Francis P. Dinneen, S.J. - General Linguistics
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title: General Linguisticsauthor: Dinneen, Francis P.
publisher: Georgetown University Pressisbn10 | asin: 0878402780
print isbn13: 9780878402786ebook isbn13: 9780585257853
language: Englishsubject Linguistics.
publication date: 1995lcc: P121.D478 1995eb
ddc: 410subject: Linguistics.
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General Linguistics
Francis P. Dinneen, S.J.
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS / WASHINGTON, D.C.
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Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C. 20007 1995 by Georgetown University Press. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1995
THIS VOLUME IS PRINTED ON ACID-FREE OFFSET BOOKPAPER.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Dinneen, Francis P.General linguistics / Francis P. Dinneen.p. cm.Includes bibliographical references.1. Linguistics. I. Title.P121.D478 1995410 dc20ISBN 0-87840-278-0 (cloth) 93-37008
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Contents
Foreword xv
1The study of linguistics 1
Studies of Language
1
Written Language
2
Objectivity and Subjectivity
2
Technical terms
3
Univocal, Equivocal and Ambiguous Terms
4
The objectivity of technical terms
5
Linguistics as a science
7
Assumptions
8
Purposes in studying language
9
A simple example
10
Fields in linguistics
11
Comparison and History
12
Unfamiliar Languages
12
Uses of Linguistics
12
The best language
13
Language and Technology
14
Objective properties of language
14
Some empirical properties of speech
15
Composition, Distribution, and Function
17
Linguistic systems
17
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Systems of systems of contrasts
18
Kinds of `meaning'
19
What mean meant
20
Conventions
21
The plan of this book
23
Reading
23
2Language as a system of sounds 25
Phonetics vs. phonology
26
Articulatory Phonetics
26
The objectivity of phonetic information
28
Technical terms
29
Presuppositions in phonetic terminology
31
Modifications
31
Vowel modification
32
A central focus of phonology
35
Phonemics
35
English phonemes
36
The phoneme
37
Distribution of sound units
37
Picturing speech units
28
Allophones
40
Phonetic symbols and Pronunciation
40
Symbols
43
43
-
Symbolic representation
Phone, Allophone, Phoneme
44
Representing speech sounds
45
Pattern through Omissions
47
Phonemic analysis
47
Segmental phonemes of English
49
Motivated and unmotivated contrasts
49
Suprasegmentals
50
Juncture
51
A Hierarchy of Presuppositions
53
Phonemic Pitch
53
Science and Phonemic Theory
54
Description and Explanation
55
Science and Constructs
56
Phonemics or phonology
57
Appendices:
2.1 Some definitions of phoneme
58
2.2 Some English vowel sounds
59
2.3 Stress contrasts in English
60
2.4 Contrasts of stop + fricative vs. affricate
60
2.5 Some British vs. American lexical differences
61
2.6 Scottish lexical items
62
The International Phonetic Alphabet
62
Some Minimal Pairs in American English
63
77
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Reading
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3Language as a system of forms 79
Purposes for Grammars 79
Classifying Forms
80
Parallel and complementary distribution
81
Constants and Variables
82
Grammatical Function
83
Morphemes and allomorphs
84
Defining morpheme
85
Allomorphs and Morphs
88
What languages signal
89
Structural morphology and syntax 90
Function as `mean'
90
Public description and private explanation
92
Talking about language
92
Constituents
93
Elements and Units
93
The word: A minimal free form
94
Perspectives
95
A public method
96
Distribution
98
Functional classification: Hierarchy
98
Co-variation
99
Messages and Signals
100
-
Optional expansions
103
Contexts
104
What English speakers actually say
104
Substitutes
106
Answering Questions
110
Description and Explanation
111
Reading
112
4Ancient linguistics 113
Greek concern for language
113
Rhetoric
113
Rhetoric and the sophists
114
Physis/Nomos
114
Anomaly/Analogy
114
Correctness
116
SoSEEM-SAID
116
Plato on language
116
Technique of Division
117
Logos
118
Logic or Grammar
118
Parts of Speech
119
Aristotle on Language
119
Categories
119
The categoric syllogism
120
121
-
Necessary and Contingent
Proposition and Sentence
122
Words for words
123
Speaker's Choice
123
Unhappy word choice
124
Meaning
125
The Stoics
125
Grammatical or logical terms
126
Logical rivals
126
Speech, grammar and logic
126
Stoicheia: constituents
127
Stoic theory
128
Stoic `Parts of Speech'
128
Logic, Science and Wisdom
129
Stoic `tri-vs. di-vision'
129
Structural contrast
130
The Stoic Lekton
130
Classification of lekta
131
Stoic levels
131
Logic and Language
133
Logic and Linguistics
133
Analogy
133
3-Term Analogies
134
4-Term Analogies
135
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Analogy and Proof
136
Terms vs. Propositions
136
Varro
138
Varro's definition of `word'
138
Varro's Method
139
Usage
140
Declinatio naturalis & Declinatio voluntaria: `Phobias'
141
Greek grammar
141
Athens as a center of learning
142
Pergamon & Parchment
143
Alexandria
143
Dionysius Thrax: Excerpts from the Techne Grammatike
144
Apollonius Dyscolus
146
Dyscolus and Transformation
147
Dyscolus and Analogy
147
Dyscolus and Universal Grammar
148
Priscian's Institutiones grammaticae
151
On the letters
151
On the syllable
152
Dictio
152
Oratio
153
The parts of speech
153
Priscian and Latin verbs
154
156
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Construction types
Basic forms
157
Reading
159
Notes 160
5Some medieval roots of traditional grammar 165
Description and Explanation
165
An age of synthesis: Philosophic assumptions
166
Logical assumptions
167
Psychological assump-
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tions
167
So-Seem-Said
167
Ways of knowing
168
Knowledge is perfectible
168
Linguistic Structure
168
The Modistae
169
Modistic Method
170
Modern analogical `modes'
170
Modal Distinctions
171
Translating Modally
171
Non-formal Study
173
Use of modistic terminology in theology
173
Peter of Spain's Summulae Logicales
174
The Square of Oppositions
178
The Tree of Porphyry
176
Supposition
177
Modern Modes
178
Ambiguous Modalities
179
Equivocal Terms & Constructions
180
Syntactic & Semantic Roles
180
Meaning and Reference
181
Meaning, Understanding, Representation and Attention
182
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Progress in Logic
183
Nonlogical essentials
183
Studying Dialectic
183
Some senses of smoke
185
Terministic Logic
186
Sense
186
So-Seem-Said
187
Reference
187
Equivocation & Modification
187
Subjects `in' Predicates
188
Proposition and Syllogism
188
Syllogism Designs
188
Validity vs. Truth
188
Fallacies
190
Facts and Extension
190
Usage and Meaning
190
Intuition & Empirical Classification
191
Reading
191
Notes
193
6Etymology and historical linguistics 199
Language change: better or worse?
199
Isidore of Seville's Differences
200
Grammar
201
202
-
Etymology
Interpretation
202
Etymologists
202
World Vocabulary
203
Tooke
204
Ascertaining the language
204
John Wallis
204
Hugh Jones
206
Samuel Johnson
206
Robert Lowth
207
Ways languages change
210
Sanskrit: Sir William Jones
212
Etymology and History
213
Reconstruction
214
ProtoIndoEuropean
216
Fact and Fancy
217
Historical identity and contemporary difference
218
Rhotacism
218
Grimm's Law
219
Grassman's Law
220
Verner's Law
221
The NeoGrammarians
221
Later developments in analogy
222
Indo-Germanic
223
-
Concrete data
223
Unity and Uniformity
224
Consonants changed
224
Changes Change
226
Intervocalic consonants
226
The vocalic system
228
The initial accent of intensity
228
Effects
229
Word endings
229
Reading
230
Notes
232
7Ferdinand de Saussure 235
Science
235
Models
235
Insight
236
mile Durkheim
236
Social Science
237
Collective Conscience
237
Social Fact
238
Reification
238
Human=Social
239
Social Behavior
239
Suicide
240
240
-
Ferdinand de Saussure
Langue, parole, langage
241
Abstraction and Science
241
Abstraction and Uniformity, La Langue and Perspective
242
Language as state or process
242
Description and Explanation
242
Whitney
243
Linguistic Science
243
Language and Thought
244
Passive Convention vs. Active Invention
244
Linguistics is not a Physical Science
245
Languages are not wholly autono-
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mous
245
Comparative Philology is too narrow
245
Saussure and the goals of linguistics
246
Languages Change
246
Causes of Change
246
Goals in the Cours 247
Linguistics Autonomy
247
Abstraction = Conventional Simplification
248
tat de langue
249
The linguistic sign
249
Saussure and the Stoics
249
Nature of the Sign
250
The `concrete and integral object' of linguistic science
251
Intrinsic, constituent properties of the sign
251
Relational properties of the sign
252
Linguistic value
252
Examples of Value
253
Signification, value, and content
253
La langue is pure form
255
Saussure's Substance
255
Pure Form
255
Langue's sole positive factor
256
256
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Saussure's Conclusions
Note
256
Reading
257
8Edward Sapir 259
Science explains and predicts
259
Language for linguists
260
Franz Boas
261
Boas' linguistic theory
262
Boas' Consonant Chart
262
Difference and Class
262
Analytic consequences
263
Meanings signalled
264
Meanings understood
265
Edward Sapir
265
Sapir's definition of language
266
Critique
267
Elements of speech
268
Cognitive vs. Affective
268
Autonomy of Language Design
268
Importance of Radicals
269
Form and Meaning Essentials
270
Form in Language: Grammatical processes
270
Word Order
271
Composition
271
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Affixation
271
Infixation
272
Internal Change
273
Consonantal Change
273
Reduplication
274
Form in language: Grammatical concepts
274
Linguistic Diversity
276
Reservations
276
Language, thought, and culture
277
Static or Dynamic?
277
Language, race and Culture
278
Linguistic Relativity
278
The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
279
The Real World
280
New Thinking
280
Inference, Assumption and Evidence
281
The Hypothesis
282
Critique
283
Note
283
Reading
284
9Leonard Bloomfield 285
Mentalism and behaviorism
285
Linguistics is Talk about Language
286
286
-
Old and new language about language
Psychologists talk about language
287
Subjective talk about language
287
Objective talk about language
287
Language as Response
287
Leonard Bloomfield
288
Starting to talk about language
289
Postulates
289
Bloomfield's Language (1933)
293
The study, use and spread of language
293
Speech Communities
293
The phoneme
294
Presuppositions
294
Phonetic Basis
295
Contrasts
295
Meaning
295
Bloomfield on meaning
297
The fundamental assumption of linguistics
298
Bloomfield's conclusions
298
Grammatical forms
299
Stable States
299
Basic and Modified Meaning
300
Sentence types
300
Words
301
-
Syntax
301
Forms resultant from Free Forms
301
Order
302
Parts of Speech
302
Binarism revisited
302
Structure,
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Pattern, Design
303
A Priori vs. A posteriori
303
Rationalists and Empiricists
303
Binarism and constituency
304
Valid
305
Correct
305
Suggestive Symbols
306
Notation and Insight
306
Form-classes and lexicon
307
Written Records
308
Dialect Geography
308
Borrowing
309
Bloomfield's Conclusions
309
Bloomfield's influence
309
Note
310
Reading
311
10Malinowski and Firth 313
Bronislaw Malinowski
313
Eclecticism
314
Purpose and Culture
315
Description and Explanation
315
Explaining Language Use
317
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Linguistic Fact
317
Contextual analysis
317
Abstraction
318
Induction and deduction in Malinowski
319
Objectivity
320
John Rupert Firth
321
Meaning
321
Context of situation
322
Facts
323
Ecology
323
Firthian contextual analysis vs. Malinowski's
324
System and Structure
324
Malinowski's strong points
325
Constructs
325
Context of Situation
326
Dictionary Definitions
327
Translations Meaning
327
Linguistics' Translation Contributions
327
Structure and Structuralism in Firth
328
Implications
328
Actual and Potential Data
329
Polysystemic Analysis
329
Collocation and colligation
330
331
-
Lexicon and Grammar
Connotations
331
Structural Conditioning
331
Prosodic analysis
332
Phonemes and phonematic units
333
IPA
334
Prosodies vs. Phonemes
335
Non-lexical Distinction
335
Notes
336
Reading
337
11Louis Hjelmslev 339
Autonomy of Linguistics
339
Glossematics
339
Glossematics and Column A
340
The Prolegomena and the empirical principle
341
Practical Problems
341
Prediction and Explanation
342
The Empirical Principle
342
Text
342
Langue as Pure Form
343
Logical Implication
344
Valid vs. True
344
Arbitrary vs. Appropriate
344
Text as System-and-Process
345
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Principle of the analysis: Hierarchic relations
345
Translating Metalinguistic Terms
345
`What is a' and `What functions as a'
347
Exclusion
347
Langue, Text and Context
348
Signs and figurae
348
Meaning is Contextual
349
Content: Purport, schema, and usage
349
Catalysis
350
`Meaning' Systems
351
Cognitive Systems
351
Stratificational grammar
352
Stratificational Texts
353
The Stratificational Approach
353
`Higher' and `lower' strata
353
Stratal Composition, Distribution and Function
354
Interstratal Relations
354
Stratal Realizations
354
Text
355
Arrangement vs. Process
355
Text vs. Sentences
356
Group vs. Individual Abilities
356
Strata and Elements
356
357
-
Examples vs. Formalization
Stratificational Notation
358
English Number Stratification
358
Generation and Communication
359
Exclusion
359
Morphemic, Sememic and Lexemic Strata
359
Strata mutually define
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each other
360
Stratal Representation
361
Notes
361
Reading
362
Appendices: Part of Sampson's Graphic Representation
365
12Transformational Grammar 367
Syntactic Structures
367
Preface and Introduction
367
Demonstration: The independence of Grammar
368
Semantics cannot define `grammatical'
368
An Elementary Linguistic Theory
369
`Presence' vs. `Absence'
369
Phrase Structure
369
PS Constituents are not just Words
369
How to draw `Trees' Correstly
370
Bloomfield, Chomsky and Hjelmslev
370
A Terminal Language
371
Limitations of Phrase Structure Description
372
Sentences are not all Isolates
373
Kernel Sentences
374
On the Goals of Linguistic Theory
374
Description and Explanation
374
375
-
Transformations
Oblligatory and Optional
375
Descriptive Presuppositions
376
The Explanatory Power of Linguistic Theory
377
Syntax and Semantics
377
Peroration
378
Katz and Postal's
378
Collocations
380
Description and Explanation, Rules and Theory
380
Before Aspects
381
Syntactic Structures
382
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax
382
Competence and Performance
383
Langue and Competence
383
Actual and Potential
384
Performance needs Interpretation
384
Expressions of Competence
384
`Deep' and `Surface' Structures
385
Formal and Substantice Universals
385
Linguistic Theory and Language Learning
386
Chomsky's use of Empirical and Fact
386
Rationalists and Empiricists
387
Categories and Relations
387
Subcategorization
389
-
Factors and Subcategorization
390
Such label-sets base a Structural Index
392
The Lexicon
393
Obligatory Transofrmations
393
Sense and Reference
394
Syncategorematic and other Functions
394
Organization of the Grammat
395
Residual Problems
396
Innovations in Aspects
397
Phonetic Representation
398
Proposed Universal Definitions
398
Filters
399
Semantic Problems
399
Reading
400
Note
401
13Non-Transformational Constants 403
Constants and Variables
403
Languages are Unique
404
Languages are the same
404
Language is Logical
404
Lexical Individuality and linguistic Universality
406
What Transformations Change
407
`Meaning' Contrasts
408
408
-
NEG and Q as Predicates
Visualizing Referents
409
Surface Semantics
409
Global Rules
410
Lexical Items
412
VSO Order
412
Ranking Categories
413
De Re & De Dicto
414
Intra- and Extra-Linguistic Semantic Determination
415
Performative Verbs
415
Transderivational Constraints
416
Tagmemics
418
Tagmemics' Focus
419
Etic and Emic Analysis
419
Particle, Wave & Field
420
Reduction
420
Tagmemics and Drama
422
Relations and Things-related
422
String Analysis
422
The Need for `Deep Structure'
423
Case Grammar
424
Cases and Prepo-
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sitions
424
Distribution vs. Composition
424
Predicate Types and Case Roles
425
Universals and Case Roles
426
Defining Case Roles
428
Analogical Interpretation
428
Agent and Instrument
429
Instrument, Word Magic and Semantic Interpretation
429
Time
430
Location
430
Benefaction
430
Modality Types and Representations
431
Tagmemics and IC Analysis
431
Translation
431
Proposition vs. Sentence
432
Case Grammat
433
Case Roles
433
CG Notational Conventions
435
Propositional Domination
436
Realization
438
Analogy and Metaphor
438
Literal and Nonliteral
439
-
Lexical Decomposition
441
Tentative Lexical Decompositions
442
Reading
442
Notes
444
14After Aspects 445
Standard Theory
445
The Aspects Standard
445
ISH and the Extra-Linguistic
446
Actual and Potential ISH
447
What gets Interpreted
448
Meaning
449
Meaning Change
449
Rationalism and Empiricism
450
Questions
450
Coreference
451
Structure Dependence
452
Revision
452
Extended Standard Theory
453
Internal Cohesion
453
X-Bar Syntax
454
Spatial Tree-Relations
455
Other Tree-Relations
455
Bar-Notation
455
455
-
Precedence and Dominance
X-Bar and Quirk's NP & VP Analysis
456
Constituents and Non-Constituents
456
Degree of Derivation
458
Syntax and Semantics
458
NEG as an Operator
460
Natural Distributional Classes
462
Complements of Prepositions
464
Mutual Subcategorization
464
Redundancies
466
Semantic Information
467
Transformations
467
Redundancy Rules
468
Pro-forms and Underlying Forms
468
Movement from Fixed Slots
470
WH-Movement
471
Adjunction
474
COMP Paradigmatically
476
Abstract identity in concrete difference
476
From Specific to Generic Structure
476
Subcategorization
477
Lexical or Modal
478
Empty NP-positions
479
Empty Nodes
479
-
MOve Transformations
481
Move Anything
481
T-NEG & T-Q
482
An Interim Formalization
482
Filters
482
Constraining the Base
483
Are all Likenesses Analogies?
483
Constraints on Variables in Syntax
484
Functives may not be Functions
486
Adverb-Move
487
Island Constraints
487
Complements
487
WH-Phrases
488
Complex Nps
488
`Naturalness'
491
Multiple Moves
492
Raising
493
Lexical Subcategorization
494
Subject-Raising
495
Generalizations
496
Passives
497
Zero Allomorphs
498
Relative Clauses
499
499
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D- & S-Structures
Recoverability
502
Deleting NP or PP
504
`Zero Anaphora'
504
`Inherent' Semantic Content
505
Government and Binging
506
Competence in GB
506
d-Heads in GB
506
The Pro-Drop Parameter
507
C(ategory)-Selection
507
Correlation with spatial relations
508
A Maximal Phrase
508
Movement
508
Random Movement
509
Case Theory
509
The Intralinguistic relation of
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C-COMMAND
510
The intralinguistic relation of GOVERNMENT
510
Control Theory
510
Empty Categories
511
Reading
512
Note
513
15Different Constants 515
Questions
515
Real Units
515
Characterizing Relation
515
Characterizing Categories
516
Lexical-Functional Grammar
516
Characterization vs. Realization
516
Aspects' Realism
516
Static Properties & dynamic Operations
518
Ts & Lexical rules
518
Abstract and `real' forms
519
T-independent `surfce' forms
519
Coreference
519
Argument structure
519
Lexical Entries
520
Interpreting lexical entries
521
-
Passives in Complex Sentences
522
Lexical Functional Structures
522
Indices & Interpretation
522
Verbal Complements
523
Bresnan's VP symbol
523
Function vs. Structure
525
Subject-less Passives
526
Some NPs cannot be `preposed'
526
Unnecessary T-Roles
527
Simplifying TG.
527
LFG Simplifies TG
528
Rule Ordering
528
Undeletable `basic' forms
528
Ellipses
528
Surface N-V Relations
529
A Psychological Model
529
Networks and Arcs
530
The Augmented Transition Network
531
Traces and Gaps
532
Conclusions
532
Relational Grammar
533
Signification, value and content
534
Initial and final
534
534
-
Function, functive, entity
Two-object constructions
536
Restriction on Benefactives
536
Propositional and Non-propositional Roles
536
Global Rules
537
Marked and Unmarked
537
Common Advancements
539
How to read RG Graphics
539
Relational laws
541
Abstract Competence or concrete Performance
542
Global Rules
542
Motivation of Relational Grammar
542
How to establish Grammatical Relations
543
Linearization
544
Arc Pair Grammar
544
Montague Notation & PS Rules
545
A Grammar of Categories
545
A Montague Grammar
547
Logical Notation
548
Drawing `references' or `referents'
550
Formal Notions and Notation
550
Central Questions for Syntax
550
Testable Texts
551
Recursive Definitions & Well-Formedness
551
-
The importance of Semantics
553
T-Raise-to-object
554
T-Dative-Move
554
T-Conj-reduce
554
TG & MG Compared
555
The Nature of Syntactic Representation
555
Defining Grammatical Relations
558
Syntactic Rules and Languages' Semantics
559
Universal Validity
560
Tectogrammatics
561
Functional Grammar
561
Raids are not Wars
562
Sentence and text
562
Central and Peripheral
562
Communicative Dynamism
563
Context and Meaning
563
Context Independence
563
Central vs. Peripheral
564
Text vs. Sentence
565
Reading
565
Notes
567
16Summary and Conclusions 573
Talk about Talk
573
573
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Talk about Talk about Language
Relevance and Revision
574
Analogy and Structure
574
Scientific talk
575
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Logical talk about S --> NP VP
575
Grammatical talk about S
575
Facts and Patterns
576
What Languages share
577
SAID does not define SO
577
Generic - Specific - Individual
577
Doing Linguistics
578
Describing and Explaining
578
SO's autonomy
580
Endocentric tolerance & exocentric demand
581
Phonic talk
581
Unspeakable Language
582
Language as a State
583
Phonetics, Phonoogy, and grammar
583
Linguistic levels
583
Parallel and complementary distribution
583
Lexical and grammatical senses
585
Correct combinations
584
Morpheme
584
Parallels
584
Elements and units
584
Word as a minimal free form
585
585
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IA and IP analyses
Physis/Nomos
585
Words like motorman and if
586
Aristotle's syndesmoi
586
Stoic pto:sis
586
Priscian's Parts of speech
587
A Modistic view of Language
588
Hispanus' terms and non-terms
588
Language origin and change
588
Sound Laws
589
Durkheim's Social Facts
589
Fiction & conventional simplification
590
Sounds, signals and meaning
591
Sapir's form
592
Blookfield on Sapir
593
Speech Community, Density of Communication, Standards,Dialect, and Borrowing
593
De-/con-notative semiotics & phatic communion
595
A priori vs. a posteriori
595
Glossematics as a deductive calculus
595
All grammars are stratified
596
Stratal inventory and tactic rules
597
Sentences, utterances and Speech Acts
597
Tagmemics' Questions
598
599
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Case Grammar
Tagmemics, Competence and Peformance
599
Case Grammar
600
+WH & -WH complementizers
601
Types and Tokens
602
Traces, zeros and empty categories
602
Autonomous syntactic generation
603
The Complex NP Constraint
604
The Coordinate Structure Constraint
604
Subjacency Condition
604
Zeros
605
Heads in X-bar
606
Morphology, Syntax & Projection Principle
606
0 roles and CG roles
606
Adjuncts, Complements & C-Command
607
Function, Constant and Variable
607
Inappropriate Transformations
608
Lexicon and Transformations
609
Arcs, grammatical relations & levels
610
Chmeur
610
Concrete vs. Abstrat Lexicon
611
A Categorial Lexicon
612
Montague Grammar
615
Simple senteces and relative clauses
615
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Px components of Pxyz
616
Minimalism
617
Reading
624
Notes
624
Subject Index 631
Author Index 643
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Foreword
In the late 1940's, Bertrand Russell's I am firm, You are obstinate, He is a pig-headed fool inspired The New Statesman andNation to offer prizes for the best ''conjugation" of "irregular verbs" on that model. That challenged contestants to make explicitwhat they "knew" implicitly as native speakers. One way of contrasting linguistic studies with other approaches to language is tocompare the technical vocabulary which disciplines develop to answer questions about language. Linguists propose manyexplicit terms to deal with facts that other scholars "know" but do not discuss.
Everyone "knows" that Russell's example contains three statements but not every discipline finds it necessary to distinguish, forinstance, a verb from a predicate nor a predicate from a predication. Native speakers know that English you can be indifferentlysingular or plural, masculine or feminine, polite or familiar but few bother to point out that, unlike English, Hawaiian pronounsneglect gender, distinguish singular from dual and plural you, and both of the latter as inclusive or exclusive, whereas Chineseonly contrasts first, second and third person pronouns with no distinction of gender.
Linguistic studies are basically structural. They detail both what the composition of language forms is as well as howcomparable forms differ, how those forms must, may or cannot be distributed and sketch what they must, may or cannot mean.Some studies add information about how forms are used in nonlinguistic contexts for different purposes on different occasions.
This book suggests that one thread of continuity throughout the history of language studies is that linguistics has made theancient search for the bases of four-term analogies more precise as the study of immanent language structures at distinct butinterrelated levels (phonetic, morphological, lexical, phrasal, clausal, sentential, functional, discursive, etc.).
Linguistic studies can be more abstract than others. Transformational Grammar, for instance, shows how simple Englishsentences can be "produced" from, or "reduced" to, a generic formula like S ---> NP VP, since VP can be rewritten as ---> V, or---> V NP, or ---> V NP PP, or ---> V AP, etc.
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1The Study of Linguistics
1.00 Studies of Language.
Many disciplines deal with language, and Linguistics is one of them. The names of some traditional studies suggest a focus ondifferent objects, but no one would deny that language is intimately involved when Grammar, Rhetoric, Poetry, or traditionalLogic are discussed. When a `linguistic' approach is mentioned, a question naturally arises about whether what it studies is notalready covered by the others.
In the traditional approaches, we might agree that what they study is pretty much `the same thing', but that they differ in howand why they are studied, and perhaps that they are mainly distinct because only a part or aspect of language is singled out forattention. No one is disappointed to find no Poetry in a book about Logic, or very little about Poetry in elementary Grammars. Ina work on Rhetoric, there might be some mention of Logic and Poetry, but a good deal of what is appropriate to a Grammar willmost likely just be taken for granted.
Romance Philology and Germanic Philology are more generic studies of language, and in these fields, we expect to find factsabout the authenticity, original form, or interpretation of a variety of written texts in a language or a related group of languages.'Fancier' language studies include Orthoepy, (about correct pronunciation), Etymology (when correct word derivations areinvolved), Orthography as correct spelling, Calligraphy or Penmanship for more attractive writing, Elocution, as correct controlof voice and gesture, Remedial Reading for better understanding, Speed Reading for more efficiency, Epigraphy, dealing withthe peculiarities of inscriptions, Graphology, which deals with character and personality traits individual handwriting reveals,and Paleography, study of ancient writing.
To study Language rather than particular languages, to ask about what is used rather than its use or users, deserves a speciallabel to stress its peculiar interests: such a study ought to deal with factors presupposed by specialties or the Philologies, andGeneral Philology would be an apt name for it. It just happens that Linguistics has been generally agreed upon for the studydiffering from the others in that kind of focus (e.g. on signal theory rather than what is signalled, on representation possibilitiesover what is represented).
It may seem that no such object exists, or that its invention is more ingenious than useful: the only `language' we reallyencounter is something like English or Chinese. `Language' that is not `a language' is obviously an abstraction. Even Englishcannot be found in the concrete, and no one has ever spoken it. In order to speak `English', one would have to simultaneously
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speak Cockney and all other British dialects, to talk at the same time just like those Irish, Nigerian, Scottish, Canadian, Indian,Australian, Filipino, American, etc., speakers whose native language is `English'. That none of these speakers have troubleunderstanding the books the others write, and that most can usually grasp what the others say, would suggest that there issomething about `English' which is not identical with its concrete manifestations.
Linguists go further than that. They assume there are aspects of Language common to any language, and that one stage of thestudy called Linguistics ought to try to make explicit what they are.
1.01 Written Language.
It is easy to forget that once we were all among the illiterate, especially if we learned to read and write when very young. It isinevitable that normal humans will speak. There is nothing inevitable about learning to read and write: either someone teachesus or we do not learn. If there is nothing to teach, we cannot learn: only a fraction of the world's population can read and write,because their societies have no way of representing what people say. Writing re-presents not only what has been spoken, butanything experienced, imagined, or thought. But writing is not Language. Nor are poetic, rhetorical, or logical skills reserved forthe literate. Many societies flourish by memorizing and passing on their wisdom, and have astonishing abilities to do this; othersmay think there is nothing to learn beyond normal local experience, but all are poorer when links with the past are broken.Writing is neither moody nor absent-minded. It neither comments nor improvises. Its report need not vary when copied ormoved, and it indifferently records the beautiful, offensive, or challenging, for those who could never experience or hear ofthings alien to local conditions and perspectives.
So there is something about Language to be learned even by considering a successful writing system; and two complementarystudies linguists cultivate, Phonetics and Phonology, will be sketched in Chapter 2, as a simplified version of more complexproperties of Language. These two studies exemplify a first contrast between the how and why of linguistic concerns, comparedto those of traditional disciplines.
But the fundamental acquisition of writing is a fairly low level skill compared to those it takes for granted, such as learning themeaning and use of new words and constructions, more effective ways of putting this knowledge of language to subtle particularuses. It will become clear that there are limitations as well as advantages in the objective approach of Linguistics.
1.02 Objectivity and Subjectivity.
Subjective is a pejorative term when opposed to objective, the quality just claimed for Linguistics. Both subjectivity andobjectivity are indispensable for learning anything, particularly about Language. Recall the oddity that every individual's speechcould be aptly called subjective in one of its several senses. Yet the fact that people
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routinely communicate so well presupposes something objective, something speakers of a language share as a common, public,external factor. That you are you, an individual, is not diminished by the fact that you also function as a member of a groupwhen you speak and are understood. Could individuals insist that society form around them by acquiring their private /subjective language? Obviously infants could not, and speakers at any age would already have to have acquired the publiclanguage of a society to make that presumptuous demand intelligible.
Sorting out in what sense Language can be viewed objectively, and not just as an invention by linguists, has its own interest. Inthe process, we can gain insight into questions like why this language is an instance of Language, how individual languagescompare, how one would decide whether a potential message from outer space was part of a language or not, how languageschange, often independently of the uses made of them, or whether information like that can help decide whether the change alllanguages undergo is a good or bad thing.
1.03 Objective and Bad.
Associating subjectivity with evaluations like correctness or good and bad is meant to stress the importance of this eminentlyhuman duty. Nor should there be any misunderstanding if objectivity is claimed for Linguistics and subjectivity assigned toTraditional studies, since a claim like that can initially be no more than a subjective evaluation by linguists. Nor should theguardians of traditional values associated with refinements in grammatical, poetic, or rhetorical sensitivity find anything strangeabout basing their prescriptions on expert, subjective, individual judgments rather than some normalized, objectivegeneralization.
An opposition like subjective vs. objective is relative rather than an absolute matter in private affairs, and the idea of turning anopposition into an either-or vs. a more-or-less by agreeing on some public norm does not attract everyone. What is heavy for achild is light for an adult, while heavy for an adult might be light for a weight-lifter: the evaluation is relative to `who does thelifting', a subjective affair. By shifting from the private and subjective heavy to the public and objective 100 pounds, we dealwith an either-or instead of a more-or-less for each unit of measure, with steps more precise than more-or-less for ranges. Whyanyone would want to do this is another matter, but it should introduce some proportion into invidious comparisons ratingtraditional studies as purely subjective while holding that Linguistics attempts to be wholly objective.
1.04 Technical Terms.
To foster their own kind of objectivity, disciplines substitute technical for ordinary word to communicate more precisely. Heavyand pound do not seem to show the contrast particularly well in the foregoing example, but one can suspect that the chemist'suse of heavy water would be clumsily expressed in pounds. In linguistic and in traditional language studies, terms like word andsentence are in common use, but since
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the objective approach of Linguistics is contrasted here with the subjective, we can expect these expressions can differ inlinguistics just like heavy water does in Chemistry and ordinary language.
Technical terms coined for only one field present a different learning problem from those adapted from common use. Linguistshave innovated many terms, but their usage evolves much the same way as in ordinary language: we have to know who usessome term, and when. For example, atom was used in ancient times, but no one would expect that its modern counterpart occursin the same way. Among Roman grammarians, oratio was in common use, but that one word indifferently covered what wewould distinguish as a phrase, clause, or sentence, as well as an oration.
When ordinary words are adopted or adapted with technical restriction, things are a bit different: sport in Biology is `a mutantanimal, plant, or part deviating from the normal type' (the latter sense is adapted in Statistics), while obsolete English equates itwith amorous dalliance. We speak of the flow of electric current, its impedance and resistance in terms appropriate to liquids,without expecting electricity to have trouble going uphill; technical restriction can lessen the ordinary associations, but notremove them: ordinary language locates a problem for us; technical restriction refines its discussion. We can then appreciatesome traditional distinctions about terms, and conditions under which they can be used with precision. These distinctionsinvolve different ways of discussing objectivity and subjectivity.
1.05 Univocal, Equivocal and Ambiguous Terms.
A term can be called univocal when the expression always has the same sense and reference: H2O always has the same sense(two molecules of Hydrogen, one of Oxygen) and refers uniquely to objects meeting these specifications. Water may often referto the same thing, but it rarely does outside of laboratory conditions. Like English, H2O might be said not to occur `in theconcrete', but unlike English, H2O can refer to a physical object.
A term is equivocal when it coincides with another in pronunciation, but differs in sense and reference. For other reasons, it isalso called a homonym. The difference is clearer for spellings like raze and raise: their spelling suggests that the two havedifferent origins, something we might not have suspected from their spoken form. That is a fascinating sport has at least thethree interpretations mentioned above (there are others), while the written form of the spoken version occasions other problems.
An ambiguous term is one whose sense or reference varies in context, and deciding whether homonyms are involved may not beobvious: coarse is interpreted differently with thread, hair, sand, glass, features, manners, language, etc. The number ofdictionary entries for a word indicate in how many ways ambiguous the isolated expression can be, and ordinary language,which uses many such terms together, can multiply the ambiguities.
Coarse is a systematically ambiguous term, one in which the variable interpretation of sense or reference can be predicted andexplained according
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to the context or universe of discourse in which it occurs. Systematically ambiguous terms are also called analogous: when allor most of the conditions which allow for systematic interpretation are known, an analogy (a type of system) and ways ofdiscounting both similarities and differences are understood. This takes one sense or reference as its clearest interpretation,against which the others are to be measured. Many basic terms in ordinary use are like that, as in good applied to God, angels,men, dogs, mosquitoes, microbes, liars, books, knives, and murders, or same applied to any two things. Why a given sense orreference is taken as clear or basic (both analogous terms themselves) is not fixed. Classical Mythology was once taken forgranted as a source (He's a real Apollo), but today, the popular press or the Guinness Book of Records are more likely. Or itmight be some trivial but striking fact: can coarse be used as casually after associating coarse used of a metal file and cowarse?
Important aspects of objectivity and subjectivity arise from these simplistic distinctions. One is that Language and languages canbe viewed as subjective tools for dealing with objective nature by human subjects equally part of that nature and learning asinvolving appreciation of the difference. Another is that much scientific writing mixes ordinary and technical language, with thepressing need to sort out where they overlap. A third follows from these, that technical advances make different kinds ofobjectivity possible (e.g. just ordinary looking at things, then through magnifying glasses, then with optical and electronmicroscopes), but human intelligence, a defining part of subjectivity, does not change as rapidly as the supply of newinformation. To confuse information and intelligence will not assist our investigations.
1.06 The Objectivity of Technical Terms.
All speakers assume they know a great deal about their language. To say that this knowledge is subjective, particularly asembodied in our traditional disciplines, is not to demean it, just to characterize it in a particular way. Another way of contrastingthis with the sort of objective knowledge Linguistics seeks about language is to distinguish it as implicit vs. explicit. Socratesonce elicited answers correct for Geometry from an untutored boy by the way he questioned him, and there are many things we`know' which can be made explicit by an analogous approach that makes us aware of what we take for granted.
Since one function of written language is for marks on a piece of paper to be the visible sign of a stranger's invisible thought, itis normal for facile readers to look through writing rather than look at it. What a sign is can be subjectively unimportantcompared to what it is objectively a sign of, and in Linguistics, it is often the case that what a sign is objectively is even lessimportant than what it is not. This cryptic remark will become obvious, but it suggests part of the different how thatdistinguishes traditional from linguistic study.
A study should begin with a clear idea of the what it studies. So a first step in Linguistics is to be clear about what its object is(compared to that of
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other disciplines), and what that object does; in this case, to separate signs from their sign-function. As already noted, a vastnumber of languages are unwritten, but all normal humans speak, so the obvious candidate for a basic aspect of Language studyis an account of speech. We know what a good deal of speech in our own language `means' (a difficult word to deal with) andcan guess what it might mean in cognate languages. We need only assume that it means something in a wholly unknownlanguage, as a start in finding out how it functions there as a piece of language. This point of view brings us closer to talkingabout Language rather than a language, and linguists cultivate that perspective by the methods they use.
This is a kind of objectivity: the investigator is (or puts himself) outside the subjectively shared codes ny which a societycommunicates messages in a language. Even when we don't understand them at all, the noises people make and some of themechanisms they use to produce them are empirically observable: we can hear them, we can see some, and feel in our ownexperience how we produce similar sounds. To the extent that these data of the senses are public, the terms used to discuss themcan be made exact.
Technical terms in linguistics aim at being exact by being based on empirical evidence. That in turn constitutes their objectivity,their public availability to normal observers. Some training is needed for an advance in precision, of course, but when the termscan be checked against what anyone can hear, see, and feel, they are to that extent objective. Statements involving terms likethat can be verified or falsified by the same senses of hearing, sight, and touch.
Subjective reactions by individuals to the same sounds might rate them as harsh or melodious, measured or sing-song, or anyother number of things. What is problematic about human reactions is their lack of uniformity, and the difficulty of persuadingsomeone to have the same reactions as we do. It is less difficult to direct their attention to, and to agree about, what we can allhear, see, or touch.
Another type of subjectivity common in discussions about language has to do with what expressions mean. It is even morecomplicated to get agreement about what some individual "really' intends when using them. One could argue that no amount ofobjective data of the kind we have been talking about so far could solve such a disagreement, and to the extent that this is faircriticism, it points out a striking limitation of the method. Disputes about proximate objective evidence are more easily settledthan disagreements about the diffuse reasons for feeling more at home with varying interpretations of it. Compare AmbroseBierce's 1911 satirical definition of dictionary and that in any standard one:
Dictionary, n. A malevolent literary device for cramping the growth of a language and making it hard and inelastic. Thisdictionary, however, is a most useful work. (The Devil's Dictionary. 1958. New York. Dover)
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It is obvious that Linguistics is not uniquely objective in terminology or method, or that calling traditional studies subjectivesomehow puts them beyond some pale of serious consideration. There is no nonsubjective way of even deciding why one wouldsearch for an objective norm for what is serious. We read Bierce for pleasure as well as enlightenment, Webster for more soberpursuits, but a decision to define serious as a univocal rather than an analogical term is not a scientific matter. By the sametoken, the kind of questions, and what constitute valid answers in linguistic and traditional approaches, can be taken ascomplementary rather than mutually exclusive: each has a different purpose.
1.07 Linguistics as a Science.
We have been edging toward a suggestion that Linguistics might merit the definition of the scientific study of language: a claimmade often enough for this to appear in dictionaries. But dictionaries can only record what words have meant up to the date oftheir publication. Both critics of the field and some practitioners in it have become less certain, particularly as the scope of whatis called linguistic study expands. Readers will have to decide this question for themselves, since only samples of the evidencecan be provided, with some general outlines of how the discussion might proceed.
Later chapters will detail how Linguistics as a discipline differs from the institutional perspectives of traditional studies. While itdeals with the same matter language its assumptions and the kind of questions it asks are not the same. No solid informationfrom any source is neglected in linguistics, but the data must undergo some rethinking. In an area where the methods andassumptions of physical sciences were considered inapplicable, claims have been made that there are aspects of language thatcan be studied scientifically, that without this scientific basis, even the humane interpretation of the role of language cannot bepursued on a sound basis.
A claim to scientific status is disputed within and outside Linguistics. For some linguists, it now describes the actual state of thediscipline; for others, only its potential; for still others, a status lately abandoned because of the increased role of subjectivity:intuitions about one's native language now count as scientific evidence. Some dismiss such a claim as pretentious ordemonstrably misleading. Many think nothing more than a discussion of labels is involved.
Since academic degrees are awarded in Linguistics, its standing as a discipline is a matter of some interest, both for the self-esteem of those who are already in the field or intend to enter it, and for the public who might be confusing a persuasive buttemporary subjective stance with the solidity attached to findings of pursuits no one disputes as scientific. Linguists'recommendations have important consequences in education and other arenas of public concern. They are called upon to judgelanguage teachers and texts, make recommendations to governments, advise psychologists and psychiatrists,
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influence decisions of lawyers, juries, doctors, teachers of the deaf, etc. why should responsible persons pay attention to whatthey have to say?
Involved in these questions are others like what science is, and what scientism involves; is there just Science, or are theresciences? Is science identical with a particular method, or does the object of study determine whether a scientific study can bemade of it? Is the distinction between `Natural' and `Social' Science legitimate, illusory, or a matter of degree? Some of theallusions to the complex continuum of subjectivity and objectivity are involved here.
Answers to questions like these are often presupposed rather than made explicit when discussing Linguistics as a science, sosome of the presuppositions of this present text ought to be outlined here, and others will emerge.
1.08 It is Assumed Here:
(1) that Science may be about causes and effects; that the kinds of causes and effects discussed in Physics, Chemistry,Biology, etc. are not identical with those operative in linguistic behavior.
(2) that in addition to these natural or objective causes, peculiarly human or subjective ones are involved in language use.
(3) that in ordinary expectations, a science explains a definable range of phenomena by showing how it coheres with otherareas defined in the same way: that allows us to predict them, and may lead to comprehension, control, or both.
(4) that we can comprehend some things (like laws of planetary attraction) without being able to control them, or controlsome things (like electricity) without understanding them fully; that we can predict some things without eithercomprehension or control (like the accurate prediction of eclipses within Ptolemaic astronomy). (5) that there are objectsimpervious to scientific study, and methods incapable of achieving the kind of scientific results just sketched. Beforemicroscopes, microbes could only be abstract or theoretical objects; now we can observe them instrumentally.
(6) that if some object of investigation is random, it is not susceptible of scientific analysis. A random method is incapableof scientific results, regardless of its object. `Randomness' may result only from deficient conceptualization, methods, orinstruments.
(7) that the objects of science are abstract while the objects of ordinary experience are concrete, as talk about objects like`English' and `H2O' show.
(8) that science aims at uncovering the universal rather than the individual, though sciences are constructed principallyfrom, and should apply to, individual instances.
(9) that sciences can differ according to their purposes, and that these purposes are not immanent in data, but determinedby scientists, so studies
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of the same material for different purposes deserve different labels (like those proposed for Philology and Linguistics).
(10) that sciences should construct precise technical terms and conventions appropriate to their own objects, methods, andpurposes first: translatability into other sciences is a secondary priority.
1.09 Empiricism.
These considerations suggest why and how technical terms in any discipline should be made exact, and why empirical methodslend themselves to objectivity. There are degrees of empiricism, ranging from the directness of unaided vision through theindirectness of instruments that increase its scope; or from simple forms of human touch and hearing through mechanical andelectronic interactions where we see what we cannot hear or feel (as in dial-readings), so that the empirical data becomesincreasingly remote from the original inputs; or ultimately, in the fact that human observers have to agree about what theyobserve and on the relevance of those observations.
Empiricism guarantees (in principle) the public aspect of scientific objectivity. It makes experiments replicable under conditionsindependent of individual people, places or times. It allows for objective falsification of results independent of subjectivedisagreement about interpretations. The Physical Sciences make the greatest strides when data are quantifiable. But a notableproblem about quantification in human or social sciences is that no science tells us what to manipulate mathematically or whyonly how. The difference can be discussed in terms of subjectivity and objectivity, and is often mentioned as a qualitative vs. aquantitative contrast.
A similar problem arises when technical terms are taken from ordinary language: a refinement in perspective is adopted on thebasis of a qualitative or subjective decision of the scientist, but when ordinary terms are retained, their vagueness can bemisleading or a source of imprecision. The adoption of empirically objective technical terms no more constitutes a science thanthe use of subjective ones robs humane disciplines of their precision, as any student of traditional logic can attest. Traditionalgrammars also make use of many terms that are empirically quite defensible. But the overall data, purposes, and methods oftraditional grammar are not the same as those in Linguistics, even when they coincide.
1.10 Purposes in Studying Language.
Purpose is a humane word empirical sciences avoid. Function is sometimes found instead. But traditional studies of languageaccept an unabashed discussion of what the author had in mind (e.g. in writing a book about Grammar, Poetry, Rhetoric, orLiterature). Ruskin coined the expression pathetic fallacy in 1856 for the attribution of human traits and feelings to nature (e.g.smiling skies and undaunted cliffs), but while subjective poetic turns like this are not likely to mislead in literature, empiricalterms should be objective. This is not easy: what objective data, for instance, could you supply even about humans that
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would distinguish smiling from smirking or simpering? There are questions about language which some stages of objectivelinguistic study do little to illumine.
Subjective purposes determine what the object of study should be even in science, and what is relevant to it; of what use theresults will be, and how apt a method was chosen in view of the purpose. If the object of a study is to present standard English,a method that records only nonstandard language would be as inept as one that never mentions it in dubious cases. The inclusionof details about Bantu usage in such a work would be irrelevant unless the study were designed for Bantu learners of English.
For instance, two books that organized Greek thought on Poetry and Rhetoric are preserved from the prodigious output ofAristotle along with a few others in which he pioneered Logic and Grammar. Although they are fundamental to all Westernthought about language and traditional grammar, many could not name them, few read them in translation, and fewer in Greek.What makes them foundational is their conceptual perspective, not the physical texts. Many ideas they originated are part of theculture of those who have never heard of them. Assume that someone presents a manuscript acclaimed as one of Aristotle's lostworks about language: how would this object be approached by linguistic and traditional scholars? How would their purposesdiffer, and what would each find relevant or irrelevant? What methods would promise useful results?
Both would look for physical indications of authenticity (e.g. what it was written on, the script, vocabulary, construction types,etc. compared to accepted originals). Where others would then debate consistency of the manuscript's message with itscontemporary culture, linguists would focus on it as a set of signals transmitting whatever that message was. As scholars, nonewould dream of ignoring the findings of the others, but there would be a complementary division of labor. For those equallycompetent in both fields, a new subdiscipline deserving a separate title could result, just as within Linguistics there arespecializations wedding generic linguistic insights with those of other approaches.
So while there are some purposes common to traditional and linguistic study, they are unlikely to coincide perfectly, even whenretaining the same labels. Traditional Grammars have as their legitimate purpose the prescription of a language standard and theproscription of offenses against it. Traditional grammar applied to unwritten languages is surely an anomalous expression. Anygrammar of a language like that would more aptly be called a Descriptive Grammar (a common title in linguistic studies).
1.11 A Simple Example.
Assume that only a single speaker of such a language is available, but he assures us that he really doesn't speak his ownlanguage `correctly'. While neither traditional grammarians nor linguists would prefer to study a substandard variety, linguistsmight be happier with their data as an instance of Language than grammarians concerned with norms
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of correctness. Yet we might never know exactly how this speaker's language is incorrect in his own society, if the otherspeakers rarely used language to talk about language, and our informant never listened when they did. It might be that for him,to speak incorrectly involves only an inconsistent avoidance of tabu expressions (comparable in Western societies to the use ofearthy language where a euphemism or medical term would be more polite). It would also be difficult to explain that we areinterested in his language, when neither he nor his compatriots have shown much concern. Probably the only thing that wouldmake sense to him would be that somehow our investigations were to uncover the secrets of his culture for some occult orimperialistic purpose.
But there are other kinds of correctness that have concerned Western traditional grammars, such as the avoidance ofcontradiction, inconsistency, or ambiguity. We find it ambiguous if someone answers Yes to a question like `Are you aDemocrat or a Republican?', or says that `The Democrats maintain that the Republicans are wrong and they are right'. `Reallyout of this world, and only in America' (Reagan's comment on the 1984 pre-Olympic Games Gala) seems at least inconsistent;and if we are assured that The mummified Pharaoh has consistently voted Democratic in Chicago for years is to be takenliterally, there seems to be some kind of contradiction involved. Traditional grammars make rules proscribing expressions likethat, since they can involve questions of truth and falsity. Deviations like these can often be called extralinguistic, since a sureappreciation of their standing may require native competence. There are stages in linguistic investigation (as in earlyacquaintance with our exotic informant) where suspicion of logical fallacy is premature, and where the basic concern oftraditional logic about truth and falsity rather than consistency or validity is irrelevant. Lies are more convincing when theirgrammar is faultless.
1.12 Fields in Linguistics.
Just as traditional studies of language developed into quasi-autonomous disciplines, we expect Linguistics to show similardiversification. Once some general principles are established and basic findings are taken for granted, the linguistic aspects ofother disciplines can constitute a new subfield, informed by techniques and perspectives peculiar to Linguistics. Particularly inthe case of the linguistic study of one's native language, modern grammatical work coincides increasingly with, and accepts,most of the conclusions and presuppositions of traditional grammar.
Some of the fields in Linguistics commonly used are General or Theoretical Linguistics, Anthropological and AppliedLinguistics, Descriptive, Historical or Comparative Linguistics, as well as Psycho-, Socio-, Mathematical and ComputationalLinguistics. The labels alone suggest reasonably well how the fields are related and distinct.
The process or activity that cumulatively results in an overall view of language phenomena, how they might be studied andcompared, and how they are relevant to other intimately connected pursuits, lies within the field of
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General or Theoretical Linguistics. There is no single Linguistic Theory to which all linguists subscribe. But a distinctionbetween Theory and Model, clear in some disciplines, can be elusive in Linguistics. As a consequence, there are inconsistencies,basic or superficial, when different purposes dominate. Criteria for dividing intralinguistic from extralinguistic data waver.There are inconsistencies in viewing linguistic data as static or dynamic. Part of the task of General or Theoretical Linguistics isto sort out the continuities.
1.13 Comparison and History.
The comparison of languages began in antiquity, but the study did not merit labeling as a separate discipline until thedevelopment of Comparative and Historical Philology in the nineteenth century. Before that, there was little sound informationabout non-European languages, and little interest in them, or in the historical development of European ones. Early interest wasaroused because of cultural concerns, but to the extent they are different, the philological focus is on access to cultures throughlanguage, the linguistic stress on the developing and differing forms of language. Here, the contrast of static vs. dynamic mightseem obvious: one could compare the present state of English with that of contemporary German, the dynamic development ofboth from a common source, or in either case, the dynamisms at work in each. A static comparison of dynamic forces seemspromising. These complementary concerns belong to the fields of Comparative and Historical Linguistics.
1.14 Unfamiliar Languages.
Descriptive Linguistics in America has been closely allied to Anthropology: unfamiliar speech can be described moreconfidently than the significance of social norms connected with it. But speech is universally recognized as a key for access tothe culture. Connections between such studies and Comparative Linguistics are easy to see: new data results to whichcomparative methods can be applied, and as information accumulates, theories in Historical Linguistics may prove useful whendealing with suspected cognate languages.
1.15 Uses of Linguistics.
Applied Linguistics is a very broad term: if one wanted to teach English to the groups our Anthropologists have been studyingwith the tools of Descriptive, Comparative, and Historical Linguistics, we can see why the effort would be called an exercise inApplied Linguistics. Any description is an implicit comparison, but what has been outlined here is an explicit one: there wouldbe precise details about the kinds of sounds speakers hear and produce, and how they differ from those of English. Thegrammatical description would show any marked differences in the way English and the other languages exemplify generallinguistic categories. Languages differ markedly in what they must express, simply because one is speaking a particularlanguage, compared to what they may express, depending on what interests the speaker.
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If there were question about which of the languages our Anthropologists studied should become the standard for a new politicalunit, Applied Linguists' experience could suggest which might be more easily learned by the others, and which, whenmispronounced by nonnative speakers, would be more intelligible to other nonnative speakers (it could be that the languageeasiest for all to learn on those norms was that of a numerical or cultural minority). Since the new standard language might bethe only one that all would have to learn to read and write, Applied Linguists would be in a position to propose a writing systemwhose symbols made best use of factors common among these languages and English. Anthropological Linguists routinelycollect culturally important texts, and these could provide material for elementary readers, evaluated for linguistic and cross-cultural acceptability. None of these tasks could succeed unless technical expertise were supplemented by the humanity andsensitivity of the linguists consulted.
Part of that sensitivity can be honed by the kind of work done in the fields of Psycholinguistics and Sociolinguistics. There arebarriers as well as norms in the normal acquisition and use of native language, and the hypothetical situation we have beendiscussing could be fraught with difficulties.
1.16 The Best Language.
In a hypothetical situation, it is easy to imagine some possibilities: e.g. that some sounds or intonations neutral in language Aare threatening in language B; when these pronunciations mark the nonnative speaker of a new standard C, speakers and hearersare both disadvantaged: the A speaker because his subgroup has always supported and rewarded proper usage, the B hearerbecause in her and C subgroups, negative reactions to them are as powerful as they are certain. Or it may be that one cannotspeak A grammatically without distinguishing personal experience from hearsay, so the nonnative transliterates that into thestandard language C; when B and C speakers do not volunteer such information, an A speaker demands it: an A-speaker mayimpress B and C speakers in much the same way `namedroppers' bore us, but he will find B's and C's evasive or untrustworthy.
The hypothetical situation may seem so unlikely that such specializations seem esoteric. But it describes the situationnonstandard speakers encounter. This is the case even when the standard is only a local one, so that all that is known about thenonstandard speakers is that they aren't ''one of us". `Standard speakers' have less motivation to become aware of how ignorantwe all are of the way any language functions: the weight assigned to automatisms is never comparable to those deliberatelychosen. Fortunately or not, it just happens that standard automatisms are standard. But while some modes of speech (like theexamples used above) are not chosen by A speakers, they may be available to B and C speakers for deliberate threatening orboasting. Given the initial misunderstandings, experience suggests that A's, B's, and C's are more likely to find furtherconfirmation of their prejudices than to learn how
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to discount them. While the lesson is a truism in Linguistics, linguists, too, speak A, B, or C.
1.17 Language and Technology.
The connections for Mathematical and Computational Linguistics might be just as mysterious, but less surprising now, whencomputer illiteracy is becoming an embarrassment. Quantification of much language data resulted from years of linguistic work.Even if one does not really understand advanced Math or computer design, the omnipresence of transistorized andprogrammable calculators suggests to the innocent that the enormous details of language might be amenable to simplification ifwe knew enough about what, when, and how to calculate. It seems obvious that addition or subtraction of words would accountfor differences from some model, but it is much less obvious what the analogue of multiplication or division would be how doyou divide or multiply a sentence like Mary had a little lamb by if or although?
A Linguistic Analysis is intended to reduce a language to its elements. If elements can be counted, does it follow that theyshould be manipulable mathematically and whizzed through complex computer programs? Unfortunately, human languages arenot as simple as signal systems like semaphore flags or Morse code, and what has to be `counted' is not as overt as semaphoreand Morse code units. Within some ranges, computerized programs for translating one language into another can produceremarkably acceptable results, but we are still far from understanding Language well enough to make programs connectinglanguage A and language B so obvious that inclusion of language C is just incidental.
1.18 Objective Properties of Language.
Pi represents a quantity variously presented as 22/7 or 3.14+. It is the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter. Thedecimal version can be carried further but not concluded, and this fact is part of what is meant by saying that a quantity is acontinuum: `something indefinitely divisible'. Each additional step can be counted beyond the +, and, like the example aboutheavy and light vs. measurement in pounds, we can quantify the accuracy of 3.141592+ compared to 3.14+ rather than justqualify the two as more or less accurate. The first procedure is said to be more objective and empirical; the second, moresubjective and less empirical.
Carrying out the decimal value further is said to be mathematically `uninteresting', when we know or anticipate that no newprinciples are involved, and instead of +, we could write etc., since we just keep repeating the same procedures. One reason forthis is that the Circle is considered here as a static object. It is also a theoretical object, comparable to English.
But if we apply pi to the real world of bouncing balls and racing tires, there is nothing static at all about circumferences. Thedynamics of their behavior will depend on whether they are solid or inflatable, as well as a number of other factors like heat,weight, and force of impact. In the study
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of Language, we find similar options. Many slim books elegantly present the facts of English, but no static account of any sizecan do justice to its concrete use.
So the problem for Linguistics or any science is its degree of removal from the concrete: how abstract can it afford to be, yetstill be informative, or how concrete must it become without getting lost in detail? The sketch of fields in Linguistics shows thatthey differ in emphases. The general theory sets what to look for; its applicability shows whether a theory is vacuous orpromising, given the kind of objects it defines, the purposes of the study, and the methods it makes possible.
In the stage called Descriptive Linguistics, the data considered relevant derive from Speech, since it is a universal manifestationof language compared to writing. Speech is `objective' because it is more empirically accessible than subjective reactions, andwhile these reactions are ultimately the most important to us (i.e. appreciation of what is being communicated), they are lessstable, less predictable, and considerably less public.
1.19 Some Empirical Properties of Speech.
A readily observable property of speech is succession. If five people simultaneously pronounced a word apiece of Are you angrywith me?, it would be unintelligible. Speed readers take in this entire message at a glance, and in Sign Language, the samequestion can be asked by gestures made at one and the same time. So a derivative empirical property of Speech can be called itslinearity, a one-to-one relationship between the temporal succession of the sounds produced in Speech and the way it can berepresented:
Are you angry with me?
The representation would still be linear whether in rows, columns, circles, or spirals, whether it is in two or more dimensions, aslong as it is to be followed in sequence in any continuous or discontinuous order. A linear representation provides a suggestivepicture of what does, may, must, and cannot occur when comparing any part of the utterance Are you angry with me? with anyother, or that expression with others most like it.
That is because speech is not only sequenced in a linear fashion, but unlike some conceivable representations, it is systematic.The successive members of the example cannot occur randomly. Some combinations are producible but do not occur (e.g. Withare me angry you?) and alternative arrangements that can occur get a different or puzzled interpretation (e.g. With me are angryyou?).
If we generalize the notion of system as what restricts a finite number of items to a finite number of combinations, somemeaningful implications for speech are revealed:
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(1) Only some combinations are readily interpretable, and some combinations are uninterpretable or meaningless. Two speechsequences will contrast because one is allowed and meaningful but the other excluded, hence nonsense (e.g. *With are me angryyou?) or because both are allowed and meaningful, but differently (e.g. Are you angry with me? or You are angry with me!).
(2) Ordinary options must be within the system, unless speakers choose to speak nonsense. For example,
Are you angry at me?
Are you angry with me?
Are you angry because of me?
but not:
*Are you angry few me?
*Are you angry but me?
*Are you angry democracy me?
or the many other unacceptable options, with their systematic implications, for are, you, angry, and me.
(3) Each segment in lawful successions is a point at which options appear, but the range of options (as just illustrated) is nomore random than the succession. Even this trivial example suggests that Language should be approached as a system ofsystems.
(4) These factors are just as observable in unknown languages as they are in our own, with a few notable differences. Nonsenseis easy to produce in unknown languages but some kinds are quite difficult in our own. We can know or suspect about foreignutterances that they mean something without knowing what, or discover that natives find them meaningless without our knowinghow or why, when trying to imitate native speech: since language is a system of systems, violations of one system can short-circuit others.
(5) The example exemplifies points about English that are important for Linguistic analysis. The first is that only angry belongsto a class or system that is large and comparatively open-ended, while each of the other words belong to closed and rather smallclasses. This suggests that if a finite number of classes and how they interact can be identified, there is a norm for decidingwhen to stop the analysis (it can never `finish' in the case of a living language: it is a kind of `etc.' comparable to writing piwhen no new principles operate at that level of analysis). The second is that historical study shows that the class to which angrybelongs is more likely to change with external exigencies than the closed ones. Members of the closed classes are few, but occurvery
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frequently; members of the open classes are so numerous that few of them can occur frequently.
1.20 Composition, Distribution, and Function.
To say that violation of one system can `short-circuit' others suggests subordination of one system to another, orinterdependence among them. Both views can be justified, although abstraction is just as clearly involved as in distinguishingvarious systems in the human body. There, the same physical parts may be important to the function of several systems which amedical specialist may seem to treat as autonomies, and in linguistic study, different points of view allow us to discuss the samefacts from different perspectives. E.g. the phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, etc. of `i' in Latin, which can be discussedas a high, front, unrounded vowel phonetically, as one of a small number of vocalic contrasts in phonology, as a morph ormorpheme in morphology, as a word or independent sentence, etc., telling some individual rather impolitely to Go!.
1.21 Linguistic Systems.
Many systems can be distinguished in an utterance as simple as Are you angry with me?, and about each, we can ask whatmakes them up, where they are found, and what they do in the example. Assuming that speech can be analyzed into discretesounds, for instance, we can inquire about their composition, alone and in comparison to each other; about their distribution, orwhere they occur relative to each other; and their function, what they do, what role they play, in speech.
Since speech-sounds are a central concern in Descriptive Linguistics, we must notice that a definition of the object sound is notso obvious. (We are really not talking about the way the example is written, although it is a useful shortcut here). In terms ofsound composition, there are several points of view to take: (a) sound as produced by what the speaker does, (b) sound asdisturbances in the air, or (c) sound as it impinges on the hearer. (These are clearly interdependent, but can be examined in termsof temporal subordination). Having decided on one or the other of these objects or combinations of them, study of theirdistribution in a language would ask where they do, do not, cannot, or may occur, and having established that, what theirfunction is. Then, since we expect any language to be a system of systems, it is of interest how these three aspects interact (e.g.does the Distribution of a sound affect its Composition or not, and how does this affect their Function in either case?).
For instance, a sequence like disrup
