Frog Fire Fatality

United States Department of Agriculture

The Frog Fire began on July 30, 2015 in a remote region of the Modoc National Forest.

“If this accident didn’t happen, I wouldn’t have any sense of the danger we were in.” —Firefighter

Frog Fire Fatality

Learning Review Report

July 6, 2016

Frog Fire Fatality Learning Review Report

Contents Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 1

Narrative ...................................................................................................................................... 2

Background........................................................................................................................................... 2

Frog Fire Events .................................................................................................................................... 3

Alex’s Perspective: “Just a normal fire” ............................................................................................... 5

Ryan’s Perspective: “Fire was pretty straight-forward” ..................................................................... 10

Casey’s Perspective: “Fire is starting to take off” .............................................................................. 11

Search ................................................................................................................................................. 14

Engine Accident .................................................................................................................................. 15

Incident Timeline ....................................................................................................................... 19

Sensemaking Discussion ............................................................................................................ 20

Works Cited ........................................................................................................................................ 34

Appendix 1: Fire Behavior Summary ......................................................................................... 35

Appendix 2: Personal Protective Equipment Report ................................................................. 54

Appendix 3: USDA Forest Service Fire and Aviation Management Briefing Paper: Establishing New Minimum Qualification Standards for Forest Service Fire and Aviation Duty Officers (2014) .. 58

Learning Review Team Members Mike Dudley (CRP Response Lead) Joe Harris Kevin Pfister Don Boursier Tony Petrilli

Randy Draeger (Learning Review Team Lead) Curtis Heaton Ruth Spradling Shoshana Cooper Joe Duran

Frog Fire Fatality Learning Review Report Page 1 of 62

Frog Fire Fatality Executive Summary

On the evening of July 30, 2015, 38-year-old Black Hills National Forest Engine Captain David “Dave” Ruhl was entrapped and killed while scouting on foot during initial attack of the Frog Fire on the Modoc National Forest (Region 5, California). A Coordinated Response Team was convened with a delegation of authority from the USDA Forest Service, Washington Office. The team included a diverse cadre of members, who were asked to understand the circumstances that led to this fatality and produce a report. This report tells the story of events surrounding Dave Ruhl’s death based upon information collected through site visits, interviews, and materials, including photos, videos, maps, dispatch logs, incident documentation, weather data, and other resources. Focus group sessions and an academic review were conducted with subject-matter experts to consider the conditions and sensemaking associated with these events. Five contextual themes that directly or indirectly shaped the actions of the firefighters on the ground were developed, including cultural acceptance and normalization of risk; fundamentals of effective training; understanding the risk of scouting fireline; reaffirmation that communication challenges continue to influence tragic events; and finally, ambiguity in standards around key positions and definitions.

Figure 1: Frog Fire sketch.


Narrative Background Situated in northeastern California, the Modoc National Forest (Modoc) is a land of contrasts—an ecologically diverse landscape ranging from timbered mountains to high desert plateaus. The rugged landscape, formed from expansive prehistoric lava flow, is marked with areas of rough, broken lava rock ridges surrounded by deep basins. These “reefs” of boulders rise 10 to 20 feet high, limiting visibility and making walking over them deceptively difficult. The Frog Fire was no exception. The Modoc averages 103 wildfires per year, the majority of which are started by lightning and burn an average of 14,200 acres annually. Composed predominantly of ponderosa pine, scattered juniper, manzanita, bitterbrush, and grasses, “gasoline alley” was primed for fire on the afternoon of July 30, 2015. No red-flag warnings were issued. The scattered clouds offered little relief from the 94° F temperatures, 9° F above the average high for that time of year. Relative humidity measured 13 percent. South-southwest winds at 5 miles per hour, gusting up to 12 miles per hour, were recorded at a nearby remote automated weather station. Live fuel moisture in the bitterbrush, known locally as “plant-based gasoline,” was measured at 113 percent, making for volatile fuel conditions when lightning struck that Thursday. However, in a seasonal context, fuels were wetter than average. The Energy Release Component (ERC) based on National Fire Danger Rating System (FDRS) fuel model G (Northeastern Geographic Area Coordination Center) on July 30 was well below a 23-year average at 57, suggesting a relatively low probability for large fire growth. The ERC values had averaged well below normal for the week prior to July 30. At this time, the Modoc was managed by a Forest Supervisor and two District Rangers covering the four ranger districts. All three line officers had been in place for approximately one year. The forest-level fire organization consisted of Chief 1 (Forest Fire Management Officer), Chief 2 (Deputy Forest Fire Management Officer), Chief 3 (training), and Chief 4 (fuels). Chiefs 1 and 2 had been on the forest for many years. The Forest had two fire zones, each managed by a Division Chief (District Fire Management Officer) who reported to a District Ranger. Each Division Chief had two Battalion Chiefs (Assistant District Fire Management Officers) and a Fuels Specialist. The East Zone Division Chief had been with the Forest Service for just over a year but had a high level of local experience with another federal agency. In the months leading up to the Frog Fire, the west zone fire program experienced a high amount of turnover at the management and module levels, so detailers, new employees, and ongoing vacancies were commonplace. The West Zone Division Chief was new (in place for about three weeks at the time of the Frog Fire). Both West Zone Battalion Chief positions were filled with detailers going into the fire season. Dave Ruhl’s permanent position was Engine Captain on the Black Hills National Forest (Region 2, South Dakota and Wyoming), but he was detailed into one of the two Battalion Chief/Assistant District Fire Management Officer (BC/ADFMO) positions for the west zone of the Modoc National Forest. During the almost seven weeks that Dave worked in this position, he clearly articulated his goal of getting his Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3) task book signed off to his supervisor. Dave was looking to advance his career, and this qualification would make that easier. Dave’s call sign was Suppression 41 as opposed to Battalion Chief 41. This was a contentious issue that he had raised with leadership several times during the first couple weeks of his detail. Although he met


Forest Service-Fire Program Management (FS-FPM) BC/ADFMO standards as a qualified Division Supervisor and Burn Boss Type 2, he didn’t meet national standards for Unit Duty Officer (DO) because he was still an Incident Commander (IC) Type 3 trainee. The Modoc required Battalion Chiefs to also meet the national standards for Unit Duty Officer, which direct that both Division Supervisor (DIVS) and Incident Commander Type 3 qualifications be met. The outreach for Dave’s detail stated: “may be delegated to perform as a qualified District Duty Officer and must maintain fire qualifications at the Division Group Supervisor and/or Incident Commander Type 3 level.”

Frog Fire Events A lightning strike recorded at 1732 on Thursday, July 30, 2015 started the Frog Fire. Two storm cells located near the fire were reported to be small, light in color with virga, and difficult to pick out from under the tree canopy. Initially, the fire grew to the northwest at a relatively moderate rate influenced by the collapse of a southeasterly storm cell. Approximately one hour after ignition, the fire quickly spread toward the northwest as outflow winds increased to 9 mph with gusts to 28 mph from the southeast. Outflow winds (air that flows outwards from the leading edge of a storm system or thunder cell) from a second storm cell located to the northeast of the fire caused a sudden wind shift to the southwest. This change in wind direction was felt directly on the fireline around 1930. This wind transition created a powerful head fire running southwest with torching, spotting, and intermittent crown runs and flame lengths calculated between 20 to 80 feet. The following account depicts how conditions unfolded for the initial attack firefighters on the Frog Fire. To begin the story, multiple perspectives are used to illustrate the firefighters’ different initial perceptions based upon their arrival times, means of travel, and past experiences. Some portions of the storyline are repeated as we see events unfold from these multiple perspectives. The story then transitions into one narrative.

Figure 2: Frog Fire representative terrain and vegetation conditions.

1743 On July 30, fire crews on the Modoc were winding down their shifts when they received an order to extend staffing later until 2000 that evening. Dispatchers and Duty Officers discussed the supplemental


afternoon forecast, which called for “a slight chance for dry thunderstorms” in the area. They monitored the radar and detected the early arrival of a thunderstorm although none had been predicted in the original morning and afternoon forecast until the next day.

Figure 3: Medford Nexrad storm cell motion data, July 30, 2015; 1735 hours.

At 1746, mere minutes after the extended staffing call was broadcast across the radio frequencies, the lookout spotted blue smoke drifting upward through the trees about four miles east-southeast from his perch at the historic Round Mountain Lookout tower. Initial attack (IA) resources immediately dispatched included two Type 3 engines and a helicopter with five helitack crewmembers onboard. A second fire report was called out minutes after the Frog Fire was dispatched. This new smoke report was south and west of the Frog Fire. Back at the district office, the west zone Duty Officer (DO) monitored the IA response via status board and radio traffic while updating the Agency Administrator. This was his third full week on the job, but he was very familiar with the fuel type. However, he was not so familiar with the local weather patterns. A few weeks earlier, after visiting the general area where the Frog Fire would burn, the DO thought to himself that this would be an ugly place to have to put a fire out. As he monitored the fire response, he recalled the rugged landscape formed from expansive prehistoric lava flows. The DO informed the Agency Administrator they had a chance to catch it at 20 or 30 acres based on his hope that the thunder cell would move on. In reality, the cell just camped over the fire. The Frog Fire was located in a remote location surrounded by land administered by the Forest Service, and all initial attack responders belonged to the agency. No private land was immediately threatened. However, several utility corridors were at risk, including electric supply transmission lines approximately 4.5 miles ahead of the fire, an underground pipeline distribution network, and a railroad right-of-way. Other values at risk included sage grouse habitat, Long Bell State Game Refuge,


ponderosa pine timber, Round Mountain Lookout, Lava Campground, and the Longbell Guard Station (duty station for the local engine crew).

Alex’s Perspective: “Just a normal fire” Fire Behavior Observed: 1828 1 acre with 10’x10’ spot Erratic southwest winds 2-3’ flame lengthsEast flank actively burning

It was toward the end of shift, but the four crewmembers on the engine based at nearby Longbell station responded to a smoke sighting reported by the Round Mountain Lookout. The smoke was located a few miles south of their station, and they anticipated getting on scene quickly. Alex was the acting Engine Captain and a qualified Type 5 Incident Commander (ICT5). He had recently completed his ICT4 task book and was waiting for the Red Card Committee to meet and sign off on it. He heard dispatch order the off-forest engine that had been pre-positioned to help with initial attack. He was also aware that the DO ordered a crew and a helicopter. At 1800, the lookout estimated the fire doubled in size to a quarter acre. Alex heard the lookout tower relay to dispatch that the fire was influenced by erratic southwest winds and that cloud-to-cloud lightning was observed in the area at 1823 hours.

1828 Alex’s local engine arrived first on the Frog Fire. Eager to paint a picture of the fire, he jumped out of the engine and headed cross-country toward the smoke while the engine worked its way down the road to find a better parking spot. He assumed the role of IC and reported the initial size-up for a one-acre fire and a 10’ x 10’ spot fire burning with two- to three-foot flame lengths in manzanita and bitterbrush with a ponderosa pine overstory. True to the lookout’s recently broadcast observations, the fire was being influenced by erratic southwest winds. Alex walked around the small fire several times while scouting. He thought, “Okay, once we get people on this, we can get it. It was just a normal fire.” The eastern side was actively burning while the western side was only smoldering. He observed there was not a well-defined head to the fire and felt comfortable engaging. To the south of the small spot fire, a lava reef made a natural barrier, limiting the fire’s spread. It made sense to encompass the spot and main fire together. Alex directed the sawyer to anchor to the reef and cut saw-line through the thick brush on the hotter, eastern flank of the fire. Meanwhile, two other engine crewmembers started to build a hose lay from the engine. The hose lay progression was slow and difficult as they negotiated the broken, rocky, and brushy terrain between the engine and the reef, considered the heel (anchor point) of the fire. At 1838, the helicopter arrived overhead and established communication with Alex. Shortly afterward, the second engine arrived on scene. Both of these resources came from a contingent of off-forest resources pre-positioned on the Modoc for the past week to help with initial attack activity. Alex had worked closely with the engine to help get them familiar with his district. The helicopter gave Alex a size-up of the fire; then Alex directed them to find a landing zone and have the five-person helitack crew engage the fire on the ground.


By 1841, less than 15 minutes after the first engine’s arrival, Alex radioed dispatch to report increased activity on the west flank with a thunder cell in the area “giving down drafts” and creating erratic winds on the ground. He updated the fire size to two acres with a ¼ acre spot. Alex ordered three more engines, another crew, and a tactical water tender. Alex tied in with Ryan, the Captain of the off-forest engine, to discuss the plan. The Longbell engine would remain tied into the hose lay while the off-forest engine shuttled water from a nearby campground. The two engine crews constructed an 800-foot trunk line through the green to establish an anchor point at the heel of the fire. During this time, the helicopter found a landing zone approximately 15 minutes walking distance away from the fire. Meanwhile, Dave had self-dispatched to the Frog Fire from the Big Valley Ranger District office at 1809, which is about the same time that the DO called to make sure he was on his way. He arrived at the engines around 1852, a few minutes before the hose lay was charged. At this time, both engines were on scene; the helitack crew was on their way by foot from the landing zone; and the helicopter was getting a load of water. After parking near the engines, Dave cautioned an engine crewmember to be heads up for the squirrely winds, which could push the fire toward the engines. According to those on scene, Dave was obviously in a good mood and energized to be there. Alex, the ICT5, was at the end of the hose lay on the eastern flank but made his way to the heel of the fire to rendezvous with Dave. The two of them briefed on the current tactics, including resources already ordered as well as additional resources needed. They agreed to transition to a Type 4 fire. Alex radioed dispatch to order a dozer and an additional water tender. Alex asked if Dave was going to take over as the IC now, and Dave smiled, “No, you got this.” Dave was happy with the plan in place, and he quizzed Alex about the protocols for ordering a spot weather forecast. Dave climbed up on the lava reef for a better view of the fire, turned back to Alex and said, “It doesn’t matter. This [thing’s] gone anyway.” With that, Alex watched Dave walk up the reef to scout the west flank of the fire. At 1904, Alex relayed to dispatch the transition to a Type 4 fire with Dave as the ICT4 and himself as the Type 4 trainee. Alex then walked the other direction up the east flank to see how the line was holding.


Figure 4: Smoke column seen from Round Mountain Lookout, exact time unknown.

Around 1913, the helitack squad arrived at the anchor point, and Alex had a face-to-face briefing with the Superintendent, Casey. Alex directed them to start digging line from the anchor point along the east flank because the wet line wasn’t holding. Shortly, the captain of the off-forest engine radioed Alex to tell him they were going to stop progressing the hose lay and try to hold what they had. Alex heard the helicopter return and the chatter between the pilot and Dave. The second load was dropped on the same area as the first, on the west flank. Dave asked the pilot to scout ahead of the fire (north) to look for houses as well as the power lines and railroad. The pilot relayed that the fire was spotting ¼ to ½ mile ahead of itself to the northwest and that the fuels got thicker and denser to the north of the fire. He estimated the distance from the fire to the power lines to be about 4.3 miles. Dave asked if the fire was going to get there, and the pilot responded it looked like it would. The pilot never noticed panic in Dave’s voice; he was controlled, calm, and professional. They had good communication, and Dave conveyed his appreciation for the information he was getting.

1917 – 1923 Trying to avoid congesting the radio with more traffic, the Round Mountain Lookout called the dispatch center on the phone to report a spot fire ¼ mile north of the fire with trees torching. Dispatch relayed this to Alex and asked if he could see it. “Not at this time,” he answered from the east flank near the end of the hose lay. There were very few vantage points and enough of an overstory that it was difficult to look out over the fire or even to see the column.


1926

Figure 5: Texts from the Duty Officer to Dave Ruhl.

Figure 5 Alex then got a call from Dave, who said, “Let’s do it; we’ll tie in at the heel.” Ready to pass the command of the fire, Alex radioed this transition to dispatch. There had been earlier discussions identifying Casey, the helitack Superintendent, as a qualified ICT3, and that he could serve as a trainer for Dave if the fire went Type 3. “Transitioning to a Type 3 incident… [Dave] will be IC… [I] am no longer trainee. Request spot weather forecast for tomorrow.” The Zone Duty Officer, listening from the Doublehead Ranger District office, was a little confused since Dave wasn’t fully qualified as an ICT3. He followed up via text to Dave, “So you’re tied in with the ICT3 for a trainer? If so, get that over the airways.” Dave never replied.

The Captain of the off-forest engine, Ryan, radioed Alex that the wet line was not holding. The Helitack Superintendent, Casey, radioed Alex and Dave to request a face-to-face briefing, and they agreed to meet at the anchor point. Alex walked back to the anchor to see Casey standing there but was confused as to where Dave was. Alex tried to call Dave on the radio but couldn’t reach him. From about 1927 to 1945, two lookout towers and the helicopter informed dispatch of changing conditions on the fire, including an additional spot fire and a change in the direction of the smoke column. At 1940, Alex copied radio traffic from dispatch that the smoke had changed direction from the north to the south, erroneously answering as Frog Trainee. He had to remind himself that he was no longer the trainee.


1946 – 1953

Figure 6: 1954 - Frog Fire smoke column as seen by incoming crew approaching from the southeast.

Dispatch attempted to contact Dave seven times. No contact. At 1954, Alex answered dispatch who directed him to tie in with Casey and transition the ICT3 to him. They informed him that Dave could remain as the ICT3 trainee. Alex replied that he was searching for Dave as they spoke and that he was unable to raise him on the radio. He assured dispatch that he was face-to-face with Casey and that he would introduce him to Dave when they located him so they could talk about their trainer/trainee assignment. During this transmission, Alex also informed dispatch that fire activity had picked up because of the wind and that it was hard to stay engaged on the fire, which he now estimated to be between 15 to 20 acres. During the next 10 minutes, Alex and Casey waited impatiently for Dave to meet them at the anchor as the fire pushed westward. Under Ryan’s supervision, all the firefighters working the hose lay disengaged and hiked east through the green to the road to meet up with the engines who also disengaged. Alex and Casey finally walked out to where the engines had been parked. Alex and Casey continued to wait for Dave to show up at his truck as the fire steadily backed toward them. They held onto the hope Dave would show up. When the fire was within 30 feet of the vehicle, they were finally forced to drive Dave’s truck out of there. Casey officially assumed command of the Frog Fire as ICT3 at 2004. At 2007 he reported to dispatch that they hadn’t had contact with Dave for about 20 minutes.


Ryan’s Perspective: “Fire was pretty straight-forward” Fire Behavior Observed: 1848 2 acres, ¼ acre spot No wind 1-2’ flame lengthsNo defined head or heelWest flank actively burning

Ryan was captain of an off-forest engine pre-positioned on the Modoc for the past week. His engine had been at the lookout tower to get a better vantage of the area when the smoke was first identified. After successfully navigating the spider web of unmarked roads, the second engine arrived on scene around 1848. Ryan was glad that they were able to find the fire without assistance. It was sunny, and a few puffy clouds were visible from the ground. When they got to the fire, two crewmembers from the Longbell engine were constructing a hose lay through the green to an anchor point on the fire. Ryan incorporated those two crewmembers into his crew and continued the hose lay construction. Dave arrived on scene, parked his truck, and tied in with Ryan. Dave bounced around happily, leading Ryan to place both hands on Dave’s shoulders and give him a friendly shake. Dave smiled back, obviously in a good mood and excited to be there. Ryan scouted ahead, following the hose lay, and eventually tied in with Alex who was making his way back from where the sawyer was cutting line on the east flank. At this time, the west flank was noticeably the hottest part of the fire, so the decision was made to extend the hose lay to the east following the reef. Dave and Alex briefed with each other while Ryan made his way along the hose lay. He felt pretty comfortable at this point because they were establishing a good anchor point and committing resources where they would do the most good. However, this feeling didn’t last long. The Frog Fire more than quadrupled in size during the 30 minutes since firefighters first arrived at 1828. The reports from the lookout and the helicopter echoed each other; the fire was taking off. Erratic ground level winds contributed to group torching and short runs. With the hose lay charged, water was pumped onto the eastern flank in an effort to hold the line they had established. The helitack crew arrived, and Ryan saw them building handline from the anchor point along the hose lay up the east flank of the fire. Alex and Ryan had a quick face-to-face where Alex mentioned that he was trying to meet up with Dave and Casey to transfer command, but he hadn’t been able to get Dave on the radio. Ryan and his crew heard the fire boiling up in the interior as the fire became increasingly active. Ryan noticed the wet line was not holding in places, so he stopped extending the hose lay, already an additional 700 feet beyond the anchor point, and focused on holding the wet line. The wind flipped directions and blew fire to the west and then south towards the trucks. From the engines, the operator saw the fire cross the road west of where the engines were parked and continue to eat up acres to the south of the road. They had nearly exhausted their water supply and needed to refill, so they unhooked from the hose lay and rolled the engines eastward down the road away from the fire. Ryan huddled together with all the firefighters constructing line and they decided to hike through the green on a predetermined route away from the fire spread to get to the road east of the trucks. The engines drove down the road and honked their horns to let the ground firefighters know where they were. They discovered they were past where the rest of the crews were


going to pop out on the road, so the engines backtracked up the road and honked their horns again until the firefighters traveling on foot were able to meet up with them. By this time, the fire had crossed the road west of where the engines were parked and was running to the south. Ryan informed Alex that all resources with him had made it to the road. Ryan knew that Alex and Casey were back at Dave’s truck waiting for him to meet up with them.

Casey’s Perspective: “Fire is starting to take off” Fire Behavior Observed: 1838 Observation made from air 7 acres Erratic winds Active on all flanks Trees torching

The helitack crew was ready to head back to their hotel in Alturas and call it a day when they got an order to extend for possible lightning storms in the area about 15 minutes before the end of shift. Eventually, five members of their crew were dispatched to the Frog Fire while the rest of the 14-person crew remained at the helibase. When the helicopter launched at 1811, it couldn’t have been a nicer day in Alturas, with clear skies and bright sun. However, weather conditions in the direction of the Frog Fire were different; clouds were backed up along a ridgeline with additional clouds and virga observed to the north and the south of the fire’s coordinates. The pilot noticed that the thunder cells were a little unusual: small, light, and transparent, not dark and thick like normal. He changed the flightpath to the south a little to navigate between cells and could see the smoke from about 20 miles out. The fire was putting up a steady dark plume of smoke like it was starting to take off. A few drops of rain smattered against the windshield during the rough and bumpy flight in. A trainee helicopter manager rode in the front seat while the Superintendent, Casey, sat in the back. The fire had a south-southeast wind pushing it and laying the smoke column over, indicating the fire was wind-driven. Casey heard Alex’s size-up of the fire on the radio. Seeing a training opportunity for his crew, he mentioned over the helicopter intercom that they were going to need a lot more resources on this fire. Just as he made this comment, he heard Alex put in an order for additional resources.

1838 The helicopter manager trainee relayed a size-up and the current fire activity to the IC on the ground. He estimated the fire to be about seven acres. He described the smoke column as well defined and laid over to the northwest. He estimated how long it would take to get the squad on the ground and also offered an updated latitude/longitude to dispatch. From the air the fire looked very hot and active on all flanks but headed mostly to the north. The helitack crew knew it was going to be a long night given the fire’s activity and the number of resources on hand. After circling the fire several times, the helicopter located a landing zone ¾ of a mile southwest of the fire.

1900 – 1913 Upon landing, the five-person helitack squad focused on getting to the black. The smoke column continued to grow darker, and fire quickly consumed large groups of trees. “The terrain


was much more difficult to navigate than it looked like from the air.” The 15-minute hike took them past the engines, up the hose lay, and to the anchor point to tie in with the ground resources. Not liking the look of the black at all, they discussed the lack of safety zones. Helitack Superintendent Casey told his crew, “If things go [south], we need to beat feet to the road and out the east.” Despite being on high alert, they didn’t feel like they were in a dangerous spot, so they agreed to support the current plan and engage the fire. Alex directed the helitack squad to support the hose lay, so they joined the engine module and helped reinforce the hose lay by clearing brush and building handline. The crew had mixed opinions about their ability to catch this fire but not about their personal safety. Radio communication on the tactical channel was unreliable, possibly due to the lava reefs blocking line-of-sight transmissions. The local firefighters were aware of this communication challenge. Casey overheard Dave working with the helicopter to direct the first load of water out in the north flank somewhere. Casey radioed Dave to tell him he tied in with Alex and was engaged in building a handline along the hose lay to the east of the anchor point. Although they had never met face-to-face, Casey radioed Dave to clarify he was qualified as a Type 3 IC, and Dave offered up he was interested in being the ICT3 trainee in the event the fire increased in size and complexity. With those details established, the helitack crew returned to scraping dirt and cutting back vegetation along the heel of the fire. As the pilot circled the fire between drops, the bubble on his side window was getting so hot that he had to back off from the fire. He thought, "Boy, this thing’s really burning hot."

1926 Casey heard Alex radio dispatch that the fire was transitioning to a Type 3 and that Dave was now the IC. He was surprised. He did not think that the amount of resources on scene warranted a Type 3 fire, and he also assumed he would have a face-to-face transition before being named the IC over the radio. Casey then radioed Alex and Dave to request a face-to-face briefing, and they decided to meet up at the anchor point. When Alex showed up, he was surprised that Casey was there alone. Casey and Alex waited at the heel of the fire, feeling frustrated that Dave wasn’t there yet. They couldn’t raise him on the radio. Where was Dave?

Photos Taken from the Helicopter Figure 7: 1903 - Looking south-southeast, fire spreading to the northwest.

Figure 8: 1923 - Looking southwest, fire heating up and making a run to the west-northwest.

Figure 9: 1933 - Looking west-southwest, column lifting.

Figure 10: 1935 - Looking south, fire changed direction and is spreading to the west-southwest; spot fires can be seen on the north side of the fire.

In talking with Alex, Casey realized that Dave had been scouting the west flank, not at the end of the hose lay as he thought. Alex told him, “I just saw him; he was right over there on some scree.” They continued to wait at the heel of the fire for Dave to show up, thinking he must have gotten cut off but was on his way.

You could hear it boiling up inside…then it just blew out the other side. – Firefighter

1930 With a bird’s eye view from his tower, the lookout reported a second spot fire and torching. Shortly afterward, he radioed in to dispatch that the direction of smoke dispersal changed. The smoke initially pushed to the northwest now headed south. To the firefighters on the ground, the wind shift manifested in erratic winds from all directions and a fire that began to boil. The pilot, who was returning with the third load of water at 1933, was concerned about the wind change. He tried to contact Frog IC, but Dave did not answer. He sent out an “all call” on air to ground to advise everyone the winds were coming from the east, almost a 90-degree change. He didn’t know if anyone heard it; no one acknowledged the call. The fire was very hot, and it was “chewing up the trees.” Countless embers were driven across the line as Casey yelled to his helitack crew, “Heads on a swivel, watch for spots!” Choked by smoke, struggling to catch a deep breath and eyes stinging, the firefighters took a lot of heat and knew the line was not going to hold. It was time to pull everyone off the line; they were too close to that thing. Looking up they saw the column laid over above them. It was like “day and night” compared to what the engine crews initially walked into. Casey officially assumed command of the Frog Fire as ICT3 at 2004. With all the other resources disengaged from the fire, Alex and Casey continued to wait for Dave to show up at his truck as the fire steadily backed toward them. They held onto the hope he would show up. When the fire was within 30 feet of the vehicle, they were finally forced to drive Dave’s truck out of there.

The story now transitions into one narrative.

Search Additional engines, crews, and dozers began to stream into the fire’s assigned staging area. Alex and Casey proceeded east to tie back in with the rest of the firefighters. Alex’s anxiety for Dave was growing, and he wanted to search for Dave on foot, but Casey told him that he needed to pair up with somebody else for safety. As they drove out, they ran into the captain of one of the staged engines who was walking down the road toward the fire. Jumping on his chance to start searching for Dave, Alex enlisted the captain’s help to look where they could. Casey continued to the staging area where he recruited the help of a Crew Boss to be operations for the fire and to be the point of contact for incoming resources. This freed him to focus on the search for Dave.


Figure 11: 1936 – Fire pushing the road where the engines and Dave’s truck were parked.

Engine Accident Casey attempted to drive around the north end of the fire, but the road narrowed and he didn’t like his position in relation to the fire. He called dispatch to ask if there was a prevention person available to help “bird dog” the extensive road network, but none was available. He decided to drive back and tie-in with the resources on the east side of the fire. Casey heard a medical call over the radio and like many others that night, breathed a sigh of relief, assuming that Dave had been found. He then learned one of the engines went off the road, a minor accident, and the growing sense of dread for Dave returned. Prior to 2109, the engines left the fire and headed toward water to refill their tanks. As it became later in the evening, the winds calmed, leaving dust hanging over the road, which reflected the glare from their headlights. The off-forest engine was in the rear, following the Longbell engine through the maze of roads so they wouldn’t get lost. After passing a dozer headed up to the Frog Fire, the off-forest engine hit a slick patch of needle cast and slipped into the ditch. The driver didn’t want to overcorrect and tip the engine over. He thought, “No way, I can’t believe this is happening!” The engine struck a large rock, denting the rear door on driver’s side and coming to an abrupt halt. One of the engine crew members was examined by an EMT staged at a nearby station and later at the hospital but sustained no injury beyond bruising. After gathering the details, Casey relayed the information to dispatch, ensuring the firefighter involved with the accident received medical care, and then returned his focus to the search for Dave.

Frog Fire FatalityLearning Review Report 16 of 62

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Figure 12: 2026 - Looking west as the firefighters disengaged down the road where the engines had been parked.

Back at the office, forest staff discussed the risk assessment and planning needs for the fire. Well aware the Frog Fire was growing, a firefighter was unaccounted for, and there was a vehicle accident, they decided to send Chief 2 (Deputy Forest Fire Management Officer) to help with leadership. He met up with Casey, still in the role of ICT3. They agreed that Chief 2 would take over command of the Frog Fire and Casey would take over command of the incident within an incident—the search for Dave. At 2237, Chief 2 assumed command of the Frog Fire and immediately pulled resources off the fire to reassess and develop a new strategy for this complex incident, focusing first on search-and-rescue. The search for Dave continued the rest of that evening. As difficult as the decision was, Casey informed all the searchers they would call off the search at midnight due to the continued fire behavior, nighttime hazards, snags, and potential for serious injury. It was a long night for many people, listening for any sign of hope on the radio while sleeplessly waiting for the sun to come up. The search resumed at 0500 the next morning. Many firefighters and sheriff deputies walked grid patterns through the charred landscape, yelling Dave’s name.


Tragically, Dave’s body was found at 0917 on Friday, July 31, 2015, approximately one-quarter of a mile west of the lava reef upon which he was last seen. Although much will remain unknown about the circumstances (or influences) around Dave’s decision-making and complete travel route, the final 100 feet of his route were accurately established. It appears he was cut-off and overcome by fire during the period of time that the fire spread shifted dramatically toward the west-southwest. Dave’s fire shelter was not deployed. The Frog Fire grew to 4,863 acres before being contained on August 8, 2015, under the management of a Type 2 Incident Management Team. Detailed information and maps can be found on the Frog Fire InciWeb link at http://inciweb.nwcg.gov/incident/4427/.

Figure 13: 0733 - Crews lined out to grid through black.

http://inciweb.nwcg.gov/incident/4427/

Figure 14: Aerial Photo of fire origin and fatality site.

Figure 15: Dave Ruhl.


Incident Timeline


Sensemaking Discussion The death of a wildland firefighter is a significant event that should cause pause, reflection, and learning throughout the wildland fire community and supporting organizations. In order to understand why actions and decisions made sense at the time, we have to evaluate the context in which they were made. Sensemaking refers to how people select what seems important to attend to and how this influences their actions. According to organizational theorist Karl Weick, who popularized the phrase “sensemaking in organizations,” people cannot possibly cope with all of the raw data and information coming at them at a given moment. Instead, what a person pays attention to is a function of identity, past experience, one’s understanding of one’s purpose, and other factors. Sensemaking is a very active process whereby people literally “make sense” of the world around them at each moment. The intent of this discussion is to inspire readers to learn and to encourage group discussions about how the wildland fire community can improve at the individual, team, and organizational levels. This discussion is not intended to provide readers with finished, concrete answers; instead, it is to be a springboard that will prompt readers to make sense of the incident by thinking about these issues, trying to understand the conditions that surround this fatality, and to find opportunities to improve safety and resilience in their organizations. The Learning Review Team has drawn five contextual themes from the Frog Fire that directly or indirectly shaped the actions of the firefighters on the ground. Recognize that the context discussed within these themes does not capture everything that occurred on the Frog Fire, nor are the questions presented the only ones to be asked about wildland fire organizations and operations. The recommendations and discussion points following these five themes are shared in the vein of working toward improving our community of practice as risk managers and firefighters. It is the duty of every wildland firefighter to identify issues, discuss hard truths, and facilitate ongoing discussions aimed at vectoring organizations toward becoming learning organizations and ultimately resulting in improvements to risk management and employee safety. Cultural Approach to Fire Management: The first theme questions our cultural approach to fire management. Fundamentals of Effective Training: A second theme places the Frog Fire against the general backdrop of the 2015 fire season and led us to conclude there is a need to review the wildland fire training process. Scouting Fireline: The third theme explores our understanding of the risks of scouting. Communication: A fourth theme reaffirms that communication challenges continue to influence tragic events within the fire community, and Frog is no exception. National Duty Officer Standards: The final theme identifies ambiguity in standards around key positions and definitions. When faced with qualitative data after an accident, a learning organization will analyze this data, along with other sources of information from various communities of practice, and seek opportunities to learn where and how we may make substantive systemic improvements. Improving our system of work may require an examination of the deeply held assumptions that agency personnel hold (sometimes unknowingly). Understanding these assumptions provides the ability to determine if changes need to occur so that longer-lasting and broader improvements could lead to better outcomes. We realize that while improving individual firefighters is a worthy pursuit, examining the deeply held assumptions built into our firefighting system may provide a wider organizational reach and lead to lasting positive change that could translate into institutional memory.


Cultural Approach to Fire Management

Past wildfire experiences have led fire managers on the Modoc to the conclusion that fires not successfully contained when small have a high probability of growing into a much larger fire. Pressure from the public, political entities, and our own internal fire organization have led fire managers to define success as preventing large fires through aggressive initial attack. Firefighters responded to the Frog Fire in this manner and developed a strategy to engage and suppress the fire while it was as small as possible. This made sense to them. It was normal. The “need” for full suppression on this forest is one of the deeply held assumptions in the fire management system. If success were defined differently, innovative alternatives to full suppression could be explored. Perhaps our agency needs to redefine success for our wildfire responders. Before we are able to propose a new metric for success, we need to understand the current assumptions in the system by critically analyzing what is currently considered “normal” work operations.

The Fire Behavior Triangle (Fuels, Weather, and Topography) Firefighters observed small thunderstorms that the lookout tower and helicopter also identified. They expected squirrely winds associated with these cells. The lava rock made walking cumbersome, (although the “reefs” acted as good holding lines, at least at first). The fuels were light and flashy—some of the local personnel used the word “gasoline” to describe the associated fire behavior. These risks were not unusual, and the fire responders accepted them. The conditions were “normal.”

Values at Risk Firefighters were aware that timber, a major powerline utility corridor, and a railroad track were all values at risk. In fact, some firefighters were also aware that the power company contributed funding to their station for their services. These assets were important, and it was assumed that it was their duty to protect them, especially the powerlines. These were “normal” values at risk.

Scouting the Fire It is a best practice for leaders to become familiar with the landscape and current fire conditions. As the fire grew and became more complex, the initial attack Type 5 incident commander transitioned into a Type 4 trainee role, with Dave Ruhl as his trainer. Dave had just arrived on the fire and was comfortable with the trainee continuing to run the fire. They talked current conditions, spot weather, strategy, additional resources en route, and additional resources to be ordered. Dave then scouted a flank of the fire—alone. This was normal.

Full Suppression as the Only Model of Success Firefighters on the Frog Fire worked with the intent to contain the fire quickly and minimize the size, the risk, and the damage to assets. The fire didn’t cooperate with suppression efforts but instead quickly grew beyond the capacity of the on-scene resources to successfully implement the initial strategy. This was normal.


Disengaging Arguably the firefighters pulled off the line and stepped back from the fire at the last minute to regroup. Reevaluating and adjusting tactics for changing conditions is a standard operating procedure. This was normal. What was not normal was when one firefighter wasn’t able to get away from that situation. In the current wildland firefighting culture, aggressive initial attack is highly valued and is generally the standard operating procedure. A sense of urgency accompanies the belief that extinguishing small fires quickly minimizes the overall risk to firefighters and the public simply because fewer people are exposed to the complex hazards of a larger fire. The reasoning goes that as fire size increases, more firefighters are dispatched and thus cumulative risk to personal safety increases. As fire size increases, more natural resources are lost; as fire size increases, more values are threatened or destroyed. Firefighters currently see themselves as most successful when they catch the fire and feel like they’ve failed when they lose a fire. This strong sense of what success looks like can make it difficult to disengage from aggressive initial attack. Currently, firefighters are trained to stay engaged if there’s any chance they might still catch it. Wildland firefighters understand and accept that they work in a dangerous environment. We must also recognize that some risk-taking is incentivized in our organization. In our fire management system, a “good” employee is one who goes to great lengths to get the job done. Firefighters are told theirs is a “noble” profession—one of service to others, often at the cost of personal comforts. They are asked to work in hot, dirty, challenging conditions for long hours. There is a certain amount of satisfaction that comes from knowing that their job isn’t for everyone. The title of wildland firefighter sets them apart from the rest of the population. The mere fact that they have survived in that profession says something about their toughness and tenacity. There is also competition among crews. Crews openly set standards for determining who is “better” among their peers by comparing who has worked more overtime hours; who has endured more challenging fires and assignments; who hikes the fastest or longest distance; or who has carried the most weight up the hill. Perhaps an employee who is willing to take a risk that others aren’t (carrying the chainsaw all day, digging that last foot of line at the end of a long shift, or saving a structure just moments before the fire arrives) will be noticed by a supervisor and may be considered for a promotion or get that permanent position for which he or she has been hoping. If our fire culture incentivizes these behaviors, how can we expect people to disengage from risky activities? Additionally, there is an unwritten expectation and agreement with the American public that firefighters will put out wildfires as best we can before they cause problems. We are very thorough in telling partners, politicians, and citizens about our 98 percent success rate in catching fires in initial attack. The Smokey Bear educational program has amazing brand identity and reach, but the message has contributed to public fear of fire, reinforcing the social contract that wildland firefighters stand ready to play the hero by aggressively suppressing fires. Is this the best “system?” The Forest Service has strong historical ties to fire suppression. The fires of 1910, coupled with views of fire as a destructive force, provide context for some of the assumptions that many people still hold regarding fire. However, fire and forest ecologists began to understand the importance of fire as a natural and necessary process as early as the 1940s. Since the 1960s, researchers have been able to clearly identify a link between extinguishing fires and increasing fuel accumulations in ecosystems that have naturally frequent, low-severity fire cycles. One such ecosystem is the ponderosa pine forest; the forest type where the Frog Fire burned.


Ponderosa pine forests are among the most well-studied and understood ecosystems. They can perpetually dominate a site providing there are recurrent low- to moderate-intensity fire disturbances. Ponderosa ecosystems are considered “fire-dependent.” Prior to European settlement, lightning and Native American people caused the periodicity of disturbance that perpetuated these ecosystems that dominate vast expanses of many western forests. For probably hundreds of years, fires burned through these forests every 3 to 35 years (Schoennagel et al., 2004). The fires removed understory grasses, shrubs, seedlings, and saplings. Pockets of passive crown fire would occur, removing small stands of mature ponderosa pine. Under this frequency of disturbance it would be highly unusual that ponderosa pine forests would experience an intense stand-replacing fire. Mature ponderosa pine trees have thick bark and high first-branch heights, making them resistant to damage from all but the most intense fire. In the 18th and 19th century, measles and other European diseases decimated Native American populations. This was later followed by wars and forced removal of surviving tribes. Fire frequency decreased as a result, and then sheep heavily grazed much of the Modoc. Fire sustaining grasses became food for the sheep, and fire frequency further decreased. After the Modoc became a National Forest in the early 20th century, the heavy grazing was restrained, and fire suppression became a federal priority. As fire suppression was implemented, vegetation increased. Trees that would have been killed by frequent understory fires grew into mature trees. Shrubs grew taller and increased the density of ladder fuels, making it easier for fire on the ground to make it into the crowns of the trees. Ponderosa pine forests that in the 1800s contained 20 to 60 trees per acre now host ten times that number. In ponderosa ecosystems where this is occurring today, fire is often no longer a low-severity surface fire; it is characterized by intense crown fires that leave behind severe fire effects. Local fire responders on the Frog Fire referred to this area as “gasoline alley.” The understory fuels that once carried low-severity fires through the open forests now provide a flashy ladder that allows fire to climb into the tightly packed crowns. Local managers are well aware that if a fire starts in this forest type there is a good chance the fire will grow quickly. For this reason fire managers on the Modoc rarely question the default routine of full suppression that has helped to create the gasoline-like fuel conditions. The fire community has come to a realization that we have front-loaded all of our effort and attention to the short-term risk of fire on the landscape. Even though we now understand that there is more to the story: the long-term risk component to wildfires. We have tried to make substantial changes to our wildland fire philosophy (e.g., fuels programs that implement prescribed fires and mechanical treatments, prescribed natural fire, wildfire use, appropriate management response, resource benefit fires, the FLAME Act, etc.), but we are still trying to figure out the best way to bring about lasting positive change in how we interact with wildland fire. In the face of all of this new understanding and flux, we still find ourselves falling back to the old default of keeping fires as small as possible, even in the heat of the summer with multiple thunder cells present. In an effort to do this, fire suppression personnel engage the fire while simultaneously identifying, accruing, and fielding an organization, establishing communication and safety plans, and identifying suppression tactics. This use of age-old tactics in such a dynamic environment needs to be questioned. This build-it-as-you-go approach surprised several of the academic experts who were asked to provide outside perspective on the events of the Frog Fire. When told this was a common practice in wildland fire suppression (especially in emerging Type 3 incidents), they suggested to look to other fields such as the military to see how they handle similar situations. Do they also conduct


business this way? Or have they found a way to build a management structure before engaging? Our agency may need to examine whether this “normal” process is worth the potential gain in time and perceived efficiency or if the cost of this practice may outweigh any gains that are made. So why are forest managers not able to solve this problem? Management efforts have contributed to creating the problem, so surely management can get us out, right? It isn’t that the managers lack understanding of how their forests have come to be so flammable. The science is clear. Even the possible solutions are easily understood. The answer lies in the complexity surrounding the implementation of the possible solutions. One of the first steps is already under way; we are recognizing that our current solution to this problem (fire suppression) has proved to be an unsustainable and ever riskier solution, and we are working to learn as much as we can from what happened at the Frog Fire. We are quickly realizing that fire responders do not have control over fires in the ways that they have convinced themselves that they do. Complex fuel conditions, weather dynamics, topography, and human factors make fighting fire in this altered ecosystem increasingly risky. Shouldn’t significant environmental changes dictate the way fire managers engage the fire? Shouldn’t there be an equally wide range of tactical and engagement options that mirror our dynamic environmental conditions? Perhaps rather than continuing to employ our old routines developed in the early 1900s (engage every fire with a standard, recognizable suppression objective), we should enter into every fire situation with a default of no-engagement until a dynamic, appropriate plan is created that matches the conditions for that specific fire. Creating a new default of “no-go” rather than our current default “go” mode may help us reduce the stress created during the time wedge built around our old suppression routine. Rethinking our mode of operations and our standard tactics could allow for decisions about engaging in risky fire management efforts to be made in partnership. These changes in our engagement strategies could create innovative new tactical methods and ways of engaging fire that reduce risk while simultaneously ending our historic sense of urgency and stress when there is smoke in the air. However, in order for these ideas to be successful, we must communicate our changes in tactics (and the reasons behind the changes) with our partners and stakeholders. Obvious solutions include both prescribed burning and mechanical fuels reduction treatments. These solutions have been implemented with small-scale success; some efforts were even found to reduce fire behavior during large-scale wildfires. So what is the problem? The challenge is four-fold: (1) these efforts are very costly; (2) the work requires exposure to risk for the workers; (3) the efforts only last 3 to 35 years (paralleling the natural fire return interval); and most importantly, (4) the ecosystem is so spatially extensive that it is impossible for mangers to keep up with the needed treatments across the landscape. However, these challenges have not stopped the agency from continuing to implement versions of this solution, and in some areas efforts have provided temporary relief from the fear associated with catastrophic wildfires. Some forest managers question whether the problem could be solved by simply reintroducing natural fire cycles with minimal strategic thinning efforts. In a few locations this may be a viable option, but for the Modoc this would not be directly implementable. The complexity associated with this solution may actually be orders of magnitude greater than the previous solution. First, because the forest structure has been altered, fire cannot just be reintroduced into the ecosystem in its historically natural role. Second, humans have built structures, even entire communities, near the densely packed forests, creating a highly complex wildland-urban interface. Third, smoke from prescribed fire (as well as wildfires) can pose health threats to adjacent populations. In the face of these


challenges (in addition to a host of others), how does a forest manager begin to apply this solution? Perhaps rather than being a currently implementable solution, reintroducing fire is a target end-state—an ultimate goal for our forested systems. Creating a system where managers can safely reintroduce natural fire cycles provides a vision for how fire could be managed in the future. If this is the targeted end-state, how do managers begin the process of making that goal a reality? Portions of the solutions outlined above are most likely part of the long-term vison—to be able to reintroduce fire into the system in a safe manner. Determining the specific steps necessary to work toward this goal will require efforts and intermediate solutions that are as equally complex as the problem itself. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to this problem. Identifying the issues, discussing them with collaborators and stakeholders, and learning about what is required to make the necessary systemic changes needed to solve this issue may be the first steps toward finding a realistic path forward.

Questions for Discussion What assumptions motivate us to continue with “ops normal?” Are the trees, houses, or public image worth the cost of lives? Is it tolerable for administrators or the agency to “normally” accept this risk? Do short-term risks always trump long-term risks? Is it acceptable to continue to put out nearly all fires as small as possible when we know in most cases this will make fire suppression even more dangerous in the future? Is our system designed with enough resiliency to manage the ever increasing fire complexity? Does our cultural acceptance of “normal” hinder us from reconsidering the foundational tenants of why and how we manage fire? Is it even acceptable to challenge the system, to ask why we are doing this or why we are doing it this way? If we change, how does that affect our cooperators and the American public? If some of the answers to these questions suggest changing the system within which we work as fire professionals, then how should we redefine success so that we can work toward a different outcome?

Recommendation 1. Reevaluate our cultural acceptance of “normal” in wildland fire management.The national level dialogue needs to include fire ecology-based discussions that emphasize the tradeoffof taking on additional risk and exposure in the near term rather than deferring the majority of it tothe future. Additionally, the dialogue needs to emphasize that reducing exposure to fire responders isnot the determining factor in setting a plan in place for a fire; choosing the “right plan” is theprimary responsibility, and minimizing risk to responders is a key supporting component ofsuccessfully implementing that plan. Use the questions above to fuel conversations. Engage fireleaders from all levels of the organization in this discussion, from the National Office to the Districts.

Fundamentals of Effective Training

In the aftermath of the Frog Fire and the 2015 fire season, it is necessary to review both the current learning methods used for the wildland fire training program and the training process. These needs stem from the fact that Dave was on a training assignment when the accident occurred. Through the


course of this review, conversations frequently focused on how we train our firefighting workforce. While more training is occurring for our employees, the type of training may not be lending itself to creating a safer work environment for field-going fire personnel. Classroom and computer-based training have become much more prevalent, reducing the amount of training time dedicated to performing field operations such as digging line, equipment use and maintenance, and scenario-based fire training in the field. There is little (often none at all) training that teaches firefighters about the human factors involved in their complex work environment. Firefighters are expected to learn how to build positive, effective relationships; to communicate under stressful situations; and how to understand the dynamics of working within a human-based work force on their own.

Non-Incident Training Research focused on adult education suggests that excellent “peace-time” training requires well-designed and professionally delivered training that targets all facets of the work that employees are required to perform. Training should clearly articulate expectations; provide relevant learning objectives; allow learners to practice what they have learned in a hands-on setting; provide learners with feedback and/or assessment about their performance; and provide time to reflect on their newly acquired skills long before they use the skills on an actual assignment (Handelsman et al., 2004). A focus group participant provided the following analogy about the current Forest Service training methods: “That’s like sending someone to a class and then asking them to wait until they go to war to find out what’s really expected of them.” As the Forest Service continues to move toward becoming a learning organization, the agency needs to improve its training curriculum so that employees in high-risk jobs along with their managers have access to top-notch training and can continually learn and improve. The agency has historically focused heavily on behavior-based training that teaches employees how to apply tactics, provide command and control-style leadership, and to utilize some basic tools about how environmental conditions may affect fire behavior (fuels, weather, topography, etc.). All existing training has been created with good intentions and holds safety as a core value. Certainly, some tasks such as operating and maintaining a Mark III pump are tasks that can be accomplished by individuals at the home unit. However, other skills require cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. These kinds of skills or capacities can only be learned or identified in a group environment. As the agency has continued to develop innovative training programs, some course designs have proven to be more popular than others. According to focus group participants, scenario-driven training designed to practice decision-making, tactical decision games, and staff rides that are available through NWCG’s Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program (www.fireleadership.gov) are examples of the types of training experiences that are effective for deeply learning skills that are later applied on the fire line. In particular, staff rides have widely been hailed as one of the most outstanding learning experiences by members of the fire community. So what is it about these types of experiences that allow for “better” learning to take place? How can we identify and incorporate the successful elements of these types of learning experiences into all training? Research on how adults learn confirms the experiences of firefighters from the Frog Fire focus groups. Students of all ages benefit from short (no more than 20 minute) periods of traditional lecture (or other information transfer) followed by hands-on, active application of the material learned. Critical thinking skills are best developed when people work in small groups on relevant problems that require teamwork. Identifying specific learning objectives and sharing those with students fosters understanding of how concepts connect and can provide a topical road map for learners as they work through unfamiliar topics. Providing students with a way to assess their


learning using low-stakes assessments or feedback allows the learners to gauge whether they are gaining appropriate knowledge, as well as providing feedback to the instructor about where additional time or effort needs to be spent (Handelsman et al., 2004). Staff rides and other hands-on experiential learning opportunities closely follow what teaching and learning research suggests is an effective learning model. Unfortunately, many staff rides take place in the off-season when lower-level employees are laid off. The Forest Service needs to identify areas within the training curriculum that are successful, such as staff rides, and model all necessary training off of these successful examples. Designing classes to facilitate deep learning is only one piece of the equation. An effective training curriculum should target education and practical training around a variety of skills that firefighters utilize during normal work. Focus groups suggested that new experiential-based training sessions need to be developed that focus on non-traditional skills. These suggestions fall into three major learning categories. The first should focus on helping trainees become familiar with their “stress personalities.” That is, trainees should become familiar with how they personally react to stressful situations. This type of training could provide insight into how decision-making skills are affected during stressful fire events. The second category involves critical thinking skills. As an example of how these skills apply, firefighters are often provided with complex weather data that is in a raw format (temperature, RH, expected winds etc.) and they are then required to determine how this complex data will affect fire behavior throughout the day. Furthermore, they must apply this interpreted data to signals or indicators they identify in the environment (e.g., a wind shift), so that fire tactics can change accordingly. This skill set is required of all our fire personnel, but they receive very little training on how best to accomplish these complex tasks. The third category focuses on interpersonal skills and communication techniques. Few things are as important as positive, interactive relationships on the fireline. Communication has been shown to be one of the most effective safety tools. Firefighters are expected to know how to facilitate positive working relationships with very little hands-on training. These soft skills are highly valuable tools that should be developed and practiced. How do we strengthen and established programs and tools in order to promote world-class, valuable “peace time” training?

Experiential Training The systemic pressures and complexities associated with wildfire management are perhaps nowhere more apparent than in an emerging incident. Incident Commanders (IC) of emerging wildfires are tasked with bridging the gap between initial attack and extended attack. According to findings from focus group efforts, many in the fire community consider these positions to be very complex and challenging. These ICs are asked to make order out of chaos—to organize for the long-term fight while giving up as little ground as possible in the face of the (perceived) enemy at a time when the enemy is at its strongest and we are at a weakened state of reorganization and transition. The Frog Fire was an emerging Type 3 incident and exemplifies a truly complex, adaptive work system where tragedy was associated with our attempt to combat a natural process. So how can we train our employees to manage such a complex system? During 2004 and 2005, a rigorous sand-table exercise was added to the training necessary to qualify as an ICT3. In part, this additional requirement was due to recognition that the ICT3 position is difficult, demanding, and complex. One effect that this added training requirement had was that some currently qualified ICT3s chose not to participate in the sand-table exercise and thus lost their ICT3 qualification. Other, new


ICT3 trainees did not pass the sand-table exercise. By 2012-2013, it was decided that this requirement was no longer needed and had in fact created a culling effect on the number of qualified ICT3s in the agency. Eliminating the sand-table exercise was not done in a vacuum; the S-300 and L-380 courses that are still required for ICT3 trainees were retooled to include more exercise and scenario-based training components. Today, in 2016, the ICT3 position remains a bottleneck for firefighters who are progressing up the career ladder and need that qualification to be able to compete for Assistant Fire Management Officer or other middle management positions in fire. Dave was hoping to gain experience as an ICT3 trainee while detailing on the Modoc; could participation in a sand-table exercise better prepare our employees for trainee experiences?

Recommendations 2. Fire training organizations within the Forest Service should collaborate on research into existingtraining that is successful, understand why it is successful, and work to create more holistic andexperientially-based training methods.Forest Service fire training organizations should conduct internal and external research to identifyadditional, specific areas that our firefighter training should target. The Frog Fire Learning ReviewTeam suggests that some important areas to target may be understanding how stress affects fire linedecisions, increasing critical thinking and relationship and communication development. Because staffrides and other experiential-based training have been successful for the wildfire community, additionalresearch is needed to understand why and how these training opportunities are successful.As an example, review current fire training, delineating between individual proficiencies and collectivetasks. A course such as S-271 teaches one how to safely operate around helicopters. Another class ofskills require cooperation, coordination, and collaboration such as S-420 for Command and GeneralStaff. These kind of skills or capacities can only be learned or identified in a group environment. Thesetypes of skills should be identified as such and treated differently from individual proficiencies.Additionally, what if position task books had more “O” (Other) tasks listed that could be signed offduring non-incident training as prerequisite training? This would allow for trainers to focus more onmastery of the task at hand instead of having the task book serve as a simple checklist of tasksperformed. Moreover, being able to get credit for more of the existing tasks in a position task bookwould systematically encourage and reward scenario-based simulations, which would better preparetrainees for performing these tasks “for real” on subsequent incidents.The concept of a professional cadre of instructors for fire training was brought up during focus groups.As it stands right now, to sign off on a task book, you only need to be qualified for that position. Notall of us are good at teaching other adult learners. In our saw program certification, because of theextreme hazards present, we identify specific trainers (C Certifiers) that have the competency andteaching ability to both teach and sign off on others learning how to operate a chainsaw.An outcome of professionalizing our fire training would be the formulation of a set of minimumstandards a person would be required to master before they would be allowed to teach and sign off atask book. Only the most articulate and experienced trainers should be training our future leaders.3. An IC simulation exercise should be reinstated into the regular training curriculum for all IC levels andused periodically to sharpen skills instead of as a test to be taken one time as a condition of obtaining thequalification.Post Cramer Fire (2003), the Forest Service required all current and newly certified ICT3s to participateand pass a time-sensitive sand-table simulation involving an emerging initial attack fire and tested the


ICT3 on decision skills. More simulation-based training should be utilized to improve or maintain intuitive decision-making skills among firefighters. 4. The National Director of Fire and Aviation Management should explore other Type 3 command andgeneral staff positions to reduce workload and to improve the IC’s decision-making capability when faced with complex tasks of gathering raw data, making sense of it, and applying it toward a plan.Who is responsible for tracking all of the complex variables that affect our workplace? Currently thereis no standard process or protocol to track thunderstorms or to identify associated signals that wouldsuggest something different or dangerous is happening on emerging Type 3 incidents. Commonly,those on-scene are relied upon to keep an eye on the fuels, weather, topography, and a myriad of othercomplex variables and to make their own determination of what impacts these may or may not haveon fire behavior. On the Frog Fire, incoming modules one and two were aware of the thunderstormsin the area but did not have a visual on them. The third arriving module was aware because they hadto fly around the storms as they arrived on the incident. But Dave did not have this information as hestarted his scouting other than the weather report over the radio.In effect, we are asking the people who are the most overwhelmed with a variety of tasks to take rawdata, make sense of it, apply it to tactical decisions, inform their resources of the associated decision,and then follow up to ensure the decision is being acted on. Each of these tasks are substantial andmay require special training or skill sets.Even if successful, we are still left with a potentially more important and difficult question: given thisinformation, will people make different decisions? Will the strong cultural influences of succeeding incatching the fire continue to bias folks on the ground towards remaining engaged on the fire until theeffects of some natural variables force them to abandon the current plan?

Scouting Fireline

Scouting fireline can be hazardous and often involves the person who is providing leadership for the fire (IC, DIVS). Scouting is clearly a dangerous activity and has not received the attention it deserves in our research efforts or training curriculum. Investigating the underlying deep assumptions associated with how we scout fires now could provide valuable insight into our current fire culture. Why do firefighters feel the need to scout fire? Why do we currently often scout alone? What dynamics would change if we scouted in pairs or groups of three? What sort of dialogue should occur before deciding to scout a fire? What dialogue should happen (and with whom) during the scouting effort? Are there less risky ways to get the same information without putting an individual at risk? Are there technologies that could provide information to us that would reduce the need for scouting (drone, Google Earth maps, etc.)? Our training in the area of scouting wildfires may be outdated (or non-existent) for the complexity we face in today’s wildfire environments. Not only should classroom experiences focus on scouting, but hands-on simulations associated with the decision to scout, the practice of scouting, and the dangers associated with it need to be developed. The Panther Fire (2008), The Devil’s Den Fire (2006), and the Sawtooth Rx Entrapment (2003) are just a few recent examples of incidents where people died while scouting. These incidents may offer insights about how to develop the specific training that could help our fire personnel become better informed about scouting a fire and the associated risks.

http://www.wildfirelessons.net/orphans/viewincident?DocumentKey=bf7fa21a-4c22-4d58-b568-a1dec4aa2945

http://www.wildfirelessons.net/orphans/viewincident?DocumentKey=02eeb89d-7bf4-4eed-be81-0465625ec49b

http://www.wildfirelessons.net/orphans/viewincident?DocumentKey=0bcc89b4-233f-464c-ac03-167b9be4d75a


Recommendation 5. Have the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (or other appropriate entity(ies) develop educationalproducts focused on the hazards of scouting based on the outcome of the fire scouting-focused research.Undertake a research effort to better understand the risks and underlying assumptions associated with the current fire scouting practices and to identify ways to systematically change this practice to reducerisk. This research effort may use data and sensemaking gathered after serious incidents and accidentsthat involved scouting (e.g., Panther Fire (2008), The Devil’s Den Fire (2006), and the Sawtooth RxEntrapment (2003)), as well as conducting new research by examining both internal andexternal practices related to scouting fires in a complex system.

Communication

Within organizations, subcultures defined by geography can have differing philosophies and values. Members of organizations tend to communicate with each other in ways accepted within their own subculture, which may be very different from practices in other areas of the organization. Resources that have not worked closely together face challenges in communicating effectively under normal circumstances, let alone when conducting complex operations. For example, what does “copy” mean when used over the radio? “I understand,” “I will follow up on that,” or “I heard you?” The use of some words or terminology can be very different from one part of the country to another based on local influences. Culturally as an organization, we do not have a common understanding of language, interpersonal skills, or radio-transmission use to help transcend geographic difference as resources move around from fire to fire. Of the three modules and Dave Ruhl (four resources) to first arrive on the Frog Fire, three of these resources were from other forests. This is not unusual in wildland firefighting, as resources are often shared across geographic areas. As the operational tempo escalated on the Frog Fire, the level of complexity and challenges to communication also increased. Are interpersonal communications among resource leaders potentially hampered by lack of familiarity with each other or a common practice of language? What are the basic radio transmission tenets to which we teach? Do we have any standards of practice when talking on the radio?

Deference to Incoming Expertise There were no specific signals that incident management or leadership control was lacking on the Frog Fire. The practice of what occurred on the Frog is rooted in culture—this emerging fire being managed this way could have just as easily been on any forest in the system.

Deference to Authority…in Training Working in a task-book system may complicate deference to expertise vs. deference to authority. Specifically, how will the trainee learn if someone else just comes in and takes over? How often might those with expertise give lukewarm support for a so-so plan either because they are not sure it won’t work or because they are trying to give the trainee some leeway to try out a plan even if it turns out to be a lesson learned for that trainee?

Deference to (Local) Expertise Deference to expertise may actually be happening, but to a different kind of expertise in the form of deferring to local knowledge and those who have been on the fire longer. How often does it happen


that a crew reasons, "Well, we think we know what we saw, but we just arrived and so we may not have the whole story?" What else could they do to share what they saw and to inquire about what more they need to know?

Deference to (Higher) Authority In an especially strong culture, there may be deference to authority up the chain of command, for which the local leader may simply be a conduit. In a strong suppression culture, for example, everyone might be deferring to the authority of those higher up who have set the system in motion to catch every fire when small, with few other alternatives. In those cases the local leader becomes a representative of that higher authority.

Deference to Harmony Perhaps based on the foregoing, avoiding a challenge may simply be a way to keep the peace in an already stressful situation. To come in from outside and be overbearing too early invites conflict and potentially sabotages the effort. When operating under uncertainty, so long as there are no outright safety concerns, how often is it easier to just go along with the plan until it is clear from some external event or authority that something needs to change? (But how often do we allow the fire to be the one who decides?) When deference to expertise emerges during high-tempo operations in highly reliable organizations, it is often from use of a practiced skill among team members who interact frequently. As such, these tools are communicative in nature. In the absence of such familiarity, it would be important for there to be tools readily available for people to draw on in the culture that people can mobilize on a moment’s notice.

Recommendations 6. The Office of Human Performance, Innovation, and Organizational Learning (HPIOL) and otherappropriate entity(ies) should conduct a study on what individual training, practice, or other learning toolcould be institutionalized to create an open environment of communication between leaders on an initial- or extended-attack assignment.This study should identify commonalities and changes needed in training to reduce miscommunicationin high-tempo operations and even be institutionalized so it becomes as natural a practice as Lookouts,Communications, Escape Routes, and Safety Zones (LCES).7. The Office of Human Performance, Innovation, and Organizational Learning (HPIOL) should work withthe academic community to review the last 15 years of fatality-fire reports and conduct a meta-learningstudy on communication during a fire incident. The study will focus on communication trends among thedata, leading toward a better understanding of firefighter fireline communications and correctionmeasures to improve performance. Items include communicating intent by radio, deference to initialplan and command structure, common understanding of language, interpersonal skills, radio-transmission tenets, communicating across geographical differences, etc.

National Duty Officer Standard

Dave had been an engine captain on two National Forests for about 10 years. He was qualified as a Division Group Supervisor (DIVS) and a Type 2 Burn Boss (RXB2) and was actively working on his Type


3 Incident Commander (ICT3) qualifications. Promoting into the District/Zone Assistant Fire Management Officer (D/ZAFMO) positions was the next logical step in his career progression. The US Forest Service Standard Position Description Crosswalk Addendum to IFPM,1 page 5, states that an individual may be qualified as D/ZAFMO on a high complexity sub-unit under Forest Service Fire Program Management Standards (FS FPM) if the person is qualified as a DIVS and ICT3 or RXB2. Dave met these standards. However, minimum standards for a Duty Officer (DO) are DIVS and ICT3, per Forest Service Manual (FSM) 5120-2005 issuance, section 5126.4. Individuals qualified as ICT3 compete better for D/ZAFMO positions (which are highly competitive across the agency, especially in certain geographic areas), and this motivated Dave to seek out the D/ZAFMO 120-day detail to the Modoc and strive to complete his ICT3 task book. The 2015 Modoc National Forest Standard Operating Guide outlines the following: Minimum standards for Forest Duty Officer (FDO), as per the FSM 5120, are Division Group Supervisor (DIVS) and incident commander Type 3 (ICT3). Currency is not required. Minimum standard for Zone Duty Officer (ZDO) is being currently qualified as an ICT3 and DIVS. The title of Battalion Chief (BC) is often used synonymously with D/ZAFMO. However, on the Modoc, BCs are expected to be qualified as DO. Dave did not meet Modoc BC expectations because he needed to be qualified as an ICT3 before becoming qualified as a DO. This was a point of friction for Dave because even though he was qualified as the D/ZAFMO without the ICT3 qualification, he did not meet the Modoc standard for BC and was not given that title. Rather, he was given the title of Suppression 41, which was an unusual title for a leader at the AFMO level. This is important to note because the title of BC signifies a particular level of authority and autonomy as a single resource while the title of Suppression XX was more often used by single resources split from their module such as an engine captain or assistant working independently from their engine.

Recommendation 8. Clarify Forest Service policy for District/Zone Duty Officers and make duty officer standards consistentthroughout the Forest Service (see Appendix 3).

1 Go to http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/management/ifpm/IFPM_FS-FPM%20Crosswalk%20revised4_29_2016.pdf.

http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/management/ifpm/IFPM_FS-FPM%20Crosswalk%20revised4_29_2016.pdf


Summary of Recommendations

1. Reevaluate our cultural acceptance of “normal” in wildland fire management.2. Fire training organizations within the Forest Service should collaborate on research into

existing training that is successful, understand why it is successful, and work to create moreholistic and experientially-based training methods.

3. An IC simulation exercise should be reinstated into the regular training curriculum for all IClevels and used periodically to sharpen skills instead of as a test to be taken one time as acondition of obtaining the qualification.

4. The National Director of Fire and Aviation Management should explore other Type 3 commandand general staff positions to reduce workload and to improve the IC’s decision-makingcapability when faced with complex tasks of gathering raw data, making sense of it, andapplying it toward a plan.

5. Have the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center (or other appropriate entity(ies) developeducational products focused on the hazards of scouting based on the outcome of the firescouting-focused research.

6. The Office of Human Performance, Innovation, and Organizational Learning (HPIOL) and otherappropriate entity(ies) should conduct a study on what individual training, practice, or otherlearning tool could be institutionalized to create an open environment of communicationbetween leaders on an initial- or extended-attack assignment.

7. The Office of Human Performance, Innovation, and Organizational Learning (HPIOL) shouldwork with the academic community to review the last 15 years of fatality-fire reports andconduct a meta-learning study on communication during a fire incident. The study will focuson communication trends among the data, leading toward a better understanding of firefighter fireline communications and correction measures to improve performance. Items includecommunicating intent by radio, deference to initial plan and command structure, commonunderstanding of language, interpersonal skills, radio-transmission tenets, communicatingacross geographical differences, etc.

8. Clarify Forest Service policy for the use of District/Zone Duty Officers and make duty officerstandards consistent throughout the Forest Service.


Works Cited Handelsman, J., Ebert-May, D., Ceichner, R., Bruns, P., Chang, A., DeHaan, R., Gentile, J., Lauffer, S., Stweart, J., Hilghman, S.M., and Wood, W.B. 2004. Scientific Teaching. Science: 521-2. Richtel, M., and Santos F. (2016, April 13). Wildfires, Once Confined to a Season, Burn Earlier and Longer. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com. Schoennagel, T. Veblen, T.T., and Romme, W.H. 2004. The interaction of fire, fuels, and climate across rocky mountain forests. Bioscience 54 (7): 661-676. doi: 10.1641/0006-3568(2004)054[0661:TIOFFA]2.0.CO;2.

http://www.nytimes.com/


Appendix 1: Fire Behavior Summary Don Boursier, Fire Behavior Analyst/Long Term Analyst Location: Modoc National Forest, Region 5, California CA-MDF-000570; P5J0HP (0508) Frog Fire, July 30, 2015

Geography The incident was located in the Long Bell Game Refuge of the Modoc National Forest. Nearby landmarks include Round Mountain 3.3 miles to the west, White Horse Flat Reservoir 6 miles to the south, Sugar Pine Ridge 3.8 miles to the east, and Black Mountain 9 miles to the north of the fire. The fire origin lies at approximately 41º 24’ 01.01” N / -121º 24’ 06.63” W at an elevation of 4,400 feet. Elevation in the area averaged 4400+/- feet ASL. The involved U.S.G.S. Quadrant is Border Mountain. Within the variable topography is a series of volcanic rock features, reefs, and drainages aligning in multiple directions. Topography varied from flat to steep/rugged in drainages and rock outcroppings. All areas were littered with volcanic rock. Slope percentages of 3-9 percent are in the majority of fire and 18+ percent in steeper drainages and rock faces. One watershed, Pit River, was involved within the fire area. Ownership of land affected is under the sole jurisdiction of the United States Forest Service, Modoc National Forest.

Climatology Climate in the area is Sub-humid with annual rainfall averaging 14.71 inches per year at the Round Mountain RAWS (elevation 5,258 ft.). Summers are warm and dry with an occasional influx of monsoonal moisture from the desert southwest, and winter temperatures are cool with precipitation falling as rain and as snow. The weather pattern in the Northern Sierra Nevada is influenced by topography and geographic position relative to the Central Valley, Coast Ranges, and Pacific Ocean. Winters are dominated by low pressure in the North Pacific Ocean while summer weather is influenced by high pressure in the same area. The prevailing wind regime is a southwesterly flow. Typically afternoon valley winds reach sustained speeds between 4 and 8 mph with gusts of 10 to 14 mph. Winds are typically from a west/southwesterly direction. High temperatures for the weeks of July 15 to August 15 have a mean of 85 degrees at the Round Mountain RAWS (20 years data). Minimum mean relative humidity for July 15 to August 15 is 18 percent at Round Mountain RAWS.


Average Wind Speeds

Average Wind Gust Speeds


Weather The weather over the fire area was quite normal for the late part of July. Southwesterly flow dominated. There was a brief incursion of monsoonal flow from the south. No measurable precipitation occurred. High temperatures were approximately 7 to 9 degrees above normal. The mean high temperature at Round Mountain RAWS (approximately 3 miles west of the fire perimeter at 5,258 ft.) was 94 degrees F (9 degrees above mean). The last wetting rain in the area was .29” on July 27, 2015.

Fuels The Frog Fire perimeter was within the Western Cordillera, Eastern Cascades Slopes, and Foothills ecological zone. Fuels as a result are many and varied from annual grasses to mixed conifer. Annual grasses, perennials, Green Leaf Manzanita species, Silver Sage, Sumac, Bitterbrush, Chamise, Ceonothus, Ponderosa Pine, Sugar Pine, Douglas fir, White Fir, Incense Cedar, and others are present. Densities of fuel types varied according to elevation and aspect. The main carrier of fire spread were the fine fuels (annual grasses), shrub component, and litter through surface fire. A large proportion of the fire scar can be best classified as Fuel Model 122 (GS2) and 186 (TL6); Scott and Burgan Standard Fire Behavior 40 Fuel Models. Fuel model 122 is grass and shrubs combined. Shrubs are 3 to 6 feet high; grass load is light. Spread rate is high; flame length moderate. Fuel model 186 is a moderate load of broad leaf litter and coarse fuels and includes small-diameter downed logs. Spread rate is low; flame length low. It is forest litter with a shrub or small tree understory. These fuel models were observed in most areas of the perimeter. This shade tolerant, fire intolerant understory was very receptive to ignition and acted as a ladder source for establishing fire into the canopy. Canopy base height (CBH/Ladder Fuels) averaged 2 meters (6 feet). A moderate percentage of the burn scar showed evidence of passive crown fire activity, and there were numerous incidents of short-duration active crown fire runs when wind and understory fuel consumption energy were involved. This passive and active crown fire activity resulted in increased fire spread through spotting due to extensive ember cast. Spotting distances were estimated on the day of initial attack activity to be approximately one-third mile at times. Numerous areas of “dirty” burn with the potential of re-burn were observed within the fire scar. Live fuel moistures averaged 113 percent in Bitterbrush and 150 percent in Silver Sagebrush at the Deer Hill fuel sample site east of the fire near Hackamore. 100-hour fuels for the Northeastern GACC sampling area had a moisture of approximately 7 percent. 1000-hour fuels for the Northeastern GACC sampling area had a moisture of approximately 12 percent. The Energy Release Component (ERC) based on NFDRS fuel model G (Northeastern GACC) on July 30 was well below a 23-year average at 57, suggesting a relatively low probability for large fire growth. The ERC values had averaged well below normal for the week prior to July 30.


No Fire Behavior or Fuels Advisories were in effect for July 30.


Values at Risk • Sage Grouse Habitat• Long Bell State Game Refuge• Round Mountain Lookout• Lava Campground• Electric Supply transmission lines• Underground pipeline distribution network• Railroad right-of-way (BNSF)

History Historical events that may have influenced this incident are varied from natural events to decisions made by Federal Agencies. The area has been affected by drought conditions for the past four years. Round Mountain RAWS seasonal rainfall was approximately 26 percent above normal (18.6”) for 2014-2015 (July 1-June 30) with most accruing during the winter pattern. The area in and around the fire perimeter had a moderate natural and prescribed fire regime. A majority of the fire area has had no significant large fires. Some notable fire occurrences near the fire perimeter include the following: • High Fire 2006 (1,053 acres)• Happy Fire 2006 (460 acres)• Lakin Fire 2006 (480 acres)• Lava Fire 2006 (210 acres)• Cougar Fuel Treatment 2011 (1,790 acres)• Sand Fire 2003 (332 acres)• Scarface Fire 1977• Glass Mountain Fire 1918

Pocket Cards2 Local thresholds or combinations that contribute to an increase in fire behavior include: • 20 feet wind speed over 5 mph.• Temperature over 90.• Less than 20 percent relative humidity.• Burning Index over 51.• “Be Alert” includes “Severe and often unpredictable weather changes caused by

thunderstorms or weather fronts can cause erratic winds and downdrafts.”

2 MDF Pocket Card, 2014 version.


Wildland Fire Decision Support System WFDSS was utilized for complexity/risk analysis during the Initial Attack phase of the fire on July 30, 2015.

Basic Fire Behavior Runs No Basic Fire Behavior runs were completed.

Short-Term Fire Behavior Runs No Short-Term Fire Behavior runs were completed.

Near Term Fire Behavior Runs Two Near Term Fire Behavior runs were completed on August 2 and 4 remotely.

FSPro A Fire Spread Probability was completed on July 31, 2015 remotely.

Sequence of Events July 30, 2015 – 17:32 hours (see figures 1 & 2) The Frog Fire was possibly started during a lightning event that affected the Modoc National Forest from a seasonal monsoon pattern. This strike at 1732 hours was said to be witnessed by personnel at the Round Mountain lookout. Due to receptive, dry fuels in the moderate dead and down component,


the fire was growing at a relatively moderate rate as related to historical fire growth patterns. On the evening of July 30, Round Mountain RAWS reported 92 degrees and 13 percent relative humidity. Simultaneously, the site reported sustained winds of 5 mph from the south/southwest, gusting to 12 mph. Skies were overcast with two storm cells in the area. One cell was reported to be southeast of the fire and producing virga, thus indicating a collapse or downdraft in process. A second cell was reported to be northeast of the fire area. Fine dead fuel moisture was calculated at 6 percent (shaded fuels) and probability of ignition at 57 percent. Intermittent sun exposure may have reduced the fine dead fuel values to 3 percent with a probability of ignition at 60 percent.

Ancillary Information: NO RED FLAG IN EFFECT FOR 7/30/15 Criteria for a Red Flag Watch/Warning for wind and/or low humidity for Fire Weather Zone 285 (Fire Area) ≤ 15% RH with wind gusts ≥ 30 mph for 3 hours or more OR Daytime Min RH ≤ 10% with wind gusts ≥ 20 mph for 3 hours or more. Abundant lightning (scattered [25%] areal thunderstorm coverage or greater) in conjunction with sufficiently dry fuels (fuels remain dry or critically dry during and immediately following a lightning event). Warnings may be issued for isolated events (<25% areal coverage) when little or no precipitation is expected to reach the ground.


July 30, 2015 – 18:30 hours (see figures 3 & 4) Round Mountain RAWS reported 81 degrees and 19 percent relative humidity. Simultaneously, the site reported sustained winds of 9 mph from the east/southeast, gusting to 28 mph from the southeast. Skies were overcast with two storm cells in the area. Fine dead fuel moisture was calculated at 6 percent (shaded fuels) and probability of ignition at 57 percent. Intermittent sun exposure may have reduced the fine dead fuel values to 3 percent with a probability of ignition at 60 percent. Initial attack resources reported flame lengths 2-3 feet with occasional interior torching. Fire behavior values were within BehavePlus calculations. Shortly after initial resources arrival, the fire began to travel rapidly to the northwest, suggesting the collapse of the southeasterly storm cell. Acreage estimated @ 1830 hours: 1 acres per MNF E-46

July 30, 2015 – 19:00-20:00 hours (see figures 5, 6, & 7) Round Mountain RAWS reported 81 degrees and 17 percent relative humidity. Simultaneously, the site reported sustained winds of 8 mph from the north, gusting to 22 mph from the northeast. Skies were overcast with two storm cells in the area. Fine dead fuel moisture was calculated at 6 percent (shaded fuels) and probability of ignition at 57 percent. Intermittent sun exposure may have reduced


the fine dead fuel values to 3 percent with a probability of ignition at 60 percent. Fire traveled to the northwest but transitioned to movement to the southwest with head fire, torching, and intermittent crown runs. This transition of winds from southeast to northeast suggests a downdraft/collapse of the northeast storm cell. Flame lengths were calculated to be in excess of 20 feet. In some locations flame lengths could have been in excess of 80 feet. Calculated rates of spread in excess of 80 chains per hour. In some locations rates of spread could have been as high as 150 chains per hour with running crown fire. Acreage estimated @ 1900 hours: 65 acres per Geospatial Analysis Acreage estimated @ 2000 hours: 372 acres per Geospatial Analysis


Figure 1.


Figure 2.


Figure 3.


Figure 4.


Figure 5.


Figure 6.


Figure 7.


Appendix 2: Personal Protective Equipment Report Escape Items were found approximately 77 feet from the fatality site. A knife, remnants of a roll of flagging, and a GPS receiver mark the escape path. Much of the presumed escape path was filled with heavy brush and lava rock. Yellow flags in the photo mark items found.

Figure 8.


Entrapment Site The entrapment site is located on an edge of a lava reef with lava rock and remnants of duff among the rocks. It was exposed to a significant flame front. Much of the surrounding burnable vegetation was consumed by fire; only burnt stobs3 of brush and scorched standing trees remain. The yellow flags and shirt mark the fatality site. Figures 9 and 10 .

3 A short straight piece of wood, such as a stake.


Fatality Site

Figure 11.

Fire Shelter – M2002 The fire shelter was located directly next to right side of body, still accordion folded and slightly expanded. It is not clear if the shelter was removed from the pack or carry case. However, since the shelter was still accordion folded and only slightly expanded, it shows that very likely the shelter was still encased in its PVC bag at time of entrapment. No remnants of the shelter PVC bag remain. Condition: Exposed edges of the shelter show delamination of the foil from the cloth and some aluminum burned away. Internal folds of the shelter remain intact.

Helmet The helmet appears to be Bullard brand. The helmet was found two feet uphill from the body. Condition: Mostly melted.

Shirt The shirt appears to have been Forest Service specification 5100-91. Condition: Mostly consumed by fire; small pieces of charred and dye sublimated fabric remain.

Pants The pants appear to have been Forest Service specification 5100-92 Type I (meta-aramid blend). Condition: Mostly consumed by fire; small pieces of charred and dye sublimated fabric remain.

Gloves - Leather The right glove was found still on the hand; the left-hand glove was not found. Condition: Right glove was 50 percent shrunk.


Boots The boots were reported as being a mountaineering style boot. Condition: Mostly consumed by fire.

Fireline Pack The fireline pack was reported as being a Mystery Ranch brand pack. The pack appeared to still be worn at time of entrapment and was found directly under the body. Remnants of the right shoulder strap were found still over the shoulder. It is unclear if the left shoulder strap was over the shoulder at the time of entrapment because it was consumed by fire. Condition: Burnable contents of the pack were consumed by fire.

Tool – Rhino The Rhino tool was found six feet from body. Condition: The wooden handle of the tool was completely consumed by fire.

Item conditions and corresponding temperatures

Item condition Temperature Vegetative Fire (typical) 1600-1800 F Meta-Aramid Cloth (shirt and pants) – Auto ignition Fire Shelter Aluminum – Melt

1300 F

1220 F Meta-Aramid Cloth(shirt and pants) – Char 825 F Leather Gloves – Shrinks 50 Percent 600 F Nylon Webbing and Material – Melt 500 F Meta-Aramid Cloth (shirt and pants) – Dye Sublimation

425 F

Helmet - Melt 325 F Human Survivability 300 F


Appendix 3: USDA Forest Service Fire and Aviation Management Briefing

Paper: Establishing New Minimum Qualification Standards for Forest Service Fire and Aviation Duty Officers (2014)

USDA Forest Service Fire and Aviation Management Briefing Paper

Date: November 21, 2014 Topic: Establishing New Minimum Qualification Standards for Forest Service Fire and Aviation Duty Officers Issue: When the new FSM 5120 replaces the 2005 issuance the Forest Service will no longer have any policy direction for Fire and Aviation Management (FAM) Duty Officers. FSM 5126.4 is the section in the current FSM 5120 that provides direction for Duty Officers but this section was not included in the revised FSM 5120 as it was determined by the revision authors to incorporate direction for FAM Duty Officers in a venue other than the manual system. In January 2014 a task team was assembled by the Washington Office-FAM to evaluate the effectiveness of the current policy, provide recommendations to update the current standard, and provide continued direction for the use of FAM Duty Officers. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) were solicited to represent the interests of each region. On November 20, 2014 the task team presented the final recommendation to the National Operations Committee and received their endorsement. The purpose of this briefing paper is to outline the recommendation and propose how the new direction should be implemented. Background: The 2005 FSM 5126.4 Duty Officer minimum qualification standards were tiered from the original 2004 Interagency Fire Program Management (IFPM) standards for Unit Fire Program Managers (i.e. Forest Fire Management Officers). IFPM has since evolved but the FSM 5120-2005 direction did not keep up with the updates. Numerous questions in the ensuing years have arisen regarding continued applicability of the FSM 5126.4 minimum qualification standards, whether the direction also applied to Zone or Ranger District level Duty Officers, and whether there are additional NWCG qualifications that possess similar position competencies that can be applicable for Duty Officers. The following is what the FSM 5120-2005 requires for Duty Officers and will be in effect until superseded by a new FSM 5120 issuance: 5126.4 - Duty Officer Qualifications Forests utilizing Duty Officers, that serve as on-call leadership and supervision for fire suppression response and that have the responsibility to provide oversight and support to personnel engaged on emergency incidents, shall require those officers to meet the following Interagency Fire Program Management (IFPM) Qualification Standards for Unit Fire Manager. 1. High Complexity: Incident Commander Type 3 and Division Group Supervisor.


2. Moderate Complexity: Incident Commander Type 3 and Task Force Leader.3. Low Complexity: Incident Commander Type 4 and Single Resource Boss.The Duty Officers need not be currently qualified in the above positions; however, they must havebeen qualified in the positions at one time.Actions Needed for the Path Forward: The Task Team’s regional SMEs provided regular updates totheir regions and kept the team appraised of feedback received. In general, most regions are reportinggood support for the proposed revision, though there have been a few responses that indicate theproposal is too prescriptive and/or some units cite the lack the qualified individuals to be in fullcompliance.To address these concerns, the Task Team is recommending a number of key changes to the currentFSM 5126.4 to provide units with greater flexibility:Activation of unit Duty Officers is required during any periods of predicted or actual incident activity.The only required position is the Forest Duty Officer.Expanded the minimum qualification standards for Duty Officers to match the updated IFPM or FS-FPM standards for FMO or AFMO positions commensurate with the unit or subunit’s complexity level.This includes the alternate pathways implemented in 2012 which include certain aviationqualifications.Clarified that activation of Duty Officers at the District/Zone level is at the discretion of the local unit,and is intended as a way to manage span of control during periods of high activity or fire danger.Clarified that a written delegation of authority to Duty Officers is recommended (not mandatory)however each individual performing as a Duty Officer must be approved by the AgencyAdministrator(s). Approval can be verbal or in writing.Provided guidance for use of trainee Duty Officers for career enhancement or to create additionaldepth on units.An earlier version of this briefing paper was provided to the National Line Officer Team (NLOT).Pending concurrence from NLOT the consensus from the National Operations Committee is to moveforward with implementing the recommended modifications to FAM Duty Officers.Contact: Stephen Gage, WO Assistant Director, Operations [email protected], 208-387-5605-or- Evans Kuo, WO –FAM Qualifications and Standards Program Lead [email protected], 208-387-5974Enclosure: Draft FAM Duty Officer Standard

Forest Service FAM Duty Officer (DO) Standard Each Forest or Grassland Fire Management Officer or Assistant Fire Management Officer will perform the duties of a Fire and Aviation Management Duty Officer (DO) for their unit, or will provide a delegated DO, during any periods of predicted or actual incident activity. Individuals performing as DO must meet the minimum NWCG qualification consistent with the Forest/Grassland’s IFPM complexity rating and must also have the approval of the unit’s Agency Administrator. A written delegation of authority from the Agency Administrator is recommended as it represents a vital link between fire operations and the line officer. The required duties for all DOs are: Serve as the unit’s primary contact with dispatch for both on and off-unit assignments. Monitor unit incident activity for compliance with Forest Service risk management practices. Coordinate and set priorities for unit suppression actions and resource allocation.

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]


Keep Agency Administrators, suppression resources, and information officers informed of the current and expected situation. Plan for and implement actions required for future needs. Document key decisions and actions. DOs will perform the above duties in addition to any unit specific duties assigned by the unit’s Agency Administrators or fire managers through a delegation of authority or unit operating plan. When assigned to the DO role, DOs will not concurrently perform any ICS command or operational functions directly connected to an incident. In the event that the DO is required to accept an incident assignment, the outgoing DO must transition with another qualified and approved DO. The activation of DOs at the District or Zone level is at the discretion of each Forest or Grassland. Use of District/Zone DOs is intended to manage span of control. Personnel assigned as District or Zone DO must meet the minimum NWCG qualifications consistent with the sub-unit’s FS-FPM complexity rating and have the approval of the unit or sub-unit Agency Administrator. DO staffing levels may vary based on locally determined metrics such as fire danger, local area Planning Level, predicted incident activity, prescribed fire implementation, and/or span of control. For example: During periods of relatively low fire danger a unit's staffing plan may only require one DO at the Forest level and none at the District/Zone level with allowances for after-hours or days-off contact. During peak fire season, conditions may warrant activation of 7-day coverage and staffing of DO positions on the Forest and each Ranger District or zone. Multiple districts (i.e. zone) may be covered by a single District DO if conditions warrant. The practice of assigning DOs that do not possess minimum NWCG qualifications at or above the unit or sub-unit’s complexity rating is expressly prohibited, regardless of fire danger or activity level.


Requirements for Duty Officer (DO) Forest DO

District or Zone DO

Forests and Grasslands will staff Duty Officer (DO) position(s) during periods of predicted or actual incident activity. Activation of DO(s) at District/Zone level is at discretion of unit.

Required Optional

Persons serving as DO must meet the minimum NWCG qualifications and be approved by the Agency Administrator. The NWCG qualifications for DO are dependent on the unit’s IFPM or FS-FPM complexity ratings (see below).

Required Required

Authority to function as DO must be granted by Agency Administrators. Required Required

A written delegation of authority from Agency Administrator(s) to serve as DO is recommended.

Optional Optional

Authority may be extended to non-fire emergencies such as storms, flood events, search and rescue, etc. by the Agency Administrator.

Optional Optional

Forests and Grasslands will include DO staffing and minimum draw down levels in their annual operating plans. Activation of DO(s) at District/Zone level is at discretion of unit.

Required Optional

Activation of District/Zone DOs is recommended during periods of high initial or extended attack activity.

N/A Optional

Person(s) identified as DO must be known to Dispatch, Agency Administrators, and resources at all times.

Required Required

Persons performing as DO must remain in communication with Dispatch and Agency Administrators. Protocols for contacting the DO after hours must be established and adhered to.

Required Required

If a District/Zone DO is assigned, one District/Zone DO may cover multiple districts.

N/A Optional

For development purposes, trainee DOs may be used. Optional Optional

Trainee DO should remain in communication with DO, but does not have to be co-located.

Required Required

Forest DO trainee must at one time been qualified in at least one of the minimum NWCG qualifications and have an open position task book for the remainder, and must be supervised by individual serving as Forest DO.

Required N/A


Requirements for Duty Officer (DO) Forest DO

District or Zone DO

District/Zone DO trainee must be fully qualified in at least one of the minimum NWCG qualifications and have an open position task book for the remainder, and may only be supervised by individual serving as D/Z DO and not the Forest DO.

N/A Required

DO Trainer to Trainee ratio must not exceed 1:1. Required Required

Key Required: Must comply with minimum standard. Optional: Recommended, but Forests and Grassland Supervisors have the discretion to utilize or not. N/A: Not applicable

Minimum Qualification Standards for Duty Officers Complexity Forest DO District/Zone DO

High DIVS –and- ICT3 or RXB2 -OR- ASGS –and- ICT3 (Currency not required)

DIVS –and- ICT3 or RXB2 -OR- ASGS –and- ICT3 (Currency required)

Moderate TFLD –and- ICT3 or RXB2 -OR- HEB1 –and- ICT3 (Currency not required)

TFLD –and- ICT3 or RXB2 -OR- HEB1 –and- ICT3 (Currency required)

Low CRWB, ENGB, FIRB, HEQB or HMGB –and- ICT4 (Currency required)

CRWB, ENGB, HEQB, or HMGB –and- ICT4 (Currency required)

Frog Fire Fatality

Documents

Transcript of Frog Fire Fatality