From Cold War geopolitics to post-Cold War geonarcotics · From Cold War geopolitics to post-Cold...

IVELAW L. GRIFFITH

From Cold Wargeopoliticsto post-Cold Wargeonarcotics

The dramatic transformations in world politics occasioned

mainly by the collapse of world communism and the concomi-

tant end of the Cold War oblige scholars to assess the factors

that precipitated the changes and to ponder the implications of

the 'new' world order emerging from them. While neither

scholars nor statesmen are clear about what the transformations

portend, most are nevertheless convinced that this new order

brings new challenges and opportunities, new threats and coun-

termeasures, and structural and functional alterations at theregional and international levels that require new conceptual

and theoretical explorations.

Geoffrey Kemp rightly suggests that geopolitics - a long-

standing component of Cold War international political analysis- while not dead, will have to share the spotlight with other

items on the international agenda.' And Edward Luttwak is con-

vinced that the new agenda will be dominated by geo-econom-

ics: 'As the relevance of military threats and military allianceswanes, geo-economic priorities and modalities are becoming

Department of Political Science, Florida International University, Miami; edi-tor of Strategy and Security in the Caribbean (199 i) and author of The Quest forSecurity in the Caribbean (1993).This article is part of a larger study, Sovereignty under Seige, funded by theMacArthur Foundation and the North-South Center, University of Miami.The author is grateful for assistance provided by Donna Kirchheimer and byShauna Jamieson, his research assistant. Thanks also to Clifford E. Griffinand Howard H. Lentner for helpful comments on an earlier version.

I Geoffrey Kemp, 'Regional security, arms control, and the end of the ColdWar,' Washington Quarterly 13(autumn 1990), 44.

International Journal XLIX WINTER 1993-4

2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

dominant in state action."' Another 'geo' is, however, becomingprominent in the post-Cold War political landscape. It is geonar-cotics, defined here to mean relations of conflict and co-opera-tion among national and international actors that are driven bythe narcotics phenomenon.

Narcotics problems are presenting dilemmas to an increas-ing number of nations and states around the world. They areincreasing in scope and intensity, and they have political, eco-nomic, military, health, environmental, and psychological con-sequences that offer actual and potential threats to thesovereignty, political stability, economic equilibrium, and socialfabric of many societies. For these reasons, drugs are increas-ingly being discussed by scholars and policy-makers under therubric of national security.

However, for several reasons, including disagreement overthe definition of security and the multidimensionality of thenarcotics phenomenon, little attention is given to the concep-tual-theoretical basis for the drugs-security linkage. This articleis a modest attempt to help fill this void. I will begin with adiscussion of the nature and scope of the key narcotics opera-tions. An assessment of the concept of security and the realistparadigm on which it has been anchored follows. Finally, I willexplain the nature of the challenges to which drug operationsgive rise and provide a preliminary outline of a framework foranalysing the security aspects of drugs.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF NARCOTICS OPERATIONS

Societies around the world face problems arising from the exis-tence of a variety of drugs. The list includes alcohol, ampheta-mines, tobacco, hashish, LSD, heroin, cocaine, morphine,marijuana, mescaline, barbiturates, and pCp. 3 However, not all

2 Edward N. Luttwak, 'From geopolitics to geo-economics,' National Interest20(summer 1990), 20.

3 For an appreciation of the wide variety of drugs abused, see United States,

Drug Enforcement Administration, Drugs of Abuse (Washington 1989), 1 1-52;and United Nations, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1992

(E/INCB/1992/I) (New York 1992), 17-48 (hereafter UNNarcotics Report).

POST-COLD WAR GEONARCOTICS 3

of these drugs create security concerns. The 'danger drugs' aremainly cocaine, hashish, heroin, and marijuana, and their deriv-atives such as crack which comes from cocaine. The main prob-lems relating to these drugs are production, consumption andabuse, trafficking, and money laundering.

Drug operations are universal but not uniform among coun-tries. Nor is their impact uniform on the societies around theglobe. Most of the world's cocaine is produced in Colombia,Bolivia, and Peru, with Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela providinglesser, but increasingly larger, quantities. Heroin comes fromthree major regions: the Golden Triangle countries of Myanmar(Burma), Laos, and Thailand; the Golden Crescent countriesof Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan; and Mexico and Guatemalain Latin America. The most significant places for marijuana pro-duction are the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Jamaica, andBelize, although large quantities are also produced elsewherein Latin America and in parts of Africa and Asia.4

In terms of consumption, the United States is the world's

single largest market for narcotics. As an analyst at the UnitedStates Congressional Research Service indicated in 1988: 'Amer-ica is consuming drugs at an annual rate of more than six metrictons (mt) of heroin, 70-90 mt of cocaine, and 6,ooo-9,ooo mtof marijuana - 8o% of which are imported. American demandtherefore is the linchpin for one of the fastest-growing and mostprofitable industries in the world.'5 By 1993, however, StateDepartment estimates placed consumption of cocaine alone at150-175 metric tons, valued at US$1 5 -17 . 5 billion." It must,

4 Scott B. MacDonald and Bruce Zagaris, 'Introduction: controlling the inter-

national drug problem,' and Raphael F. Perl, 'The United States,' in Mac-

Donald and Zagaris, eds, International Handbook on Drug Control (Westport CT:

Greenwood 1992), 7-8 and 68-9; United States, Department of State, Bureau

of International Narcotics Matters, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report

(Washington, April 1993), 16 (hereafter INCSR).

5 William Roy Surrett, The International Narcotics Trade: An Overview of its Dimen-

sions, Production Sources, and Organizations, CRS report for Congress 88-643, 3

October 1988, 1.

6 INCSR, 3.


however, be noted that high and growing narcotics consump-tion is not unique to the United States.

Because of the high demand and profitability of the UnitedStates market, however, international trafficking is best appre-ciated when considered in relation to the United States as des-tination. South American cocaine traffickers, for instance, usea network involving Mexico, Brazil, Jamaica, Guyana, Belize, andthe Bahamas, among other countries. Southwest Asian heroincomes through Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey. Malaysia,China, and Singapore are some of the main countries involvedin the southeast Asian trade.

The illegality and lucrativeness of drug production and traf-ficking necessitate another operation - money laundering. Drugoperators need to control their money, conceal its origin andownership, and convert and legitimize the fruits of their labour.Estimates of the quantity of money laundered internationallyvary considerably, ranging between US$ 3 oo billion and US$5 oobillion annually.7 All regions of the world are involved, althoughsome countries are implicated more than others. One sourcelists twenty-nine countries other than the United States as theworld's major money launderers: Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Cay-man Islands, Colombia, C6te d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Germany, HongKong, India, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico,Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Singapore,Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates,the United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela.8 Countries areimplicated for varying reasons, and often for a combination ofreasons. Factors include bank secrecy, corruption, limited andpoorly trained enforcement resources, offshore banking oper-ations, and lax foreign exchange controls. Drug operators varythe places used and the sums laundered. In one instance, joint

7 United States, Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Drug MoneyLaundering, Banks, and Foreign Policy, Report by the Subcommittee on Narcot-

ics, Terrorism, and International Operations, 1Olst Cong, 2nd sess, February199

o, 1; and United Nations, International Drug Control Program Information

Letter, May 1993, 4.

8 INCSR, 62.


investigations by several countries revealed that the Cali andMedellin cartels of South America have conducted financialoperations in some forty countries in Europe, Latin America,the United States, Africa, and Southeast Asia.9

The international drug trade is a dynamic industry - strong,rich, and able to adapt to changing circumstances. Within it are

some of the best financed, best armed, and most ruthless organ-izations in the world. Indeed, many analysts believe that inter-national drug operations have grown beyond a mere industry.

Consider the following observation:

The international narcotics industry is, in fact, not an industry at all,

but an empire. Sovereign, proud, expansionist, this UndergroundEmpire, though frequently torn by internal struggle, never fails to pres-ent a solid front to the world at large. It has become [today] as ruth-lessly acquisitive and exploitative as any nineteenth-century imperialkingdom, as far-reaching as the British Empire, as determinedly cohe-sive as the American republic. Aggressive and violent by nature, theUnderground Empire maintains its own armies, diplomats, intelligenceservices, banks, merchant fleets, and airlines. It seeks to extend its dom-inance by any means, from clandestine subversion to open warfare.'-

One study identified ten developments during the 198osand early 199os that have influenced changes in this industry/empire.- The dramatic increase in cocaine demand in theUnited States during the 198os is the first. This led to effortsby Colombian producers to eliminate major competitors,expand refining capacity, adjust trafficking routes, and neutral-ize Colombian law enforcement measures. A second develop-ment followed in the wake of the 1979 Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan. The ensuing conflict facilitated increased opiumproduction, provided a source of funding for the anti-Soviet war

9 lbid, 493. For a short, often funny, discussion of money laundering methods,see Gerald Mobius, 'Money laundering,' International Criminal Police Review

44oUanuary-February 1993), 2-8.io James Mills, The Underground Empire (Garden City Nv: Doubleday 1986), 3.

i i See MacDonald and Zagaris, 'Introduction,' 7-11.


effort, and allowed traffickers to exploit the support to themujahedin by Iran and Pakistan, by using those countries astransit routes.

The Islamic revolution in Iran is also said to have had adramatic impact: Iranian government assistance to fundamen-talists in the Bekaa Valley undermined narcotics countermea-sures in Lebanon and the region generally and allowed Iran tobecome a major element in the heroin distribution network.The introduction of tough countermeasures in Mexico andColombia in the mid-i98os led to shifts in production and trad-ing operations. Production expanded in Brazil and Ecuador,and Venezuela, Suriname, Haiti, and Paraguay became majortrans-shipment points.

The collapse of the Ne Win government in Myanmar(Burma) in 1988 is cited as the fifth development. Myanmarhas long been a major opium producer, but the Ne Win gov-ernment had periodically conducted raids against producersand traffickers. However, with that government's collapse andthe ensuing political instability, narcotics countermeasuresbecame a minor concern. As a result, by 1990 Myanmar rankedas the world's largest opium producer. Indeed, the 1993 Inter-national Narcotics Report claims that 'if all its potential poppy cul-tivation were processed into heroin, Burma alone could satisfythe world's known demand for the drug.' 2

The combination of intensified countermeasures in Colom-bia following the assassination of presidential candidate LuisCarlos Galdn in August 1989 and the United States interventionin Panama in December 1989 is described as the sixth develop-ment. These two events led to the end of Panama as a majortrafficking centre; reduced cocaine production in Colombia andexpanded production in Peru; vertical and horizontal integrationof operations in Bolivia; expansion of operations in Argentina,Chile, and elsewhere in South America; and the relative declineof the Medellin cartel and the rise of the Cali organization.

12 INCSR, 7.


The seventh development derived from the apparent satu-ration of the market for cocaine in the United States in theearly 199os, forcing operators to diversify both product andmarket. Latin American traders are now seeking to expand mar-kets in Europe, Japan, and the Middle East. The evidence indi-cates that the Cali cartel has been recruiting Polish carriers tosmuggle cocaine across the Polish-German border. Czech andPolish law enforcement agencies have also uncovered a networkinvolving Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands,central to which was a Czech-Colombian agricultural importcompany in Prague.'3 Continuous experimentation with thedevelopment of psychotropic substances, such as Ice, is theeighth factor. These drugs can be produced anywhere as longas the relevant chemicals are available.

The internationalization of the drug trade is another factor.While some nations do not have major production or consump-tion-abuse problems, they are deeply implicated in traffickingoperations because of their location. Uzbekistan and Azerbaijanare key to the central Asian trade, Guyana and Trinidad andTobago have become major points in the movement of drugsfrom Colombia to the United States, and Nigeria is now key tothe heroin trade from both southeast and southwest Asia.Indeed, the International Narcotics Control Board reports that'Nigerian customs authorities seized 555 kilograms of cocainein 1991, compared with 6o6 kilograms of cocaine reportedseized in the entire (West African) region that year.'4 The finalfactor identified by MacDonald and Zagaris is the movementtowards internationally co-ordinated responses.

The drug dilemmas facing some regions are aggravated byrefugee problems. Surveys conducted in southwest Asia, forexample, indicate that heroin addiction among Afghan refugees

13 Rensselaer W. Lee III and Scott B. Macdonald, 'Drugs in the east,' Foreign Pol-icy, no go(spring 1993), too.

14 UN Narcotics Report, 19. The report also indicates that Turkey remains theprincipal transit country for southwest Asian heroin destined for Western

markets.


in Pakistan (both men and women) has risen dramatically. Onegets a sense of the implications of this development when it isremembered that following the Soviet invasion nearly seven mil-lion of Afghanistan's sixteen million people fled to Pakistan andIran. There is justifiable concern that the return of more refu-gees to Afghanistan will deepen the already terrible situationthere. Moreover, the widespread destruction of infrastructureand agriculture caused by political instability will exacerbate thesocial-economic situation of addicted refugees.'5

Beyond all these factors, the demise of the Soviet Union andthe creation of independent states in its former political spacehave precipitated a host of post-Cold War drug-related prob-lems. Adaptations of free market economics and access to theglobal economy have spurred myriad initiatives, including onesby drug operators, and political liberalization and the creationof new social space have given rise to increased drug experi-mentation and spiralling abuse. Moreover, economic doldrums,weak law enforcement, unprotected borders, poor financial sys-tems, and limited institutional and material capabilities makethe societies of central Asia and eastern Europe very vulnerableto drug operations.

There are other factors involved. The law enforcementmethods used during the communist era created a deep-seatedand pervasive popular mistrust of officialdom, especially of lawenforcement agencies. Criminal investigations are, conse-quently, hampered by the inability of the relevant authorities torecruit informants and secure witnesses for court testimony.International co-operation is also affected. In addition, lawenforcement is seen as suffering from a lack of broad-basedcitizen support. (Not that it is much better in other parts of theworld.) The supersensitivity of the newly independent centralAsian states about their sovereignty also engenders a certain

15 Ibid, 28, and Great Decisions 1992 (New York: Foreign Policy Association

1992), 25.


unwillingness to give intelligence to Russian authorities aboutlocal drug operators or about drug operations within theirterritories. 6

Thus, drug operations are dynamic and increasing in scope.Their consequences and implications have led to a recognitionby the international community that they present securitythreats. In February 199o the United Nations convened a spe-cial session of the General Assembly at which it was declaredthat 'the magnitude of the rising trend in the illicit demand,production, supply, trafficking, and distribution of narcoticdrugs and psychotropic substances [was] a grave and persistentthreat to the health and well-being of mankind, the stability ofnations, the political, economic, social, and cultural structuresof all societies, and the lives and dignity of millions of humanbeings. '"7 Concern was also voiced that 'the large financial prof-its derived from illicit drug trafficking and related criminal activ-ities enable transnational criminal organizations to penetrate,contaminate and corrupt the structure of Governments, legiti-mate commercial activities and society at all levels, thereby viti-ating economic and social developments, distorting the processof law, and undermining the foundations of States. '" 8

In response to the gravity of the narcotics phenomenon, thespecial session proclaimed the period 1991 to 2ooo as theUnited Nations Decade against Drug Abuse - a time for 'inten-sifying and sustaining international, regional, and nationalefforts in the fight against drug abuse.' The session also adopteda wide-ranging Political Declaration and Global Program ofAction to 'protect mankind from the scourge of drug abuse andillicit trafficking.' The Global Program of Action invites states

16 For a discussion of these issues, see Lee and MacDonald, 'Drugs in the east,'89-107, and Stephen E. Flynn, The Transnational Drug Challenge and the New

World Order (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies1993).

17 United Nations, General Assembly, XVIIth Special Session, Political Declara-

tion, A/RES/S-17/2, 15 March 1990, 2.18 Ibid.


to give high priority to demand reduction and to enhance therole of the United Nations in anti-drug campaigns. It outlinesspecific efforts relating to treatment and rehabilitation, supplycontrol, illegal traffic, money laundering, the strengthening oflegal and judicial systems, and arms trafficking.'9 Resolution 47/99 of the General Assembly, passed at the regular 1991 session,required that the implementation of the Program of Action beevaluated at the 1993 regular session where four high-level ple-nary meetings were to be devoted to the drug question. At thattime the situation was determined to be as grave as ever.2 0

This sketch of the increasing scope and gravity of drug oper-ations suggests that drugs now command a more prominentplace on the international agenda than a decade or two ago.However, it does not explain the security aspects of the phe-nomenon. An appreciation of this requires a preliminary assess-ment of the term 'security' in the context of structural andoperational changes in the contemporary world.

SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD

Security has long been a highly contested concept with a mul-tiplicity of definitions and usages. 2' Most of these definitionsand usages, however, are built around a few core concepts: inter-national anarchy, survival, territorial integrity, and militarypower. Moreover, most of them share a common theoreticalfoundation: traditional realism. Realism focuses on the state asthe unit of analysis, stresses the competitive character of rela-tions among states, and emphasizes the military and, to a lesserextent, the political aspects of security. It also is oriented to the

19 See United Nations, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assemblyduring its Seventeenth Special Session, supplement 2 (A/s-17/13), 1991.

20 United Nations, press release GA/18562, 26 October 1993.21 For various definitions and usages of 'security,' see 'Concepts of security,' Dis-

armament 14 (1986), 4-21; Joseph S. Nye, Jr, and Sean Lynn-Jones, 'Interna-tional security studies: a report of a conference on the state of the field,'International Studies Quarterly 12(spring 1988), 5-27; Stephen M. Walt, 'Therenaissance of security studies,' International Studies Quarterly 35 (June 1991),

211-39; and Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear (2nd ed; Boulder co: LynneRienner 1991), 16-24.

POST-COLD WAR GEONARCOTICS 1 1

international arena, sees states as national actors rationally pur-suing their interests in that arena, and considers military andeconomic power capabilities to be the most critical ones. Forthe realist, security is 'high politics.'22

The end of the Cold War has prompted an increasing chal-lenge of the realist conceptualization of international politics ingeneral and of security in particular. However, serious criticismof realism began long before - as early as the 196os with theemergence of the behavioural movement. Although the publi-cation of Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics in 1979precipitated the rise of structural realism, during the i98os

scholars, especially those concerned with small states and weakstates - not always the same set - increasingly widened the ambitof the term 'security' and re-evaluated the utility of its realist-centred definition.

Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, for instance, broadened

the definition of security to allow analysis of four threat areas:military, political, ecological, and protracted ethnic or social

conflict.23 For his part, Robert Rothstein saw several problemswith the traditional approach and argued for a more differen-tiated analytic approach, preliminary to which would be a pre-theory to categorize and differentiate countries and to generatea conceptual framework able to facilitate explanatory hypothe-ses. Rothstein believed the security of most states had little todo with universal structural constraints but was instead tied tolimited power capabilities, domestic order, and threat percep-

tion of small ruling 6lites. Security challenges were therebylinked with problems of development.24

22 For a discussion of realism, see HansJ. Morgenthau, revised by Kenneth W.Thompson, Politics among Nations (6th ed; New York: Knopf 1985), and Paul

R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Political Theory: Realism, Pluralism,Globalism (2nd ed; New York: Macmillan 1993), 35-227.

23 See Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, 'Third World national security: towarda new conceptual framework,' International Interactions i i (no 2, 1984), 103-

35.24 See Robert Rothstein, 'The "security dilemma" and the "poverty trap" in the

Third World,' Jerusalem Journal ofInternational Relations 8(December 1986), t-38.


With the end of the Cold War have come transformations

both in the structure of international politics and in the natureand severity of threats and challenges to nations and states.Charles Kegley believes these transformations are being influ-enced by 'the cumulative and collective effect' of several salient

developments which include: the dispersion of power amongthe most powerful states and the potential re-emergence of amultipolar system; the increasing political influence of non-stateactors such as multinational corporations; a resurgence ofhypernationalism, setting the stage for a new wave of nationaldisintegration; the continuing internationalization of nationaleconomies; and the deterioration of the global ecosystem.2 5

Stanley Hoffmann discerns the development of different cur-rencies of power affixed to different poles of international

power: military, economic and financial, demographic, andmilitary and economic. The poles will vary in their productivi-

ties. Demographic power, for example, will prove to be more ofa liability than an asset, while the utility of military power will

be reduced. Hoffmann contends that the fate of the new worldorder will depend on the ability of the poles to co-operate toprevent or moderate conflicts and to correct the imbalances inthe world economy that will induce some states to disrupt themomentum of interdependence.26

Other scholars view the complexity of the post-Cold Warera in different terms. Joseph Nye, for example, points to mul-tilevel interdependence: 'The distribution of power in world

politics has become like a layer cake.' He sees a structure withthe top, military, layer being largely unipolar, the economic,middle, layer as tripolar, and the bottom layer of transnationalinterdependence showing a diffusion of power.2 7 As mentioned

25 Charles W. Kegley, Jr, 'The neoidealist moment in international studies? Real-ist myths and the new international realities,' International Studies Quarterly

37(June 1993), 140.

26 See Stanley Hoffmann, 'A new world order and its troubles,' Foreign Affairs69(fall 1990), 115-22.

27 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 'What new world order?' Foreign Affairs 71 (spring 1992),

88.


earlier, Edward Luttwak envisages a new order whose centralfeature will be geo-economics - the mixture of the logic of con-flict with the methods of commerce. He expects that both thecauses and instruments of conflict will be economic. He is con-vinced that with the waning of military conflict, commercialquarrels that generate political clashes will result in the use ofweapons of commerce: the more or less disguised restriction ofimports; the more or less concealed subsidization of exports;the funding of competitive technology projects; and the provi-sion of competitive infrastructures, among other things.28

Samuel Huntington challenges contentions that economics(or indeed ideology) will be the fundamental source of futureworld conflict. He sees culture as the key source of discord.While he expects nation-states to be the most powerful actorsin world affairs, he foresees the main global political conflictsoccurring between nations and groups of different civilizations.And he asserts confidently: 'The clash of civilizations will dom-inate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will bethe battle lines of the future. '

'29 This clash of civilizations isexpected to occur at two levels. On the 'micro' level, neigh-bouring groups along 'fault lines' between civilizations willstruggle, often violently, over control of territory and eachother. At the 'macro' level, clashes will involve states from dif-ferent civilizations competing for relative military and economicpower, struggling over the control of international institutionsand third parties, and competitively promoting their particularpolitical and religious values.

Huntington's conflict of civilizations thesis is multifaceted.Conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and otherforms of conflict as the dominant factor in global conflict. Inter-national relations, historically a game played out within Westerncivilization, will progressively be de-Westernized and become agame in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not

28 See Luttwak, 'From geopolitics to geo-economics.'29 Samuel P. Huntington, 'The clash of civilizations?' Foreign Affairs 72(summer

1993), 22.


merely objects. Successful political, security, and economicinternational institutions are more likely to develop within civ-ilizations than across them. Conflicts between groups in differ-ent civilizations will become more frequent, more sustained,and more violent than battles between groups in the same civ-ilization. Violent conflicts between groups in different civiliza-tions are the most likely and the most dangerous source ofpotential global wars. The paramount axis of world politics willbe relations between 'the West and the Rest.'3o

Irrespective of which interpretation of the global changes orvision of the new world order one shares, it is no longer tenableto view international power as centred primarily on militaryissues. International power is becoming increasingly multidi-mensional, and international structures are becoming morecomplex. Consequently, it is untenable for states to operate onthe traditional lines of military balance of power, the east Asianarms race notwithstanding. Indeed, there is a certain diminu-tion in the importance of some military issues - the StrategicDefense Initiative of the United States, nuclear conflict, and theglobal arms race, for example - which allows other survival con-cerns to be accommodated. Barry Buzan argues that 'as themilitary security agenda has become static, those for economicsand the ecology have become more dynamic and more centralto day-to-day concerns.'3'

These interpretations of the changing international land-scape call into question the adequacy of the traditional realistconception of security and even of the relevance of realismitself. As Kegley has observed: 'Realism, rooted in the experi-ence of World War II and the Cold War, is undergoing a crisisof confidence largely because the lessons adduced do not con-vincingly apply directly to these new realities. The broadened

30 Ibid, 48. Huntington's thought-provoking analysis has elicited some equallyprobing responses by Fouad Ajami, Kishore Mahbubani, Robert Bartley, LiuBinyan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and others in Foreign Affairs 72(September-October1993), 2-26.

31 Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 133.


global agenda goes beyond what realism can realistically beexpected to address.'32 It is, however, important to note thatmost critics do not advocate a total rejection of realism. AsRichard Falk remarked: 'To challenge the centrality of realismdoes not imply its total repudiation. States do remain importantactors, war does remain profoundly relevant to international rela-tions, and many international settings can be better understoodas collisions of interests and antagonistic political forces.'33

As might be expected, there is no unanimity among scholarsabout what constitutes the broadened security agenda. Amongissues that many include on that agenda are AIDS, the inter-national drug trade, the destruction of the ozone layer, theinternational debt burden, and global warming. In their variousways, these matters threaten the physical safety, territorial integ-rity, and economic and political stability of various societies.However, the nature and sources of these threats make it infea-sible to use the state as the sole unit of analysis in examiningthese issues. Nor is it plausible to focus exclusively on externalthreats. It is now practically conventional wisdom that chal-lenges that are not constitutively military, such as those men-tioned above, can and do pose genuine threats to the survivaland quality of life of nations and states. It therefore seems rea-sonable to argue that the meaning of security should extendbeyond the confines of 'high politics.'

For me, security does go beyond 'high politics.' As I haveexplained elsewhere, security involves the protection and pres-ervation of a people's freedom from external military attackand coercion, from internal subversion, and from the erosionof cherished political, economic, and social values. Perception,capability, geography, and ideology are crucial to this under-standing of security.34 This conception of security is a multifac-

32 Kegley, 'The neoidealist moment,' 141.33 See Richard Falk, 'Theory, realism, and world security,' in Michael T. Klare

and Daniel C. Thomas, eds, World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century'sEnd (New York: St Martin's Press 1991), 0o.

34 See Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean (New York: M.E.

Sharpe 1993), 11-13.


eted one, enabling us to see security as operational along severaldimensions: military, political, economic, and environmental.

Military security is concerned with political violence and theinstruments used to prosecute it, whether for offence ordefence, whether by states or sub-national groups. Political secu-rity pertains to the stability of nations and the ideological andorganizational elements that facilitate their maintenance. Eco-nomic security concerns the availability of and access to eco-nomic capabilities, such as natural resources and finance, to theeconomic equilibrium of states, and to the welfare of individualsand groups within them. Environmental security deals withmaintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essen-tial support systems for all human enterprise.35 This conceptu-alization does not see security as military hardware, although itmay include it. Security is not merely military force, although itdoes involve it. It is not traditional military activity, although itmay encompass it. Security is linked with development; withoutdevelopment there can be no real security.36

This framework obviously takes account of the state. But itdoes not exclude from the universe of analysis sub-state groups,such as organized drug producers, or non-state systemic ones,such as international drug cartels and international non-govern-mental organizations (INGOS). It pays attention to both internaland external security because the distinction between the twois becoming increasingly blurred. And because security does notrevolve solely around a military fulcrum, attention must be paidto non-military capabilities as well as non-military counter-measures.

Predictably, many analysts are reluctant to widen the con-ceptual boundaries of the term 'security,' especially in relationto the environmental dimension. One of the most caustic

35 This formulation draws on Buzan, People, States. and Fear, 19-20.

36 For a similar proposition, see Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security:

Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row 1968), 149. Unlike McNamara,

I do not limit the relevance of the security-development nexus to the Third

World.


remarks in this regard has been made by Daniel Deudney: 'Thefashionable recourse to national security paradigms to concep-tualize the environment represents a profound and disturbingfailure of imagination and political awareness.' He suggests that'when environmentalists dress their programs in the blood-

soaked garments of the war system, they betray their core values,and create confusion about real tasks at hand. ' 37 Stephen Waltis also among scholars who warn against 'expanding "securitystudies" excessively' lest to do so might destroy the 'intellectualcoherence' of the field.3S This is a reasonable caution. But it isclear to many analysts, this one included, that whether or notscholars choose to redefine security, practical developmentsaround the world are doing so. Long-standing constructs shouldnot be abandoned summarily. Scholars should, however, guardagainst sacrificing the conceptual adaptation necessary to(re)interpret phenomena in the changing world on high altars

of theoretical conformity, even in regard to a theory like realismthat has held intellectual sway since the end of World War II.

Happily, I am not alone in these views. They are also heldby some reputable security scholars. Edward Kolodziej, forexample, has observed:

Neither scientific inquiry nor human self-knowledge is promoted by

blind commitment to a singular philosophical view, or to group-thinkcanons that substitute assertion for reflection and discerning judgment

37 See Daniel Deudney, 'Environment and security: muddled thinking,' Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists 47(April 1991), 22-8, at 28. For a debate on the inclu-sion of the environment (and ecology) in the security matrix, see Deudney,'Environment and security'; Terry Terriff, 'The Earth Summit: are there secu-rity implications?' Arms Control 13 (September 1992), 163-9o; Jessica TuchmanMathews, 'The environment and international security,' in Klare and Tho-mas, eds, World Security, Lothar Brock, 'Security through defending the envi-ronment: an illusion?' in Elise Boulding, ed, New Agenda for Peace Research:Conflict and Security Reexamined (Boulder co: Lynne Rienner 1992), 79-102;and Peter H. Gleick, 'Environment, resources, and security,' in Patrick M.Cronin, ed, From Globalism to Regionalism: New Perspectives on U.S. Foreign andDefense Policies (Washington: National Defense University Press 1993), 165-79.

38 Walt, 'The renaissance,' 213.


in deciding what security is, what security problems are, and how they

should be studied or resolved ...... Let the limits of the problem to be solved determine the scope

and parameters of empirical and normative theory rather than imposea particular theory of politics and security that defines what has to bedescribed, explained, and rationalized ... Critical to the task of the secu-rity scholar and practitioner is the challenge of defining those dimen-

sions as inclusively as possible.39

What, then, are some of the security dimensions of narcotics

operations?

THE DRUGS-SECURITY NEXUS

Karl von Clausewitz once declared that the first task of strate-

gists is. to determine the nature of the conflict confronting

them, as this is the first of all strategic questions. The wisdomof this declaration should be obvious even to non-strategists.With this in mind it is important to note that while narcoticsoperations have military implications and consequences, the'war on drugs' is not constitutively a military matter.

The nexus between drugs and security lies in the several

consequences and implications of drug operations for the pro-tection and development of individuals and state and non-stateentities in the international system. Drug operations presentsecurity problems not merely because of their internationalscope, in that very few of the nation-states in the United Nations

system escape some kind of threat, but also because of theirmultidimensionality which means that they have an impact onthe military, political, economic, and environmental areas.

Military security concerns

Because the war on drugs is not purely a military matter, the

outright application of military countermeasures would be

39 Edward A. Kolodziej, 'Renaissance in security studies? Caveat lector!' Interna-

tional Studies Quarterly 3 6(December 1992), 435, 436. Kolodziej's article is a

harsh response to Walt.


futile. The utility of some of the most modern weapons forefforts to combat drug operations is zero or near zero. Attemptsby United States defence officials to commit resources of theColorado-based North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD)

Command to the drug war make this only too clear. First, theNORAD surveillance system, which is designed to identify high-flying Soviet bombers and nuclear-tipped missiles, is blind toaircraft flying below io,ooo feet, the altitude range of most nar-cotics air trafficking missions. Moreover, not only does NORAD

have to ground its 16 radar-carrying balloons that scan for air-craft below io,ooo feet whenever there is stormy weather, butits fighter jets fly too fast for pilots to see tail numbers on sus-picious aircraft.4o This is not to suggest, however, that there isno need or room for military capabilities and sophisticated mil-itary technology in the war on drugs.

In some countries efforts to deal with drug operations, espe-cially production and trafficking, have taxed police forcesbeyond capacity, forcing some governments to commit militaryforces to anti-drug countermeasures and other governments tocontemplate doing so. This is true of countries in all parts ofthe world. Such measures are fraught with problems, includingjurisdictional conflicts between military and police forces,resource (re)allocation, potential corruption (and in somecases increased corruption) of military personnel, training andtechnology adaptations, and the potential for (re)militarizationof society in some places. Some of these issues threaten fragiledemocracies under (re)construction in parts of Latin Americaand central and southwest Asia.4'

40 Eric Schmitt, 'Colorado bunker built for Cold War shifts focus to drug bat-

tle,' New York Times, 18 July 1993, 18. Also, see United States, GeneralAccounting Office, Drug Smuggling: Capabilities for Interdicting Private Aircraft areLimited and Costly, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/GG D-89-93,June

1989, and Computer Technology: Air Attack Warning Systems Cannot Process allRadar/Track Data, Report to the Chairman, House Sub-committee onDefense, Committee on Appropriation, GAO/MTEC-91-15, May 1991.

41 For a useful discussion of most of these issues, see Michael H. Abbott, 'The

army and the drug war: politics or national security?' Parameters 18(December1988), 95-1 12; Rensselaer W. Lee III, The White Labyrinth (New Brunswick Nj:


In parts of the world where the military has never exerciseddirect political power - like the Caribbean - many leaders worrythat successful or prolonged use of the military in anti-drugcampaigns risks catapulting them into the countries' politicalpower centres, with the potential for the development of aguardian mentality. If the military comes to be seen - or, worse,if they come to see themselves - as indispensable to this criticalaspect of national security, there is little to prevent them fromintruding into the political arena, whether subtly or forcefully.For a region such as the Caribbean, such a development wouldjeopardize political stability and likely lead to the sort of mili-tarization that a few countries experienced in the 197os and198os but this time in a much more significant way.

In some countries traffickers possess larger and more sophis-ticated military resources than the police or the military. Insome parts of Latin America, traffickers appear to rely onsophisticated communications systems, including digital encryp-tion devices, to maintain secure communications within theirorganizations and to monitor law enforcement countermea-sures. Indeed, one retired general has testified that traffickerscan track the movement of Colombian armed forces and air-craft and ships better than their respective commanders andknow more surely where they are and where they are going.42

The demands of the drug industry have also led to increasedarms trafficking. These operations are not only truly interna-tional, but sometimes they implicate countries that are vulner-able by virtue of small size, openness, relative poverty, andcorruptibility. Such is the case of Antigua-Barbuda and its

Transaction Publishers 1991), especially chaps 4 & 5; Bruce M. Bagley,'Myths of militarization: enlisting armed forces in the war on drugs,' in PeterH. Smith, ed, Drug Polity in the Americas (Boulder co: Westview 1992), 129-5o; Robert P. Walzer, 'General [George A.] Joulwan stresses the role of theSouthern Command,' San Juan Star (Puerto Rico), 7 July 1993, 2, 6; Lee and

MacDonald, 'Drugs in the east'; Schmitt, 'Colorado bunker'; and Kate Doyle,'Drug war: a quietly escalating failure,' NACLA Report on the Americas 26 (May1993), 29-34, 43-4-

42 Lee, White Labyrinth, 104.


involvement in the Medellin arms trafficking episode in 1988-9. That case involved corruption of high-ranking members ofthe government, including a government minister and the armycommander, and use of the Antigua-Barbuda Defence Force asfront purchaser of Israeli weapons. The initial order was for 500weapons and 200,000 rounds of ammunition, valued at

US$3 5 3 ,7oo. The final order total was US$ 3 24 ,20 5 , and thefinancial aspect of the deal was handled through thirteen trans-actions, ranging in value from US$ 4 4 ,ooo to US$ioo,ooo.Antiguans, Israelis, Colombians, and Panamanians were directlyinvolved. They used Danish and Panamanian ships, and Amer-ican, Panamanian, and Israeli banks for the operation.43

Some countries have the misfortune to house not only oneor more major drug operations but also insurgencies or guer-rilla operations of one kind or another. Peru, Colombia, Myan-mar (Burma), Tajikistan, Suriname, Afghanistan, and thePhilippines are cases in point. Collaboration between drugoperators and guerrillas has given rise to narcoterrorism. Thereis evidence that in parts of Latin America and southwest andcentral Asia guerrillas finance their activities by taxing the drugtrade and by protecting traffickers' plantations, laboratories,and airstrips against raids by government forces. Moreover, drugtraffickers in Latin America and southeast Asia are said tofinance guerrilla campaigns that serve their interests.

Some insurgents run their own drug outfits, as in Myanmar,where, according to the 1993 International Narcotics Report, the

Shan United Army remains a powerful drug trafficking and her-oin refining organization. The drugs-arms-conflict connectionis also present in the Balkans. Rensselaer Lee and Scott Mac-Donald suggest that many traffickers in the former Yugoslaviaare motivated by more than just profit, providing financing andequipment for the civil war in the region. There is also evidencethat some Albanians have purchased weapons in Berne and

43 See Griffith, The Quest, 260-2, for a summary of the affair. For full details, see

Louis Blom-Cooper, Guns for Antigua (London: Duckworth 199o).


Basel, using the proceeds from the sale of heroin in Switzerland.Some of the weapons go to two insurgent groups: Kosovo'sFront of Resistance and National Liberation of Albania.44

Political security concerns

Irrespective of the strength of the bonds between drug traffick-ers and guerrillas, drug operations generate a significantamount of crime and violence around the world: from racket-eering, kidnapping, bribery, tax evasion, and theft to bankinglaw violations, import/export infractions, murder, burglary, ille-gal money transfer, extortion, and other crimes.

The crimes drug operators commit may be placed in twogeneral categories: 'enforcement' crimes and 'business' crimes.The former involve crimes among traffickers and between traf-fickers and civilians and police, triggered by traffickers' effortsto avoid arrest and prosecution. The latter encompass crimescommitted as part of business disputes and acquisitive crimessuch as robbery and extortion.45 Because of the nature anddimensions of drug operations, these crimes are not all com-mitted on an individual, random basis; they are mostly organ-ized, well planned, and executed by national groups andinternational networks. Some of these groups and networks arebound together by national, ethnic, or racial ties, such as theMedellin, Tijuana, and Cali cartels, the Asian gangs, La CosaNostra, and the Jamaican posses. 46

The criminal activities and the drug operations that precip-itate them have generated increased violence, both political andnon-political. The violence has been unprecedented in theUnited States and in Latin America, especially in Colombia,

44 Lee and MacDonald, 'Drugs in the east,' ioo-i.

45 See Mark A.R. Kleiman, Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control (Westport

CT: Greenwood 1989), 109-17.

46 See Mills, Underground Empire, Michael D. Larman, Gangland: Drug Trafficking

by Organized Criminals (Springfield IL: Charles Thomas 1989); E. Marotta,'Drug abuse and illicit trafficking in Italy: trends and countermeasures, 1979-

i 99o,' Bulletin on Narcotics 40(no 1, 1992), 17-22; and Gary Brana-Shute,

'Jamaican posse gangs in the United States,' unpublished paper, 1993.


Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. Over the last decade thousands ofordinary citizens, businessmen, journalists, and governmentofficials have been maimed or killed in drug-related violence.Even priests and bishops have been victims. One of the mostrecent such incidents was the murder on 24 May 1993 of JuanJesfis Cardinal Posadas Ocampo, archbishop of Guadalajara,Mexico, and six other people in a daylight airport shootout. Thecardinal, who was shot fourteen times, and the others were vic-tims of mistaken identity in the battles between the Sinaloa andTijuana drug cartels.47 On the government side in Colombiaalone, casualties have included an attorney general, prosecutors,several judges, prison guards, a presidential candidate, and hun-dreds of police and soldiers.

Violence undermines and wrecks the institutional basis forthe maintenance of good government and public safety in manyplaces in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Europe. It seems tobe systemic in some places, notably Italy, Jamaica, and Colom-bia. In the case of Colombia, it is believed that a major contrib-utor to the growth of systemic violence has been La Violencia- the virtual civil war between 1948 and 1966 in which extremecruelty and wanton destruction were the order of the day. Someanalysts claim the killings involved 2 to 3 per cent of the coun-try's population, and the noted historian, Eric Hobsbawm, esti-mated that La Violencia involved the largest armed mobilizationof peasants - as guerrillas, bandits, or self-defence groups - inthe contemporary West, with the exception of the most turbu-lent moments of the Mexican revolution.48

Many Latin American scholars are convinced that La Violen-cia has left legacies that facilitate, if they do not actually encour-age, the cocaine operations. For one thing, the government lostcontrol of large sections of the country. Moreover - and a direct

47 'Reputed drug lord arrested in killing of Mexican cardinal,' Stabroek News

(Guyana), i June 1993, 5; and Tim Golden, 'The enemy within: Mexico'sdrug habit is giving it shivers,' New York Times, 2o June 1993, E 1, E6.

48 Robin Kirt, Feeding the Tiger: Colombia's Internally Displaced People, a Report forthe American Council for Nationalities Service, July 1993, 5.


consequence of La Violencia - a low value tends to be placedon human life. As one writer argues, one of its legacies is that'Colombians are quick to resort to violence in dealing with con-flict - a very useful attribute in a high-profit, high-risk, and con-flict-prone business.'49 Certainly, the propensity of Colombiandrug dealers to wipe out their Bolivian and Peruvian competi-tors is notorious.

Crime and violence have forward and backward and verticaland horizontal linkages with a major threat to political stability:corruption. Drug operators bribe the police and soldiers not toraid laboratories or make arrests and to drop investigations.They pay state prosecutors not to prosecute, judges not to con-vict, and prison officials to release colleagues. They bribe gov-ernment ministers, journalists, political parties, bankingofficials, pilots and other airline workers, shippers, and others.In some cases, judges are offered 'plomo o plata,' a choicebetween death if they convict or a reward if they dismiss charges.Understandably, under such circumstances few judges opt toconvict.

It is not difficult to appreciate how drug operators can cor-rupt top officials in industry, business, and government: theyhave the money to do it. As a matter of fact, some cartels andindividual barons have more money than the national treasuriesof some small countries. In one case, Colombian traffickersoffered to liquidate Colombia's entire foreign debt in exchangefor the repudiation by the government of extradition as anational policy.50 Few people doubted their ability to honoursuch an offer. Latin American specialists know that corruptionis one of the greatest threats to current democratic

49 Francisco E. Thoumi, 'Why the illegal psychoactive drugs industry grew in

Colombia,' Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 3 4 (fall 1992), 50.

For a comprehensive analysis of violence in Colombia, see Charles Bergquist,

Ricardo Pefiaranda, and Gonzalo Sfdnchez, eds, Violence in Colombia (Wilming-

ton DE: Scholarly Resources 1992).

50 Michael J. Dziedzic, 'The transnational drug trade and regional security,' Sur-

vival 31 (November-December 1989), 534.


(re)construction in the region, shaking the pillars of the polit-ical system recently in Brazil, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Gua-temala. According to Richard Millett, the drug trade hascompounded the problem by committing its vast resources 'witha frightening ability and willingness to use deadly force.'5'

Societies in which corruption has long been part of thesocial-political culture are even more vulnerable. RichardCraig's observation about Mexico is applicable elsewhere inLatin America and to places in Asia, Africa, and Europe: 'Mex-icans are virtually inured to corruption. They would actually besuspicious of any totally honest bureaucrat, politician, or judge.But narcotrdfico has done what even the most corrupt politiciancould not do: it has rendered dysfunctional the cement of Mex-ican politics and society. And in the process it has transformedthe subtle and necessary art of the mordida into an outrageous,system-threatening corrupci6n desaceptable.'52

Corruption of law enforcement and military officials has dis-tinct implications for military security: it compromises agents ofnational security, with the consequences that their capability foreffective action is undermined or destroyed, and individuals andgroups in the society become inclined to resort to vigilante tac-tics because of the perception or reality of a diminished capac-

ity. Moreover, drug corruption not only undermines thecredibility of governments, it also impairs the ability of politi-cians and bureaucrats to define and defend the national interestadequately. In addition, it contributes to the development ofcynicism and increased tolerance for corruption, both of whichare dangerous. Consequently, drug corruption subverts politicalsecurity.53

51 Richard L. Millett, 'Is Latin American democracy sustainable?' North-South

Issues 2(no 3, 1993), 5-52 Richard B. Craig, 'Mexican narcotics traffic: binational security implications,'

in Donald J. Mabry, ed, The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National

Security (Westport CT: Greenwood 1989), 29-30.53 Ivelaw L. Griffith, 'Drugs and security in the Commonwealth Caribbean,' Jour-

nal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 31 (July 1993), 84.


Economic security concerns

Drug abuse contributes to loss of productivity due to addiction,rehabilitation, and incarceration. It increases the cost of healthcare and in many countries drug operations lead to distortedresource allocation by forcing governments to devote large pro-portions of scarce resources to dealing with drug operations andthe attendant crime and violence. In the Bahamas, for example,85 per cent of the 199o defence budget had to be devoted todrug counter-operations. The situation was equally dramatic inMexico. In 1985, 32.5 per cent of the attorney general's budgetwas devoted to the Permanent Campaign, but by 1988 nearlytwice that amount was needed: 6o per cent.54 (The Permanent

Campaign is the umbrella under which narcotics counter-oper-ations have been conducted since the 1970s.)

Countries with monocultural economies are especially vul-nerable. For instance, the Caribbean economies that revolve sig-nificantly around tourism are being adversely affected becauseof the negative impact of drugs and drug-related crime. In addi-tion, private and state-owned transportation industries areaffected in many cases. Between 1989 and 1991, Air Jamaica, astate-owned enterprise, was fined US$ 3 7 million by UnitedStates customs for illegal drugs transported on its aircraft toAmerican cities. This might not be a huge loss for a conglom-erate or a big country, but for a nation of 2.4 million peoplewith a US$4 -billion foreign debt it is a catastrophe.

Studies indicate that coca and cocaine not only cause infla-tion by introducing a huge monetary mass into the economybut that they also raise the price of goods and services in thecoca-growing parts of the countries concerned. While drugoperations may not cause distortions in social-economic growth,they certainly exacerbate them. Rensselaer Lee gives a Peruvianexample: Tocache, a coca boom town in the Upper HuallagaValley, has no paved streets and no drinking water or sewerage

54 The Bahamas figure comes from ibid, 92, and the Mexico figures are fromMiguel Ruiz-Cabafios I, 'Mexico's Permanent Campaign: costs, benefits, impli-cations,' in Smith, ed, Drug Policy in the Americas, 157.


system for its residents, but there are six banks, six Telexmachines, several stereo dealerships, and one of Peru's largestNissan outlets.55

Drug operations, especially production and trafficking, havea strong impact on some economies, generating a high per-centage of the gross domestic product (GDP). In Jamaica, forexample, marijuana operations are said to have contributedbetween one and two million United States dollars to theisland's foreign exchange earnings in the late 198os - morethan all other exports combined, including bauxite, sugar, andtourism. Bolivia is considered the Latin American country 'mostdeeply in thrall to cocaine dollars.' The estimated value of its1986 coca production - US$6oo million - was nearly doublethe US$ 3 4 5 million produced by sales of natural gas andamounted to 15 per cent of the country's GDp.56 Herein lies avery difficult problem: 'Once a national economy is dependenton such illicit activities, any effort to combat them will haveimportant recessionary impact or will be accompanied by costlycompensatory schemes.'57

Another element of the economic dilemma arises from thepositive economic aspects of drug operations. Lee shows thatthe Latin American cocaine business has beneficial economicmultiplier effects in that local businessmen have expanded pro-duction to meet drug industry demands for farm equipment,simple chemicals, filters, centrifuges, and other items. Manybanks and legal and accounting firms specialize in services forthe drug industry. Further, traffickers' demands for luxury hous-ing boost the construction industry, generating work for con-tractors and domestic producers of materials such as cement,bricks, and glass. A former Bolivian finance minister, FlavioMachicado, estimated that coca dollars have allowed for the cre-

55 Lee, White Labyrinth, 43.56 Ivelaw L. Griffith, 'Some security implications of Commonwealth Caribbean

narcotics operations,' Conflict Quarterly, 13(spring 1993), 28; andJo Ann

Kawell, 'The addict economies,' NACLA Report on the Americas 22(March

1989), 36.57 UN Narcotics Report, 2.


ation of some 300,000 jobs that have no direct connection to

the drug trade.58

A look at the Eurasian mainland found a tenfold increasein Uzbek poppy cultivation between 199o and 1993. To Uzbek

producers, one hectare of poppy meant, in mid- to late 1992,

an estimated annual gross income of US$5 ,ooo-6,ooo - abouttwenty times the earnings from a hectare of cotton and somethirty-five times those from a hectare of vegetables.59 In boththe cocaine and the heroin business, the farmers get the small-est percentage of the net earnings of the finished product. Butas one observer notes - and this is relevant to marijuana as well:'Campesinos did not become millionaires growing coca, butthey made more money than they could doing anything else.At $200 per hundredweight, no crop substitution programcould be as effective.'" Thus, in many places, drug operationsprovide an economic safety valve by providing jobs and gener-ating income and foreign exchange when the formal economyfalters.

Of course, not only do large numbers of people 'survive'because of the international drug trade, a small numberbecome super-rich. And depending on how one views the situ-ation, even government agencies in some countries can be seenas beneficiaries of the enterprise. According to one source, theDrug Enforcement Administration boasts that it is one of onlytwo government agencies in the United States - the other beingthe Internal Revenue Service - that operates at a profit. Reportsare that in 1989 alone it seized US$i.i billion in cash whilebeing run on a budget of US$5oo million.6'

Yet another aspect of this dilemma is that some drug baronsengage in what they see as social investment: they put some oftheir profits into social welfare endeavours. Pablo Escobar ofColombia, for example, not only built about 500 two-bedroom

58 Kawell, 'Addict economies,' 37.59 Lee and MacDonald, 'Drugs in the east,' 96.6o Guy Gugliotta, 'The Colombian cartels and how to stop them,' in Smith, ed,

Drug Policy in the Americas, t 18.61 Ibid, 519. For DEA international seizures between August 1989 and February

1993, see INCSR, 71-6, 495-6.


houses in a Medellin slum but also financed projects dealingwith sewerage repair, education, health clinics, and sports. InBolivia, Roberto Suarez is said to have paved streets, restoredchurches, and donated sewing machines to poor women inSanta Ana de Yucama, his home town. 62 As might well beexpected, the beneficiaries of this benevolence see these baronsas heroes.

Environmental security concerns

Most of the environmental concerns linked to the drug traderelate to production and manufacturing operations. Cocaineproduction, for example, gives rise not only to deforestation,but also to pollution, species destruction, soil erosion, and dan-gers to human health.

A look at operations in Peru, the world's greatest coca pro-ducer, provides an appreciation of some of the problems.Experts at Peru's National Agrarian University estimated that in1986 the 16o,ooo hectares of coca cultivated produced 6,ooometric tons of basic paste whose manufacture required 57 mil-lion litres of kerosene, 32 million litres of sulphuric acid, 16thousand metric tons of toilet paper, 6.4 million litres of ace-tone, and 6.4 million litres of toluene. The considerable wasteinvolved in manufacture is dumped and flushed into rivers andstreams, with adverse consequences. Whereas, kerosene, forinstance, has only a moderately toxic effect on humans, its long-term presence in water produces serious results for fish andamphibians by reducing dissolved oxygen levels in the water,and by chronic effects caused by ingestion and inhalation. Sul-phuric acid is highly corrosive and toxic and dissolves easily inwater. The fish, amphibians, and flora in the rivers runningthrough drug-producing areas are unable to escape acute orchronic sulphuric acid poisoning.63

When chemicals such as carbide or calcium carbide are dis-

62 Lee, White Labyrinth, 6.

63 United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Cocaine

Production, Eradication, and the Environment: Policy, Impact, and Options, o ist

Cong, 2nd sess, August 199o, 143-5.


solved in water, they are extremely toxic for organic tissue andthey increase the water's acidity to levels which the flora andfauna cannot withstand. Toxins like acetone and toluene thatare highly soluble in water and extremely toxic are said to beparticularly harmful to fish and amphibians if ingested, inhaled,or absorbed through the skin. Acidic toxins are very harmful toliving organisms, both because they accumulate in organic tissue

and because high concentrations of these contaminants loweroxygen levels in water, thus affecting aquatic life since most ofit cannot survive in deoxygenated rivers and lakes. In addition,the high concentrations of these chemicals reportedly reducethe natural self-regulation of small and medium-sized rivers. Fur-ther, the tendency of toxins to damage the vital organs of plantsand animals is considered to have the potential for geneticmutations. Moreover, a drastic reduction in the amount of oxy-gen in the water can decimate aerobic bacteria which are impor-tant for the water's natural purification.64

There are indications that many species of fish, amphibians,aquatic reptiles, and crustaceans have already disappeared com-pletely from rivers and streams in areas where maceration pitsare located. These include fish such as the caracha, the bagres,and the carachama. It must be noted, though, that the pollutionhas consequences not only for plants and animals, but also forhumans since the lack of adequate supplies of potable water insome places forces residents to use the contaminated water,thereby contracting various diseases. According to one source,over 150 streams and small and medium-sized rivers have beenpolluted in Peru alone.65

Considerable deforestation results from cocaine production.Marc Dourojeanni asserts that since the coca boom began inthe early 197os, coca production has directly caused the defor-estation of 700,000 hectares of jungle in the Amazon region:'One can go on to say that coca is the direct cause of io% of

64 Ibid, 145, 146.65 Ibid.


the total deforestation in the Peruvian Amazon Region this cen-

tury.' 66 A look at southeast Asia has found that because of shift-

ing opium poppy cultivation, forests in Thailand are being

destroyed at an estimated rate of 280,000-300,ooo hectares per

year. The total area affected amounts to some 2.8 million hec-

tares - 70 per cent of the country's northern forest areas.67

The consequences of deforestation are numerous and

include: the loss of soils through violent and insidious erosion;

the extinction of genetic resources; the alteration of hydrolog-

ical balances; the reduction of hydro-electric potential;

increased difficulties in river navigation; a reduction in potential

hydrobiological resources; a shortage of wood and lumber; and

a reduction in wildlife. Moreover, the obligatory burning off of

woods and land clearing lead to air pollution, loss of soil nutri-

ents, and damage to top soil.68 The United Nations Food and

Agriculture Organization calculates that Latin America and the

Caribbean had the world's largest rain forest loss annually in

the years between 1981 and 1990 - 7.5 million hectares - com-

pared with 4.2 million hectares in Africa and 4.0 million hec-

tares in the Asia-Pacific region. Drug production is not, of

course, solely responsible for this loss. 69

Geonarcotics framework

Having discussed the scope of the problems, my conceptuali-

zation of security, and some of the security problems precipi-

tated by narcotics operations, it might now be useful to sketch

a framework to study the linkages between drugs and security.

66 Ibid, 85.

67 S. La-Ongsri, 'Drug abuse control and the environment in northern Thai-

land,' Bulletin on Narcotics 44(nO 2, 1992), 33.68 Cocaine Production, Eradication, and the Environment: Policy, Impact, and Options,

85-8, 131; see also 'Destroying drug crops without harming the environ-

ment,' United Nations Focus, April 1991, 1. For a brief examination of the

impact of heroin and marijuana production operations, see L. Armstead,

'Illicit narcotics cultivation and processing: the ignored environmental

drama,' Bulletin on Narcotics 44(no 2, 1992), 14-18.

69 'World's rain forests shrink,' Stabroek News, 12 August 1993, 13.

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This framework is built around the notion of geonarcotics:relations of conflict and co-operation among national and inter-national actors that are driven by the narcotics phenomenon.Geonarcotics is built on the inter-relationship of four factors:drugs, geography, power, and politics. Geography is a factor notonly because of the global spacial dispersion of drug operationsbut also because the geographical features of some areas facili-tate certain drug operations. Power in the geonarcotics milieuis both state and non-state in origin, with non-state power bro-kers sometimes exercising more power than some state agents.Politics, which involves resource allocation, is consequently notsolely a function of state action.

A central proposition of this framework is that there aresignificant relations of conflict and co-operation that are drivenby narcotics production, trafficking, consumption-abuse, andmoney laundering operations, by the myriad problems stem-ming from them, and by the efforts to deal with the operationsas well as the problems. Figure 1 captures the components ofthe framework, showing the main problems, the security dimen-sions and some of the threat areas involved, some of the coun-termeasures used, and the actors involved.

The components of the framework are interdependent,although there would be variation in the nature of the inter-relationships. As mentioned earlier, there is no uniformity indrug operations or in their impact on individuals and state andnon-state entities around the world. Some are affected by severalor all areas; others by just one or a few. Hence, there would bevariation in the correlations among level of analysis, problems,and threats, and among problems, threats, and countermea-sures. As for countermeasures, they would vary not only in rela-tion to the security dimension(s) and threat(s) involved but alsoaccording to the level at which the phenomenon is tackled.

This framework is intended to permit an appreciation of the

multiple and interconnected levels at which the narcotics phe-

nomenon could be analysed: individual, group, state, and sys-


temic.7o Analysis is possible at several levels because of themultiplicity of actors involved: individuals, narcos, states, INGOS,

international drug cartels, vigilante groups, domestic non-gov-ernmental organizations, domestic corporations, multinationalcorporations. It is also possible because of the differing kinds,patterns, and directions of relationships that the narcotics phe-nomenon involves.

Two basic kinds of relationships are driven by drug opera-tions: conflict and co-operation. These exist and co-exist amongdifferent actors and at different levels within the global envi-ronment. Relationships are bilateral and multilateral, and sym-metrical as well as asymmetrical. Not all interactions involveforce or military capabilities. This is true of all levels of inter-action. Some interactions involve asymmetric pressure usingnon-military capabilities. One example of this at the systemiclevel has been the application of economic sanctions by theUnited States against countries which, in its estimation, do notadopt effective counter-narcotics measures or show good faithefforts in that regard. The range of sanctions has included lossof tariff benefits, a 5o-per-cent withholding of bilateral aid, sus-pension of services, and the withholding of support for aid inmultilateral funding institutions.7'

Some interactions are verbal and symbolic; others are non-verbal, but with little symbolism. Still others are physical andsymbolic, while some are physical, but not intended to be sym-bolic. As conflict analysts have shown, verbal conflict interac-tions include protests, accusations, complaints, warnings,threats, and demands. Conflict relations also include a range of

70 For a discussion of levels of analysis, see J. David Singer, 'The level-of-analysisproblem in international relations,' in James N. Rosenau, ed, International Pol-itics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press 1969), 20-9; and Ted Robert

Gurr, Politimetrics (Englewood Cliffs Nj: Prentice-Hall 1972), 25-42.71 See United States, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Nar-

cotics Control and Foreign Affairs Certification: Requirements, Procedures, Timetables,

and Guidelines, report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, toothCong, 2nd sess, March 1988.


physical actions, such as seizures, blockades, physical assault,

and armed attacks.72 All of these verbal and physical conflicttypes exist in the geonarcotics milieu. Some actors are engagedin both conflict and co-operation simultaneously, and with sev-eral milieu partners.

International systemic co-operation is dictated by severalthings: the scope and intensity of problems, or at least by theperceptions of these by the relevant political, bureaucratic, andcommercial 61ites; by recognition of the transnational nature ofthe phenomenon, and by the capability limitations of the vari-ous actors. It is important to remember that while states are keyactors in the international system, they are not the only ones.And more importantly, they are not the only ones affected bynarcotics operations. States, international organizations, andINGOS have been collaborating to create and maintain variousnarcotics regimes.73

CONCLUSION

This article identifies the narcotics phenomenon as a multifac-eted one that is growing in importance internationally becauseof its increasing complexity, scope, and gravity. Its impact goesbeyond the domestic environment of states to all kinds of actorsin the international system. This is happening at a time of majorstructural and operational changes in the international system- changes that are causing re-evaluation of the conventional

72 See Charles A. McClelland and Gary D. Hoggard, 'Conflict patterns in theinteractions among nations,' in Rosenau, ed, International Politics and Foreign

Policy, 711-24.

73 See Jack Donnelly, 'The United Nations and the global drug control regime,'

in Smith, ed, Drug Policy in the Americas, 282-304; Robin Rolley, 'United

Nations' activities in international drug control,' in MacDonald and Zagaris,eds, International Handbook on Drug Contro4 415-31; INCSR; UN Narcotics Report,William 0. Walker Ill, ed, Drug Control Polity (University Park PA: Pennsyl-

vania State University Press 1992), especially the chapters by Jonathan Mar-

shall and William McAllister; and United Nations, Social and Economic

Council, Report of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its Thirty-Sixth Session, E/1993/29, E/CN-7/1993/12, 3 June 1993.


theoretical paradigms that have been adopted to examine inter-national interactions and of conceptual constructs normallyused to assess different issue-areas. The security issue-area hasnot been exempt from this scrutiny. In this context, the geonar-cotics framework sketched above (and which will be developedlater) might permit a better appreciation of the various securitycomponents and elements of the narcotics phenomenon, amajor challenge to the international community in the post-Cold War era.

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