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GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BALANCE OF FORCES AND ITS CHANGES

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Mykola Sungurovsky, Razumkov Centre

The modern security environment is being formed against the background of the world processes of globalisation, regional disintegration and reintegration that become ever more intense and strongly influence the formation of the new system of international relations.

The modern world has not and in the middle run will not become more stable and safe. The majority of the existing threats are of a global (environmental pollution, climate change, depletion of resources) or network (terrorism, cyber crime, drug and arms trafficking, etc.) nature. New threats arise and change in their nature and scale faster than governments and international institutes learn to efficiently counter them. All this requires adequate common approaches to countering threats and guarantee of security.

Deepening of interdependence and comprehension of the need of peaceful coexistence make the basis for development of state strategies of future development and principles of the foreign policy. Meanwhile, there are factors that can prompt rearrangement of the current international balance of interests and forces, cause destabilisation of the situation and its development under undesirable scenarios – including spread of violence using armed force.

Many theories explaining the world order by rivalry and dialogue of civilisations, rise and fall of centres of power, their struggle for resources, leadership, the right to influence others seem “partially correct” and more than that, complementary – the world presents a much more tangled mosaic of all those puzzles, a body, in which centres of power fight one another, instead of acting as interdependent and interrelated entities.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict was a manifestation of changes and a milestone in the world order and security environment. It revealed

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the factors and possible negative effects of imbalance of forces on the international scene.

This article examines the world trends and the balance of forces in the regions close to Ukraine.

World trends

The recent decade has seen a steady trend towards a decrease in the number of interstate conflicts. However, the number of domestic and internationalised conflicts and the general level of violence in the world, including with the use of arms and involving both state and non-state actors, remain rather high. The probability of emergence of large-scale armed conflicts provoked by excessive ambitions, self-sufficiency or stubbornness of individual states at solution of problem issues goes up.

Growth of tension in international relations in some regions and states is accompanied with and sometimes even prompted by growth of military expenditures. According to SIPRI, they make over 2.5% of the world GDP (or nearly $250 per capita) and are largely (30-50% and more) spent on arms. After a peak in early 1980s and a decline in early 2000s, the world arms deliveries began to grow and over the past five years rose by 14%.

As of the end of 2013, the arms race among regions was led by Asia and Oceania (47% of the world imports) and the Middle East (19%). Meanwhile, imports of arms by all European countries fell by 25% and made 21% of the world total. The five largest exporters of conventional arms are the USA, Russia, Germany, China and France that account for 74% of the world exports. At that, the two former – the USA and Russia – supply to the market 56% of all conventional arms. The five largest importers of arms are India, China, Pakistan, the USA and Saudi Arabia, getting 32% of all deliveries.

According to many experts, the arms race and the “cold war” were not stopped but transformed into a new form of global confrontation – “cold peace” – with more parties and some changes in the balance of forces.

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Uneven economic development and ruinous effects of crises that accompany it lead to expansion of the area and scope of conflicts, impair capabilities and reduce the efficiency of reaction. Attempts of some states to assume or secure regional or global leadership complicate dealing with threats. This prompts the need of interference of the UN, other international organisations and regional alliances in affairs that until recently have fallen within the exceptional responsibility of national governments.

Modern global networks of trade, economic, political, information ties – on the condition of liberalisation of economic relations, mutual penetration of economies and cultures – become ever more efficient tools of advancing not only human achievements but also economic, political, social disruption, crises and their effects.

In the global peacekeeping efforts, the importance of regional alliances and groups of states is growing, especially of the South, providing more peacekeeping contingents for conflict settlement. More attention must be paid not only to resource support for joint actions but also to their legitimacy, involvement of the maximum possible number of states. The role of non-state actors that can exert strong positive or negative influence both at home and abroad is growing.

Fundamental changes in the world lead to painful processes of search or revision of the internal and external political identity of states in the modern world, the rationale of participation and their place in international unions. Some regions, including Eurasia, see competition of integration projects – with Ukraine in its focus. Those processes lead to complex changes in international unions: weakening or breakup of old alliances, attempts to strengthen the existing or to create new ones.

Most of all suffered the alliances and other forms of international cooperation (e.g., BRICS, OSCE, recently – the EU) that were set up, are developing and operate disregarding or contrary to factors of integration projects: community, similarity or non-contradiction of the (1) value basis, (2) interests and methods of their attainment, (3) partners’ perceptions of threats and methods of their countering,

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(4) availability of resources and readiness for their pooling and joint use.

In absence of responsibility for breach of security guarantees of the states that gave up possession and acquisition of nuclear arms, and in the conditions of actual growth of the club of nuclear states and lack of solidarity in non-proliferation, divergence of interests at the global and regional levels, there arises a danger of use of military advantage and the fact of possession of nuclear arms not only as a tool of deterrence but as an argument in rivalry for resources and leadership.

The world sees tough rivalry for energy resources – not only constructive (search of new sources, energy conservation) but also destructive (forced re-division of markets, excessive environmental damage). Access to energy resources presents an important factor of tough international economic and political competition. In such conditions, for consuming countries and international unions including them, achievement of high levels of energy efficiency and energy dependence is among the main security goals. On the other hand, for some supplying countries (e.g., Russia) monopoly of energy resources supply is not just a source of profit but a tool of economic and political pressure.

Against the background of those negative factors and trends, the adequacy and efficiency of international institutes go down, the international law is neglected, commonly accepted norms and rules are devaluated. International relations greatly suffer from commercialisation and “bureaucratisation” of values: priority of material values over spiritual ones, observance of procedures and organisational stability – over the need of prompt response to the new situation.

Despite many declarations of the need of modification of the system of international relations, the majority of international institutes and organisations founded decades ago have not fundamentally revised their principles, functions, tasks, methods of activity and interaction, keep on trying to solve international problems using somewhat modified legal mechanisms and instruments inherent in the old paradigm of the world order.

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Despite the increase in the number of key international actors, the main centres of power now and in the middle run are and will remain the USA, the EU, China and Russia. The range of their relations with each other and with other international actors is highly varied: from coexistence, partnership and interdependence to antagonism, rivalry and open confrontation.

The USA: despite the effects of the economic crisis, some decline of military-political activity and shift of priorities in implementation of their ambitions, the country retains the world leadership, a powerful potential, tools of financial, economic, political and military influence. The USA leads in the scientific, production and consumer sectors, is present in next to all segments of world markets, has most powerful nuclear arsenals, advanced armed forces, military bases and allies in key regions of the world, is the key actor of key international institutes and organisations, retains control of all other centres of power. Its role on the energy market goes up. Meanwhile, the USA is facing growing competition with countries claiming the role of leading world and regional actors. Dissatisfaction with the US role of the “world gendarme”, feeling that it is unfit to discharge that function as before grow both in the country and abroad.

The EU is the world largest economic bloc, a powerful union of states with common foreign and security policies, rules and standards of economic activity. Meanwhile, the EU has a limited military potential and, in terms of security, an imperfect mechanism of reaction to threats. The USA remains its main geopolitical and economic partner and helps to somewhat offset those drawbacks. The EU is trying to build pragmatic relations with China and Russia and to enhance the role of Europe in regional and global processes. The EU leaders are Great Britain, Germany and France. Serious problems weakening the EU unity include uneven economic development of its members and differences in their positions in the issues of enlargement, political, economic and defence priorities caused by the economic crisis and its effects.

China is the world actor best of all using the fruit of globalisation and modernisation of economies of the Western countries, where search of ways of profitability growth led to movement of production

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and advanced technologies to the Asian region. China has become a new global power and continues to build up its economic and military potential – the second world largest and the most powerful in the region. It does not claim the role of the world leader and mainly focuses on the strengthening its stand in the Asian and Pacific region, South East, Central Asia and the neighbouring regions of Russia. Its other priorities include: preservation and strengthening of its position on markets of the USA – the main trade and economic partner of PRC; wider access to the natural resources of the Middle East, Africa and South America; intensification of credit and investment activity and financial and economic expansion in Europe, Africa and Latin America. The attainment of its strategic goals is accompanied with growing contradictions with India, Russia, the USA, as well as deterioration of relations with countries of the region. The new problems faced by China include serious “overheating” of its economy, aggravation of the domestic social and political situation.

Russia inherited the status of a world centre of power from the former USSR and still has the ambition to retain it, not resting on real economic capabilities however. The main factors of its might include its monopoly on the European energy market, its military (including nuclear missile) potential, state-controlled access to the huge domestic market, skilful use of differences in positions of the leading states and their allies, as well as weaknesses of the key political and business figures of other states, not ruling out direct or indirect graft. Its main problems include the inefficient oligarchic, overly centralised model of governance with wide-spread corruption and the obsolete economic model mainly built on profits from export of energy resources. Its main strategic goals include: maintenance of military (first of all, nuclear missile) parity with the USA and NATO; keeping of the other post-Soviet countries within its sphere of influence by implementing Eurasian integration projects (CIS, CSTO, Eurasian Union); retention of presence and markets in the third world countries, provision of support to them and winning their loyalty; rapprochement with the Western countries and getting critical products and technologies from them; enhancement of its stand in international organisations (BRICS, SCO, APEC);

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weakening of the “western front”, playing on differences in positions of the EU and NATO member states. Involvement of Russia in a new arms race and competition of pipeline projects, along with rooted corruption, further exhaust Russian resources and compromise implementation of its ambitions. Meanwhile, feeling of the burden of internal (political, economic, demographic) and external (lag in economic development and inability to keep up with the rivals) problems provokes aggressiveness of the Russian policy, recently running contrary to the international law.

At presence, the balance of forces on the world scene is determined by the degree of influence of recognised leaders and creation of coalitions of loyal states led by them. From this viewpoint, the USA and China have the largest potentials and prospects. Both states take part in many existing powerful regional alliances or initiate new integration projects (transatlantic and transpacific partnership, the New Silk Road).

With time, the status of new centres of power may be claimed by Latin America and the Arab world – but only on the condition of successful implementation of their own integration projects, in particular, by deepening cooperation within the framework of the Pacific Alliance and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.

Present-day global trends cause rapid and complex changes in the security environment, emergence of new and transformation of old risks and threats, so that no state has sufficient capabilities to fight them, while international institutes prove increasingly inefficient.

The end of the “cold war” without adequate “resetting” of the international law, principles of international relations, the whole world order led to growth of turbulence affecting next to all domains of the international community life and fraught – in absence of proper reaction – with unpredictable consequences.

The main differences among the existing centres of power include, among other things, the fact that the might of the USA and the EU rests on liberalism, humanity, global network structures, finance; of China and Russia – on authoritarianism,

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hierarchic state-building structures, resources. The asymmetry of those principles, their instability, different sets of values of other regional actors cause inconstancy of the balance of forces and instability of relations on the international scene. If the world centres of power invariably stay in their positions, the chances of conversion of their value bases – being a subject of the dialogue of civilisations – and easing of tension in relations among them will long remain compromised.

Toughening of competition among the world centres of power for resources and markets, their rivalry for retention of tools of influence on the regions of Africa, Latin America, South and Central Asia bring growth of tension. The Arctic region is becoming a new site of rivalry of the world centres of power – in particular, the balance of forces in that region may be influenced by sanctions against Russia for its aggression against Ukraine.

The changing equilibrium among centres of power – with temporary strengthening of some of them and weakening of others – prompts growth of mutual mistrust and fears, exacerbates international relations and the security situation. The future world order will depend on the success of integration projects of the centres of power – i.e., on their ability to bring together other states, to share common values and interests, and on their readiness for a compromise.

On the other hand, search of identity by some international actors, claims to global or regional leadership provoke and legitimise aggression of some states against others, raise the probability of emergence of crises and conflicts. The sources of conflicts may include contradictions not only among the centres of power proper also between them and their allies (e.g., disputes between China and Japan, Russia and Ukraine – involving the USA and the EU).

The need of reconfiguration of institutes and mechanisms of global, regional and national regulation is growing, in particular, in the security sector. Such reconfiguration may bring success on the condition of coincidence of positions of

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the widest possible range of international actors and conclusion of legally binding agreements among them.

Non-state actors – trans-national companies, non-state international organisations, network communities, etc. – will exert growing influence on the processes of competition and interaction of world centres of power.

The main priorities of international actors at modern threat prevention and countering should include creation of a safe environment, establishment of reliable partner relations, strengthening of collective security systems, building trust and fruitful cooperation among them, resolute countering of all attempts of unilateral violation of norms of the international law.

Processes in the Euro-Atlantic region

Disintegration and reintegration processes taking place on the European continent (in particular, involving Ukraine), emergence and growth of ideological, economic and political differences between “old” and “new” Europe caused instability and emergence of areas of active, "frozen" and potential conflicts, national, ethnic, religious confrontation. The situation and its rapid changes require permanent attention of national government and the international community.

After the breakup of the socialist bloc, emergence and maturity of new independent states, thanks to far-going demilitarisation of countries of the region, in particular, in line with the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), repudiation of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan from nuclear arms, settlement of crises and reconstruction of Baltic, East European and Balkan countries, and till mid-2000s the European continent saw relative equilibrium of forces and stability.

However, the painful Russian feeling of loss of former satellites, its claims to the status of a superpower, regional leadership and exceptional spheres of influence, as well as differences in positions of European countries in relations with Russia and the USA, processes of separatism and erosion of relations within the EU,

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manifestations of national egoism and attempts of some European states to restore “historic justice” at the expense of neighbours, on the contrary, exacerbate tension and cause variability of the balance of political, economic and military force, many areas of “frozen” conflicts, raise the risks of the existing contradictions growing into armed clashes. This was witnessed by the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict of early 2014.

Negative security developments in the Euro-Atlantic region take place despite maybe the largest, compared to other regions, number of international organisations there in one or another way dealing with security issues: NATO, the EU, OSCE, CIS, BSEC, CSTO, GUAM. The absence of a common principled stand of the Euro-Atlantic community regarding the values, interests, threats to regional security and effective ways of crisis prevention and countering led to the failure of attempts to negotiate a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture (the Corfu Process). The feeling of security vacuum by European countries is aggravated by the following factors:

Russia’s withdrawal from CFE, which effectively gave it a free hand in uncontrolled deployment and concentration of task forces in the required directions and became an evidence (not properly appreciated yet) of its preparation of forcible scenarios of “coercion to friendship” of post-Soviet states (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Central Asian countries);

violation of the 2011 Vienna Document on confidence and security building measures, including exchange of information about military activities, by Russia;

differences in the positions of the USA (and their allies) and Russia on issues of nuclear disarmament, TMD, deployment of military bases;

effects of destabilisation of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, illegal migration from those regions, transformation of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries into a destination and in some cases – the safe haven for extremists and terrorists, whose activity often overlaps with the activity of radical anti-globalist, environmental and other organisations; absence of internal borders

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of the EU, unimpeded flow of people, capital, information enhances mobility and facilitates spread of influence of those organisations and groups, complicate security measures;

multidirectional and multilevel relations of the USA, the EU, NATO, some CEE countries with Russia: on one hand, fears of revival of its imperial, aggressive nature and the desire to isolate it or to switch it to a democratic track, on the other – fears of forcing it into a deadlock, removing it from the processes of regional and global stability, losing access to its energy resources and domestic market; this was fully manifested during imposition of sanctions on Russia in response to its aggression against Ukraine (and earlier – against Georgia).

The USA, NATO, the EU and Russia remain key Euro-Atlantic security actors.

The USA has a large military potential and nuclear arms deployed in Europe, maintains economic and military-technological interdependence with European partners. As a NATO member and the main contributor, the USA demands from its European partners higher defence expenditures and a more active role in the Alliance’s affairs. Setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic crisis prompted revision of foreign policy priorities and a shift of the US attention to Asia. Some hopes for offsetting the US retreat in Europe are associated with the creation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the EU and encouragement of the EU and NATO expansion to the East.

The EU and NATO – the Asian turn of the USA somewhat distracted European countries and, along with drawbacks revealed by the global economic crisis (such as the lack of political solidarity, decline of strategic importance, excessive commercialisation and “bureaucratisation” of values and interests), impaired the efficiency of European and Euro-Atlantic institutes in stability building and conflict prevention. Against that background, in order to offset those drawbacks, military-political initiatives are put forward and encouraged, in particular, by Great Britain and France, the Nordic countries, the Visegrad Four, within the framework of the policies of smart defense (NATO) and pool and sharing (the EU). In general,

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the EU and NATO now feel relatively secure from the Russian aggressiveness. However, since the EU and NATO are not ready to strongly oppose Russian plans, their partners in the post-Soviet space (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) experience a security deficit that can destabilise the Euro-Atlantic security space and requires additional efforts of NATO and the EU.

Russia is gradually turning a regional state with inefficient economic and political systems that, however, possesses huge resources, retains and builds up a powerful military potential (especially after the Russo-Georgian war of 2008). Meanwhile, using its role in the US plans of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, settlement of the Syrian crisis and withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, Europe’s energy dependence, its interests on the Russian market, weakness of European institutes, absence of an agreed policy and resolve of the West to strongly oppose its aggressive policy, Russia is trying to further split and weaken the Euro-Atlantic community, strengthen its position in Europe and restore the Russian Empire in the borders of the former USSR – if not territorial, then at least politico-economic. Despite the peaceful and democratic nature of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, Russia, in line with its strategic foreign policy and security documents, views NATO and the EU enlargement as a threat to its national interests in the result of reduction of its sphere of influence, and the CIS space – as an area of rivalry rather than cooperation with the EU, NATO, the USA and, recently, China. The Kremlin’s awareness of the seriousness of internal and external threats, limited time for their management and attainment of strategic conditions growth of aggressiveness of the Russian policy.

Establishment of at least non-confrontational relations with Russia is one of the key lines of confidence-building and improvement of the security environment for the West. However, present-day Russia witnesses processes contrary to democratic development: trends to authoritarian governance are growing, militarisation of society gains momentum, the population is really zombified by ideas of revival of Great Russia and the Russian World, dissidence is punished, chauvinism and radicalism are inoculated. The Kremlin presents the West to the Russians as a source of external threats and claims the

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roles of the only defender of compatriots and traditional moral values.

Those processes are catalysed by the awareness of the Russian elite of the importance of the next 5-10 years for the attainment of strategic goals against the background of predicted internal problems: growth of structural imbalances in the Russian economy combined with irrational use of revenues from sale of energy resources; negative demographic trends; disastrous decline and deterioration of the human potential; separatist spirits and destabilisation of the situation in some regions of the Federation, etc.

Russia really made others to be afraid but not to respect it, which, on one hand, significantly softens the tone of official relations of the international community and the West with it, reduces possibilities for pursuance of a tougher policy towards it even in case of principled disagreement with its steps, on the other – adds Russia confidence in pursuance of its policy and gives it a reason to see the post-Soviet space as a legitimate area of its influence with its possible extension to some countries of the former socialist camp.

Ukraine has become a focal point in the EU and US rivalry with Russia as a potential target of competing integration processes: on one hand, the EU Eastern partnership and NATO enlargement, on the other – the Eurasian project of Russia. While for the EU – with its rather bureaucratic approach to partnership – until recently, Ukraine has not been among the key priorities, for Russia, prevention of Ukraine’s exit from the orbit of its influence is a fundamental task. In such conditions there is a risk of Ukraine turning a bargaining chip of global actors. To escape that, Ukraine should become a fully-fledged international actor – with independent and strong home, foreign and defence policies supported by the majority of citizens.

Cooperation of the leading Euro-Atlantic security actors, despite some disputes and contradictions among them, still has the potential of political will and peaceful means, being gradually depleted.

In case of success of integration processes in the Euro-Atlantic area – creation of the Transatlantic Trade and

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Investment Partnership of the USA and the EU (economic NATO) – in the middle run, the new union may become the main global centre of power.

The states that have chosen the European vector of development but are not members of collective security systems, do not have nuclear arms for deterrence and proper foreign security guarantees feel insufficiently protected from real threats – both military and non-military – with which they cannot cope on their own.

Manifestations of national egoism, especially at removal of effects of the world economic crisis, mutual demands and lack of political solidarity of the EU and NATO members make the balance of political forces transient and aggravate the situation in the region.

Growth of political importance of Russia in the eyes of the USA, the EU and NATO, kind of commercialisation of those relations are fraught with areas of “frozen” conflicts in the CIS space (Transdnistria, Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the Crimea) and potential conflict areas (such as Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) becoming a small coin in the game played by world and regional leaders dividing spheres of influence. This can lead to instigation of tension in those areas with future emergence of new divides and spread of conflicts to the neighbouring states and regions.

In the tangle of relations among the lead European security actors, Ukraine occupies a key place and in the middle run can appear in the focus of a conflict rather than cause community of views.

Developments in the Asian and Pacific region

That densely populated region, being a huge emerging market and a crossroad of interests of the world centres of power, experiences especially strong confrontation among them and sees intra- and interstate contradictions.

The main actors in the region are the USA, Russia, China, India, Pakistan (all possessing nuclear arms) and unions of states –

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APEC, ASEAN, SCO. The security situation in the region is shaped by their relations, processes in countries of the region, their dependence on external influences and reaction to them. The nature of those influences is shaped, on one hand, by the coincidence or diversion, sometimes – clash of contradicting interests of the key actors, processes of their attainment, on the other – by the awareness of risks of deterioration of mutual relations, the ability to find a compromise between contradictory interests and potential effects.

The security landscape of the region is mixed and may be conventionally divided into several sub-regions: Eurasia (the Russian Federation and Central Asia), South and South-East Asia.

The geopolitical climate in the Eurasian sub-region is shaped by confrontation of political vectors of development of post-Soviet Central Asian countries looking at Russia and China. This largely explains centrifugal and centripetal processes in and around Russia. In separate countries, the latter mainly have the provisional and situational character of forced integration or voluntary dependence on Russia with growing orientation to China. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan so far show no willingness to join Russian integration projects. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict made countries of the sub-region especially cautious to Russia, which hinders its project of Eurasian integration.

Also demonstratively, next to all Eurasian member states of the CIS, CSTO, CU, newly-created EAC (organisations dominated by Russia) at the same time are SCO members and active NATO partners.

In many cases, intra- and interstate relations in the sub-region are fraught with conflicts and experience external influences: growing activity of China in the Far East and Siberia; of the USA, the EU, NATO – in the countries of Central Asia and the Caspian region; as well as the spread of Islamic radicalism to the North Caucasus.

Central Asia and the Caspian basin are on crossroads of interests and an area of competition of the lead world and regional actors – the USA, China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, the EU, SCO. Their presence, including military, in Central Asian countries poses a threat of use of

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armed force as an argument in competitive struggle. However, understanding of effects of armed confrontation by the leading actors keeps them from forcible moves and prompts search of mechanisms of peaceful dispute resolution.

An important factor of destabilisation of the situation in Central Asian countries is presented by the activity of external and internal (supported from outside) non-state actors that resort to instigation of separatist spirits, terrorist activity, spread of Islamic radicalism. The situation is further aggravated by unsettled border disputes, inter-ethnic conflicts, difficult problems with demography, illegal migration, deterioration of the environmental system (drinking water, development of hydro power engineering) that deteriorate the internal situation in separate countries and interstate relations.

In the short run, one may expect serious aggravation of the situation in the sub-region against the background of processes of change of the ruling elites, struggle for power with active participation of Islamic movements, enhanced by inflow of radical elements after the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan. Given all this, along with the developments in Ukraine and importance of the sub-region as a source of energy resources, it will be the next Russian priority in the “near abroad”.

The existing integration structures (CIS, CSTO, SCO) cannot contain the emergence and development of intra- and interstate conflicts in the sub-region (for instance, absence of response to the conflict in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, to the Tajik-Kyrgyz border dispute in January 2014). China and Russia initiated two competing integration projects – EAC and the New Silk Road.

The security situation in South Asia is shaped by the conflict in Afghanistan (currently – withdrawal of the US troops), territorial disputes in the border areas of India, Pakistan and China (states possessing nuclear arms), intrastate conflicts in countries of the Bay of Bengal. Withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan may become a catalyst of crises in Central Asia, a source of spread of extremist movements to the neighbouring countries.

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The leading regional actors – India and Pakistan – are trying to establish close cooperation with the USA, Russia, countries of South-East Asia.

South-East Asia is the area of collision of interests of the USA allied with Japan, China, and Russia, touching the interests of South and North Koreas, countries of the South China Sea basin. The situation is especially aggravated by North Korea trying to get nuclear arms and its missile tests, difficult talks on denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, territorial disputes for islands in the North, in the East China and South China seas.

That sub-region is the fastest growing in the whole world – the growth rate there is higher than in the USA and the EU. In addition to successful operation of APEC and ASEAN, it sees the process of emergence of Greater China – integration of PRC, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore, Taiwan in a powerful international union claiming the status of a superpower.

Meanwhile, the rise of China meets a cautious reaction of the other world centres of power and regional states – Vietnam, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan – that not unreasonably see it as a challenge. By and large, states of the region try to manoeuvre among centres of power, which complicates their integration and activity of the existing regional alliances.

China remains the strongest economic and military power of the region – its annual GDP growth rate slowed down but still exceeds 7%, defence expenditures – 10-12%. Strengthening of the position of China at the regional and global levels bothers the USA, the EU and Russia alike, and its cooperation with Pakistan and their territorial claims irritate India. The US military presence in the region and its support for allies (in particular, Japan, Taiwan) arouse dissatisfaction of China and Russia, bring together their positions on that issue. China, in its turn, cautiously views Russia’s attempts to establish relations with countries of that (Vietnam, Indonesia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan) and other regions (including Central Asia).

The situation in the Asian and Pacific region will be determined by the ability of the world centres of power to find

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allies among countries of the region. Here, the advantage is still with the USA, but China increasingly takes the initiative. In the competition between China and Russia looking for allies, the situation evolves in favour of China.

Without European technologies and culture of governance, the Eurasian Union knocked up and led by Russia will have no future (the ideas of Eurasianism have always rest on combination of technical and cultural advantages of Europe, natural resources of Russia and cheap labour resources of Asia). In this respect, Russia could substitute the EU with China, but integration with that actor does not guarantee its dominant role (as witnessed by the experience of SCO), on the contrary, it poses a risk of loss of its current positions.

A more promising project of regional integration may be seen in the building of Greater China with its subsequent expansion – if it proves attractive – to the countries of South and South-East Asia.

Despite overlapping interests of the leading world actors in the region, their possession of nuclear arms and potential losses from deterioration of the situation in the most economically attractive region prompt them and their regional allies to look for diplomatic ways of problem solution.

Situation in the Middle East

The Middle East (including North Africa) is now the richest in energy resources and one of the most conflict-hit and “explosive” region of the world. Despite the huge natural resources of the region, the overwhelming majority of its population stays in the zone of poverty, which, combined with unfavourable demographic trends, provokes an increasingly stern reaction to inequality of the world distribution of material values, providing the basis for growth of radicalism and extremism.

The main regional actors are Iran, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, competing for leadership in the Arab world. The USA and other NATO members, the EU and, to a smaller extent, Russia

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traditionally retain strong presence and influence there. The Chinese presence is growing.

The importance of influence of transnational companies and non-state actors (terrorist organisations, separatist movements, other radical forces) often used as tools by outside actors goes up. As a result, the region became the main "exporter" of radical Islam, international terrorism, refugees, illegal migrants.

The situation there is shaped by the following processes:

struggle of transnational corporations for access to energy resources and influence on the world oil market;

unwillingness of Arab countries to see Israel as a regional leader and the persistent Palestine-Israeli conflict that aggravated after radical Islamic forces came to power in Lebanon;

competition of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey for influence on the Middle East and the Islamic world;

Sunni-Shia confrontation that aggravates intrastate conflicts in the region and, along with movements for national self-determination (in particular, of Kurds), is fraught with fragmentation of post-conflict countries (Iraq, Syria);

rivalry of the USA and Russia for leadership in conflict settlement and winning allies;

talks on Iran’s nuclear programme, the effects of which can in one or another way influence nuclear non-proliferation processes, regional leadership and the oil market.

In such conditions, integration processes in the region are seriously complicated – despite even some progress, such as institution of a common foreign and security policy in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The security situation in the region and in separate countries is strongly affected by rivalry for energy resources. It was greatly complicated by the wave of “jasmine revolutions”, fraught with further unpredictable consequences. They were triggered by improper governance and driven by the most active but poorly organised social groups dissatisfied with the state of affairs. Those

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forces – due to their weak organisation – may become tools in the hands of more experienced state and non-state actors (including extraregional) with further radicalisation of the conflict potential, goals and forms of its use.

An additional factor of destabilisation may be presented by the spread of the conflict in Syria to the neighbouring countries due to the movement of extremist forces there (as it happened in Mali with the arrival of Tuaregs after the end of the conflict in Libya).

Presence of ballistic missiles in Iran and a high probability of extension of their range and its development of nuclear arms cause growth of the threat of their use and spread of their effects to the neighbouring regions, including Europe. The readiness of Israel to deliver a preventive strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities and the relevant public statements can make the situation explosive, with global consequences.

Negative trends in the region are boosted and sometimes generated by problems of the clan system, corruption, weakness or absence of the institutes of the rule of law, low efficiency of law-enforcement bodies, border services and national security systems in general, deeply rooted at the national level.

In the middle run, the Middle East will remain a source of threats related with emergence of intra- and interstate conflicts, proliferation and possible use of mass destruction weapons, spread of extremism, terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration.

Transparent borders facilitate spread of threats not only in the region but also beyond its borders. Combined with economic attractiveness of the region, they make it an object of regard and efforts of the leading world actors.

Some regional leaders try to initiate integration of Arab countries, but in presence of internal contradictions and influence of external actors that option seems unlikely, for the time being.

Changes prompted by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict

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The Russian aggression against Ukraine met an ultimately negative reaction of all (certainly except Russia) members of the UN Security Council. The Crimean “referendum” and Russian annexation of the peninsula were not recognised by the absolute majority of member states of the UN General Assembly. The Russian actions met a strong reaction and sanctions of the USA, the EU and other leading countries against the Kremlin and some Ukrainian officials.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict prompted realignment of the world order and the global balance of forces. On one pole and in the lead of that process is the USA allied with the EU; on the other pole – Russia surrounded by states with similar authoritarian regimes. China views the struggle of its rivals with caution, hoping that the focus of the USA and the EU on Ukraine will divert some of their forces from the Asian and Pacific region and give it an opportunity to strengthen its position there. Russia seems to pursue a similar goal, trying to strengthen the “anti-American front” in Central Asia, the Caspian region and the Middle East.

One of the key elements of that process is presented by competition of the world centres of power and regional leaders for allies – including among those who abstained from voting on the Ukrainian issue at the UN General Assembly on March 27, 2014. Among them were such countries claiming global or regional leadership as China, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Uzbekistan, the relations of which with Russia, the USA and the EU can seriously influence the balance of forces on the global and regional levels – assuming that the future international agenda will be shaped by alliances rather than separate states.

In such conditions, countries lying on frontlines dividing world and regional leaders will feel even stronger security deficit and may become the scenes of conflicts. In those conflicts, the advantage will be with those who possess the whole range of tools of “soft” and “hard” power, strategic thinking, strong political will and broad public legitimacy.

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In particular, one of the reasons for the Russo-Ukrainian conflict was presented by Ukraine approaching the point of choice of one integration project – European or Eurasian Union – as the trajectory of future development with a possible escape from the Russian influence. Ukraine’s European choice compromises not only the Eurasian project but also the way of development chosen by Russia.

The international community and security system, influential global actors face a dilemma – how to curb the aggressiveness of Russia (and other authoritarian regimes) and to give them a constructive role in settlement of regional and global crises. At the same time, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict adds to the split of the international community in the issues of: disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation; guarantees of territorial integrity, sovereignty of states and the right of nations to self-determination; the right to self-defence; responsibility to protect; the right of the aggressor nation to veto an issue of a conflict provoked by it in the UN Security Council, etc. The UN should urgently hold discussions on all those issues and find an adequate response.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict that became an example of dilution of the fine line between the right to use force and international commitments of confidence and security building may become another precedent for other states in solution of such problems by unacceptable methods (including a “mysterious war”, like that unleashed by Russia against Ukraine). The conflict compromised the institute of international guarantees, demonstrated bankruptcy of obsolete models of the regional and global security systems and prompted the need of urgent revision of the existing concepts and legal principles of international security, joint development of a new paradigm of the world order.

Beginning its aggression against Ukraine, Russia hoped (as well as in the case of Georgia in 2008) for a weak reaction of Europe, to some degree relying on its tested tool of political and economic influence – monopoly of gas supply to European countries. In case of a possible negative reaction of Europe to its gas blackmail, Russia prepared “plan B” – redirection of gas deliveries to the Chinese market. However, China does not hurry to make such a

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contract, trying to win a discount on energy prices. Furthermore, the USA plan to make a contribution to diversification of sources of energy supply to Europe. In such conditions, the Russian stand is vulnerable, but it leaves no hope for differences among European countries in the issues of energy security.

The weak position of the EU deserves a separate examination and is shaped by two key factors: first, strong dependence of some European economies on Russia. Many European companies work on the Russian market. This gives huge profits, proceeds to budgets and social programmes, jobs, and therefore, votes at elections sought by politicians in European countries. Second, on the ability of Russia to buy loyalty and readiness of many Western politicians, public figures, mass media to sell themselves – according to some European experts, in the present situation they became an appendix to the Kremlin policy and propaganda. If one tried to draw a cartoon of Europe, it might look like a businessman with a gun against his head and a calculator in his hands, with which he calculates possible gains and losses.

Now, the circle of political and economic isolation of Russia tightens, but like a “wounded beast”, it is seen in the near and far abroad as a source of potential threats, an actor that can both positively and negatively influence security – and therefore requires attention and dialogue. Along with the problems inherent in present-day Russia, sanctions imposed on it can ultimately exhaust its resources and lead to its disintegration (like the USSR). In the middle run, Russian weaknesses can be used by other centres of power in their competitive struggle.

In some issues (of strategic disarmament, NATO enlargement, participation in conflict settlement) the controversial position of Russia is used by the West to justify its own weakness and concealed interests. Today, the UN, the EU, NATO, OSCE should admit that they have no efficient means to influence Russia, first of all, due to uncertainty and difference of positions of their members regarding values, strategic and tactical interests, threats. In their turn, the impotence and lack of unity of the peace-loving

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international community will tempt Russia to continue aggressive acts.

The ability to solve the Russo-Ukrainian conflict will show the might of the existing centres of power, the efficiency of the Euro-Atlantic and entire international security system. The degree of external influence on the situation in Ukraine will primarily depend on the resolute stand of Ukraine proper, the balance of seriousness of international sanctions and geopolitical stakes of Russia, its “threshold of vulnerability” and readiness of the Western countries for certain losses for the sake of restoration of justice. Inability of the West to cope with the Russian aggression through sanctions may add confidence of impunity to other aggressive regimes, demonstrate impotence of the international security system, dangerously encourage spread of violence.

The red line in international relations, brought closer to the whole world by this conflict, should encourage peace and security champions to join efforts, prompt them to seriously treat all (not just separate) elements of the “technology” of actualisation of threats and their countering, to analyse the wide range of (not only apparent) negative and positive factors at all (not only final) stages of their escalation, to work out timely and adequate measures at crisis prevention and response. One cannot tolerate methodological and political mistakes often turning unacceptable human toll and terrible consequences, affecting millions of people.

March 2014