“Under Illinois law, a release is a contract whereby a party abandons a claim to the person against whom the claim exists.” Loberg v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 323 Ill. App. 3d 936, 941 (1st Dist. 2001)(citations omitted). “Illinois courts treat a settlement agreement in the same manner as other contracts.” Tropp v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 2003 WL 21688245 (N.D.Ill. 2003)(citing Henderson v. Roadway Express, 308 Ill. App. 3d 546, 548 (4th Dist. 1999).

“[T]he rights of the parties are limited to the terms expressed in the agreement and a release will not be construed to release claims not within the contemplation of the parties.”“Where the terms of the release are clear and explicit, the court must enforce the release as written.” Loberg, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 941; Tropp, WL 21688245 at 9.

Third Swansea Prop., Inc. v. Ockerlund Construction Co., 41 Ill. App. 3d 894, 897 (1st Dist. 1976)(

EXPRESS LANGUAGE

Keeran v. Wahl Co., 320 Ill.App. 457, 466-67 (1st Dist. 1943)(Document signed by plaintiff releasing defendants “from all claims and demands of every kind, nature and description ‘which I now have (or may hereafter have), arising out of anything that has heretofore transpired,’” did not release claims for acts committed after the date the release was executed.) The intention of the parties is found in the language of the instrument itself, in light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. 466.

“Where the language of the release is directed to claims then in existence, it will not be extended to cover claims that arise in the future.”LaGrange Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n v. Rock River Corp., 97 Ill.App.3d 712, 716 (2d Dist. 1981)(Settlement agreement in prior breach of contract action did not bar claims for future breaches of contract where the agreement released defendant “from all causes of action, claims . . . known or unknown . . . which they now own or hold or have at any time heretofore owned or held as against any of the parties hereinabove specified . . .”)

“A release covering all claims that might later arise between the parties would constitute a consent to the foregoing of legal protection for the future and would plainly be against public policy.” 687 (quotations omitted).“[C]laims that originate subsequent to [the release’s] execution are not discharged absent a clear expression of intent to that effect.” 686. (citing Rotberg v. Dodwell & Co., 152 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1945); W.J. Perryman & Co. v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 324 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1963).Chubb v. Amax Coal Co., Inc., 125 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-87 (5th Dist. 1984)(Release in settlement agreement for plaintiff’s previous claim under an insurance policy did not waive liability for future claims under the identical insurance policy where a separate paragraph of the settlement agreement generally waived all claims “arising out of any matter described in paragraph 1 [(releasing the particular claims plaintiff had brought)]

which exist as of this date but which he does not know or suspect to exist in his favor”, and thereby “implicitly limited the release of future claims to those that were in existence but unsuspected by the plaintiff”.)

Carona v. Illinois Cent. Gulf Railroad Co., 203 Ill.App.3d 947, (5th Dist. 1990)(

A party cannot waive future unknown claims.FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 892 F.Supp. 1061, 1066-67 (N.D.Ill. 1995)(provision in “New Product Submission Form”1 waiving plaintiff’s future unknown claims for intellectual property infringement was invalid.) Such a claim is void against public policy. 1066.

But

Fair v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 905 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1990)(In title VII discrimination claim, settlement agreement waiving plaintiff’s right to sue claims relating to her (past, present and future) employment relationship with defendant, precluded plaintiff’s claim that defendant failed to categorize her settlement proceeds as salary contributing to her retirement fund. Although plaintiff was reinstated for a year and a half in terms of salary, the agreement also provided she would “cease reporting to work”, and was executed less than two years before plaintiff would receive her pension, so the claim was not unknown, i.e. “discoverable upon reasonable inquiry.”)

Moreover, in securities cases, waivers of future illegal conduct are void. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a)(“Any … provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter … be void.”); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 402 (7th Cir. 1978)(“[R]elease of claims under the federal securities laws is valid only as to mature, ripened claims of which the releasing party had knowledge before signing the release.”)

Releases absolving a party of future liability for antitrust violations is in restraint of trade and void as against public policy; this impacts the public.Oberweis Dairy, Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 568 F.Supp. 1096, 1099 (N.D.Ill. 1983)(Settlement agreement release did not bar plaintiff’s claims against defendant for anti-competitive conduct occurring after execution of the settlement agreement. Provisions “absolve[ing] liability for future violations of the antitrust statutes against another” are void as against public policy because “the effect of such a release could be to permit a restraint of trade to be engaged in, which would have impact, not simply between the parties, but upon the public as well.”)

1 “We are prepared to consider your idea only upon the following terms: 1. You will expressly waive any and all claims of any kind whatsoever, past, present or future, known or unknown against Playmates Toys, Inc. in any way relating to or connected to the “idea”.” Id. at 1064. Because the waiver includes any claims relating to the “idea”, it encompasses all future conduct/wrongs by defendant in connection with the idea.