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G7 to G8 to G20:Evolution in GlobalGovErnancEciGi G20 PaPErs | no. 6, May 2011

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G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global GovErnancE

Summary

This paper provides a brie history o the evolution othe Group o Seven (G7) rom its origins in the atermath

o the 1971 breakdown o the Bretton Woods system oexchange rates and the oil crisis in 1973. It then discussesRussias participation at summits ater the all o theBerlin Wall, ormally joining the group in 1997, thus becoming the Group o Eight (G8). The paper gives aconcise account o the ormation o the Group o Twenty(G20) nance ministers and central bank governors in thelate 1990s, in the wake o nancial crises in Asia and LatinAmerica, which was elevated to a leaders summit orumat the outbreak o the global nancial crisis in 2008. Thepaper wraps up with a discussion o the dierences in theG8 and G20 models, concluding that the G20 process isstill the best option or meeting the challenges o complex

global governance issues.

acronymS

3G Global Governance Group

ASEAN Association o Southeast Asian Nations

AU Arican Union

BMENA Aghanistan, the Broader Middle Eastand North Arica

CFGS Centre or Global Studies

G5 Group o Five

G7 Group o Seven

G8 Group o Eight

G20 Group o Twenty

IMF International Monetary Fund

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

US United States

Copyright 2011 The Centre or International Governance Innovation.

The opinions expressed in this publication are those o the author and do notnecessarily relect the views o The Centre or International Governance Innovationor its Operating Board o Directors or International Board o Governors.

This work was carried out with the support o The Centre or InternationalGovernance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (www.cigionline.org).This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives License. To view this license, visit (www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/). For re-use or distribution, please include thiscopyright notice.

Table of conTenTS

Summary 3

Acronyms 3

G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance 4

Works Cited 8

CIGI G20 Resources 9

About CIGI 10

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thE cEntrE for intErnational GovErnancE innovation

The origins o the G7/8 can be briefy summarized.1 In theuncertain years ollowing the 1971 collapse o the BrettonWoods system o xed international exchange rates tiedto the price o gold and the 1973 oil crisis, the need or better coordination o economic and nancial policyat the highest level became evident. Finance ministersrom key countries led the way (Hajnal, 2007: 1116). OnMarch 25, 1973, the nance ministers o Britain, France,Germany and the United States (US) met and ormed theLibrary Group, named ater the venue o their initialmeeting the White House Library. In September o thatyear, they were joined by the Japanese nance minister,and this group (subsequently known as the Group o Five

[G5]) met periodically or more than a decade.2

Following these exploratory meetings, French PresidentValery Giscard dEstaing in 1974, invited the headso government rom the United States, Britain, WestGermany, Japan and Italy to a summit the next year atRambouillet, France. In 1976, the group was expandedto seven, with the addition o Canada (seen as a NorthAmerican counterbalance to the inclusion o Italy byFrance), and has met 36 times in total. Beginning in theearly 1990s, Russia began participating in some o thesessions with G7 leaders during their summits and, at the

1 The literature on the G8 and the G20 has become extensive inrecent years. A historical summary o G8 development can be ound inThe G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation by PeterHajnal (2007). A useul bibliography can be ound on the Universityo Toronto/Munk School or Global Aairs G20 Inormation Centrewebsite (www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/index.html), and Canadian workon these subjects can be ound at the websites o the Centre or GlobalStudies (CFGS) at the University o Victoria (www.globalcentres.org),the Centre or International Governance Innovation (CIGI) in Waterloo(www.cigionline.org) and the Canadian Deence and Foreign AairsInstitute in Calgary (www.cdai.org).

2 The G5 nance ministers group was superseded by the G7 nanceministers group set up by the 1986 Tokyo G7 summit.

invitation o the G7, Russia ormally joined the group in1997. The G7 thus became the G8.

The initial composition o the group clearly representedthe dominant economic powers o the day, and these

countries shared the additional characteristics o beingdemocratic, largely Atlantic-oriented and militarilyallied to the United States. The club was relatively small,and the heads o government knew each other reasonablywell. The opportunity to talk inormally (the use o rstnames being common) and directly to counterparts wasviewed as invaluable, as was the political prole aorded by the regular summits. In retrospect, the addition oRussia now seems anomalous, but at the time, eorts werebeing made to encourage Russia to become a ree marketliberal democracy with a commitment to the internationalprocesses and norms that the G7 considered acceptable.This attempt to secure good behaviour through co-optionhas been only a partial success Russia remains dierentrom the original seven both politically and economically.3

The G8s working methods refect the G7s priorestablished habits o close consultation. Each head ogovernment appoints a personal representative o thegovernment leader, known in the trade as a Sherpa.This ocial is a critical cog in the summit machine and, tobe eective, must have direct access to and the condenceo their leader. The Sherpas meet repeatedly in the run-up to a summit, to broker agenda items, communiqulanguage and physical arrangements; by custom the

leader serving as host chair or a given year proposesthe main subject matter ocus or that session, as well asthe meeting site. Sherpas tend to be appointed or morethan one year (although the practice varies rom countryto country) and provide both institutional memory anda means to ensure ollow-up on previous commitments.

Over the years, while the agenda has remained ocused oneconomic and nancial issues, increasingly, leaders havetaken on a broader range o topics, rom security matters todevelopment to the environment. Once leaders had gatheredtogether, they did not eel circumscribed by the agenda, butinstead talked about what seemed most important to them

at the time, no matter what the precooked communiqusmight have suggested. By and large, the G8 had evolvedinto a comortable club by the turn o the century, anestablished eature o the international landscape thatacilitated policy coordination and guaranteed a goodphoto-op or leaders, which conveyed a sense o importanceto their respective domestic political audiences.

3 For an account o this period rom the perspective o the ClintonAdministration, see The Russian Hand: A Memoir o Presidential Diplomacy

by Strobe Talbott (2002).

abouT The auThor

Gordon Smith is a CIGI distinguished fellow and the

executive director of the Centre for Global Studies atthe University of Victoria in British Columbia. A former

Canadian deputy cabinet minister, NATO ambassador

and Sherpa for the prime minister of Canada at the

G7/G8 summits in Halifax, Lyon and Denver, he is a

leading expert on the evolution of the G20 and global

summitry. Since joining CIGI in 2010, he has been a key

contributor to CIGIs G20 research activities, events and

publications.

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By the late 1990s, however, a series o nancial crisescentred largely in Latin America and Asia4 had convincedthe G7 nance ministers that key emerging economieswere insuciently included in global economicmanagement eorts. Finance ministers had been meeting

together with their central bank governor counterpartsin parallel to the G7 summits since 1986. Their mandatehad been to ocus on airly technical matters related toeconomic and nancial growth and stability, infationand currency developments. Led by Canadian FinanceMinister Paul Martin and US Treasury Secretary LawrenceSummers, discussions were expanded to include a rangeo new players. Ater our initial meetings in 1998 and 1999involving larger groups o countries (the G22 and G33),in December 1999 a set grouping o 20 was established,consisting o the G8 along with key regional powers plusthe European Union.5

In the years that ollowed, the G20 nance ministersgroup proved its worth as a way o opening up andrationalizing the international dialogue. Paul Martin,in particular, was struck by its eectiveness. Based onthe experience o nance ministers and central bankgovernors, Martin became convinced that these countriesshould meet at the heads o government level. Duringhis period as Canadian Prime Minister (2003 to 2006), hecampaigned actively or the idea with his counterpartsand, driven in part through a network o think tanksaround the world, the approach developed currency.6

In the meantime, the practical disadvantages occasionedby the unrepresentative nature o G8 membership werebecoming clearer. The chair o the 2005 G8 summit, UnitedKingdom (UK) Prime Minister Tony Blair, responded byinviting ve key developing countries to the Gleneagles,Scotland, meeting Brazil, China, India, Mexico andSouth Arica. The 2007 Heiligendamm Summit inGermany regularized the relationship among the G8+5,establishing a schedule or regular ministerial meetings

4 Mexico 1994, Indonesia/Korea/Thailand 199798, Russia 1998,Brazil 19982002, Turkey 19992002 and Argentina 200001.

5 The additional countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China,India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Arica, South Korea andTurkey.

6 In 2003, Martin had encouraged the CFGS and CIGI to combinetheir eorts to fesh out the concept o a leaders G20. Those thinktanks worked with an array o international partners to produce acollection o research that addressed the many real-world obstacles andopportunities related to establish this new process. See, in particular,the CFGS website: www.l20.org/ and the accounts o the researchproject by Peter Heap: Globalization and Summit Reorm: An Experimentin International Governance (2008) and Breaking Global Deadlocks: ACanadian Track 1.5 Success (2009).

among the 13 countries to cover our areas.7 The so-calledHeiligendamm Process was scheduled or review at theG8 summit in 2009, but well beore then, the approach oinviting the heads o government o important countriesto the occasional meal during summits dominated by

developed countries, had become bankrupt and indeedinsulting to developing countries and their leaders.Refecting on the inappropriateness o dealing with thesecountries in this way, Paul Martin stated:

...the image o Hu Jintao, the president o China,and Manmohan Singh, the prime minister oIndia leaders o the two most populouscountries on earth, quite possibly destined to be the largest economies on earth within ourlietimes waiting outside while we held our G8meetings, coming in or lunch, and then beingushered rom the room so that we could resumeour discussions among ourselves, is one thatstayed with meEither the world will reorm itsinstitutions, including the G8, to embrace thesenew economic giants, or they will go ahead andestablish their own institutions (Martin, 2008:358).

The Heiligendamm Process was only a transitional stepin the direction o inclusiveness. It refected the view omany leaders, including the then-new UK Prime MinisterGordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozythat expansion at the summit level was inevitable. What

was lacking was the crisis that would make signicantinstitutional change seem essential and, in 2008, thecrisis arrived.

By the all o that year, the US economy was in ree alltriggered initially by bank ailures and a housing marketcollapse. Stock markets around the world plunged. Itquickly became apparent that the existing political andeconomic institutions the International MonetaryFund (IMF), the G8, the United Nations (UN) or theG20 grouping o nance ministers were incapable o

7 Promoting and protecting innovation; enhancing reedomo investment by means o an open investment climate includingstrengthening the principles o corporate social responsibilitydening joint responsibilities or development ocusing specicallyon Arica; and joint access to know-how to improve energy eciencyand technology cooperation with the aim o contributing to reducingCO2 emissions. See Heiligendamm Process declaration at www.g-8de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/2007-06-08-heiligendammprozess__en.html. Starting in 2000, G8 hosts began to invite a variablecollection o leaders rom developing countries (in Arica and Asia) tomeetings on the margins o the summits.

8 The +5 approach had the additional unwelcome consequence(rom the G8 perspective) o generating what was, in essence, a newcompeting group the G5 complete with secretariat and summischedule o its own. So much or the ecacy o hal measures.

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coordinating a response to the nancial crisis. At the endo October 2008, just prior to the US presidential election,a lame-duck President George W. Bush called together theleaders o the G20 countries to review progress beingmade to address the current nancial crisis, advance

a common understanding o its causes and, in order toavoid a repetition, agree on a common set o principlesor reorm o the regulatory and institutional regimes orthe worlds nancial sectors (Perino, 2008). A meetingo G20 nance ministers was already scheduled orNovember 2008; in the event, it served as a preparatorysession or the subsequent meeting at the leaders level.9

The meetings on November 14 and 15, 2008, were notsmall, including, as they did, the leaders o the IMF andthe World Bank, as well UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the chair o the Financial Stability Forum. Inaddition, Spain and the Netherlands insisted on beingpresent and were supported in this eort by the Frenchpresident, who was also president o the European Unionat the time and, thus, controlled two sets o seats.

The litmus test o this rst G20 summits success, at atime o high nancial peril, was that the leaders ound itsuciently worthwhile to ollow through and meet again.In London in April 2009 and Pittsburgh in Septemberthe same year, leaders subsequently hammered outa common approach, which included coordinatingeconomic stimulus packages (and, eventually, steps toextricate themselves rom them), avoiding protectionism,

working to address global imbalances, tripling thenancial resources o the IMF (thereby reinvigoratinga moribund institution) and working out stricter rulesor banks, hedge unds and other nancial players. Thegeneral view is that the rst three G20 summits can becounted as successes, especially when the potentialalternatives are considered.10

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper decided tohost G8 and G20 summits back-to-back in 2010. Theoutcome o the Huntsville G8 and the Toronto G20 didnot illuminate the respective roles o the two gatheringsso much as it demonstrated the conusion over them. It

could be argued that Toronto (as opposed to Huntsville),served to cement key developing countries into global

9 Earlier in the year, on August 27, 2008, President Sarkozy had calledor the G8 to be expanded to a G13 (by adding China, India, Mexico,Brazil and South Arica), but the French president acquiesced in the G20summit conguration.

10 See Whatever Happened to the G20? (2010) by Katinka Baryschor a rather contrary view rom the Centre or European Reorm.Katinka Barysch emphasizes the need or G20 leaders to concentrate onunnished business and resist the temptation o broadening the agenda.She also suggests that leaders ocus on the task o integrating the G20into the existing systems o global governance.

decision making but, equally, a case could be made thatthe G20 needed more time to work through the ambitiouswork program set in motion at the two G20 meetings London and Pittsburgh held in 2009.

The Seoul G20 Summit in November 2010 was wellprepared and skillully executed. The Koreans did anexcellent job in consulting with non-G20 countriesand non-state actors, including the development and business communities, and civil society generally. TheSeoul agenda again ocused on the commitments made atprevious G20 summits, and the progress made towardsthose commitments. The Koreans, however, also addedaspects o development and global nancial saety nets tothe agenda and, as such, successully added developmentto the G20 agenda with commitments that will requireollow-up at uture summits.

France is hosting both the G8 and G20 summits in 2011. TheFrench are prudently planning or two separate summitswith two separate agendas. The G8 will take place inMay and the G20 in November. The G8 in Deauvillewill give priority to: Aghanistan, the Broader MiddleEast and North Arica (BMENA) Initiative, the Internet,non-prolieration, G8 partnerships with Arica, counter-terrorism, drug-tracking and security (G8-G20 France2011, 2011a). Like the G20 summit, the G8 agenda willinclude ollow-up on past commitments rom previoussummits and progress reports on working groups. Atthe G20 summit in Cannes, the French priorities are:

continuing the previous work on coordinated economicpolicies and macroeconomic imbalances, strengtheningnancial regulation, and development; more specicallyin terms o French priorities, President Sarkozy hasspoken on a number o occasions about reorm o theinternational monetary system; reducing volatility incommodity markets; and improving global governance.

The G20 at the leaders level was originally convened tomitigate the damage o the nancial crisis o 2008. As wetransition out o crisis management towards recoveryand stability, there is a concern that countries will losethe sense o urgency to agree on key issues and the

policies in response to them. Most importantly, the G20will only be capable o continuing as an infuential orumi it successully coordinates its eorts on resolving thenancial issues that originally called it into existence.

I the G20 increases its credibility, the potential does existor it to substantively tackle other pressing challengesmentioned (within the context o the crisis). When andhow these issues will be added to the agenda depends onthe G20 chair, which is responsible or setting the agendaor each summit. The Koreans added development tothe Seoul summit agenda and produced the G20 Action

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Plan on Development. The French will continue thedevelopment work initiated in Seoul, and have stated theyseek to raise its prole as an agenda item (G8-G20 France2011, 2011b). France has also added ood security to itsagenda in the context o commodity price volatility.

The Mexicans, as 2012 G20 hosts, have already beganruminating on potential agenda items and topics. Mexico,as an emerging economy, recognizes its role as a bridgecountry, and hopes to make a contribution on subjectssignicant to both emerging and developed counties.

Earlier discussions or a more representative body thanthe G8 model tended to treat the question o who wouldqualiy or inclusion with circumspection. Although theCannes summit in 2011 will be the sixth meeting o the G20leaders, there is still ongoing debate regarding who will beat the table. None o the summits, thus ar, have actuallyhad 20 seats at the table. Spain and the Netherlands wereinvited to the rst ew meetings, and Pittsburgh invitedthe Association o Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)and the Arican Union (AU). The Koreans invitedve additional countries our as representatives oregional organizations: Malawi (AU); Ethiopia (NewPartnership or Aricas Development); Singapore(3G);11 Spain (based on the size o its economy and now,curiously, a permanent guest); Vietnam (ASEAN); andseven international organizations: the Financial StabilityBoard, the International Labour Organization, theIMF, the Organisation or Economic Co-operation andDevelopment, the UN, the World Bank, and the World

Trade Organization. Despite these additions, Arica is stillunder-represented and Europe is still over-represented.There is no criterion or membership, and the excludedwill always be critical, i not resentul, o both the processand its outcomes, until the day they are at the table.

The relationships among leaders are an important actorin the success o summits. The greater the number oleaders around the table, the more challenges it presentsin developing empathy and personal relationships imperative in generating consensus. Personal trust amongleaders allows or the candid discussion o sensitiveissues without political posturing. To engage the leaders

in discussions, there needs to be ewer people in the room,and the heads o international organizations should onlybe present or relevant agenda items.

11 The 3G is the Global Governance Group, is an inormal group osmall- and medium-sized states that came together in 2010 in the hopeo developing a constructive dialogue on coordination and cooperation

between G20 and non-G20 members. Singapore is chair o the group.See: www.un.org/esa/d/events/2010GAWGFC/7/Stmt_Singapore.pd.

The new norm will be ve non-members invited to G20summits. The reality is that the invited guests say verylittle. The discussions at these summits are very dierenthan in the G8. People read statements, come in and outo the room, and the heads o international organizations

and non-G20 countries do not contribute much. Thereewheeling discussion characteristic o the G8 meetingsseems to no longer exist. This is deeply worrying.

Finally, there is the more general consideration concerningthose that are not in the room. To enhance legitimacyor, and understanding o, the G20 process, moreextensive outreach eorts are being institutionalizedled by the chair. The Koreans were successul in theiroutreach eorts, hosting consultative meetings withthe development community as well as a side event a business summit with business leaders. The G20must incorporate the interests, perspectives and opinionso both excluded countries and non-state actors. Thelegitimacy o the decisions and directions taken by theG20 depends on the degree to which those let out eerepresented by the process the greater their perceptiono inclusion, the more likely they will be to adopt orendorse G20 policy positions (Carin et al., 2010). Thisrequires reaching out to not only other governments, butto business and civil society (as the Koreans did), regionaorganizations and the policy research communityTransparency and participation will enhance the G20slegitimacy.

For the G20 to be sustainable, it must be legitimate. To belegitimate, it must be eective as well as demonstrablymore representative than the G8. Public opinion is becoming increasingly impatient with the perceivelack o output rom this process. However, the G20is exactly that: a process. It is a mechanism to workthrough intense policy disputes, or leaders to meet andagree on coordinated policies and to provide leadershipon dicult global challenges. At this point in time, theG20 remains the best option or working through suchcomplex challenges.

A longer version o this paper will be published by the Trilateria

Commission later in 2011.

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WorkS ciTed

Barysch, Katinka (2010). Whatever Happened to theG20? Centre or European Reorm (blog). April 14. See:

http://centreoreuropeanreorm.blogspot.com.

Carin, Barry et al. (2010). Making the G20 Summit ProcessWork: Some Proposals or Improving Eectiveness andLegitimacy. CIGI G20 Paper No. 2 (June).

G8-G20 France 2011 (2011a). The Priorities o the FrenchPresidency or G8. Available at: www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/priorities-or-rance/the-priorities-o-the-rench-presidency/the-priorities-o-the-rench-presidency-or-g8.815.html.

G8-G20 France 2011 (2011b). The Priorities o the FrenchPresidency. Available at: www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g20/english/priorities-or-rance/the-priorities-o-the-rench-presidency/the-priorities-o-the-rench-presidency.75.html.

Hajnal, Peter (2007). The G8 System and the G20: Evolution,Role and Documentation. London: Ashgate.

Heap, Peter (2008). Globalization and Summit Reorm: AnExperiment in International Governance. Springer/IDRC.

Heap, Peter (2009). Breaking Global Deadlocks: ACanadian Track 1.5 Success, Policy Update Paper,Canadian Deence and Foreign Aairs Institute(September).

Martin, Paul (2008).Hell or High Water: My Lie In and Outo Politics. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.

Perino, Dana (2008). Quoted in a story in The WashingtonPost, October 22.

Talbott, Strobe (2002). The Russian Hand: A Memoir o

Presidential Diplomacy. Random House.

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ciGi G20 reSourceS

all ciGi publicaTionS are available for free

doWnload aT:

WWW.ciGionline.orG/publicaTionS

G20 paper SerieS

The Financial Stability Board and International StandardsEric Helleiner,CIGI G20 Paper No. 1(June 2010).

Making the G20 Summit Process Work: Some Proposals orImproving Eectiveness and LegitimacyBarry Carin, Paul Heinbecker, Gordon Smith, RameshThakur, CIGI G20 Paper No. 2(June 2010).

The G20 and the Post-Crisis Economic OrderAndrew F. Cooper and Colin I. Bradord Jr., CIGI G20Paper No. 3 (June 2010).

The G20 Framework or Strong, Sustainable and BalancedGrowth: A Study in Credible Cooperation.Daniel Schwanen, CIGI G20 Paper No. 4 (June 2010).

The Future o the G20 and Its Place in Global Governance.Paul Heinbecker, CIGI G20 Paper No. 5 (April 2011).

commenTarieS

Beneft Sharing or the French G20: The Role o AsiaGregory Chin (February 2011).

Understanding Global Interdependencies: The Contribution oEconomic ModelsBadye Essid and Paul Jenkins (April 2011).

The Global Rebalancing and Growth Strategy DebateColin Bradord (April 2011).

reporTS

Flashpoints or the Pittsburgh SummitEdited by Andrew F. Cooper and Daniel Schwanen, CIGISpecial G20 Report (September 2009).

The Future o the International Monetary Fund:A Canadian PerspectiveBessma Momani, Debra Steger, Eric Helleiner, Thomas A.Bernes, Eric Santor, Randall Gemain, C. Scott Clark, DaneRowlands, Robert Lavigne, Roy Culpepper and James A.Haley, CIGI/CIC Special Report(September 2009).

The Financial Stability Board: An Eective Fourth Pillar oGlobal Economic Governance?Edited by Stephany Grith-Jones, Eric Helleiner andNgaire Woods, CIGI Special Report (June 2010).

Leadership and the Global Governance Agenda: Three VoicesAlan A. Alexandro, David Shorr, Wang Zaibang, CIGISpecial Report (June 2010).

Challenges and Opportunities or the French Presidency: TheG20 2011 and BeyondColin Bradord, Barry Carin, Paul Jenkins, Deanne Leisoand Gordon Smith, CIGI-IFRI Conerence Report (March2011).

The G20 Agenda and Process: Analysis and Insight by CIGIExperts

Compiled and with an introduction by Max Brem(March 2011).

Preventing Crises and Promoting Economic Growth: AFramework or International Policy CooperationPaola Subacchi and Paul Jenkins, Joint CIGI andChatham House Report (April 2011).

naTional perSpecTiveS on Global leaderShip

National Perspectives on Global Leadership: Soundings Series Summitry and Public Perceptions

A joint CIGI-Brookings Institution Project, ColinBradord et al. (March 2011).

NPGL Soundings Series: www.cigionline.org/npgl

online reSourceS

G20 Web Page: www.cigionline.org/g20

NPGL Soundings Series: www.cigionline.org/npgl

Summit Speak Blog: www.cigionline.org/publications/

blogs/summitspeak

G20 Twitter Feed: twitter.com/cigionline

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abouT ciGi

The Centre or International Governance Innovation isan independent, non-partisan think tank on international

governance. Led by experienced practitioners anddistinguished academics, CIGI supports research, ormsnetworks, advances policy debate and generates ideas ormultilateral governance improvements. Conducting anactive agenda o research, events and publications, CIGIsinterdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy,business and academic communities around the world.

CIGIs current research programs ocus on our themes:the global economy; the environment and energy;development; and global security.

CIGI was ounded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, co-CEO o RIM

(Research In Motion) and collaborates with and grateullyacknowledges support rom a number o strategicpartners, in particular the Government o Canada and theGovernment o Ontario.

Le CIGI a t ond en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, co-che dela direction de RIM (Research In Motion). Il collaboreavec de nombreux partenaires stratgiques et exprime sareconnaissance du soutien reu de ceux-ci, notamment delappui reu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui dugouvernement de lOntario.

For more inormation, please visit www.cigionline.org.

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