Framing the Egyptian Uprising in Arabic Language ... · N. Hamdy & E. H. Gomaa Framing the Egyptian...

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Framing the Egyptian Uprising in ArabicLanguage Newspapers and Social MediaNaila Hamdy1 & Ehab H. Gomaa2

1 Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, The American University in Cairo, New Cairo 11835,Egypt2 Department of Sociology, Alexandria University, Alexandria, Egypt

This study examines the framing of Egypt’s January 2011 uprising in the country’s state-run,independent and social media using a unique dataset of Arabic language content fromnewspapers and key social media posts collected during the peak of protests. Semiofficial(governmental) newspapers framed the event as ‘‘a conspiracy on the Egyptian state,’’warning of economic consequence and attributing blame and responsibility for the chaos onothers. Social media posts used a human interest frame defining protests as ‘‘a revolutionfor freedom and social justice’’ and independent newspapers used a combination of theseframes. Findings point toward the potential roles that news media will play in shaping publicopinion and demonstrate why social media have wide appeal in times of political crisis.

doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01637.x

Millions of Egyptian citizens turned to the news media for information during the 18-day protests that ended Mubarak’s prolonged authoritarian rule. Egypt’s movementfor popular democracy represented a defining moment for media coverage, especiallyin the context of a transformative media landscape. The news media, a cornerstoneinstitution in the country, struggled to shape the public opinion by framing theseevents in their own unique ways.

Egypt, the most populous and one of the most politically influential countriesin the Arab region has traditionally had strong news media organizations, thoughhistorically there has been some oscillation between the extremes of a highlyautonomous press and total government domination. The more recent decades ofthe Mubarak era had witnessed changes despite the often unpredictable relationshipbetween government and media. The appearance of private satellite televisionstations, the emergence of media privatization, the birth of independent newspapersand the accessibility of the Internet meant that the once-monolithic media scene ofthe past became pluralistic. This new media cornucopia created a vibrant, although

Corresponding author: Naila Hamdy; e-mail: [email protected]

Journal of Communication (2012) © 2012 International Communication Association 1

Framing the Egyptian Uprising N. Hamdy & E. H. Gomaa

contradictory arena; of private and state ownership, repression and resistance, andofficial and popular voices, characteristic for its near-chaotic mix of competingthemes. Consequently, it was within this relatively freer media environment that thevoice of Egypt’s activists grew louder, for the most part, through the use of newmeans of communication (Khamis, 2011).

In the context of Egypt’s news industry, it makes sense to distinguish betweenindependent media, state-run media, and social media. Remarkably, each mediumtells different tales, making radically different news choices in terms of framing.Egypt’s semiofficial newspapers are directly influenced by the government, theindependent newspapers are owned by government sanctioned businessmen, and thesocial media is populated by citizens looking for a free space to express their opinions.Despite the efforts made toward the liberalization of the media system in more recentyears; the semiofficial print media seized the moment to support the ailing regime byframing the protests in ways that denied the existence of a powerful social movement.In the meantime, grassroots media including blogs, Facebook groups, and twitteraccounts used contrasting frames allowing for an alternative representation of eventsand allowing for political activists to raise public awareness and rally support, whileindependent print media challenged government-set media restrictions and tonesand attempted to negate their obfuscation of the issues at hand.

Even though this eroded public trust, particularly toward the semiofficial news-papers, all three types of media have continued to flourish since, offering the prospectof a continuing growth of the media arena where they may all compete and evolve.Hence, in order to understand these media interpretations and how they differ, thisstudy investigates the frames used to represent the events of the popular uprising. Inaddition, as the conditions under which these frames emerged are specific to a certaincircumstance, this study also attempts to further the concept of framing by specifyingthese conditions and how they may have operated in forming public opinion. Usingthe framing theory and its proposed process model, this study will be contributing tothe mission of the communication field through adding to the organic process of theframing research program (D’Angelo, 2002; De Vreese 2005; Scheufele, 2000).

Theoretical backgroundFraming research as a contribution to theory and a method for analyzing media is awork in progress and empirical contributions continue to flourish. The concept offraming portends that communication is a dynamic process that consists of differentphases: frame-building, and frame-setting and individual and societal consequencesof framing (D’Angelo, 2002; De Vreese, 2005; Scheufele, 2000).

The significance of framing lies in the fact that it can affect both individuals andsociety at large. An individual-level consequence may result in altered attitudes afterexposure to certain frames. On the societal level, frames can affect processes suchas political socialization and collective actions (De Vreese, 2005). News framing isimportant to study within that context, as audiences may have no direct experiencewith the event and therefore, depend on media accounts to stay informed and make

2 Journal of Communication (2012) © 2012 International Communication Association

N. Hamdy & E. H. Gomaa Framing the Egyptian Uprising

rational decisions (Entman, 1991). In fact, a vast body of literature exists on howthe news media frame events and consequently influence public perception of thoseevents (Entman, 1991; Scheufele, 1999, 2000).

Entman (1993) summarized this concept with the following: ‘‘to frame is toselect some aspects of a perceived reality and makes them more salient in acommunicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for theitem described’’ (p. 52). In important ways, Egyptian media frames function inthe same fashion as that described by Entman, to choose, highlight, or excludeinformation, emphasize problematic aspects of one issue over another, formulateanalysis, make moral evaluations, and suggest solutions. If Egypt is to evolve intoa meaningful democratic society, then it is essential that attention is paid to thestructure and representation of political issues. The exchange of information andideas through a free press, is a critical component of mass participation and arequirement for democratic responsiveness to public preferences (Sartori, 1987).

Method

SampleA quantitative content analysis was conducted to study a sample of media coveragepublished or posted between 25 January and 12 February, 2011. Material collectedconsisted of three manually filtered purposive samples of news stories and opinioncolumns from semiofficial newspapers, independent newspapers, and posts fromsocial media sites. The first group consisted of four semiofficial newspapers: Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar, Al-Messa and Al-Jomhoriya newspapers. The term ‘‘semiofficial’’is used to describe these newspapers because of strong government influence on thecontent (Amin, 2002). The search yielded 720 (90%) news stories and 80 (10%)opinion columns and editorials, all included for analysis.

The second group consisted of Al-Shorouk and Al-Youm-Al-Sabee newspapers,launched in 2007 and quickly becoming influential newspapers (Khamis, 2011).Independent media employ a mix of journalists and freelance writers, rangingfrom state-media writers to cyber activists, resulting in an exceptional merge ofcontradictory beliefs and mindsets. Using the same criteria, the search for newscoverage and articles yielded a total of 800 articles; 640 news stories and 160 opinioncolumns for inclusion in analysis.

Another 800 items were collected from popular social media that contain contentwith youthful characteristics and quality, punctuated with fresh ideological pointsof view and anarchistic slants. The sample consisted of 150 posts (19%) came from‘‘We are all Khaled Saed’’ the Facebook group later credited with mobilizing therevolution (https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed), 450 (56%) were tweets postedon hashtag ‘‘#Thawra#25jan’’ in reference to the Arabic word for revolution and 200(25%) are blog posts collected from popular Egyptian political blogs.1 All 800 posts,whether text, video, Twitter, or Facebook posts, were included for analysis.



CodingThe unit of analysis employed was the news article, opinion articles for the newspaper,and the posts for social media. A group of six student coders from AlexandriaUniversity were trained by the researchers to code the sample. Intercoder reliabilityusing Holtsi’s formula was .95 (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006).

Variables and operationalization of framesThe coding categories included standard variables such as the name of the publicationor website, name of author or byline or blogger name. The coders also examinedthe material for uses of various frames through checking for phrases, headlines, andportrayals of events in news accounts and in informational and analytical posts.

Framing categories were conceptualized following a review of literature whichindicated that journalists have been found to use a multitude of ways to framethe news. Commonly used themes include emphasizing the conflict, an emotionalaspect of the story, and the grim economic consequences (Entman, 1993; Severin &Tankard, 2001). Such frames can promote a particular problem definition, causalinterpretation, or moral evaluation (Entman, 1993) and thus influence debates andstructure the political outcomes. The researchers depended on identifying the conflictframe, the responsibility frame, the economic consequences frame, and the humaninterest frames in their study (Valkenburg, Semetko, & De Vreese, 1999).

Findings

This study proposes four main research questions intended to uncover how Egyptiannewspapers and the social media framed the demonstrations and how these framescompare.

How were the protests framed by each medium?Semiofficial newspapersThe dominant frame choices for the three types of media examined in this studyare displayed in Table 1. Semiofficial newspapers used the conflict frame as themost dominant one. Results showed 480 (60%) of news articles highlighting theconflict in the situation. This comes as no surprise, as throughout the protests anduntil the former President resigned, these government-influenced papers portrayedthe protestors as disruptive forces and depicted them as unemployed thugs, foreignconspirators, and delinquent and violent youth who did not have the national good atheart. These newspapers used this frame to dehumanize the movement and humanizethe state instead. It was also used extensively to malign the democratic movement asa malicious, chaotic scheme.

Striking, but commonly used, descriptions are exemplified by excerpts whichincluded outright lies such as the story published in Al-Messa newspaper on 25 Januarywhich claimed that ‘‘the Internet youth have refused to follow those who are calling forchaos scheduled for the police forces celebration day,’’ implying that the protests didnot succeed and that they had been directed by a group of misled youth (The Internet



Table 1 Dominant Frame in Each Media Set

Conflict Human Interest ResponsibilityEconomic

Consequences

Type of Media N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)

Semiofficialnewspapers

480 60 80 10 40 5 200 25

Independentnewspapers

320 40 280 35 160 20 120 15

Social media 0 0 640 80 160 20 0 0Total 800 100 800 100 800 100 800 100

youth, 2011). On the next day, 26 January, the same newspaper’s main headline statedthat Egypt’s day of rage (in reference to protest) has become a victory for legitimacyand democracy, while instigators and conspirators have failed. This story continuedto spin reality into an elaborate, untrue version of the day’s event. On that very sameday, the Al-Akhbar newspaper’s main headline also stated that the instigators hadfailed to achieve their goals. Al-Ahram’s editor-in-chief also wrote on the 28th of asmall mutinous group that had been afflicted by moral confusion (Saraya, 2011).

By 3 February, the conflict frame was further embellished to better accommodatethe foreign influence scenario. Al-Messa ran a headline stating that Tahrir protestorswere identified as foreign agents paid to sustain the chaotic order. This was supple-mented with quotes from supposed activists who had been trained to subvert theruling regime (Al-Messa, 2011).

Protestors in these newspapers were systematically portrayed as incapable, mis-guided youth who were helpless to resist foreign influence or to formulate a strategy.They were also characterized as hooligans who are unable to use any form of strugglebut disorder to communicate their illegitimate message.

Another dominant frame in use by semiofficial newspapers is the economicconsequences one. A total of 200 (25%) articles used this approach to emphasize theimplications of a collapsed economy and instill fear in the minds of their readers. Itwas used to highlight potential doomsday scenarios including loss of tourism revenue,and both western and regional investments. On 27 January, Al-Ahram newspaperused this method to report a communication from the Emir of Bahrain to Mubarakthat indicated how Egypt’s stability is important to the entire region following reportsof sharp drops in the stock market. Numerous news stories elaborated on how theprotests will destroy the image of stability and run-off investors (Phone call, 2011).Quite typical of the coverage was a unanimous emphasis on the stability factor.By February 10, prominent columnist Makram Mohamed Ahmed wrote to evokefurther fears of future economic woes. This Al-Ahram writer spoke of how a shortertransition period would result in quicker economic recovery (Ahmed, 2011a, 2011b).

Some semiofficial newspaper articles adopted the human interest frame, too. Atotal of 89 articles (10%) used this approach, but the twist was their focus on the



feelings and health of the aging former President. This frame was used to invokesympathy in every case.

A smaller number of semiofficial newspapers used a responsibility frame. Thiswas the dominant frame in only 40 articles (5%). Most of these articles blamed theprotestors for starting violence. Al-Messa newspapers dated January 26 and 27 putthe blame on an anonymous unemployed man, the Muslim Brotherhood and eventhe protestors themselves (Al-Messa, 2011).

Independent newspapersEgypt’s independent newspapers fared differently on the dominant frame scale.Similar to the semiofficial newspapers, the most dominant frame used was theconflict frame. A total of 320 (40 %) of the news articles used this scale.

Trying to tiptoe around the facts and give a nonpartial description of events on25 January, Al-Shorouk newspaper detailed how the state security, the opposition,and the former National Democratic Party (NDP) arranged themselves for the PoliceDay anniversary. They also referred to the evident social network mobilization as alive rehearsal between the supporters of the regime and the opposition (The statesecurity, 2011).

In an attempt to circumvent media censorship and government pressure, theindependent newspapers covered opposing views carefully avoiding appearance ofbias toward either side. They neither treated the event as a revolution nor did theyovertly support the regime.

As the protests progressed the independent newspapers voiced their supportfor the revolutionaries more openly. Al-Youm-Al-Sabee published direct accusationsagainst key members of the regime by 8 February (‘‘Innocent, pure revolution,’’2011). This trend persisted among these papers, with words such as ‘‘pure,’’ ‘‘noble,’’and ‘‘selfless’’ used repeatedly to describe the social movement.

Results also showed that independent papers used the human interest frame insharp contrast to the semiofficial papers. In fact, 280 articles (40%) emphasizedthis frame. For instance, on the 3 February, Al-Shorouk newspaper the main storyheadline was: ‘‘Tahrir a place for reuniting friends. Essam and his teacher, Mohamedand his colleagues: Separated for years, reconnected by their love for the nation thatbrings them back together again.’’

Similarly powerful quotes such as ‘‘the parent of the martyr Amr said that hisson’s final words are, I am dying so that 80 million can live’’ (Tahrir a meeting place,2011) were used frequently. These newspapers relied heavily on emotional movingstories of ordinary citizens reacting to adversity.

Results also indicated that 160 articles (20%) of the independent newspaperschose to use the responsibility frame. But in this case, responsibility fell on membersof the government, the police force, the media, or a combination of all three.

Evidence also appeared in stories such as Al-Shorouk’s description of state securityand the ruling party’s violation of protestors’ rights, or their accusation of the regimedirectly backing thug attacks on nonviolent protestors in the 3 February issue



(‘‘State security,’’ 2011). In the meantime, Al-Youm-Al-Sabee newspaper was directlyblaming government crony Ahmed Ezz on 1 February and later accusing him of illicitpower gains (Ahmed Ezz, 2011).

Economic consequences frames were used in 120 (15%) of independent news-paper articles, postulating numerous theories of how the consequences will impactEgypt. ‘‘Expected rise in interest rates after next Friday’s demonstration’’ reports theAl-Shorouk on 26 January in advance of the upcoming protest date (Interest rates,2011). ‘‘Mobile phone pre-paid cards have disappeared and prices will double’’ yetanother economic bereavement angle used by Al-Shorouk on 5 February terrifyingthe ordinary Egyptian citizen (Fear in the heart, 2011).

Social mediaSocial media adopted quite different frames from traditional newspapers. The mostdominant frame was by far the human interest frame. A total of 640 posts (80%)highlighted the suffering of families that had lost a member in the protests. Thisexcerpt from a post gives human suffering, such as martyrdom and rage, moreexplanatory weight: ‘‘a new page of Egyptian history is being written with the bloodof the martyrs and the hissing of anger from demonstrations that we should all join’’(Hamdy, 2011).

None of these posts used the conflict or economic consequences frames, while 160posts (20%) used the responsibility frame; blaming the police forces for the use vio-lence and the killing of civilians. This post from 26 January on ‘‘We Are Khaled Saed’’Facebook group page accused the former Interior Minister with maltreatment ofprotestors and exemplifies the responsibility frame used in social media: ‘‘In responseto a peaceful, civilized protest, the police forced them out of the square and treatedthem as though they were Zionist enemies’’ (https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed).

How was protest defined in different media?Our second goal was to gauge how the newspapers and social media defined theproblem of protests. Using content analysis, we identified unrest, uprising, protests,revolution, conspiracy, and chaos as the main themes, but also revealed differences inhow often these themes were portrayed across the three types of news media (Table 2).

Semiofficial newspapersSemiofficial newspapers often relied on conspiracy as a definition of the event.Conspiracy was the attribution found in 480 articles (60%). The conspirators differedbut mostly ranged between the United States, Israel, Qatar, the Muslim Brotherhood,and Al Jazeera Television news channel. For instance, Al-Messa’s 26 January editorialwas topped with a banner headline of ‘‘The Muslim Brotherhood Wants Destruc-tion.’’ Their 27 January editorial pointed to the Muslim Brotherhood, Baradie(Presidential hopeful), and Al Jazerra News channels as instigators of problems(Muslim Brotherhood, 2011). On 31 January, Al Jomhoriya’s editor-in-chief accusedAl Jazerra News Channel of becoming a tool for the destruction of Egypt (Ibrahim,2011a).



Table 2 Definition of the Problem

SemiofficialNewspapers

IndependentNewspapers Social Media

Type of Media N (%) N (%) N (%)

Unrest 96 12 112 14 16 2Uprising 24 3 200 25 104 13Protests 80 10 152 19 120 15Revolution 0 0 336 42 560 70Conspiracy 480 60 0 0 0 0Chaos 120 15 0 0 0 0Total 800 100 800 100 800 100

Chaos was another definition used by semiofficial newspapers. This definitionappears in approximately 15% (120) of the stories sampled. Stories within this frameplainly expressed the view that skirmishes had been intentionally escalated into fullyblown chaos. Other definitions included the unrest frame (12%), the protest frame(10%), and the uprising frame (3%). None of the semiofficial papers defined ‘‘theproblem’’ as a revolution.

Independent newspapersIn contrast, independent newspapers recognized the protest as a revolution. In termsof definition of the problem, this was used in the largest proportion (336 or 42%).The closely related term, ‘‘uprising,’’ was used to define events in a large proportionof cases as well (200 or 25%). Clearly the independent newspapers were less subject toself-censorship and were in a better position to recognize the reality of the situationearly on. Along with reports attributing violence against protests to the regime andstate security, columnists in the independent press described the protests as a popularuprising (Abdel Fatah, 2011; Gamal, 2011). Independent media became increasinglybold after January 25 when the Tahrir protests began to tip the balance againstthe regime. These independent entities emerged as proponents of freedoms andsucceeded in preserving their reputation as impartial, at least as in comparison tostate influenced newspapers.

Social media: An even more oppositional definition of events emerged from the social media(Table 2)Social media chose the revolution definition of the problem at an overwhelming70% (or 560 posts). It was also described as a peaceful revolution. As a matterof fact, at 9:17 am on the first day of the revolution, ‘‘We Are All Khaled Saed’’(https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed) posted a vision which called for a peacefulsystematic movement as a method to demand change. Many postings also describedpeaceful youth protesting for change, using rhetorical and visual imagery ranging fromprotected interfaith prayers to dreams of a successful revolution (see GemmyHood,2011; Mohamed, 2011).



Approximately 15% of social media posts in our sample defined events in termsof a protest, while an additional 13% defined the situation as an uprising. Oneblogger from Alexandria described how the ‘‘demonstrators were organizing andspontaneously volunteering to protect the personal property of citizens in the eventof a mass stampede’’ (Iskandarani, 2011). A few (2%) defined events in terms of‘‘unrest.’’

Conspiracy and chaos frames were not used at all in our social media sample.Egypt’s social media sites, however, were filled with daily updates about the formerPresident’s grasp on power, corruption stories, police brutally, failed governmentresponses and logistical notes on the protests themselves. It became evident that socialmedia (despite a 5-day shutdown of Egypt’s Internet access) functioned as a newsand analysis source for many Egyptians in the absence of dependable mainstreamsources. Trust in social media appeared to soar during the crisis.

In the social networking paradigm that existed during this period, Internet userscould mine social media for relevant information and analysis. For those citizens whoactively participated in the political change, there were rarely any other satisfactorychoices. It was also the only interactive and participatory platform. The impact of thiscyber networking has potential to change the way Egyptians receive and contributeto the flow of information in the future.

How were the causes of the protests portrayed in the media?A third goal of our project was to identify the causes most commonly givenfor the protests. Nine main causal categories emerged from our content analysis:dictatorship, corruption, oppression, poverty, injustice, foreign influence, satellitetelevision influence, political groups’ influence and unemployment causes. Resultsfor each of the three media types are displayed in Table 3.

Table 3 Diagnosis of the Reason



Type of Media N (%) N (%) N (%)

Dictatorship 0 0 88 11 240 30Corruption 80 10 208 26 200 25Oppression 0 0 96 12 120 15Poverty 40 5 120 15 88 11Injustice 0 0 128 16 152 19Foreign influence 280 35 16 2 0 0Satellite channels 40 5 8 1 0 0Political groups 240 30 24 3 0 0Unemployment 120 15 120 15 0 0Total 800 100 800 100 800 100



Semiofficial newspapersAccording to the semiofficial newspapers the main causes of the protests were foreigninfluence (280 or 35 %) and/or political groups (240 or 30 %). This is not altogethersurprising because these causal scenarios had been used throughout the Mubarak era.Foreign influence was a particularly broad category because it could include westernpowers, regional antagonists, or a mix of both in alliance with internal enemies.For example, a favorite conspirator was the government of Qatar. Al-Jumhoreyanewspaper on January 30 published an editorial containing an elaborate explanationof Qatar’s efforts to undermine Egypt in order to replace it as a regional leaderthrough its use of Al Jazeera news channel (Ibrahim, 2011b).

Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements werethe political groups mentioned most frequently in conspiratorial terms. Perhapsthe most common scenario advanced in the semiofficial press was that the MuslimBrotherhood had planted members among the demonstrators and thereby causedthe movement to lose its peaceful approach (The Muslim Brotherhood, 2011).

The semiofficial press cited corruption (15%), poverty (5%), and satellite tele-vision’s influence (5%) much less often as causes of the protests. None of thesemiofficial press accounts in our sample mentioned dictatorship, oppression, andinjustice as causes.

Independent newspapersThe account offered in the independent press was almost completely opposite of thatoffered in the semiofficial press. The largest portion of the articles in our sample (208articles or 26%) viewed corruption as the root cause of the problem. Other reasonsincluded injustice (16%), poverty (15%), oppression (12%), and dictatorship (11%).

The stark contrast can easily be seen in the stories themselves. For instance, theAl-Shrouk on 3 February took the position that massive demonstrations were proofof the people’s desire to end Mubarak’s abusive dictatorship and replace it with anew order based on democratic principles that rely on justice, freedom, and humandignity (‘‘Continuous million,’’ 2011). Fahmy Howaidy, a prominent journalist,explained the causes of the protests in this way: ‘‘People would not have risen if itwere not for the abuse of power and the use of emergency laws and suppression offreedom that they endured under the rule of Mubarak’’ (Howaidy, 2011).

Social mediaAlthough they frequently used terms similar to those used in the independent press,Egypt’s social media also provided a distinctive view of the causes of the protests. Thedominant theme in the social media was the dictatorial rule of the ousted president.As shown in Table 3, approximately 30% of the posts in our sample directly accusedMubarak , whereas another 25% pointed to corruption as the cause.

Activist Galal Amer tweeted on 26 January that the revolution intended toeliminate corruption and abuse, while on 1 February, ‘‘The Egyptian Girl’’ bloggerangrily denounced officials for accumulating vast financial fortunes at public expense



(Zeinab, 2011). On 11 February, a ‘‘We Are All Khaled Saed’’ post expressedgreat joy for ridding themselves of the oppressive ruler (https://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed).

Injustice (19%) and oppression (15%) were mentioned in the social media asoften as they were mentioned in independent newspapers. Police brutality wasa particularly common theme. One blogger, for example, specifically linked theprotests with a more general dissatisfaction with the behavior of Egyptian policeofficers, their arrogance and mistreatment of citizens and their notoriously unethicalbehavior (Samir, 2011).

Poverty (11%), but not unemployment specifically, was mentioned in our sampleof social media posts. In contrast to the semiofficial press, social media made noreference to foreign influence, satellite TV, or political groups as causes of the unrest.

How were solutions portrayed in the media?Our final content analysis focuses on the way possible solutions to the crisis wereportrayed in the various media. We identified 20 major solutions that were advancedand then explored how their use differed between semiofficial, independent, andsocial media. Results are displayed in Table 4.

Semiofficial newspapersArticles in the semiofficial papers predictably focused on regime supportive solutionsthat supported the Mubarak regime. The most common theme was that it wasessential that Mubarak stay in power because only he was capable of restoringorder. Fully 50% (400 articles) of the articles in our sample advanced that solution.Columnist Salah Montaser, writing in the February 4 issue of Al-Ahram, contrastedan uncharted future filled with tragedy if Mubarak were to resign with a long list ofMubarak’s past achievements (Montaser, 2011).

The solutions proposed in the semiofficial press also included transferring powerto the newly appointed Vice President. This proposition meant that power wouldnot be handed to the former President’s son, a particularly contentious possibility inEgypt’s political landscape. This theme appeared in 160 news articles of the sample(20%). Another suggestion was to begin a national dialogue and negotiations withvarious stakeholders (40 articles or 5%). This solution assumed no regime changes.Columnist Anise Mansour expressed his belief that both solutions would be best forEgypt (Mansour, 2011). Finally, articles in the semiofficial press recommended anend to the demonstrations (10%) and a ‘‘return to work and study’’ (15%).

Independent newspapersIndependent newspapers shied away from giving absolute solutions. The largestproportion published were 112 news articles (14%) that called for an end to thecontrol of communications and the Internet. Other themes that appeared included afreer media, the right to establish political parties, and dissolving the latest People’sAssembly and Shura Council (each scored a 9% of the sample).



Table 4 Suggested Solutions



Solution N (%) N (%) N (%)

1. Resignation of Mubarak 0 0 40 5 160 202. Abolition of Emergency Law 0 0 24 3 40 53. Elimination of State Security 0 0 16 2 88 114. Ban Vice President from

Presidential election0 0 0 0 16 2

5. Dissolving Parliament 0 0 72 9 56 76. Release of January 25 Detainees 0 0 56 7 24 37. End the Curfew 0 0 40 5 16 28. Cancellation of University

Guards0 0 32 4 32 4

9. Investigation of Police use ofViolence

0 0 48 6 24 3

10. Dismissal Minister ofInformation

0 0 16 2 24 3

11. Compensation for CurfewLosses

0 0 0 0 16 2

12. The Right to Form PoliticalParties

0 0 72 9 24 3

13. Establishing Trade Unions 0 0 64 8 80 1014. Free Media 0 0 72 9 72 915. End Control of

Communication and Internet0 0 112 4 128 16

16. National Dialogue andNegotiations

40 5 64 8 0 0

17. The Transfer of Power to VicePresident

160 20 40 5 0 0

18. End Demonstrations 80 10 0 0 0 019. Return to Work and Study 120 15 0 0 0 020. Mubarak Remains in Power to

Restore Stability400 50 32 4 0 0

Total 800 100 800 100 800 100

Social mediaThe social media postings were in total contrast to the semiofficial newspapers butdid share a few commonalities with the independent newspapers. The resignationof Mubarak was the single most common solution (20%) proposed in social mediaposts. A sizable proportion (11%) called for the elimination of state security, whileothers advocated greater freedom of speech in the form of a free media (9%) or theend of state controls on communication and the Internet (16%).



Social media posts typically either called for Mubarak’s resignation directly orwould do so indirectly by describing demonstrations that called for his resignation.Beginning on the first day of the demonstrations on 25 January, ‘‘We Are All KhaledSaed’’ published a statement that included a list of demands with the key stipulationthat Mubarak not run for another term. This set the tone for many more posts thatfollowed on this site and others.

Discussion and conclusion

This study set out to examine how Egyptian semiofficial newspapers, independentEgyptian newspapers, and a representative sample of social media postings framedthe revolution in January and February 2011. We conducted a content analysis of 800separate documents in order to identify and categorize the way stories were framedin each of these three types of media. More specifically, our analyses focused on howthese media compared across four dimensions: the general way in which the protestswere framed, how the nature of the protests was defined, what causes were given forthe protests, and what solutions were proposed for ending the crisis.

We found that semiofficial newspapers depended mostly on a conflict frame. In theattempt to paint the protests as a harmful catastrophe, journalists in the semiofficialpress sometimes constructed frames based on unverified assertions as to what washappening, thus calling their journalistic practice into question. In our view, the mostblatant of these efforts echoed the attempts in the semiofficial press to deny the realityof Egypt’s military loss to Israel during the 1967 war. The semiofficial press also framedthe crisis in terms of its potential negative economic consequences. In contrast, socialmedia postings almost entirely depended on human interest frames that emphasizedthe suffering and resiliency of ordinary Egyptians in the face of a repressive regime.Independent newspapers utilized a mixture of conflict, human interest, economic,and responsibility frames. The more varied stance of the independent press reflectsboth the distinctive character of the publications themselves and the fact that thosewriting in the independent press often have multiple loyalties. Some also write forgovernment media, while others are well-recognized political and social activists.So explanations in this case, may be found in factors internal to journalism suchas the values and journalists’ perceptions of their roles (Ramaprasad & Hamdy,2006). Nonetheless, we believe the greater variety of frames found in the independentpress reflects an attempt to provide more balanced coverage and a stronger senseof journalistic principles than was exhibited in either the semiofficial press or socialmedia.

When we examined the way the crisis was defined, it was also clear thatindependent press was quicker than the semiofficial press to recognize the eventsof late January and early February as a mass social movement if not a full-blownrevolution. Indeed definitions in the semiofficial press rarely if ever acknowledgedthe scope and depth of the crisis. Social media, on the other hand, defined the crisisas a revolution from the beginning.



The gulf between semiofficial and independent newspapers was also apparent inour analysis of the causes each gave for the crisis. Semiofficial sources largely attributedthe cause of the protests to foreign meddling, subversive political groups, and, and toa much smaller degree, to unemployment and corruption. The independent press, onthe other hand, emphasized corruption, injustice, oppression, dictatorship, poverty,and unemployment as causes. Mubarak’s dictatorship was advanced as a root causeof the crisis more than twice as often in the social media as in the independentpress. And while unemployment was mentioned frequently in the independent pressarticles we sampled, it was absent as a cause in our social media sample. In otherrespects, however, the causes advanced in the social media were similar to thoseadvanced in the independent press. Both frequently pointed to corruption, injustice,oppression, and poverty as causes.

Approaches to ending the crisis also differed dramatically in the semiofficial press,the independent press, and social media. Stories in the semiofficial press tended to beopenly supportive of the existing regime, calling for an end to the demonstrations, areturn to work and study, and affirming Mubarak’s leadership. Stories in the socialmedia, on the other hand, most commonly called for Mubarak’s resignation, the endof government controls on the Internet and freedom of expression, free media, andthe elimination of state security. No clear consensus emerged in the independentpress. Stories here were as likely to affirm Mubarak’s leadership as to call for hisresignation. Indeed, none of the 20 different solutions we coded appeared in morethan 10% of the stories we sampled in the independent press.

In summary, the Egyptian uprising of January and February 2011 was framedin strikingly different ways in the semiofficial press, independent press, and socialmedia. Indeed if these reports are compared in the semiofficial press and in socialmedia, it would be reasonable to conclude that they were not even covering thesame events. The independent newspapers at times shared stories constructed insimilar frames with the semiofficial newspapers and at times used frames similar tothose advanced in social media. The decision by semiofficial newspapers to back theMubarak regime will damage their credibility in Egypt for years to come, particularlybecause the very same newspapers made an abrupt 180◦ turn once they realized thatthe protest was succeeding in bringing political change. Under these circumstances, itwill be difficult for many to view state supported media as anything but a propagandaarm of Egypt’s rulers whoever they may be for some time to come.

Although social media posts often provided minute-by-minute factual accountsof the protests from Tahrir, they often depended on the activists themselves forinformation, which reflected the spirit of the revolution, but the social mediawere not guided by journalistic standards or practices. Posts were written by theactivists themselves in some cases. Not all posts could be verified and often rumorsproliferated. In spite of these problems, social media posts were often more truthfulthan other media options and they gained substantial credibility as a result.

As noted earlier, independent newspaper journalists were from the onset coura-geous in their defiance of the government line. We found that these newspapers



attempted to cover the protests more objectively than either the semiofficial news-papers or the social media. They are not above criticism, but are well positionedto achieve higher standards of journalistic integrity and credibility in the post-Mubarak era.

As Egypt evolves toward a more democratic culture, media will become increas-ingly vital for public discourse and the media landscape will continue to developand diversify. It is impossible to project our findings regarding differences amongmedia types or current attitudes in Egypt toward the media very far into the future(Solayman, 2011). Egypt is still in political transition and the outcome will ultimatelydepend on numerous factors. Although there is still much to be determined, it isevident that public perceptions of media are changing and that the events of early2011 clearly constituted a revolution.

The results of this study are obviously limited to Egypt during a specific timeperiod, and should not be generalized to other media sources in the Arab region oroutside it. Our purpose was to provide a picture of frames used by Egypt’s newspapersand popular social media sites and to project future implications for these local media.However, the results may also contribute the concept of framing by specifying theconditions under which frames emerge and by identifying systematic differences inframes across different types of news media (D’Angelo, 2002; DeVeere 2005). It is ourhope that this study will serve as a catalyst for further research on media strategies inEgypt, regionally, and beyond.

Notes

1 List of blogs in sample, analyzed in study (names are translated from Arabic). Blog of anAlexandrian Egyptian (Ismail) http://ismailalex.blogspot.com/, The Silent Majority Blog(Ahmed Samir) http://theegyptiansilentmajority.blogspot.com/, Justice for All Blog(Sherif Abdel Aziz) http://justice4every1.blogspot.com/, The Dean is Dead Blog(Mohamed Adel) http://43arb.info/meit/, Egyptian Awareness Blog (Wael Abbas)http://misrdigital.blogspirit.com/, Egytimes (Mohamed Mariee) http://egytimes.org/,Egyptian Girl Blog (Zeinab) http://www.bentmasreya.net/2011_02_01_archive.html,Blog for National Nonsense (NawaraNegm) http://tahyyes.blogspot.com/, Gemmy hoodblog http://www.gemyhood.com, Mak’s thoughts blog http://www.demaghmak.com, MyThoughts (Mohamed Hamdy) http://demaghy.blogspot.com/, Please Sign Attached Bloghttp://zamakan.gharbeia.org, KarimAmer http://karam903.blogspot.com/, ExposureBlog http://kashfun.blogspot.com, Behavior Exposure Blog http://kashfhesab1.blogspot.com/, Welk’s blog (Wael Khalil) http://waelk.net/, An Egyptian Female’s Blog (ShahinazAbdul Salam) http://wa7damasrya.blogspot.com/, Alaa and Manal’s bit bucket (AlaaAbdul Fatah) http://www.manalaa.net/, An Egyptian Blog of Human Rights (RamyRaouf) http://ebfhr.blogspot.com/, An Egyptian Blog (Tantawi) http://masrena.blogspot.com/, A Free Egypt (Karim Al Shaer) http://misrhura.blogspirit.com/, Egypt’s Blog(Ahmed El Gizawi) http://iloveyouegypt.blogspot.com/, What’s the cost of a meter inthis nation (HaithamAbou Khalil) http://metrelwatanbekam.maktoobblog.com/,Malcom X (Malek) http://malek-x.net/, What I have discovered (AmrEzzat) http://mabadali.blogspot.com/



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