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The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Rhetoric and Actions in Parliament and Professional

Syndicates from 1984-2010

George R. Burkes Jr.

U.S. Department of State

MSSI Class 2014

This thesis has been accepted by the faculty and administration of the National Intelligence

University to satisfy a requirement for a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence or Master of

Science and Technology Intelligence degree. The student is responsible for its content. The

views expressed do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence

University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or the U.S.

Government. Acceptance of the thesis as meeting an academic requirement does not reflect an

endorsement of the opinions, ideas, or information put forth. The thesis is not finished

intelligence or finished policy. The validity, reliability, and relevance of the information

contained have not been reviewed through intelligence or policy procedures and processes. The

thesis has been classified in accordance with community standards. The thesis, in whole or in

part, is not cleared for public release. I understand that this thesis was prepared under the

authorities of the Defense Intelligence Agency and that dissemination outside of official U.S.

Government channels, either in whole or in part, is prohibited without prior review and clearance

for public release as required by Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction DIAI 5400.005.

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Dedication –

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife, Eugenia. She gave me the time and

encouragement to pursue my goal. Thank you.

I would also like to thank my thesis chair, Colonel Anderson, and my reader, Mr.

Devillafranca for their suggestions and assistance. The Hughes Library at NIU was the best at

finding very difficult material in interlibrary loans. My translator at the State Department helped

greatly in determining value in the Arabic sources used.

Finally, a special thanks to my friend, Thomas J. O‟Brien who told me I could do this.

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Topic –

The topic of my thesis is the reconciliation of rhetoric of the leaders of the Muslim

Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and the actions of its members when they participated in the

People‟s Assembly (Majlis) of Parliament and professional syndicates between 1984 and 2010.

Even though membership in the Majlis during this time was dominated by the National

Democratic Party, participation for other political parties was opened to a degree under President

Mubarak (1981-2011). It took many years for the MB to decide to even compete in

parliamentary elections. When it did put forth candidates for parliament, it also involved the

organization in one of the few avenues of political participation available outside of parliament,

the professional syndicates.

Professional syndicates in Egypt protect the interests of their members and are modeled

after European syndicates that represent professions such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers.

They have also acted as an arena in which the less influential professionals can try to advance

their causes outside of government.1 Historical information regarding syndicates in Egypt will

be discussed in the introductory chapter as well as background information regarding the

participation of the Brotherhood.

Most information available through scholarly journals and books written about the

participation of the MB during this time period have been focused on the process involved in

getting members elected to Parliament and syndicates. Relatively little has been written about the

actions of the MB after joining those organizations. This is perhaps due to the fact that the MB

had a modest presence relative to total numbers of members in the Majlis. This changed with the

1 Robert Springborg, “Professional Syndicates in Egyptian Politics, 1952-1970,” International Journal of Middle East

Studies, (October 1978), 278.

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election of 2005, when 88 brothers were elected out of a total of 454 Members of Parliament

(MPs).2 The MB started gaining influence in the syndicates in 1984, when they won 7 out of 25

seats in the governing council of the Doctors syndicate.3 After this initial success, the influence

of the MB in syndicates continued to grow in the 1990s.

The general topics to be covered in this thesis will be social and economic issues. While

participation in the Majlis and professional syndicates was of little use to the MB in effecting any

major changes, it did allow for an outlet for political expression and a refinement of organizing

abilities that were put to use in the 2012 elections, when the MB elected 235 out of 498 members

to the Majlis.4

The MB has presented itself to Egypt, and the rest of the world, as a moderate and

practical organization since the mid-1970s. The leader, or Murshid of the organization at that

time, Hasan Isma‟il al-Hudaybi, established a concept of non-violence that has mainly continued

since that time. Additionally, even though the desire has been to have Islamic law as the source

of legislation, there is a belief that obedience to divine law is independent of the application of

state laws. God‟s law must be followed individually and even if Islam is the foundation of the

state, there is no guarantee that it will be a just system.5 The slogan of the MB, “Islam is the

answer,” has guided its participation in the Majlis and syndicates, and has affected much of its

action in those entities.

Relevance of the Research Question –

2 Samer Shehata, ‘’The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament,” Middle East Report, 240 (Fall, 2006), 33.

3 Ninette S Fahmy, “The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative

Formula for Reform?” The Middle East Journal, 52, no. 4 (Autumn, 1998), 552. 4 Election Watch, Journal of Democracy, 23, no. 2 (April, 2012), 170.

5 Barbara H.E. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology (New York: Routledge, 2009), 151.

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Egypt is a country of great strategic importance to the United States. It is in the interest of

the U.S. to have a stable government in Egypt that remains at peace with Israel. It is also

important to maintain cooperation with Egypt regarding the prevention of terrorist groups in the

Sinai Peninsula from destabilizing the region.6 Since 1948, Egypt has received from the United

States more than 71 billion dollars in bilateral foreign aid, which includes Economic Support

Funds for sectors like health, education, and economic development as well as Foreign Military

Financing.7 It is imperative that stable relations with Egypt are maintained in order to facilitate

transit through the Suez Canal for U.S. warships and over flight rights for U.S. aircraft.8 As the

MB is a recently deposed political power in Egypt, a historical view of how it has participated in

the Majlis and professional syndicates is of interest to the intelligence community. An

understanding of how the MB has matched deeds with proclamations in the past will assist the

intelligence community in future analysis of how it is likely to govern in the future, if given the

opportunity.

Research Question –

This thesis seeks to answer the question – Does the Muslim Brotherhood attempt to

follow through on what it proclaims to the public when participating in the Majlis and

syndicates? When the MB espouses certain aspects of democracy, does it follow through on

those proclamations through its actions in the Majlis and influence in the syndicates, or has the

organization acted more in line with its traditionally held views of “Shari’a law?” This thesis

researches printed and electronic sources to identify actions taken in the Parliament. It also

6 Jeremy M. Sharp “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service Report RL33003,

(December, 2012), 5. 7 Ibid, 14.

8 Ibid.

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researches speeches and interviews given to document to the extent possible the influence of the

MB in professional syndicates for the years 1984 -2010. The following inquiries will be

addressed in answering the research question.

Have members of the MB acted as a bloc when participating in the Egyptian Parliament

or professional syndicates?

If so, have those actions been in accordance with proclamations of the MB during the

time period analyzed?

Have MB members of Parliament and professional syndicates acted differently under

different general guides?

Methodology –

As this thesis analyzes how the MB has acted in the Majlis and policies that have

influenced the professional syndicates, it utilizes a qualitative research design with the single

case study approach of content analysis for the time period 1984-2010. Research is conducted

utilizing written proclamations and interviews of General Guides or Murshids of the MB as well

as statements released on behalf of the MB. Additionally, observations made by public media

and actions by syndicates under MB control are discussed. This should lead to reconciling

general themes espoused by the MB and patterns in its actions that will either contradict or

substantiate those themes.

Assumptions –

I start with the assumption that, because the MB had been a social movement for much of

its existence, the transformation into a political entity was made without a completely centralized

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plan from its leadership. As such, I also assume that there will be some discrepancy from what

the leadership of the MB proclaimed and how its members actually acted. The extent this

discrepancy may exist and any indication of a clear break with leadership regarding MB policy

will be analyzed. Utilization of the observations from printed media, memoirs, and newspapers

will assist in obtaining knowledge of the action of the participants.

Hypothesis -

All of the hypotheses presented will need to be viewed as degrees of what the evidence

indicates. The standard will be “more likely than not” and notable caveats will be discussed in

the empirical information obtained before a determination can be assessed.

My hypothesis is that the MB did not always act as a bloc in accordance with the

proclamations of its leaders in the Majlis nor did its members act in unison when participating in

syndicates. While it is assumed that the majority of the MB were supportive of the Murshids’

leadership and proclamations, actions may have been taken contrary to their edicts.

Alternate hypothesis number one – The MB did mainly abide by the proclamations of its

leaders in Parliament and acted in unison while participating in syndicates.

Alternate hypothesis number two – The MB acted uniformly in the Majlis and acted

dutifully in syndicates, but in one or the other acted apart from the proclamations of the MB

leadership.

Chapter Organization –

There will be four chapters to the thesis. The first chapter will be a historical introduction

to the MB and events that led to its eventual political aspirations in the 1980s. Historical

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development of the syndicates will also be discussed to give context to the political participation

of those organizations. The second chapter will concern the actions of the MB in the Majlis and

in the syndicates on social, foreign, and economic issues from 1984 through the beginning of

1996 when it was under the guidance of Umar al-Tilmisani and Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr.

The third chapter will cover the same issues through 2010 while under the guidance of Mustafa

Mashour, Ma‟mun al-Hudaybi, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, and Mohammed Badie. These two

chapters will incorporate proclamations and deeds of the MB as well as actions taken by the

Egyptian government at the same time to provide context. The final chapter will be conclusions

and policy recommendations.

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Literature Review –

The two seminal works regarding the early history of the MB are Mitchell‟s Society of

the Muslim Brothers and Lia‟s The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Both cover the

beginning and development of the organization in a thorough manner. The Mitchell book takes

the MB through the late 1960s. The Zollner book The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan Al-Hudaybi

and Ideology is the most recent and scholarly explanation of the decision by the MB to renounce

violence. It goes into great detail the theological discussion taking place in the prisons where

many of the Brothers were serving long prison sentences. It is excellent in explaining the

deflection of Qutub‟s more stringent writings without renouncing them outright.

Al-Awadi, Pargater, and Wickham are the best at integrating the MB into the social and

political events of Egypt. They each bring great context to the events and decisions made by the

leadership of the MB in different periods of its history. For Egyptian political history, Kassem

and Kienle present the changes in constitutional and electoral laws in good detail.

For Egyptian syndicates, the two best historical authors are Bianchi and Reid. They

develop the history and importance of professional syndicates in Egypt. For more current

material, Amani Kandil is the acknowledged expert. Her material is not readily available and

almost exclusively in Arabic, but she is the best place to gain knowledge of professional

syndicates from the 1980s forward.

Egyptian economics are very well covered by Utvik, Ates, and Oweiss. They explain the

Egyptian economy, including the shadow economy of Islamist finances and the MB participation

quite well.

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Chapter One

MB History and Entrance into Syndicates and the Egyptian Parliament

History of the MB through the early 1980s –

The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic-oriented organization based in Egypt and has

existed for over eighty-five years. During that time, its members have been frequently harassed

and arrested by whatever government was in power. The eight leaders (Supreme Guides or

Murshids) of the MB collectively spent over ninety-two years in prison because of the

organization‟s differences with those governments. Numerous other MB members were

incarcerated for lengthy periods of time as well. The organization itself has occasionally been

dissolved and it was declared an illegal entity from 1954 through the ouster of President

Mubarak in 2011. Despite these setbacks, it not only persisted as an organization, but it also

eventually gained political positions in the Egyptian Parliament and professional syndicates

starting in the mid-1980s.

The MB was founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 when several disaffected workers in a

labor force working for the British in Cairo approached him about collectively “working on the

road to action and …. service to the religion (Islam) of the nation.”9 Al-Banna was a recent

graduate of Dar al-„Ulm University in Cairo. It was considered to be a high-level training school

for teachers and included a modern curriculum, especially when compared to other schools at

that time. He was trained in a traditional religious education, but it was more secular than the

9 Richard P. Mitchell. The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 8

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famous Al-Azhar University10

. He had been working as an agent for the Young Men‟s Muslim

Association and he was interested in improving the lives of people by “teaching them the

objectives of religion and the sources of their well-being.”11

He decided that this could best be

achieved through “the path of true Sufism … with sincerity and work in the service of

humanity.”12

In a broad sense, the version of Sufism desired by the MB could be described as

“Muslims who take seriously God‟s call to perceive his presence both in the world and in the

self.”13

Al-Banna believed that one of the bigger threats to Islam was the fascination the educated

Egyptian youths had with European culture and habits.14

While there was no one specific vision

of exactly the type of Islamic society ultimately desired by the MB, there was an emphasis by the

group on action and organization over ideology.15

Al-Banna became the Murshid and the MB quickly established itself by developing direct

outreaches to mosques, coffeehouses, and private homes. Additionally, it built schools for boys

and girls as well as becoming involved in community service projects.16

This approach replicated

itself across the country and in a twenty year period, it became a national organization of social

and welfare institutions with an estimated membership of over three hundred thousand members

by 1946.17

The MB “established a network of branch offices throughout the cities and villages of

10

Al-Azhar is acknowledged as the greatest mosque-university in the Islamic world. Located in Cairo, it began organized religious instruction in 978. It is a conservative institution that has historically tried to keep Islamist activists and governments at a distance, though not always successfully. John L. Esposito, ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) Vol. 1, 170-171. 11

Mitchell, 6. 12

Ibid. 13

Esposito, Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, 102-103. 14

Brynjar Lia. The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of and Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942 (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), 55. 15

Mitchell, 326. 16

Ibid, 8. 17

Ibid, 328.

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Egypt that was unified by a central headquarters in Cairo.”18

This became the basic structure of

the MB and members displayed considerable loyalty to their branch as well as the organization

as a whole. The local branch leader became a liaison between the members and the central

leadership.19

Participation in the MB consisted of a three-tiered membership structure. At the first level

were members considered to be “assistants,” only required to join as a member and pay dues.20

The second- level members were called “related” and needed to demonstrate knowledge of the

MB‟s principles, attend meetings on a regular basis, and swear an oath of obedience.21

The third-

level members were “active” and expected to immerse themselves entirely into the organization,

which included gaining a higher understanding of Islamic learning and obligations.22

The MB wanted to educate its members with a stringent knowledge of Islam that could

be shared through their outreach to the community. They believed that this would eventually lead

the population at large to desire Islam as the foundation for societal needs.23

The strategic

“operational principle” of the MB can be described as the “establishment of an Islamic social

order on the basis of the Shari’a.”24

The “tactical principle” of accomplishing this goal was

“seeking to do it nonviolently through the consciousness-raising of the Muslim masses and

advice to rulers.”25

Al-Banna imparted to the followers of the MB that they “are not a benevolent

18

Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” The Sociological Quarterly, 42, no. 4 (Autumn, 2001), 497. 19

Ibid. 20

Mitchell, 183. 21

Ibid. 22

Ibid. 23

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 23. 24

Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Egypt Islam and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1996), 39. 25

Ibid.

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society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a

new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qur’an.”26

A noted expert on the MB, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, has written about some of the

goals of the MB in this early period. The MB claimed to not desire power for itself, but wanted

to “facilitate a wider process of social reform.”27

The MB believed in the establishment of a legal

system “consistent with Shari’a law that would require the backing of a governmental

authority.”28

Shari’a law is a scholarly tradition of determining God‟s law through the Prophet

Muhammad and the body of the Prophet‟s revelations discovered throughout the years.29

There

was also an acknowledged but muted support by the MB for institutions such as parliament, an

independent judiciary, popularly elected rulers, and the rights of citizens under the law.30

In

regards to Shari’a, the MB was not interested in literal applications of the past, but rather the

desire for human reason or ijtihad, in “constructing laws relevant to the Muslim community in

modern times.”31

This did not address whether the ultimate authority was to be expressed by God

through Shari’a or through elected representatives.32

The MB also did not clearly indicate how it

would interact with Christians (Copts) and other Muslims who did not agree with its agenda.33

Because the MB was somewhat ambivalent towards parliament and political parties, it

decided candidates would be presented only when the time was right.34

The MB understood that

eventually it would have to participate in elections if it was going to exert any real influence on

26

Quoted in Mitchell, 30. 27

Wickham, 24. 28

Ibid. 29

Esposito, Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, 450. 30

Wickham, 24... 31

Ibid. 32

Ibid, 25. 33

Ibid. 34

Ibid.

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the functions of government.35

The MB finally chose to field candidates, including al-Banna, in

the national elections of 1942. Because the law at the time required national unity and did not

permit religious parties, an understanding needed to be reached between the MB and the

Government. Egyptian Prime Minister Nahhas met with al-Banna to convince him and the MB to

withdraw their candidates. Al-Banna agreed, while extracting concessions from Nahhas that

included the promise of freedom for the MB to carry on with its work and a curtailing of the

selling of alcoholic beverages to the greater public.36

Al-Banna and five other Brothers also ran

for office in 1945, but were defeated in what was widely considered to be a flawed election.37

While politics was an important avenue to be utilized in effecting change, it was not the only

way the MB pursued its cause. The Brothers strove for non-violent means to accomplish its

goals, but they were not above using violence when it was deemed necessary.

The MB was very concerned and apprehensive about what it thought of as the three

external archenemies of Islam. It considered the Jewish influence of Palestine, the perceived

crusade of the West against Islam and Communism to be the most important international threats

requiring the immediate attention of the MB. The Brothers considered the Jewish people or

Zionists to be virtually entwined in all three of these concerns.38

The MB was one of the first

organizations to send volunteers and military assistance to the Palestinian resistance in the 1940s,

even before Arab armies were sent to fight after the creation of Israel. Within Egypt, the MB was

very much concerned about the influence of the British, who had stationed troops in Egypt with

35

John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, “Democratization and Islam,” Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991) 429. 36

Mitchell, 27. 37

Ibid, 33. 38

Ibrahim, 42.

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varying strength from 1882 until the end of 1954.39

The MB also had disagreements with the

Egyptian Wafd party, which consisted mainly of members of the political and economic elite.

When the Wafd party formed a government that cooperated with the British in World War II, its

popular support was diminished and violent clashes with the MB became more prevalent.40

The

willingness of the MB to use armed force led it to utilize a division that had been created within

its structure. This internal structure was to cause problems for the organization over parts of the

next three decades.

In its earlier years, the MB created a division known as the Rover Scouts, which was

essentially a mechanism used to build youthful and dedicated cadres to the cause.41

The aim of

the Rovers was to “raise the Islamic sports spirit in the souls of youth … and accustom them to

obedience and order.”42

Some members of the MB concluded that in order to fulfill the strategic

desire to create an Islamic order, the “execution involving uncompromising struggle (Jihad),”

must take place and they worked to have the Rovers evolve into a more militant wing or “Special

Apparatus.”43

The Special Apparatus has also been known as the “Secret Unit” or “Special

Organization.”44

Its members have included two men who later became Murshids of the MB.

Two events hastened the development of the Special Apparatus in the 1930s. The first

was an order issued by the Egyptian Royal Councilor, Ali Mahir Pasha. In 1939, it was decreed

that in response to the developing world war, all schools should teach students military drill and

maneuvers.45

The second factor assisting the growth of the Special Apparatus was the financial

39

Munson, 495. 40

Ibid. 41

Lia, 101. 42

Ibid, 102. 43

Ibid, 178. 44

Zollner, 12. 45

Lia, 179.

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contribution made by the German Legation in Cairo in the 1930s. The money given to the

Brothers by Germany was larger than subsidies made to any other anti-British activists at that

time.46

Even with training and money available, the Special Apparatus was somewhat dormant

during World War II. It did make contact with a group of officers in the Egyptian army in 1940

that encouraged the MB in its activities. These officers became the “Free Officers” that later led

the 1952 revolution.47

The MB, especially the Special Apparatus, expanded recruitment and

became much more active towards the end of the war and immediately after. This activity led to

the first dissolution of the MB as an organization. The Brothers, along with other organizations,

became involved in a series of violent acts (bombings and assassinations) that took place in

Egypt starting in 1945 and lasted off and on until the revolution in 1952. The struggle was not

only with the Egyptian government. There was also rejection of British influence and

competition for power with rival political entities, like the Wafd party.48

In late 1947, al-Banna ordered the Secret Apparatus to prepare for Jihad in Palestine.

When war broke out in 1948, after Israel became a nation, the MB dispatched fighters to assist

soldiers sent by the Arab League to Palestine. This involvement was not sanctioned by the

Egyptian government, but it was permitted, as long as the official training of volunteers was

conducted by an army officer.49

The MB assisted in some of the fighting, but one of the more

notable contributions it made involved an incident of running supplies to Egyptians trapped by

an Israeli military advance in the battle of Faluja. The MB requested that more volunteers be sent

46

Ibid. 47

Mitchell, 96. 48

Ibid, 60. 49

Ibid, 57.

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to help, but the Egyptian government refused.50

By now, the government was becoming more

wary of the MB because in 1947 a large cache of arms was found in the possession of the

Brothers on the outskirts of Cairo.51

Additionally, a jeep owned by the MB filled with explosives

was identified not long after the Cairo incident. The government became anxious about the

possibility that the MB was planning imminent revolution and, given the recent violence

committed by the MB in Egypt, it was decided that they should be dissolved by decree.52

Many members of the MB were imprisoned after the decree in December of 1948 in

order to try to dismantle the organization. This did not have the effect the government anticipated

and three weeks after Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi issued the decree, he was assassinated by the

Special Apparatus.53

His successor declared martial law and many of the MB were given military

trials, having been charged with membership in a terrorist organization.54

Al-Banna tried to

deescalate the situation by denouncing the violence and assassinations. He claimed the Secret

Apparatus had been designed to protect the national interests and not to overthrow the

government.55

This claim was somewhat disingenuous and seemed to indicate that “al-Banna

was either duplicitous in the violence or that he had lost control of the organization as Supreme

Guide.”56

Al-Banna was not one of the Brothers arrested and he “prophetically told his associates

that the failure of the government to arrest him was his official death warrant.”57

He was

assassinated in February, 1949.

50

Ibid, 58. 51

Ibid, 75. 52

Ibid. 53

Zollner, 13. 54

Ibid. 55

Ibid, 14. 56

Ibid, 15. 57

Mitchell, 71.

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For a number of years, it was generally believed that much of the organizational

capability of the MB was destroyed as a result of the raids and imprisonment of its members as

well as the death of al-Banna during this period. However, citing de-classified material from the

United States Department of State, Ziad Munson indicates the Brothers were actually somewhat

successful in surviving the repression.58

Files from the State Department at the time indicate

“reports of secret mass meetings, continued organizing in mosques, and the handing out of

pamphlets throughout Egypt.”59

The organizational structure of the MB that had developed over

the years provided a means to survive the attacks of the current and future regimes.60

The MB was now without a leader and facing persecution from the state. It was important

to them that they not be seen as a threat to the Egyptian political system in order to preserve the

remainder of the organization.61

They needed to choose a leader who was not attached to the

previous violence and who had connections with the existing political leaders. They chose Hasan

al-Hudaybi as the new Murshid. Al-Hudaybi was a judge of the Egyptian High Court whose

brother-in-law was the chief of the royal household.62

It was believed that this contact would

“narrow the rift between the Palace and the Brotherhood and hasten the return of their

organization to a state of legality.”63

At the time, al-Hudaybi was seen by the MB as nothing

more than a placeholder until the various factions that had developed in the MB (who did not

want to give up their power within the organization) could come to a decision on a new leader.

58

Munson, 499. 59

U.S. Department of State (USDS) 1954, Confidential Files, Egypt 1950-1954, Washington DC (cited in Munson, 499). 60

Ibid. 61

Zollner, 19. 62

Zollner, 20. 63

Sayed Khatab, “Al-Hudaybi’s Influence on the development of Islamist Movements in Egypt,” The Muslim World, 91, no. 3/4 (Fall 2001), 454.

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This assumption of temporary leadership was to prove false, and al-Hudaybi remained the

Murshid of the MB until his death in 1973.

Among his first acts as Murshid, al-Hudaybi replaced some of the senior members of the

MB with recent recruits into the organization who had a more moderate temperament. He also

created the post of vice-guide (Na’ib) and discredited the Special Apparatus along with the use

of force by the MB in general.64

He let it be known that “There is no secrecy in the service of

God, no secrecy in the Message, and no terrorism in religion.”65

He also indicated that violence

could not liberate Egypt and it was the duty of the MB to educate the people and prepare them

spiritually for an Islamic society.66

Al-Hudaybi tried to reach out politically to the monarchy, yet he also rejected the

parliamentary monarch system then in existence.67

His attempts to ingratiate himself with the

king did not please the younger members of the MB or the Special Apparatus that still held

influence in the organization despite al-Hudaybi‟s attempts to eliminate it.68

When Nasser and

the Free Officers took power in Egypt on July 23, 1952, al-Hudaybi declared the MB‟s support

for the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).69

The MB was glad to see the abolishment of

the monarchy and reduction of British power and influence in Egypt.

As previously mentioned, the Free Officers had a relationship with a segment of the MB

dating back to the early 1940s. Those members tended to be Brothers who were in the Special

64

Ibid, 455. 65

Quoted in Mitchell, 88. 66

Khatab, 456. 67

Zollner, 24. 68

Ibid. 69

Ibid, 25.

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Apparatus and they supported Nasser and the revolution.70

Not all members of the MB did; some

of the newer members in the Guidance Council were opposed to Nasser. Al-Hudaybi agreed to

support Nasser but in return wanted him to reinstall civilian leadership, reform the army, and

instigate the redistribution of land.71

Additionally, he wanted the “introduction of an Islamic

constitution, with the Qur’an as its foundation” and direct involvement in any negotiations

regarding the withdrawal of all British troops from Egypt.72

Nasser was more interested in

deflecting any encroachment on his power and did not trust al-Hudaybi even as he sought

support from the Brothers for his leadership.

Nasser hoped to keep a distant, but cordial relationship with the Brothers. He wanted to

be able to co-opt them against other political parties by utilizing the internal strife that was

current in the MB and by playing all the various political parties against each other as well.73

He

was wary of the MB‟s ability to generate crowds and its capacity for violence.74

Nasser further

generated rifts in the MB by offering two cabinet positions to higher-ranking Brothers. There

were divided opinions in the Guidance Council as to whether the MB should be involved in the

government at this level. Al-Hudaybi was against the idea and expelled the two members under

consideration who subsequently joined the cabinet.75

The internal opposition within the MB to al-Hudaybi as Murshid and his leadership of the

organization continued when many of Brothers wanted to participate in political elections. Al-

Hudaybi was against the MB‟s becoming a political party. He wanted to avoid subjecting the

70

Omar Ashour, the De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009), 42. 71

Ibid. 72

Zollner, 30. 73

Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 98. 74

Ibid. 75

Ibid, 100.

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Brothers to the supervision of the RCC.76

A Consultative Assembly of the Brothers was gathered

and it called on al-Hudaybi to resign. He did resign for a short period of time, during which the

MB registered with the government as a political party. A week after submitting his resignation,

and pressed by his supporters to return to the leadership, al-Hudaybi withdrew the registration of

the MB as a political party and instead “submitted a new application with the government that

redefined the Brotherhood as a religious association.”77

Relations between the RCC and the MB were good, until early 1954. All political

prisoners who had been arrested (including MB members) in the previous fifteen years were

released and there was even an investigation by the government into the murder of Hasan al-

Banna in an attempt to develop good will with the Brothers.78

In early 1953 the RCC banned all

existing parties and groups except the Society of the Muslim Brothers, as it had accepted the

petition of al-Hudaybi seeking to have the organization defined as a religious association. This

acceptance allowed the government to name three members of the Brotherhood to a

constitutional committee that was formed in December of 1952. The recognition gave the MB an

“unprecedented degree of political legitimacy.”79

These good feelings did not last long; the MB felt emboldened enough to propose to the

government that a secret advisory committee (that the Brotherhood would dominate) be

established to oversee and promulgate all legislation.80

The RCC saw this as a step too far and an

intrusion into its leadership of the revolution. Because Nasser had no intention of sharing power

with any groups, he announced the creation of the Liberation Rally. The purpose was to “create a

76

Ibid. 77

Ibid. 78

Ibid, 101. 79

Gordon, 101. 80

Ibid.

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government-supported „people‟s movement‟ with the purpose of generating „unity‟ in the

nation.”81

The Rally was meant to be the catalyst of a single political organization to replace the

previously banned political parties.82

The MB saw this as an attempt to subsume the organization

into the ranks of the revolution and resisted overtures to join. They were especially irritated with

the secular nationalist rhetoric of the Rally and they withheld their cooperation.83

In January 1954, a scuffle broke out between the MB and Liberation Rally students at

Cairo University. Vehicles were burned and weapons were found in the possession of both sides.

The authorities arrested over four hundred members of the Brotherhood the day after the clash.84

Two days after that, the regime outlawed the MB under terms of the decree banning all political

parties (citing the original petition by the MB to be registered as a political party).85

The

crackdown was aimed mainly at al-Hudaybi and not necessarily an attempt to destroy the MB.

The decree indicated that “The revolution will never allow reactionary corruption to recur in the

name of religion and allow none to play with the fate of the country for personal desires.”86

Soon

after, the RCC slowly started releasing members of the MB who were not closely affiliated with

al-Hudaybi.87

The regime was also dealing with a revolt within its ranks regarding the distribution of

governmental power as well as contending with rising tensions and demonstrations on university

campuses. Nasser was able to consolidate his control of the leadership of the RCC and on March

25, 1954, declared the revolution was over and “that the country would resume normal

81

Mitchell, 109. 82

Ibid. 83

Gordon, 101. 84

Ibid, 105. 85

Ibid. 86

Ibid. 87

Ibid, 106.

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parliamentary life.”88

This promise did not materialize and it marked the beginning of an

institutionalized military rule in Egypt.89

Nasser also released the remaining MB prisoners by

revoking the 1953 ban on political parties.90

There were conditions set for the MB to return to

legal status. They had to cease proselytizing within the army and they needed to purge al-

Hudaybi and his followers from the Brothers.91

Even though there was dissension within the MB

regarding al-Hudaybi, he remained the Murshid and an antagonist of Nasser.

Nasser tried to establish himself in the eyes of the people as their natural leader. He set

about attacking the weaker political parties and silenced anti-government journalists while

purging student groups of agitators.92

Because the MB still had considerable support in the

country, he decided to engage them at a later date.

In the summer of 1954, al-Hudaybi took a step back from the general confrontation with

the RCC and left the country on a business trip. While he was gone, Nasser negotiated a treaty to

have all the remaining British troops withdrawn from Egypt.93

This was fiercely rejected by the

MB which did not like the conditions that were negotiated, among them a seven-year period in

which the British might return to Egypt in case of aggression in the Suez Canal zone.94

The treaty with Great Britain was formally signed on October 19, 1954. A week later, on

October 26, Nasser was giving a speech in Alexandria regarding the treaty when shots were fired

in his direction from a member of the MB.95

Nasser was not injured and this presumed

88

Mitchell, 130. 89

Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990 (London: Routledge, 1993), 39. 90

Mitchell, 131. 91

Gordon, 106. 92

Hopwood, 40. 93

Zollner, 35. 94

Gordon, 178. 95

Hopwood, 42.

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assassination attempt strengthened his image and made him very popular as he deliberately

exposed himself to large crowds around the country to exploit the incident.

A wave of arrests of MB members followed and only a few in the leadership managed to

flee to Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.96

Thousands of Brothers were arrested and charged as

terrorists aiming to overthrow the political system in an attempted coup d‟état. Seven of the MB

leaders, including al-Hudaybi, were sentenced to death. Six of the leaders were hanged and al-

Hudaybi had his sentence commuted to life in prison.97

It is estimated that approximately eleven-

hundred prison sentences were handed out and another one thousand Brothers incarcerated

without any charges being made against them.98

The Society of Muslim Brothers was officially

dissolved on December 5, 1954 and remained that way through 2010.

Until 1958, the MB was a fractured and hounded organization. They “lived in constant

fear of being arrested or spied upon.”99

In 1958, the government loosened the repression

somewhat. Many of the Brothers who had not been officially charged were released. Some other

lower-ranking members were released as well. Al-Hudaybi was pardoned, but put under house

arrest.100

From this time period and several years after, al-Hudaybi‟s influence within the MB

was shared with another supporter, Sayyid Qutb.

Qutb was one of those imprisoned in 1954 and a decided ideologue within the MB. While

in prison, he wrote several books. Two of those books, Signs Along the Path and Milestones had

profound influence on the growing Islamist movement in Egypt.101

His vision was much more

96

Zollner, 37. 97

Zollner, 38. 98

Ibid. 99

Ibid. 100

Ibid, 39. 101

Sullivan, 43.

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militaristic and called upon Muslims to undertake Jihad against their leaders because “they had

replaced God‟s law with man-made laws.”102

He defined Jihad as “a complete armed rebellion”

and “a declaration of the freedom of man from servitude to other men.”103

In Milestones, his

concept of “criticizing society where Allah is not held to be the sovereign being or His law is not

the sole authority in human life and society” resonated with the population. The book had six

printings within a month before it was banned by the government.104

Qutb also indicated there

was a distinction between believers and unbelievers. “The true Muslim is defined through active

engagement, which legitimizes violent resistance against what is seen as unjust rule.”105

Qutb

was charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government and hanged in August, 1966.106

The

regime began a renewed crackdown on the MB resulting in arrests, especially for those who

owned a copy of Milestones.107

Al-Hudaybi was again arrested and sentenced to death, but the

sentence was commuted to life in prison. Several years after Milestones was written, a book,

Preachers, not Judges, was released by the MB. It was attributed to al-Hudaybi, (but actually

written in conjunction with other high ranking Brothers) while they were in prison.108

While not directly refuting Qutb and his influence, the book was written mainly to

provide guidelines towards political moderation in a time of radicalism championed by Qutb and

aimed at continuous state persecution against the MB.109

The book endeavored to look at the

foundations of Islamic faith and undermine concepts that Qutb had put forth regarding radical

102

Ibid. 103

Quoted in Sullivan, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 43. 104

Khatab, 464. 105

Khatab, 149. 106

Ibid, 470. 107

Zollner, 43. 108

Ibid. 109

Ibid, 149.

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ideas of Jihad.110

One of the concepts was the idea that individuals have a greater freedom for

self-determination under the realm of God‟s supremacy. It argued that Islamic law was an

adaptable system of regulations derived through deductive reasoning. It also argued that

“obedience to divine law is independent of its application at a state level.”111

It further mentions

that “God‟s law must be followed individually … and even if Islamic law was the foundation of

a state, it is no absolute guarantee of a just system.”112

Al-Hudaybi indicated that “divine law is

superior to the contractual nature of a social and political structure among humans.”113

Nasser tried to benefit politically from these thoughts by incorporating the assistance of

religious leaders to prove that the values of Islam and socialism were similar. He encouraged

them to identify religious sanctions for the ideas of class solidarity and the power of the state.114

After the war with Israel in 1967, Nasser resorted to appealing to the Islamic values of the

population even more. Realizing the Brothers still had resonance with the population, he started

releasing many members of the MB from prison.115

Nasser began using Islamic slogans in

speeches to try and appease public sentiment regarding the disastrous outcome of the war. There

was a feeling among the population that Egypt‟s military weakness was a punishment from God

and that only a return to Islam would help in its war against Israel.116

Nasser died of a heart attack in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, another

military man. Sadat granted a general amnesty to many of the MB in 1971 and allowed exiled

110

Ibid. 111

Ibid, 151. 112

Ibid. 113

Ibid, 144. 114

Hopwood, 97. 115

Sullivan, 44. 116

Ibid.

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Brothers to return to Egypt.117

The atmosphere of embracing Islam continued under Sadat and it

was his intent to normalize relations with the MB in an attempt to stave off political intrusions

from Nasserites and Socialists.118

The MB also disliked Nasserites and Socialists because of their

secularism. Sadat continued gradually releasing Brothers from prison in stages through the

middle of 1975.119

He even allowed the MB to resume publication of its monthly magazine, al-

Da’wa (The Call).120

The ability to regularly publish and articulate its message to a wider

audience helped the MB in re-establishing itself in Egypt.

The MB was further encouraged by Sadat‟s foreign policy actions when he expelled

Soviet troops from Egypt in the months preceding the 1973 war with Israel. The Soviets had

acquired great influence with the Egyptian government under the Nasser regime, but were now

being marginalized. Sadat was not only angered by the Soviets sending military weapons and

equipment to India (before its war with Pakistan in 1971) instead of Egypt, he was also irritated

about the burgeoning U.S. – Soviet détente. He was especially concerned because of the close

ties between the U.S. and Israel.121

In the eyes of the Brothers, Sadat was now acting against the

acknowledged “archenemies” of Islam (and the MB). Those being Western (U.S.) influence,

communism, and Israel. While not displeased with the action of war with Israel, the MB did not

like the effect it had on Sadat and his overtures with the U.S. and Israel in the aftermath. The

early 1970s brought change to Egypt that was favorable to the MB. But, while Sadat was

coalescing a new government, the MB was also changing leadership.

117

Wickham, 30. 118

Sullivan, 44. 119

Wickham, 30. 120

Ibid. 121

Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years (New York: Palgrave, 2000) 124.

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The Murshid of the MB, Al-Hudaybi, died in 1973 and was succeeded in that position by

Umar al-Tilmisani, the oldest member of the leadership in the Brothers at sixty-eight. He had

been al-Hudaybi‟s assistant on the Guidance Council of the MB and had contributed to the

writing of Preachers, not Judges. He spent seventeen years in prison, dating back to the mid-

1950s before being released by Sadat. The guidance of the MB during the tenure of al-Hudaybi

had profound implications for the organization going forward. His approach to missionary work

and recruiting members helped influence politics through social structures and institutions. It was

largely adopted as the strategy going into the future for the Brothers.122

By eventually becoming

the largest social movement in Egypt, the MB was able to find success in student unions,

professional organizations, and other civil institutions.123

Al-Tilmisani embraced his

predecessor‟s approach to “the gradualist approach of the Islamic reform to society and state.”124

He marginalized the Secret Apparatus as well as the radical ideas of Qutb. He also made it clear

that the Brothers rejected violent action against the state.125

This approach helped in initially

finding common cause with Sadat.

Even though the MB was not a legal organization, Sadat invited the leaders to assist in

drafting sections of a new constitution in 1971.126

While he was willing to stipulate to the MB

that “the principles of Islamic Shari’a are a primary source of legislation,” the Brothers wanted

them to be the sole source of Egyptian laws.127

This would be an ongoing point of contention for

the MB in the coming years. In 1976, Sadat initiated the concept of “platforms” within the ruling

party to serve the interests of different groups that could be established as a prototype towards

122

Zollner, 48. 123

Ibid, 49. 124

Wickham, 30. 125

Ibid. 126

Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 17. 127

Ibid.

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having a multi-party structure in the future. The MB supported this idea and Sadat in the

parliamentary elections that year as it began to become more interested as an organization in

having a political role in the government.128

Six of the Brothers were actually elected to

parliament, although not as individuals affiliated with the MB.129

Some MB leaders predicted

that they would eventually be able to form a political party, but that was quickly deterred by the

passage of the Political Parties Act of 1977, that prohibited the forming of parties based on

religion.130

Working with members of parliament who were from the countryside and sympathetic to

their cause, the Brothers began lobbying the assembly to change laws in two fundamental areas.

They wanted the status of Shari’a changed from “a primary source” to “the primary source” of

legislation.131

They also wanted to repeal laws they felt violated the principles of Shari’a. One of

these pertained to the sale, production and distribution of alcohol. The Brothers and their allies

were also interested in establishing laws regarding Quranic punishments for crimes such as

murder and adultery. Additionally, they wanted to reconcile current laws regarding marriage and

divorce with Shari’a mandates.132

Sadat was not interested in allowing religious leaders or the MB to define the interest of

the state with Islam regarding legislation. He allowed their proposals to be introduced, but made

sure the legislation went nowhere. Sadat then used executive privilege to issue personal status

128

Ibid. 129

Wickham, 31. 130

Ibid. 131

Ibid. 132

Ibid.

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laws that expanded the rights of women in marriage and divorce. This did not sit well with the

MB and was vehemently opposed.133

At the same time, the MB publication, al-Da’wah, began criticizing Sadat for not

effectively working on the problems of education, housing, transportation, and inflation.134

The

criticism turned into a major break with Sadat when he started turning to the West regarding

foreign policy and negotiating a peace treaty with Israel. Al-Tilmisani believed that the Camp

David peace agreement “fulfilled all Israel‟s demands and “should be fought to the end by all

Muslims.”135

The MB felt that the modern state of Israel was “based on the illegal and

illegitimate usurpation of Muslim territory and advocated Jihad to liberate the holy site of

Jerusalem.”136

More criticism from the MB towards Sadat was based on his crackdown on dissents,

especially after food riots across the country in 1977. It viewed Sadat as developing into more

and more of a dictatorial figure.137

Sadat became increasingly combative and insisted that there

should be a “total separation of religion and politics.”138

Yet this sentiment did not preclude

Sadat from amending the constitution in 1980 to actually define “the principles of Islamic

Shari’a as the chief source of legislation.”139

The Brothers would argue from this time forward

133

Ibid, 32. 134

Rubin, 17. 135

Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt’s Political Soul (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 255. 136

Wickham, 33. 137

Ibid, 32. 138

Quoted in Wickham, 33. 139

Ibid, 32.

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that any revision of existing laws had to recognize the constitutional requirement of conforming

to Shari’a law.140

In 1981, Sadat attempted to clamp down on dissent behavior from any

perspective. He arrested over 1500 civic and religious leaders, including al-Tilmisani and other

MB members. He also closed down many publications, including al-Da’wah. An activist in the

radical Islamic group al-Jihad was enraged, and acting with others in the group, assassinated

Sadat in October, 1981.141

While the MB under Sadat made strides towards a more involved political

participation, its leaders continued to stay outside the formal system in order to operate as much

outside of state control as possible.142

They wanted to continue the social services that had

allowed them to develop a base of support among the population. While the MB was open to

creating a party for the Brothers when the timing was right, it did not want to replace the

outreach of its religious association.143

Sadat was replaced by his vice president and military

man, Hosni Mubarak. The pattern of interaction between Egyptian leaders and the MB

continued. Initially, there was cooperation with Mubarak followed by major differences. It is

under Mubarak that the MB decided to fully participate, to the extent allowed, in the political

arenas available to them. This participation will be explored in the following chapters.

140

Ibid. 141

Ibid, 33. 142

Ibid, 43. 143

Ibid.

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Professional Syndicates in Egypt –

Egyptian professionals have strived since the early 20th

century to create syndicates that

would reflect their economic interests, raise professional standards, and influence the country‟s

politics in their favor.144

The desire of professionals to organize developed with the increased

interaction of Egyptians and Europeans in the late 19th

century. The first of the professional

groups to form a syndicate was the Lawyer‟s Syndicate in 1912. It is the oldest and most

established of Egypt‟s syndicates. Other leading professions, like doctors, journalists, and

engineers developed syndicates in the 1940s.145

The syndicates were influenced by three distinct branches of professionals in their

formulation. The more predominant members were European intellectuals residing in Egypt. The

next most influential were Egyptian professionals who had obtained a modern (mainly European)

education. Finally, there were professionals with only traditional apprenticeship training in Egypt

who did not possess higher education.146

Each profession had a traditional wing and a more modern wing that vied for influence

within the syndicates.147

For instance, the Lawyers‟ Syndicate included traditional lawyers who

practiced before Shari’a courts (generally small claims and family matters). They were

eventually subsumed by lawyers in the syndicate who strove to integrate the profession into more

political areas in Egyptian society. Likewise, the Physicians‟ Syndicate had recent graduates of

medical school practicing alongside assorted members whose primary jobs were barbers and

144

Donald M. Reid, “The Rise of Professions and Professional Organization in Modern Egypt,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, (January, 1974), 24. 145

Reid, 24. 146

Ibid, 25. 147

Ibid.

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holy men.148

The modern wing of the various syndicates tended eventually to have the most

influence as the professionals passed through several phases in order to become true syndicates.

The first of these phases was the establishment of university-level training. Professional

schools specializing in medicine, engineering, and law were all functioning by 1880.149

These

schools led to the development of specialized journals within the professions and grew in number

during the years of British influence from 1882 through 1922.150

This in turn led to the next

phase, which was developing the numbers of professionals that would warrant formulating a

syndicate. While there is no specific threshold for the number of members required, there should

be a sizable enough contingency to enter the final phase, which is actual syndication.151

After World War II, there was a dramatic increase in the opening of new universities and

the expansion of existing schools that set the stage for much larger numbers of professional

graduates.152

These graduates went on to establish professional syndicates. The models for these

syndicates were mainly drawn from the more traditional Ottoman-Egyptian guilds as well as the

influence of European learned societies and professional associations.153

Historically, indigenous

guilds served as links between the rulers and members of a profession. They helped arbitrate

disputes, control wages, and also supplied services to their members.154

By the end of the 19th

century, the central government took over those functions and the guilds disappeared.155

While

Europeans influenced the organization and formulation of the regulations of the burgeoning

148

Ibid, 26. 149

Ibid, 28. 150

Ibid. 151

Ibid. 152

Ibid, 37. 153

Ibid. 154

Ibid. 155

Ibid.

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syndicates, there were still differences of perception between the view that syndicates were being

used as a tool of government and the view they were representing membership.156

There was no common denominator to explain which professions decided to organize

into syndicates.157

Their creation seems to have “reflected the nature of the existing relations

between those professions and the state.”158

While syndicates allowed professionals some aspects

of self-governing, the broader regulatory powers over them were still held by the ruling elite.

Government feared the connection between occupational organization and the potential for

political mobilization against it.159

Syndicates gradually developed political significance when on occasion they would

influence governmental policy decisions. For example, in the early 1960s, the Physicians‟

Syndicate successfully resisted the introduction of fully socialized medicine into Egypt. The

Journalists‟ Syndicate has been a consistently vociferous advocate of reducing censorship since

the 1950s.160

Other syndicates have sponsored debates and published commentaries regarding

topics such as school curricula and land ownership. The issues raised have mainly been

intermittent and covered a somewhat narrow range of subjects, but whenever the government has

expressed strong disapproval of their demands, the syndicates have generally ceased in pursuing

them.161

156

Ibid, 38. 157

Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), 37. 158

Ibid. 159

Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (New York: Oxford Press, 1989), 62. 160

Springborg, 279. 161

Ibid.

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Membership in a syndicate was not considered a stepping stone to the cabinet or even

high level government posts, but it did make members visible to the ruling elite. It let policy

makers know who in the syndicates might have developed a following with their colleagues.162

Syndicates thus served as a vehicle for the regime to control behavior or mobilize support of the

professionals.163

They were also used for building patronage networks inside the ruling elite and

state bureaucracies.164

Yet, there have historically been mutual suspicions between Egypt‟s rulers

and heads of the syndicates leading to a frequent redefining of syndicate operations.165

The constitution of 1923 gave all Egyptians the right to association, but development of

professional syndicates was slow and through 1949, only eight had been formed.166

The

government of Zewar Pasha in 1925 passed a law constraining “all associations participating in

political activities.”167

Syndicates were obligated by law to inform the government of their

activities. The law also allowed Council Ministers the right to dissolve any organizations, if they

wanted.168

Syndicates at this time did not yield much influence.

When President Nasser came to power, he thought about abolishing syndicates

altogether or folding them into the labor movement at large. In the first years of his rule, he did

not want to have to contend with any powerful or centralized interest groups “until he was

confident that they would not be infiltrated by his enemies or manipulated by his rivals in the

army.”169

Two syndicates were actually dissolved in 1954 when dissention within the army led to

162

Ibid. 163

Ibid. 164

Bianchi, 91. 165

Ibid. 166

Helmut K. Anheier, ed. The Nonprofit Sector in the Developing World (New York: Manchester University Press, 1998), 128. 167

Ibid, 129. 168

Ibid. 169

Bianchi, 77.

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the Lawyers‟ Syndicate and the Journalists‟ Syndicate to align with those in opposition to

Nasser.170

Law no. 8 was passed in 1958 and required all candidates running in the elections for

syndicate councils to be members of the ruling party of that time, the Arab Socialist Union.171

The leaders of the A.S.U. thought that the syndicates could be controlled by penetrating and

mobilizing them towards the socialistic views of President Nasser.172

Nasser used the law to

move army officers into influential positions in the syndicates. This was especially true for the

Engineers and Physicians Syndicates.173

The President also allocated himself the power to

dissolve syndicate councils at any time. This law was applicable until 1977, when it was

amended to require candidates to who ran for membership on the council to obtain approval from

the state‟s General Attorney.174

The law was not quite as effective as Nasser had hoped and he

came to the conclusion that “the syndicates either had to be abolished entirely or suppressed even

more ruthlessly.”175

In 1964, the Civic Association Code (Law no. 32) was passed to give government

officials the authority to reject the formation of organizations and the discretion to combine or

dissolve groups at any time.176

Among the requirements for forming a voluntary association

under this law (including syndicates) was the need for organizations to inform the government of

170

Ninnete S. Fahmy, “The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative for Reform?” The Middle East Journal, 52, no. 4 (Autumn, 1998), 555. 171

Ibid. 172

Bianchi, 93. 173

Reid, 55. 174

Fahmy, 555. 175

Springborg, 284. 176

Mohamed Agati, “Undermining Standards of Good Governance: Egypt’s NGO Law and its Impact on the Transparency and Accountability of CSOs,” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 9, no. 2 (April, 2007), 58.

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all their activities.177

This included notifying three government offices of the agenda and location

of any meetings and then promptly filing records of the proceedings.178

The law also closely

regulated the fundraising of all organizations. Many organizations that raised money overseas

were denied permits and only dues collected during local religious services were allowed without

government interference.179

Because syndicates were formed by professional business associates

that were wealthy enough to fund themselves through internal dues, government involvement in

their financial accounts was minimal.180

Limiting the funding of organizations, however, was not

the only means government had of controlling them.

Restrictions on the creation and activities of associations included the categories of

“national security, preservation of the nation‟s political system, support for social morals, and

opposition to the revival of previously dissolved associations.”181

The last category was used for

prohibiting the re-establishment of the Society of Muslim Brothers.182

However, because the

Brothers and other Islamic voluntary associations provided desperately needed social services,

the government did not seriously interfere with their activities.183

Law 32 also allowed the Ministry of Social Affairs to appoint a temporary board of

directors when necessary, prevent associations from affiliating with international organizations,

and suspend any internal organizational decision deemed in opposition to the law.184

Government manipulation also occurred when President Nasser intervened in syndicate elections

177

Vickie Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes,” Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (Jan. 2004), 193. 178

Ibid. 179

Ibid. 180

Ibid, 194. 181

Amani Kandil, “Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Egypt,” The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project Working Paper No. 10 (May, 1993), 10. 182

Ibid. 183

Langohr, 193. 184

Ibid.

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by officially endorsing favored candidates, postponing elections, and even extending or cutting

short council terms in office.185

Syndicates tried to be as effective as possible, given their

circumstances. They generally gave support to the regime whenever they sensed the possibility

of any liberalization in political or economic measures. They also tried to widen any autonomy

they had when the regime persisted in influencing their policies and elections.186

The

professional syndicates had more success in establishing “an autonomous space for their

members and in winning access to the center of power” under Sadat, but there were still major

disagreements with the regime that would develop during his presidency.187

Membership in professional syndicates quadrupled between 1963 and 1978, with most of

that growth accelerating under the Sadat regime.188

By the end of his rule, over 700,000

professionals had joined syndicates.189

In the 1960s, most new members were technicians and

civil servants. Growth among doctors and lawyers remained relatively stagnant.190

In the 1970s,

there was an infusion of university graduates into some of the more “elite” professions. Stability

was encouraged in the syndicates when legislation mandated that a greater continuity of

leadership be provided with longer terms for elected presidents and councils (from one and two-

year terms to three and four-year terms).191

There were differences in the development of certain

syndicates based on divergent strategies of building coalitions under Sadat‟s regime.

185

Fahmy, 555. 186

Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Egypt Under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post-Populist State,” Social Problems 28, no. 4 (April, 1981), 458. 187

Ibid, 459. 188

Bianchi, 94. 189

Ibid. 190

Ibid, 95. 191

Ibid, 96.

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Engineers’ Syndicate

Under Nasser, the syndicate presidency had been passed back and forth between well-

connected army engineers. It provided few benefits to its members and many recent engineering

graduates did not bother to join.192

This started to change in the Sadat regime. In the latter part of

Sadat‟s rule the Engineers Syndicate was headed by Osman Ahmed Osman, who was actually a

member of the MB until the demands of business led him to leave the organization.193

Osman,

who was an in-law of Sadat, (one of his sons married one of Sadat‟s daughters) was determined

to shift the focus of the syndicate from politics to economic issues.194

He said the syndicate

“would change from an institution demanding privileges from the state … to a productive power

capable of active participation in solving society‟s problems by work and not talk.”195

Osman collected union dues in a more systematic way and invested the funds in

enterprises made possible by Sadat‟s economic policies.196

Osman also founded the Engineers‟

Bank and Engineers‟ Insurance Company. He also used the treasury to underwrite investments in

new companies like the Engineers‟ Company for Food Production and Engineers‟ National

Company for Soft Drinks.197

Not all investments panned out and the syndicate also made

dubious financial investments that led to corruption cases in the early 1980s. Osman believed

that the syndicate (especially the bank) could use its funds as it saw fit and that in the private

sector, “one took risks for profit, and a few mistakes were inevitable.”198

In addition, Osman

brought the syndicate more into line with the political policies of Sadat. The syndicate endorsed

192

Bianchi, 114. 193

Baker, 18. 194

Baker, 42. 195

Quoted in Baker, 42. 196

Baker, 42. 197

Ibid. 198

Quoted in Baker, 43.

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the “warm peace” of normalized relations with Israel and even insured the Israeli embassy in

Cairo through the Engineers‟ Insurance Company.199

This cooperation with Sadat was not typical

of other syndicates.

Journalists’ Syndicate

The Journalists‟ Syndicate has historically been one of the most active in Egypt. Since its

beginning, different governments have tried to involve the syndicate in self-censorship and

professional discipline, but they have rarely succeeded.200

Regimes have always viewed them as

untrustworthy and depended on penal codes, censorship bureaus, and publishing bans to keep

them in line.201

Under the Sadat presidency, the syndicate was often in confrontation with the

regime.

During student uprisings in 1972-73, the Journalists‟ Syndicate issued a formal

declaration of support for the students and petitioned the government for greater freedom of the

press.202

Sadat vowed to crack down on dissidents who were “exploiting democracy” to

denigrate the regime and in February of 1973 stripped over one hundred writers and journalists

of their membership in the syndicate.203

Six of those members had been on the syndicate‟s

council and did have leftists and “Nasserite” leanings. The government hoped to gain influence

within the syndicate when elections were held in June that year. They were disappointed when

all of the seats were filled with journalists who had similar ideologies to those dismissed.204

Sadat offered a temporary olive branch by reinstating many writers and giving amnesty to

199

Ibid. 200

Bianchi, 106. 201

Ibid. 202

Beattie, 120. 203

Ibid, 121. 204

Ibid, 122.

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students who had been arrested. This was done in the run up to the October 1973 war with Israel

and bought the regime some goodwill.205

The Sadat regime managed to get its preferred candidate elected to the head of the

syndicate in the mid-1970s, but this did not reflect the power held by Sadat in the organization. It

was common for syndicates to elect presidents who could work well with any particular regime

to try and advance the syndicate‟s material interests.206

It did not help Sadat when he brokered a

peace agreement with Israel. While the syndicate refrained from issuing public statements

regarding Sadat‟s visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords, it did issue a report against

the Israeli ambassador in Egypt and also encouraged Egyptian journalists to not travel to

Israel.207

Sadat instigated a concerted attack on the syndicate and announced that the press had

essentially become the Fourth Estate in Egypt with equal political powers. If that was the case,

then there was no reason for a syndicate to even exist to protect its rights.208

He hinted that he

would “transform the syndicate into a club for journalists.”209

In 1978 the government passed a

National Unity Law that it used against journalists who it deemed “defamatory to Egypt and a

threat to the security of the home front.”210

Sadat hoped to create a new generation of supportive

writers by adding journalists to newspaper staffs to try change the press from within. This did not

develop, as many of the new journalists turned against him.211

205

Ibid, 123. 206

Ibid, 243. 207

Beattie, 244. 208

Raymond William Baker, “Sadat’s Open Door: Opposition from Within,” Social Problems, 28, no. 4 (April, 1981), 382. 209

Ibid. 210

Beattie, 244. 211

Ibid, 245.

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Lawyers’ Syndicate

Since early in the Nasser regime, the Lawyers‟ Syndicate has been in numerous

disagreements with the government. It was the most persistent critic of government policies.212

It

“expressed fully liberal ideas of free speech, the right of assembly, and a constitutional definition

of national interest.”213

It also embraced all political trends and acted to “safeguard the legitimate

rights of all political groups, including communist and Islamic radicals.”214

They conceived their

syndicate to be a national institution and not just a political or professional organization.

Among the issues the syndicate had with Sadat was the peace treaty with Israel, the

suppression of the press, and military basing rights for the United States.215

The syndicate

sponsored almost weekly meetings to discuss its opposition to the peace treaty and what it

perceived as anti-democratic measures by the regime.216

Sadat felt that he could no longer

tolerate the potential for an anti-regime coalition that the syndicate might promote and decided

he had to take them on to send a message to his opponents.217

He instigated a televised meeting

in which he lashed out against a small group of dissidents said to be controlling the syndicate. He

indicated that the syndicate should be purged. This in turn inspired a number of lawyers

(suspected to have been bribed by the regime) to break into the syndicate headquarters and

declare a vote of no confidence from the existing council.218

Sadat then got the People‟s

Assembly to dissolve the council and put in its place lawyers who were viewed as pro-regime.219

212

Bianchi, 99. 213

Baker, Sadat and After, 67. 214

Ibid. 215

Beattie, 249. 216

Ibid, 251. 217

Ibid, 265. 218

Ibid, 266. 219

Ibid.

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In-fighting among members of the syndicate continued into the early years of the Mubarak

regime.

Entrance of the MB into the Parliament

After Sadat‟s assassination in 1981, Mubarak tried to avoid the cycle of protest and

repression from the previous regime.220

He indicated that he wanted a gradual increase of public

freedom and released in stages activists that Sadat had imprisoned.221

MB Murshid Al-Tilmisani

evaluated options available to the MB to assess how it could take advantage of the new political

climate.222

He decided that it would be irresponsible to not participate in the opportunity that

presented itself in the way of parliamentary elections. “Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in

the views of officials… It was the opportunity of a lifetime; had the Brothers let it slip through

their hands they would have been counted among the ranks of the neglectful.”223

Al-Tilmisani further rationalized the participation of the MB by indicating that

they did not enter politics to gain power, but to spread the word of God.224

Because the National

Democratic Party (NDP) had such a stranglehold on the votes in the parliamentary election, the

number of members that the MB could expect to gain was quite small. Al-Tilmisani indicated

that the numbers were irrelevant as the MB could use the parliament as a pulpit to disseminate

their ideas to the public at large.225

By aligning itself with an existing political party, the MB was

able to have eight of its members elected to parliament in 1984. This election and entrance into

220

Wickham, 46. 221

Ibid. 222

Ibid. 223

Quoted in Wickham, 48. 224

Ibid. 225

Ibid, 49.

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Parliament, as well as participation in professional syndicates, will be discussed in the next

chapter.

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Chapter Two

The MB Enters Egyptian Politics: 1984-1996

When President Mubarak took office in 1981, he had only been participating in politics

since 1975. He was appointed to the position of Vice-President by Anwar Sadat.226

Mubarak had

been a career military man and was somewhat apolitical. He was not of the generation of Free

Officers who had taken power in 1952 and held no personal antagonism towards the MB.227

When he became President, Egypt was in turmoil because of the authoritarian policies of

President Sadat.228

Mubarak initiated a program of appeasement towards the opposition and the

MB in particular.229

Shortly after becoming President, he said “I believe democracy is the best

guarantee of our future … I totally oppose the centralization of power and I have no wish to

monopolize the decision-making because the country belongs to all of us.”230

He advanced a

quasi-liberal policy at that time by allowing more freedom of the press and a modest ability for

political parties and associations to organize to a greater extent than previously allowed.231

This

would all come to an end once he consolidated political power in the mid-1990s.

Neither President Mubarak nor the MB was in a position to enter into conflict with one

another in the early 1980s. The MB was now established as a moderate Islamic organization and

not viewed as a threat by Mubarak. As long as the MB did not directly challenge the regime, it

227

Ibid. 228

Ibid. 229

Joel Campagna, “From Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years,” Journal of International Affairs, 50, no. 1 (Summer 1996), 281. 230

Quoted in Kassem, 54. 231

Hala Mustafa, “The Islamist Movements Under Mubarak,” in The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, ed. Laura Guazzone (Lebanon: Garnet Publishing Limited, 1995), 166.

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was welcome.232

The regime decided that any advantages gained politically by the MB from

giving it increased political freedom would be offset by the Brothers‟ having to compete with

secular parties. Mubarak also believed that, with greater exposure, the ideas of the MB would

have less appeal to the general public.233

Mubarak had two basic aims in dealing with the MB

(and Islamists in general): to create a balance of power between the secularists and the Islamists,

and to divide the moderate Islamists from the more militant ones.234

There was a difficulty in

this approach in that while different tactics were utilized by various Islamic groups, they tended

to have the same objective of establishing an Islamic state.235

One expert in the study of Islamic

groups, Dr. Ali al-Magli, turned the axiom of war by Clausewitz on its head. Dr. al-Magli

indicated that for the Islamic movement in general, “politics is an extension of war by other

means.”236

In the 1980s, Egypt had a number of Islamist groups encompassing views ranging from

the “excommunication” of Muslims not deemed religious enough (al-takfir), to those espousing

armed struggle (al-jihad) in the name of God, to those trying to persuade Muslims to abide by

the tenets of Islamic Law and apply them to everyday life (the MB).237

The MB saw Egyptian

society as “not completely Islamic and the world as un-Islamic.” The aim of the Brothers was to

change society and the world from within.238

To accomplish this, the MB needed to re-establish

itself.

232

Campagna, 282 233

Ibid 234

Mustafa, 177 235

Ibid, 178 236

Springborg, 220 237

Gehad Auda, “The ‘Normalization’ of the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to the Early 1990s,” in Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 376. 238

Ibid, 377

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One organizational detail Murshid al-Tilmisani established in the early 1980s was

continuity and the succession of leadership. He wanted the position of Supreme Guide to go to

the oldest MB member of the Supreme Office of Guidance, unless it was declined.239

This

decision was followed by the Brothers and the average age of the Murshids (including al-

Tilmisani) upon taking over the leadership through 2010 was 73. They had collectively spent an

average of fourteen years in prison as well. Al-Tilmisani also instituted a policy of working with

other civic organizations. “We cooperate sincerely with others in matters on which there are (sic)

common agreement and sincerely excuse each other on matters of disagreement.”240

This

reflected not only the desire of entering politics, but expanding membership of the organization.

The MB was in a rebuilding mode after having a number of its members imprisoned

by President Sadat.241

Among the Brothers released in the late 1970s were some of the more

conservative elements who had participated in the Secret Apparatus and who were not inclined

towards politics. One in particular, Mustafa Mashour, would later become the Murshid of the

MB.242

This group focused on recruiting for the MB on university campuses because students in

that era had become more involved in domestic and international events.243

The MB found an Islamic element among the students who were already organized

and addressing conservative issues, such as the encouragement of female students to wear hijabs

(scarfed head cover), the segregation of the sexes in classes, and halting lectures at various times

of the day for prayer.244

These students had a slightly more proactive view of Islam than the

239

Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Egypt’s Islamic Activism in the 1980s,” Third World Quarterly, 10, no. 2 (April, 1988), 648 240

Interview of al-Tilmisani with Ibrahim, Ibid, 648 241

Hesham al-Awadi, “A Struggle for Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak, 1982-2009,” Contemporary Arab Affairs, 2, no. 2 (April/June 2009), 215. 242

Alison Pargeter. The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power (London: Saqi Books, 2013), 37. 243

Ibid. 244

Ibid, 38

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public at large and bonded readily with the hawkish MB recruiters, especially given the honored

reputation the recruiters had gained in Islamic circles while they were imprisoned.245

This new

generation of MB members was “used to working openly and unconstrained, as opposed to past

members who were used to secrecy and the fear of imprisonment.” The newer members “were

also interested in moving slightly away from the more ideological and theological issues to more

socio-economic issues like poverty and corruption.”246

This group was willing to enter into what

were basically secular organizations, like professional syndicates, to expand the MB‟s influence

in society.

The decision by Murshid al-Tilmisani to participate in the political arena came at a

fortuitous time. Just after the assassination of President Sadat, there was a temporary clampdown

of the MB. The conservative members who did not view the participation in politics favorably

(including Mustafa Mashour) left Egypt for safer conditions in other Arab countries. This

allowed the reformist element of the MB (including the newer university graduates) to lobby for

direct engagement in Egyptian politics.247

Because the MB was an illegal organization, it could

not participate in parliamentary elections as an independent party.

Parliamentary Elections -

In 1983, the Majlis (People‟s Assembly) passed Electoral Law 114 in response to

public demand for a more proportional representation system in parliamentary elections. This

law stipulated that candidates were to run on party lists and there would be an exclusion of

anyone running as an independent.248

The law also specifically prohibited candidates of different

245

Ibid 246

Ibid, 43 247

Ibid, 45 248

El-Ghobashy, 378

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parties running on the same list. This would prove to be a problem for many of the burgeoning

political parties allowed to participate by Mubarak. None of the newer parties had enough of a

following to get elected or influence elections on their own. An additional handicap was placed

upon candidates when a threshold of eight percent of the national vote was required for a party to

qualify for parliamentary representation. Any votes to opposition parties that fell short of this

percentage was automatically transferred to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).249

Because the MB was an outlawed organization and had no political party, it decided

the best way to enter the Majlis was to cooperate and join forces with the recently re-constituted

Wafd Party. Even though the Wafd party was basically secular, the MB saw it as the best chance

of getting Brothers elected because the Wafd provided a legal vehicle to the election and the MB

provided the popular base and ability to get out the vote.250

In the 1984 Parliamentary elections,

the Wafd party gained fifteen percent of the national vote and fifty-eight seats in the Majlis

(eight of which went to MB members).251

The MB was now openly serving in the Majlis,

though as affiliated with the Wafd party. The new parliament was supposed to be constituted for

a five year period, but it came to a premature end. The 1983 electoral law was challenged by

candidates who were not allowed to run as individuals. It was claimed that they were denied their

constitutional right to nominate themselves in elections and that the law was “a breach of public

right, equality, and opportunity … as enshrined in the constitution.”252

As the Supreme Constitutional Court was evaluating the case, President Mubarak had

the Majlis pass another piece of legislation, Law 188 of 1986. This amended Law 114 by

249

Ibid 250

Ibid 251

Ibid 252

Kassem, 60.

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maintaining the eight percent threshold and the party-list system, but it stopped the transfer of

votes that did not reach the threshold to the NDP. It also reserved forty-eight seats in Parliament

for candidates running as independents.253

Mubarak then dissolved the Majlis and set an election

for April, 1987.

The MB did not get along politically with the Wafd party in the 1984 Majlis. For the

1987 election, it decided to align itself with the Labor Party and the Liberal Party in what

became known as the Islamic Alliance (IA).254

This combination garnered sixty-two seats in the

new Parliament, with thirty-six going to the MB. This was the election in which the phrase

“Islam is the Solution,” was first used by the MB.255

In what was to be the nadir of elected

members from opposition parties in parliamentary elections for some time, the Wafd party itself

captured thirty-six seats.256

This election became notable for the IA placing several Coptic candidates on its list,

with one actually getting elected to the Majlis. The IA also went out of its way to show that it

wanted the implementation of Shari’a to take place at a gradual, but steady pace. It did not want

to be seen as trying to replicate the revolutionary manner of Iran in 1979.257

Another aspect of

this election that would repeat itself in the future, was the harassment (sometimes violently) of

MB candidates and poll workers by the regime. Just before the 1987 elections, approximately

two thousand members and supporters were arrested by the government.258

253

El-Ghobashy, 379 254

Kassem, 61 255

Ibrahim, Egypt’s Islamic Activism, 646. 256

Kassem, 61 257

Ibrahim, 647 258

Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 27

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Another lawsuit was filed against the implementation of Election Law 188 from 1986

with many of the arguments used from the previous lawsuit against Law 114 from 1983.259

The

Supreme Constitutional Court ruled in May, 1990 that the 1986 electoral law (and essentially the

1984 law) was unconstitutional. Mubarak then issued a decree that abolished the party-list

system and declared an individual-candidacy system. He prematurely dissolved the Majlis again

and held elections in 1990.260

Because opposition parties had been having increased success in

the party-list system, many (including the MB) chose to boycott the 1990 elections because they

perceived the new election law as a governmental attempt to maintain political control of

Parliament.261

A spokesman for the MB, Ma‟mun al-Hudaybi (who would later become

Murshid), was quoted as saying the Brothers “refused to contribute to the creation of a false

democratic façade.”262

The elders in the MB also saw a need to curb the advancement of the

younger generation within the Brothers in what was perceived by the old guard as

overenthusiastic steps by the newer members politically.263

The decision to boycott the elections

was not something that the younger members of the MB embraced. They felt that the MB should

continue to build on its performance and plan to establish a political party.264

The Murshid was

persuaded by the younger MB members to field candidates for the next parliamentary elections.

The 1995 Parliamentary elections saw the MB field 170 candidates running as

independents because the MB was still not a legally recognized organization.265

The political

alliances between opposition parties that had been prevalent in the 1984 and 1987 elections was

marginal in 1995. The regime took unprecedented coercive actions against non-NDP parties and

259

Kassem, 61 260

Ibid 261

Abed-Kotob, The Accommodationists Speak, 328 262

Quoted in Campagna, 286 263

Auda, 389 264

Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 144 265

Ibid, 170

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individual candidates. Hundreds were harassed, and at least fifty people were killed; close to a

thousand were injured during voting.266

When the elections were over, only a single MB

candidate had been elected. He was removed from the Majlis the following year in 1996 for

having been a member of an illegal movement (the MB).267

This left the MB without any

representatives in Parliament from 1990 until the 2000 election. It did not, however, restrain the

organization from participating in the political environment in Egypt. It gained quite a bit of

influence in the professional syndicates during this time, which led to problems with the

Mubarak government.

Professional Syndicate Elections

When the MB maneuvered to gain seats on the boards of the syndicates in the mid-

1980s, it was with the understanding that it would not attempt to get its members elected to the

presidency of any of the professional organizations. Those positions were historically reserved

for individuals with close ties to the regime. Because of the contacts established with ministers

and other high officials, leaders of syndicates were able to offer their members increases in

pensions and other financial incentives.268

Mubarak allowed unhindered elections to take place in

syndicates because he hoped that “relatively free elections would divide the syndicates into rival

opposition groups and at the same time partially neutralize complaints about restrictions imposed

on the Parliament.”269

This did not turn out to be the case in the more influential syndicates.

The first syndicate to come under the influence of the MB was the Physician‟s

Syndicate. Historically, this syndicate had been limited in its societal role. It represented a varied

266

Ibid, 171 267

Ibid 268

Reinoud Leenders. “The Struggle of State and Civil Society in Egypt: Professional Organizations and Egypt’s Careful Steps Towards Democracy,” Middle East Research Associates. Occasional Paper no. 26 (April, 1996), 13 269

Ibid, 16

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combination of doctors in the public sector as well as military doctors and university medical

professors who had private clinics.270

The president of the syndicate was traditionally a military

officer and one of the few negative encounters the syndicate had with the government was in

1962. A non-military president of the syndicate objected to the nationalization of hospitals under

President Nasser and called for constitutional limits to Nasser‟s power.271

That president was

expelled from the syndicate, lost his teaching position at a university, and had property taken

away from him.272

Opposition to the president after this time was largely marginalized until the

Mubarak era, when the syndicate became much more politically involved.

In 1984, the MB launched a major campaign to entice syndicate voters to its

candidates. In the previous syndicate election, turnout was barely four percent of those eligible,

indicating the frustration and disinterest among voters.273

After that election, there was a large

expansion of new members experiencing competition for jobs, rising living expenses, and

diminishing salaries.274

Much of this can be attributed to a recessionary economy in the mid-

1980s in which the price of oil being exported from Egypt dropped from forty-one dollars a

barrel in 1980 to eight dollars a barrel in 1986.275

Before the 1984 election, MB members of the syndicate pledged to increase services

to the doctors in the organization. Dr. Issam Al-Aryan, who later served in the 1987 Parliament,

was the MB point man in the syndicate. He stated that “We provided social benefits for the

270

Fahmy, Politics of Egypt, 135. 271

Ibid. 272

Ibid, 136. 273

Leenders, 20 274

Amani Kandil, The Political Role of Interest Groups in Egypt: A Case Study of the Physicians Order, 1984-1995 (Cairo, 1996), 34 275

Nadia Ramsis Farah, Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2009), 80.

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members and offered them vaccinations, durable goods, and affordable medical equipment.”276

The most important service provided by the MB was a subsidized health insurance program for

its members. It offered doctors and their families quality treatment at a reasonable cost.277

In

addition to the popular health insurance subsidy, the MB “organized massive sales of furniture,

gas ovens, washing machines, and other appliances … through interest-free instalments and low

prices.”278

There was also a program for interest-free emergency loans called the “Social

Solidarity System,” that was based on the Islamic principle of no interest owed on the loan.279

Craftsmen and traders could also set up exhibits at syndicate functions to display low-cost

merchandise to members.280

The MB gained seven of the twenty-five seats on the executive board of the

Physician‟s Syndicate and by 1990, it controlled twenty of the twenty-five.281

The only reason

the MB did not win all the seats was the organizational decision to accommodate views and

representatives of other groups.282

The number of new doctors coming into the profession

doubled between 1980 and 1988, but the number of them voting in syndicate elections

quadrupled.283

The MB set about winning other syndicate elections utilizing the same formula of

general voting apathy and promises of genuine assistance to those members. This advantage

allowed the MB to win elections in the Pharmacist‟s Syndicate and Scientist‟s Syndicate soon

276

Ibid, 35 277

Hesham al-Awadi, Struggle for Legitimacy, 217. 278

Al-Awadi, Struggle for Legitimacy, 217. 279

Amani Kandil, “The Nonprofit Sector in Egypt,” in The Nonprofit Sector in the Developing World: A Comparative Analysis, ed. Helmut K. Anheier and Lester M. Salamon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 142. 280

Ibid. 281

Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 186. 282

Ibid. 283

Ibid.

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after the 1984 surprise showing.284

The MB ran in the Engineer‟s Syndicate in 1985, but did not

achieve success until the 1987 election when it won forty-five of the sixty-one seats on the

executive board.285

While the MB did not take over the Journalist‟s Syndicate, it did place a

younger member on the syndicate council. Muhammad „Abad al-Qaddus “received nearly two-

thirds of all votes cast and more than twice as many as the leading opposition.”286

He would be a

strong advocate for the MB and assisted in building alliances with the existing party system. The

most stunning success, and the one that shook the Mubarak regime, was when the MB took over

the Lawyer‟s Syndicate in 1992. It won fourteen of the twenty-four seats on the board.287

The

coalition of Brothers was headed by Sayf al-Islam Banna (son of the MB founder Hasan al-

Banna) and it was rumored that the MB paid the overdue membership fees of nearly 3,000

attorneys just before the election in order to help gain votes.288

Much of the money the MB used

for Parliament and syndicate elections became available through its participation in Islamic

investment companies and banks (described below).

The MB solidified the loyalty of future syndicate members within the university

system. The network of Brothers in syndicates organized lectures and connections with students

in the engineering and medical schools. They set up committees for the future members by

giving them informal membership and access to some of the syndicate facilities and clubs.289

This network also became a source of funding for student needs and activities on campus.290

284

Wickham, 186. 285

Ibid. 286

Bianchi, 114. 287

Leenders, 20. 288

Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 196. 289

Al-Awadi, Mubarak and the Islamists, 70 290

Ibid

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Even beyond these methods, the MB tried to broaden connections for further political

impact. In 1990, the MB who were in charge of their respective syndicate councils formed the

Committee for Coordinating Syndical Action. Its declared purpose was to protect syndicate

interests, but in reality it was another means of furthering the political impact of the Brothers.291

An expert on Egyptian syndicates, Amani Kandil, noted:

The Brothers in syndicates began to organize public functions that were attended

by people from outside the syndicate. They also used syndicates to form alliances

with each other in opposing regime policies. Further, they also used syndicates to

form alliances with political parties. Indeed, the syndicates‟ activism went outside

syndicates.292

The political actions taken by the MB in the early 1990s would lead to quite a bit of

pushback by the regime.

Conflict with President Mubarak -

The first major conflict with the government occurred in October of 1991,

when the Brothers criticized the Madrid peace talks regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict in

Palestine. The MB was highly critical of the talks and indirectly condemned the Egyptian

government‟s participation in the conference. The Supreme Guide of the MB at the time,

Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, stated “The eagerness many Arab leaders are

showing… for the sell-out of Palestine is alarming. If they take part in this conference …

they will be held responsible … for abandoning the Palestine issue … and will bear the

guilt of keeping them under occupation.”293

This stance led the regime to arrest and

torture members of the MB (including past members of Parliament) for opposing the

291

Ibid 292

Ibid, interview with author 293

Campagna, 286

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government‟s part in the peace talks.294

Two other major events in 1992 would lead to

further crackdowns by Mubarak against the Brothers.

The first of these events occurred in February 1992, when the regime‟s

security forces raided the Salsabil Computer Company, which was co-owned by a senior

member of the MB, Khairat Al-Shatir.295

He and the other owners were charged with

belonging to a secret group and holding meetings within the company to plan an

overthrow of the government. The security forces claimed to have found documents

detailing the establishment of an Islamic state.296

The overall strategy was called the

“Consolidation Plan” and it purported to outline how the movement would consolidate

control over the state and society.297

The document indicated that in addition to its gains

in the professional syndicates, the MB wanted to target the army and police for greater

infiltration.298

The concerns of the regime grew when it was determined that the Salsabil

Company had sold many computers to the army and intelligence services.299

This event

was used as an excuse by the government to organize a campaign against other Islamic

economic interests.300

The concern of the government only grew later that year.

The event that really challenged the government happened in October 1992,

when a major earthquake hit Cairo. It occurred on a Thursday afternoon when most

government offices had closed for the weekend. There was virtually no response at all

294

Abed-Kotob, The Accommodationsts Speak, 336 295

Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 162 296

Ibid 297

Ibid 298

Nachman Tal. Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordon (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 58 299

Al-Awadi, 162 300

Ibid

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from the government for two days.301

Meanwhile, the MB-led Doctor‟s Syndicate rolled

out the resources of the Humanitarian Relief Committee to provide food, clothing, and

medical assistance to the victims.302

The Engineer‟s Syndicate (dominated by the MB) set

up emergency relief centers and donated money to help families most affected. It also

conducted inspections for over 10,000 residences before allowing them to return to their

dwellings.303

The government, quite naturally, saw this as a direct challenge to its

legitimacy. The syndicates were accused of using humanitarian assistance to “gain

popularity and undermine the role of the state.”304

The government quickly issued

decrees under the emergency laws that “prohibited the raising of funds or distribution of

goods except through the Ministry of Social Affairs or the Red Crescent.”305

Military

troops were also sent in to dismantle temporary tents that had been provided by the

syndicates.306

President Mubarak saw the organizational skills of the syndicates as a

direct threat and decided to try and change the composition of the syndicate councils in

future elections.

The takeover of the various syndicates was disconcerting enough to the

regime, but when those syndicates started behaving in a highly political fashion, and even

usurping governmental functions, it was time for new legislation to curb that behavior.

Public Law 100 of 1993 was designed to do just that. It now required fifty percent of the

eligible members of the syndicates to vote for the election of the respective councils and

301

Kassem, 113 302

Ibid 303

Ibid 304

Ibid, 114 305

Ibid 306

Ibid

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presidents.307

If that threshold was not met, a meeting of the general assembly of the

syndicates would be called and another election would be held. In this case, a third of the

eligible voters must participate. If this requirement was not fulfilled, then the current

council and president would continue to run the syndicates for three months, and the

process would be repeated from the start.308

If conditions were not met this time, a

temporary judicial committee would be assigned to function as the council. The next

election would then be held under judicial supervision, with the dates, places, and vote

counting of the elections conducted by the judicial committee.309

The law was passed by

the Majlis in less than a day and signed into law by President Mubarak the day after it

passed.310

The law was immediately protested by all of the syndicates, claiming that the

threshold was far too high, especially when there were no such requirements for election to the

People‟s Assembly.311

It was further argued that the law was a direct contradiction to the bylaws

of the syndicates and that judicial control precluded a fair arbiter from challenging the law.312

The government did not waste any time, in May 1993, by placing the Engineers‟ Syndicate under

official custodianship by court order for supposed allegations of financial mismanagement of

funds by the MB-controlled board.313

In addition to the syndicate law, another law was passed that circumvented the

outreach of the MB in June 1994. This law amended the Egyptian Universities Act and was

307

Fahmy, Politics of Egypt, 107 308

Ibid 309

Ibid 310

Campagna, 294 311

Fahmy, 107 312

Ibid, 108 313

Campagna, 295

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aimed directly at the MB‟s ability to recruit students to its organization. The election of faculty

deans was repealed and they were now appointed by government-appointed university

presidents.314

University student councils were also now controlled by government appointees.

This law had a direct influence on subverting MB influence on university campuses

everywhere.315

Despite the attempts to curtail the MB through legislation, the organization

continued to carry on its mission of trying to make Egypt a more Islamic country by participating

in available political zones.

Rhetoric and Actions of the MB –

Murshid al-Tilmisani died on May 24, 1986. During his tenure as Supreme Guide, he

led the MB in recruiting and rebuilding the organization into political viability after most of the

leadership spent years in prison and membership dropped off. He was responsible for

encouraging the MB to integrate into the political avenues available to it in the Parliament and

professional syndicates. His death coincided with the return from exile of many of the MB

brothers who left Egypt in the aftermath of the Sadat assassination. This group became one of

four factions that vied for influence in choosing the new Murshid of the MB.316

Even though the

leadership was supposed to go to the eldest member of the MB per al-Tilmisani‟s decree, there

was no avenue for expressing other desires of leadership through a larger meeting of the MB.

The limits placed on organizational gatherings in Egypt (especially of the MB) were due to the

Civic Association Code of 1964, discussed in the previous chapter.

314

Ibid 315

Ibid 316

Abdel Azim Ramadan, “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Takfir Groups,” in Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 175

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The first faction vying for input on the leadership question comprised the returning

members who made fortunes in the exiled countries (mainly in communications) and who

wanted to see Mustafa Mashour (who would later become the Supreme Guide) as the new

Majlis. The second faction were followers of Sayyid Qutb and had spent many years in prison,

but there were not very many of these Brothers left in the MB to make a difference. The third

faction wanted someone who was not at all affiliated with the Secret Apparatus, but still

traditional, and put forth the name of Ma‟mun al-Hudaybi. He was the son of the previous

Majlis, Hassan al-Hudaybi, but much more conservative than his father. He would also

eventually become the Murshid, but not at this time. A fourth faction wished to go back to the

roots of Hasan al-Banna‟s vision and wanted his brother, Abd al-Rahman al-Banna to be the new

Supreme Guide.317

It was ultimately decided that the decree of the eldest member becoming Murshid

would be honored and Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr was named the Supreme Guide in 1986.

Because he was considered something of a compromise candidate, he was only viewed as a

temporary Murshid.318

It was widely believed that the real power resided with Ma‟mun al-

Hudaybi and, to a lesser extent, Mustafa Mashour.319

Al-Nasr was a member of one of the most

wealthy and powerful families in the city of Asyut.320

He was not well educated and had not even

finished secondary school.321

Of all the Supreme Guides of the MB, he was viewed as one of the

least memorable, yet he remained Murshid until early 1996.

317

Ibid 318

Ramadan, 175 319

Pargeter, 48 320

Springborg, 224 321

Pargeter, Ibid

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The guidance of the MB did take a more conservative turn after the death of Al-

Tilmisani and the younger members became more marginalized within the organization. One

disgruntled member was quoted as saying, “After the return of the exiled group, we saw there

was an attempt by them to restrict the generation that was leading the real work inside the

Ikwhan (Brotherhood).”322

This period was the beginning of a generational split in the MB that

would become more apparent in the mid-1990s. At this time, any differences between what the

Supreme Guide of the MB said and the actions of its members in the Majlis and syndicates were

somewhat nuanced on most topics. A notable exception was how the MB dealt with the rights of

women.

Domestic Issues –

Shari’a –

The overriding issue for the MB above all others was the implementation of Shari’a

law in the everyday affairs of Egyptians. The organization felt this would only really come about

through the actions of the Majlis. Al-Tilmisani was quoted as saying:

“Any way the Majlis considers the beginning of the application of sharia will

satisfy us. We do not specify the method … but we affirm and demand that the

process continue. It would be impossible … to announce the application of all

these codes in an Islamic manner at once because it would create confusion in

economic, political, and judicial circles.”323

323

Khalil Ali Haydar. 1985 interview quoted in Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: Sujal al-Ahdath [The Muslim Brotherhood: Documentation of Events]. (Kuwait: Kazima Company, 1989), 92.

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He also indicated that the Brothers in the Assembly would “urge the enforcement of the Islamic

Shari’a laws, and will embarrass the government on this issue without fear of detention or

torture.”324

His successor, Al-Nasr, tried to alleviate concerns of a headlong rush to Shari’a:

“I believe that Islamic law must be applied gradually. We must first put an

Islamic stamp on the state. Initially, we must implement what the people feel they

need. We will wait for matters that need time before being carried out, as Islamic

law was established in phases. Alcoholic drinks were banned in three stages.

Slavery was also banned in stages. Gradual implementation is one of the

hallmarks of Islamic law.”325

The MP Brothers in the 1984 Majlis did not feel the same constraint as the leaders

and constantly called for the application of Shari’a law. They made demands for this application

by citing the un-Islamic practices of the government regarding the manufacturing of liquor and

usury in economic issues.326

They also noted a lack of Islamic ethics in Egyptian news media.

MB members demanded the adoption and application of Islam (and Shari’a specifically) as an

economic, social, political, military, and cultural system.327

The MB was not the only organization that wanted more attention to be paid to

Article 2 of the constitution regarding the principles of Islamic Shari’a being the chief source of

legislation. Judges, legal academics, and the leaders of al-Azhar University all complained about

delays in obeying the commands of Article 2 to Islamize the law.328

In 1985, the Supreme

Constitutional Court issued a ruling regarding Article 2 legislation. It ruled that the court could

324

“Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Elections, Policy” (text), London Al-Majallah, 9-15 June 1984, 9. FBIS Daily Report, 13 June 1984, D2. 325

“Muslim Brotherhood Leader Comments on Elections” (text), Cairo Uktubar, 19 April 1987, 11. FBIS Daily Report, 30 April 1987, D4. 326

Hassanein T. Ibrahim, The Political Role of the Muslim Brotherhood under Restricted Pluralism in Egypt: A Study in Political Practice, 1984-1990 (Cairo: Markaz al-Mahrusah lil-Buhuth wa-al-Tadrib wa-al-Nashr,1995) 327

Ibid. 328

Clark B. Lombardi. State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Shari’a into Egyptian Constitutional Law (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 163.

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not force wholesale Islamization by the government even though it did not approve of the

government‟s decision to only passively incorporate Islam into legislation. It further ruled that it

could not review laws entered into force at the time the constitution was amended in 1980. The

court could review laws entered into force thereafter.329

The Mubarak regime gave little more

than a passing thought to really incorporating Shari’a law into legislation.

The MB Majlis members of the 1987 Assembly were even more strident in their

Islamic legislative demands. They noted the slow pace of the government towards applying

Shari’a and challenged the ruling NDP party to justify delays. They also indicated that partial

adjustment of existing laws was not enough.330

Brotherhood MP Muhammad Tawfiq Qasim was

quoted as saying, “Only the creator knows what is best for his creations. Hence submission to the

Shari’a is not a choice; rather it is an obligation of the Muslim faith.331

MB member Mohammad

Al-Sayyid Habeeb declared, “The government is not serious about purifying Islamic society

from sins and aberrant behavior, although this can be done with a simple signature by President

Mubarak. I beseech him to shut down liquor plants and night clubs and reorient television

programming to protect our sons, youth, daughters, and wives.”332

MB member Mohammad

Abdel Hamid Nafi insisted that “Islamic illiteracy is widespread in our society … I propose that

every student may not graduate from the elementary stage until after he/she has passed an exam

whereby they can recite the Koran.”333

While Shari’a was an overall goal of the MB, there were

other issues it addressed politically as well.

Women –

329

Ibid, 164. 330

Wickham, the Muslim Brotherhood, 54. 331

Ibid, 58. 332

MB Under the Dome, 87. 333

Ibid, 129.

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The rights of women became one of the causes of friction between the younger and

older members of the MB. The old guard leadership had quite conservative views about women

in society. There was a section within the MB established by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, which was

known as the Muslim Sisters.334

The purpose of the section was to “raise women‟s awareness of

the decrees of their own religion, spread Islamic culture and the MB call among women, and act

as a counter-movement against other destructive ideologies that find appeal among women.335

In

addition to these duties, the Sisters also distributed food and were a means of communication

among the Brothers who were serving time in prison. They also collected money to be

distributed to the families of those Brothers who were in prison.336

However, the Sisters had no

positions on any committees or any other mechanism for delegating responsibilities and all

leadership positions were held by men.337

While Murshid Tilmisani was progressive in getting the MB integrated into

positions of political power, he was very traditional regarding women:

“I do not like to talk about women. Modern people may find this shameful, or

cowardly, but I want nothing to do with modern theories and the equality of men

and women. I still believe that a man is a man and a woman is a woman and that‟s

why God created her … A woman who believes that she is equal to a man is a

woman who has lost her femininity, virtue, and dignity.”338

During the 1984 Assembly, the MP members of the MB lobbied hard for a repeal of

a set of laws known as “Jehan‟s Law.” This was essentially a decree by President Sadat issued in

1979 on behalf of his wife, Jehan, and was a feminist attempt at modifying family law

334

Mariz Tadros. The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined? (London: Routledge, 2012), 116. 335

Ibid. 336

Ibid, 122. 337

Ibid, 117. 338

Quoted in El-Ghobashy, 382.

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(especially divorce) in Egypt. Among the provisions the MB objected to was the requirement

that a man notify his wife of divorce through a court, rather than simply a verbal proclamation.

The MB also rejected the part of the decree that allowed a woman to apply for a divorce on the

grounds of incurring harm by their husbands‟ taking another wife.339

The MB leaders and MPs

objected to these provisions as not being required in Shari’a law. As a relatively easy way to

oblige the MB, the Mubarak regime agreed to weaken or abolish much of the decree in the 1984

Majlis.340

The younger MB members in the syndicates had a different view of the participation

of women and other minorities in society. To effectively work in syndicates, the MB members

had to work to gain the trust of a wide range of professionals representing all parts of society.341

In 1994, they published a pamphlet dealing with the rights of women, among other groups. They

cited the Qur’an to the effect that “men and women are morally equal in the eyes of God because

he considers both to be the offspring of Adam.”342

The pamphlet endorsed “granting women full

equality before the law, the right to vote, and the right to run for public office… a woman may

become a judge, so long as her duties do not „compromise her honor‟.”343

These younger

Brothers could “find nothing in the Shari’a texts which prohibited women from this

participation.”344

The proclamation made in the pamphlet did not come without heated debate

from with the leadership of the MB. The younger members pointed out that countries that denied

those rights to women in general also tended to limit the rights of Islamist candidates. They

339

Tadros, 124. 340

Wickham, 59. 341

Ibid, 59. 342

Bruce K. Rutherford. Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 97. 343

Ibid. 344

Wickham, 70.

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dismissed conservative arguments regarding the mental ability of women and fears that women

would not fulfill their duties at home.345

Copts -

In regards to Copts, the old guard proclaimed that the MB sought to treat them in an

equal fashion. This was not always the case and will be discussed further in the next chapter. Of

the Islamic organizations at the time, the MB had the most accommodating attitude towards the

Copts. This dated back to cordial relations established by the founder, Hasan al-Banna.346

When

asked about any conflict between the MB and Copts, Murshid al-Tilmisani stated:

“Copts in Egypt have occupied positions of ministers and even speaker of the

Majlis. They own buildings and land in which Muslim farmers work. There are

Coptic law offices and medical clinics which treat thousands of Muslims without

any sensitivities, discrimination, or racism. Laws in Egypt are applied to Muslims

and Copts without discrimination.”347

When asked about the possibility of Copts joining any political party that the MB might form,

Al-Tilmisani replied:

“This is possible. If we form a political committee or a cabinet there is no

objection to the presence of a Coptic member. We choose the fittest to work. For

this reason we see that the majority of technicians working in economic

companies owned by the Brotherhood are not Muslims.”348

Mustafa Mashour (speaking as a Deputy Guide in 1995) was quoted as saying:

“We have no objection to the establishment of a Coptic party. This does not

mean, as others have claimed, that this will cause sectarian strife or religious

argument. Our relations with the Copt have been good and without blemish since

345

Ibid. 346

El-Ghobashy, 385. 347

1984 quote in Haydar, 98. 348

“Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Islamic Parties” (text), London Al Majallah, 29 December1984 - 4 January 1985, 36. FBIS Daily Report, 3 January 1985, D2.

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the days of Imam al-Banna. Islam has charted the way to treat them kindly and

fairly.”349

In the 1987 Majlis, Brotherhood MP Mohammed Salim Habib stated, “If you

imagine that Muslims and Copts live in fortified barracks facing each other, this is not true. We

say to our brethren, the Copts: You are part of one fabric and in one trench and on a single ship.

We either are rescued together in a single ship or we all drown, and I ask God to rescue us all

and our beloved Egypt too.”350

The earlier 1994 statement by the younger members of the MB

members in syndicates also included a section regarding Copts:

We the Muslim Brothers always say that we are advocates and not judges, and

thus we do not ever consider compelling anybody to change his belief, in

accordance with God‟s words: “No compulsion in religion.” Our position

regarding our Christian brothers in Egypt and the Arab world is explicit,

established and known: they have the same rights and duties as we do …

Whoever believes or acts otherwise is forsaken by us.351

The MB members striving to increase opportunities to work with other groups saw the Copts as

“partners and brothers in our long struggle to build the nation.”352

One of the internal struggles

the MB had to deal with was whether or not the organization should have its own political party.

MB Political Party

Hasan al-Banna had always been against the idea of parties. He viewed them as

nothing more than organizations of disagreeable politicians.353

As noted in the previous chapter,

349

“Muslim Brotherhood Leader Interviewed” (text), London Al-Hayah, 6 May 1995, 7. Open Source Center website accessed 20 March 2014. 350

Mushin Reda. Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun tahta Qubbat Al-Barlaman: Haqiq wa-Mawaqif [The Muslim Brotherhood under the Dome of the Parliament: Facts and Stands (Cairo: Dar Altawzi wa-Al-Nashr al-Islamiya, no date), 151. 351

Quoted from El-Ghobashy, 385. 352

Rutherford, 97. 353

El-Ghobashy, 383.

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there had been an ongoing discussion regarding the benefit of forming a political party since the

time of President Nasser. Murshid al-Tilmisani, like the previous Supreme Guides, had been

against the idea of forming a political party. He said in 1983 that “The Parties Law has blocked

the Brotherhood from every outlet it might have pursued, but as another matter, the Brotherhood

has never thought of forming its own party, because Islam does not recognize the word

parties.”354

He changed his mind when a legal case he filed in 1977 to allow the MB to become a

lawful organization had not been ruled upon after many years (it never was). As he saw the need

to affiliate with other parties, he became convinced that a political party might be necessary. In

1985, he was quoted in an interview:

“When the door was slammed in our face, out of a desire to express our views, we

thought of following a course that would reflect some of the Muslim Brotherhood

activities … If we have contemplated making preparations to form a party, that is

only one aspect of the brotherhood‟s activities but not its vocation. Although we

do not like to anticipate events, we will submit an application to the parties

committee within two or three months, and are already studying all the conditions

for forming a party.”355

The application was never submitted. After Murshid al-Tilmisani‟s death in 1986, the MB did

raise the issue in the 1987 Majlis. MB member Al-Hudaybi said, “We aspire that the government

would contain a promise to abolish the political parties‟ law that includes restrictions that impede

democratic political development or any attempt to form a new party.”356

This was mainly a

statement made in conjunction with other complaints against the government. There was never

any real MB attempt at forming a political party until the mid-90s. It did not want to be just one

party among many.

354

Wickham, 51. 355

“Muslim Brotherhood Leader Details Future Plans” (text), London Al-Sharq Al-Wast, 18 February 1985, 8. FBIS Daily Report, 22 February 1985, D1. 356

Muhammad Abdallah Khatib, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun that Qubbat al-Barlaman [The Muslim Brotherhood under the Dome of Parliament]. (Cairo: Islamic Distribution and Publishing House, 1990), 45.

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The next three Murshids after Al-Tilmisani all refused the idea of a political party.

They were concerned with the revival of an Islamic order and did not want the activism of the

MB to be reduced to a political party or civic association.357

The MB rejected the separation of

religion and politics and also noted the legal environment as being inhibitive even if it chose to

try and exercise its political rights.358

The younger members of the MB did not agree with the

decision not to form a political party. Because the MB was an illegal organization, they saw its

position as being “in a state of chronic vulnerability to repression and an impediment to its full

integration into the political system.”359

This would lead to internal disagreements within the MB

in 1996, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Economics –

President Sadat sought to reverse the economic policies of his predecessor, President

Nasser, through his “economic opening,” or infitah. This policy invited foreign capital to make

investments in Egypt and foreign trade was also liberalized.360

To accomplish this, Sadat

promulgated Law 65 of 1971 that contained incentives such as „free zones‟ in which foreign

companies could have a five-year exemption from taxes and assurances that businesses would

not be nationalized.361

Sadat also promulgated Law 43 of 1974 that indicated any approved

foreign project would be automatically considered to be part of the private sector, even if there

was participation from Egyptian public sector companies in the venture.362

357

Mariz Tadros. The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined? (London: Routledge, 2012), 73. 358

Ibid. 359

Wickham, 72. 360

Bjorn Olav Utvik, “Filling the Vacant Throne of Nasser: The Economic Discourse of Egypt’s Islamist Opposition” Arab Studies Quarterly. 17, no. 4 (Fall, 1995) 33. 361

Farah, 38. 362

Ibid.

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This led to Egypt‟s relying on external sources of income while it neglected its

agriculture and manufacturing sectors.363

GDP rates did grow, but most of this was attributed to

the exportation of oil during a boom in the 1970s. 364

Other sources of income came from

tourism and remittances from Egyptian migrant workers in other Gulf countries that were also

prospering from the oil boom. This temporary success disguised the structural weakness of the

economy and imports grew at a drastic rate. Foreign indebtedness grew after the fall of oil prices

in 1986 and by 1990, Egypt had become among the leading debtor nations in the world.365

While the country was suffering economically, many members of the MB did quite

well in what became something of an underground Islamic economy. The leadership of the MB

mainly consisted of urban middle class members of the civil service, merchants, and

professionals.366

Under the persecution of President Nasser, a good many of the MB escaped to

other Arab countries and entered into profitable economic enterprises that they continued upon

their return under President Sadat.367

The policy of Sadat‟s infitah and the interests of the

middle-class members of the MB were “complementary and mutually supportive.”368

These MB

members established businesses, Islamic banks, Islamic investment companies, factories, and

health clinics.369

While the MB did not have a monopoly on these endeavors, they did have a

large presence and influence. It was estimated that up to forty percent of all Islamic investment

363

Ibid, 40. 364

Utvik, 33. 365

Ibid. 366

Davut Ates, “Economic Liberalization and Changes in Fundamentalism: The Case of Egypt,” Middle East Policy, 12, no. 4 (Winter, 2005), 137. 367

Ibid. 368

Ibid. 369

Ibid, 138.

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companies “belonged to owners who were either from the MB or who sympathized with its

cause.370

The two main components of the underground economy were the remittances of

Egyptians working in other Arab countries and the institutions like Islamic banks and investment

companies that handled the finances.371

It has been estimated that between 1982 and 1992, the

equivalent of twelve billion U.S. dollars exchanged hands in this manner.372

These dealings were

so successful that in 1985 the Central Bank in Egypt actually had to borrow foreign exchange

from these dealers because of a critical shortage at that time due to falling oil prices.373

The

Islamic banks operated largely outside of Egyptian banking laws and promised large rates of

return to investors.374

These banks dealt in foreign and Egyptian currency and were very

successful in inducing small savings accounts from citizens and also remittances from foreign

workers. The Islamic banks made profits by putting the savings of investors at the service of

borrowers. They did not charge fixed rates to borrowers, but instead shared in the profits or

losses incurred by the borrowers.375

The Egyptian government had something of a dilemma in

dealing with these institutions. On one hand, they operated outside of the laws governing

financial institutions and depositors were at risk. On the other hand, if the government tried to

regulate too much, these institutions could just go elsewhere and the population would blame the

regime.376

370

Al-Awadi. In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 133. 371

Delwin A. Roy, “The Hidden Economy in Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, 28, no.4 (October, 1992), 690. 372

Ibid, 692. 373

Ibid. 374

Ibrahim M. Oweiss. The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1990), 254. 375

Clement Henry Moore, “Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics in the Arab World and Turkey,” The Middle East Journal, 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990), 234. 376

Oweiss, 254.

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The two main Islamic banks were the Islamic International Bank of Investment and

Development (IIBID) and the Faisal Islamic Bank (FIB). Both were founded in 1979 and both

were developed and supported by the MB.377

These banks, as well as the Islamic investment

companies, were major contributors to the MB candidates and the Islamic Alliance in the 1987

elections.378

The MB members who were elected to the Majlis were then often hired as

consultants to these institutions to lend a sense of safety to the populace and investors who

trusted them.379

The major problem with the Egyptian Islamic financial institutions at that time

was that few of their managers had much education in business, but they did possess good

marketing skills.380

Bad business practices led to the receivership of the IIBD in 1985. The FIB was

paying out at lower rates than conventional banks. The government felt compelled to act and

passed law 146 of 1988, which required the companies to “reconstitute themselves as joint-stock

companies, repatriate their funds to Egypt, and submit to supervision by the Capital Markets

Board and independent audits.”381

The legislation was stringently resisted in the Majlis by the

MB. They argued that the law “was anti-Islamic, based on capitalist and socialist notions, and

would only serve the interests of America and Zionism as enemies of Islam.”382

When

interviewed on the topic of Islamic investment companies, Murshid al-Nasr made a disingenuous

statement:

377

Al-Awadi, 69. 378

Gehad Auda, “The Islamic Movement and Resource Mobilization in Egypt: A Political Culture Perspective,” in Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 402. 379

Ibid. 380

Moore, 250. 381

Ibid, 253. 382

Sami Zubaida, “The Politics of the Islamic Investment Companies in Egypt,” British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 17, no.2 (1990), 159.

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“I state frankly that the Brotherhood has nothing to do with the activities or

policies of these companies nor with the way they seek to achieve their objectives.

The campaign launched against these companies was and is still engineered by

those who fight all Islamic trends in the Middle East.”383

After the passage of law 146, the MB started calling for economic independence. It

wanted stronger economic ties with other Arab countries. They did not want to cut off relations

with industrialized nations entirely, but they did want to limit imports to what Egypt could not

produce.384

The MB rejected overtures by the government to obtain loans from the International

Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It viewed those institutions as tools of the United States and

believed it used Egypt‟s debt to force their policies on the country.385

What the MB wanted was

an integrated Arab economy.

In 1990, the Brothers established the Muslim Brothers‟ Economic Committee. They

felt that an economic union could take place between countries with abundant natural resources,

like Iraq and Yemen, as well as abundant human resources, like Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. With

the financial resources of the oil states, the MB believed that this would liberate Egypt from

dependence on the outside world.386

The MB also believed strongly that this could be

accomplished through privatization of most means of production.387

Views on social and economic issues were just some of the aspects that led to an

irreconcilable split between the MB and the Mubarak regime. There were also splits within the

383

“Muslim Brotherhood Leader Interviewed” (text), London Al-Majallah, 27 July – 2 August 1988, 11. FBIS Daily Report, 1 August 1988, 14. 384

Utvik, 45. 385

Utvik, 46. 386

Ibid. 387

Mustafa Kamel Al Sayyid. “Privatization: The Egyptian Debate,” Cairo Papers in Social Science, 13, no.4 (Winter 1990), 51.

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MB that would reveal a sometimes dysfunctional organization. These issues will be discussed in

the next chapter.

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Chapter Three388

Differences within the MB

The year 1995 was a turning point in the interaction of the Mubarak regime and the MB.

Violence attributed to Islamic groups had increased steadily over the previous three years,

including the use of assassinations of former prominent members of the Majlis as well as high-

ranking police officials, the former prime minister, and the ministers of interior and information.

There was even an assassination attempt on President Mubarak when he traveled to Ethiopia in

1995.389

Combined with the recent political success of the MB, the Mubarak regime felt it was

time to halt the advance of the Brothers.

In late 1995, the regime started arresting some of the younger members of the MB who

had become successful in the professional syndicates and trying them in military courts.390

These

included officials of the Physicians‟ Syndicate, the Engineers‟ Syndicate, and university

professors. The regime also closed the MB headquarters in Cairo, which had been open since

1972.391

President Mubarak was quoted as saying:

“I must tell you, this whole problem of terrorism throughout the Middle East is a

by-product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood … they all spring from

underneath the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood. They say they have

renounced violence, but in reality they are responsible for all the violence, and the

time will come when they will be uncovered.”392

Fifty-four MB members were sentenced to hard labor the week before the 1995 parliamentary

elections took place. Most of these members were from the more moderate wing of the MB and

388

Wickham, 78. 389

Cook, 204. 390

Rutherford, 87, 391

Ibid, 88. 392

Quoted in Wickham, 79.

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some of its most experienced leaders. The regime had already successfully marginalized the

Brothers in some of the syndicates by putting the organizations under government control and

eliminated MB members from participation in the Majlis. These actions made internal dissension

within the MB more noticeable.

Murshid al-Nasr died in January, 1996 and was immediately succeeded by Mustafa

Mashour in what became known as “the graveyard pledge.”393

This was because the senior

members present at the funeral simply gave Mashour their oath of allegiance. This was seen by

the younger members as leadership blocking any kind of reform within the MB.394

This

unorthodox method of selecting the Supreme Guide did not even follow the understood

agreement of the eldest member taking the position. When asked about this, Mashour said:

“For nearly two years I have been performing many of the guide‟ duties in view

of Murshid al-Nasr‟s health. After his death, the Brothers chose me as their guide.

Many of the duties had been delegated to me … The group‟s system stipulates

that the guide should be succeeded by the eldest member temporarily, to avert

disputes among the leaders until they agree on the new guide. The decision to

choose me was unanimous and swift, and there were no disputes.”395

Mashour was seventy-five when he became Murshid. As mentioned in the previous chapter, he

had been a member of the Secret Apparatus and had served ten years in prison in the Nasser

regime. He came from a wealthy family and had done well in business when he was out of the

country in the early 1980s, developing business connections throughout the Gulf region.396

He

was conservative and did not alleviate apprehensions about the MB in the Coptic community

when he made inflammatory statements regarding Copts in the military. He indicated that they

393

Pargeter, 50. 394

Ibid. 395

“New MB Leader Interviewed on Duties, Egyptian Government’ (text), London Al-Hayah, 24 January 1996, Open Source Center. 396

Bjorn O. Utvik. The Pious Road to Development: Islamist Economics in Egypt (London: Hurst & Company, 2006),

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might have divided loyalties when it came to defending an Islamic country from its enemies and

suggested they should not serve in the armed forces. He proposed they pay jizya or a religious

tax that historically had been levied against Christians and Jews living in Muslim countries.397

He was quoted as saying:

“Instead of Copts defending themselves, the Muslims will defend them and take

jizya in exchange. It is merely a tax for their defense and could be paid out of state

funds in the case of those who could not afford it.”398

Though these statements were walked back, they resonated not only with Copts, but with the

reformist branch of the MB. They felt that leadership not only restricted their involvement in the

MB, but also did not reflect the changing society in which they wanted to integrate. This resulted

in some of the Brothers looking elsewhere for political involvement.

Wasat Party –

The Wasat party was an attempt by the younger members of the MB to establish a

political party that would be welcoming to people of different views and faiths. The concept was

heavily influenced by an informal movement that developed in the late 1980s in Egypt, the

Wasatiyya (Centrists). This group of journalists, professionals, and more recent members of the

MB were drawn to Islamic writers and thinkers who were interested in “outwardly expanding the

boundaries of moderate Islamism.”399

This group wanted to craft a democratic political order that

397

“Copts-out-of-army remarks show ‘ugly face’ of Egypt’s Moslem Brothers,” Mideast Mirror, 14 April 1997. 398

Ibid. 399

Joshua A. Stacher, “Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party” The Middle East Journal, 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002), 417.

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included the participation of Muslims and Christians and a protection of their rights.400

These

concepts resonated with many of the MB members serving in the professional syndicates.

The MB used its influence in the syndicates to sponsor conferences to address topics such

as “poverty, unemployment, freedom and development, and terrorism.”401

In 1994, there was a

major effort to initiate a national dialog to work on a National Pact that would work on political

reform for Egypt. Future Murshid Ma‟mun al-Hudaybi represented the MB and refused to sign

the draft document.402

This experience was a bitter disappointment to the younger MB members

and marked the beginning of a philosophical split within the organization. Later that year, there

was a more vigorous attempt at forming a National Charter that would represent consensus for

constitutional and political reform.403

Al-Hudaybi participated in this ten-month endeavor as

well. He would not sign this document because it did not mention religion or Shari’a law. Only

six of the twelve committee members signed off on the document and the initiative collapsed.404

This irritated MB members like Abu Ala Madhi, who was a member of the Engineers‟

Syndicate and one of the founders of the Wasat Party. He viewed this behavior as a hindrance in

the attempt to work with others as well as a reinforcement of the perception that the MB was

becoming an obstacle to democratic reform.405

Madhi and other like-minded Brothers had grown

tired of the arrogant and dictatorial attitude of the MB Guidance Bureau as represented by older

members, like al-Hudaybi. The newsletter for the Engineers‟ Syndicate produced an article

critical of the older MB members in the Bureau that essentially said they should restrict their

400

Ibid. 401

Bjorn O. Utvik, “Hizb al-Wasat and the Potential for Change in Egyptian Islamism,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 14, no. 3 (Fall 2005), 299. 402

Ibid, 300. 403

Wickham, 85. 404

Ibid, 86. 405

Ibid.

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participation to being advisors.406

Madhi decided it was time to transfer the success of the

Brothers in the syndicates to the political realm. He was quoted as saying, “We were running the

syndicates like political parties. This was never our intention. It just turned out that way.”407

In

early 1996, Madhi and sixty-two members of the MB resigned from the organization and applied

to the Egyptian Political Parties Committee (PPC) for legal party status as the Wasat Party.408

The party was started to be inclusive of the various progressive groups in Egypt.

The spokesman for the party was Rafiq Habib, a sociologist and Copt. He said that Egypt

was in a political and economic crisis that allowed sectarianism to expand.409

Habib said that the

Wasat Party would create common ground between Muslim and non-Muslim, exclude theology

from socioeconomic and political areas, and rid the political conversation of vague slogans.410

Yet, Shari’a law was still something the party considered to be a factor in the formulation of

legislation.411

Madi was quoted as saying, “Shari’a is very simply a collection of guiding

principles, which should be put to a free interpretation in order to adapt them to a world in the

process of change.”412

The Wasat Party believed that Shari’a “can be viewed as a tool to

facilitate modernity if interpreted properly by democratically elected religious officials.”413

The

party believed it was important to define:

“religious values that must guide society … vital distinctions must be made

between what is permanent and what is unchanging … what must change as

society changes, and what is incumbent on Muslims and what is incumbent on all

406

Pargater, 50. 407

Geneive Abdo. No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 99. 408

Stacher, 422. 409

Meir Hatina, “The ‘Other Islam’: The Egyptian Wasat Party,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 14, no.2 (Summer, 2005), 173. 410

Ibid. 411

Stacher, 426. 412

Quote Ibid. 413

Ibid.

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citizens … and between those issues directly regulated by the Shari’a and the vast

field of human activity that falls within the neutral category of the permitted.”414

The Wasat Party was not well received by anyone. President Mubarak thought of the

party as being a branch of the MB hiding behind the „façade of democracy.‟ He also indicated

that the participation of Copts was merely a „decoration.‟415

Equal criticism came from the

Coptic clergy and politicians. They viewed the Wasat Party as “creating internal strife in the

Coptic community and assisting the Islamists in their campaign against the state.”416

The MB

was wary of antagonizing the government and feared internal splits within the organization. It

denied any connection to the Wasat Party and denounced the MB members who joined the

Wasat as violating their sacred allegiance to the MB and seeking exposure through the media.417

The application to the PPC to form a political party in 1996 was rejected. More than a

few of the MB members participating in the Wasat returned to the Brothers, but Madhi and

several of his closest advisors resigned permanently from the MB.418

An appeal in 1998 to the

PPC was also rejected. The PPC stated that the Wasat Party “failed to add anything new to the

existing political parties.”419

A final appeal in 2000 was refused again, but this time the Wasat

also filed for status as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) at the same time. This resulted in

the PPC approving the Egypt for Culture and Dialogue organization.420

This Wasat-oriented

NGO held workshops, seminars, and meetings to keep communication open among different

groups and the Islamic political project. It allowed intellectuals to participate without being

414

Utvik, 302-03. 415

Hatina, 174. 416

Ibid. 417

Ibid, 175. 418

Utvik, 296. 419

Stacher, 422. 420

Ibid, 423.

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connected to the party.421

The government was willing to allow Islamic culture, as long as it did

not cross into political activity.422

The NGO also had to promise to finance the organization

through donations and membership dues while not obtaining financing from any international

assistance.423

After a wait of fifteen years, the Wasat Party was eventually granted status as a

legitimate political party just days after the overthrow of President Mubarak in February,

2011.424

Murshid Mashour was restrained in how he allowed former MB members who had joined

the Wasat to return to the Brothers in 1996. While making it clear that they had violated rules

and acted independently of the MB, he wanted to avoid any more tension with the regime and

within the MB.425

Mashour knew that the chances of the Wasat being granted political party

status were non-existent and that the Brothers who were participating in the Wasat were trying to

distance themselves from the MB to increase their chances of getting approval from the PPC.426

The Brothers who did not immediately return to the MB were tried and imprisoned for a time on

charges of conspiring to create a party that was nothing more than a front for the MB. These

Brothers, including Madhi, did not return to the MB. In an interview several years later, Madhi

described his displeasure with the MB:

“We were trying to express a new and sophisticated vision from within the

Brotherhood. Unfortunately, we always clashed with a closed and narrow-minded

vision. Finally we defected from the group to express our own views.

Unfortunately, people see the brotherhood as a group with a mature political

experience, when actually it is not. The leadership of the Brotherhood do not have

421

Ibid. 422

Ibid. 423

Ibid. 424

“Egypt’s Wasat Party Becomes Official Legitimate Political Party after 15 Years” (text) The Middle East Reporter, 21 February 2011. Accessed through ProQuest database 28 May 2014. 425

Tal, 74. 426

Ibid.

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a mature political vision. The weakest part in the Brotherhood‟s structure is the

head. The deterioration at the top is worsening.”427

The impact of the Wasat party on the MB organization was minimal. It did not change

the structure or power base of the MB. It could best be described as a split in the younger

membership and left only a weakened reformist movement in the organization.428

Senior leaders

of the MB indicated that forming a political party would only dilute the mission of religious

outreach to society and lead to government control of the Brothers.429

Changes in the Supreme Guide –

Murshid Mashour was the leader of the MB from early 1996 until his death in 2002.

During that time the fortunes of the MB began to ebb. The strides it had made in the political

arena were countered by the Mubarak regime. Mashour faced the first open rebellion within the

movement with the Wasat party. While it was dealt with, it did not stop the resentment that was

building from the more progressive and younger members of the MB. His successor, Murshid al-

Hudaybi was eighty-one years old when he became Supreme Guide and died fourteen months

later. He had been the man behind the scenes and kept the conservative ideology intact for the

organization, even to the point of alienating the reformists. When he died in early 2004,

Mohammed Mahdi Akef became the Supreme Guide.

Murshid Akef was seventy-six years old when he took over as leader of the MB. He had

also been in the Secret Apparatus and was jailed under President Nasser and released twenty-

427

“Former Member Says MB Politically Immature” (text) 7 August 1999, 19. Open Source Center website accessed 20 March 2014. 428

Wickham, 93. 429

Ibid, 94.

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three years later in the Sadat regime.430

Despite his conservative credentials, he was at least open

to some of the ideas of the younger members of the MB in their desire for political integration.

2000 Parliamentary Elections –

In July 2000, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the 1995 parliamentary

elections (as well as previous elections) were invalid because they were supervised in an

unconstitutional manner.431

This did not invalidate legislation passed during those parliaments,

however.432

The court ruled that Article 88 of the 1971 constitution had been violated when it

allowed nonjudiciary members to share in the supervision of elections.433

For the 2000 election,

the judiciary would not only monitor the voting, but also the counting of votes.

The MB chose to participate by running independent candidates, but only a limited

number. Predictably, the regime harassed those candidates and their supporters. Twenty MB

candidates were arrested just a few day before the election and over one thousand supporters of

the MB were also arrested.434

Still, the MB managed to elect seventeen members to the Majlis.435

It was the largest single opposition group in parliament. There was a conscious effort by this

parliamentary bloc to limit the call for Shari’a and instead concentrate on economics and

democratic reform. Despite the limited opportunities for reform in the Majlis, there were other

outside groups that were also clamoring for change.

Kefaya –

430

Mon Salem, “Muslim Brotherhood Old Guard and Reformers Compromise on New Leadership” (text) Agence France 14 January 2000, accessed through LexisNexis. 431

Kienle, 172. 432

Ibid. 433

Kassem, 63. 434

Wickham, 98. 435

Ibid.

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The Egyptian Movement for Change (EMC) was a political force that coalesced in 2003

and was also known by its popular name, Kefaya (Arabic for “enough”). It was loosely

composed of mainly secular and leftist groups who had formed several years earlier to show

solidarity with the second Palestinian intifada.436

When the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, this group

became inflamed over Cairo‟s unwillingness to do much about the invasion of a Muslim country

and staged an authorized protest in the city‟s Liberation Square.437

The critique by Kefaya

regarding Iraq evolved into a disparaging of President Mubarak and his presumed dynastic

intentions to put his son, Gamal, into the office of the presidency upon his retirement.438

This

was a significant political moment and completely eliminated the tacit understanding between

the regime and political parties that no criticism would be directed against the president

personally.439

The Kefaya movement also had political elements of the far right participating in its

actions. What the left and right had in common was the experience of coming of age in the 1970s

and a mistrust of the older political elite in Egypt.440

The search for common ground that had

been started tentatively with the Wasat party in the 1990s became a more determined attempt at

reaching a consensus among the disparate groups.441

Kefaya had its first street protest in

December 2004. It was relatively small and with one message:” No to the extension (of

Mubarak‟s presidency), no to the inheritance of power.”442

The group continued to stage small

436

Steven A. Cook. The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 241. 437

Ibid. 438

Ibid. 439

Mariz Tadros. The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined? (London: Routledge, 2012), 27. 440

Manar Shorbagy, “Understanding Kefaya: The New Politics in Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 29, no. 1 (Winter, 2007), 40. 441

Ibid, 44. 442

Wickham, 109.

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demonstrations throughout the spring of 2005. While the demonstrations generally consisted of a

few hundred to a couple of thousand protestors, Kefaya was disciplined about the non-violent

actions of the participants.443

The MB was caught off guard by this small group of secular dissidents that was garnering

a lot of attention with its message. While a few of the Brothers were already actively

participating, the senior leaders were confronted with the problem of mobilizing the MB

members and risking a harsh response from the regime or sitting out protests and alienating

younger members.444

The MB decided it would participate, but on a limited scale. It did not want

to mobilize the large crowds it was capable of putting into the streets and overwhelming Kefaya.

The two organizations decided upon a new political tactic in utilizing the recent growth of new

Arab media.445

The Kefaya movement kept its message uniform and simple. No more Mubarak and no

dynastic presidency. While the crowds it generated were not large, they were made for the

visuals of satellite television and the internet. They included not only women, but minority

groups as well. Messages were generated and repeated on websites and blogs.446

The main

contribution of Kefaya to the political process was exposing the regime‟s monopoly on power by

its encouragement of strident divisions among the opposition.447

The coalition was never likely

to produce a party or platform because of the diverse nature of the participants. By coming

together on a simple message of no more Mubarak, it did lead to an interesting 2005 election.

443

Ibid, 110. 444

Ibid, 111. 445

Yoram Meital, “The Struggle over Political Order in Egypt: The 2005 Elections,” The Middle East Journal, (Spring, 2006), 269. 446

Ibid. 447

Shorbagy, 54.

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2005 presidential and parliamentary election –

In February of 2005, President Mubarak declared that Egypt would have its first presidential

election with multiple candidates.448

This not only eased some of the domestic critics of the

regime, but also was seen as a nod to pressure being applied by the United States for a more

democratic environment in Egypt.449

The Majlis passed a constitutional amendment that limited

candidacy to those who could gather the support of at least 250 members of the People‟s

Assembly, Shura Council, and Municipal Councils nationwide.450

This made it almost

impossible for independent candidates, and especially members of the MB, to enter the race.

Many opposition parties and rights organizations protested the charade, as did over 1200

judges.451

At first, the MB decided to boycott the elections. The environment, however, seemed

conducive to a successful election and Murshid Akef decided to participate. Still, the MB stood

only about 160 candidates for election, and “none in districts where senior government

candidates were running.”452

It also made sure that there was no possibility of challenging the

two-thirds majority held by the ruling NDP party in parliament.453

Once again state repression

against the MB prevailed and thousands of Brothers were arrested. Despite this, the MB won

eighty-eight seats in the Majlis, and could easily have won more had it decided to run more

candidates for election.454

In typical fashion, the regime promptly passed a constitutional

448

Tamir Moustafa. The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 210. 449

Ibid. 450

Ibid. 451

Ibid, 212. 452

Wickham, 117. 453

Ibid. 454

Moustafa, 215.

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amendment that would not allow any political party based on religion, essentially ending the

opportunity for the MB to run in the next parliamentary election.455

Economics -

While in the Majlis after the 2000 and 2005 elections, the MB members called

attention to the economic shortcomings of the regime by making numerous inquiries regarding

budget proposals and tax revenues.456

The MB bloc voted against all annual budgets from 2000

to 2005 because they failed to increase tax revenues or decrease budget deficits.457

The Brothers

tried to create Islamic banking supervision to run Islamic banks differently than commercial

banks and introduced an alms law to oblige Egyptian Muslims to give regular taxes to Islamic

banks, but both of these proposals were defeated.458

The MB members were not against the government when it attempted to privatize

public assets, but they did criticize the process.459

They felt that public-sector banks and other

“strategic assets” should be sold only to Egyptian investors and not below value. The Brothers

also continually lobbied for an increase in the budget for education and the hiring of more

teachers, along with an increase in benefits, but to no avail.460

These setbacks did not discourage

the MB from looking forward politically.461

MB Party Platform –

455

Ibid. 456

Amr Hamzawy and Nathan J. Brown, “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist Participation in a Closing Political Environment.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2010, 22. 457

Ibid. 458

Ibid, 26. 459

Rutherford, 185. 460

Ibid. 461

Ibid.

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In late summer, 2007, the MB circulated a draft party platform to intellectuals and

analysts regarding what kind of party it would formulate, if ever allowed to do so by the

regime.462

The document articulated in more detail than previously what it would do regarding

political, social, and economic issues and was very different from the usual vague slogans and

repetitive quotes it had given over the years.463

While the MB had declared off and on since the

mid-1980s that might establish a political party, it had never devoted this much time and effort

into what that party might actually look like.

The platform was more revealing and gave the public at large a chance to critique its

political motives.464

There was still considerable division within the MB over whether to even

form a party. It was felt by the more conservative Brothers that the party would never receive

official recognition. There was also the perennial fear that a political party would detract from

the missionary work of the MB and erode its grassroots support.465

The platform was not

endorsed either by the MB Guidance Office or by Murshid Akef.466

It was emphasized that this

was only a way of sharing ideas and getting feedback on the best political direction for the

MB.467

While more detailed than anything released before, it did raise some questions with

critics. The document recognized the legitimacy of the existing structure of the Majlis and

Supreme Constitutional Court to reconcile new legislation with Shari’a law, but it also

462

Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray into Political Integration or Retreat into Old Positions?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2008, 1. 463

Ibid. 464

Khalil El-Anani. “Brotherhood Scenarios” (text), Cairo Al-Ahram Weekly 13 September 2007, Open Source Center. 465

Ibid. 466

Rutherford, 182. 467

Ibid.

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established a council of religious scholars.468

This council “would be elected by the full

complement of religious scholars in the country and serve to advise the legislative and executive

branches in matters of religious law.”469

Critics thought this was too much like the Council of

Guardians in Iran who “could veto laws from a democratically elected parliament.”470

First

Deputy of the MB General Guide Muhammad Habib tried to alleviate concerns about the

council:

“It is a consultative committee that could be part of al-Azhar University and the

parliament could use it as a consultant. Of course, the parliament would have the

final decision which could be appealed to the Supreme Constitutional Court …

should parliament pass legislation thought incompatible with the freedoms

guaranteed by the constitution.”471

This was only one of the provisions that provoked a fierce backlash within and without the

organization. The platform also made it clear that women and non-Muslims (Copts) were to be

excluded from senior positions in the state.472

Islamic leaders, whether rulers or high officials,

undertake some religious functions and traditional authority held that the leader needed to be

Muslim and male.473

Deputy Guide Habib indicated that:

“The MB Guidance Bureau has decided that non-Muslims or women should not

hold the position of head of state. This was our jurist opinion which we have

sponsored and we are committed to this view. If the people turn down the

platform, we will have to try to convince them and to explain the reasons why we

have made such a decision.”474

468

Cook, 188. 469

Brown, 4. 470

Wickham, 124. 471

“Egypt’s Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integration?” Middle East/North Africa Report International Crisis Group no.76 (June 2008), 17. 472

Brown, 5. 473

Ibid. 474

“Egypt: MB Leader Details Discussion of MB Political Party Platform” (text), Cairo Ikwhanonline, 16 November 2007, Open Source Center.

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This was not well received by women, Copts, or the younger members of the MB. They

responded with strident words and actions of their own.

In December, 2007 a letter was drafted by women who were members of the MB

addressed to Murshid Akef and submitted through the MB website. It was submitted this way

only after trying several times to send it through official internal channels. It demanded:

“the right to be nominated for membership of the Guidance Bureau … and for

their roles to be expanded and given the right to promotion within the

organizational pyramid, to join the political and information committees,

participate in the internal elections, and choose the MB officials, including the

general guide.”475

The organization countered with a statement from the female candidate it ran in the 2000

parliamentary elections, Jihan al-Hilfawi. She indicated that “the role of women inside the

organization does not differ much from their role in society at large; it is to a great extent a

privileged one.”476

Even the somewhat progressive Essam al-Erian wrote in a statement posted

on the website that:

“The status of women within the movement is good and surpasses the general

status of women in Egyptian society as a whole. She enjoys appreciation and

respect within the organization, and we listen to all views and discussions that

take place on this issue. There is some exaggeration by some women writers …

particularly since most of them are young and lack experience. They do not

represent an overwhelming current inside the movement.”477

As for the relegation of Copts to a lower participation in the political arena, Murshid Akef was

quoted by a journalist as saying, “It would be preferable for a Malaysian Muslim to be president,

475

Mustafa Sulayman “MB Women Protest Marginalization of Roles, Demand Rights” (text), Al-Arabiyah 17 December 2007, Open Source Center. 476

Ibid. 477

Ibid.

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than a Christian Egyptian.”478

A leading Coptic businessman, Najib Sawiras, was then quoted as

saying:

“No Christian in Egypt expects the MB to condescend to grant a Copt the right to

become president. This is because we, Copts, do not wait for anyone to teach us

the rights of citizenship. Copts are Egyptians, just like the Muslims. The MB has

no right to distribute posts and give itself the authority to grant or withhold the

post of president. If it has given itself this right, all I can say is that we reject

this.”479

The uproar of the exclusionary language regarding women and Copts caused a genuine

split in the MB. Some saw the most insensitive aspects as a political distraction. It was viewed as

something with little benefit to the MB since the likelihood of a woman or a Copt attaining the

presidency in a country where the population was predominately Muslim was quite remote.480

One of the younger Brothers was quoted as saying:

“The program was drafted in a very hasty way and without consultation … the

Society should apologize for it because now we are stuck with the image of a very

negative program … it fails to tackle the issue of how to exist as a group in Egypt.

If we are to be a major presence, then we must make some major decisions.” 481

When the MB leaders accused the younger members of backwardness and triviality, those

younger MB members who used social media established a lampoon of the official MB website,

Ikhwanonline, with their own website, Ikhwanoffline.482

It was established because the official

478

International Crisis Group, 17. 479

“Egyptian Christian Figure Criticizes Muslim Brotherhood over Presidency” (text), Al-Misri al-Yawm, 07 November 2007, Open Source Center. 480

Brown, 5. 481

Quoted in International Crisis Group, 18. 482

“Analysis: Egyptian Bloggers Emerge as Opposition Voice,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring January 9, 2008, accessed through LexisNexis March 20, 2014.

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website had made many “professional mistakes.” Though nothing came of it, another group of

MB bloggers even established a parallel MB Guidance Office to elect a younger Murshid.483

The split among the Brothers regarding the platform was not just generational. The

conservative wing was led by Deputy Guide Habib, who defended the platform and the most

controversial elements of the document.484

A more moderate element, led by Abd Abu al-Futuh,

criticized not only those controversial elements, but the entire process of putting the platform

together. These members indicated there was little or no consultation, let alone an attempt at

consensus among the Brothers.485

Deputy Guide Habib responded that:

“We did not aim to refer the platform to all members of the MB Group, but to the

administrative bureaus. We had to complete this assignment as quickly as possible

or it would have turned into a pure media incitement and fireworks. We were

eager to complete this matter quickly and submit it to the largest possible

members of the MB group.”486

Former MB member of the Majlis, Gamal Hishmat, contended:

“The controversial points were not raised in the preliminary discussions and

dialogues during the consideration of the document that would be announced as

the movement‟s draft platform. In no way does it represent the opinion of the

entire Brotherhood or its branches which were deprived of the opportunity to see

the program or comment on what was in it. I had earlier expressed my objection

to the Brotherhood, but that opinion was not accepted.”487

483

Ibid. 484

Brown, 7. 485

Ibid. 486

“Egypt: MB Leader Details Discussion of MB Political Party Platform” (text) Ikhwanonline, 15 November 2007, Open Source Center. 487

Quoted in Brown, 8.

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Even the head of the MB bloc in the Majlis at that time, Saa‟d al-Katatni, indicated that the

opinion of the organization‟s parliamentarians had not been considered.488

This led the two camps into what was described as a “fatwa war,” in which both sides

sought religious authorities to support their positions regarding women, Copts, and the religious

council.489

The moderate camp shared the views of the prominent religious authority, Yusif al-

Qaradawi, who indicated that there are no positions in traditional Shari’a law that prohibit

women or Copts from holding leadership positions and that there was no need for a religious

council when there was a Supreme Constitutional Court.490

Deputy Guide Habib mentioned

several times that the Guidance Bureau had consulted with numerous religious authorities on the

draft and their opinion was that women and Copts were not suitable for ministerial positions.491

This public disagreement regarding the political platform brought out the main issue for the

reformist camp and the younger generation in the MB. One senior MB member in the reformist

wing noted:

“The current leadership consists of people who have experienced only torture in

prison, and they have become so paranoid they have a single view on everything.

The leadership needs to be younger, with a more representative experience. At the

moment most of the leadership is too conservative, focused on protecting itself

rather than the future of the Society. This closed-minded group is not the

dominant view in the MB, but it is in power.”492

Murshid Akef decided in January of 2008 to suspend working on the platform. In March of that

year Deputy Guide Habib said:

488

Ibid. 489

Ibid, 9. 490

Ibid. 491

Ibid. 492

Quoted in International Crisis Group, 18.

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“We decided the platform should be briefer and much more cohesive. There will

be addenda dealing with separate issues, with each item under the responsibility

of a different committee. But for now, we decided to resolve the debate by means

of democracy. We voted and now every member has agreed to adhere to the

decision.”493

While the platform itself was essentially shelved in 2008, it made another appearance

in 2011, after the fall of President Mubarak. When the MB established the Freedom and Justice

Party as its first political party, it basically dusted off the old platform from 2007.494

While

inclined to do away with the religious council, it still kept the stance against women and Copts

from running for president.495

The MB party platform was the most visible aspect of conflict within the

organization. In October, 2009 Murshid Akef tried to include some of the reformist Brothers on

the Guidance Bureau, but was rebuffed by the old guard. At eighty-one, he decided he had

enough of the infighting and became the first Supreme Guide to resign from the MB. He was

succeeded in January 2010 by Mohamed Bade. He was sixty-six when chosen and a veterinarian

by trade. He was a conservative who ran the indoctrination section of the MB.496

This

consolidated the power of the more rigid conservative MB members and there were even

accusations of a flawed electoral procedure by the reformists.497

It was a conservative MB that was in place in September, 2010 just before

parliamentary elections. President Mubarak had disbanded or neutralized all secular opposition

493

Ibid. 494

“Egypt Muslim Brotherhood Said to be Amending Platform of Planned Political Party” (text), London Al-Hayat 2 March 2011, Open Source Center. 495

Ibid. 496

“Which Way Now? The Muslim Brothers’ New Leader” (text) The Economist, 23 January 2010. Open Source Center. 497

Ibid.

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and the MB was the only group left with any organization. The MB was restrained in criticizing

Mubarak and this led to some reformist Brothers to resign.498

Secular opposition groups that

were left were also disappointed by the MB‟s lack of protest or willingness to boycott the

upcoming elections.499

This was the scenario before the February, 2011 uprising that led to the

removal of President Mubarak.

498

“Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Stands Alone: Islamic Group is Careful not to overtly Challenge the Government’s Power” (text), International Herald Tribune, 7 September 2010 – Open Source Center. 499

Ibid.

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Chapter Four

Conclusions and Implications

In discussing the various hypotheses submitted in the first chapter, it is better to consider

degrees of cooperation between the Supreme Guides and the members of the MB regarding

participation in the People‟s Assembly and professional syndicates. The MB has always been,

first and foremost, a social movement intent on spreading the benefits of Islam and Shari’a to

Egypt and other Muslim countries. Earlier in its existence, violence was a seen as a means of

dealing with the government and with other organizations that differed from the MB. When

violence was renounced by the organization, it sought other ways to influence government. The

only available means were through parliament and syndicates.

The MB members who entered parliament were chosen by the MB Guidance Bureau and

towed the line of the Supreme Guide. Because they were never a legitimate political party, those

members could engage in long, rhetorical attacks against the regime that echoed what the

Murshids were saying. Entering the professional syndicates required more of a political

engagement to participate successfully. The MB members elected in syndicates were proficient

at organization and brought economic benefits to the syndicates that had been previously lacking.

Their success was due more to efficiency than to Islamic messages. They were also of a younger

generation that had been enticed to join the MB, but were not nearly as hard-lined as the older

leaders.

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Did the MB attempt to follow through on what it proclaimed to the public when participating in

the Majlis and syndicates?

The preponderance of information would indicate that yes, the MB did try to follow

through on proclamations in whatever venue they happened to occupy.

Have members of the MB acted as a bloc when participating in the parliament or syndicates?

There is little indication that MB members acted independently or against the wishes of

the Supreme Guide.

Have MB members of parliament or syndicates acted differently under different general guides?

While some Supreme Guides were a bit more progressive in their outlook as to how to

best take political advantages, they were all conservative in their leadership. Some MB members

who were of the more reformist bent and working in syndicates tried to influence treatment of

women and Copts as well as to show the Murshids how working with other segments of society

could be beneficial, but they still operated in the bounds set for them. When they disagreed to the

extent it would have caused too much disruption, they simply left the MB.

This background information shows that the hypothesis that the MB did not always act as

a bloc in accordance with the proclamations of its leaders in the Majlis and that its members also

did not act in unison when participating in syndicates is incorrect. Actually, the members of the

MB did mainly act in accordance with the proclamations of the Murshids. The constant drumbeat

for Shari’a law in all societal aspects was demonstrated in parliament and syndicates. There was

a more nuanced approach in syndicates as the Brothers genuinely tried working with other

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98

secular and Islamist members to achieve benefits. This did not reach the level of defiance of the

Supreme Guides.

The first alternate hypothesis – the MB did mainly abide by the proclamations of its

leaders in Parliament and acted in unison while participating in syndicates would seem to be the

most plausible.

The second alternate hypothesis – the MB acted uniformly in the Majlis and acted

dutifully in syndicates, but in one or the other acted apart from the proclamations of the MB

leadership does not match the evidence.

Implications –

Throughout its history, the MB has periodically been branded as a terrorist organization

by the three presidents of Egypt before 2011. These incidents seemed to have coincided with the

perceived political threat that the MB presented at any particular time, even though it was never

an organized political party. When political violence against a regime occurred, the MB was

conveniently grouped rhetorically with more militaristic Islamists. The organization itself has not

engaged in violence for quite a while.

In early 2011, the leadership of the MB was as conservative as it had been since 2004

when Murshid al-Hudaybi was in charge of the organization. During that time of societal unrest

across the political spectrum, the MB started losing some of its reformist members who saw

opportunities to participate in an emerging environment that had not previously been available to

them. Rather than trying to work within the Society and fighting the conservative leadership,

they simply left. When President Mubarak was deposed in 2011, the old guard running the MB

reflected the way the MB was to lead the Egyptian government when it came to power.

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99

The MB was in the perfect position to assume power with the departure of President

Mubarak. It was a known entity with a presence throughout Egypt and it had excellent

organizational skills. It did not have to compromise its beliefs or appeal to a political base in

order to get elected. This lack of give and take usually necessary to obtain political power was

evident in the way the Brothers worked more on consolidating power when in office than

building coalitions and including different points of view.

The MB itself was deposed and is once again going through a period of massive

disruption from the government elected in July, 2014. Arrests and military trials are the norm

and the organization is at its weakest since the assassination of President Sadat. While many MB

members are being harassed and imprisoned, they are still interwoven into the societal structure

of Egypt. Many of them are professionals and they still carry out charitable deeds in which the

government has not shown an inclination to engage. It is the stated intention of the new regime to

eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt. This will be easier said than done. The MB has

demonstrated that it takes the long view in its quest for an Islamic country and will not be

disposed of easily. It has operated in the open and secretly over the years. It has many

connections and resources at its disposal.

Policy recommendations –

With the desired goal of fostering democratic practices in Egypt, the United States should

encourage the new regime to be less malevolent towards the MB. The Brothers are but one

segment of society and are not much of a political threat to the regime, given its demonstrated

incompetence when running the government. By labeling the MB “terrorists” the new Egyptian

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100

government lessens its ability to protect itself against a genuine violent Islamic threat in the

Sinai.

The United States should also monitor Egyptian non-governmental organizations and

charitable associations. It is in these institutions that the Brothers who are not imprisoned or

exiled to another country are likely to take refuge. They have participated for decades in assisting

the needy and will continue this practice. The more MB resources that are dedicated to these

endeavors, the less chance there is for the organization to turn towards violence.

While monitoring Islamic economic institutions may not be easy, it is another venue in

which the MB will participate. It is also the most likely way the Brothers would associate with

Islamic organizations that skew towards violence, should the MB choose to abandon its pledge

of non-violence. It is also a way to keep a degree of separation for the MB away from violence

while utilizing its ability to affect the Egyptian government.

It would behoove the United States government to monitor the Society of Muslim

Brothers, if it reconstitutes itself again into a viable organization. While it has not shown that it is

ready to change from a social movement or to accept the compromise necessary to become a

valid political party, it has always shown great resilience to adversity and deep faith in its beliefs.

Whether this manifests itself into a return to violence that it renounced years ago remains to be

seen.

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101

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