GCC Relations with - SISUmideast.shisu.edu.cn/_upload/article/fb/96/e43f84ec41d2... ·...

GCC Relations with Post-War Iraq:

A Strategic Perspective

Gulf Research Centre Cambridge

GCC Relations with Post-War Iraq: A Strategic Perspective

Edited by

Omar Al-Ubaydli and Andrea Plebani

First published 2014Gulf Research Centre Cambridge

© Gulf Research Centre Cambridge 2014All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

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ISBN: 978-1-909864-05-4

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Gulf Research Centre Cambridge.

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By publishing this volume, the Gulf Research Center (GRC) seeks to contribute to the enrichment of the reader’s knowledge out of the Center’s strong conviction that ‘knowledge is for all.’

Dr. Abdulaziz O. SagerChairmanGulf Research Center

The Gulf Research Center (GRC) is an independent research institute founded in July 2000 by Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, a Saudi businessman, who realized, in a world of rapid political, social and economic change, the importance of pursuing politically neutral and academically sound research about the Gulf region and disseminating the knowledge obtained as widely as possible. The Center is a non-partisan think-tank, education service provider and consultancy specializing in the Gulf region. The GRC seeks to provide a better understanding of the challenges and prospects of the Gulf region.

About the Gulf Research Center

Contents

Preface ...............................................................................................................11

Introduction ......................................................................................................13

1. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait: Post-2003 Challenges and Opportunities for the Iraqi Federal Architecture ................................................................15

Andrea Plebani

2. Iraq and the Security Situation in the Gulf Region: Advantage or Threat? ...................................................................................37 Ashraf Mohammed Kishk

3. Iraq-GCC Relations in the New Middle East: Closing the Political Gap ...........................................................................59 Fatin Shabbar

4. Confronting Threats from Iran through Proactive Cooperation with Iraq: “Objective Necessity” for the GCC .............................................................79

Metodi Hadji Janev

5. GCC and Post-War Iraq Relations: Issues of Stability and Conflicting Interests .......................................................................................................97

Abderraouf El Ouazzani Taibi

6. China as a Factor in the Emerging GCC-Iraq Relations: The Predominance of Oil ..........................................................................115

Sanju Gupta

7. The Strategic Evolution of US Military Presence in Iraq ..........................137 Degang Sun

8. Arabism, Nationalism, and Islamism in Iraq: A Few Scenarios for the Future .................................................................157

Yacoob Abba Omar

9. Religious Use of Social Media in the Gulf and Iraq ..................................179 Safa Mubgar

About the Contributors ..................................................................................191

GRC Publications ...........................................................................................197

Gulf Research Center 137

The Strategic Evolution of US Military Presence in Iraq


Degang Sun1

Key Recommendations for GCC Policymakers:

• TheGCC should play a leading role in regional security affairs, and itshouldnotremainalooftothechaoticsectarianconflictinIraq.

• TheGCC should serve as amediator and integrate Iraq politically andeconomically.

Key Recommendations for Iraqi Policymakers:

• ForeignmilitarypresencecannotsolveIraq’sinternalsecurityproblems.• Thebestpolicyistoachievenationalreconciliationandsticktoeconomy-

firstdevelopmentstrategy.

1. TheauthorisindebtedtoProfessorYahiaZoubir,Dr.BashirZainAl-Abdin,Dr.OmarAl-Ubaydliandtheanonymousreviewerfortheirinvaluablesuggestionsandadviceontheearlyversion;theresearchissupportedbytheprogramofNationalSocialScienceFoundationofChina’sStrategicUSMilitaryBaseDeployment intheMiddleEast–IslamicRegionsand ItsTrendofReadjustment and theProgram forNewCenturyExcellentTalents inUniversities(NCET),ChineseMinistryofEducation.

7

138 Gulf Research Center


Research Questions and PuzzlesForalongtime,theMiddleEasthasbeentheepicenterofethnicconflicts,religiousdiscord, terrorist attacks, territorial disputes, and other cross-border problems.Throughout thepastcenturies, the fateof theMiddleEasthasbeendecidedbyexternalpowers rather than the regionalpeople.Due to itsunique locationas a“corridor”tothethreecontinentsofAsia,Africa,andEurope,aswellasitsroleasa“hub”oftheworld’soilandnaturalgasreserves,theregionhasbeentheplaygroundformajorpowerscompetingforpredominance.

Theestablishmentofa foreignmilitarypresence isundoubtedlyoneof themost strategicways for external powers to project their influence, grab regionalresources, anddenyother powers seekinghegemony.2By the early 21st century,countriessuchastheUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,France,Russia,andJapanhaveestablisheddozensofmilitarypresencenearthePersianGulfandtheMiddleEast as awhole.Even India, an emerging economy,has built amilitary base inTajikistan(asJapanhasinDjibouti),anditmaywellbekeentoestablishasecondbaseintheMiddleEast.Ofthe21countriesinandaroundtheMiddleEast,onlythree are without any apparent foreign military presence (Iran, Azerbaijan, andTurkmenistan).TheUnitedStateshasamilitarypresencein13ofthesecountries,theUnitedKingdominnine,andotherexternalpowers innineMiddleEasterncountriesaswell.Therefore,theexternalpowersactasiftheywere“Gulfneighbors”duetotheirmilitarypresencepowerprojectioninthisarea.3

TheUSisatypicalexampleofcountriesseekinghegemonythroughamilitarypresence. Since the end ofWorldWar II, it seems to be a “rule” for theUS toestablishmilitary bases in occupied states to project power and ensure regionalpredominance. For instance, the US-led coalition defeated Fascist Italy, NaziGermany,andImperialJapanandafterdefeatingthesepowersin1945,Washingtonestablishedpermanentmilitarybasesinthesecountriestocontainandestablishacounterbalancetothecommunistbloc;sincetheendoftheKoreanWarin1953,

2. For more literature on military bases, please refer to Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the US Military Overseas (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,2008);MarkL.Gillem,AmericaTown:BuildingtheOutpostsofEmpire(Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,2007);ThomasBarnett,The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sSons,2004).

3. J.E.Peterson,“ForeignMilitaryPresenceandItsRoleinReinforcingRegionalSecurity:ADouble-EdgedSword,” inArabian Gulf Security: Internal and External Challenges, ed.,Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center forStrategicStudiesandResearch,2008),93.



UStroopshavebeenstationedinSouthKorea,resultingintheestablishmentofastrategicbalanceontheKoreanPeninsulavis-à-visChinaandtheSovietUnion;aftertheUS-ledcoalitionforcesexpelledSaddam’stroopsand“liberated”Kuwaitin1991,USbuiltmilitarybasesintheEmirate;whentheKosovoWarendedin1999,theUScrushedSerbiaandmaintainedabalanceofpowervis-à-visRussiaintheBalkansbydeployingmilitarybasesinKosovo;sincetheendoftheAfghanWarin2001,theUShassucceededinbuildingmilitarybasesinthecentralAsiancountry,todetertheTalibanandAl-Qaeda.Therefore,whydidtheObamaadministrationcloseitsmilitarybasesandabandonitspowerprojection“beachheads”inIraqin2011?IsIraqanexception?

Hard Military Bases and Soft Military Presence: A Conceptual DifferentiationPowerprojectioncanbeachievednotonlybyhavingmilitarybases,butalsobyasoftmilitarypresence.AlthoughtheObamaadministrationclosedhardUSmilitarybasesinIraqin2011,asoftmilitarypresencestillexiststomaintainUSpowerandinfluenceinthatcountryinanindirectway.

Powertocountriesislikecurrencytoindividuals,andtheessenceofaforeignmilitarypresence ispower.AsKarlMarxput it, land is sufficient for a regionalencroaching regime, but waters are indispensable for an aggressive regime withworldambition.4Similarly,A.T.Mahanhighlightedthat,“themysteriouspower…wasnot in this or thatman, kingor statesman, but in that control of the sea.5”Foreignmilitarypresenceisanimportantmeansforstatestoprojecttheirpower,interfereinregionalaffairs,spreadtheirculture,safeguardtheirforeigninterest,andenhancetheirpoliticalinfluence.6

Inthischapter,foreignmilitarypresencereferstoanareaonlandoronseabeyondasovereignstate’sjurisdiction,whereacertainnumberofarmedforcesarestationed and which has military activities, organized institutions, and military

4. Karl Marx, The Inside Story of the Diplomatic History in 18th Century (Beijing: People’sPublishingHouse,1979),80.

5. AlfredT.Mahan,The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660–1783(Boston:Little,Brown,1895),278.

6. DegangSun,“Outpost forPowerProjection:AChinesePerspectiveofFrenchMilitaryBasesonAfricanContinent,”Journal of Cambridge Studies6,no.4(2011),53.



facilities.7Itisbynaturethegeographicalandfunctionalextensionofacountry’sdomesticmilitarydeployment.

Foreignmilitarypresencetakesagreatvarietyofforms.Forinstance,accordingtoduration,theycanbedividedintopermanent(withalong-termobjective)oranadhoc(withashort-termobjective)presence;basedondifferenceinfunctions,theycanbedividedintoarmy,air,naval,logistic,communication,arsenalandintelligencepresence,etc.

This paper divides foreign military presence into two types: hard militarybasesandsoftmilitarypresence.Theformerrefers tomilitaryareasontheopensea, colonies, departments, trust territories, or foreign territories, where a statedeploysacertainnumberofarmedforces,engagesinmilitaryactivities,andbuildsupcertain institutionsandfacilities.8Asof2013,theUShad598militarybasesandinstallationsin40sovereignstates(Army:265;Navy:116,Air:197,MarineCorp:20).9ItstotalforeignbasesarealmostasmanyasthatofRomanEmpirein117A.D.andoftheBritishEmpirein1898whenthetwoempireswereintheirrespectiveheyday.Besides,currentlyBritainhasforeignmilitarybasesinCyprus,AscensionIslands,KenyaandFalklandIslands,makingitaworldpoweraswell.10

In the contemporary greater Middle East, the US has military bases inQatar (with forwardheadquartersof theUSCentralCommand),Bahrain (withheadquartersoftheUSFifthFleet),UnitedArabEmirates(UAE),Oman,TurkeyandDjibouti;Francehasbases in theUAEandDjibouti;Russianbasesexist inKyrgizstanandTajikistan,andBritainhasabaseinCyprus.

Soft military presence is more dynamic and less visible, including ad hocmilitarydeployment(suchasrapiddeploymenttroops),technicalmilitarystations,foreign arsenals, military supply sites, drone bases, small intelligence stations,reconnaissance sites, aerospace tracking facilities and so on. In a broader sense,broadcastrelaystations,communicationfacilities,aerospaceandaviationlaunchers,

7. Professor Robert Harkavy admits that there are “definitional and semantic problemssurroundingthissubject(bases),”andscholarsusuallyusefacilities,basingaccess,amongothers, to refer to“bases.”SeeRobertE.Harkavy,Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200–2000(NewYork:Routledge,2007),5.

8. ChinaEncyclopediaCompilingCommittee,China Encyclopedia (Military) (Beijing:ChinaEncyclopediaPublishingHouse,1989),562.

9. DepartmentofDefense,Officeof theDeputyUndersecretaryofDefense,Base Structure Report,FiscalYear2012Baseline,2012,7.

10. Danica Sorber, “What Countries Have Overseas Military Bases?” eHow, May 2, 2011,availableat:http://www.ehow.com/info_8342821_countries-overseas-military-bases.html.



andgroundreceivingstationsareregardedassoftmilitarybasesaswell.11Accordingtostatistics,in2012,softmilitarypresencerepresented90percentofallUSmilitaryforcesabroad,whilebigandmedium-sizedmilitarybasesmadeuponly6percentofthetotal(seeTable7.1).

Table 7.1: US military deployment abroad (as of 2012)

TheUSmilitarydeploymentintheMiddleEastisacaseinpoint.Sincethe9/11incidents,WashingtonhasmaintainedhardmilitarybasesinTurkey,Djibouti,UAE,Kuwait,Qatar,andBahrain,amongothers,andasoftmilitarypresenceinAlgeria,12 Israel, Iraq andYemen.With terrorist threatmounting, theUS rapiddeployment troops have become amajor type of softmilitary presence, whichenjoysmoreflexibility,strongermobility,lowercost,andwhatismore,lessphysicalvisibility to the host nations. Therefore, soft military presence can reduce thepotentialriskof“basepolitics.”

From Hard Military Bases to Soft Military Presence: Case of IraqSince its invasion of Iraq, the US deployed a considerable number of troops,pooledinresourcesandcontributedtodiplomaticendeavorinthecountrytoseta“democraticmodel”forotherfailedandfailingIslamicstates.Toachievethatgoal,theUSpaidaheavyprice-4,485soldiersandofficersdied,72,271wereinjured,

11. Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy(NewYork:PergamonPress,1982),27.

12. AlthoughAlgerianauthoritieshaveconsistentlydeniedanyUSpresence in thecountry,there is evidence that the US enjoys a soft presence in the Algerian desert near thesouthernmostcityofTamanrasset.

LargeBases

Medium-sizedBases

Soft MilitaryPresence Others Total

Army Bases 31Naval Bases 9Air Bases 11Marine Bases 5Total

5493

21

8352

18

27298

19110

571 26

31611421620

666Source:DepartmentofDefense,OfficeoftheDeputyUndersecretaryofDefense,BaseStructureReport,FiscalYear2012Baseline,2012,24.



and2,097public servants lost their lives.The enduring conflicts and chaos costWashingtonadirectlossof$805billion.13AtonepointtheUSdeploymentpeakedatover150,000troopsandover100hardmilitarybasesthroughoutthecountry.However,thequestionastowhetherUSshouldcontinuetorunhardmilitarybasesorhaveasoftmilitarypresenceinIraqinthefuturecausedcontinuousdebateinWashington.AsearlyasJune2006,apolicyreportbythePentagonsuggestedthattheUSshouldcontinuetooperateatleastfourbigmilitarybasesinIraq,mostlyairbases,includingTallilintheSouth,Al-AsadintheWest,BaladinCentralIraq,andTalAfarintheNorth.Amongthefour,Baladairbasewasthelargest;itboasted20,000-25,000Americantroopsatthepeak.Thebasewasprotectedbya25km-longsecurityzoneandwasthegatewaytoBaghdad.14JosephGerson,ahistorianofAmericanmilitarybases,commentedthat“theBushadministration’sintentionistohavealong-termmilitarypresenceintheregion...ForanumberofyearstheUShassoughttouseanumberofmeanstomakesureitdominatesintheMiddleEast...TheBushadministrationseesIraqasanunsinkableaircraftcarrierforitstroopsandbasesforyearstocome.”15

In2008,areportbythethinktankRANDputforthasimilarsuggestion.Theauthorsof the report argued that after theUS troopsweredemobilized in Iraq,Washingtonshouldmaintainoneortwopermanentmilitarybases.For instance,USairbasesinBaladandAl-AsadmaybefrequentlyusedtodeployUSPredatordrones.Meanwhile, the report said, the bases could contribute to suchmilitaryoperations as air support, military rescue, assistance, and tactical airlifting.Thetwomilitarybaseswouldalsobeused tocoordinatewith the largerUSCentralCommandmilitarybases in theGulfCooperationCouncil (GCC)countriesonissuessuchasintelligence,pre-warning,reconnaissance,aerialrefueling,attackinghighvaluetargets,andmilitarydeterrence.16

TheObamaadministration’spriorityintheMiddleEasthasbeensimilartothatoftheearlieradministration’s;itsobjectiveistosecureUSregionalleadershipintheregion.However,themeansthatPresidentObamausestoachievethisendisverydifferent.DuringtheBushpresidency,Washingtonattachedgreatimportance

13. Hannah Fischer, “Iraq Casualties: US Military Forces and Iraqi Civilians, Police, andSecurityForces,”CRS Congressional Report, June11,2010,1.

14. DavidE.Thaler,Future US Security Relationship with Iraq and Afghanistan: US Air Force Rolesvol.681,RAND(2008),115–16.

15. DeborahWhite,“AnAmericanPalaceinIraqandFourPermanentUSBases,”About.com, http://usliberals.about.com/od/homelandsecurit1/a/AmerPalace.htm.

16. Thaler,Future US Security Relationship, 116.



tobuildingandexpandingmilitarybasesintheMiddleEast,apracticethatwasharshlycriticizedbythegovernmentsandpeople,particularlyIslamicradicalsandextremistgroups.From2001to2008,apartfromGermany,JapanandSouthKorea,USmilitaryforcesabroadwereconcentratedmainlyintheMiddleEastandIslamiccountries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, theUAE,andDjibouti,withthenumberofUSarmedforcesinIraqtoppingothersintheearly21stcentury.

Table 7. 2: Cumulative time that individuals have deployed to Iraq between September 2001 and December 2011, by year

SinceBarackObama took office, theUS government has attached greaterimportancetoasmall-scalemilitarypresencewithstrongermobilityandflexibility.This soft military presence, at facilities called Cooperative Security Locations(CSL)alsoreferredtoas“lilypads,”islessoffensivetothehostgovernmentsandlocalresidents,andtherefore,caneffectivelyreducethechanceof“politicization”offoreignmilitarypresenceintheIslamiccountries.ThisistheinternaldynamicsoftheUSdeploymentofasoftmilitarypresenceinIraq.

Aftermuchwrangling,theIraqiSupremeCourtpassedaresolutiononAugust15, 2011, which denied diplomatic immunity to the US military forces in thecountry,andthereafterUStroopsweredeniedextra-territorialityinIraq.Surprisedandratherembarrassed,theObamaadministrationpromptlydecidedtopulloutallarmedforcesfromIraqandcloseallmilitarybasestheresoonafter.BytheendofDecember2011,boththeUnitedStatesandNATOstatedthattheyhadnotroopsstationedandnomilitarybasestoruninIraq.Thus,theWesternmilitaryoperations

Years of Deployed Duty Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps

Not yet deployed 153,341(27.3%)

108,021(34.0%)

133,989(40.9%)

1 year (1 - 12 months) 131,057 141,232 118,035 2 years (13 - 24 months) 135,876 57,460 55,8853 years (25 - 36 months) 94,574 9,479 15,498

4 years (37 - 48 months) 35,705 1,564 3,5015+ years (49+ months) 5,959 368 1,029Total 554,512 318,124 327,937

77,233(38.6%)66,45944,14810,584

1,362161

199,947Source: Dave Baiocchi, “Measuring Army Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan,” RANDCorporationResearchReportSeries,2013,5.



thatfollowedtheinvasionofIraqinMarch2003cametoanend.OnDecember31,2011, thousandsof Iraqi civilians fromallwalksof life celebratedpeacefullythroughout the country the withdrawal of foreign troops. Iraqi Prime MinisterNouriAl-MalikideclaredatagatheringinBaghdadthatthedaywouldbe“IraqDay”,symbolizingtheformalendtothenine-year-longUSmilitaryoccupationofthecountry.ThisistheexternalreasonwhytheUShasdeployedonlyasoftmilitarypresenceinIraq.

IraqihatredofUSmilitarybasesismulti-dimensional,andthemostimportantfactorisUSsenseofarroganceandsuperiorityovertheIraqis.TheUnitedStates“tookontoomanylargeprojectsandoftendidnotconsultsufficientlywiththeIraqisaboutwhichprojectswereneededandhowbesttogoaboutthem,”accordingtothepeople’scomplaints;PrimeMinisterMalikialsonotedthatonehighlypromotedproject,theBasraChildren’sHospital,ranfaroverbudgetandwasstillnotfinished.Theprojectwasmorethan200percentoverbudgetandfouryearsbehindschedule.17 Afterthewithdrawaloftroops,theUSdeclaredthatits“mission”wasfulfilledandPresidentObamahadabidedbythepromiseto“pulloutallarmedforcesfromIraq”thathehadmadeduringhispresidentialelectioncampaign.

Since assuming power, President Obama has readjusted the US militarystrategy.Withasloganof“implementingUSsmartpower,”theObamaDoctrinewas lessaggressive, relyingmoreonalliesandmultilateralismandadvocatedtheprojectionofaUSglobal force inan intangible,flexible,andmobilizedway.USsoftmilitarypresenceinIraq,therefore,wassmallerbutmoreeffectiveandusefulinrecentyears.

Bytheendof2011,theUShadclosedallhardmilitarybasesinIraq,butits“soft”militarypresence remainedusingprivate security contractors,militaryandintelligenceofficerslocatedintheUSembassyandinUSconsulates,USmilitarytrainingofficersandconsultants,anddeployedspecialoperationforces.Suchsoftmilitarypresenceisofgreatsignificance.

Forms of US Soft Military Presence in IraqInfluenced by Obama’s views on military deployment, Washington abandonedthepreviousschemeof“maintainingseveralpermanentmilitarybasesinIraq”anddecidedtocloseallmilitarybasestherebyDecember31,2011,agoalitostensiblyreached. However, a careful study reveals a different version: Pentagon has not

17. MichaelR.Gordon,“ReportDetailsMistakesMadebyU.S.inImprovementProjectsforIraq,”New York Times, March6,2013.



yetpulledoutallthemilitarypersonnel;instead,ithasmaintainedasoftmilitarypresenceinIraqfocusedonanumberofareas.

First,USsoftmilitarypresenceisintheformofprivatesecuritycontractors.Ontheonehand,WashingtonwithdrewalltroopsfromIraq;ontheotherhand,theUSstillemploysanumberofprivatesecuritycontractors.TheUSgovernmenthiredsuchprivate security contractors tomaintain Iraqi security andescortAmericannationals in the country.These security contractors, albeit troublesomeandevensomehowharmfultoUSnationalimage,arestillanasset.SinceUSmilitarybaseswereno longer visible, the softmilitarypresencehasminimized antipathy fromIraqi society. FromAugust 31, 2010 to 2012, theUSDepartment of State hademployedover 6,000private security contractors, a large increase from2,700 in2009.InDecember2011,Academi,aVirginia-basedUSprivatesecuritycontractor,said it has trained 50,000 people and conducted more than 60,000 protectivesecuritymissionsaroundtheworldinthepastsevenyears,18includinginIraq.ByJanuary29,2012,USprivatesecuritycontractorsnumbered5,000inIraq,mainlyperforming such tasks asmilitarypreparation, securityoperations,peacekeeping,andsecuritychecks.19

Second, the US soft military presence is also in the form of security andintelligenceofficersattheBaghdadembassyandotherconsulates.AfterthenewIraqi government denied US military forces’ diplomatic immunity and extra-territoriality,thePentagonhastokeepacertainnumberofsecurityandintelligenceofficersintheUSembassyandconsulatesinIraq.StatisticsshowthattheAmericanembassy inBaghdad is the largest and themost expensive around theworld; itserved as a “green zone” and “bridgehead” for US power projection.The $730millionembassy,aslargeastheVaticaninRome,coveredanareaof104acresandwasequippedwithitsownwatersupply,electricityfacilities,anddrainagesystems,makingitvirtually“astatewithinastate.”20Accordingtoreports,itisthelargestembassyinworldhistoryandtheonlybuildingprojectinIraqthatisontimeandonbudget;isabomb-proofsuper-bunkerwitha15-feetthickperimeterwall;has21buildingsandisthesizeofnearly80footballfields;isequippedwithstate-of-the-artcommunicationsandsurveillancetechnologies;wasbuiltatacostof$592

18. NathanHodge,“CompanyOnceKnownasBlackwaterDitchesXeforYetAnotherNewName,”Wall Street Journal, December12,2011.

19. EricSchmittandMichaelSchmidt,“USDronesPatrollingItsSkiesProvokeOutrageinIraq,”New York Times, January29,2012.

20. JamesDenselow,“TheUSDeparturefromIraqIsanIllusion,” The Guardian, October25,2011.



million; has twohuge blocks of offices for 8,000US staffworkers; andhas thebiggestswimmingpool inIraq.21Oneofthemostvocalcritics isanti-AmericanShiite clericMuqtadaAl-Sadr, who demanded that Iraq open a similarly largeembassyinWashington“inordertopreservethedignityofIraqandtosavetheUSEmbassy(inBaghdad)fromthefireofweaponsthathavenotyetbeenlaiddown.”22

Asof2011, theUSEmbassy inBaghdadboasted16,000staffandofficers,includingdiplomats,militaryattachés,aswellassecurityandintelligenceofficers,most of who were endowed with diplomatic immunity.23 According to theWashingtonPost,afterthemilitaryoccupationofIraq,Washingtonhaddispatchedabout 300 intelligence officers and 500 intelligence staff, making Iraq an areawiththelargestnumberofintelligencepersonnelsincetheendoftheColdWar,comparabletoSaiKung,SouthVietnaminthelate1960s.24AftertheUSwithdrewitsforcesfromIraqinlate2011,therewerestillabout16,000diplomats,securityandintelligenceofficersintheembassyofBaghdad.Inaddition,thethreeconsulatesinBasra,Kirkuk,andMosul,staffedwith1,000peopleeach,alsohadacertainnumberofsecurityandintelligenceofficers.25

AthirdaspectofUSsoftmilitarypresencecouldbeseeninmilitarytrainingofficersandconsultants.AfterconqueringIraq,theUSdispatchedmilitaryofficersandconsultantstohelptheIraqitransitionalgovernmenttraincombatantsandthepolice.In2008,BradleyL.Bowman,aCouncilonForeignRelationsinternationalaffairsfellow,arguedthattolessenantipathyfromthelocalIraqipeopleWashingtonshould rely on military training programs and encourage US combatants andintelligenceofficerstoinfiltrateIraq,sothatUSpresencecanbelessconspicuous.26 RaymondOdierno,aUStopmilitaryofficial inIraq,admittedthatafterpullingoutitsforces,someUSforceswouldremainintheIraqilocalsecuritycheckpoints.Theirmaintaskwouldbetraining,supervising,providingmedicalcare,assistinginairtrafficcontrol,andgivinghelicoptersupport.TheOfficeofSecurityCooperation

21. White,“AnAmericanPalace.”22. AssociatedPress,“USDiplomaticPresenceinIraqShrinkingFast,”PhilStar.com,March

21, 2013; available at: http://www.philstar.com/breaking-news/2013/03/21/922357/us-diplomatic-presence-iraq-shrinking-fast.

23. Scott Stewart, “US Diplomatic Security in Iraq after theWithdrawal,” Security Weekly, December22,2011.

24. Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” RAND Corporation,Occasional Paper 127(2004),7.

25. Denselow,“TheUSDeparturefromIraq.”26. Bradley L. Bowman, “After Iraq: Future US Military Posture in the Middle East,”

Washington Quarterly31,no.2(2008),83–84.



(OSC),forinstance,waslocatedintheUSembassyinBaghdad,andwasmadeupofseveraldozenAmericanofficers,totrainIraqiSpecialForces.CooperatingfullywiththeIraqiarmedforces,theseofficerswerebothtrainersandconsultants.AsMartinE.Dempsey,USChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffputit,althoughlimitedinnumber,theteamofUStrainersandconsultantswouldhelptheIraqitransitionalgovernmenttoimprovetheircombatskillsandcarryouttrainingprograms,sothattheIraqigovernmentwouldbereadyforprocurementofUSarmsinthefuture.UStrainingprogramsconcentratedonabouttenIraqimilitarybases;theynotonlytrainedIraqitroopsandpolice,buttheyalsoengagedincounterterroristcampaignswiththeirIraqicounterparts.27

Due to thepresenceofAmericanmilitaryofficers andconsultants, theUSbecamethelargestsupplierofarmstoIraq,apositionpreviouslyoccupiedbytheSoviet Union/Russia and France. By 2011, the US and Iraq had signed about400military cooperationagreementswitha total valueof$10billion.Thedealsincluded18F-16swithavalueofover$2billionaswellasother$6billionworthofweaponsandmilitaryfacilities.Inthatyear,WashingtonandBaghdadembarkedonnegotiationsforanotherarmsdealwithavalueof$900million.

Accordingtothenewagreements,theUSwouldsend160moreciviliansandmilitaryattachéstoparticipateinvariousIraqitrainingprograms,andtherewere750moreAmericancivilianswhowouldstaypermanentlyinIraqtosupervisetheUSmilitaryaidprograminIraq.AfterleavingIraqinDecember2012,Washingtonleft about $400millionworth ofmilitary facilities, and in 2012 theUSofferedIraq about $6 billionworth of additional aid programs – these programs couldnot transact smoothly without coordination from the US military officers andconsultants.28To improve its training in Iraq, theUS set up about 10offices inIraq and dispatched 3,500 American staff for various programs. For instance,theUS 402ndArmy Field Support Brigade (AFSB) assumed themaintenanceofIraqitroops;thiswasobviouslypartofthemilitarypresence.Undoubtedly,UStrainingofficersandconsultantswillmaintaintheirpresenceinIraq,thusplayinganimportantroleinIraqisecurityinthefuture.29

27. Walter Pincus, “After Iraq Pullout, U.S. Serves A Reminder to Iran,” Washington Post, October24,2011.

28. DennisSteele,“TheSunSetsonOperationNewDawn,buttheShadowsRemain,”ARMY, January2012,53.

29. Ibid.,54–55.



Fourth,USsoftmilitarypresencewasalso intheformofspecialair forces.DespitethefactthattheUShaddemobilizeditsarmedforcesinIraq,theBaghdadairdefense forcewas still underUScontrol throughaUS special force.US topofficialsatthePentagonreiteratedtimeandagainthattheUSwascommittedtoIraqi securityandwouldreserve theright tocombatAl-Qaedacells inIraqandjihadists,includingtheuseoftargetedkillingsofIslamicextremistsandterroristswithdrones.ApartfromthelargerdronesdeployedinIraqbytheUSDepartmentofDefenseandtheCIA,suchasRQ-1“Predator”andMQ-9“Reaper”with55-feetwinglength,theUSStateDepartmentitselfalsodeployedover20smalldroneswithwinglengthof18inches.Althoughtheywerenotlethal,droneswereextensivelyusedforintelligencecollection,communication,andforguaranteeingthephysicalsecurityofdiplomats.30

Functions of US Soft Military Presence in IraqIn2012,USmilitaryandsecuritypersonnelnumberedaround15,000to30,000,andsuchsoftmilitarypresencewouldindubitablyexertafar-reachinginfluenceonUSstrategyinIraq,intheArabianGulfandaroundtheworld.

First,atthestatelevel,theUSsoftmilitarypresenceonthegroundwouldhelptheObamaadministrationtofurtherinfluenceIraq.Inthepastdecade,WashingtonhastakengreatpainstoshapeIraqasa“model”forotherfailedandfailingstates,todemonstrate that“Islamanddemocracy are compatible.”Therefore,with Iraqasanexample,WashingtonhighlightedthatWesterndemocracyandvalueswereuniversal,andIslamanddemocracyhascompatibility.31

SinceitislocatedattheheartoftheMiddleEast,ademocraticandWestern-styleIraqwouldhaveastrongsymbolicsignificanceandwouldproducea“spillovereffect,”forasuccessfulIraqitransitiontodemocracythatwouldinturnsetamodelfor other transitionalArab countries, such asEgypt,Tunisia,Libya andYemen.Therefore, a stable, democratic andprosperous Iraq servesWashington interests,andUSsoftmilitarypresencewouldserveasaguarantee.OnNovember26,2011,IraqiPresidentJalalTalabanipointedoutthatUSpresenceinIraqafter2011wasanecessityandwouldbeofgreatsignificancebecauseIraqiforceswerestillweak,ill-experienced,andpoorlyequipped,andparticularlyitsnavyandairforceswere

30. SchmittandSchmidt,“USDronesPatrollingItsSkies.”31. See Salim Cevik, “Myths and Realities on Islam and Democracy in the Middle East,”

Estudios Políticos38(2011),121–44.



toofeebletodefendthecountry.32AcontinuousUSmilitarypresence,intheformofmilitaryandpolicetrainers,consultants,andprivatesecuritycontractorswouldeffectivelypreventIraqfrombecomingthetargetofterroristattacksandsectarianconflicts, save a democratic constituency of the new Iraq, and consolidate USdominanceofIraq.

Asmentionedbefore,military presencewas an essentialmeans for theUSto stabilize and control Iraq, but hard military bases would only alienate localresidents.Since2003,theIraqipeoplecommonlyregardedUSmilitaryoccupationandmilitarybasesasa formofWesterncolonial rule, claiming thatUSsoldierswereinvaders,notliberators,andIraqisovereigntyanddignityhadbeenviolated.SinceWashington’s military occupation started a decade ago, Iraq Body Count(IBC) has documented 112,017-122,438 civilian deaths from violence betweenMarch20,2003andMarch14,2013,33thuscausingaserioushumanitariandisasterthatarousedhatred.Thatwastherootofanti-Americanismandterrorisminthecountry.34

After the establishment of a transitional government in Iraq, the call forcompletewithdrawalofUStroopsandforclosingallhardmilitarybasesbecameincreasingly loud in the Iraqi parliament and among themasses. In addition toSunni Iraqis, large segments of the Iraqi Shiites and IraqiKurds also requestedthattheUScloseallmilitarybases.In2008,theProgramonInternationalPolicyAttitudes(PIPA)attheUniversityofMarylandcarriedoutasurvey,whichshowedthatnearly70percentofIraqipeoplehopedthattheUScouldpulloutitsarmedforcesimmediately.35Inthesameyear,BradleyL.BowmanarguedthatUSmilitarybasesinIraqhadinducedIslamicradicalsandterroriststotargettheUSclearly;USmilitarybasesinIraqwerenotonlyunnecessary,butwerealsoperceivedtobeoffensive andhostile to the Iraqi people.Consequently, he pointed out that theUSshouldcloseallitsmilitarybasesinIraq.HealsoarguedthattheUSCentralCommand’smilitarydeploymentintheGCCcountrieswaspowerfulenoughto

32. Alsumaria.TV,“USPresenceinIraqbeyond2011IsaNecessity,”availableat:http://www.alsumaria.tv/news/48567/talabani-us-presence-in-iraq-beyond-2011.

33. IraqBodyCount.org,“TheWar in Iraq: 10Years andCounting:Analysis ofDeaths in aDecade of Violence,” available at: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/ten-years/.

34. GrafHans-ChristofSponeck,A Different Kind of War: The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq (NewYork:BerghahnBooks,2006),20.

35. Cooley,Base Politics, 268.



respondtoanyIranianthreat.36Ontheotherhand,USsoftmilitarypresenceinIraqsince2011wouldnotonlyguaranteeUScontroloverIraqisecurityaffairs,butalsolowerIraqipeople’sdissatisfactionandantipathy.

Second,attheregionallevel,USsoftmilitarypresenceinIraqhelpstocurballegedIranianaggressionandmaintainastrategicbalancebetweentheShiiteandSunnisectionsintheGulfregion.

Pentagon’s key concern was that, following the withdrawal of its forces,Iran might take advantage and “Finlandize” (i.e., “neutralize”) Iraq, compellingBaghdad to seek a compromise with Iran.37The consequence of such scenariowould be an imbalance of power between Sunnis and Shiites in the Gulf.TheObama administration firmly believed that Iranians would attempt to fill thepower vacuumcreatedby theUSmilitarywithdrawal and infiltrate further intoIraqiShiiteheartland.Ifthathappened,theUSgovernmentreckoned,theIran-led “Shiite Crescent,” consisting of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hizbollah in Lebanonwouldmaterialize,adevelopmentunacceptable forWashington.Formanyyears,TehranwasquitecomplacentwiththechaoticIraqisituationsincethatprovidedabarrieragainstUSmilitaryinterventioninIran.38InNovember2011,theUnitedStatesand itsEuropeanalliesdeclared that theywould implementanewroundof sanctions against Iranian oil companies and financial institutions, a decisionTehranharshlydecried.Iraniansthreatenedthat,ifanotherroundofsanctionsisimposed,IranmightclosetheStraitofHormuzandthatoilpriceswouldskyrocketby50percent.IntherecentreportSustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense issuedby theUSDepartmentofDefense in January2012,thePentagonmadeitclearthattocontainIranandstopitswould-bedestructiveactivities, the US would cooperate with the GCC countries and other allies tomaintainamilitarypresenceintheGulf.39Bytheendof2012,almostallIranianneighbors,suchasAfghanistan,Turkey,Iraq,Kuwait,Bahrain,Qatar,SaudiArabia,

36. Bowman,“AfterIraq,”79.37. PatProctor,“TheMythicalShiaCrescent,”Parameters38,no.1(2008),availableat:http://

www.google.com.hk/url?q=http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/08spring/proctor.pdf&sa=U&ei=atGvUsPQOqSwiQf16IDQAg&ved=0CDMQFjAD&usg=AFQjCNEmz66xOTtFwVSu3fvR8--TFlEjIA.

38. EdwardP.DjerejianandFrankG.Wisner,co-chairs,proceedingsfromaworkinggroupco-sponsoredbytheCouncilonForeignRelationsandtheJamesA.BakerIIIInstituteforPublicPolicy(2003),13.

39. USDepartment ofDefense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense ( January2012),2,availableat:http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.



UAE,Oman,andPakistanhadUStroopseitherinhardmilitarybasesorasasoftmilitarypresence.AccordingtorecentCENTCOMfigurescommunicatedtoAl-JazeeraonApril30,2012,thenumberofUStroopsstationedincloseproximitytoIraniscloseto125,000.40USaircraftcarriers,literallyfloatingbases,intheGulfandintheArabianSea,arealsopartofthechainofmilitarybases.41AccordingtoCENTCOM,around15,000-20,000soldiersarestationedonnavalvesselsintheNearEast area.USsoftmilitarypresence in Iraq isoneof the links connectingthoseintheGCCcountriesandinTurkey,playinganessentialroleforWashingtontokeepitspredominanceintheArabianGulf.InDecember2013,theUSSecretaryofDefenseChuckHagelpaidavisittoBahrainandcommittedtomaintaininga35,000-strongforceintheGulfregionregardlessoftheinterimnucleardealwithIran.Heemphasizedthatthemilitaryfootprintincludes10,000USArmytroopswith tanksandApachehelicopters, roughly40shipsat sea includinganaircraftcarrierbattlegroup,missiledefense systems, advanced radar, surveillancedrones,andwarplanesthatcanstrikeatshortnotice.42

Finally,atthegloballevel,USsoftmilitarypresenceinIraqisconducivetoaUSstrategicshiftfromtheGreaterMiddleEasttotheAsia-Pacificregion.Ontheonehand,thesoftmilitarypresenceinIraqcouldhelptocuttheUSdefensebudget and lessenUSfiscal deficit so thatPentagon could pourmore resourcesintotheAsia-Pacificregion.Accordingtostatistics,by2011,USfederaldebthadexceeded$14trillion,whichvirtuallyequalstheUSGDPofthesameyear,whiletheUSdebtpercapitareachedahistoricalrecordof$45,000.In2010alone,theUSfederalgovernmentpaid$414billionininterestonthefederaldebt.43WiththeslowdownoftheUSeconomy,onDecember31,2011,PresidentObamaratifiedanactdecidingthatthe2012USdefensebudgetwouldbe$662billion,adropof$63billion.44InJanuary2012,thePentagondeclaredthatin2013,theUSdefensebudgetwoulddropto$613.4billion.45PresidentObamaalsodemandedthat, inthenextdecade,theUSdefensebudgetshouldbecutby$450billion,ofwhich$78

40. BenPiven,“USBasesEncircleIran,”AlJazeera,May1,2012.41. OnfloatingbasesintheGulf,seeThomShanker,“FloatingBaseGivesU.S.NewFooting

inthePersianGulf,”New York Times, July11,2012.42. “UStoMaintain35,000TroopsinGulfRegion:Hagel,”Peninsula, December8,2013.43. AdnanKhan,“IsAmericaBecomingtheNew‘SickMan’?”Khilafah, March15,2009,19.44. DavidNakamura,“ObamaSignsDefenseBill,PledgestoMaintainLegalRightsofUS

Citizens,”Washington Post, December31,2011.45. InFiscalYear2014,USdefensebudgetreachedabout$630billion.



billionwouldbecutfrom2012-2016.46Toachievethatgoal,theUSmustcutitsforeignmilitaryexpenditure,particularlyinIraq.

Inthepastdecade,theUSspentover$800billionontheIraqWarandoncombatinginsurgentsinpost-warIraq.IttookWashingtonoveronebilliondollarsannually to run hardmilitary bases in Iraq alone, which became an unbearableburden for Washington, especially if one adds other military expenditures.ComparedwiththeprevioushardmilitarybasesinIraq,thesoftmilitarypresenceischeaperandmoreflexible,enablingdefensebudgetcuts.AsthereportSustainingUSGlobalLeadership:Prioritiesfor21stCenturyDefensepointedout,althoughtheUSwouldcutthedefensebudget,USforeignmilitarypresencewasrequiredandthiswouldbeachievedincreativeways.47Thesoftmilitarypresenceisoneofthose“creativemethods.”

Furthermore, US soft military presence in Iraq alleviated the US lack ofarmedforcesintheglobalbasedeployment.PresidentObamaunderscoredthatthedecade-longUSanti-terrorwarhaddeviatedfromitsdirectionandthattheUSmustrefocusontheAsia-Pacificregions,fortheareawasrisinginglobalinfluenceandtheUShadabigstakecounteringthatinfluence.OnNovember17,2011,PresidentObamadeliveredaspeechtotheAustralianparliament,wherebyhereiteratedthetwostates’six-decadelongstrategicalliance.Inhisspeech,ObamadeclaredthattheUSwouldincreaseitsmilitarymaneuversinAustralia,andUSnavalforceswouldbe stationed inAustralia.With foreignmilitary bases inAustralia as platforms,theUSwouldstrengthenitsmilitarypreparationswithitsAustralianallyandatthe same time trainAustralian troops.Obama is convinced that a powerfulUSmilitarypresenceintheAsia-PacificregionwouldreinforcetheUSrapidresponseanddeploymentcapabilitiesandguarantee“regionalpeaceandsecurity.”In2012,theUSplannedtodispatch250marinestoDarwinCity,innorthAustralia,andthetotalUSforceinthemilitarybasewouldreach2,500intheyearstocome.

OnJanuary5,2012,PresidentObamafurtherillustratedtheUSfuturemilitarystrategy “blueprint”, which is three-fold. First, the US will reduce its militarypresenceinEurope,Africa,andLatinAmerica,whilecontaininganti-USforcesintheMiddleEast,particularlyIran.TheUSwillalsoincreaseitsmilitarypresenceintheAsia-Pacificregion.Second,USArmytroopswouldbereducedfrom570,000to490,000,whileincreasingtheNavyandAirForce’spowerprojectioncapabilities.Third, the US will reduce its large and permanent military bases and increase

46. DepartmentofDefense,Officeof theDeputyUndersecretaryofDefense,Base Structure Report, 6.

47. USDepartmentofDefense,Sustaining US Global Leadership, 2.



smallerandmobilizedmilitarypresenceabroad.48SincetheObamaadministrationregardedtheAsia-Pacificregionaskeytoitsmilitarystrategies,andsinceitwasdeterminedtoconsolidateUSmilitarybasesinAustralia,Guam,Japan,Okinawa,SouthKorea,SingaporethePhilippinesandThailand,theUSwithdrawalofactivetroopsfromIraq,optinginsteadforasoftmilitarypresence,wouldcertainlyhelpWashingtontofocusonEastAsia.

Challenges to US Soft Military Presence in IraqAsof2013,USmilitarypresenceinIraqisfurthershrinking.AccordingtotheUSAmbassadortoIraq,RobertStephenBeecroft,USmilitaryandcivilianpersonnelnumbered16,000inearly2012,butdroppedto10,500inMarch2013,andbytheendoftheyear2013,thefigurewillbearound5,500.49ThedeclineofUSmilitarypresenceimpliesaweakeningofUSmanipulationpowerintheregion.Incontrast,dramaticchangeshavetakenplaceintheMiddleEast,andWashington’sdecisiontokeeponlylimitedsoftmilitarypresenceinIraqisdisputableandwillprobablysabotageUSinfluenceinIraqandintheMiddleEastatlarge.

Thefirst challenge is theworsening Iraqi situation,whichhas exposed theweaknessoftheUSlackofhardmilitarybasesinthecountry.SincetheObamaadministrationclosedallthemilitarybasesinIraq,thenumberofterroristattackshasrocketed,andIraqiPrimeMinisterNouriAl-MalikihaswarnedthattheSunniandShiiteconflictsaresointensethatIraqisonthevergeofacivilwar.Moreover,in 2012 and early 2013, violence attributed to Al-Qaeda in Iraq intensified,highlightingthegroup’sattemptstoexploitwideningsectariancleavages.50TheUSStateDepartmentstronglycondemnstheterroristattacksperpetratedthroughoutIraqandremainscommittedtosupportingIraq’seffortstocombatandovercometerrorism,51butUSmilitaryresponseandpoliticalresolvearequitelimitedduetoitslackofhardmilitarybasesinthecountry.“SincetheendoftheIraqWar,manyIraqi insurgents fromAnbarandDiyalaprovincestooksanctuary inSunniareasofSyria, targetingtheAl-Malikigovernment inBaghdadandtheAssadregime

48. ThomShankerandElisabethBumiller,“ObamaPutsHisStamponStrategyforaLeanerMilitary,”New York Times, January6,2012.

49. “USDiplomaticPresence.”50. JonathanMastersandZacharyLaub,“Al-QaedainIraq(a.k.a.IslamicStateinIraqand

Greater Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder October 29, 2013, availablefrom:http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq/p14811.

51. EmbassyoftheUnitedStates—Iraq,“TheUnitedStatesCondemnstheTerroristAttacksacrossIraq,”April16,2013,availableat:http://iraq.usembassy.gov/pr_april_16_2013.html.



inDamascus.The irony is that theUS isprotectingapro-IranShiite regime inBaghdadagainst aSunni-based insurgencywhile at the same time supportingaSunni-ledmovementagainsttheIran-backeddictatorshipinSyria.”52

Beforeleavinghispost,USDefenseSecretaryLeonE.PanettacomplainedthattheinabilityoftheObamaadministrationtofinalizeanagreementprovidingfor an American military presence in Iraq after 2011 had deprived the US ofimportantpoliticalleverageinIraq,andsincetheIraqigovernmentisadheringtopro-Iranianandpro-Russianpolices,theUSgovernmentisgreatlyconcernedoverMaliki’sgrowingauthoritarianismandincreasedtensionsamongSunnis,ShiitesandKurds.53ThesecondchallengeisIraqipolicyreorientation.Washingtoncalculatedthat,solongasUSmaintainsasoftmilitarypresenceinIraq,itwouldbeamodelofdemocracyforotherMiddleEastcountries.IraqwillnotonlybeabeaconforArabcountries,butalsoa“USbackyard.”However,theIraqigovernment’sforeignpolicyreorientationisworrisomefortheObamaadministration.Ontheonehand,Al-MalikiadministrationinBaghdadseeksastrategicpartnershipwithIran,theUSarchenemyintheMiddleEast,andhelpsbuilda“ShiiteCrescent”;ontheotherhand,BaghdadhasshowninterestinpurchasingarmsfromRussia.Iraq,accordingtoareport,isnegotiatingwithRussiatopurchaseairdefensefacilities.54

ThethirdchallengeisfromtheprolongedSyriancivilwar.TheSyriansituationisworsening,butUSdiplomaticandmilitaryinfluenceislimitedduetoitslackofhardmilitarybasesinIraq,oneofthekeyneighborsofSyria.

Tomeetthesechallenges,theObamaadministrationseemstobeprobingthepossibilityofrebuildinghardmilitarybasesinIraq.InOctober2012,theObamaadministration reportedly negotiated with the Iraqi government on restoringmilitary deployment in the country. In the samemonth, amember of the IraqiParliamentKazzemAl-Shimritoldthemediathat“giventheexistingchallengesthattheUSisfacingintheregion,itistryingtofindabaseinIraqandforthatreasonitistryingtoreturntoIraq’sAl-Assadmilitarybase.”55

52. TomHayden,“USSpecialForcesDeployedinIraq,Again,”TheNation.com,September5,2012, available at: http://www.thenation.com/article/170158/us-special-forces-deployed-iraq-again.

53. Gordon,“ReportDetailsMistakes.”54. “American Special Forces Deployed to Iraq: US General,” Press TV, September 29,

2012, available at http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/09/29/264108/us-special-forces-deployed-to-iraq/. In November 2012, Iraq’s Prime Minister Al-Maliki declared thecancellationofthe$4.2billionarmsdealsignedwithRussia.

55. “Iraqi MP: USTrying to Restore Military Presence in Iraq,” Islamic Invitation Turkey, available at: http://www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/2012/10/08/iraqi-mp-us-trying-to-



InDecember2012,despitetheclaimbythePentagonthattheUShasonly157soldiersinIraqtoimplementitsdiplomaticmission,thePentagondispatched3,000troops(ArmySpecialOperations)secretlyfromKuwaittoIraqformissionspertainingtoSyria,accordingtothewesternmedia.Itisreportedthatthesetroopsare“mostlystationedatBaladmilitarygarrisoninSalahuddinprovinceandal-Asadairbase inal-Anbarprovince” to increase itsmilitary influenceoverSyria.56TheUStroopsonthegroundinIraqareinresponsetoconcerninWashingtonoverapossiblechemicalweaponsattackagainstSyrian rebelsbyembattledPresidentBasharAssad.57ItisstilltooearlytojudgewhethertheUSisreadytorestoresomeofitshardmilitarybasesinIraq.

ConclusionForalongperiodoftime,theUSsoughttokeepitspredominanceintheArabianGulfthroughmilitarydeployment.SaudiArabia,Iran,andIraqarethetopthreecountriesthatholdtherichestoilreservesintheArabianGulfandtheworldaswell.TheUSsoftmilitarypresenceinIraq,togetherwithitshardbasesinKuwait,Bahrain,Qatar,UAE,amongothers,hasformeda“PersianGulfShield,”whichhasconsolidated theUShegemonicposition in thevolatileGulfand transformed itintoan“AmericanGulf.”

Since the end of World War II, the US has habitually stationed troopsand established military bases in occupied countries. Nevertheless, the ObamaadministrationdecidedtocloseallmilitarybasesandpulledouttroopsfromIraqinamannersuggestinganeglectofthecountry’sgeopoliticalimportance.Thispapercategorizes foreign military presence into hard military bases and soft militarypresence,andfindsthat,althoughWashingtonclosedallharditsmilitarybasesinIraq,its“soft”militarypresencehasremained,intheformofsecuritycontractors,militaryandintelligenceofficers intheembassyandconsulates,militarytrainingofficersandconsultants,andspecialoperationforces.The“lilypads”inIraqprovideeasiermobilizationandflexibility,reflectingObama’s“NewThinking”onmilitarydeploymentintheMiddleEast.

restore-military-presence-in-iraq/.56. “3,000USTroopsSecretlyReturntoIraqviaKuwait,”PressTV,December9,2012,available

at:http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/12/09/277127/3000-us-troops-secretly-return-to-iraq/.

57. CarloMuñoz, “DODDeniesDeployments ofUSForces back to Iraq,” DEFCONHill,December10,2012;availableat:http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/operations/272049-dod-denies-deployments-of-us-forces-back-to-iraq-.



SincetheclosureofUSmilitarybasesinIraqinlate2011,theUSDepartmentof State and thePentagon, through close-knit coordination, have planned for acivilian-ledpresenceinIraqconsistingof16,000-17,000personnelat14sitesstartinginfiscal year 2012.TheStateDepartmenthad a scheme to reduce thepresenceto 11,500 personnel at 11 sites by 2013.Evenwith the reductions, themissionin Iraqwould be the largestUS diplomatic presence in theworld.TheObamaadministrationallocatedanestimated$4billion for the civilian-ledpresence forfiscalyear2012,93percentofwhichwasforsecurityandsupportcosts.Inaddition,theStateDepartmentrequested$1.9billioninpoliceandmilitaryassistanceand$471 million in other foreign assistance for fiscal year 2012.58Washington hasattemptedtoinfluenceregionalaffairsthroughthatsoftmilitarypresenceandavoidtheresentmentcausedbylargemilitarybases,buttheshortfallsofthisapproachareapparent.WiththeincreasinginfluenceofRussia,thechaosofIraqisectarianconflicts,theIran-IraqrapportandtheworseningoftheSyriancivilwar,USsoftmilitarypresenceis“toosoft”tocontrolIraqi,theGulf,andtheSyriansituations.

ApartfromIraq,Obamaattemptedtobuildasoftmilitarypresenceinotherpartsoftheworldaswell.Forinstance,inJanuary2012,theUSdeclaredthatitwouldestablishasoftmilitarypresence, i.e.,dronebases, inEthiopiaand intheRepublicofSeychelles.59OnJanuary25,2012,althoughWashingtonadmittedthatithadnointerestinbuildingmilitarybasesinthePhilippines,itwasinterestedincooperationinjointmilitaryexercises,anti-terrorism,andcombatingpiracy.60AllthesestepsareinlinewithObama’s“lightfootprint”strategy,ofestablishingasoftmilitarypresencesimilartothe“lilypads”inIraq.

58. MichaelJ.Courts,“MissionIraq:StateandDODFaceChallengesinFinalizingSupportandSecurityCapabilities,”USGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,June28,2012;availableat:http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-856T.

59. SchmittandSchmidt,“USDronesPatrollingItsSkies.”60. CraigWhitlock,“RemoteU.S.BaseatCoreofSecretOperations,”Washington Post, October

25,2012.

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