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From the Lane to the City:The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’sLow Cost Sanitation Model

A WaterAid reportby Akbar Zaidi

From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model

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WaterAidPrince Consort House27-29 Albert EmbankmentLondon SE1 7UB

Telephone: +44 (0)20 7793 4500Fax: +44 (0)20 7793 4545Website: www.wateraid.org.uk

Charity Reg No 288701

Published by WaterAidLondonJune 2001

All rights reserved.

This report is one of a series whichanalyse WaterAid’s experience insupporting integrated water,sanitation and hygiene educationprojects in developing countries.Other reports in the series are:

WAMMA: Empowerment in practiceHitosa Water Supply: A people’sprojectIndia: Making government fundingwork harderContracts or Partnerships: Workingthrough local NGOs in Ghana andNepal

Cover Photo: WaterAid/Caroline Penn

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Men dig a trench and lay pipes through compacted sewage, earth and rubbish inHassanpura, Faisalabad.


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Contents

Introduction 4

OPP Principles of Good Practice 8

Problems of Replication 13

OPP – The Wider Impact 16

Conclusion 19

List of Acronyms and Terms 21

Bibliography 22

Acknowledgements 23

Boxes and TablesAkhtar Hameed Khan and the OPP’s Growing Influence 12The Anjuman Samaji Behbood (ASB) Experience in Faisalabad 15

A WaterAid Report

Written by Akbar Zaidi

Edited by Eric Gutierrez and Virginia Roaf

June 2001

From the Lane to the City:The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’sLow Cost Sanitation Model

Karachi

P A K I S T A N

C H I N AT A J I K I S T A N

I R A N

A F G H A N I S T A N

I N D I A

150 300 Kms0➛

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Rawalpindi

Faisalabad

Multan

Mingora

LodhranUch


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In 1994, WaterAid started arelationship with one of Pakistan’smost influential non-governmentalorganisations (NGO) and perhapsthe world’s best-known non-governmental project in the large-scale provision of sanitation for theurban poor – the Orangi PilotProject (OPP). This relationshipwas primarily aimed at learninglessons from the ‘OPP experience,’and in funding projects to replicatethis process inside and outsidePakistan. Five years later, asWaterAid was to carry out someform of assessment of this funding,it received a proposal for a broaderstudy on the impact of the OPP.1

Wishing to contribute to anindependent critical assessment ofthe OPP, WaterAid funded thebroader study, from which thisabbreviated report is derived.

The OPP started in 1980 in thedepressed and crowded Orangisettlement, one of Karachi’s2 mostblighted districts and its largestkatchi abadi with a population of 1.2million. Led by the renowned DrAkhtar Hameed Khan (see boxp.12), the OPP evolved in just a fewyears to be a remarkable self-funded, self-administered and self-maintained grassroots movementrelying on nothing more than theresources and skills of its urbanpoor constituents using localmaterials and labour in buildinghundreds of kilometres ofextremely low-cost undergroundsewers.3 By April 2001 these hadbenefited 92,184 families in 6,134lanes, representing almost 90% ofthe entire settlement. There havealso been 409 collector sewers built,and collectively the communityhave invested Rs. 82.141 million(£924,000) in their seweragesystem. By the late 1980s, the OPP

Introduction

had radically changed the Orangisettlement. Gone were the murky,stinking open sewers thatcrisscrossed the settlement andwhich posed considerable healthand physical hazards to itsresidents. Mobility improvedwithin the community both forgoods and human traffic, boostinghome-based enterprises and small-scale trading. Infant mortality ratefell from 130 per thousand livebirths in 1982 to 37 per thousand in1991, which was far faster than ithad fallen in Karachi or the rest ofPakistan.(Badshah, 1996: 49; andReed and Vines, 1992a:19)4 Theavailability of cleaner and extendedspace in front of houses had asignificant social and recreationalimpact as well. New and relativelysafer play areas for childrenemerged.5 Women were able tomove around more freely and bevisited by friends and relatives,leading some to comment that itimproved marriage prospects foryoung women.6 Such success hasnaturally drawn attention from theworld over. The OPP experience is,in WaterAid and many otherdevelopment agencies’ view, amost impressive demonstration ofjust how much urban poorcommunities can contribute to thedevelopment of quite complexlarge-scale infrastructure projects.It also presented a challenge todominant development paradigmsthat are too technical, too reliant ongovernment and donor support,and which generally treated poorcommunities as simply the objectsof, rather than the central force ofdevelopment.

Over time, the OPP expandedbeyond sanitation provision tocover programmes for health,credit, low-cost housing and

education. By 1988, fourautonomous institutions were inplace to manage the OPP’sexpanding concerns. The mainOPP Research and TrainingInstitute (OPP-RTI) took charge ofthe Low Cost SanitationProgramme and the EducationProgramme. The OrangiCharitable Trust (OCT) ran theFamily Enterprise EconomicProgramme that provided cheapand readily accessible credit. TheKarachi Health and SocialDevelopment Association

1 The proposal was submitted by the OPPand the London-based InternationalInstitute for Environment and Development(IIED) in early 1999.

2 Karachi is Pakistan’s economic centre witha total population of over 9 millionresidents.

3 It is not very clear by how much the OPPlow-cost sanitation model is cheaper thanother alternatives because of difficulties incomparison. However, some studies haveshown that sewer construction in Orangiare one-seventh the cost compared to thoseconstructed by the Karachi MetropolitanCorporation (KMC) due to thesimplification of the technical design andthe elimination of middlemen, contractorsand the pay-off to professionals likeengineers. (Siddiqui and Rashid, 1997).

4 The improvement in infant mortality ratescan be attributed to many factors, includingreduction of solid wastes, the reduction ofchildren defecating in the streets, etc. Butmost observers and official sources agreethat the most important factor is theconstruction of underground sewers.

5 In the Manzoor Colony where an 8-12 footwide concrete case was built on a 2050-footnala local enthusiasts acquired a continuouscricket pitch.

6 It is customary in Pakistani society for thepotential husband’s parents and elders tovisit the house of their prospectivedaughter-in-law.


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(KHASDA) implemented theHealth Programme. And finallythere was the OPP Society thatadministered funding from theInfaq Foundation, a Pakistanicharity, for the OPP organisations.

The OPP, however, was ascontroversial as it was popular.Despite its ostensible success andtremendous potential, the ‘OPPexperience’ was perceived not to bereplicable on any serious scaleoutside of Karachi. It faced anumber of critics – fromgovernment, the internationaldonor community, as well asPakistani NGOs – who posed awide array of arguments thatdownplayed and sometimes deniedoutright the OPP’s claims tosuccess. There were critics whopointed out that the OPPexperience was specific to Orangi.Orangi has a natural slope, whichmade secondary sewer lanes andcollection points dispensable to acertain extent. Had Orangi been onflat terrain, the project may havehad to rely on government anddonor support from the outset.Furthermore, most Orangihouseholders were acknowledgedowner-occupiers, who had moreincentive and security of tenurethan renters or squatters to investtheir hard-earned income in sewerconstruction. Others say that theOPP was too ‘Dr Khan-centred’,and reliant on his involvement.Government engineers andindustry professionals initiallydoubted the quality and technicalstandards of the OPP-facilitatedsewer lines. Some critics look atsustainability, arguing that OPP-initiated community organisationscreated through this process do notactively continue once constructionwork has been completed.

But perhaps the main point thatbrought the OPP into conflict witha number of NGOs, the donor

community and government wasits firm, resolute and activerejection of any form of subsidiesor funding for what it termed asinternal7 development work forpoor communities. The OPPstressed that the responsibility tofund the internal component restssolely with the community. Itbelieves that government or donormoney, when used for internaldevelopment, is a corruptingsystem that undermines theindigenous and self-motivatedinitiatives of communities. Theycondemned NGOs that readilyaccept donor money as contractorswho make a business out ofdevelopment work. The OPPbecame known for its consistent

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Children cross over the sewage flow in Mansoor colony, Karachi.

7 The OPP used the term internal to refer toany form of development work that thepeople, communities, and lanes aresupposed to do, while external refers to theresponsibility of government. This isdiscussed in the following section of thisreport.

criticism of NGOs that thrive onforeign funding which, as a result,reinforces development paradigmsthat depend on complex, technicalinputs from highly-paidconsultants and organisationsrather than rely on what isavailable from communities. TheOPP has in fact developed areputation for taking on andchallenging even internationaldonor organisations. It called the


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Urban Basic Services (UBS)programme – nominated by theUnited Nations InternationalChildren’s Fund (UNICEF) as oneof the ‘Best Practices’ projects forthe Habitat II conference – afailure, despite its owninvolvement with it.

In 1990, when the OPP-RTI learnedabout an Asian Development Bankfunded project for Orangi, whichwas ignoring the work the peoplehad done and was building bothinternal and external sanitation, itlobbied with the Mayor to adoptthe OPP principles. The OPPcampaigned actively, pointing outdesign flaws and technical defectsof the plan while proposingalternatives. As a result, a projectthat was to cost Rs 1,300 million(£14.7 million) was reduced to acost of Rs 36.2 million (£410,000)and 21,866 houses benefited from itand improved communitymonitoring roles were introduced.

Further, a major component of theGreater Karachi Sewerage Plan, theUS$70 million (£50 million) ADBloan for the Korangi SewerageProject, was withdrawn altogetherdue to intense lobbying, creatingboth friends and enemies for theOPP both within government andin donor organisations who wereembarrassed by the cancellation.

Critics have charged that the OPPtends to be ‘rigid in its thinking’ andthat it is an organisation that doesnot agree with any analysis, evenwhen not critical, if it does not fittheir own organisational frameworkand values. The OPP, they contend,would not accept that transparentfunds from donor organisationsmay serve a useful purpose.

What compounds the controversiesis that analyses on these issues areoften difficult to make, becausethere have been too fewindependent studies of the OPP.

Most of the many materials on theOPP are documentation assembledby the OPP itself, leading to acharge that there is a lack of reliableinformation and analysis that cancapture, put into context, andcritically analyse the variousaspects of the ‘OPP experience’.

A further criticism aimed at the OPPrevolves around how it distanceditself from the violence that madeKarachi one of the most violent anddivided cities in Asia. This peakedin 1985-86, and was largelylocalised, with ethnic roots,although there was the significantinvolvement of the land mafia thatwere prevalent in katchi abadis. By1988 however, the violence took amore political colour, controlledfrom areas outside Orangi, andinvolving partisans of factionswithin the Muhajir QuamiMovement (MQM) and the nationalgovernment. Thousands of liveswere lost in this strife, with curfewbeing imposed on Orangi for dayson end. The OPP initiated the repairand rebuilding of infrastructureafter incidents of violence, offeringits offices as a place for debate anddiscussion to the leaders of thevarious ethnic groups. However,critics say the OPP should haveused its influence to intervene andmitigate the violence. The OPP saysit is precisely its non-interferencepolicy, its particular focus onsanitation, and its non-involvementin issues where it has notconsolidated expertise, that hasbeen its source of strength andwhich has made it successful. Untiltoday, the OPP stays away fromissues that do not concern it, and asa result, is generally seen in Orangias a non-partisan organisation.

This study is thus a preliminarycritical assessment of the OrangiPilot Project that tries to put the‘OPP experience’ as well as thecontroversies around it into a

longer-term and relatively moreobjective perspective. Amongothers, it argues that the OPPphilosophy is based on simplecommunity-centred principles andpractice whose main goal is tomake NGOs and outside changeagents peripheral to thecommunity, that is, that the poorcommunity is empowered to thepoint that they could do things ontheir own without relying much onNGOs, donor organisations or evengovernment.8 The OPP ethic issimply to be researchers andfacilitators. It does not carry outdevelopment and does not take its“model” to the people unless it hasfirst established substantial linkswith the community. Thus the OPPappears as a paradox. It does notseek a power agenda, it keeps anon-state, non-party role, andsometimes even identifies itself as anon-NGO player in Pakistan’sdevelopment matrix. Yet this verycharacter is what makes itsuccessful and consequently,threatening to those who havepower. This explains why it hasbecome controversial to manydevelopment players, and why ithas fiercely strived to retain itsindependence.

This study however, is not a fullevaluation of the OPP. It focusesonly on OPPs low-cost sanitationprogramme, rather than the wholerange of programmes it hasdeveloped since its inception.These include housing, health,education and micro-credit. Itreviews the nature and philosophyof the organisation, its technical,social and training approaches, theefforts to replicate it at the microlevel, its effect on the macro policy

8 This is for the internal components of thework; the OPP has always expected thatdonor organisations and the governmentwould take responsibility for the externalcomponents.


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level as well as its overall impact inPakistan. The lessons are thenidentified and discussed in a long-term development policyperspective.

The study methodology is chieflybased on a thorough review of thepublished and unpublished reportson the OPP; visits to the OPPproject sites in Karachi and theOPP-advised projects initiated byother NGOs outside Karachi; anddirect interaction with key peopleinvolved as well as informedobservers. Interviews and focusgroup discussions were held inPakistan, which included aparticipatory assessment andreview of impact sessionsconducted with the concernedcommunities in Orangi (Karachi)and Hasanpura (Faisalabad). E-mails were sent out to donororganisations, NGOs, academics,and professionals for opinions onthe OPP from outside of Pakistan.

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Raw sewage and rubbish fill the 200-foot wide drainage creek for Mansoor colony.

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Mansoor colony after the community laid the drainage system and pavement was put downby the municipal authority.


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The Orangi Pilot Project has reallydone nothing extraordinary interms of implementation,intervention or invention. Theconsiderable success of the OrangiPilot Project and its model, are notso much its technical innovations,but the nature, philosophy, andmethodology of the organisation.This approach has its roots in thecommunity research and extensionwork of OPP’s founder, Dr AkhtarHameed Khan, in the rural andagricultural communities ofComilla, East Pakiston (nowBangladesh) in the 1960s. Thisapproach, which made Dr Khan awell-known development theoristand worker, is based largely on theidea of ‘social preparation’ – thatbefore development work andphysical infrastructure can be builtespecially in poor communities,there has to be a prerequisite phaseof ‘social infrastructure building.’Social infrastructure building canbe broadly defined, ranging frombasic education, identification andtraining of local leaders, to complexcommunity consultationapproaches, to setting up andmaintaining actual socialorganisations. The socialpreparation that the OPPundertook in Orangi was identifiedas early as 1985 when an evaluationwrote, “It is apparent thatconsiderations of externalapplication relate principally toprogramme approach andorganisation rather than the typeand design of sanitation systems,”and that “a totally self-helpsanitation programme is onlypartly dependent on technicalcompetence. The crucial componentis the sociological input if successfulimplementation is to be achieved…” (Abbott and Lumbers, 1985: 30).

OPP Principles of Good Practice

A community therefore needs to be‘socially prepared’ to embark on alarge-scale infrastructure project.But there are differentinterpretations of ‘socialpreparation.’ Certain localpoliticians as well as NGOs inPakistan, for instance, will interpretsocial preparation in terms ofconducting formal socio-economicsurveys and using this as a basisfor convincing the nationalgovernment or donor organisationsto allocate funds and inaugurateprojects. National governments willhave different ideas of socialpreparation more closely aligned toa self-interested local politicalagenda. The OPP has a morealtruistic, community-oriented andcommunity-inspired idea of socialpreparation. Social preparation isguided by a general strategy topromote community organisationand self-management, by providingsocial and technical guidance thatencourages the mobilisation oflocal managerial and financialresources and the practice of co-operative self-action. Applyingthese principles in Orangi was, inmany ways, facilitated by thecommunity’s own self-preparation– they were already buildingsewers long before the OPP wasestablished. The general principlesof the OPPs social preparation,which is not a one-off but acontinuous on-going processthrough the project, are as follows:

• Existing local communityorganisations are the primaryand principal players in theproject. They need to becarefully identified from thebeginning, and a serious,consistent dialogue with themand general members of thecommunity started to identify

what they, not the NGO orgovernment, consider to be theirpriority problems. Formalphysical and socio-economicsurveys should only besupplementary to thesedialogues and consultations.

• Projects should generally rely onwhat is readily available. Thecommunity has some of theneeded resources fordevelopment but it needssupport to fully use theseresources. A survey anddocumentation of what exists isuseful: physical conditions,social actors and theirrelationships, economicconditions, technologies in use.How the community tackles thepriority problems needs to beidentified and studied. A studyis not needed to identifyprojects, but is required tounderstand the people, theirprocesses and relationships, andto identify their choices.Decisions can then be made onwhether existing systems couldbe either improved or whether acompletely new approach isnecessary.

• The conceptual plan is anecessary tool in the process.The development of aconceptual plan should be basedon the following principles:division of work into internaland external infrastructurecomponents, component sharingbetween the community NGOand/or government, whilemaking sure that there is no costsharing;9 decentralisation offunctions/technology;establishment of the optimumrelationship between needs,resources and standards.


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9 Component sharing is the separationbetween the internal component which isthe lane sewers and household connectionsand the external component, which is thetrunk sewers and treatment plants, lanesewers and the sewers outside thecommunity boundaries: the bulk sewers. Inmany NGO projects, costs are sharedbetween the NGO and the community onthe lane sewers, through subsidies. This isnot permissible within the OPP approach.

10 The concept of identifying activists fromthe community who were responsible formotivating people in the earlier days of theproject was criticised by more formaldevelopment consultants, like the UNCHSchief technical advisor who called them‚musclemen’ when differences in approachbetween him and Dr Khan emerged veryearly on in the project. (Hasan, 1999: 58)

• Local lane leaders and activistsare the key ‘frontline’development workers. In eachlane there are generally twopeople identified, who are eithernominated or elected by theresidents of the lane. They areaccountable to the residents, notto the OPP, but are giventechnical and social support bythe OPP. The two play thedifferent roles of organiser, whorepresents the needs of thecommunity to the OPP, and atreasurer who collects and keepsthe money and accounts. Theorganiser is generally male, butthe treasurer is frequently arespected older woman, who haslong-term standing with theresidents.

• Social organisers and technicians(paid employees of the OPP) aretrained to provide technicaladvice, and to motivate theresidents. These people are alsothemselves drawn from thecommunity.10

• Local communities are therepositories of wealth in‘traditional knowledge’developed from daily experience.They can therefore become‘experts’ in improvisation andinnovation. Training should beprovided to develop necessaryskills within the community,especially those involving localpara-professionals and ‘street’technicians. Conventionallytrained professionals such asengineers and architects, shouldpreferably not be used asalternatives. This will also makesure that skills for themaintenance of the project aredeveloped by members of thecommunity in the constructionphase.

Following the principle of relyingon knowledge that already exists,and after extensive consultations,

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A metal worker makes steel shuttering for a drain manhole in Hassanpura, Faisalabad.

the decision was made by thecommunity at large to improve onthe existing technologies, tryingthis out in lanes which had not yetinstalled sewers, rather thanreplacing existing sewers. Thisresolution was first taken by acouple of brave lane committees,and following the successfulinstallation of sewers has now beenreplicated throughout Orangi,either with OPP assistance, or insome lanes, residents have beeninspired by the OPP, but not usedtheir services. A process ofcommunity mobilisation in theorganisation and implementationof the project emerges. It isdescribed as follows:


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Through social organisers, an initialdialogue with the community/laneis made. The OPP identifies andthen contacts an influential/activeindividual with good reputation,who in turn contacts the laneresidents. At this stage, the OPPstaff arranges a slide show/publicmeeting explaining the salientfeatures of the low-cost sanitationprogramme. If the people showwillingness and submit a writtenrequest to the OPP, the OPPsurveys the lane and prepares amap and cost estimates of thesewer line. These documents arehanded over to the representativeof the lane who is confirmed by thelane residents as theirrepresentative/lane manager. Thelane manager collects money fromeach household as per prescribedcontribution and requests the OPPto provide technical guidance. TheOPP establishes physical levels inthe lane and demarcates theposition of the sewer line. Materialsare then purchased by the lanemanager and labour is hired. Thework begins. The OPP providestools and shuttering and supervisesthe entire execution. The lanemanager expects technical co-operation and supervision from theOPP while the OPP expects the lanemanager would generally managethe overall process as well asfacilitate the maintenance ofaccounts. But it should be stressedthat the lane manager is notaccountable to OPP and vice versa.(Development Consortium, 1998:4)

With time, much of the inputs ofthe OPP in projects are taken overby local masons and contractorswho have been trained over theyears, and by the community itself,who have learnt by doing andobserving.

The Orangi experience is more thanjust a case study on the issues andprinciples around the social

preparation of a community fordevelopment. It also informs on keytechnical details on the particularpractice of NGOs and externalagents in grassroots communitydevelopment. The OPP considersitself to be primarily a researchorganisation whose objective is toanalyse problems and then throughprolonged action research andextension education, discover viablesolutions. What differentiates itfrom other similarly-situated NGOsis the strict observance of thefollowing operational principles:

• The OPP does not itself lay thesewers or physically undertakethe projects. Whilst they providetechnical advice and supportsocial organisation, they makesure that those living in the laneswere the very personsresponsible for managingfinances and constructing lanesanitation. All decisions andresponsibilities on individuallane sewers rest with lane people,while the household connectionfrom the latrine to the lane seweris the responsibility of thehousehold owner. Thecommunity is the client,responsible for supervising anycontractor. The OPP role islimited to providing motivation,technical inputs (surveys, plansand cost estimates), and the loanof construction equipment. TheOPP consciously avoid creatingany form or notion ofdependence on them by thecommunity.

• The OPP support the building ofsmaller and functional, ratherthan large-scale, socialorganisations. It makes the lane,with around 20-40 households,the informal unit oforganisation, rather thanfollowing the conventionalpractice of most NGOs of settingup large, formal organisations

on the basis of neighbourhood orarea committees. The lane mademore sense as well given thesanitation technology used. Forsecondary sewers linking lanesto the main trunk sewers, a‘confederations of lanes’ havebeen created, to address theneeds of a collection of lanes.

A further principle that needs to beclarified is OPPs position onfunding. As noted earlier, the OPPphilosophy clearly differentiatesbetween internal and externalcomponents of development. Theinternal component is defined asthe tertiary level sewer lines, at thelane level, while the externalcomponent is the trunk sewers,removing the effluent from thesettlement. Funding for the internalcomponent, the OPP maintains, issolely the responsibility of thecommunity. It should beemphasised that the OPP rejectsmatching grants or subsidies aswell – wherein, for example, adonor provides 50% of the cost andthe community shoulders the rest.The OPP believes this completecommunity self-financing forinternal development is the onlyway to create a far greater sense ofownership, a factor that isimportant in the construction phaseand critically important duringtrouble-shooting and maintenance.It also ensures that the sanitationsystem will be used and befunctional.11 The OPP has not onlydistanced itself from NGOs andcommunity groups that werefunded by donors and weresubsidised by non-communitysources, it has also discouragedsome of its partners from takingfunds from donors.12 But the OPP isnot strictly opposed to donorfunding. When it is available, theymake sure it is used only for theexternal component of thedevelopment, including researchand training, and that such funding


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should be autonomouslyadministered by the organisation. Itis on this basis, for example, thatWaterAid support has beenmanaged.

There are other reasons why theOPP has been opposed to subsidiesbeing used for internal componentsof infrastructure. Its experience inOrangi shows that when subsidiesare used, it most often opens theroute for the collapse of the project.It creates dependence, which spiralsinto a point where the communityexpects others to take responsibilityfor paying for the services, andwhen started in one community, thisquickly spreads to other areas. Itends up with a whole populationjust waiting to be helped and simplynot doing anything themselves. Butperhaps most important is thatcommunity self-funding is theprincipal instrument that bringsdown the costs of projects.Subsidies, the OPP believes citingexperience, tend to raise costs andgive rise to wastage. When thecommunity pays for a project on apurely self-help basis where theyprovide or pay for the labour andsupervise the work, costs are

11 Experiences around the world show thatsanitation systems constructed for poorcommunities many times end up not beingused completely for the purposes for whichit was built, for example children wouldcontinue to defecate in the streets.

12 The OPP for instance stopped workingwith a possible partner in Quetta (Taraqqi)because they also applied to the World BankSocial Action Programme for core funding,and another NGO, PIEDAR in Khanewal.This is because these organisations did notaccept the approach of ‘component sharing’,but used the more standard ‘cost-sharing’.See box. Among the partners it discouragedfrom getting donor money is the AnjumanSamaji Behbood in Faisalabad and AnjumanFalahi Behbood in Rawalpindi,predominantly because these organisationsdid not yet have the capacity to handlelarge amounts of funding.

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Razia Begum works in Hassanpura, Faisalabad to support her family with her garmentbusiness.

immediately cut – designs aresimplified, methods of constructionbecome extremely cost-efficient,profiteering and kickbacks, as wellas professional fees for contractors,engineers and supervisors areeliminated. The process is self-reinforcing – without the drasticreduction in costs, it would beimpossible to persuade low-incomefamilies to undertake theresponsibilities of self-financing.

Finally, with the principle ofcomponent rather than costsharing, the NGO or governmentcan spend scarce funding over awider area.

The OPP stresses that quality is notcompromised by this system. TheOPP’s support role includeimproving designs to make theconstruction of pipes and jointsmore cost-efficient, like plain ended


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BOX 1: AKHTAR HAMEED KHAN AND THE OPP’S GROWING INFLUENCE

In order to understand the OPP ethic better, it is essential to look at the personality of its founder, Dr Akhtar HameedKhan, and how his and the OPP’s work ethic have put a distinctive stamp on development work in Pakistan.

Dr Khan was perhaps Pakistan’s best known development worker. He argued strongly that functions of the statecould not be taken over by NGOs. He considered the seminars, workshops and meetings arranged by foreign donorsfor promoting their concepts as “dating and dining get togethers.” (Hasan, 1999: 34). He criticised the donor-dependence of Pakistani NGOs, and steered the OPP to be a fiercely independent and autonomous NGO that negotiateson its own terms. The austere, frugal, and almost sufiistic personal style of Dr Khan is translated into the OPP workethic. Unlike most Pakistani NGOs with airconditioned offices, four-wheel drives and state-of-the-art gadgetry, OPPseems poor. Salaries at OPP are far lower than at other NGOs. Yet the OPP takes pride in this. Surprisingly, by mostNGO standards, there is very little staff turnover at OPP – its personnel stay on, with some moving from being theapprentices of Dr Khan for fifteen years to becoming today’s OPP leadership.

OPP is thus admired, but not emulated by many NGOs inside and outside Pakistan. The OPP is unconventional inmany respects and prefers to be left alone in its work. But this is precisely where its strength lies. Its influence isimportant and growing, though indirect and perhaps limited by the fact that it does not play a direct role in broaderNGO-led advocacy campaigns. Recently, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (a NGO providing capacity building andadvocacy support to CBOs and other NGOs), and the UN’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and Local Initiativesfor the Environment (LIFE), have accepted some of the OPP’s basic principles and applied them to their direct andindirect interventions in the sanitation sector.

spun concrete sewer pipesmanufactured in small castingyards or a standard cast-in-situconcrete chamber for lane sewers.The OPP also developed its ownmanhole design adapted to localconditions. The quality of theOPP’s simplification of technologyand design to cut costs and makethe sanitation project affordable hasbeen confirmed by experience to beappropriate.13 (Siddiqui andRashid, 1997 and UNDP-WorldBank Conference, 1996).

As the project developed, more goodpractice principles emerged. In 1992,an OPP-RTI report summarisedsome of these principles:

“Working with communitiesrequires consistency, flexibility anda low profile. An attitude of mutualrespect, sharing and learning isneeded. The concept that thecommunity knows all, or thattechnicians know all – both areequally incorrect. It has to be acombined effort. Importantly, andunlike most NGOs, the OPPemphasises the importance ofidentifying and dealing with onepriority problem in one area before

moving on to tackle other problemsand extend the programme in otherareas. (The desire for) quick resultscan have a damaging effect on theprogramme. For instance, toachieve quick results in one lane,subsidies will be given; then otherswill expect the same. What makesthe OPP approach unique is theircontinual effort to respond to theinitiative taken by localcommunities and to support andenrich these whenever possiblethrough research and extensionprogrammes. Fundamental to thephilosophy of OPP-RTI is thetraining of local community peoplein technical and socialorganisational skills at differentlevels. This training is conducted todevelop an autonomous network ofcommunity organisers and a localresource of technical skills,enabling the communities to dealwith problems independently.”(Rahman and Rashid, 1992: 2-4).

Other principles identified by theOPP-RTI which are guidelines forgood practice are the following:

• Monitoring of communicationand constant feedback are

essential. Weekly meetings,informed discussions betweenstaff and community members,keeping minutes anddocumentation and regularfollow-up are to be maintained.

• Building public support for theproject and encouragingcontributions from academicsand consultants are necessary.However, aggressive marketinglike public relations blitzesshould be avoided.

• Transparency is standard goodpractice. All accounts of theorganisation, including and mostespecially the salary of staff, areto be published regularly andmade public.

• Wider collective decision-makingis always more desirable.

• Local issues, realities andconcerns have to be properlytransmitted through dialogue tothe concerned governmentagencies and politicians.

13 Government engineers and NGOs arenow using the OPP models and standardsfor their own sewerage systems.


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While the OPP model has inspiredattempts at replication in 59settlements in 11 cities in Pakistan,with 23,151 households having laidtheir sanitation lines at a cost of Rs.31.993 million (£360,000) (outsideOrangi) the most persistentcriticism levelled against it is thelack of any substantial replicationof its approach outside Orangi. Ifindeed it is a model that offers asolution to the varied sanitationproblems of poor communities, alack of replication suggests that theapproach simply fails in other areaswhere it has been attempted or thatit is dependent on many factorsthat are present only in Orangi. Acloser examination of the problemsof replication will indeed revealthat to a certain degree, the OPPmay have been successful inOrangi because of factors andconditions peculiar to theorganisation, to Orangi andKarachi. These factors thereforehave to be discussed as well, inorder to properly appreciate thesuccess of the OPP.

What makes the Orangi townshipand the other urban poorsettlements of Karachi different isthat a large percentage of residentsare second generation urbanresidents, unlike in many townsand cities in the rest of Pakistan,and the Punjab in particular, whereurbanisation is still largely due torecent rural-urban migration.14

Residents of urban poorsettlements in Karachi are thereforefamiliar with urban basic services,and have had some experiencewith sanitation problems as well assanitation solutions in crowdedurban areas. Also a key factor isthat Karachi’s literacy level is aboutthirty percent higher than the rest

Problems of Replication

of urban Pakistan. The city’s femaleliteracy, in particular, is higher byabout fifty percent. The averageKarachi income earner also gets 1.6times more than his or hercounterpart in other cities. Morerecent estimates suggest thatKarachi’s per capita income is twoand a half times that of the nationalaverage. (Hasan, 1999:141). It cantherefore be assumed that Orangi’sresidents are generally better offthan those living in katchi abadisoutside Karachi.

Another key factor is Orangi’sadvantage of topography – itsnatural slope eliminates the needfor pumping sewerage. The slopemakes it easier to demonstrate theefficacy of the OPP model, and theexistence of natural nalas makeslinks between the internal andexternal sanitation far easier. Incities with flat terrains, externalsanitation and sewerage facilities –such as pumps, trunk andsecondary sewers – are aprerequisite before any internaldevelopment efforts can bestarted. In Orangi, there was noimmediate need for externaldevelopment, which usuallyincreases the costs of sanitationsystems. Also, this made itpossible to be independent of themunicipal governments, at leastinitially, the municipality beingresponsible for the management ofthe secondary and trunk sewers.

A factor often overlooked is that inmany communities where there is adesire to introduce the OPP’s lowcost sanitation model, an opendrain sewerage system alreadyexists, unlike in Orangi where noformal sewerage systems existed.Hence the problem in these areas ismuch more complicated as it is

about replacing or incorporating asystem rather than introducing anew one.

Despite these Orangi-specificadvantages, it can still be arguedthat the reason for the failure ofreplication in other communitiesmay have to do more withproblems of social preparation orwith the nature, ability, capacityand resources of communitygroups and local NGOs, rather thanwith the technical OPP modelitself.15 For example, residents ofFaisalabad and Lodhran, despitetheir lower incomes, have paidmuch higher costs for theirsewerage systems than theresidents of Orangi. Also, inKarachi, 2,950 houses in ManzoorColony alone built their system inflat terrain. In Faisalabad, 2,578houses have also built their sewagesystems in flat areas and arecontinuing to do so.

Another reason why replicabilityis likely to be low is that in manycommunities where OPP’s help issought, community groups andNGOs are not prepared to observethe OPP’s strict adherence to self-reliance and freedom fromdependence on donors. This wasinitially the case with thecommunity group Anjuman SamajiBehbood (ASB) in Dhuddiwala,Faisalabad, led by social worker-cum-politician Mr Nazir AhmadWattoo who thought that the OPPwas a funding agency that dolesout funds (see box). The Boo Ali

14 1998 Pakistan Census.

15 For more, see Zaidi (1999) The NewDevelopment Paragidm: Papers onInstitutions, NGOs, Gender and LocalGovernment, and Jalazai (1998) The NGOsConspiracy in Pakistan.


14

Sena Welfare Society inMuzzaffargarh and theOrganisation for ParticipatoryDevelopment (OPD) in Lahorewere initially interested inreplicating the OPP model. Butorganisational problems and highpersonnel turnover at Boo Ali Senaworsened, and since then it hasfolded. In the case of OPD, aninternal review led to the closureof their sanitation programme, andthe organisation eventually shiftedits focus to credit, education andhealth, also initiated andsupported by OPP. The YouthCommission for Human Rights(YCHR) formed in 1989 in thePunjab was seen as the bestreplication of the OPP model. Butits success led to many offers offunding from multilateral andbilateral donors for different kindsof community-based work. YCHRnow allows a 30 percent subsidy

for internal development, arguingthat since there is money available,why not subsidise potentialbeneficiaries. Since taking anapproach that utilised subsidiesfor the internal components of theinfrastructure development, YCHRhas not been as successful in thisaspect of its work, only expandingthe number of households coveredfrom 720 to 1391 in the last fiveyears.16

The ASB initiative however, as wellas the project started by theAnjuman Falahi Behbood (AFB) inRawalpindi, turned out to besuccessful sanitation projects aswell, not because they strictlyfollowed the OPP model, butbecause they improvised andadapted innovations to suit localsituation and problems, on OPP-RTI advice, and through OPP – RTIresearch. Both experiences provide

lessons on dealing and workingwith government institutions. TheAFB, which made initial errors inthe beginning, has now installedsome 9206 running feet of seweragelines funded by about Rs1,042,000(£11,840) of community money17

(OPP Progress Report, December2000).

The attempts at replication tell usthat models should only be usedfor guidance – each communitywill have its own specific contextand problems that require certaininnovations. These attemptssuggest that there are some basicprinciples that need to be adhered

16 YCHR progress reports.

17 The cost of this community initiative isone-eighth the cost of what it costsgovernment, a piece of informationconveyed by a councillor who used to havecivil works done in the area.

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A clean street after the project in Hassanpura, Faisalabad.


15

BOX 2: THE ANJUMAN SAMAJI BEHBOOD (ASB) EXPERIENCE IN FAISALABAD

Since the 1960s Mr Watoo’s social work in Dhuddiwala consisted of inviting local politicians to dole out funds andinaugurate projects. In 1979 and 1984, Mr Watoo ran in local elections but lost both times. In 1987, he met the OPP’sArif Hasan at a seminar in Islamabad, and was subsequently invited to visit the project in Karachi. Disappointedwhen he found out the OPP was not an organisation that could provide funding for his project, he neverthelessbecame interested in its work. He visited the OPP a number of times over six years, and posed the problem of howthe OPP approach could be replicated in his community that was dependent on the promises of politicians, on theinfrequent public work schemes of the municipality, and would therefore likely reject any self-help initiative. Apartnership eventually developed, and OPP proposed that ASB begin a credit programme so that the trust of thecommunity could be regained. A loan of Rs 100,000 (£1,136) was made available to ASB by OPP for this creditprogramme, and soon after a six-month agreement was signed between ASB and WaterAid for the former to map theexisting water and sewerage facilities in Dhuddiwala in order to initiate and replicate the OPP infrastructure model.

The credit programme became a success, and laid the groundwork for initiating other projects and a pilot watersupply project in nearby Hasanpura financed and managed by the community. The social preparation entailed showingeach household how much they were to save if water connections were undertaken on a self-help basis. Communityactivists were identified to further reach out to the community. Eventually a Water Supply Committee of the residentswas set up. A loan from WaterAid was made available to the ASB, with responsibilities for payment resting with theWater Supply Committee. Soon the project necessitated negotiations with the Faisalabad Water and SanitationAuthority (WASA) to tap into their main line. But this proved to be a difficult task, as numerous reasons were givenwhy this could not happen. The principal reason though was the typical reservations government departments hadin dealing with NGOs. Conflicts also emerged within the residents’ Water Supply Committee. A connection to themain line was eventually made. By June 1999, about 30 percent of houses in Hasanpura had been given legalconnections, and 30% of WaterAid’s loan has also been recovered.

At about the same time, the sanitation project for Dhuddiwala was also started. Since some degree of social mobilisationand community contacts had already been established and activists identified, work here became far easier. Again,the problem was negotiating with WASA to connect lane sewers to their trunk sewers as Faisalabad was on a flatterrain. ASB had to build a collector sewer, and it was decided that its cost would not be paid by the communitydirectly until the lane sewers have been built. This increased the costs to each household to twice that in Orangi.When the first lane sewer was being built, differences arose amongst its members and work stopped. In order toexpedite the process and revive community interest, ASB gave a loan to the community to complete the construction.Knowing OPP’s position, the ASB kept this move secret. The demonstration of the success of this first lane becamethe key for the residents of other lanes to take interest and approach the ASB for assistance in laying their seweragelines. The ASB’s innovation paid off. ASB has now assisted communities in installing 52,120 running feet of seweragelines, serving 2578 households at a cost to the community of Rs7,182,137 (£81,615) In many ways, the ASB experiencehas disproved many of the OPP’s critics.

to in order to attain some level ofaccomplishment, rather than followa preconceived map or structure.Once those basic principles arefollowed, there is enough room toadapt and innovate, which perhapsin itself is also a principle to berecognised. Apart from theprinciple of the rejection ofsubsidies and external funding for

internal development that the OPPadheres to very strictly, there ismuch room to manoeuvre under itsbasic principles. Another thing toconsider is that the OPP experienceis only one case study. There is agrowing body of organisationswhich have been influenced by theOPP, which are providing manyother important lessons and

principles for good practice.

Three other NGO projects that haverecently started offer potentiallyimportant and interesting lessons.These are Lodhran Pilot Project inLodhran, the EnvironmentalProtection Society in Swat, and theConservation and RehabilitationCentre in Uch.


16

As the OPP experience in low-cost,community-based sanitationprojects increased, its organisationalphilosophies, methodologies as wellas its technical expertise developed.The OPP’s technical capabilitieseven surpassed those ofgovernment’s. Survey plans andmaps of Karachi’s katchi abadis madepainstakingly through the years arestored in its databases, which issomething that not even therelevant government agencies have.It was inevitable that in time, theOPP would be drawn into largerpolicy debates as well as projects ona wider level. The OPP expanded itsfocus from community-managedprojects to include large-scaleprojects addressing multiplecommunities, secondary level trunksewerage and ultimately, advocacyand lobbying on Karachi-widesanitation plans and policy. FromOPP’s experience the knowledge aswell as the vantage pointdeveloped, which enabled it toactively engage state agencies, localpoliticians, international NGOs anddonor organisations.

The OPP’s wider impact andgrowth into a more strategicorganisation can be analysed fromits experience in four areas:

• The attempts to scale up the OPPexperience in Sukkur andHyderabad in partnership withUNICEF and the World Bank(WB);

• The attempts to work with theSindh Katchi Abadi Authority(SKAA) in developing nalas intotrunk sewers;

• The research and lobbying onthe ADB-funded Greater KarachiSewerage Plan; and

OPP – The Wider Impact

• The efforts to respond to calls forpolicy advice, from governmentgroups and organisationsworking with community-basedorganisations, both internationaland Pakistani.

In 1990, the OPP was invited byUNICEF and the commissioner ofSukkur to participate in the UrbanBasic Services (UBS) programme toreplicate the OPP process in Sukkura city in Sindh. The OPP became aconsultant to UNICEF and tooksome responsibility for shaping theprogramme, provided technicalinputs, trained project engineers,organisers and activists, andmonitored and documented theentire process.18 The first thing thatthe OPP learned from this projectwas how partnerships like this hada more complicated nature: despiteclear delineation of roles andresponsibilities, problems andconflicts amongst partners almostroutinely occurred. UNICEF andthe Sukkur Municipal Corporation(SMC) were co-financiers of theexternal components of the project.The Public Health EngineeringDepartment (PHED) was to designthe external sanitation andsupervise construction. The SindhKatchi Abadi Authority (SKAA)was to ensure that the residents gotleases and ownership rights for theland. The OPP was the consultant,technical adviser and trainer. Andlike all other OPP projects, thecommunity had to finance theinternal component.

As soon as the project started,conflicts arose between the threegovernment departments (SMC,PHED, SKAA), mostly concerningthe timely allocation of resourcesfor operation and maintenance. Theconstruction of the external

components slowed down,compounded by the frequenttransfers of government personnelassigned to the project. As a result,the internal components that wereinstalled did not function properly.The OPP also felt that the SMC wastechnically incompetent, having noconcept of levels, joints andgradients and a general disinterestin the work. This department’sorganisational culture was deemedto be too ad hoc. The OPP thusconsidered the project a failure, andwas surprised when UNICEFnominated it as one of the ‘BestPractices’ project for the Habitat IIConference.

The OPP was invited in 1991, thistime by the World Bank, toparticipate in the CollaborativeKatchi Abadi ImprovementProgramme (CKAIP).19 Like theUBS, the project had many partners,including the SKAA and theHyderabad Municipal Corporation(HMC). The SKAA was responsiblefor the overall co-ordination and co-financed the project. The HMC wasthe other co-financier and wasresponsible for the implementationand maintenance of externalsanitation. OPP was the principaladvisor, providing training in socialand technical matters on externaland internal sanitation. The WorldBank Shelter Team was to takeresponsibility for the facilitation andmonitoring of the project and forchannelling funds to the OPP.

18 UNICEF was interested in initiating theprogramme in two other towns in the Sindhsimultaneously, but the OPP, following itsphilosophy of focusing and consolidating inone area before moving to other localities,insisted on working only in Sukkur initially.

19 The CKAIP was a World Bank and SwissDevelopment Co-operation initiative.


17

As with the UBS project, delayswere recurrent. Work on theexternal component had not begunone year after the agreement, andfour years later was not evencompleted. In these four years, theSKAA had seven Director Generalsreplacing one after the other. TheHMC had eight administratorsduring this period. The projectdirector, appointed from the HMC,was replaced three times. Theproject also suffered from having tofollow cumbersome governmentprocedures, affecting payments andeventual work output and speed.The World Bank team, likeUNICEF, also wanted to work inthree towns simultaneously. Therewere also procedural issuesregarding monitoring andreporting, which often ignored theway OPP operated. Hence, theproject likewise failed.

OPP learned from these twoexperiences that working withgovernment, especially in donor-funded schemes, was fraught withdifficulties. On one hand it wasessential for the OPP to work withthese projects, as wider impact canonly be achieved when workingdirectly with government, whichoften brings in the donororganisations. But on the otherhand, government was in itself anarena for competing politicalinterests and factions, and itsbureaucracy ran inefficiently andwas tainted with corruption. Notwishing to totally abandoninteraction with government, theOPP decided that its role in futuresimilar programmes would be tostrengthen the community throughmotivation, training and technicalassistance. Rather than spend timeon indifferent, if not hostilegovernment functionaries andengineers, it would arm communityorganisations with surveys, plans,estimates, and viable alternatives.With these, the communities could

then establish a more equitablerelationship with governmentagencies and get them to serve theirinterests. (Hasan, 1997: 95) The OPPrealised that perhaps the better wayto change government was to createconditions outside government – inthe community and amongst NGOs– that would force government toshape up. But even then,government was not at all totallyresistant to change from within.Further interaction by the OPP withthe SKAA did produce positiveresults, owing largely to results-oriented and reforming civilservants who managed to get intokey positions once in a while.

The OPP and SKAA began talkingto each other in 1988. The SKAAwas created to regularise the katchiabadis in Sindh. It was to takecharge of processing ownership orentitlement claims, upgrade anddevelop these areas, and providesocial and physical services once thelocality was ‘notified’, i.e. acceptedas a proper legal settlement. TheSKAA, especially during the timeswhen Tasnim Siddiqui was Director-General, had an open mind andinterest in working with NGOs, and

also improved and streamlined itsown structures and procedures toimprove such relations. In thecoastal areas of Karachi, there hasbeen an OPP-SKAA partnership,with the OPP playing the role offacilitating internal development,while the SKAA took responsibilityfor external development. In 1994, aformal agreement was signed thatgave the OPP a training andmonitoring role as well as anadvisory role for the SKAA. Changefrom within soon became evident.Weekly meetings, site visits andcommunity interaction becameroutine for SKAA employees.Mobile lease offices and site officeswere brought into the localities tomake it easier for people to reachSKAA services. And the SKAAslowly took on more community-centred principles, taking extensivemeasures to involve the communityin its work and innovating to adaptitself to the requirements of thecommunity. This mode of workingproved itself as the SKAA becameone of the few, if not onlygovernment department that hadbecome financially self-sufficient.But like other governmentdepartments, the SKAA was subject

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Abdul Razak and Ershad Bibi have a piped water supply at their home in Hassanpura,Faisalabad, making it easier for them to make chutneys which they sell for a living.


18

to repeated changes in itsleadership, which has had animpact on the working relationshipbetween SKAA and OPP.

The OPP has been able to build onthis positive experience and iscurrently training municipalengineers from three cities,Faisalabad, Multan andGujranwala, as part of a newUNDP Plus Programme, which isusing the OPP approach as thebasis of the programme.

The OPP’s experience with theFaisalabad Area Upgrading Projectprovides some contrasts betweendifferent approaches. The FAUP isa government project thatundertakes internal development,as well as secondary and tertiaryexternal infrastructure building inthe Islamnagar, Noorpura andShadab Colonies of Faisalabad.20 Itis principally funded by the UnitedKingdom’s Department forInternational Development(DFID).21 As the FAUP was starting,they requested assistance in policydevelopment from the OPP and theFAUP uses the technical standardsset by the OPP. Over time OPPrealised that their principle of nocost-sharing for the internalcomponent was being ignored, andwithdrew their support, althoughdialogue between the OPP and theFAUP continues. The communityonly had to pay 50% of the internalcomponent costs, with theFaisalabad Development Agency(FDA) providing the balance,drawing from the DFID grants andgovernment resources. Also, theFAUP provided full funding fortrunk sewers.

The contrast between the ASB andFAUP brings into focus thedisparity between two differentapproaches to funding. The FAUP’sfifty-percent internal developmentsubsidy can be challenged forcreating more dependence than

empowerment, but it can also beargued that this in fact is whatgovernment can do in terms ofmaking full use of resources whilerequiring some amount ofcommunity contribution. This isclearly only a valid argument if itcan be shown that the governmenthas resources to spend on essentialinfrastructure development, whichat present is not the case. Part ofthe success of the ASB is due totheir argument that unless thepeople carry out this essential workthemselves, the work will not becarried out at all. The FAUP isscheduled to close in December2001 after which its long-termimpact on government approachescan be assessed.

The biggest advocacy challenge ofthe OPP to date was the campaign itlaunched when it found out in 1997that the Karachi Water SewerageBoard (KWSB) was set to implementthe Korangi Waste WaterManagement Project. The cost of thisproject was US$100 million (£68million) and US$70 million (£48million) of this was to be providedthrough an ADB loan. The projectwas part of the Greater KarachiSewerage Plan. At that time, the OPPwas already dealing with the KarachiMetropolitan Corporation, the SKAAand other government agencies. Theproject was to make an extensiveinvestment in physical infrastructureat great cost to the city. It consisted ofconstructing a sewerage treatmentplant, the rehabilitation andextension of about 120 kms ofsewers, and extensive construction ofnew trunk sewers. The OPP, with acoalition of NGOs, academics andothers, documented the existinginfrastructure in the Korangisettlement. On that basis, byproviding a detailed study and analternative proposal in the process,this coalition argued that theexisting infrastructure could be putto better and far more cost-effective

20 Faisalabad is a major city in the EasternPunjab, with a population of 2 million. Thecity almost tripled in size from 70,000 to180,000 between 1941 and 1951, due to theinflux of refugees from India after 1947(Alimuddin; 1999; 3).

21 FAUP do not publish their accounts, so itis not known the extent of funding for thisproject.

22 Korangi is an industrial area in the southof Karachi.

use. The project design had not takencognisance of conditions in Korangi,and ignored that already in 72% ofthe lanes, sewerage lines and smallsecondary sewers had already beenlaid by the residents at their own costor using funds from local councillors.The design did not consider as wellthat these sewerage lanes drain outinto natural nalas flowing in the area,and instead planned to installexpensive trunk mains along themain roads in Korangi.

OPP and its allies lobbied theGovernor of Sindh resulting in theestablishment of a committee in1999 to review the design and tofollow the OPP principles of internaland external components. As aresult, a least cost option for theproject was prepared which broughtdown the cost to US$20 million.

Through this work, the mostsignificant victory was thecancellation of the US$70 million(£48 million) ADB loan for theKorangi22 Waste WaterManagement Project, of the GreaterKarachi Sewerage Plan. This wasdespite the presence of strongvested interests, especially in theForeign Aided Projects Office of theKWSB. ADB officials, according tonewspaper reports, were surprisedat how the “country rejected a loanby a lending agency.”

The provision of alternativestrategies is an important feature ofthis work.


19

In many ways, the OPP model isunique. By not doing very much, ithas achieved a great deal. Themain feature of the OPP model isits simplicity, based primarilyupon the notion that people/communities have been dealingwith problems from timeimmemorial, and they alwayscome up with solutions. Thesolutions may be inappropriate,costly and badly designed.Nevertheless, the spirit of the OPPmodel is that people can and dohelp themselves. Perhaps a keyassumption of the OPP model isthis faith in the ability of people toaddress their own problems.Unlike many well-meaning ‘socialworkers’ or NGO developmentworkers, the OPP modelacknowledges the community’sability to help itself.

Another aspect of the originality ofthe OPP model is its co-option ofactivists working in the communityAs a result, those who work withthe community to explain the OPPmodel are members of thecommunity itself, rather thanoutsiders who may not be sensitiveto or familiar with the sociologyand dynamics of the community.

A key factor that makes the OPPmodel unique and adds to itssimplicity is the view that OPPwill not do development and willnot take its model to the peopleunless it has first establishedsubstantial links with thecommunity. The OPP is not in thebusiness of constructinginfrastructure. It is simply asupport organisation of anadvisory nature. Because the OPPdoes not need to get involved inconstruction, it does not need tomake any promises and does not

Conclusion

need to make any financialdecisions regarding its own or thecommunity’s money. Unlike manyother groups working withcommunities, OPP does not investany of its own money in the formof physical infrastructure, nor doesit take any money from thecommunity. This ‘money-less’relationship between OPP and thecommunity, where the OPP doesnot invest cash directly other thansome of the broad overhead costswhich OPP incurs, is quite uniqueto the NGO sector.

The OPP model works on thepremise that the community willidentify what they want, ratherthan outsiders (whether local orforeign) coming and telling themwhat is good for them (thecommunity). OPP feels that peoplehave been too dependent upongovernment coming and solvingtheir problems. As governmentshave become less able to addressgrowing problems, donors seem tohave filled that void. A key issue ofthe OPP model is the aim to endany sort of dependence, and allowthe community to build its ownconfidence in its own abilities. TheOPP does interact with donors, andis funded by international donorsas well, but primarily for researchand extension. The main form of‘subsidy’ that OPP itself gives otherCBOs/NGOs is in the form of itsconsiderable experience andtechnical and social expertise.

Estimates show that 82 percent oflanes in Karachi now have sewerlines laid in them. It is logical thatone thinks about the next stages inthe disposal system. Collectorlanes, secondary and trunk sewersand treatment plants, shouldbecome the concern of any

organisation interested in seweragedisposal. Consequently, OPP’semphasis has turned to dealingwith issues of the nalas andaddressing issues related to theGreater Karachi Sewerage Plan,looking at the city as a unifiedintegrated whole, rather than atpockets or areas of the city. Somecritics of the OPP felt that it neededto look at the city as a whole fromthe time of OPP’s inception. Withhindsight, the influence of OPP inpolicy making and in givingadvice, could not have beenpossible had it not focused onOrangi and consolidated its gainsthere. It is the result of that workwhich has permitted OPP to play afar more influential role in thecity’s sanitation and sewerageprogrammes.

While much of this Study hasargued that the OPP low-costsanitation model has been asuccess, one cannot ignore the areaswhere OPP has failed to measureup to expectations. There are someareas of weakness in the OPPmodel and its intervention andthey are highlighted in this finalsection. Some recommendations onhow to overcome these problemsare also discussed.

The OPP’s methodology inmobilising communities couldbenefit from a review. While inessence, this process has beenextraordinarily successful in layingsewers and improving the sanitaryenvironment of the katchi abadis,and the residents have continued tomaintain these sewers and improvetheir environment through theplanting of trees, developing homeschools and health programmes,starting up small businesses andother linked activities, there is some


20

criticism that the voice of theweakest and most vulnerable withinthe community such as women ornew settlers, is not fully heard.

There are a few issues specific to theOPP as an institution which are alsoproblem areas. Whereas onerecognises the high commitment ofOPP staff and acknowledges the factthat unlike most NGOs, there hasbeen little staff turnover, the factthat the same people have beeninvolved in OPP and that it has notgrown in terms of professional staff,is also cause for concern. As OPPconsiders moving into new areasand beyond the lanes where itstarted, it may also need to acquirethe services of more professionals. Italready has a number of importantlinks with professionals and alsoruns training sessions, but perhapsit needs further full-time staff,especially at a mid- and senior level.This is also true for the AnjumanSamaji Behbood in Faisalabad, whichis largely a one-man show; there isfar greater need to incorporate morestaff at the ASB.

Visits to Orangi where OPP hadhelped in laying sewers showed

that there was evidence of brokenmanhole covers and blockedsewers (although a very smallpercentage of all sewers laid). Thissuggest that there could be aproblem with standards andmaintenance, but as thegovernment’s own engineers arenow also using these standards fortheir own designs, this should beeffectively monitored. Further,there could be a need to modifymanhole cover design to take intoaccount the heavier trucks whichare now using the roads.

Solid waste is a problem ofendemic proportions and unlessthis issue is also addressedsimultaneously with the laying ofsewers and health education,sewers will continue to be cloggedcausing problems withmaintenance. AFB in Rawulpindihas included a solid wastemanagement aspect to their work.

Now that OPP is increasinglyinvolved in city-level projects,designing treatment plants,external sanitation infrastructure,etc., and is being asked to designmany of the structures it criticises,

it must also acquire competenttechnical expertise in these areas.

OPP too, may have to ‘learn’ toaccommodate NGOs that look to itfor inspiration but find difficulty inimplementing its principles.‘Aloofness,’ a term used to describeOPP’s general attitude towardsmany NGOs, could perhaps bereplaced by advocacy (amongstNGOs), a function and role that ithas to execute. Also, it needs todisseminate its materials morewidely, and written in a morereader-friendly and accessiblemanner, especially as it strives togenerate further policy dialoguebetween NGOs, government,donors, policy makers andpoliticians and as it takes on largerissues that it has often set asidebefore.

Even with these concerns, it is clearthat the OPP experience is repletewith lessons and insights that cancreate an impact not only for thesecommunities, but also for NGOs,donor organisations andgovernment agents far beyondPakistan’s borders.


21

Acronyms and Terms used throughout From the Lane to the City

OPP Orangi Pilot Project

OPP-RTI Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute

KHASDA Karachi Health and Social Development Association

OCT Orangi Charitable Trust

KMC Karachi Metropolitan Council

BCCI Bank of Commerce and Industry

UNCHS United Nations Centre for Human Settlements

SKAA Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority

HMC Hyderabad Municipal Council

FAUP Faisalabad Area Upgrading Programme

CKAIP Collaborative Katchi Abadi Improvement Programme

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Fund

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

WB World Bank

UBS Urban Basic Services

FDA Faisalabad Development Authority

Katchi abadi Informal settlement

Nala Natural drainage channel


22

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Afzal, Nadeem, ‘Design of Low CostSanitation by Promoting LocalOrganisation to Adopt an ApproachToward a Process of SustainableDevelopment’, unpublished mimeo,Pakistan Institute for EnvironmentDevelopment Action Research,Islamabad, 1999.

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Development Consortium, LaneManagers in the Orangi Pilot Project LowCost Sanitation Programme: A SelectedProfile, Development Consortium,Karachi, August 1998.

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Ghazali, Naziha, ‘Dirty Business’,Newsline, June 1999.

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Hasan, Arif, Working with Government,City Press, Karachi, 1997;

Hasan, Arif, Government, InternationalAgencies, and OPP Collaboration for theReplication of OPP’s Low Cost SanitationProgramme, Second Annual World BankConference on EnvironmentallySustainable Development, Washington,1994.

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Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Kazi Adil Ahmed Shafi andTowhida Yesmin of WaterAid Bangladesh.

WaterAidPrince Consort House27–29 Albert EmbankmentLondon SE1 7UB

Tel: +44 (0)20 7793 4500Fax: +44 (0)20 7793 4545

Website: www.wateraid.org.uk

Charity Reg No 288701

WaterAid – Water for Life

WaterAid is the UK’s only major charitydedicated exclusively to the provison of safedomestic water, sanitation and hygienepromotion to the world’s poorest people. Cleanwater is essential for life. Without it we die.Safe water is a necessity not a luxury, but abillion people in the world do not have it.

WaterAid, with its partners, works withindividuals and families in their communities,using practical solutions to enable them to takeownership of projects to maintain a lastingsupply of safe water. We also influence othersto do the same. Together with our supporterswe strive for a world where everyone has accessto safe water for life, for living and for a lifetime.

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