Game Theory

25
Playing the Business Game

description

Game Theory. Poker. Who plays? Do you play the probabilities?. John von Neumann. “The best mind of the 20th Century” 1928 - Mathematical genius von Neumann, 25, plays poker, invents game theory. The odds are meaningless when someone bluffs. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Game Theory

Page 1: Game Theory

Playing the Business Game

Page 2: Game Theory

Poker If you have ever played poker, do you play

the probabilities?

Page 3: Game Theory

John von Neumann “The best mind of the 20th Century” 1928 - Mathematical genius von Neumann,

25, plays poker, invents game theory.– The odds are meaningless when someone

bluffs. 1944 - Von Neumann is a major force in

inventing the atomic bomb and the modern computer.

1950 - Two Rand Corporation scientists invent the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.

Page 4: Game Theory

Game Theory

You have to take into consideration the objectives and strategies of the other players.

– Not just the probabilities– Not just your own goals and strategies– Your moves depend on your competitors’

moves

Page 5: Game Theory

The Prisoner’s Dilemma In 1950 a conductor on a train to Kiev

rehearses for a Tchaikovsky concert. KGB arrests him for subversive activity. KGB arrests Boris Tchaikovsky, a worker,

on the streets of Kiev. KGB puts them in separate cells so they

can’t communicate. KGB offers them both a deal.

Page 6: Game Theory

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

If the conductor turns states evidence and Boris doesn’t, he gets one year in a gulag and Boris gets 25 years.

If the conductor doesn’t turn states evidence and Boris does, he gets 25 years in a gulag and Boris gets one year.

Page 7: Game Theory

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

If both give incriminating evidence against the other (“rats”), each gets 10 years.

If neither rats, each get three years.

Page 8: Game Theory

Boris

Conductor

Rat Not Rat

Payoff Matrix

Rat

Not Rat

10, 10 * 1, 25

25, 1 3, 3

* Conductor, Boris

Page 9: Game Theory

The silent auction begins.

Page 10: Game Theory

The Prisoner’s Dilemma Each serving 10 years, they meet in the

gulag, begin talking and discover they ratted on each other.

While talking, they realize that if each had said nothing, they would only have been in for only three years.

Page 11: Game Theory

Scenario KAAA-TV, on the West Coast, is

considering switching from its current prime time (8-11 p.m.) to early prime time (7-10 p.m.). KAAA is #2 in prime time, and because of KBBB’s very strong 10-11 p.m. lead-in to its late news, KAAA is #2 in late news even though its news product is competitive. KBBB is #1 in late fringe also.

Page 12: Game Theory

Scenario KBBB-TV is #1 in prime time and has

excellent 10-11 p.m. network lead-ins to its 11 o’clock news, which puts it #1 in the late news race. KBBB is also #1 in late fringe.

KCCC-TV is a weak #3 in prime time and late news. It is a network-owned station and will not switch to early prime.

Page 13: Game Theory

KAAA Decision Tree

KAAA

KAAA Go

KBBB Go

KBBB No Go

KAAA No Go KBBB Go

KBBB No Go

Page 14: Game Theory

KAAA Decision Tree

KAAA

KAAA Go

KBBB Go

KBBB No Go

KAAA No Go KBBB Go

KBBB No Go

Page 15: Game Theory

Payoff Matrix

KBBB

KAAA

Go

No go

Go No Go

4, 2* 3, 4

1, 3 2, 1

Assigning weights is the most difficult decision.

* KAAA, KBBB

Page 16: Game Theory

KAAA’s Payoff Weights 4, 2 = If KAAA switches (go) to early prime

and KBBB also switches (go), both gain more revenue from higher ratings for 10-10:30 p.m. late news. KBBB doesn’t gain as much as it would if KAAA switches and KBBB doesn’t (3,4).

Page 17: Game Theory

KAAA’s Payoff Weights 3,4 = If KAAA switches (go) and KBBB

doesn’t switch (no go), KAAA gains revenue with its 10-10:30 p.m. news, but the news is up against KBBB’s strong prime and KBBB’s late news gets higher ratings than before because KAAA has dropped news from the time period.

Page 18: Game Theory

KAAA Strategies 1,3 = If KAAA doesn’t switch (no go) and

KBBB switches (go), KAAA loses big because its weaker 10-11 p.m. prime is up against strong KBBB news which has strong leadins and strong late fringe.

2,1 = If KAAA doesn’t switch and KBBB doesn’t switch, nothing happens, but the outcome isn’t as bad as if KAAA doesn’t switch and KBBB switches (1,3).

Page 19: Game Theory

KAAA Strategies Adding KAAA go weights (4+3 = 7) shows

switching is the best strategy, because its no-go weights (1+2 = 3) are much worse.

KBBB’s judged weights are the same with either decision (4+1 and 3+2 = 5).

Page 20: Game Theory

KAAA Strategies KAAA’s best strategy is to announce it’s staying

with its current schedule, hoping KBBB will switch to gain an advantage and hurt KAAA (1,3).

– False Announcement– Or consider a Preemptive Move

Amazon.com

Then, at the last moment, KAAA switches to early prime to gain its maximum outcome (4,2), assuming KBBB stays with its decision to switch.

– Secrecy Apple

Page 21: Game Theory

Game Theory

See “Game Theory- Sales ” case on www.charleswarner.us/indexppr.html for another business game using various strategic moves:

– False announcement– Secrecy– Preemptive Move– Tit for Tat

Page 22: Game Theory

The Prisoner’s Dilemma If the prisoners had been able to

communicate, what would have happened?

If they had been given a chance to play the game again and again, what would have happened?

Page 23: Game Theory

The Prisoner’s Dilemma The rules for the game changes when you

play repeatedly, as Rand Corporation scientists discovered.

And if the other side gets greedy (which is inevitable), you must use Tit-For-Tat.

You must teach the other side cooperation (to accept three years in the gulag) – to do what’s best for both.

Page 24: Game Theory

It might be a smart strategic move to change the game and the players.

In fact, it might be a smart strategic move to pay someone to compete.

– Coke, Pepsi and NutraSweet– Lin, McCaw and Bell South

Page 25: Game Theory

The lessons are:– Know what game you’re playing– Know the rules of the game– Play to win-win (cooperate). Do not play a zero-

sum game (win-lose). Think “we,” not “me.”

– Collectivism vs. individualism