16 April 2014 | Vol. 5, № 12.

From the Editor’s Desk

Dear FDI supporters,

Welcome to the Strategic Weekly

Analysis. We begin this week’s edition in

Indonesia, with an assessment of what

might be expected from a Joko Widodo

presidency.

Returning home, we review the success of

Australia’s North-Asia Trade Mission and

the likely benefits of new trade

agreements with Japan and South Korea.

We then assess some of the possible

effects of the scrapping of the $1.5 million

Community Food Grants programme.

Next, we look at the grim news for India’s

water security contained in the latest

United Nations World Water

Development Report. Then our next

article evaluates the latest tussle for

control of the highly strategic Chagos

Archipelago, home to the Diego Garcia

military base.

We then head to Africa, with an analysis

of the steps being taken by the Kenyan

Government to counter the presence and

influence of the Somali al-Shabaab militia

in its territory.

We conclude this week’s edition in the

non-recognised, but otherwise

functioning, state of Somaliland, in the

wake of new interest from China in its

resources sector.

I trust you will enjoy this edition of the

Strategic Weekly Analysis.

Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International

*****

Page 2 of 14

Indonesian Election: Hopes Boosted with Likely Jokowi Win,

but Won’t Be All Smooth Sailing for Australia-Indonesia

Relations

The recent victory of the PDI-P suggests that little now stands in the way of Joko Widodo

becoming the next president of Indonesia. While commentators have suggested his

election will be a boon for Australia, it will not be all smooth sailing for Canberra as it

seeks to boost relations with Jakarta.

Background

Hopes have been boosted that Australia-Indonesia relations could thaw, following the

victory of the Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P) at the 9 April parliamentary

elections. While it must form a coalition to take power, Jakarta’s popular governor, Joko

Widodo, is still the favourite to succeed President Susilo Bambang. Barring a major surprise

on 9 July, he should take office in October. Commentators are optimistic that his election

could kick-start Australia-Indonesia relations, following a tense diplomatic stand-off

between the two in recent times. But a new president will also present a significant

challenge for Canberra, especially with the departure of Yudhoyno, a long-term supporter of

Australia.

Comment

The PDI-P won the Indonesian parliamentary election on 9 April, with unofficial tallies

suggesting it will claim just fewer than 19 per cent of the vote. Following the PDI-P were the

Golkar and Gerinda parties, which look set to gain around 15 and 12 per cent of the vote

respectively. As expected, the ruling Democratic Party was punished by voters, limping in at

fourth place and claiming just ten per cent of the vote. Marred by corruption and ineptitude

in its second term, the blue party now expects to lose around 90 seats out of the 692 being

contested around the country.

While most expected the PDI-P to claim victory, the biggest surprise was that they did not

win by a larger margin. With Megawati Soekarnoputri, the party’s enigmatic leader and

daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, recently anointing Jokowi as its presidential

candidate, many analysts had predicted a whitewash. Some suggested, in fact, that the

party, buoyed by the “Jokowi Effect”, would easily win the 25 per cent of the popular vote,

or 20 per cent of parliamentary seats, needed to nominate their presidential candidate

outright. Instead, the party will now have to form a coalition to satisfy Indonesia’s electoral

rules, though there is no shortage of minor parties vying to run on Jokowi’s golden ticket.

With no party winning the right to nominate a presidential candidate, the horse trading and

deal making will continue for some time. But a general picture has emerged: the presidential

election on 9 July, in all likelihood, will now be a three-way race between Jokowi, Aburizal

Bakrie of Golkar, and Prabowo Subianto, the former military general, who will run for

Gerinda. The overwhelming favourite is still Jokowi, despite a weaker-than-expected

showing for the PDI-P at the recent election.

Page 3 of 14

In any case, the splintered election results do not bode well for whoever succeeds

Yudhoyono. Whichever party eventually wins, the next government will almost certainly be

a weak coalition. That is bad news, as the country faces major challenges in opening up

industries to foreign investment, instituting labour reforms and rolling back the subsidies

that continue to cripple the country’s economy. Last year, the parliament blocked ministers’

attempt to water down the controversial mineral ore ban and the Government faced a steep

challenge before finally pushing through a reduction in fuel subsidies. With any new

parliament likely to be even more unstable, and with nationalist sentiment running high

among presidential hopefuls, many investors, including those from Australia, fear the worst.

But the presidential election may yet provide Canberra with an opportunity to kick-start

relations. While the two states have traditionally enjoyed a close relationship, the recent

spying scandal and the controversial “turn back the boats” policy, have led to a tense

diplomatic stand-off; the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia was recently recalled and has

not been back to Canberra for over three months. With a new head of state to take office in

October, however, hopes are high that relations may thaw. As Ross Taylor, head of the

Indonesia Institute, told ABC News last month, ‘the election of a new president, which would

hopefully be Jokowi, could represent a new start for bilateral relations between Indonesia

and Australia’. He said a new leader could ‘provide a circuit breaker for the diplomatic stand-

off’.

Yet even if Jokowi does claim victory as expected, a new president will still present a

challenge for Canberra. Yudhoyono has been a staunch supporter of Australia; not only did

he visit several times during his tenure, but his son also attended Curtin University in Perth.

Jokowi, meanwhile, is unlikely to share the same fervour or warm feelings towards Australia.

Moreover, with limited international experience and mounting domestic issues to address,

the relationship will not be high on his agenda. If Canberra is serious about improving

relations with Jakarta, it must seriously reach out to Jokowi after the election. Having often

taken its northern neighbour for granted, Australia cannot afford to do so much longer.

Andrew Manners Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme amanners@futuredirections.org.au

*****

North Asian Trade Mission to Bring Gradual Gains for Farmers

Despite Stalled China FTA Talks

Last week, Prime Minister Abbott concluded trade negotiations for an Economic

Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan and signed a Free Trade Agreement with South

Page 4 of 14

Korea (KAFTA). While the domestic beef industry emerges as the key winner of the trade

agreements, doubts have been raised over the holistic benefit to Australia’s agricultural

sector.

Background

Japan and South Korea are Australia’s two largest agricultural export markets. Seven years of

trade negotiations with Japan came to a head last week, as Prime Minister Abbott concluded

EPA negotiations with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The agreement grants Australian

agricultural products gradual preferential access to a market historically known for its

protectionism. Following his visit to Tokyo, Abbott signed the KAFTA with South Korean

President Park Gyen-hye, consolidating the agreement reached in December last year. The

third stop of the mission, China, was less successful, with the visit failing to bring the two

countries any closer to finalising an agreement.

Comment

Australian farmers stand to benefit under the Japan-Australia EPA, with Australian beef and

dairy industries predicted to gain $2.8 billion over the next twenty years. Beef tariffs will be

reduced on Australian products from 38.5 to 19.5 per cent over eighteen years, with an

immediate tariff reduction to 30.8 per cent. Chilled beef tariffs will be reduced to 20.5 per

cent within fifteen years. Slight tariff reductions in Australian canned fruit and vegetables

were also agreed upon, while the quota of duty-free cheese was increased by 20,000 tonnes.

Australia will remove tariffs on Japanese industrial products and automotives in return. The

Foreign Investment Review Board threshold was also lifted to $1.078 billion on both

Japanese and South Korean investments, although review thresholds for agricultural land

($15 million) and agribusiness ($53 million) are in effect.

Australian agricultural exports are expected to increase by 75 per cent over 15 years under

the KAFTA agreement. South Korea will progressively eliminate its forty per cent tariff on

Australian beef products over this period. Cheese, butter and infant formula quotas and

tariffs will also be eliminated between 2017 and 2037. Fruit and vegetable exporters will

enjoy improved access too, with the phasing out of tariffs between 30 and 54 per cent from

2019 to 2029. South Korean consumers are expected to benefit to the tune of $1.6 billion,

over a period of ten years from the ratification of the KAFTA, but South Korea faces a

continued trade deficit with Australia.

The trade agreements reached with Japan and South Korea will bring gradual improvements

for some of Australia’s agricultural industries. The timeline of tariff and quota reductions, of

fifteen to twenty years for some products, however, will assist Japan and South Korea to

improve their own agricultural competitiveness. The Australian National Farmers Federation

has stated that, while there are benefits to the Japan EPA, it does not improve, or only

marginally improves, access for dairy, sugar, grains, pork and rice producers. The Federation

expressed similar views on the KAFTA.

Prime Minister Abbott failed to achieve any meaningful results during talks with Chinese

President Xi Jinping. The Coalition Government has signalled that Australia will provide

special treatment to Chinese state-owned enterprises, releasing restrictions on several

Page 5 of 14

forms of investment, yet it has fallen short of Chinese demands to expressly issue 457 visas

to Chinese workers. The Coalition Government faces a conundrum in dealing with domestic

concerns over a possible surge in Chinese state-owned enterprises investing in agriculture

and infrastructure, while attempting to forge a trade agreement with China.

The projected economic benefits of bilateral agreements such as the Japan EPA and KAFTA

may be overstated. A 2010 Productivity Commission Report into bilateral and multilateral

agreements refuted arguments that recent bilateral deals, such as the TAFTA and the AUSTA

in 2005 (with Thailand and the US, respectively), can provide substantial economic benefit.

The report states that: ‘The main factors that influence decisions to do business in other

countries are likely to lie outside the scope of such agreements’. The report also suggests

that there are risks involved in investor-dispute resolution processes, intellectual property

and government procurement requirements which would incur significant costs and affect

domestic policy. While these bilateral agreements in North Asia may provide benefits to

select agricultural industries, and demonstrate strong diplomatic relations with partner

countries, there is cause to argue that unilateral domestic reform would be more useful

instead of maintaining home tariffs as a bargaining chip for future agreements.

Jack Di Nunzio Research Analyst Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme jdinunzio@futuredirections.org.au

*****

Setback for Local Markets as Community Food Grants Axed

Cuts to the Community Food Grant programme will financially affect many independent

organisations that provide healthy and locally sourced food alternatives to consumers.

Background

The Federal Government has announced that it will discontinue the $1.5 million Community

Food Grants programme. The grants have financed non-profit projects led by food hubs,

food rescue groups and local food producers.

Comment

Farmers’ markets, food banks and community gardens took a hit last month, with the

Federal government decision to discontinue the Community Food Grant programme. The

grants were a key initiative of the National Food Plan proposed by the previous Labor

Government, aimed at strengthening ties between local farmers and their communities.

Local markets and community gardens represented an important agricultural and social

asset in the National Food Plan, particularly for their potential to improve food security and

create new opportunities for Australia’s primary industries.

Page 6 of 14

The termination of the programme has left 200 grant applicants, whose grants had already

been approved, with limited alternative options. In Australia, there are more than 350

farmers’ markets, providing fresh and local produce to various communities. Along with

community gardens, the markets are a means of assisting local food security and an

alternative source of fresh, nutritious food. Community gardens have the potential to

address food insecurity for those who are financially unable to buy fresh and affordable food

or are geographically isolated.

Local farmers also benefit from interacting directly with consumers, as transactions increase

their market power and access, cutting out the middle retailer. Moreover, in larger

commercial supermarkets, fresh fruit and vegetables are selected for sale based on their

“cosmetic”, or visual, appeal. That which does not meet standards is discarded despite the

produce being fit for consumption. With cosmetic standards unnecessary in farmers’

markets, the potential for food wastage is also reduced.

Farmers’ markets have the potential to contribute significantly to Australia’s local economy.

In the United Kingdom, estimates indicate that the London Farmers’ Markets have

contributed more than £3 million ($5.3 million) to the local economy in the past eight years.

In the United States, the Department of Agriculture is sponsoring and certifying a great

majority of the country’s 3,100 markets, praising the benefits they bring to communities and

local economies.

Some commentators have expressed concerns that local markets may pose a threat to

biosecurity. Mandatory monitoring and evaluation of compliance with rigid health and

safety regulations, however, suggest that potential risks are being managed appropriately.

Farmers’ participation in selling to these markets is only approved following such checks on

their produce.

The proliferation of markets and community gardens across Australia reflects the

increasingly popular food movement that is gaining traction in many Western countries. The

markets provide consumers with the opportunity to purchase fresh local food, with the hope

that this will ultimately inspire a healthier dietary regime. The produce is both affordable

and sustainably sourced.

Moreover, farmers’ markets and community gardens have the potential to support

Australia’s long-term domestic food security and diversify domestic markets. Supplies from

local markets, combined with export strategies, could prove critical in meeting predicted

growth in domestic and global food demand, while ensuring affordable access to healthy

food for the population.

Maria Rosaria Torrisi Research Assistant Global Food and Water Security Research Programme

*****

Page 7 of 14

UN Report Stresses Upcoming Water Crisis in India

The United Nations has released the World Water Development Report and its predictions

for India’s water security are grim. There are possible solutions to improve India’s water

use efficiency, but issues involving water sharing remain a concern for the future of the

region.

Background

A UN report released recently predicts that as many as 3.4 billion people will be living in

“water-scarce” countries by 2025. The report is particularly grim when it refers to India’s

water security. While India is home to 18 per cent of the world’s population, it only holds

four per cent of global usable water resources. Water insecurity would have dire

consequences for India’s economy, food and health security. With energy demand expected

to rise, India needs to focus on improving water use efficiency and ensuring

co-operation in the use of shared water sources, to work towards water security.

Comment

A report by the UN states that 29 per cent of India’s groundwater assessment blocks are

categorised as semi-critical, critical or over-exploited and the situation continues to

deteriorate. Approximately 97 million Indians already lack access to safe water and the UN

estimates that the overall water demand in India will exceed the available quantity of usable

water by 2050.

The report identifies Asia as the future hotspot for conflict over water extraction. The Aral

Sea and the Ganges-Brahmaputra, Indus and Mekong River basins, are not only crucial for

India, but also for Pakistan, Bangladesh and China, which all depend on those sources for

water supplies.

Water in India is used inefficiently; 85 per cent of the rural population depends on

groundwater reserves, and extraction from those sources at the current usage rates, is

unsustainable. The Green Revolution led to the acceleration of agricultural development and

groundwater usage, severely degrading groundwater resources as irrigation expanded. As a

result, water resources today are critically mismanaged and wastage and inefficiency are

widespread.

The water security challenges facing India require a holistic and inter-disciplinary

management approach. The government needs to take major policy decisions to ensure

better usage and conservation. Some policies that could bring a positive change include:

rational water pricing; encouraging a reduction in domestic and industry water use; and the

development of an effective national legal framework for water governance.

Rainwater harvesting is an important part of the solution to India’s water problems.

Currently, 65 per cent of rainwater is wasted. Holding on to this water is crucial. If collected

properly, it could reduce the pressure on water demand in the agricultural sector.

Page 8 of 14

A better use of technology in both the agricultural and energy sectors, would also improve

water use efficiency. Education on the scarcity and economic value of water is also required,

if the country is to achieve long-term changes.

Water is likely to become the new source of conflict between India and its neighbours. In

2013, India voiced its concerns that China was building three new dams on the Yarlung

Tsangpo River. Although China stated that its projects would not harm downstream flows,

the lack of transparency has not alleviated Indian fears. Increased regional co-operation and

formal agreements are critical to avoid potential conflict. China does not have any

multilateral water sharing agreements with its neighbours. As a result, increasing

transparency and co-operation on projects impacting shared water sources is crucial.

Solutions to India’s internal water issues will be costly and will take time to produce tangible

change. If the crisis is to be managed effectively, however, insecurity must be addressed

now. External pressures created by shared sources will prove even more difficult to manage

than local issues. Governments from the region need to show willingness to work together.

Conflict might not be inevitable, but considerable co-operation and practical compromises

will be required to avoid it.

Cécile Levacher Research Assistant Global Food and Water Security Research Programme

*****

A New Landlord for the Diego Garcia Military Base?

If the United Kingdom loses control of the Chagos Archipelago and with it Diego Garcia,

Washington may find itself negotiating with a new landlord: Mauritius.

Background

In 1960, the United Nations declared that all peoples may freely determine their political

status and pursue their economic, cultural and social development free from colonialism.

Importantly, the boundaries of post-colonial states would be as they were when

independence was achieved.

The atoll of Diego Garcia, which supports what is arguably the United States’ most important

military base, was originally within the territory of Mauritius when independence talks

began in the early 1960s. The British Government excised the Chagos territory before

independence was granted in 1968, keeping it under UK sovereignty and allowing the newly-

created British Indian Ocean Territory to be leased to the US.

Page 9 of 14

Comment

A large part of the controversy stems from the

timing of the excision of the Chagos Archipelago in

relation to Mauritian independence. Although, on

paper, the excision took place prior to

independence, the United Nations General

Assembly noted in 1965 that, to detach certain

islands from the territory of Mauritius for the

purpose of establishing a military base would be in

contravention of its prior declaration.

This means that the majority of UN members at that

time believed that the excision of the Chagos

Islands was wrong and that it was originally

Mauritian territory. Whitehall claimed that Diego

Garcia had no inhabitants and that the agreement

with Mauritius had been made prior to the split.

Both claims, however, have been contested.

First, London had informed Mauritius that its independence effectively depended on the UK

retaining the Chagos Islands, which would be returned after the termination of British

interests there. Mauritius would be compensated through import concessions for its sugar.

Second, close to 2,000 people lived on the Chagos Islands in 1973, when they were removed

to allow construction of the Diego Garcia military base. Reports indicate that these people

were left on the docks in the Seychelles and Mauritius without either housing or funding.1

Ownership of the Chagos Archipelago has again come into debate recently, as the 50 year

lease granted to the US for Diego Garcia, comes to a close. The lease is due to terminate in

2016 and, while the UK would be unlikely to refuse to renew it, it is claimed that it has no

legal right to do so. Washington has recently invested US$32 million ($34.1 million) in the

installation of a submarine facility on the island. The proximity to targets of possible interest

in the Middle East, plus past and current investments, all allied to its isolation, make Diego

Garcia prime real estate for a military compound, one that the United States will not

relinquish.

Fortunately for the US, it will not have to. Although Whitehall has refused to accept

Mauritius’s claim to sovereignty, international law may indicate otherwise. The European

Court of Human Rights will deliver a judgement this month, which may entail a permit for

the Chagossians to return,2 placing more pressure on the UK. The United States, however, is

still refusing to allow their return.

1 Ross, S., ‘Diego Garcia Military Base: Islanders Forcibly Deported’, Global Research, 27 October 2009.

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/diego-garcia-military-base-islanders-forcibly-deported/15840>. 2 Robertson, G., ‘Diego Garcia, a Mauritius Island, Is Crucial Real Estate for U.K. and U.S.’, Daily Beast,

6 September 2012. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/06/09/diego-garcia-a-mauritanian-island-is-crucial-real-estate-for-u-k-and-u-s.html>

Page 10 of 14

London may ultimately be kept to its promise to return the islands to Mauritius when it no

longer has an international interest in them; and that day may not be so far away. It is even

possible that, by the end of 2016, Mauritius will be receiving the rent for Diego Garcia.

Kyle Sargon Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

Kenyan Security Crackdown: Concerns Valid but

Disproportionate Measures Must be Avoided

Kenya has ramped up security measures recently, in a bid to prevent further terrorist

attacks on its soil – such as the strike by al-Shabaab on Nairobi’s Westgate Shopping Mall.

While counter-terrorism measures are necessary, there is a risk that disproportionate

action will further marginalise Kenya’s large Somali community.

Background

Recent weeks have seen large-scale arrests of ethnic Somalis in Kenya, restrictions on the

movement of Somali refugees and the deportation of Somali “illegals.” These measures

follow a number of terrorist attacks inside Kenya by the Somali extremist group, al-Shabaab.

Facing public pressure, the Kenyan Government has claimed that Somali communities and

refugee populations in Kenya serve both as a hideout and breeding ground for Al-Shabaab

extremism. There are also concerns that recent territorial gains against al-Shabaab in

Somalia, by AMISOM forces, will push fighters into Kenyan territory and result in further

retaliatory attacks.

Comment

On 9 April, over 4,000 Kenyan-based Somalis were arrested in a vast security operation in a

Nairobi district. While many remain in custody, 82 of those detained were forcibly sent back

to Somalia for not having the necessary legal documents. The Interior Minister, Joseph Ole

Lenku, has cited security reasons for the crackdown, ‘For the last few months we’ve had

heightened insecurity. Time has come for a mop up to restore order.’

Kenya’s new counter-terrorism measures are developing on two fronts, focussing on

processing large Somali communities in Nairobi and flushing out al-Shabaab fighters who

hide in large refugee populations. The security concerns are valid. Last September’s

Westgate Shopping Mall attack in Nairobi was staged by al-Shabaab. On 24 March, six

people died in an attack on a church in Mombasa.

Page 11 of 14

In retaliation, the Kenyan Anti-Terrorism Police Units (ATPU) have been raiding houses and

arresting suspected al-Shabaab militants. The ATPU has been accused, however, of

assassinating radical Imams. The well-known cleric, Ibrahim “Mukaburi” Shariff, blacklisted

by the UN Security Council as a recruiter for Al-Shabaab, was shot outside his home on 1

April.

A recent agreement between the UN Refugee Agency and the two East African countries

may be used as a pretext for forced repatriations from the large Somali population, to a still

unstable Somalia. As part of the agreement, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was

supposed to help facilitate the voluntary return of Somalian refugees to their home state. In

November last year, however, Lenku told the 400,000 refugees in the Dadaab refugee camp

that soon they would all be forcibly repatriated.

Al-Shabaab claimed the Westgate and other recent attacks were retaliatory strikes for

Kenyan intervention in Somalia. In 2011, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to fight as part of

the UN-mandated AMISOM force. In March this year, AMISOM regained major cities and

population centres from al-Shabaab for the fledgling Somali Republic. While al-Shabaab is a

fractured and fragmented movement, there is a credible threat that the extremists can cross

the porous border with Kenya and strike there at will.

A major grievance among Kenya’s Somali population, as well as the country’s wider

underclass, is the alleged disproportionate use of force by the security forces. In the post-

2007 election violence, security forces allegedly contributed to much of the instability and

violence. Kenyan security policy must strike a balance between addressing legitimate

security concerns and upholding citizens’ rights, maintaining the rule of law and its

obligations to genuine refugees.

The presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta passed its one-year mark last week. Much of his first year

in office has been marred by security problems and his indictment by the International

Criminal Court for alleged involvement in the violence in 2007-08. An already tribally and

ethnically polarised country, it does not need a further backlash from overzealous security

measures and the further disenfranchisement of a large segment of the population.

Kenya is a fast-growing political and economic leader of East Africa. While inequality is rife

and social mobility poor, it has the potential to further expand its burgeoning business,

finance and capital markets. If Kenya is to reap the dividends that peace provides, its

security policies must not undermine stability through disproportionate measures.

Hugo Seymour Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

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Somaliland: Reaping Recognition from Resources?

Somaliland has yet to be officially recognised as an independent country, but its new friend

China has shown interest in mineral exploration there. Its resources sector could be what

puts Somaliland on the map.

Background

On 8 April, the Somaliland Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Hussein Abdi Dualeh,

welcomed a visiting delegation of Chinese businesspeople, consisting of 20 representatives

from energy company Guangzhou Dongsong Energy Company (GDEC) Limited. The

delegation was in Somaliland to begin work on the exploration, mapping and extraction of

coal, as part of the development of Somaliland’s energy sector.

Comment

GDEC and the Somaliland Government had previously agreed on the work in February 2014,

after the company became convinced Somaliland has good oil and mineral prospects. The

agreement could have immense benefits for Somaliland, by enabling it to more fully benefit

from its resources.

Regular electricity supplies would be a specific benefit to the residents of the capital,

Hargeisa. For over a week now, sections of the town have been without electricity due to

power outages. The development of coal-powered energy under the GDEC agreement would

go a long way towards solving that problem. The Somaliland government’s agreement with

GDEC includes the construction of a power plant, which will produce electricity from locally

mined coal.

This could be the beginning of a new China-Somaliland bilateral relationship. One of the

delegates from GDEC hinted at the future strengthening of bilateral ties, when he said that

the survey would be of ‘important significance in the signing of future agreements and

contracts’ between the two parties.

There may be even more benefits for Somaliland. China has pledged to open new doors for

it and an invitation has been extended to Somaliland’s President, Ahmed Mohamed

Mahmoud Silanyo, to visit China in the near future. GDEC has even gone to the extent of

promising to establish a Chinese language website, to promote what Somaliland has to offer

to the Chinese people. The company also talked about opening an office in the industrial city

of Guangzhou, aimed at promoting Somaliland’s interests; which could also be used as a

commercial office. The office would, in the future, issue visas and facilitate diplomatic

relations between the Somaliland and Chinese Governments.

On a political level, Somaliland is not yet recognised as an independent country; although it

is, seemingly, a viable, functioning and reasonably well-governed state. The new and

promising ties with a contending superpower, and United Nations Security Council

Permanent Member, would be of immense help to a country still trying to make its mark on

the map. Aiding Somaliland with its energy supplies and development of the resources

Page 13 of 14

sector, while also helping to promote it abroad, could mean a new ally for China in eastern

Africa.

Adil Cader Research Assistant Indian Ocean Research Programme

*****

What’s Next?

Trade and Investment Minister Andrew Robb wraps up his visit to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia on 16 April.

The two-day Tenth Session of the Pakistani-Saudi Joint Ministerial Commission finishes in Riyadh on 16 April.

The Central Asian Business Opportunities Conference bringing together public and private sector participants from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, ends in Islamabad on 16 April.

South Korean Prime Minister Chung Hong Won concludes a three-day visit to Pakistan on 16 April that included his attendance at the Korea-Pakistan Investment Co-operation Forum.

King Juan Carlos of Spain, together with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation José Manuel García-Margallo, Minister for Defence Pedro Morenés, Minister for Public Works Ana Pastor and Minister for Industry, Energy and Tourism José Manuel Soria, finish their visit to the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait on 16 April.

On 17 April, India begins phase four of its nine-phase Lok Sabha polls. The process ends on 13 May.

The African Standby Force will conclude the second round of its operational emergency response exercise, AMANI-AFRICA II, in the Lesotho capital, Maseru, on 17 April.

Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi arrives home on 17 April after a week-long visit to France and Germany.

Afghanistan will finish counting the votes from its national election on 20 April.

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Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual authors, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. 80 Birdwood Parade, Dalkeith, WA 6009 Tel: +61 8 9389 9831 Fax: +61 8 9389 8803 E-mail: lluke@futuredirections.org.au Web: www.futuredirections.org.au