" the mime ho "eci"es as it erehich gen"er it ill be to"ay.T2 Hence GutlerVs on analysis o gen"er provi"es a useul e5ample o theay in hich a socially constructe" element may play a central role in structuring i"entity an" socialpractice even in spite o "econstructionist eminist analyses an" oneVs on inevitable perormativeailings. Gy analogy the hetero/homo classiicatory scheme much li'e the binary gen"er systemoperates as a ubiIuitous an" constitutive "imension o estern society embo"ie" in institutions an"social roles. 9his "oes not mean that se5ual orientation - any more than gen"er i"entity - is necessarilyroote" in biology or other transhistorical human processes. Father the implication is that categories ofsexual orientation have material significance apart from their etiolog$. As Davi" $reenberg notes&93he epistemological observation that alternative systems o classiying people are possible has littlerelevance to those ho are no classiie" as homose5ual.... 9he mo"ern estern system o se5ualclassiication is embo"ie" in social i"entities roles institutions an" ays o life that can hardl$ -ea-olished -$ an ar-itrar$ act of 3ill.!& Draing rom sociological phenomenology $reenbergrecogni1es the signiicance o classiicatory para"igms hile brac'eting the issue o their Ttruth.T2 < =n thisapproach the source o se5ual orientation be it "iscursive or organic is irrelevant. Hence $reenberg isable to map the social pro"uction o i"entity ithout getting lost in the Gutlerian conun"rum o ToriginsTversesT eects.T Applie" to the stu"y o homose5uality $reenbergVs phenomenological social

constructionism highlights the institutional an" cultural conte5ts in hich i"entities are constructe" an"e5periences pro"uce". His analysis ma'es it clear that the hetero/homo classiicatory system is not lessimportant to our scholarship but more as e map the social mechanisms that pro"uce the Tmo"ernse5ual regimeT an" its eects in structuring i"entity an" e5perience. 9o be sure Gutler is right in arguingthat se5ual categories cannot a"eIuately capture erotic plasticity in the human species in any historicalera let alone our on - -ut to -e a po3erful organizing social force the$ do not need to.8abeling-interactionist recogni1e" this general point "eca"es ago in their or' on a i"e range o "eviantphenomena. #chur or instance analy1e" the inerior position o omen using the labeling perspectivean" "emonstrate" the ays in hich classiications o gen"er ere socially constructe" an" embo"ie" ininstitutions an" social roles that beneite" menR an" $oman outline" processes o minstreli1ation that le"the stigmati1e" to conorm to their "eviant i"entities.2* 9his latter enterprise has a orty-year history insociology an" its core tenets ten" to reappear in this strain o Iueer theory ith little reerence to itsscholarly past. Although surely it coul" be argue" that the investigation o se5ual categories as an a5is o

social organi1ation represents a uniIue application o labeling-interaction ist theory its novelty oul""erive rom the particularity o its ocus rather than the substance o its theoretical insights. =n act3ehave good reason to "eep the heteroGhomo -inar$ at the center of our research agendas given thei"e range o lesbian an" gay i"entities netor's an" communities that have been uncovere" in the lastthree "eca"es o se5uality scholarship. 8i'e etonVs research this bo"y o historical an" social scientiicor' ma'es it clear that sexual classifications have had an enormous impact on shaping theexperience of homosexuals.=n the tentieth an" no tenty-irst centuries men an" omen o theestern orl" ho eel se5ual attraction or same-se5 partners encounter a massive conceptual an"institutional apparatusaroun" hich their social se5ual an" political lives orbit. @rom chil"hoo"orar" local community attachments an" inormal structures o social control intervene in the proQect obecoming se5ual transmitting an" enorcing classiications o se5ual orientation across the lie-course. =nthis conte5t homose5ual actors have been an" ill continue to be inluence" un"amentally byse5ological classiications as they "evelop a sel-concept2C engage in se5ual practices2 maneuver in

an" out o the closetB0encounter homophobia B+ negotiate stigmaB2 conront H=N/A=D#BB participatein an" observe local an" national political events an" religious strugglesB an" e5ist ithin or alongsi"egay communities.B4=n "ee" in the inormation age e can e5pect the impact o categories o se5ualorienta-tion to be ever more ar reaching as various me"ia transm

Georgetown Louvis Knez Neg Kentuckycollege Round3

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