From Cardoso to Lula: The Politics and Policies of Reform in Democratic Brazil
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Transcript of From Cardoso to Lula: The Politics and Policies of Reform in Democratic Brazil
FROM CARDOSO TO LULA: THE POLITICS
AND POLICIES OF REFORM IN
DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL
MARIA HERMÍNIA TAVARES DE ALMEIDA
UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO
From Cardoso to Lula: the politics and policies of reform in
democratic Brazil
Maria Hermínia Tavares de Almeida
University of São Paulo
Abstract
The paper discusses the basic features of economic and social policies
reforms, under Cardoso and Lula administrations. It sustains that both
presidents shared the same agenda of reforms and that moderate
reformism, instead of neoliberal radicalism, has been the rule. It
sustains, also, that moderate reformism can be explained by the
characteristics of Brazilian political institutions – especially federalism
and coalition presidentialism.
Introduction
Reforming has been the name of the game in Brazil, since
democratization. Social protection reform began with the first civilian
government, in 1985. Market oriented economic reforms came later.
Although they broke into the governmental agenda under Fernando
Collor de Mello (1990-1992) they gained momentum during the eight
years Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). Social
protection and economic reforms were both central to Cardoso´s policy
initiatives. In both cases, changes in public sector roles and
prerrogatives were at stake. Nevertheless, although the issues
belonged to the neoliberal reform agenda – international trade
liberalization, privatization of public firms, regulatory reform, monetary
reform, inflation target policies, tax and fiscal reforms, social security
reform, targeted cash transfer programs -- the script and the actors
were not. In Brazil, moderate reformism prevailed instead of neoliberal
fundamentalism. The ongoing administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva (2003-2006), against all odds, accepted the changes promoted by
his predecessor and continued in the same moderate reformist path.
Neither social-democratic, nor neoliberal reformist, governments, in
Brazil, have been basically pragmatic, facing the challenges of the
moment under tight economic constraints, in a complex institutional
setting, a plural and diversified polity and political elites that favored
negotiation and arrived at a certain degree of convergence.
This paper analyses the last ten years of reforms in Brazil, under
Cardoso and Lula administrations. It sustains that both presidents
shared the same agenda of reforms and that moderate reformism,
instead of neoliberal radicalism, has been the rule. It sustains, also,
that moderate reformism can be explained by the characteristics of
Brazilian political institutions – especially federalism and coalition
presidentialism.
In the first’s part, the evolution of social protection reform is presented.
In the second, the same thing is done for economic reform. In the third,
we discuss how institutions such as decentralized federalism and
coalition presidentialism defined incentives and constraints to the
reformist process.
Reforming the social protection system
Poverty and inequality reduction stood high in the agenda of
democratic opposition against military rule. The fact that high rates of
economic growth were insufficient to reduce poverty significantly —
and even increased income inequalities— during the Brazilian
“economic miracle”, under authoritarian government, was attributed to
a particular choice of economic policies and regressive social policies1.
The opposition to authoritarian rule was fought in the name of civil
liberties and democratic institutions, reshaping the federation through
decentralization and paying the “social debt”, V.G., reducing poverty
and inequalities.
Prevailing social protection system was thought to be a perverse
combination of excessive centralization at federal level, fragmentation
and overlapping of programs and policies, inefficient social
expenditures, clientelism and regressive distribution of benefit and
services.
The social protection system that came to age under the authoritarian
regime could be considered a special case of conservative welfare
regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990)2 . The criticism to it set the guidelines
of reform. It should embody decentralization, participation of the
beneficiaries, measures to shun clientelistic misuse of social programs,
rationalization and increased efficiency of social expenditures,
universalization of access and a more even distribution of benefits and
services.
At the same time, emergency policies aiming at extreme vulnerable
groups were thought necessary until sustained economic growth and a
reformed social protection system were put in place.
As usually happens when social reform is at stake, epistemic
communities (Heclo, 1974; Rimlinger, 1982; Weir, Orloff & Skocpol,
1988), gathering together university researchers, governmental
institutions researchers, policy makers and international organizations,
such as PHO, ILPES/CEPAL, IADB, were important for designing
innovative reform blueprints.
1 Major international organizations, such as UNDP and BIRD, recognized the need for development policies to include specific goals regarding poverty and inequality reduction in the 70s.2 Draibe & Aureliano prefer to call it a particularistic-meritocratic system (1989) while Werneck Vianna (1998) prefers to classify it among the liberal or residual welfare regimes. I tend to agree with Draibe & Aureliano.
Changes begun with the first civilian government3 and acquired
institutional form under the 1988 Constitution4. They pointed out
towards a social protection model granting universal access to social
security, basic health care services and basic education. Competences
and duties among federal levels were reshaped bringing to the fore a
decentralized and cooperative model with significant expansion of
municipal responsibilities and decentralization of fiscal resources.
In the 1990s, those reform guidelines were implemented through a slow
process of decentralization of responsibilities and resources and the
expansion of the provision of social benefits and health, education a
social welfare services. Two issues have been especially important to a
successful decentralization. The first was monetary stability that came
with the Real Plan, in 1994 granting predictability to the flux of
resources from national to state and municipal administrations. The
second was institutional and policy learning allowing for the definition
of a set of incentives for redistributing responsibilities, as much as for
cooperation among governmental levels in providing social services.
Around the middle of the decade, municipalization of social assistance
and basic health care was completed5 and a lot had been accomplished
regarding the first for years of education. On the other hand, access to
basic education and health care became, at last universal. Social
welfare was expanded with the creation of cash transfer programs for
elder and disable persons.
3 As discussões e primeiras iniciativas de reforma do sistema de saúde tiveram início no governo Sarney. São deste período, também, as primeiras experiências de reforma descentralizadora da educação feitas por governos estaduais. Programas emergênciais destinados aos mais pobres foram montados pelo governo federal. Entre eles, destacou-se o programa de distribuição de leite.4 Draibe (1999:10) resumiu as mudanças introduzidas pela carta constitucional em termos de: “a) ampliação e extensão de direitos sociais, b) concepção de seguridade social como forma mais abrangente de proteção, c)um certo afrouxamento do vínculo contributivo como princípio estruturante do sistema, d)universalização do acesso e expansão da cobertura, e) recuperação e redefinição dos patamares mínimos dos valores dos benefícios sociais, f) maior comprometimento do estado com o sistema, projetando um maior grau de provisão estatal pública de bens e serviços sociais”.5 Em 2001, 90% dos 5.531 municipíos brasileiros já havia assumido a gestão plena da rede de atenção básica à saúde.
During Fernando Henrique Cardoso`s first term (1995-1998), social
security reform began to tackle the distortions of a system with highly
regressive distribution of benefits. A constitutional reform was
necessary to allow for a moderate reform of private sector retirement
and pensions scheme. Nevertheless, due to fierce opposition of
powerful unions and opposition politicians, the government failed to
change the rules for the civil service employee’s.6.
Last but not least, the federal government created new and innovative
policies targeting the poor. Four conditional cash transfer programs
aiming at different vulnerable groups were established: Bolsa-escola,
Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI), Bolsa-alimentação, Auxilio-gás,
and Agente Jovem. Together with other special programs, they were
meant to create a social safety net7.
The choice for cash transfer programs, instead of expanding
governmental services, was thought to circumvent bureaucracy and
trim clientelism. Comunidade Solidária, conceived and commanded by
first lady Ruth Cardoso, searched new forms of bringing together
governmental ministries and agencies and NGOs.
In order to reduce political exchange and pork barrel, the Cardoso
administration established formulae to calculate the values to be
transferred to subnational governments in the case of grant-in-aid
programs.
The administration failed in the areas of crime and public security,
housing and sanitation, where no innovative initiative came out.
Although social safety net programs gained importance, during Cardoso
´s second term in office, universal policies – such as education and
basic health care – continued to be central to the federal government
agenda. In this sense, Cardoso´s social policies did not broke up with
6 Para uma análise da reforma da previdência ver, Melo (2002).7 The other were: previdência rural e dos programas não contributivos da assistência social?, os seguintes:, Programa de Saúde da Família, Programa de Apoio à Agricultura Familiar, além do Projeto Alvorada para os 2.361 municípios onde era maior a concentração de brasileiros situados abaixo da linha da pobreza.
prevailing conceptions of social protection aiming at achieving equity
and universalizing citizen access8.
In brief, when the PT won the national elections, in 2002, an important
part of the social reform agenda had already been implemented with
modest success in reducing poverty, improving education and health,
although it failed in diminishing income inequalities. Tables I and II
show data on some chosen social indicators.
Table I
BRAZIL – SELECTED SOCIAL INDICATORS
1991-2002
1992 2002
Illiteracy rate (people 15 years old and more) 17,2 11,9
Infant illiteracy rate 12,4 3,8
Children 7-14 years old, in school 81,9 94,5
Mean Gap between age and level, in years (children 10-14 years) 2,1 1,1
Children 10-14 years old, in school, with more than 2 years of
educational gap(%)37,3 16,1
Mean of years in school (adults 25 years old or more) 4,9 6,1
Adults with 8 or more years of education (%) 28,6 39,5
Infant mortality (1/1000) 45,2 27,8
Unemployment rare (people 15 years old or more) 6,6 9,2
People bellow poverty line (%) 40,8 32,9
People bellow misery line (%) 19,3 13,4
Source: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), apud IETS.
8 Para um exemplo dessas concepções, ver o documento oficial do governo brasileiro para a Conferência Copenhagen+5, das Nações Unidas: Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2000).
Note: poverty line = R$ 125/month ( in real –september/2002 or approx. US 128 PPP)
misery line = R$ 62/month ( in real – september/2002 or approx. US 63,5 PPP)
Table II
BRAZIL – SELECTED INEQUALITY
INDICATORS
1992-2002
1992 2002 2004
Gini Index 0,58 0,59 0,57
House income – participation of the poorest
20% (%)2,36 2,52
2,75
Illiteracy rate (white people, 15 years old or
more)10,6 7,7
7,1
Illiteracy rate (black and mulatto, 15 years
old or more)25,8 18,2
16
Mean of years of education (white people) 5,9 7,0 7,7
Mean of years of education (black and
mulatto)3,6 4,9
5,9
Unemployment rate (white people) 6,0 8,2 8,2
Unemployment rate (black and mulatto) 7,4 10,4 10,5
Unemployment rate (male) 5,5 7,4 7,1
Unemployment rate (female) 8,2 11,7 12,1
Percentage of people bellow poverty line
(North) 52,8 45,2
Percentage of people bellow poverty line
(Northeast)65,7 56,5
Percentage of people bellow poverty line
(Centerwest)33,8 23,5
Percentage of people bellow poverty line
(Southeast)27,5 21,0
Percentage of people bellow poverty line
(South)32,3 21,8
Source: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) apud
IETS.
Note: poverty line = R$ 125/month ( in real
–september/2002 or approx. US 128 PPP)
The PT arrived at federal government denying all previous
improvement in social conditions. Nevertheless, its actual policies did
not depart significantly from the previous government agenda.
One of Lula´s first move was to continue social security reform
attacking the benefits of civil services employees, succeeding where
Cardoso had failed. A new bill was approved, in the PT first year in
government, trimming the civil servants benefits and establishing the
same retirement scheme for both the private and the public sectors.
Although the government could justify it in the name of fighting
inequality and statutory privileges, the social security reform was also a
topic of the neoliberal agenda and was claimed to be so by PT´s left
wing and civil servant unions.
On the other hand, the rise of PT to federal government brought
poverty and hunger to the forefront of the national agenda. And in-cash
benefits programs became synonym of social policies. In his
Inauguration address, President Lula assured that at the end of his
administration every Brazilian would enjoy three meals a day, and
hunger would be banished from the national scene. The Hunger Zero
program was launched as the great innovative anti-poverty action. It
was meant to mobilize government and society in a crusade to eliminate
hunger9.
9 By the time it was put forward, specialists, based in academic research, had concluded that, due to the expansion universal policies, like health care and education among others, hunger no longer was a national problem. Malnutrition was circunscribed to some areas, most of them rural, located mostly in Northeastern Brazil (Monteiro,2003).
Hunger Zero was rather a misconceived and misguided multi-sector
policy package aiming at wrapping together structural policies, such as
agrarian reform and job creation, and target actions such as in-cash
transfers available to poor families exclusively for buying food, direct
food distribution, popular restaurants with subsidized meals, measures
against child malnutrition, financial support to family agriculture and to
construction of wells and small dams, and so forth. The new program
ignored the recent past experience in anti-poverty programs and tried
to start from scratch.
In spite of of intense government propaganda and the open support it
received from public opinion, Hunger Zero proved to be unfeasible and,
by the end of President Lula’s first year in power, was phased out. It
was replaced by the Family Grant program, which, instead of
concocting an additional in-cash grant, promoted the merge of School
Grant, Food Grant and Gas-Aid, changed some of their rules and
expanded their coverage up to 8,5 million families bye the end of
200510. Family Grant, still in the making, is meant to cover the whole
poor population in the next few years.
As of today, targeted anti-poverty policies, in government rethoric and
in government action, seemed to be kept apart from other social
policies and to have lost connection to any broader social development
proposals. The Family Grant embodies the PT conception of how to
fight and eventually eliminate poverty. Especially after the social
security reform, social protection reform is no longer in the
governmental agenda. The social Ministeries either directly continue
the previous policies or Cardoso´s era or try to improve upon them11.
10 The Grant consists of two components: the first is due to every family below the poverty line and is free from conditionalities and the second is conditioned to children school enrollment. The program size and the lack of adequate monitoring tools makes the control of school attendance an impossible goal.11 The establishment of FUNDEF, a fund to spurr municipalization of fundamental education and improve teachers salaries, has been one important innovation of Cardoso´s administration. Lula´s government is proposing to expand the fund to encompass also secondary education.
Finally, Lula´s administration also brought to the fore front affirmative
action as a way to dealing with ingrained inequalities. The federal
program PROUNI established quotas at private universities for poor
students that came from public high schools and for ethnic minorities.
Quotas are also part of government bill on Federal University System
reform that is still in Congress.
In brief, in spite of of the strong symbolic association between Lula and
the PT and the promise of social reform their government did not have
an innovative approach to the issue. Rather than change, Lula´s social
policies show significant continuity with those of previous government
and an unexpected affinity to the neoliberal agenda.
Economic reforms
The issue of economic reforms, understood as market oriented reforms,
broke into governmental agenda under Fernando Collor de Mello´s
administration, as a result of the international influences but also of
political elite’s policy learning, after almost a decade of economic crisis
and failed efforts to curb inflation. Reckoning the importance of
reforms and its relations to monetary stabilization was a process that
marched in slow pace. Previous consensus over the virtues of state-led
development and the import substitution model of growth has been
strong, extensive and therefore difficult to break12.
Under Collor, economic reforms began with efforts to liberalize trade
and with an essay in putting forward a program of privatization of
public firms. Non tariff barriers to import were reduced along with a
schedule of cut in tariffs themselves. Graph I shows the evolution of
the weighted mean tariff, from the end of Sarney´s administration to
the beginning of Cardoso´s second term. From then on no big changes
occurred. The hugest slash took place under Collor and Franco.
Graph I
Brazil – Evolution of Import tariffs (weighted mean)
12 For a discussion of factors leading to it see Tavares de Almeida (2004).
1988-1998
Source: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, apud Patri (2000)
On the other hand, during Collor´s short period in government,
privatization of public firms began for real. Law 8.031/90 created the
Programa Nacional de Desestatização (National Program of Divestiture) 13. Steel, petrochemical and fertilizer public firms were sold. After his
resignation, the program continued, albeit reluctantly, under former
vice-president, then successor Itamar Franco (1993-1994). The process
gained momentum in the following Administration, led by Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998). The new president introduced
important institutional changes. Law 8.031 was reshaped and
constitutional reform, in 1995-96, allowed previous State monopolies in
telecommunications, electricity, coastal and domestic navigation, gas
and oil, to be included in the privatization program. Legislation creating
regulatory agencies to supervise privatized companies in
telecommunications, oil and electricity sectors was also approved by
the Congress. During Cardoso's second term in office (1999-2002)
privatization continued, although at a much more moderate pace. In a
13 The law established an initial list of firms to be privatized, put the program under the National Development Bank (BNDES) management and gave the Executive the authority to add or exclude firms from the list. Complementary legislation defined privatization currencies, allowing for the use of several kinds of Federal debt certificates acquired by the financial markets in order to buy shares of auctioned enterprises.
matter of fact, privatization of federal electricity firms came to a halt
due to political pressures and, above all, to divergent views about the
best privatization model inside Cardoso´s coalition parties14.
From 1991 to 2001, 68 enterprises owned by the Federal government
have been privatized. Among them almost all steel, chemical,
petrochemical and fertilizer public companies, Brazilian hugest Mining
Corporation, the railway system and several electricity enterprises.
From 1998 to 2001, the whole telecommunications system was
auctioned. Some important privatizations also occurred at State-level15.
As shown elsewhere (Almeida & Moya, 1997; Almeida 2004), the
Presidency took Congress' preferences into account when establishing
the list and the order of corporations to be privatized. Privatization
began in areas where an early and firm majority of legislators favored
its transfer to private hands: steel, chemical, fertilizer and
petrochemical firms. Constitutional amendment to allow for the
privatization of coastal navigation, gas, iron- ore mining,
telecommunications and electricity came after privatization policy in
general had won some degree of legitimacy. And although State
monopoly of oil was broken, Petrobrás, the hugest Brazilian company
and the icon of State-led development, was not included the
privatization program.
Under Cardoso, economic reforms such as privatization and trade
liberalization became part and parcel of the successful effort towards
monetary stability and fiscal adjustment. Those goals were pursued
through an array of policies that changed in time and included:
monetary and exchange rate policies, inflation target rules, increase in
14 On Cardoso´s policies for this sector see Goldemberg & Prado (2005)15 As of the end of 2001, the Federal program reached the US$ 37,705 billion mark, including debts transfered to the new owners. This sum goes up to US $ 68,623 billion when the telecommunications sector is added.
taxes and other compulsory contributions16, limiting rules for
expenditures of the different level of government17
Those policy initiatives demanded a significant mobilization of political
resources. Some of them required constitutional amendment and the
Congress approval. Therefore, the institutional designing and
institutional building, under Cardoso administration, was far from
trivial.
On the other hand, some issues pertaining to the international reform
agenda, although present in Brazilian public debate never were really
included in the governmental agenda. This is the case for tax reform
and labor reform. Finally, other reforms failed or acquired a limited
scope such civil service and administrative reform.
While out of government, the PT made a fierce opposition to Cardoso´s
economic and reform policies, thought to be neoliberal, subdue to the
international organizations´ agenda and contrary to national interests.
Nevertheless, Lula´s government did not brought any significant
change regarding economic policies, which have been in clear
continuity to those implemented in the four previous years: inflation
targets, high interest rates, free exchange rates, high tax burden and
compliance to international financial compromises and agreements.
Despite internal dissent and critics from its allies, continuity rather
than change has been the hallmark of PT government economic
policies18.
16 Tax as percentage of GDP grew from 19,88 % in 1988 to 35 % in 2002. On the subject see Afonso (2004), Melo (2005).17 For a good overview of economic policies, specially during Cardoso´s second term see Oliveira & Turolla (2003)18 The Finance Minister and his staff , always supported by Lula, are the garantors of continuity while critic from other important PT ministers and party leaders, supported by the Vice-President, have stressed the necessity of putting growth instead of stability in first place. The debate inside Lula government reproduces the cleavages present during the two Cardoso´s terms between the so called “neoliberals” and “developmentalists”. On this see, Sallum Filho (1999).
Although opposed to Cardoso´s privatization policy, the PT government
did not tried to reverse what have been done, but did not proceed
privatizing what was left of Brazilian public sector: the federal energy
companies and Petrobrás.
On the other hand, Lula administration got congressional approval for
a law allowing for public-private partnership in utilities and public
services sectors that was meant to attract private investment to develop
much needed Brazilian infrastructure systems.
At same time, as previous said, the PT government send to Congress
and got the approval for a moderate social security reform bill that
continued Cardoso´s effort to cope with social security increasing
deficits.
As much as Cardoso, Lula tried to formulate a blueprint for reforming
tax and fiscal systems but failed, due to the difficult of overcoming the
fragmented and opposed interest of different economic sectors,
subnational governments, either states or municipalities, and federal
ministries and agencies (Melo, 2005).
The continuity of economic policies between the two adversarial
presidencies expresses the convergence of Brazilian political elites on
the value of currency stability and on the policies adequate to sustain it.
International constraints were surely important but they would not be
effective if a new consensus had no emerged. This was not an
ideological neoliberal consensus, but rather a pragmatic convergence
molded inside a specific institutional set of decentralized federalism
and coalition presidentialism.
Reforming under coalition presidentialism
Party government never existed in democratic Brazil. The combination
of federalism, proportional representation and rules that facilitate the
organization of new parties and their participation in electoral
competition have produced a very fragmented party system and the
necessity for presidents to govern with huge multiparty coalitions.
Brazilian coalition presidentialism19 is a complex political arrangement,
similiar to parliamentarianism in the mode of government formation.
Ministries and other important positions in the Executive, such as
directories of public enterprises and governmental agencies, are
divided among parties belonging to governmental coalition in Congress.
When parties have important basis all over the country, the distribution
of ministries and first rank governmental positions must oblige its
different state level factions. Therefore, huge instead of minimum party
coalitions have been rule, especially under Cardoso and Lula.
Table IV shows the governmental party coalitions under different
Brazilian presidents.
Table IV
Governing coalitions in Brazil – 1988-2004
President
President´sparty
Parties in governmentcoalition
BeginingOf the coalition
End of thecoalition
Period % of Chamber of Representatives(in the date of its begining)
Days
Months
Sarney 1
PMDB PMDB-PFL 15/03/1985
30/09/1988
1.295
42,5
19 Sobre o tema ver Abranches (19 ), Amorim Neto ( 199 ), Figueiredo & Limongi (2000), Santos & Amorim Neto (200), Figueiredo, Limongi & Cheibub (200 )
President
President´s
Parties in governmen
Begining
End of the
Period % of Chamber of RepresentativSarney
2PMDB PMDB-PFL 06/10/19
8814/03/1990
529 17,5 64,40
Collor 1
PRN PRN-PDS-PFL
15/03/1990
31/01/1991
322 10,5 29,70
Collor 2
PRN PRN-PDS-PFL (BLOCO1)*
01/02/1991
14/04/1992
438 14,5 34,59
Collor 3
PRN PDS-PTB-PL-PFL (BLOCO2)*
15/04/1992
30/09/1992
168 5.5 43,54
Itamar 1
Non-partisan
PSDB-PTB-PMDB-PSB- PFL (BLOCO3)*
01/10/1992
30/08/1993
333 11 60,04
Itamar 2
Non-partisan
PSDB-PTB-PMDB-PPPFL (BLOCO3)*
31/08/1993
24/01/1994
146 5 55,64
Itamar 3
Non-partisan
PSDB-PP-PMDB-PFL (BLOCO4)*
25/01/1994
31/12/1994
340 11 55,27
FHC I 1 PSDB PSDB-PTB-PMDB-PFL
01/01/1995
25/04/1996
449 16 57,26
FHC I 2 PSDB PSDB-PTB-PMDB-PFL-PPB (BLOCO5)*
26/04/1996
31/12/1998
979 32 77,19
FHC II 1
PSDB PSDB-PMDB-PPB-PTB-PFL (BLOCO6)*
01/01/1999
05/03/2002
1.159 38
76,61
FHC II 2
PSDB PMDB-PSDB-PPB
06/03/2002
31/12/2002
300 10 45,22
Lula 1 PT PT-PL-PCdoB-PDT-PPS-PSB-PTB-PV
01/01/2003
22/01/2004**
35512,5
41,91
Lula 2 PT PT-PL-PCdoB-PPS-PSB-PTB-PV-PMDB-(BLOCO7)*
23/12/2004
31-12-2004
34311,5
61,21
Sources: www.planalto.gov.br; Meneguello, 1998; Legislative data base, Cebrap. Organized by Argelina Figueiredo e Fernando Limongi.
Criteria: 1end of the term and change in party composition of Ministry (exit or entry of Minister from a new party in the coalition); 2. Beginning of a legislature or of a parliamentary bloc, changing the % coalition seats in Congress.
* Composition of parliamentary blocks:
BLOCO1 = PFL, PRN, PMN, PSC e PST;
BLOCO2 = PFL, PSC, PRN e PL;
BLOCO3 = PFL, PSC e PRN;
BLOCO4 = PFL, PSC e PRS;
BLOCO5 = PPB, PL e PMDB, PMN, PSC, PSD e PSL;
BLOCO6 = PFL, PL, PMN, PSC, PSD, PSL e PST;
BLOCO 7= PL, PSL.
Number of seats of parties forming a block is considered only when the party remains in the block for the whole period of the coalition.
** The PDT left officially Lula´s government and his base in Congress on 12/12/2003. Nevertheless, the criterium used was the exit of Minister Miro Teixeira on 01/ 23/2004.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso presided to a huge center to the right
congressional coalition and Lula to an odd left to the right one. The
2002 elections excluded the possibility of a PT government or a
government supported only by leftist parties. Lula won 46, 4% of the
ballots, in the first run, and had confortable 61, 3% majority in the
second run. Nevertheless, his electoral coalition20 won only 25,3% of
the House of Representatives seats and 22,2 % of Senate. O PT
obtained 17,7% e 18,5% of the seats in the House and Senate. Even if
we add to Lula´s coalition those seats controlled by other leftist parties
the leftist block would come short of a majority with its 37, 6% of the
representatives and 35, 5 % of the senators.
Under these circunstances, the PT and its allies had three options. The
first was to build up a minority left coalition and negotiate issue by
issue the votes of the parties ate the center. This option, hazardous as it
could be, was not impossible the moment Lula administration marched
towards the center. The second possibility was building a majority
attracting the centrist PMDB to the governmental coalition. The third
was going far beyond the center including small right wing and
20 O Partido dos Trabalhadores coligou-se com Partido Liberal (PL), Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), Partido Comunista do Brasil Pcdo B) e Partido Municipalista Nacional (PMN).
patronage parties. Lula and his party chose this third way and build up
a huge left-right coalition that included center-to-the right parties like
the Partido Liberal (PL), and rightist small parties such as the Partido
Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) and Partido Popular (PP). In a matter of
fact, this was a coalition very similar, at its right wing, to the one that
supported Cardoso, who also counted on the PTB and the PP.
Nevertheless, it was more incongruous21 and more liable to small
patronage parties.
Table IV shows that several parties participated in both governments.
Nevertheless, while Cardoso had a huge majority during his two terms,
except for his last 9 months in office, Lula lead a minority coalition in
his first year in government.
The complexity of building and keeping together a majority coalition
from a fragmented party system is not the only challenge faced by
whoever wins the federal government. Besides that , Brazil is a quite
decentralized federation, where governors can be important actors22,
although lacking of formal veto powers. Their - and not presidential -
elections are pivotal to organize electoral competition and explain
electoral results. This is so due not only to the coincidence of electoral
cycles (Shugart & Carey,1992: 207) for federal and state level
executives and legislatives, but also due to the coincidence between
states´ limits and multinominal electoral districts for Congress and
State Legislative Assemblies (Lavareda, 1991; Piquet Carneiro &
Tavares de Almeida, 2006). In brief, institutional rules account for a
decentralized political system with several potential veto points and
veto players.
On the other hand, recent research has shown that veto points can be
circumvented and veto players neutralized. The legislative powers of
21 O eixo da coalizção de Cardoso foi a aliança entre um partido de centro (PSDB) e um partido de centro-direita (PFL) que compartilhavam uma agenda de reformas econômicas liberalizantes.22 On the subject see Abrúcio,1994,1998; Abrucio & Samuels,1997; Abrucio & Costa, 1998; Santos,2001, Souza,2003, Tavares de Almeida (2005, 200.)
the Executive and Congress internal rules have guaranteed Executive´s
predominance over the Legislative and a disciplined governmental
coalition in Congress, in spite of party fragmentation produced
federalism and electoral rules and politician’s autonomy granted party
rules ( Figueiredo & Limongi, 2000).
Table V, presented by Figueiredo & Limongi (2005), shows that the
Executive has been highly successful and has exerted significant
influence on the outcomes of the legislative process, even when it
lacked a majority of seats in Congress, as has been the case under
Collor. It also shows that Cardoso and Lula had both very positive
results in circumventing their opposition.
Table V
Brazil - Legislative production in different administrations – Ordinary laws
( 1989-2004)
Administratio
n
President´s
party in
Chamber of
Representatives
(% of seats)
Governmental
coalition in
Chamber of
Representatives
(% of seats)
Executive
success **
(%)
Executive´s
dominance
***
(%)
Subtotal 24,3 77,1 29,5 38,5
Sarney 36,8 64,4 71,3 77,9
Collor 8,0 34,8 65,0 76,5
Franco 0,0 58,7 66,0 91,0
Cardoso I 15,3 73,4 73,0 84,6
Cardoso II 18,5 72,8 70,4 84,4
Lula 17,5 50,4 79,8 95,6
Subtotal 14,7 59,1 70,7 85,6
Apud Figueiredo & Limongi (2005)
Source: Legislative data base, Cebrap.** Percentage of the Executive´s projects presented and approved during the same term.*** Percentage laws of all approved that resulted from Eexecutive´s initiative.
Nevertheless, these results rely significant on the President itself and
on the government´s congressional leadership capacities for
negotiating and making room for different interests. Although the
President controls important resources and can distribute an array of
benefits to his allies in order to get compliance, it is also true that he
must be open to negotiate his positions and must take into account
what he can and what cannot sensibly expect to approve, before
sending a proposition to Congress. In a matter of fact, succesfull
proposals must be accepted by the median representative of the
governmental coalition (Velasco, 2005), depending, therefore, on the
distribution of preferences regarding each issue at stake.
In other words, Brazilian institutional arrangements as long as it
stimulates broad multiparty coalitions, do not favor radical strategies of
change. Given the voters preferences, the governmental coalitions must
include the political center, therefore favoring negotiated policies and
moderate reforms. The prevailing institutional set gives powerful
incentives to moderation and continuity of governmental policies.
Under Cardoso´s administration it benefited the moderate reformers
against neoliberal radicals. Under Lula, it has strengtened the position
of the moderate and pragmatic group that already controlled the PT
machine.
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