GeopoliticalBriefing 200109 E · President Trumps’ decision not launch retalia tory strikes for...
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Economics and Strategy Geopolitical Briefing January 9, 2020 Iran – U.S.: Has war been averted? By Angelo Katsoras Introduction The drone strike that killed General Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force commander and one of the most powerful figures in his country, marks one of the highest tension points in the decades-old rivalry between the United States and Iran. As the barrage of ballistic missiles launched this week by Iran against U.S. targets highlights, it also increases the risk of their conflict shifting from being waged primarily through economic sanctions and precision strikes against each other’s proxies to being waged by way of direct attacks on one another. Who is General Qassem Soleimani? Soleimani was known for having set up a network of proxies that has helped tip the geopolitical balance in Iran’s favour in several countries. In Syria, the Assad regime, a close Iranian ally, has been saved from defeat. In Iraq, Iran exercises a strong influence via the Shiite militias it controls. In Lebanon, Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, is literally the power behind the throne. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran’s Sunni rival, is stuck in a military quagmire against Iranian-backed rebels. Finally, it is alleged that Shiite militias in Iraq under Soleimani’s command injured or killed thousands of U.S. troops with powerful roadside bombs in the years following the American-led invasion of the country in 2003. United States withdraws from nuclear deal in May 2018 The origin of the latest spike in tensions between the two countries is the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal and reintroduce harsh economic sanctions against Iran. The reasons given for the withdrawal are the following: The restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program were set to expire only 15 years after the deal was signed in 2015 (though the agreement not to build a nuclear weapon was permanent). The deal did not cover Iran’s advanced ballistic missiles program, which could be used to launch nuclear weapons. Instead of focusing on rebuilding its economy, Iran took advantage of the previous lifting of sanctions to build up its military and funnel resources to allied militant groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza. Some of these groups now have more influence and military power than the actual governments in place. Iran has responded to these criticisms by saying that it needed to strengthen its defences to counter the tens of billions of dollars in weapons that the United States has sold to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries in the Middle East. Though the United States is the only country to have officially re-instated sanctions, the size of its economy and the importance of its financial system gives it considerable leverage. A corporation forced to choose between doing business with Iran and having access to the U.S. market and financial system will almost certainly choose the latter. Iran’s economy in dire straits Among other things, these sanctions have caused Iran’s economy to shrink by 9.5% in 2019, the value of its currency to fall by 50%, inflation levels to rise in the vicinity of 30%, and oil exports to plummet from 2.8 million barrels per day in May 2018 to less than 500,000 today. 1 It has been reported, also, that Iran’s foreign reserves have fallen by 20% to $86 billion since 2013 and that sanctions have left the country with access to only about 10% of these funds. 2 1 “Iran pulls back from nuclear deal as Middle East tensions rise,” Financial Times, January 5, 2019 2 “Six charts that show how hard US sanctions have hit Iran,” BBC, December 9, 2019, and IMF
Transcript of GeopoliticalBriefing 200109 E · President Trumps’ decision not launch retalia tory strikes for...
Economics and Strategy
Geopolitical Briefing
January 9, 2020
Iran – U.S.: Has war been averted? By Angelo Katsoras
Introduction The drone strike that killed General Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force commander and one of the most powerful figures in his country, marks one of the highest tension points in the decades-old rivalry between the United States and Iran. As the barrage of ballistic missiles launched this week by Iran against U.S. targets highlights, it also increases the risk of their conflict shifting from being waged primarily through economic sanctions and precision strikes against each other’s proxies to being waged by way of direct attacks on one another.
Who is General Qassem Soleimani? Soleimani was known for having set up a network of proxies that has helped tip the geopolitical balance in Iran’s favour in several countries. In Syria, the Assad regime, a close Iranian ally, has been saved from defeat. In Iraq, Iran exercises a strong influence via the Shiite militias it controls. In Lebanon, Hezbollah, an Iranian proxy, is literally the power behind the throne. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iran’s Sunni rival, is stuck in a military quagmire against Iranian-backed rebels. Finally, it is alleged that Shiite militias in Iraq under Soleimani’s command injured or killed thousands of U.S. troops with powerful roadside bombs in the years following the American-led invasion of the country in 2003.
United States withdraws from nuclear deal in May 2018 The origin of the latest spike in tensions between the two countries is the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal and reintroduce harsh economic sanctions against Iran. The reasons given for the withdrawal are the following:
The restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program were set to expire only 15 years after the deal was signed in 2015 (though the agreement not to build a nuclear weapon was permanent).
The deal did not cover Iran’s advanced ballistic missiles program, which could be used to launch nuclear weapons.
Instead of focusing on rebuilding its economy, Iran took advantage of the previous lifting of sanctions to build up its military and funnel resources to allied militant groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza. Some of these groups now have more influence and military power than the actual governments in place.
Iran has responded to these criticisms by saying that it needed to strengthen its defences to counter the tens of billions of dollars in weapons that the United States has sold to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries in the Middle East.
Though the United States is the only country to have officially re-instated sanctions, the size of its economy and the importance of its financial system gives it considerable leverage. A corporation forced to choose between doing business with Iran and having access to the U.S. market and financial system will almost certainly choose the latter.
Iran’s economy in dire straits Among other things, these sanctions have caused Iran’s economy to shrink by 9.5% in 2019, the value of its currency to fall by 50%, inflation levels to rise in the vicinity of 30%, and oil exports to plummet from 2.8 million barrels per day in May 2018 to less than 500,000 today.1 It has been reported, also, that Iran’s foreign reserves have fallen by 20% to $86 billion since 2013 and that sanctions have left the country with access to only about 10% of these funds.2
1 “Iran pulls back from nuclear deal as Middle East tensions rise,” Financial Times, January 5, 2019 2 “Six charts that show how hard US sanctions have hit Iran,” BBC, December 9, 2019, and IMF
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How recent events spiraled out of control Throughout 2019, the United States escalated sanctions against Iran’s regime, which rejected Trump’s offer to restart negotiations on a nuclear agreement if the sanctions were not lifted first. Instead, Iran wrongly gambled that it could pressure the United States to relax sanctions through force. Below is the timeline of recent events:
Iranian mines damage six ships near the Strait of Hormuz (May/June 2019).
The downing of an American drone barely avoids setting off a major conflict (June 2019).
Iranian missiles and drones strike Saudi oil facilities, which temporarily took offline 5% of the world’s oil supplies (September 2019).
A U.S. civilian contractor is killed and several troops injured in a rocket attack on an Iraqi military base in Kirkuk. Pro-Iranian militias had previously launched several attacks against U.S. bases this year, but this was the first time an American citizen had been killed (December 27, 2019).
The United States reacts by bombing the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah in western Iraq and Syria (December 29, 2019).
Iranian-led militias respond by storming the U.S. embassy in Baghdad (December 31, 2019).
Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani and five others are killed by a U.S. drone strike at Baghdad's airport (January 2, 2020).
Iran launched a barrage of missiles at two military bases housing U.S. troops in Iraq (January 8, 2020)
Iran’s limited options for striking back In theory, Iran has a wide variety of options to choose from. After all, there are U.S. troops, diplomats and businesses scattered throughout the Middle East. Iran could also attempt to disrupt oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz (where about 30% of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes) or once again strike Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities. In actual fact, however, Iran’s options are quite narrow.
Even under the best of circumstances, entering into a major armed conflict with the vastly stronger United States would be devastating for Iran. Its deep economic slump has only widened the power imbalance between the two countries. Its weak economy has given rise to internal criticism that the regime is using funds to advance geopolitical objectives in places such as Syria, as opposed to deploying this capital to meet pressing domestic needs. The recent mass protests over the government’s decision to significantly raise gasoline prices, which reportedly left several hundred people dead and thousands imprisoned, is a case in point.
Further, attempting to shut down the Strait of Hormuz is not a viable option for three major reasons: 1) Iran’s near-total reliance on the Strait for its oil exports and other trade; 2) the presence of the U.S. navy; and 3) Asian countries would be hurt much more than the United States and its allies. Given that Asian countries are the recipients of over 80% of all the crude shipped through the strait, Iran does not want to anger the likes of India and China.
Consequently, Iran must find ways to retaliate against the United States with enough force to save face but not so much as to provoke a direct attack on Iranian territory. The fact that it misjudged Trump’s willingness to strike back has only heightened fears of over-reach. Its first attempt at threading this needle came this week when it launched missile strikes against two American bases which seemed designed to avoid inflicting U.S. casualties. For starters, the targets were hit in the dead of night, which minimized the number of people wandering around the base who could have been killed. Second, in certain cases, the precision guided missiles reportedly struck empty areas within the bases.
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Proxies Iran has available to strike at U.S. interests
Source: “Iran's proxies: where will Tehran take its revenge for Qassim Soleimani's assassination and who will help it?” The Telegraph, January 6, 2020
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Why America would like to avoid all-out war As for the United States, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have left the American public strongly opposed to further major conflicts in the Middle East. Moreover, Trump ran in 2016 on avoiding more wars. A direct conflict with Iran would not only destabilize oil markets, it would damage Trump’s 2020 election prospects. Even more importantly, getting mired in yet another major Middle East war would ease China’s path to becoming the world’s next dominant geopolitical power and the leader in many of tomorrow’s cutting-edge technologies.
President Trumps’ decision not launch retaliatory strikes for Iran’s ballistic missile assault on two U.S. bases in Iraq also indicates a desire to avoid an all-out conflict.
The United States is also painfully aware that Iran would be a much more formidable opponent than Iraq:
Iran is a much more populous country. At the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq’s population totaled about 25 million. Today, Iran’s population is estimated at over 82 million.
Iran has a surface area of 591,000 square miles, compared with 168,000 square miles for Iraq.
Iraq had 450,000 military personnel when the United States invaded the country in 2003. Today, Iran can count on 523,000 military personnel and 250,000 reservists.3 It also has well-armed proxies throughout the Middle East capable of striking U.S. interests.
3 “A conflict with Iran would not be like the Iraq War. It would be worse.” Washington Post, June 21, 2019
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Conclusion
While the assassination of Qassem Soleimani and Iranian missile strikes on U.S. bases have taken tensions between the United States and Iran to new heights, there is still reason to hope that both sides will take steps to avoid an all-out conflict for the time being.
Nonetheless, the events of the past few days have shown that the risk of miscalculation is very high. For instance, if this week’s missile attack had caused multiple American casualties, the U.S. would have likely launched retaliatory strikes on Iranian territory, which in turn would have been followed by another Iranian attack.
We also feel that as long as the United States refrains from hitting Iranian oil facilities, Iran will not target Saudi Arabia. Still, fears of another strike against Saudi facilities could make it even more difficult for the kingdom to attract further investment and has already depressed the stock market valuation of the recently listed state-owned oil company Saudi Aramco.
Complicating matters further, Iraqi MPs have passed a non-binding resolution calling for the removal of foreign military troops from the country in response to the killing of Soleimani. A reduced U.S. presence in Iraq would greatly benefit Iran, which already has great influence over Iraq’s politicians and benefits from strong trade, cultural and religious ties with Iraq (the majority of the population in both countries is Shia Muslim). Moreover, while outside powers have always come and gone in the Middle East, Iran will always be its neighbour and must be accommodated. However, it is important to note that not all Iraqis support Iran, as evidenced by the recent waves of protests against Iran’s influence.
An even more serious tension point could be looming several months down the road as a result of Iran’s decision to no longer abide by any of its commitments to the 2015 nuclear deal. This could narrow the time that Iran needs (currently estimated at one year) to gather enough material to build a nuclear weapon should it choose to go down this path. Getting close to nuclear weapons capability would increase the odds of a pre-emptive strike by either Israel or the United States. Israel has targeted the nuclear facilities of its adversaries in the past. In 1981, it attacked a reactor under construction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and, in 2007, it bombed a suspected Syrian nuclear facility.
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