Freezing Missile AccuracyAuthor(s): Curtis CrawfordSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Fall, 1983), pp. 200-201Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20041742 .

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COMMENT AND

CORRESPONDENCE FREEZING MISSILE ACCURACY

To the Editor: In his article, "The Danger of Thermonuclear War," in your Summer 1983

issue, Andrei Sakharov states that it is "very important... to strive for the abolition of powerful silo-based missiles at the talks on nuclear disarmament." From the context he appears to be referring to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

(ICBMs) with a throw-weight equal to or greater than the American MX. At present the U.S.S.R. has more than 600 such missiles (SS-18s and SS-19s),

while the United States has none, except for 50 Titans soon to be retired. These heavier ICBMs represent the centerpiece, quantitatively and qualitatively, of the Soviet strategic or intercontinental nuclear arsenal. They are the most accurate and reliable of the Soviet systems, and are loaded with more than half of the

8,000 strategic warheads employed by the U.S.S.R. In contrast, out of 9,000

strategic warheads deployed by the United States, fewer than one percent ride such missiles.

Thus, Mr. Sakharov's statement can be revised to read: in the talks on nuclear disarmament it is very important to strive for the abolition of the centerpiece of the Soviet strategic arsenal. This is surely a prescription for failure. In the present circumstances of mutual conflict, fear and mistrust, which Mr. Sakharov rightly emphasizes, it is improbable in the extreme that the Soviet government would be willing to negotiate away the larger and more valued portion of its strategic armament. Since the strategic arms talks began in 1969 there has never been, as far as I know, any indication that the Soviets were willing to make such a sacrifice; nor has there been any offer from the American side of concessions that would have been remotely equivalent.

If elimination of these heavy missiles is indeed indispensable, and to be

attempted through negotiation, we should be considering which American ad

vantages?in cruise missiles, missile accuracy, submarine-launched MIRVs (Mul

tiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles), and/or bomber payloads? would have to be sacrificed to drive a reasonable bargain. If we could devise an

offer that would seem reasonable to an impartial observer, the Soviets probably would still refuse, since a government ordinarily values its favorite weapons more

highly than outsiders do. But long before reductions sufficient to constitute a

reasonable offer could be agreed to within our government the enterprise would be abandoned: it would be discovered that the elimination of the heavy Soviet

missiles, though desirable in theory, was in practice not worth the agony of

equivalent sacrifices in American deployments. If the "abolition of powerful silo-based missiles" is not negotiable, is there any

remedy for their destabilizing effect? Yes, in principle, if the remedy can be verified. The destabilizing effect of these weapons arises primarily from two

characteristics: their hard-target destructive capability (CMP) and their vulnera

bility to the CMP of the opponent. The capability could be substantially nullified and the vulnerability greatly reduced if both sides would freeze missile accuracy at present levels and moderately increase the hardness of their missile silos.

This remedy is possible now, and will remain so for a few years, because missile accuracy is just beginning to catch up with silo hardness. The most

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE 201

accurate MIRVed missiles currently deployed on either side barely meet the minimal criterion of a hard-target weapon: a 50 percent capability of destroying an enemy silo. (This statement applies to MIRVed missiles only; the Soviets

deploy perhaps 70 SS-18s and -19s with single warheads, whose CMP is far

greater.) The most powerful MIRVed missile warhead deployed by the United States

has a CMP index of 33 or 34; the most powerful such warheads deployed by the U.S.S.R. have CMP indexes of 25 to 30. An index of 25 implies a 50 percent

capability to destroy silos that can withstand blast pressures up to 2,000 pounds

per square inch; an index of 34, the same capacity against silos hardened to

withstand 3,000 pounds per square inch. The figure commonly given for the

hardness of U.S. silos is 2,000; for the Soviets, 2,000 to 4,000. The United States now has 900 hard-target, first-strike warheads, the W-78

deployed on 300 Minuteman III missiles. The U.S.S.R. may now have 2,000 such warheads, deployed on 250 MIRVed SS-18s and SS-19s, and may double that deployment by 1985.

If the CMP index can be held where it is, the proportion of silos on both sides that would survive attack would be substantial, even if they were not hardened

beyond their present level. The Soviet advantage in numbers would in large part be nullified by the effects of missile fratricide and of an unfavorable exchange ratio if more than two warheads were used per target. But if the risks of a

counterforce strike were still considered serious, the technology exists to harden silos so that present CMP levels would be generally ineffective against them.

But hardening cannot win the race if accuracy with no change in yield will

give the MX warhead, scheduled for deployment toward the end of this decade, a CMP index of 193, almost six times as high as Minuteman's 33. Nobody expects improvements in hardening that would be remotely comparable.

Thus, the accuracy of ballistic missiles (I have left out cruise missiles as slower, therefore second strike, weapons) needs to be frozen at the level of current

deployments. But even if the nuclear powers were willing to negotiate such a

freeze, could they verify it? That seems to depend primarily on whether improve ments in missile accuracy require missile flight tests. If they do, we can stop the

improvements by prohibiting the tests, which would be easy to verify. But what if they do not? The debate on arms control badly needs reasonably impartial, expert testimony (if such exists) on this question.

Curtis Crawford

Charlottesville, Va.

U.S. POLICY AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REALITIES

To the Editor: The refreshing good sense of Arturo J. Cruz and Piero Gleijeses, writing of

Nicaragua and El Salvador in your Summer issue, offers a timely reminder that what matters most in both countries is what happens inside their governments, and that neither one can be dealt with effectively by an Administration which

prefers the ideological certainties of Jeane Kirkpatrick and the empty big-stickery of William Clark to the stubborn realities of Central America. A stern but fair test for the Kissinger Commission will be the degree to which its recommenda

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