ELI FRANCO

STUDIES IN THE TATTVOPAPLA VASIM. HA

I. THE CRITERION OF TRUTH*

The Tattvopaplavasim. ha of Jayar~i Bhat.t.a is the only Loyfiyata text which has been discovered so far. Even though one chapter dealing with the Nyfiya theory of inference was translated for the extremely popular Source Book of Indian Philosophy ed. by Radhakdshnan and Moore, the TUS ~ is still, more than forty years after its publication, largely ignored. 2

Being a text of the so-called Materialistic school of Indian philosophy, the TUS attracted the attention of Marxist Indologists like Ruben and Dixit.a There is nothing astonishing, of course, in them trying to emphasize the materialistic aspects of the Indian culture, but this is precisely the reason why their interest in Jayar[~i quickly vanished. For Jayarfi~i who denies the validity of all means of knowledge, sense perception included, is not a Materialist but a full-fledged Sceptic.

There are several reasons why a detailed study of the TUS seems worth while to me: It is the only text in which a Lokfiyatika speaks for himself (cf. below), and where we can follow the detail of his arguments, it is also the only text where a full-fledged Scepticism is propounded. It is one of the earliest philosophical texts we have 4, and it belongs to one of the most interesting periods of Indian philosophy (it contains one of the earliest comments on and criticism of philosophers like Uddyotakara, Kum~rila and Dharmakfrti). Due to its highly negative character, we can learn from it not only about the Lokfiyata school (e.g. that there were at least two different Lok~yata schools: the one materialistic, the other sceptic), but also about the Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina schools, which it extensively criticizes. 4a But perhaps above all it is worthwhile because of the merits of the text itself, for Jayar~i is an excellent logician with an ironical sense ofhumour and a fondness ~for the absurd.

It is clear from the above that there are major philosophical differences between Jayar~i and what is generally known to be the Lokfiyata doctrine. Are we justified then in considering the TUS as a Lok~yata text?

Journal of Indian Philosophy 11 (1983) 147-166. 0022-1791/83/0112-0147 $02.00. Copyright 1983 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

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There is no doubt that Jayar~gi considered himself a disciple of B.rhaspati, the legendary founder of the Lok~yata. The parvapak.sin's first question in the book points out the discrepancies between Jayarh~i's position and the theory of four elements which appears in the B.rhaspatisatra. Jayar~i denies that there are any such discrepancies, for, so he claims, the elements or principles (tattva) appear in the sfttras for the purpose of reflexion (pratibimbana), i.e. repeating a statement without accepting it as true.

TUS, 1.13-14: prthivy-&lfni tattvani loke prasiddhani, tdny api vict~ryamd.~ni na vyavati.sthante, kim. punar anydni?

"The principles, earth etc., are well known, [but] even they, when seriously examined, are not established, then what about the others?" s

Jayar~i~i may have very well been sincere in his interpretation of the Br.haspatisatra, but one still wonders what brought about this considerable shift in the ontological presuppositions of the school. The answer, I think, lies in the weakness of the original epistemological position of the Lok~yata, i.e. that perception is the only means of right cognition. It seemed impossible to establish the theory of four elements without having some recourse to inference, the validity of which the Lok~yatikas denied.

B.rhaspati's assertion that inference is not a means of valid cognition had a pragmatic purpose: to cut off any divine or supernatural factor from the foundation of social and ethical theories. The inherent difficulties in this position were probably not apparent before Dign~ga, when logical and epistemological problems became the central preoccupation of Indian philosophers. Once every school had to establish, or give some justification for, the means of knowledge it recognized as valid, the Lokiyatikas found themselves in the embarrassing position of petitio principii (dtma~raya). By denying all other means of knowledge, perception had to establish itself, or not to be established at all.

There were at least two ways open for the Lok~yatikas to solve these problems, problems which other schools did not fail to point out. 6 Either inference had to be granted a limited validity, which would allow its use for everyday life, but would deny its use for establishing nonperceptible entities such as God, Soul etc., or, to be even more consistent, one had to forego both perception and inference.

The first solution was adopted by Lok~yatikas like Purandara 7 ; Jayar~i chose the second one.

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Unlike N~gffrjuna, Jayarfi~i does not demonstrate the interdependence between the means and the objects of right cognition; his arguments are directed against the definition of the means of valid cognition, presupposing that if his opponents are unable to provide adequate definitions for their means of valid cognition, they cannot recognize them as valid.

TUS, 1.15-19: atha katham, tani na santi? tad ucyate sal-lak.sa.na- nibandhanam, mdna-vyavasthdnam, mdna-nibandhand ca meya-sthitih., tad-abhdve tayoh, sad-vyavahdra-vi.sayatvam, katham . . . . . . 8

atha . . . a. . . vyavahdrah, kriyate, taddtmani rapdstitva-vyavahdro

ghatddau ca sukhdst#va-vyavaharah, pravartayitavyah. .

"Why do they (i.e. the principles) not exist? As to this, it is argued: the establishment of the means of right cognition depends on [their] true def'mition, and the establishment of objects of right cognitions depends on means of right cognition. When this (i.e. true det'mition) is absent, how [can] one truly speak of these two (i.e. means and object of right cognition)... ?

. . If one speaks [about reality without means of knowledge], then one could start talking about the existence of colour in the soul, and of pleasure in the pot."

Consequently, the entire book evolves around the different definitions of means of knowledge .9

The first, and one of the most important problems dealt with by Jayar~gi, and which I think illustrates nicely the general flavour of the book, is the problem of the criterion of truth, i.e. how do we know that this or that particular cognition is true or false.

The discussion evolves around the Ny~ya definition of perception (NS, 1.1.4):

indriyartha-sannikar.sOtpannam. /nanam avyapade~yam avyabhicdri vyavasdydtmakam, pratyaks.am.

"Perception is the cognition produced by a contact between sense organ and object, which is not designated [by words] ,lo is nonerroneous (lit. does not deviate [from reality] ), and has a definite character."

How do you know that a cognition is not erroneous, asks Jayar~fi, and enumerates four possible criteria: by being produced by a complex of faultless causal factors, (adu.s.ta-kdraka-sandohOtpddyatva), by absence of sublation (bddhd-rahitatva), by the efficiency of the activity (prav.rtti-sdmarthya), or otherwise (anyathd) H .

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Jayar~i's arguments against the first two criteria are directed at the following passage of the V.rttik~ragrantha quoted in the Sabarabhasya 11.5. (SBh, p. 26):

tat-sam, prayoge puru.sasy~ndriya.nam buddhi-janma sat pratyak.sam. 4a yad-v(sayam. ]aanam. tenaiva sam. prayoge indriya.ndm puru.sasya buddhi-janma sat pratyaks.am, yad anya-vis.ayam. ]aanam anya-sam, prayoge bhavati, na tat pratyaks.am. - katham, punar idam avagamyate 'idam tat-sam, prayoge, idam anya-sam, prayoge" in'? yah ndnya- sam. prayoge, tat tat-sam, prayoge, etad-viparttam anya-sam, prayoga iti. - katham, jadyate, yard hi guktikayam api ra]atam, manyamdno 'ra]ata-sannikr.stam. me caksur' iti manyate ? - badhakam, hi yatra ffu~nan: utpadyate 'naitad evam, mithya-l~anam idam' iti, tad anya- sam. prayoge, viparTtam tad-sam, prayoga iti. - prdg bddhaka-]fianotpatteh. katham avagamyate, yada na tat-kale samyag-]adnasya mithya- ]aanasya ca kagcid vi~e.sa.h? - yada k.sudddibhir upahatam, mano bhavati, indriyam, va timiradibhih., sauks.myddibhir va bahyo vi.sayas, tato mithya-]adnam, anupahates.u samyag-l~anam, indriydrtha- sannikarso hi ]aanasya hetuh., asati tasminn ajfidndt, tad-antargato doso mithya-]adnasya hetuh., dus.t.es.u hi/aanam, mithya bhavati. - katham avagamyate? - dos.dpagamdt sam. pratipatti-dar~andt. - katham, dus..tddus..tdvagama iti cet, - prayatnendnvicchanto na ced dos.am upalambhemahi, prama.ndbhavdd adus..tam iti manyemahi. tasmad yasya ca dust.am, karan.am, yatra ca mithy~ti pratyayah., saivdsam[cfnah, pratyayo ndnya iti.

"The production of cognition when the sense organs of a man are in contact with that [same object which appears in the cognition], is true perception. 4a

The production of cognition when the sense organs of a man are in contact with precisely that which the cognition has for [its] object (vi.saya) is true perception. The cognition whose object is different from the one [with which the sense organs are] in contact is not perception. - But how is it apprehended that this [cognition is produced when sense organs are] in contact with that [same object which appears in the cognition], and that [cognition when they are] in contact with a different [object] ? - That [cognition which arises when sense organs are] not in contact with a different [object], [arises when they are] in contact with that [same object]. Its opposite [arises when sense organs are] in contact with a different [object]. - How is it known? For even when someone takes a conch-shell for silver, he thinks: 'my eye is in contact with

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silver'. - [It is known,] for where a sublating cognition (badhaka/adna) is produced [which takes the form] 'this is not so, that is a false cognition'. it [arises when sense organs are] in contact with a different [object]. Otherwise it [arises when they are] in contact with that [same object]. - But how is it apprehended before the production of the sublating cognition, at the time when there is no difference whatsoever between true cognition and false cognition? - When the mind is disturbed by hunger etc., or the sense organ by timira sickness etc., or the object by fineness etc., from these [kinds of disturbances] a false cognition [is produced]. When they are not disturbed, the cognition is true. For the contact between sense organ and object is the cause (hem) of the cognition, because in its absence there is no cognition. A disturbance which intervenes (antargata dos.a) with that [contact] is the cause (hetu) of a false cognition, because when they (i.e. the sense organs etc.) are disturbed, a false cognition arises. - How is it apprehended? - Because when the disturbance is gone, one sees an agreement [between the cognition and reality] (sampratipatt O. 12 _ How is the apprehension of the disturbed and undisturbed [brought about] ? - If [in spite of] searching with effort, we do not perceive [any] disturbance, [then,] because there is no proof [for the opposite], we think that it is not disturbed. That is why only the cognition.which has a disturbed cause (kdran.a), and about which [we have] the cognition 'it is false', is an erroneous cognition, there is no other."

One can see a certain uneasiness of the V.rttikara about the criterion of truth. As the parvapaksin's questions are raised, he piles two criteria one upon the other, and he does that, of course, because none of them is really satisfying. The first criterion he uses is the sublation, or the assertion of falsity (bddhO), but as time intercalates between the cognition whose falsity is asserted and the cognition which asserts the falsity, he adds a second criterion - the production by undisturbed causes. By that he achieves that the true cognition is made the normal, 13 the one we usually have, and the error is made an exception. In other words, there is nothing inherently wrong with the cognitive process itself. But the fact that any particular cognition is produced by undisturbed causes is yet to be proved. The assertion that a valid cognition is produced by 'good' causes tells us what happens, but not when it happens. Thus the production by undisturbed causes needs in its turn another criterion which will tell us whether there is a production by undisturbed causes. Here the V.rttikara seems to be at the end of his resources, and says that if we make an effort to discredit or refute the cognition without success, we accept it as true. No further

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specification of what the effort should consist of is given. The last sentence (which is quoted by Jayaragi p. 3 .7 -8 ) concludes the discussion by putting the production by undisturbed causes and the absence of sublation side by side as a joint criterion of truth.

What the V.rttik~ra tried to do in the first half of this criterion is, I think, to adopt a definition of knowledge and turn it into a criterion of truth. The definition of knowledge in terms of causal complex appears already 14 in the Vaige.sikasf~tra (VS, 9.25-27):

indriya-do.~t samskarac cavidya, tad dustam, ffu~nam, adustam vidya.

"Non-knowledge is due to disturbance of sense organ and impressions [left by previous experience]. It is a disturbed cognition. Undisturbed [cognition] is knowledge."

The difference between a definition of knowledge and its criterion is that the definition should tell us what it is, while the function of a criterion is to tell us when and where it occurs. Taken as a criterion of truth, the production by undisturbed causes should function as a characteristic sign (hem, IMga) of an inference. One should be able to say "this cognition is true, because it is produced by undisturbed causes", just as one says "this cognition is true, because it is not sublated".

The difference between the two inferences is not in the nature of vydpti, but that in the first inference the occurence of the middle term (hem) in the minor term (dharmin) is unknown, whereas one always knows if a cognition is sublated: one has immediate experience of it when it happens.

(This is precisely the difference between a definition and an inference. In the deFmition there is a vyt~pti between what is being defined and the def'ming property, but it does not say whether a particular substratum would have that clef'ruing property or not.)

The above interpretation of the V.rttik~ra is also possible because of the ambivalence of the word hetu, which can be used to denote both a cause and a middle term of an inference. If he is to use the production by undisturbed causes as a criterion, which I think he does, then when he says that a disturbance is the hetu of a false cognition, both meanings of the word should be equally applicable to the text. Jayar~i's arguments are directed only against hetu as a middle term of an inference. He does not argue against a definition of knowledge, but he claims that it cannot be used as a criterion of truth.

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TUS, 2.8-14: tad yady adus..ta-karaka-sandohOtpddyatvendvyabhi- caritvam, saiva karandnam adus..tatd kendvagamyate? na pratyaks.en.a, nayana-ku~aldder atTndriyatvdt, ndpy anumanena, lMgdntardnavagateh. - nanu idam eva ]~anam. litigam, tad-uttham, tasya vikis..taMm gamayati. - yady evam itaretard~rayatvam, duruttaram dpanfpadyate. kim ca, indriydndm gu.na.do.sdgrayatve tad-utthe vi/adne do.sdgankd ndtivartate pum-vydparOtpddita-~abda-vi/adna ira.

"If the non-erroneousness [of a cognition is apprehended] by the fact of being produced by a complex of undisturbed causal factors, precisely that, [viz.] the fact that the causes are undisturbed, by which [means of right cognition] is it apprehended? Not by perception, because the proper [functioning] of the eye etc. is beyond [the apprehension of] the sense organs themselves. Neither by inference, because there is no apprehension of another sign (IMga) (i.e. a sign which will prove that the causal complex is undisturbed, which again proves in its turn that the cognition is not erroneous.) - It is precisely that cognition which is the sign; having arisen from that (i.e. causal complex) it reveals its distinguished character (i.e. of being undisturbed). - If this is so, [the fallacy of] interdependence is unavoidable.

Besides, the sense organs being substrata of qualities (i.e. good functioning) and disturbances, a cognition produced by them is not beyond suspicion of disturbances, just like a cognition of a word produced by the activity of a man. is ,,

The first inference would be: this cognition is true, because it is produced by an undisturbed causal complex. The second inference would be: this causal complex is undisturbed, because it produces a true cognition. The interdependence is obvious.

With this, Jayarh~i's criticism of the first part of the criterion is concluded, and he moves on to refute the second part, the absence of sublation.

Adapting a western terminology, the absence of sublation looks at first sight as if it presupposes a coherence theory of truth, where truth is defined in terms of relations among statements, and not in terms of relations between statements and reality, as is the case in a correspondence theory of truth. However, as far as I know, the basic assumption of all Indian philosophers is always a correspondence theory of truth. Even if the only way to assert the falsity of a cognition is by having another cognition which has a corrective

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function (e.g. that cognition of water was nothing but a fata morgana), it can only do so because it corresponds to reality, and because the content of the previous cognition does not correspond to reality. In fact, the relation between the two cognitions always remained problematic; and in the final analysis, unexplained. 16 We saw that the main disadvantage of the absence of sublation as a criterion of truth is that a certain amount of time lapses before the sublation is produced. Consequently one can never be certain at any given moment which of one's cognitions are true and which are going to be proved false sometime in the future. Moreover, in certain cases the falsity of the cognition will never be asserted: a deceptive sense organ may remain so, a disturbed mind may never be cured, an object may be too subtle to be rightly apprehended, or one may simply die before the sublation is produced.

TUS, 2.15-24: atha badhdnutpattydvyabhicaritvam. ]adyate, badhanutpattir viffu~nasya kim. yathartha-~..h[titvena, ahosvid badhaka-ffu~n6tpadaka-k~raka-vaikalyad iti sandihmah, d.r~yate hi badhaka-jhanOtpadaka-karaka-vaikalyad bddhdnutpddah., yatha dare mar[ci-nicaye ]ala-fftdne ]ate badha na sam. padyate, abhyasa- de~dvasthitasya karakOpanipate saty utpadyate, sd c@ajayamana sam. vatsarddi-kala-vikalpena sam. ]ayate, kadacic ca karaka-vaikalyan naiva sam. padyate, na caitavata tasya yatharthata upapadyate, api ca badha-viraha eva [na ?] 17 badhdsadbhavdvedakah, tad-upalabdhatvena tat-sadbhavOpalabdheh. .

"If the nonerroneousness [of the cognition] is known by the non-arising of sublation, we have the following doubt: Is the fact that a sublation of a cognition does not arise due to the fact that the cognition is true, or to the deficiency of a causal factor which [could have] produced the sublating cognition? For it is seen [in some cases] that the sublation is not produced because of the deficiency of the causal factor which [could have] produced the sublating cognition. For instance, when a cognition of water is produced with reference to a faraway mass of sun rays the sublation is not produced, [but] when a causal factor is produced additionally for [a man] who stands nearby, [the sublation] is produced, And being produced additionally, it is produced with a difference of time, after a year etc., and sometimes due to the deficiency of the causal factor, it is not produced at all, but the nonerroneousness of that [cognition] is not established by that much. Besides, the absence [of

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cognition] of sublation does not prove the real absence of sublation, because the apprehension of its real existence is due to its apprehension [but not the other way around] ."

In the last sentence, Jayar~i turns the practical difficulties into a matter of principle. If one apprehends a sublation, one can be sure that the sublation exists and that the sublated cognition is false. But if one does not apprehend the sublation, it does not mean that the cognition is true, for it is always possible that the sublation is not produced because of the deficiency of one of the causal factors.

One of the basic principles in Pepper's philosophy of science is that a hypothesis can never be confirmed. The scientific hypotheses we hold to be true are only those which are not yet refuted, but they are liable to be so sometime in the future. When we conduct a scientific experiment in order to check a hypothesis, we can either refute or corroborate it, but never confirm it. Jayara~i's argument is based, I think, on a similar idea, but, of course, I do not mean to make a comparison between the two philosophers. This simply illustrates that similar ideas can arise in entirely different contexts.

Jayar~i~i proceeds to refute the absence of sublation from another point of view. He considers two interpretations of the absence of sublation:

(1) If all people do not apprehend the sublation of a given cognition, the cognition is true.

(2) If there is no sublation among the different cognitions of one and the same person, the nonsublated cognition is true.

The first interpretation is a G. E. Moore-style common-sense argument (How do I know that the water is real? Everybody else says so.), and it raises the same difficulties, for even an absolute majority may be wrong. And, as Jayaras'i argues, one could hardly know what all people think on a given subject-matter without being omniscient. For the second interpretation, the arguments given above apply equally. This explains the similarity between 2.15-22 and 3 .1 -6 . This passage concludes Jayari~i's arguments against the absence of sublation as a criterion of truth.

TUS, 2 .25-3 .8 : anyac ca, bddhd-virahah, kim. sarva-puru.sdpeks.ayd, dhosvit pratipattr-apek.sayd? tad yadi sarva-puru.sdpek.sayd . . .s tadvirahopy. . .a [sa] rva-]ad.h syu.h. - bhavantu nama sarve sarva-]ad.h, ko do.sa.h? asarva]fia-vyavahardbhava-prasahgah., atha pratipattr~peks.aya badhdnurpadah., pratipattur bddhakam vij~nam.

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nOtpadyate tena tad avyabhicari, tad ayuktam, pratipattur badhaka-ffzananutpade 'pi de~dntam-gamana-maranadina mani- marfey4di-viparyaya-jaana-dar~andt, athavd tad viprayaya- /aa'nam. tathdvidham, evOtpannam, sva-prabhava-svabhavdnupmve~ena yad badhaka-viffu~ndtpdda-pmtibandha-kT.t tad-va~o 'pi tathdbhftta eva par~s.ta,samyag-jaana-vat . . . . a evam sati yad uktam "yatra (yasya) ca dust.am karanam, yatra ca mithy~ti pratyayah, sa evasamfefnah, pmtyayah. "(~Sabarabhas.ya 1.1.5) ity etad evasamTeTnam,

"And there is another [argument] : does the absence of sublation depend on all people, or on the perceiver [alone] ? With regard to these [two alternatives], if it depends on all people. . . [everybody] would be omniscient. - Let everybody be omniscient, what is wrong with that? Is - One will not be able to talk about (vyavahdra) non-omniscient [people]. If [on the other hand] the non-production of sublation depends on the perceiver, (i.e. if) the perceiver does not have a sublating cognition, [and] by this [fact he knows that] that [cognition] is not erroneous, this [too] is not correct, because a false cognition of diamond rays 19 etc. is ascertained, even when there is no production of a sublating cognition for the perceiver, because he goes to another place or dies etc. Or the false cognition arises in such a way by being subordinated to the nature of its source that it prevents the production of the sublating cognition. The impact of this [false cognition] does not change,just as [in the case of] a cognition accepted as true by the opponent. Thus, to say: "a cognition whose cause is disturbed and about which one has the cognition 'it is false', that cognition alone is untrue" is untrue."

With this Jayarfigi's criticism of the V.rttikAra is complete, and he proceeds to refute the Ny~ya criterion ofprav.rtti-sdmarthya, the efficiency of the activity.

This criterion appears for the first time in the Nydyabhds.ya (introduction pp. l, 21):

pramd.nato 'rtha-pratipattau pravr, tti-sdmarthydd arthavat pramdnam. pramd.nam antarena ndrtha.pratipattih., ndrtha-pratipattim antaren.a pravr, tti-sdmarthyam, pramdnena khalv ayam. ]adtdrtham upalabhya tam artham abhrpsati ]ihdsati yd. tasy~psd-jihdsd-prayuktasya samfhd pravr, ttir ity ucyate, sdmarthyam, punar asyd.h phalenabhisambandha.h.

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"A means of right cognition is fruitful, because the activity is efficient when the object is apprehended by a means of right cognition. There is no apprehension of the object without a means of right cognition, and there is no efficiency of the activity without the apprehension of the object. When the cognizer apprehends the object by means of right cognition, he wants to obtain or avoid that object. The endeavour of [a person] who is led by the wish to obtain or avoid that [object] is called 'activity'. Efficiency, on the other hand, is the connection between that [activity] and the result (lit. fruit)."

The Nyfiya criterion looks like a pragmatical principle of confirmation: when we have a group of cognitions of the same object, each one of them with a certain probability in its favour, the probability of the group as a whole is bigger than the probability of each cognition taken separately. Of course the Ny~ya does not talk about such concepts as probability, for the only thing worth knowing for the Naiy[yikas is whether the cognition is absolutely certain or not. If it is doubtful, no matter how probable, it cannot be trusted.

The efficiency of the activity seems also to imply a differentiation in the credibility of the different sense organs. The most vulnerable sense organ is the eye. In fact all the stock-examples of errors, the fata morgana, the conch-shell, the timira.sickness etc., are visual illusions. I cannot recall any example of illusion connected with touch, smell, taste, or even hearing. Consequently a stronger sense organ may be asked to confirm the cognition of a weaker one, for instance, if one has a visual cognition of water, one cannot be sure whether the cognition is true or not, but if the cognition is confirmed by another such as tasting or touching the water, the Naiyayika concludes that the first cognition of water is true beyond any doubt. One could perhaps interprete that by understanding "the relation to the fruit" in the strict sense of conjunction (sam. yoga) visual and auditive cognitions will be excluded, for they cannot have a confirming function. But this will not do, because for the Nyaya, the relation between the eye and its object is also a conjunction. This is probably the reason why Jayara~i defines the efficiency of the activity as a connection (i.e. conjunction) between the result and the body. Jayari~i explains the efficiency of the activity at rather unusual length (he rarely bothers to explain the parvapaks.in's position), and then dismisses it in one sentence.

TUS, 3.9-15: atha prav.rtti-sdmarthyendvyabhicdritdm, vetsi,

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pravrtti-sdmarthyam phalendbhisambandhah., phalam, ca srak- candana-vanit6dakddi, te.su satya-phala-nis.patteh, tesu phal6pacdrah., tad-deha-sambandhah, pravr, tti-sdmarthyam, pravrttih, kdya-sthd kriyd, tat-sdmarthyam avyabhictlritdm gamayati, tat kim avagatam anavagatam vd? yadi ndvagata m, tad 'asti' iti katham vetsi? athdvagatam, tad-avagater avyabhicdritd katham avagamyate ? iti parvOditam anusartavyam.

"You recognize the nonerroneousness [of a cognition] by the efficiency of the activity. The efficiency of the activity is the connection with a fruit, and fruit [means] garland, sandle wood, beloved woman, water etc. [The word] 'fruit' is used metaphorically for these [things], because [sometimes] a real fruit is obtained among them) The efficiency of the activity is the connection between the body and that [fruit]. Activity is a corporal action, its efficiency makes known the nonerroneousness [of the cognition]. Now, is [the efficiency of the activity] apprehended or not? If it is not apprehended, how do you know that it exists? If it is apprehended, how is it apprehended that its apprehension is not erroneous? Thus the [argument] mentioned above should be followed."

In order to confirm a cognition, the efficiency of the activity in itself is not enough. One has to know that the activity is efficient, and to know means to apprehend through a veridical cognition, i.e. a cognition which has to be confirmed, in its turn, by an efficiency of activity, which has to be apprehended and so on ad infinitum.

Jayar~i's argument raises the same objection one uses to criticize Pragmatism To repeat James' example once more, 2' if one believes that there are tigers in India, one is prepared to find tigers there. And if one goes to India and does not fred any tigers there, one is surprised or dissatisfied. The trouble with such a criterion of truth, as Chisholm for instance points out) 2 is that it is not true that a cognition will give satisfaction if and only if it is true. One may go to Syria, find some tigers, and think one is in India, or one may go to India, fred tigers and mistake them for cats. The cognition which is supposed to confirm another cognition has to be confirmed in its turn.

This is how I understand Jayar~i's argument. The Sanskrit, however, is laconic enough to allow another interpretation: how do you know that the efficiency of the activity is the criterion of truth? One needs a criterion

TATTVOPAPLAVASIM. HA 159

in order to choose a criterion, the second criterion needs a third one and so on. In other words, the argument is not raised in order to show the inherent difficulties once the criterion is chosen, but it is far more general and does not allow the opponent to use the criterion in the first place. This interpretation is favoured by Ruben.23 The reason I prefer the first interpretation is that such a general objection applies equally to all the four criteria criticized by Jayar~gi, and, therefore, should not have a specific connection to only the third one of them, as is obvious from the text. (As far as the Sanskrit goes, he seems to take avagateh, as an ablative, whereas I take it to be a genetive).

The next move of the opponent is to raise the concept of artha-prdpti, the obtaining of the object. For example, by obtaining water, the validity of a water cognition previously produced is established. I do not see any essential difference between the efficiency of the activity and the obtaining of the object. The second is perhaps more precise, and has a narrower focus. The efficiency of the activity was defined as obtaining a desirable object or avoiding an undesirable one, whereas the obtaining of the object can be interpreted as applying to the first possibility alone. One could easily argue that by perceiving water and avoiding it, the cognition of water is not established to be veridical, because one can be successful in avoiding the water whether the water is there or not. There are four possible relations between a cognition and the obtainment of its object:

(1) true cognition - object obtained (2) false cognition - object unobtained (3) true cognition - object unobtained (4) false cognition - object obtained Jayar~gi's opponent argues that only relations 1 and 2 are to be found in

reality. This is clearly implied by the Nydya Bhds.ya, and the Vdrttika states it explicitly (NV, introduction p. 8):

so 'yam pramdtd yadd pramdnendvadhdrya pravartate taddsya pravrttih, samarthd bhavati, yadd puna.h pramd.ndbhdseruirtham avadhdrya pravartate taddsamarthd. . .

"When the cognizer acts after determining [the object] by a means of fight cognition, his activity is efficient. On the other hand, when he acts after determining the object with a pseudo means of right cognition, [his activity] is not efficient."

Against that Jayar[~i argues that relations 3 and 4 are equally possible,

160 ELI FRANCO

but first he further diversifies the obtaining of the object into obtaining the same object which appeared in the cognition (tat-pratibhdtOdaka-pr@ti), obtaining a different object, but one which belongs to the same universal as the object which appeared in the cognition (tad-/atryOdaka-prdpti), and, finally, obtaining of an object which is produced in the same series as the object which appeared in the cognition (tad-vam~a-/a-/ala-prapti, vam~a = santana).

The first possibility is, of course, the most desirable for the Ny~ya, but it could not be applied to the example of water, because any change in the arrangement of the parts of a substance i.e. a disjunction, brings about the destruction of that substance (avayava-vibMga = vin~a-hetu). In fact the duration of the object could not be maintained for such objects as pot, cloth etc., because "addition or subtraction of a single minute particle means the destruction of the original substance and its replacement by another substance". ~ Therefore, the Ny~ya needed some guiding principle in order to bridge the gap between the object of cognition and the obtained object. Thus the opponent says: it may be true that I do not obtain exactly the same water, but if I obtain water that is similar, it is good enough for me. Now the problem is how to define the similarity. One solution is to say: the universal is responsible for the similarity among the individuals; due to the universal 'water' we recognize that different individuals are all water. Therefore I shall define the obtaining of the object not as obtaining the same object, but as obtaining an object which belongs to the same universal.

This definition, however, is both too wide and too narrow. It is too narrow, because one can have a true cognition without obtaining a similar object (e.g. the cognition of the stars). It is too wide, because one can have a false cognition, and nevertheless obtain an object which belongs to the same universal. The body of the cow, for instance, as that of every living creature in this world, contains water, and therefore the universal 'water' occurs in it. Thus one can have a fata morgana, find a cow, and satisfy the principle of obtaining an object which belongs to the same universal.

Another way to bridge the gap between the cognition's object and the obtained object is to say: the water, i.e. the avayavin, may be destroyed, but the parts (avayava) of that water produce in their new arrangement a new water. This second water-substance belongs to the same series of production as the first. Thus, if we obtain an object produced in the same series as the object which appeared in the cognition, the cognition is true.

TATTVOPAPLAVASIM. HA 161

This principle, argues Jayar~.~i, is untenable, because it contradicts another Ny~ya principle, namely, that final wholes (antyavayavin) do not produce any further wholes.

According to the Ny~ya, a production of a cloth, for instance, starts with two atoms which form a dvyan.uka, three dvyan.uka form a tryanuka, several tryanuka a particle of cotton, several particles a fibre, several fibres a thread, and several threads a cloth. Each subsequent substance is the effect of the previous substance. Being a whole, it resides in its parts, which are the samavdyilafra.na, the causes in which the effect inheres. The series stops when the substance is regarded as a final whole, because it does not become a part or a cause for any further whole. Jayar~i argues that when a fmal whole is destroyed, the substance which emerges from the parts cannot belong to the same series of production because it cannot inhere in the old substance which is destroyed.

The argument is quite convincing when we deal with solid objects which have a definite form like the cloth and the pot, but it looks rather strange in our context, where the example under discussion is water. I do not know whether the Naiyayikas accepted the possibility of water being antydvayavin, nor what it could possibly mean. (Perhaps all the water in the world?) According to D. N. Shastri there was no definite criterion as to which objects should be regarded as final wholes. 2s

Bh,~sarvajfla mentions this antyt2vayavin argument at the end of his summary of Jayarh.~i's arguments on the criterion of truth (NBha, 33.17-34. 14), but although he accepts the principle of production in the same series (p. 37.21-23), he does not answer Jayar~i's objection, at least not directly. He brings forth a vyavahara argument, i.e. that people recognize the object produced in the same series, which he defines as the immediate production of a similar object (tat-sadr~a-nirantarOrpada), as exactly the same object which appears in the cognition (tad ev~dam iti). But he does not say if and how it should be reconciled with the principle that anty~vayavin-s do not produce a further avayavin. Whatever the case may be, even if the concept of antydvayavin cannot be applied to water, it does not change much in Jayar~i's argumentation, because he also refutes the plurality (nandtva) of the water individuals.

TUS, 3 .19-4 .3 , 4 .22-24, 9 .1 -4 : tadyadipratibhdtOdaka- prdptyd, tad ayuktam, pratibhdtOdakasydvasthdnam, nOpapadyate,

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]ha.sa-mahisa-parivartandbhighdtOpajdtdvayava.kriyd-nydyena pratyastamaya-sambhavdt. atha ta].]dt[yOdaka-prdptyd, evam tarhy asatyt)daka-]hdne 'pilate kvacit toyam dsddayanti pumdmsd.h tad apy avitatham, sydt. atha tad-dega-kdla-samlagnam udakam, na prdpayati mithyd- ]adnam, samyag.]adnam, tu tad-dega-kdla-sam, lagnam udakam prdpayati, tena tad avyabhicdrfti cet, yan na prdpayati tad vyabhicdri, tarhi rnumftrsu-paddrthOtpdditam jadnam, candrdrka- graha-nak.satra-tdrakddi-sam, vedanam, ca vyabhicdri prdpnoti, na ca tad-dega-laila-sam, lagnOdaka-pr@akatvam asti, degasydpy udakavad vindga-sambhavdt. . . yadi ct)daka-jdtfydrtha-prdptydvyabhicdritd p~rvt)ditt~daka-vijfu~nasya vyavasth@yate, tadOdaka-]ater gav-dddv api sam. bhavo 'sti gav- ddi-prdptydvyabhicdritd udaka-vi]ftdnasya sydt. . . atha tad-vamga-ja-]ala-prdptydvyabhicdritd ]~yate, tad ayuktam, antydvayavi~lravyd.~m. ]anakatva-vyatirekdt. na cOdaka-vyakt[ndm. ndndtvam asti. yathd ca na vidyate tathd niveditam purastdt.

"If by obtaining the [same] water which appeared [in the cognition, the cognition is established as nonerroneous], this is not correct. The continuity of the water which appeared [in the cognition] is not established, because it may be destroyed by the action of [its] parts produced by impacts and impulses ~ of fishes and buffalos.

If it is by obtaining water of the same universal, then even when a cognition of unreal water is produced, people [may] obtain water somewhere, and that [false cognition of water] would be true. - A false cognition does not make one obtain water connected with [exactly] that place and time, but a true cognition does, by that [one knows that] it is not erroneous. - [If] whatever [cognition] does not make one obtain [its object] is erroneous, then a cognition produced by a thing that is about to vanish and the cognition of the sun, moon, planets, constellations, stars etc., would be erroneous. And [the cognition may] not make one obtain water connected with [exactly] that place and time, because the place, just like the water, may be destroyed... And if by obtaining an object belonging to the universal 'water', the non- erroneousness of a previously produced cognition of water is being established, then [since] the universal 'water' can exist in cows etc., the nonerroneousness of a cognition of water would be [established] by obtaining a cow etc . . . .

TATTVOPAPLAVASIMHA 163

If the nonerroneousness is known by obtaining water produced in the same series, it is not correct, because final wholes are not agents of production. And there is no plurality of water individuals; why there is no [plurality], has been explained above (of. pp. 5.11-6.4)."

With this I believe I translated and explained the backbone of Jayar~i's critique of the criterion of truth, but in no way should it be considered an exhaustive expose. In fact, all the material presented here covers little more than two pages (2.6-4.3, 4.22-24 and 9.1-4), whereas Jayar~i deals with this problem from p. 2.6 upto 11.18. The refutation of the universal (4.5-22, 6.5-7.11 ), of the absence of the universal water in cows (4.25-5.10), of the plurality of individuals (5.1 I-6.4), of inherence (7.13-8.26), of the functioning of the efficiency of the activity as perception or inference (9.5-11), of the meaning of 'inexistent object' (9.12-17), of the svata.h praqnd.nya criterion (9.18-10.26) and of the apprehension of cognition (11.1-19) were left out.

The general conclusion is, of course, that none of the criteria proposed by the different opponents can be established, and, therefore, one can never be sure that one is not led astray by one's sense organs. This is one of the reasons why the word 'nonerroneous' in the definition of perception cannot be justified, which, in its turn, is one of the reasons why perception is not established as a means of right cognition - tattvopaplava. Or, in other words, "The world has a dual character - its appearances and its real nature. We are acquainted through sense with the apparent, but in order to know, we must apprehend the real. The real properties of an object cannot be known inde- pendently of sense, however, since these objects are apprehended only through the media of impressions (affections). A necessary condition of knowing is that our impressions be the exact likeness of the object to which they corre- spond, The main problem to which Skeptics addressed themselves concerned a criterion of truth to facilitate differentiating decisively between veridical and non-veridical experience. Accordingly, the question that required an answer was how we can be sure that our experience of an object is an exact copy of it. And the Skeptic reply was that we cannot be sure. There is no way to establish this relation. Skepticism is an authentic response to the problem of knowledge as it arose within the above context, that is, within a conceptual framework that helped generate a problem for which, as the Skeptics saw, there was no solution." 27

Seminar fiir Kultur und Geschichte Indiens, Universitiit Hamburg, It/. Germany

164 ELI FRANCO

NOTES

* I would like to express my gratitude for Dr. D. Malvania and Pt. N. R. Bhatt with whom I read the Tattvopaplavasimha, and Professors K. Bhattacharya and A. Wezler who read the first draft of this paper and made very valuable suggestions. I The following abbreviations are used: TUS: Tattvopaplavasim. ha of Jayar~i Bhat.ta, ed. S. Sanghavia and R. C. Parikh. Gaekwad Oriental Series 87. Baroda 1940. TSP: Tattvasam. graha of Ac~irya Sh~ntaraksita with the commentary 'Paajilai' of Shri Kamalashila, ed. S. D. Sh~stri. Bauddha Bharati Series 1-2. Varanasi 1968. NBh: Nydyabhds.ya cf, NS NBha: Nydyabhas.anam of Bhasarvajfia, ed. Swhmi Yogindr~nanda. Varanasi 1968. NM: Nydyamaa/arfofJayanta Bha.t.ta, ed. S. N. Sukla. Kashi S.S. 106. Benares 1936. NV: Nydyavdrtika cf. NS NS: Nydyasatra with V~tsy~iyana's Bhci.sya, Udyotakara's Vdrtika, V~caspati Mi~ra's Tdtparyat. fkd and Vi~van~tha's Vr. tti, ed. A. M. Tarkatirtha, Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and H. K. Tarkatirtha. Cal. S.S. 18. Calcutta 1936-44. PV." Pramd.navtirtika of Dharmakirti in Pramd.nav~rtikabhd.syam of Prajfi~ikaragupta, ed. R. S~mslff.ity[yana. Patna 1953. VS: Vaiges.ikasatra of Ka.n~da with the comm. of Candr~nanda, ed. Muni Jambuvijayaji. G.O.S. 136. Baroda 1961. ,~Bh: ,~dbarabhds.ya text from E. Frauwallner, Materialien zur iiltesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmam~nt4m. sd. Wien 1968. 2 Cf. for instance D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Lok~yata, A Study in Indian Materialism. Delhi 1959, p. 6: "In the ocean of uncertainty concerning the lost Lokayata, the only piece of definite information is that we are left with no original work of it." Sometimes, even when the book is known, it is ignored because of the preconceived idea of what the Lokgyata should be, cf. K. K. Mittal, Materialism in Indian Thought, Delhi 1974. p. 23 : "[The TUS] has, no doubt, been claimed by the editors to be belonging to the Material- istic system of Indian philosophy on the basis of undeniable internal evidence and sufficiently reliable external evidence. The claim seems to us worthy of acceptance", but p. 46: " . . . there is no gain in its (i.e. the TUS) being accepted as a Cairw~ka school."

The only notable exception I know of is the dense but accurate summary of the first 30 pages in E. Solomon,Indian Dialectics vol. 2, ch. 13. Ahmedabad 1978. 3 W. Ruben, lgber den Tattvopaplavasim. ha des Jayar~i Bhat.ta, eine agnostische Erkennt- niskritik. Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde Sad- und Siidost Asiens 1958 pp. 140-153. K. K. Dixit, The Ideological Affiliation of Jayarfii, the Author of the 'Tattvopaplavasimha' Indian Studies Past and Present Vol. 4, 1962, pp. 98-104. 4 The exact date of the TUS is still to be determined; it cannot be later than the 8th c. (cf. TUS, introduction pp. IV-XI), and as the latest identifiable quotation comes from Dharmakirti (600-6607), it may be from the 2nd half of the 7th c. 4a For instance, it has been assumed that it is V~caspati who introduced the fourfold negation into the Ny~ya system, for it appears neither in the Nydyabh~sya nor in the Nydyavdrtika (cf. B. K. Matilal, The Ndvya-Nydya Theory of Negation. H.O.S. 46, Harvard 1967, p. 108). This supposition can no longer be maintained; of. TUS, p. 4.25-26: " . . . kim. itaretardbhtivah. , prdg-abhdvah. , pradhvam, sdbhtivah. , atyantdbhdvo vd?". s The translation follows Ruben (id. p. 140 n. 5) who criticizes Sukhlalji (introduction p. XII). Sukhlalji's interpretation is, however, understandable because Jayani~i's statement contradicts everything we know of the Brhaspati-stitra.

TATTVOPAPLAVASIMHA 165

6 Cf. for instance Mok.s~karagupta's Tarkabha_sd, trans, by Y. Kajiyama. Kyoto 1966, p. 31 : "When he [C~rv~ka] denies the existence of another world, he actually has resort to a proof called negation (anupalambha) [which is inferential knowledge]. Therefore how can the C~rv~ka be sane when he argues by means of inferential knowledge, while saying that inference is not valid knowledge."

Cf. TSP 1481-82, p. 528.9-10. 8 The manuscript has a lacuna here. 9 Definition of perception: according to the Nyaya pp. 2-22, Buddhist pp. 32-58, Mim[m. s~ pp. 58-61, S~imkhya pp. 61-64. Definition of inference: Nyfiya pp. 64-74. Buddhist pp. 83-109 etc. 1o The translation follows V~tsy~yana. I have no idea what the original meaning of the word in the s~tra was. t I Only the first three criteria will be dealt with here, for the fourth criterion of. TUS pp. 9.18-10.26. Jayar~i seems to designate by 'otherwise' a svatah, prdrr~.nyam theory. 12 G. Jha and M. Biardeau understand the word sampratipatti differently. According to them the agreement is between different people, and not between the cognition and reality. Cf. Jha's translation of the Sa-barabh~sya p. 11 : "On the disappearance of the defects, there appears the cognition which is recognized by all persons as right.", and Biardeau, Theorie de la Connaissance et Philosophie de la Parole clans le Brahmanism elassique. Paris La Haye 1964. p. 71 : "Lorsque le defaut dispara~t, il y aun accord universel (sur l'objet connu)."

If this interpretation is accepted, the next question cannot be understood, because it would have been akeady answered. Therefore sampratipatti here is nothing but a synonym to avyabhicdrin: a true cognition does not deviate [from reality], or agrees [ with reality ]. 13 Cf. L. Schmithausen,Mand. anami~ra's Vibhramaviveka, mir einer Studie zur Entwick- lung der lndischen Irrtumslehre. Wien 1965, p. 168. 14 That is if these s~tras are not a later interpolation. I s Jayar~i~i refers here to the ~Bh, 1.1.2 where a distinction is made between Vedic injunctions which are always true and human words which can never be trusted. 16 Cf. NM, p. 171.12-13: nanu svaka-la-niyatatvd] /~4ndndm katham uttarasya ]fu~nasya p~rva-]ru~n6tpdda-kaldvacchinna.tad-visaydbhdva-graha.na-sdmarthyam? kim kurma.h tatl~ pratyay6tpdddt? "As the cognitions are determined by their own time, how could a later cognition apprehend the inexistence of the object of a previous cognition which is delimited by the time of its production? - What [can] we do, since this is the way the cognition is produced?" 17 In my opinion the sentence does not make sense unless we have a double negation. At first I thought to obtain the second negation by reading avedaka, but Professor Bhattacharya kindly told me that this reading is highly improbable, and that in such a case a second negation would be expressed with na. 18 This is a joke of course. The Mim~msakas were the most vehement opponents to the idea of omniscience. t9 The example of diamond rays can be interpreted at two different levels. The first is obvious: one mistakes the rays for a diamond, one goes somewhere else or dies, and the false cognition is not sublated. But the example also answers a possible objection of the pt~rvapaksin, for the V.rttik[ra clearly said that one should make an effort to discredit the cognition, and going away or dying are no effort in this respect. That is why Jayar~i uses the example of the diamond rays instead of the usual sun rays. Suppose someone mistakes the diamond rays for the diamond itself, and then decides to make an effort

166 ELI FRANCO

(which seems to be worthwhile) and check his cognition. He goes to the place where he thinks he saw a diamond, finds the diamond, and concludes wrongly that his cognition was true. There is no way to sublate such a cognition.

The example of the diamond rays is taken from Dharmakfrti who uses it to explain how an inference, although false by def'mition, can lead to an efficient action, cf. PV, 3.57: man. i-pradfpa-prabhayor mani-budhydbhidha-vatoh. /mithyd./fldndvi~ese 'pi vi~e.~rtha-kriydm prati// 20 Ruben id. p. 143 gives another interpretation: " . . .d ie in Obertragung Frucht genannt wiirden, weft sic die wirkilche Utsache der Frucht (d.h. des Genusses) seien."; he understands pha/a as sukha, phal6pacara as sukha.hetu and connects satya with nispatti and not with phala. 21 Cf. W. James, The Meaning of Truth. ch. 2, "The Tigers of India." 22 A. Chisholm, A Theory of Knowledge. Prentice Hall of India 1977, p. 97. 2a Ruben id. p. 153 : "Wenn es [das Kxitedum des Erfolgreichseins] dagegen erkannt ist, (erhebt sich die Fmge) wie sich denn ans seiner Erkenntnis die Richtigkeit (des Erkenntnismittels) erkennen lassen soil."

Ruben misinterpretes this passage because he does not differentiate between the Ny[ya and Mfrnimsfi p~rvapaks.ins, and thinks that the answer to the question is given in p. 2~ f. 24 D.N. Shastri, Ch'tique of Indian Realism. Agta 1964. p. 278. As he rightly points out, this "explodes the myth of identity or permanence of an object". 2s Ibid. p. 240. 26 Jayax~i~i seems to refer to the VS, 5.2.1 : nodandd abhighdtdt samyukta-sam, yogdc ca l~..thivydm, karma.

Therefore parivartana may be understood as a special kind of nodana. One of the differences between abhighdta and nodana is that the first creates noise, whereas the second is silent. Thus we have here a yathdsamkhya correspondence, i.e. the fish turn the water silently, whereas the buffalo splash it. 27 Ch. L. Stough, Greek Skepticism. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969. p. 149.