FOURTH WORLD REVOLUTION

WITH YAPTI TASBA GUERRILLAS FIGHTING

THE SANDINISTA INVASION

Bernard Nietschmann

DEDICATION

To Bruno and Hugo who used a 1000 days to make history.

To Kabu, Carlos and Tangni and the other twenty-first century leaders.

To the people of Yapti Tasba.

Versions of Chapters 5 and 11 appeared in The Unknown War: the Miskito Nation, Nicaragua and the United states, Freedom House and The University of the Americas, 1989.

Chapter 12, "Close Shave Sandinista style," appeared in Freedom at Issue, July-August, 1988.

The author is solely responsible for the information and analysis presented in this book.

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Chapter 9

HUGO

I stare at tomorrow's news. Hugo is reported dead. He had

called last week and I am just now working late at night in

Berkeley on an article we are writing together when the thump on

the front door of the night-before newspaper delivery broke my

concentration.

New York Times

It is in the "Around the World" section of The

Missing Rebel's Body Is Found in Costa Rica

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Sept. 17 -- The mutilated body of Dr. Hugo Spadafora, a colorful guerrilla fighter, was found this week in southern Costa Rica, according to reports from San Jose, the capital.

He was reported missing last week by relatives in Panama. Associates said there was no immediate indication of who might have killed him.

Dr. Spadafora, a native of Panama, became a Sandinista fighter in the Nicaraguan rebellion in 1979.

But in 1982 he declared himself opposed to the

leftist Sandinista Government and joined Eden Pastora Gomez, whom he had fought under in the rebellion, as an anti-Sandinista fighter.

After conflicts with Mr. Pastora, Dr. Spadafora allied himself with an Indian insurgent group (The New York Times, September 18,' 1985: 9).

Hugo's death had major repercussions in Panama. Public

outrage led President Nicolas Ardito Barletta to consider

appointing a commission to investigate the torture and murder of

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Hugo. Then General Manuel Antonio Noriega, head of the Panamanian

Army, forced President Barletta to resign in order to stop the

investigation. Hugo was one of the first to accuse Noriega of drug

trafficking and corruption and he had returned to Panama to present

new evidence on Noriegas’s drug dealing when he was murdered.

Thousands of Panamanians protested in the streets. More than

50,000 people attended the funeral. Fiery anti-Noriega speeches

were made along the 200-mile route from Panama City to his home

town of Chitre. An Army faction led by Col. Roberto Diaz

Herrera tried unsuccessfully todispose Noriega. Journalists

were threatened and Spadafora's friend, Guillermo Sánchez

Borbón, a reporter from the opposition newspaper La Prensa,

went into hiding, then requested political asylum in the

Venezuelan Embassy and finally managed to escape to exile in

Miami. In November, 1985 The New York Times confirmed

Spadafora's charges against Noriega and Panama was rocked by

demonstrations and army crackdowns. Noriega was indicted in the

United states for drug trafficking in February 1988. Hugo's

murder set off a major challenge to Noriega's dictatorship.

World attention focused on the impact of Hugo's murder in

Panama. Overlooked were Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Yapti Tasba where

Hugo had spent the last three years of his life writing, planning

and shooting.

The loss of Hugo Spadafora was a major blow to the Yapti

Tasba resistance. He was a key advisor and theoretician.

347

Many Miskito commanders who had fought alongside Spadafora in Yapti

Tasba told me that he was the only "Spaniard" they trusted.

The death of Hugo Spadafora, like the death of Bruno

Gabriel, changed the course of the war.

He had put his life on the line for over 20 years in three

wars against oppressive regimes. He finally lost his life when

he discovered something that threatened a drug and arms­

trafficking dictator.

Journalists called me for background on Spadafora: "You knew

him, right? What was he like? Why was he working with the

Indians? Why do you think he was killed? What did he know?"

I met Hugo inside Yapti Tasba. He carried an AK-47, I had a

notebook. I had hitch-hiked inside to meet him with a Swedish

journalist and an ARDE videocameraman who wanted to do a story on

Hugo.

Hitch-hiking to the war

My decision to turn left or right is based more on

intuition than information. I am driving a Chevy Suburban van

filled with Miskito commanders and Nicaraguan exiles and we are

on a narrow road that snakes down the northern face of Costa

Rica's central volcanoes. Warm, moist air from the tropical

lowlands ahead has pushed up into the high mountains and cooled

to turn into a light rain and heavy fog. Visibility is further

limited by condensation that mists the inside of the windshield

348

and our worn wipers cannot clear the outside of the windshield. We

head into the night, north to Nicaragua and Yapti Tasha to meet

Hugo Spadafora who is fighting with a Misurasata unit.

Fritiof Haglund, a journalist with the Swedish Broadcasting

System, had come to Costa Rica to do some stories on Misurasata,

and Brooklyn had promised to provide transportation to get him

inside. But the promises and transportation vanished when Brooklyn

learned that Fritiof wanted to interview Spadafora, the charismatic

and legendary guerrilla tactician who had fought in Africa,

Nicaragua and now had become immensely popular in Yapti Tasha with

the Indian fighters and communities.

Fritiof had a personal angle to the stories. His parents had

been Moravian missionaries in Wasla on the Wangki where he was born

and lived until the age of five. In 1982, after the war broke out,

he went to the country of his birthplace to find out what was

happening but the Sandinistas arrested him in Puerto Cabezas for

asking questions about the wrong things and gave him 24 hours to

leave. Now in 1984 he is going to make another visit, but this time

he wants to go through the back door and he had asked my help.

Brooklyn's cancellation of our trip also has sidelined two

Miskito commanders who were scheduled to return inside. We all

grouse about the injustice of it all and Brooklyn's jealousy of

Spadafora's popularity. Maybe we can still go.

"Fritiof, do you have a company credit card?" I asked.

349

"Yes, a Visa I think. Yes, I have it right here."

We devise a half-baked plan to rent a vehicle, drive to the

edge of Pastora's ARDE supply network in northern Costa Rica and

then hitch-hike on the ARDE and Misurasata boats as far into Yapti

Tasba as we can go.

The next evening, January 2, 1984, Fritiof and I leave San

Jose in a Chevy van rented from Avis. Inside are Miskito commanders

Guillermo "Gato" Espinoza and Max "Prari" Zamora, Misurasata

political leaders Modesto Watson and Margarita Corbelo, ARDE video

cameraman Eugenio Pacheli, exiled La Prensa reporter Guillermo

Treminio, and exiled La Prensa photographer Brenda Mayorga Caldera

who works with ARDE.

Leaving the volcanoes we pass Ciudad Quesada where some ARDE

wounded are being treated in the hospital, then we snake through a

sequence of smaller and rougher roads past Buenos Aires to a two-

rut farm road that ends at a small ranch house at Boca Tapada on

the Rio San Carlos.

In the headlights I see that the walls are no longer white and

the blue trim is cracked and peeling and the red tiles on the

sloping roof are spotted with moss and mold. An old man emerges

from the sagging front door. The Misurasata people greet him. The

old man and his family will feed and house us. We have arrived on

the edge of ARDE country that extends from northern Costa Rica and

encompasses southeastern Nicaragua and southern Yapti Tasba.

350

'

Although we are still 20 miles from the Nicaraguan border,

the people at the ranch tell us to post guards because an EPS unit

is in the area and mortared a nearby house two days ago.

A Costa Rican Rural Guard unit passes close by but doesn't

bother us.

I go to sleep under a big ceiba tree watching fireflies and

listening to a Jimmy Buffet tape. Buffet sings that it is

necessary to "tropicalize".

Nicaragua on the rivers.

Tomorrow we begin hitch-hiking to

"Are you the people I'm supposed to pick up?" the motorman

shouts to us as he circles just off the Boca Tepada landing. He

has a fast fiberglass Cobra with a 140 hp outboard. What luck!

"Yes, we are", Modesto yells through cupped hands and then

adds for greater confirmation, "what took you so long?"

As we load everyone into the Cobra, Modesto whispers to me

that this is Eden Pastora's personal boat and motorman.

As expected, Pastora is not pleased with us when we reach

his base camp on the Rio San Juan.

"What are you people doing in my boat?" He scowls and then

turns on the motorman. "You were supposed to pick up Robelo and

Rivera, not just anybody."

The Cobra heads back to Boca Tepada for Alfonso Robelo and

Brooklyn Rivera who apparently are supposed to be meeting with

Pastora this morning.

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Fritiof and Guillermo interview Pastora and Brenda takes

Photographs which seems to cool things down a bit. Pastora

complains that the North Americans are trying to control him, but

despite these problems, he is planning an offensive soon.

Modesto has told us not to mention Spadafora because Pastora

is really mad at him for leaving his side to work with

Misurasata.

Pastora agrees to assist us with a dori (called cayuco here)

to go into Nicaragua. But that's it. From there on we will be on

our own, to go further inside and to get out.

We spend the rest of the day moving along rivers and switching

from canoe to canoe. Some are big and they are all loaded with new

weapons and well-equipped ARDE fighters. As we approach the

Misurasata-held area, the canoes get older and the motors are

smaller and in poorer condition. On the last canoe the motor

sputters and stops and we drift and bail the river out of the

cracked canoe while the motorman cleans the sparkplugs and swears

about the tightfisted ARDE "Spaniards" and this junk they call a

motor. We are back in Indian country.

Hugo Spadafora

At the base camp people crowd around to greet us. John, the

motorman who took me inside with Bruno last year, is there and

has a huge smile.

"John, are you still in this crapy war?" I ask and give him

a big abrazo.

"Well, the Piri almost got me a couple of months ago near Lausiksa. Caught us in the open sea just outside the bar. The

"Push and Pulls" dropped bombs on us and some of them were close.

I saw one coming right for us. But we just got a lot of water

inside."

"And the next thing," John goes on, "Brooklyn ordered us to

carry a load inside two weeks ago even though the weather was

terrible. We said no. It was too rough. But he insisted. And we

capsized right in the Colorado Bar. We went up the front of one

big sea and it threw the dori right over on its back and we were

upside down and everything sank to bottom. We lost 35 AKs, an M-

30, boots, uniforms, food, medicine, 2 million Córdobas, two

brand new motors 55s, and the dori. Everything. It was the only

trip we've ever made with lifejackets. Some of the people

couldn't swim and were on their backs --lifejackets for the

lifejackets. Hugo Spadafora was on that trip. Lucky he survived.

It was rough getting to shore. We shouldn't have gone in the

first place."

"Come on," John tells me,

here at this camp."

"let's go see Spadafora. He's

Hugo Spadafora is tall, maybe 6'1 thin and intense. He's

wearing khaki pants and a T-shirt and carrying a folding stock

AKM. Fritiof is already interviewing him and Pacheli is taping

it on the video camera.

352

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Hugo Spadafora at Liminaka, the Misurasata basecamp in southern Yapti Tasba. 1984. Photo by Bernard Nietschmann.[Chap.

9]

353

Haglund: Hugo Spadafora, a man known in all the world. You were with Cabral in ....

Spadafora: Amilcar Cabral, in ex-Portuguese Guinea, today the Republic of Guinea Bissau. I was the first doctor in the guerrilla movement that fought against the Portuguese to achieve independence for that country.

Haglund: And afterwards, In Panamá…

Spadafora: Afterwards in Panama, I participated

actively in politics and was Vice Minister of Health in the government of General Torrijos from 1976 until September 1978, when I gave up my position and came

here, to Nicaragua, to fight against the Somoza

Dictatorship.

Haglund: There are many people who call you a traitor...•

Spadafora: Who? Me?

Haglund: Yes.

Spadafora. I didn't know that.

Haglund: In Nicaragua, for Sandinista and now you are Sandinistas. This is an act of

example, fighting betrayal,

you were a against the is it not?

Spadafora: Well, when I was in Guinea Bissau with the Blacks fighting against the Portuguese, they said I was a traitor, they said I was a communist, a communist agent, I was accused by the fascist Portuguese. Later, when I was in Nicaragua to fight against Somoza, I was accused by Somoza and by the Somoza government -- on television, radio and in the newspapers, everywhere -- I was accused of being a communist. I always maintained that I was not a communist and that I was a social democrat.

Then, came the victory against Somoza, and the nine comandantes betrayed all the programs that had served as the base of the struggle and that had served as the base for the alliance between all the social sectors of Nicaragua. It was the "National Front" program that was recognized by people worldwide, a program that was formally recognized by the Organization of American states, a program accepted by communists on the left and by liberals to the right, and naturally by social democrats as I am. This was betrayed by the nine comandantes, this program. So I united with the authentic Sandinista forces to fight against the

354

dictatorship of these nine traitors, and now they accuse me of being a traitor, the same as they accuse Eden Pastora, the same as they accuse Robelo, of being traitors. This is the language that all the dictatorships use, whether they are right or left, when they try to fight against "Freedom Fighters" --as they called us in Guinea, and as we really are "Luchadores por la Libertad", for the liberty of a people against all types of dictatorship, from the left and from the right, and above all against totalitarian dictatorships that represent the extreme denial of liberty.

Haglund: As a social-democrat what is your opinion on the Socialists International and the role of Sweden?

Spadafora: It is necessary to understand that the Socialists International was born in Europe. It is necessary to know that Europe and its socialist parties were just emerging from a struggle against a right-wing totalitarianism, of terror, genocide, of Hitlerism and nazism, and were in collaboration and alliances with Marxist-Leninist forces in Europe. Therefore, Social-democrats are very sensitive-- and with good reason -- to the struggle of colonialized peoples against traditional western imperialism.

The struggle of the Blacks in Africa and our struggle of Latin Americans against North American imperialism is still a very recent phenomenon, but Soviet imperialism in Latin America is an even more recent phenomenon and the Europeans cannot yet comprehend that this is also something we must fight against. So they have a deformed perception of the Nicaraguan problem and of communism in Latin America.

And what do I believe? Understanding this it is necessary to emphasize in our best arguments possible and with our actions to teach our social-democrat friends in Europe, including the swedes, the true face of Soviet imperialism in our America. And in this sense, the overthrow of communism in Nicaragua will be decisive at both a political and historical level.

Haglund: What are your political motives for taking part, here, in this guerrilla struggle? In these mountains you are passing a hard life alongside your Miskito companions, without pay, I believe..• You don’t receive any money? What is your idealistic motive?

Spadafora: Well, I don't receive pay, not in Guinea or Nicaragua in the struggle against Somoza, nor in this one. I am a volunteer. My decision to fight in Guinea, in Nicaragua against Somoza and in Nicaragua

against communism is made up of romantic, idealist and practical motives.

The romantic elements, well, those are known, and about the practical elements I will simply say that when one has a universalist's conception of the problems in one's country and in the world and accepts as the English poet wrote, "no man is an island", then this must translate into practical terms.

For me this means that if communism remains in Nicaragua it will betray the true nature of the Latin American revolution, and then in my country, in Panama, and in the rest of Latin America, it endangers, not the imperfect and bourgeois democracies such as we know in the majority of our countries, but it endangers the future of the Latin America Revolution, that it will be deformed as it was perverted in Nicaragua, and it will regress more. Therefore, I have very practical motives in defending the ideas of social-democracy, with weapons in Nicaragua, because I am defending in my country and in Latin America the chance for a true revolution that we have been waiting for a long time.

This is what I have written about and analyzed in my book [Las Derrotas somocista y Communista en Nicaragua]

Haglund: How old are you?

Spadafora: 43

Haglund: Do you still feel strong?

Spadafora: Look, I am going to respond to that question with an historic example. Che Guevara took the best guerrilleros there were in Cuba with him to Bolivia. And we know the tragic history of Che Guevara. Che Guevara confessed in his book, the diary, that the Indians that lived in that zone where he died, were impenetrable-- I believe that was the word he used in the diary: impenetrable or impassive-- in any case, he knew that he could not even attract not even one Indian into his guerrilla, and that his guerrilla was a foreign thing within the Indian world in Bolivia. All his physical force didn't matter, nor all the technical guerrilla experience of his Cuban guerrilla experts, nothing he did evaded his fall.

In my case, I am not a technician, nor a guerrilla expert. I am a simple combatant with clear ideas on strategies and tactics. I am 43 years old and I feel very young, but if I were to 25 years old, and if I was fighting in Nicaragua in the Atlantic zone,

355

without the support of the Indians, but surrounded by Indians, I am a dead man. At the same time, if I

were to be 60 I know that I would be able to fight in the Atlantic zone if I was supported by the Indians because it would be much easier to be there.

Haglund: Then, an evaluation of the Indian combatants.

How are the Miskitos, Sumos and Ramas in the fighting?

Spadafora: Well, I always try to give a historic basis to things. The Miskitos have always fought well in combat. The Miskitos never have been defeated in their long history. The Miskitos as soldiers are the best that can be found in the Atlantic zone, they are the best there are to confront the soldiers of the

dictatorship of the nine comandantes.

I am each time more convinced that when 10,000 Indians are armed in the Atlantic zone, it will break the backbone of the communist army in Nicaragua and will ensure a victory over communism in Nicaragua.

Haglund: In terms of time... how long?

Spadafora: I will respond to your question with another question. How long will it take to arm 10,000 Indians? Only the democratic forces know the answer if they decide to support this struggle.

After there are 10,000 or 15,000 Indians armed in the Atlantic zone of Nicaragua, then, I could tell you that the nine pseudo-comandantes of Nicaragua would have less than a year left in power.

Haglund: And when this struggle finishes, where will Hugo Spadafora go to fight next?

Spadafora: Hugo Spadafora will go to his country, to Panama and he will continue being dedicated to activist politics in his country, without breaking connections with internationalism, because to be an

internationalist it is not necessary to be outside one's country. I know that in Sweden, in Europe there are many internationalists that everyday are

concerned with justice in the Third World and that aid the struggle in the Third World without moving from their countries. Then, from my country, politically involved in my country, I also will continue acting in international politics.

356

Under a big mango tree on a hillside in Yapti Tasba the

revolutionary and the professor begin a seminar that lasts for

600 days until Hugo is murdered in Panama.

Hugo calls himself an internationalist, an anti-communist,

a Bolivarista, a tercermundista. He has been in three

revolutions and now is in this one with Misurasata. He knows

many of the world's leading revolutionaries. He wrote one

book on his experiences in 1966-67 fighting in Guinea Bissau

{Experiencias y Pensamiento de Un Medico Guerrillero, 1980),

and another {Las Derrotas Somocista y Communista, 1983, 1984)

about fighting with the Sandinistas as head of the 200-man

Panamanian "Brigada Victoriano Lorenzo" during 1978-79 and

fighting against the communist Sandinistas with ARDE

beginning in 1982.

Hugo has a tremendous grasp of revolutionary theory. He

is fascinated with Miskito ideology and theory and armed

struggle. He tells me, " a strongly grounded theory does not

guarantee success in a revolution, but no revolution has been

successful without a theory." Now fighting with Misurasata he

sees that the Yapti Tasba revolution is not simply anti-

communist or against a totalitarian government in Managua, it

is for control over territory and self-government and freedom

for indigenous nations. Hugo sees that these ideas are not part

of revolutionary actions and projections in the Third World.

I speak about Fourth World theory and the territory-based

conflicts between indigenous nations and mostly Third World

communist, right-wing military and democratic states. Control of

357

a communal nation is a fundamental basis for democracy and

freedom for many indigenous peoples. Both communist and

democratic state governments covet control of indigenous nations

and resources. The Miskito fighters who have joined the

conversation support the concept that Indian peoples throughout

the Americas who only fight to change state governments are but

selecting who will be their next occupier, though they admit the

communist Sandinistas are more brutal and rigid than was the

Somoza regime.

Hugo talks about the need for a revolution that would join

forces between Third World campesinos and Fourth World Indians,

peoples who might occupy separate territories and have separate

national identities and cultures, but who share similar land-

based politics. What would be the experiences and theory that

unites these forces? How is it possible to merge these two wars

-- the civil war against the communist Sandinista government and

the nation war against the Sandinista state -- into a single

struggle for a true revolution for Latin and Indian America?

Hugo says he will return with us to San Jose to work with me

on this topic, a unified revolutionary theory for the two

Americas, one made up of new states and the other of old nations.

And we talk into the night: the Swedish journalist, the

Panamanian revolutionary, the North American geographer, and

several Miskito comandantes and fighters. Nearby, some fighters

sing songs about the war, Misurasata, and friends that have

fallen in combat.

358

Fritiof Haglund (right), Swedish Broadcasting

Corp. interviews ARDE head Eden Pastora near the

Nicaraguan Border Holding the tape recorder

is Guillermo Treminio, an exiled La Prensa

reporter, and in the back is Brenda Mayorga

Caldera, an exiled La Prensa photographer.

Photo by Bernard Nietschmann. [Chap. 9]

Hugo's Wars

We work for 10 days straight in San Jose on the first paper.

Hugo stays with friends and I board at the Costa Rica Inn, a

pensi6n frequented by North Americans on moderate incomes who

want to stay in Costa Rica for some time. A gringo and an Italian-

looking Panamanian visitor don't raise any special interest and

we are free to work at the large tables in the room next to the

reception desk. We take breaks in the nearby Parque Morazan.

Hugo talks about his experiences in Africa and Central America

and gives me copies of his articles and books.

Born in Chitre, Panama of parents with modest means,

Spadafora had the opportunity to attend Medical School at

the University of Bologna, Italy. He telephoned the Cuban

Ambassador in Rome to volunteer to fight in Cuba during the

1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the same year he volunteered to go to

Tunis after the French invasion at Biserta. He was thanked

but not accepted. After he received his M.D. he wrote Amilcar

Cabral, leader of the African Independence Party for the

Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), and

volunteered to join the liberation struggle against the Portuguese

colonialists (along with Guinea-Bissau, liberation forces in

Angola and Mozambique were fighting the Portuguese). It was 1966;

he was 25.

"After medical school and being a member of the Italian

Socialist Party, I saw the rigidity of the European left, it was

all bureaucracy, doing nothing and demanding everything. The

359

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Hugo at work editing our manuscript in San Jose, January, 1984. Photo by Bernard Nietschmann. [Chap. 9]

Hugo at work editing our manuscript in San Jose, January, 1984. Photo by

Bernard Nietschmann. [Chap. 9]

360

European left had been castrated. I wanted to do something. But

Europe was not the place and had nothing to offer a Latin American

like myself who wanted desperately to acquire the experience and

ideas to change things in my country and in the American hemisphere.

The young Italian leftists were in a mental stupor and I did not

want to end up like that."

"I developed the idea of participating in a revolutionary

movement in the Third World in a struggle against oppression. I

wanted to make a gesture as a foreigner as many foreigners did when

they participated alongside Bolivar, Marti and San Martin in our

first liberation wars."

"They accepted me in Guinea-Bissau and I arrived in Conakry,

the capital of the liberated zone in February, 1965 and then I went

to run the hospital in Boke. I was the only doctor in the PAIGC.

Finally I was able to get to Quitafine on the southern front where

fighting was active."

Spadafora was deeply impressed by Amilcar Cabral who was one

of the leading revolutionary theoreticians in Africa. He brought

some of Cabral's writings for me to read. Cabral's thoughts

transcended the Portuguese colonialism, Guinea-Bissau and Africa

and had much to do with the Nicaragua, Yapti Tasba and Central

America.

When Goebbels, the brain behind Nazi propaganda, heard culture being discussed, he brought out his revolver. That shows that the Nazis -- who were and are the most tragic expression of imperialism and of its thirst for domination ... had a clear idea of the value of culture as a factor of resistance to foreign domination.

361

I

History teaches us that, in certain circumstances,

it is very easy for the foreigner to impose his domination on a people. But it also teaches us that, whatever may be the material aspects of this domination, it can be maintained only by the permanent, organized repression of the cultural life of the people concerned. Implantation of foreign domination can be assured definitively only by physical liquidation of a significant part of the dominated population.

In fact, to take up arms to dominate a people is, above all, to take up arms to destroy, or at least to neutralize, to paralyze, its cultural life. For, with a strong indigenous cultural life, foreign domination cannot be sure of its perpetuation. At any moment, depending on internal and external factors determining the evolution of the society in question, cultural resistance (indestructible) may take on new forms (political, economic, armed) in order fully to contest foreign domination'.

The ideal for foreign domination, imperialist or not, would be to choose: --either to liquidate practically all population of the dominated country, eliminating the possibilities for cultural resistance;

whether

of the thereby

--or to succeed in imposing itself without damage to the culture of the dominated people -- that is, to harmonize economic and political domination of these people with their cultural personality.

The first hypothesis implies genocide of the

indigenous population and creates a void which empties foreign domination of its content and its object: the dominated people. The second hypothesis has not, until now, been confirmed by history. The broad experience of mankind allows us to postulate that it has no practical viability; it is not possible to harmonize the economic and political domination of a people, whatever may be the degree of their social development, with the preservation of their cultural personality.

In order to escape this choice -- which may be called the dilemma of cultural resistance imperialist colonial domination has tried to create theories which, in fact, are only gross formulations of racism, an which, in practice, are translated into a permanent state of siege of the indigenous populations on the basis of racist dictatorship (or democracy).

362

This, for example, is the case with the so-called theory of progressive assimilation of native populations, which turns out to be only a more or less violent attempt to deny the culture of the people in question. The utter failure of this "theory,”

implemented in practice by several colonial powers, including Portugal, is the most obvious proof of its lack of viability, if not of its inhuman character•••.

The liberation movement, must, as we have said, base its action upon through knowledge of the culture of the people and be able to appreciate at their true value the elements of this culture ...

It can be said at the outset of the struggle, whatever may have been the extent of preparation undertaken, both the leadership of the liberation movement and the militant and popular masses have no clear awareness of the strong influence of cultural values in the development of the struggle, the possibilities culture creates, the limits in imposes, and above all, how; and how much culture is for the people an inexhaustible source of courage, of material and moral support, of physical and psychic energy which enables them to accept sacrifices -- even to accomplish "miracles." But equally, in some respects, culture is very much a source of obstacles and difficulties, of erroneous conceptions about reality, of deviation in carrying out duty, and of limitations on the tempo and efficiency of a struggle that is confronted with the political, technical and scientific requirements of a war.

Consider these features inherent in an armed liberation struggle: the practice of democracy, of criticism and self-criticism, the increasing responsibility of populations for the direction of their lives, literacy work, creation of schools and health services, training of cadres from peasant and worker backgrounds and many other achievements. When we consider these features, we see that the armed liberation struggle is not only a product of culture but also a determinant of culture. This is without doubt for the people the prime recompense for the efforts and sacrifices which war demands. In this perspective, it behooves the liberation movement to define clearly the objectives of cultural resistance as an integral and determining part of the struggle (Cabral, "National Liberation and Culture," in Return to the Source, 1973:39-40, 52-53, 55).

Ten years after returning to Panama from Guinea-Bissau

(which achieved its independence in 1974), Spadafora renounced

363

his position of Vice Minister in Omar Torrijos’ government and

placed notices in newspapers calling for volunteers to fight

with the Sandinistas against the Somoza dictatorship. In late

September 300 Panamanians left for Costa Rica from where they

would train and then infiltrate Nicaragua.

The members of the "Brigada Victoriano Lorenzo” selected

Spadafora to lead them.

Spadafora's Intenationalist Brigade fought alongside Eden

Pastora's Frente Benjamin Zeledon on the southern front, south of

Lake Nicaragua and west to Rivas. The Internationalist Brigade

attracted considerable media attention and Spadafora was very

effective with the press. Somoza denounced him as a communist.

On June 11, 1979, Somoza called a special news conference to

announce that Spadafora had been killed and showed his supposedly

captured driver's license and voter's registration as proof

(fictionalized in the Hollywood movie, "Under Fire" with Nick

Nolte).

"What happened was we had been in fierce combat for over a

week and the National Guard mobilized a large ground force

supported by the "Push and Pulls" and counterattacked and we had

to get out fast. I had to abandon my pack and it contained some

identity cards and my address book. When they had these in their

hands they concluded I was dead -- and the loss of that address

book almost did kill me."

The day after Somoza's announcement Spadafora spoke to the

press and spoke also on Radio Sandino about the role of

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Panamanians in the struggle for Nicaragua: "We are here

because we are Americanists who believe that with Nicaragua

a struggle is being freed whose importance will extend beyond

the borders of the country of Sandino and Dario."

"Yes, we talked like that because we believed in those

ideals. The ideals made up for the deficiencies. The FSLN was

badly organized, coordination was poor, and everyone had many

equipment problems. Eden was disorganized and at the same time

too centralized. Somehow everyone overcame these things to

achieve a victory."

"What we were fighting for was to free Nicaragua from

Somoza's totalitarian dictatorship and North American

imperialism. What we did not foresee was that some sectors

within the Frente Sandinista secretly planned to take over

after the FSLN combatants and the Nicaraguan people overthrew

Somoza and the National Guard. The communists' plan they call

themselves "Marxists" was to wait for the democratic forces of

the Revolution to achieve a military victory, and then working

within the new government to seize control of the Revolution and

to purge the democratic leaders and to destroy the democratic

sectors. And they did that. They took over control

and invited in Soviet imperialism and the nine pseudo-comandantes

became the new totalitarian dictatorship."

"None of the nine comandantes actually fought in the

Revolution. They did not command. Borges showed up on the

southern front one day, borrowed a camouflage jacket and a FAL

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and had his picture taken with Eden and me. Instead of fighting

against Somoza and the National Guard, the nine plotted against

the democratic revolutionaries and the Nicaraguan people."

On April 15, 1982 Pastora denounced the nine comandantes and

vowed to regain the revolution by military means. He invited many

people to join him, including Spadafora who had been living in

Panama since July 1979. Spadafora came in late 1982 and took a

position as comandante of an ARDE unit.

This war was to be a different one than they had fought

against Somoza and the National Guard. The 1978-79 war had been

urban based in location and composition. But once in power, the

Marxist FSLN moved quickly to protect itself from urban-based

guerrillas by confiscating all household weapons, and by focusing

its internal repression forces --State Security (DGSE),

Sandinista Defense committees (CDS), informers, and eventually

the "turbas" (the divine "mobs”) -- in the cities and towns. Thus,

ARDE leaders planned to unite with indigenous peoples and

campesinos and to base military operations in the countryside and

distant forests. This is where anti-Sandinista resentment was

greatest and the terrain most favorable for fighting a guerrilla­

style war. ARDE's plan to regain the revolution was to begin with

a rural insurrection that choked off the cities.

Beginning May 2, 1983 Spadafora led an ARDE group into

southeastern Nicaragua (and southern Yapti Tasba) for political

and civic action work with the scattered and isolated Ladino

communities and ranches and farms. Miskito fighters accompanied

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him and they each carried three extra AK-47s and quantities of

ammunition. For five months Hugo and the Miskito marched from

place to place, only occasionally returning to Costa Rica for

more arms and supplies. Hugo talked to the Ladino farmers and

ranchers about ARDE's objectives in the war, showed people how

to use, clean and care for a weapon, and left one or two in each

place. At the same time, as they marched the Miskito talked to

Hugo about the nature and goals of their war against the

Sandinistas.

Despite ARDE's analysis and plans for a rural insurrection,

Pastora maintained much of his well-equipped FRS force out of

harm's way on the Costa Rican side of the Rio San Juan where

food, clothes and military supplies could be brought easily by

road, river and air. At the same time, deep inside Nicaragua and

Yapti Tasba thousands of Ladinos, Miskito, Sumo, Rama and Creoles

were willing to fight and had a civilian support base but had no

weapons.

Hugo tried to get Pastora to move deeper into Nicaragua, to

decentralize the command and to allow the ARDE comandantes to

make more independent decisions, to truly recognize and support

the demands for autonomy on the east coast, to give more support

and material to the Misurasata fighters. A few hundred Ladino

FRS fighters on the edge of the Rio San Juan received good weapons

and material while the Yapti Tasbans were almost empty handed

even though Pastora's warehouses were full. Pastora and ARDE were

receiving many times more money and assistance than he

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had during the insurrection against Somoza, but with all these

riches, little was being done. It was frustrating to see the

folly of not sharing the abundant ARDE resources with its own

ally, Misurasata, and losing the present war, only because of

fear of some future east coast autonomy program.

Pastora blamed the CIA for the small size of his FRS force

(less than 2000, that is, about the size as his Benjamín Zeledón

Brigrade in the 1979 insurrection) and for the lack of logistics

to move further inside Nicaragua. But the fact was that the CIA

had supplied Pastora with 25 million dollars in military and

financial assistance (flown in from El Salvador and Panama) and

was also urging him to move off the Río San Juan.

Spadafora told Pastora that from what he saw and did on his

long trip inside, the conditions clearly exist for civilian

support of the FRS force sin Chontales and western Zelaya. In

this way, Pastora could greatly reduce the expensive and

counterproductive Costa Rica-based supply network which absorbed

more than 60 percent in overhead, and use the savings and

the material on hand to arm the Misurasata allies and the people

in central and western Zelaya. But, the answer was no.

As a result, Spadafora and other ARDE comandantes were forced

to stand by helplessly and watch available funds and resources

being squandered and knowing the great desire and great potential

of the east coast, which Spadafora called “a gigantic Monimbó"

after the west coast Indian community that started the urban

insurrection against Somoza (and was the first urban center

to rise up against the Sandinistas during their forced military

recruiting).

Hugo believed that the principal force that could defeat the

Sandinista military dictatorship would be a rural insurrection

led by the Indian and campesino peoples of the east coast. "Only

with the Indians and the Atlantic Coast is it possible to win

the war." Spadafora saw that only the coast had the resources,

space and sufficiently determined civilian population to support

a large guerrilla force of thousands.

"It is absurd that the leadership puts all of its interest in

supporting a minority sector, meanwhile ignoring the enormous

potential force of thousands of Indians, whites, blacks and

mestizos that are waiting for their weapons. This situation

represents a setback of months in the march toward Managua and

it will impede victory as long as this situation lasts" (La

Nacion Internacional, San Jose, November 3, 1983).

After being with Pastora and ARDE's FRS for almost a year,

Spadafora quit in September, 1983 to join with Misurasata (I

missed meeting him then because I had just come out from the

trip with Bruno to the central coast and returned immediately to

the U.S.).

Hugo again was a volunteer and worked under the command of

Brooklyn Rivera, the Coordinator of Misurasata. His presence

brought additional media attention to Misurasata. Hugo made

several trips inside where he and Misurasata units visited Ladino

settlers and frontier communities to the west of Pearl Lagoon.

368

These people are fervently anti-Sandinista and were interested

in supporting a combined Indian-campesino force. North of the

Awal Tara (Rio Grande) the Misurasata unit Hugo was with armed

40 Ladino farmers.

At the same time, Hugo began to see Misurasatas' internal

problems. In many ways Rivera was a Miskito analogue of Pastora:

he had a very good political perspective -- especially for

foreign audiences, and a very bad military record. Rivera

maintained good relations with the press and bad relations with

his own commanders and fighters. Democracy was promised in the

future but not practiced; criticism was not allowed; and

subservience was maintained by economic dependency. As with

Pastora and ARDE, most of Misurasata's funds went for overhead

expenses in Costa Rica, there was no financial accountability,

the units inside received little if anything, loss of equipment

and money from theft, unnecessary dori sinkings and tip-off

confiscations eroded what precious little there was to begin

with. Spadafora wanted to get more external assistance for

Mitsurasata, but once inside the organization, he experienced

the frustration of the Misurasata comandantes who were simply

trying to make effective use of what existed before it was lost,

stolen or traded. They had to pursue the war with only lukewarm

support from Rivera who believed more in political than military

confrontation.

Again frustrated by the waste of human and war materials,

Hugo continued to fight at the side of the Misurasata military

369

units and east coast communities, but he had increasing concerns

about Rivera's leadership decisions and actions in San Jose.

The Misurasata comandantes told Hugo to quit worrying and

make do with the scraps; things could be worse, he could be with

Steadman Fagoth's Misura where there were serious leadership

problems.

It was no surprise to Hugo that this revolution had

contradictions. Every revolution has internal problems hidden by

external expectations. Internal problems are simply part of

equation and necessary for continued development of solutions to

thatched-roof politics. Internal problems were usually offset

and then tolerated because of the much greater problems posed by

the Sandinista regime.

Hugo fought against dictatorial regimes backed by European,

American and Soviet imperialism. He had learned, developed and

practiced revolutionary theory in three wars in the Third World:

against a white colonial power in Africa, and against a U.S.­

backed right-wing dictatorship and a Soviet-backed left-wing

dictatorship in Nicaragua. His fourth war was with the Fourth

World whose peoples, nations and rights are not recognized

internationally, and whose revolutionary theories and goals are

little known.

The collaboration

We envisioned writing three pieces: the first an overall

statement on the geopolitical importance of indigenous nations

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371

in the confrontation against totalitarian states; the second a

presentation of Miskito revolutionary theory and practice; and

the third a declaration of unified campesino and Indian

revolutionary theory as a basis for struggles in this hemisphere

to liberate both Third and Fourth world peoples (and not one at

the expense of the other) in terms of their own endemic

histories, cultures, ideologies, and aspirations -­ instead of

something foreign imposed from the west or east, left or right.

We outlined what we wanted to say and then divided

responsibility for writing different sections. Hugo did 11

sections and concentrated on the geopolitical significance of

what he called the natural alliance between campesinos and

Indians. Hugo’s central thesis was that for the Indian and

campesino peoples in the Americas and those fighting against

the FSLN, democracy and liberty begin with rights to their land.

I wrote 10 sections that focused on the hemispheric importance

of Indian resistance to the FSLN -- the first enemies to the

first Marxist state on the American mainland. I developed the

main thesis that Indian societies and ideologies are

fundamentally opposed to centralized totalitarian states and

thus represent a cultural barricade against the spread of

oppression. We used the then recently published Kissinger

Commission Report to demonstrate the failure of the West (and by

extension the East) to recognize the existence of Indian peoples

and territories and their hemispheric geopolitical importance.

372

Hugo was a meticulous and tireless writer and editor. He

thought about every word. We would talk about an idea and how we

wanted to formulate it, make an outline of examples and

supporting arguments, and then go for a walk in Parque Morazán

or to get a cafe con leche at the nearby Hotel Balmoral and

talk more about it.

As we were nearing completion, Hugo's long-time friend,

Guillermo Sánchez Borbón, a journalist with Panama's opposition

newspaper La Prensa, joined us and spent some time going over

preliminary drafts of our paper and discussed with us the press

and Nicaragua.

"United States and European journalists -- Hugo you know

many of them, seem to feel some responsibility for colonialism

and imperialism in Central America and for ignoring the evil and

terror of Somoza's Nicaragua and they want to atone for these

inherited sins."

"So they come to Central America on a three-day trip and

because we are thought to be simple people with but visceral

emotions, they do no research and accept the prepackaged

stereotypes churned out by the solidarity groups and totalitarian

governments and movements. In Nicaragua, the continuation of

the same revolution is called a "counterrevolution".

"Guillermo," Hugo says, "the problem is not only the naive

acceptance of the misinformation handed out by the FSLN

dictatorship, it is that the western media only covers the war

from the most accessible and marginal edges and neglects the

natural epicenter of this war which is being fought by campesinos

and Indians in the mountains and in the east coast lowlands."

"Neglect is a most important part of our trade,” Sánchez

Borbón observes. "A story from the capital usually represents a

safe and a salaried journalist. Not everyone works on speculation

as you do, Hugo."

Spadafora smiles, "Yes that is so. But the problem of

reporting the war while far from the war is more complicated.

For example, the press perceives and makes one side of the war

known through the lamentable perspective of the Nicaraguan

resistance leaders and organizations who are outside the country.

They place themselves at the center of the struggle and complain

about there being too little money and too many traitors. The

press attention feeds the inflated egos so characteristic of

leaders and they become more selfish, jealous and egotistical.

We the comandantes and combatants and the people who fight and

suffer inside see these leaders and organizations as fighting

only for themselves and that they represent serious obstacles to

winning the war, which after all, is inside where the assistance

should be directed."

"So instead of reporting the war, the journalists report

the arguments and accusations within the leadership and between

the organizations -– Pastora vs Robelo, ARDE vs the FDN,

Mitsurasata vs Misura, and Rivera vs Fagoth. All these leaders

and organizations are hundreds of kilometers from the war. But

the press accepts what they say nonetheless because no one has

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to get dirty or get shot at or go without food. Journalists

believe that once they understand all the leadership positions

and accusations, then they understand the war. And for them this

is the news, and for the world, this becomes the war."

"I have read a lot of newspapers," I say, "but I have yet

to see a story where a journalist has reported this war

firsthand as many do in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Lebanon,

or as they did in Vietnam. From this I conclude that either

all the war correspondents are in the Middle East and Southwest

and Southeast Asia -- and the major papers only have hotel

bar correspondents left to send here, or that the press has

already made a determination of which side it would like to

see win."

"Exactly. This is the most important war in Latin America

and one of the least reported anywhere," Hugo tells us. "We had

many journalists visiting us and traveling with us when we fought

against Somoza, but now that we are fighting against the

Sandinista communists we are almost alone. And the Indian war is

even more invisible."

"These things are so," Sánchez Borbón says. "That is why

you two must write. Many in my profession will never see or write

as you do. Other things are looked for and found."

"That is because for many Europeans," Sánchez Borbón continues,

"Nicaragua represents a paradise, just like the New World was

seen as a paradise for the Spanish Conquistadors who saw non-

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existent things and meaning -- mermaids, the Fountain of Youth,

cities of gold, new, untainted beginnings. The big story on the

Nicaraguan Revolution is paradise found but threatened.

Russia, China, Nicaragua ... each generation of journalists must

have a paradise somewhere. After Nicaragua falls from grace, we

will create a new paradise in another poor country surrounded by

dragons."

Our paper is published in Costa Rica in La Nacion

Internacional, January 26, 1984 ("La Lucha de Los Indios En

Nicaragua y la Comisión Kissinger"). Sánchez Borbón carries a

draft of the paper and publishes it in La Estrella de Panama,

February 12, 1984. Hugo includes it in a September 1984 update

of his book, Las Derrotas Somocista y Comunista en Nicaragua.

Inside and outside

By September 1984, Misurasata and Misura forces controlled 80

percent of the Yapti Tasba countryside and the FSLN was holed up

in the garrisoned towns and cities. At the same time, the deeply

divided exiled Misura and Misurasata leaders were far from

rapprochement and their external political organizations were

not meeting the needs of the fighters inside.

Misurasata Comandante David Rodriquez organized a meeting

between 16 Misura and Misurasata comandantes in Layasiksa, August

14, 1984 to analyze the military and political situation. They

concluded that the differences between the exiled leaders and

organizations differences were superficial, personal and

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immaterial and they united their Misura and Misurasata units

into the Internal Front. They also concluded that they did not

have sufficient military supplies to press the FSLN to the wall.

The resistance inside could not consider launching knockout

assaults on the dug-in FSLN because military supplies were

running dangerously low due to the U.S. Congress' Boland

Amendment which stopped military assistance earlier in 1984, and

because both the FDN and ARDE Contras would not share their

stockpiled war materiel.

The relationship between Misura and the FDN in Honduras

continued to be antagonistic and unproductive. Misurasata and

ARDE split in July, 1984 over internal disagreements set off by a

leadership squabble between Eden Pastora (FRS), Alfonso Robelo

(MON) and various comandantes.

Pastora was wounded by a bomb assassination attempt during a

meeting with journalists at his La Penca base, May 30, 1984.

During Pastora's recuperation in Venezuela, the CIA tried to get

his FRS commanders to break with ARDE or to set up a new

leadership without Pastora. Offers of $5000 were made to each of

the commanders. ARDE leader Alfonso Robelo concurred with the

plan. Though Pastora averted this challenge to his leadership,

it was the beginning of the end for ARDE as long-standing

internal disputes intensified over

war" strategy.

Pastora's "prolonged border

At the same time, Nicaraguans in ARDE solidified their

opposition to Yapti Tasba autonomy. One shooting incident

occurred between Misurasata and FRS fighters and several others

narrowly were averted. Misurasata pulled out of ARDE in September,

1984.

Brooklyn Rivera and the top leadership of Misurasata decided

that it was the time to convert the military successes into a

political victory by discussions and negotiations with the

embattled FSLN. In October, 1984 a secret meeting between

Rivera, Daniel Ortega and U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy in a New

York hotel room paved the way for a Misurasata visit to Nicaragua

and Yapti Tasba (October 20-31), and a first round of formal

negotiations with the FSLN in Bogota, Colombia, December 6-7,

1984.

Our small group of advisors to Misurasata supported the

initiative to negotiate a settlement to the Yapti Tasba war.

Mitsurasata Foreign Minister Armstrong Wiggins (Indian Law

Resource Center) and advisors Steve Tullberg (Indian Law Resource

Center), Jim Anaya (National Indian Youth Council) and Ted

McDonald (Cultural Survival) backed Rivera's peace plan and the

decision to enter into negotiations with the FSLN leadership. As

an advisor, I did too, but perhaps for different reasons: the

fighters and the civilians inside were getting shortchanged and

they faced heavy military retaliation because the Soviets were

upgrading the FSLN occupation forces with much more sophisticated

equipment and more of it. This was happening at the same time

supplies to the Misurasata and Misura resistance forces were being

reduced sharply. We needed a time out.

377

Hugo agreed with my analysis but he disagreed with my

conclusion. Yes, he told me, the antagonistic exiled leadership

presented a detrimental situation, and inside the resistance's

military advantages were disintegrating, but, he warned me,

instead of negotiating with the enemy, what is necessary to do is

to restructure the resistance.

Hugo met with Brooklyn in San Jose in mid-September, 1984.

He presented a different solution for the problem of declining

assistance. First of all, the CIA had just delivered 200 complete

"equipos" -- boots-to-bayonets -- to Misurasata units inside.

Second, in order to weather the political vagaries in Washington

or elsewhere, Misurasata should move its political leaders and

cadres inside with the fighters to cut off the economic

dependency and waste and to become more self-reliant and to be at

the side of the people and to strengthen their cultural and

political resistance. This alone would be at least a 60 percent

savings. Third, every effort should be focused on finding

alternative assistance which should be delivered directly inside.

Hugo's argument to Brooklyn was straight forward: move as

much as possible inside political leaders, external

assistance, communications, civic action, etc. -- to strengthen

the struggle against the FSLN, but don't negotiate with them.

Brooklyn disagreed totally with Hugo's recommendations for

prolonged guerrilla warfare. Hugo disagreed totally with

Brooklyn's plan to seek a political solution. Their differences

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exploded into an open rupture that ripped Misurasata down the

middle. The political people sided with Brooklyn and the military

people sided with Hugo.

Hugo and many of the very best Misurasata comandantes -­

including those I'd been inside with such as Negrito, Prari, and

Biawan -- organized for a military solution inside Yapti Tasba at

the community level. I opted for going after the political solution

outside Yapti Tasba at the international level.

We maintained frequent contact by phone and letters though we

pursued different trajectories toward the same target.

Looking back, I have to say that Hugo was correct in his

assessment: the resistance should have moved most everything

inside and prepared for prolonged low intensity warfare and high

intensity civic action. Though ultimately political action

secured some of the Yapti Tasba revolution's goal, it did not

defeat the revolution's enemies. In pursuing military action,

Hugo disturbed a network within a network that led to his murder.

Hugo's Group

In late September, 1984 Hugo began to organize a small group

of people in Costa Rica to serve as the conduit for direct

deliveries of arms inside Yapti Tasba. "Hugo's Group" as it was

called included Victoriano Morales ("Risa"), a Panamanian who had

fought in the International Brigade with Hugo against Somoza;

Felipe Vidal ("Cuban Max" also known as "Max Morgan"), a Cuban­

American who was a CIA contract agent; Rudy Sinclair, a political

380

leader from the south coast of Yapti Tasha; and several commanders

including "Coyote", "Danto", "Pyuta", "Largo", and others. Coyote

said Hugo was the only "Spaniard" he ever trusted. Everyone called

Hugo "the Old Man."

With the Boland Amendment in October, 1984, the U.S. Congress

barred all military assistance to the “Contras”. Even though the

Yapti resistance forces weren’t “Contras” and weren’t even

mentioned in the legislation, they inherited the arms cutoff. This

meant that Misurasata, Misura and Hugo’s Group had to seek either

private or covert assistance.

It is at this point that things get somewhat murky. Hugo

could not mention specifics in letters or telephone calls. letter

to me dated October 4, 1984, Hugo wrote:

About my work, as you know, it is not possible to say in this letter the things I would like to tell you. The only one I can tell you is that really I am sure that in a short time thing -- I mean the war -­ will enter a new stage that will be much more dynamic. And I feel that I will work on the Atlantic Coast finally in the way I hope and you know.

In the fall of 1984, operating out of the National Security

Council in Washington, Lt. Colonel Oliver North organized a secret

network to supply weapons to anti-Sandinista forces. The North

plan called for a coordinated effort between private individuals,

foreign governments and a small circle of U.S. government people

to obtain and funnel money and weapons to groups in Honduras and

Costa Rica. Rob Owen, North's assistant, made several trips to

Central A m e r i c a to discuss plans and logistics with

various people. Key to the plan was the cooperation of

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of Panama and Manuel Noriega, head of the Panamanian Defense

Forces.

Panama had played a vital role in the overthrow of Somoza.

After Pastora's daring 1978 raid on Somoza's Parliament, Eden

flew to Panama where he was warmly welcomed by President Omar

Torrijos, and his trusted aides Hugo Spadafora and Manuel

Noriega. Torrijos and Spadafora questioned Pastora on

Sandinista politics and plans and found that in Pastora they

had a political ally who was a non-communist, social democrat

revolutionary. Torrijos decided to support the Sandinistas

through Pastora and asked Noriega, PDF Chief of Intelligence,

to obtain and channel weapons to Pastora's forces in northern

Costa Rica. The first weapons came from the PDF. Torrijos sent

Noriega to Cuba to request more arms for the Sandinistas from

Castro. This was accomplished. And Venezuela also provided

weapons. Noriega controlled the logistical pipeline from Cuba

and Venezuela through Panama to Costa Rica.

Torrijos' friend Hugo Spadafora formed the Victoriano

Lorenzo Brigade to fight alongside Pastora on the Southern

Front. Named for a hero in Panama's fight for independence

from Colombia, Hugo's brigade of "internationalists" was made

up of mostly Panamanian PDF people.

Noriega and Spadafora had a visceral dislike for each

other, but managed to operate successfully to anchor each

end of the weapons pipeline to the Sandinistas.

382

Six years later, Oliver North devised the plan to reactivate

the Panama weapons pipeline, but this time instead of Cuba and

Venezuela, the arms would come from El Salvador and Cuba (and later,

West and East Germany, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere). With Torrijos'

death in a 1981 airplane crash, General Manuel Noriega was firmly

in control of Panama. Noriega agreed to assist.

Pastora had obtained some arms and supplies from Panama

beginning in 1983. Sebastian "Guachán" Gonzalez, ARDE's head of

logistics, had coordinated the deliveries from Panama by truck and

small plane (to the Tobias Bolaños airfield near the Pavas on the

western edge of San Jose). "Guachán" was picked to coordinate

the new deliveries from Panama to Pastora.

Rob Owen found that ARDE and Misurasata fighters and

commanders were angry over Pastora's and Rivera's handling of

resources and military planning. Almost everyone agreed with

Spadafora that the fighters and logistical supply network had to

be moved from the Costa Rica border area to deep inside Nicaragua

and Yapti Tasha. This strategy was the principle reason for the

boiling dispute between Pastora and Spadafora and the simmering

dispute between Rivera and Spadafora.

Pastora and Rivera openly denounced Spadafora and his small

group of followers. Direct assistance to those fighting the war

would threaten the power and control of the exile leadership. It

was seen as a CIA plot to destabilize ARDE and Misurasata.

Owen recommended to Oliver North that Hugo's Group be

supported. North had reached the same conclusion as Spadafora:

383

support for the war had to be delivered to the war. In a May 20,

1985 memo to North, Owen wrote

As for getting some military operations started, my recommendation is you supply enough arms and ammunition to equip some 50 men to go inside and

make contact with the fighters, Pastora's and the Indians'. They will come out with the necessary contacts and coordinates to start resupplying directly inside either by air or boat. Also good intelligence. The people are there as are the leaders. The three leaders would be Hugo Spadafora [sic), Felipe Vidal and Risa, who [Risa) came out about 3 months ago and had 680 men under him. Granted, none of the 3 are Nicaraguan, but they are respected by the people inside and have been in before for extended periods of time. They don't want to see a border war fought as they know it will accomplish nothing.

Later, in an August 2, 1985 memo to North, Owen wrote,

referring to Spadafora, Vidal and Risa, "These people are

Qualified and can be trusted, though many people want to ;

discredit them just because they are willing to go inside and

take the war to the Sandinistas."

Hugo's Group was to coordinate the delivery of weapons

inside to Yapti Tasbans and Nicaraguan campesinos. The objective

was to form a Brigada Latinoamericana to liberate Nicaragua and

the occupied territories. Hugo's larger objective after Nicaragua

was to use this Brigada as the core of a "Brigada Internacional

simón Bolivar" of volunteer veteran fighters independent of

superpowers and Latin American governments who would be the

military counterbalance to remove dictatorship from the

Americas. After Nicaragua, the Brigada would remove Noriega from

leadership in Panama, then fight in Cuba, and then turn to South

America. Hugo's main strategic thesis was that campesinos and

I

Indians were natural allies because of their common ties to the

land and would participate in a land-based democratic revolution

that would sweep through and liberate Latin and Indian America.

The problem was that Hugo didn't have anything approaching

the resources necessary to begin this scale of operation. So

Felipe Vidal who worked with the CIA on contract brought in

outside support through a woman in Miami named Lily, a Cuban

named Paquito, John Hull, and ultimately Rob Owen who connected

Hugo's Group to Oliver North.

Ironically, Hugo's Group sought to begin its Don Quiote­

like quest to liberate the Americas by getting weapons from the

Oliver North network.

In 1985 Hugo's Group was able to supply some weapons to the

fighters inside Yapti Tasba. Rivera was livid; the resistance

comandantes were elated. The source of the weapons was Panama.

The Double Figure a Network

Set up in 1985, the North supply line to the "Southern

Front" (ARDE, UDN-FARN, FDN) formed a Figure 8 centered on the

John Hull ranch in northern Costa Rica (Fig. 20). Privately­

leased planes flew from Florida with weapons, picked up more at

the Ilopango air field in San Salvador, air dropped some to

combat units inside Nicaragua, while some planes flew direct to

the Hull ranch to offload and then return to Florida. The

southern loop in the Figure 8 was formed by planes from Panama

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that carried Israeli-supplied weapons (Marshall, Scott, Hunter,

1987: 98-100) to the Hull Ranch and returned to Panama. Some of

the weapons were earmarked for Hugo's Group.

The Panama weapons network was piggybacked onto a pre­

existing drug trafficking route between Colombia, Panama, Costa

Rica and the United states. Beginning in 1982 or 1983, cocaine was

sent to Noriega's intermediaries in Panama by the Medellin Cartel

(Jesus Humberto Vega Escobar) for transshipment to the United States

via Costa Rica, the Bahamas and elsewhere. In 1984, Spadafora

found out that Floyd Carlton, an old friend and once Noriega's

personal pilot, had been flying cocaine out of Panama for the

General. Carlton gave Spadafora the dates of the cocaine flights

and wrote them down in his notebook that was crammed with details

on Noriega's criminal activities.

What Spadafora didn't find out for some time was that his two

closest aides, Victoriano Morales known as Risa, and Felipe Vidal

-- known as "Cuban Max" were also involved in drug trafficking,

along with Sebastián "Guachán" González, who had been in charge of

ARDE's logistic network.

Airplanes flying weapons to the Southern Front from Panama

also carried cocaine. According to someone who once worked at the

ranch, almost every two days a flight from Panama or El Salvador

would land at John Hull's ranch. The planes from El Salvador carried

weapons; the planes from Panama carried weapons and cocaine. The

cocaine was transferred to a plane returning to Florida or to

Florida via El Salvador. Sometimes the El Salvador

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387

and Panama planes landed at the same time and the transfers were

done immediately.

In mid-1985 Hugo found out that Risa and Felipe Vidal had been

active in transshipping drugs from Colombia and Noriega to Florida.

Vidal had considerable quantities of money that weren't part of

the military operations. Hugo confronted Vidal and Risa with his

information and demanded to know the source of the money. Hugo

became very angry at his companions for contaminating the clean,

democratic revolution he envisioned. According to others in Hugo's

Group, a bitter argument resulted. Risa and Vidal told Hugo that he

was too idealistic and that the Panamanian arms supply wouldn't

function if it weren't for the cocaine shipments.

Long in opposition to Noriega's strongman rule of Panama -­

Hugo was the first to publicly denounce Noriega for corruption,

graft, human rights violations and drug trafficking, Spadafora was

determined to distance his group from the cocaine trafficking and to

denounce Noriega and the drug network. In July, 1985 Hugo met with

Robert Nieves, the new head of the DEA (US Drug Enforcement

Administration) in Costa Rica (Dinges 1990: 213-214). He told Nieves

that he had evidence of Noriega's cocaine trafficking. Hugo expected

that Nieves would bring the accusations to the attention of Washington,

a n d that an ensuing investigation would remove Noriega and his

trafficking of cocaine for the Medellin Cartel. Hugo told Nieves that

he had proof and sources and gave Risa's name.

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On September 7, Saturday, Hugo met again with Nieves to ask

what had happened. Nieves told him that nothing had happened. The

accusations were not backed by hard facts and without facts and

evidence, nothing could be done to launch an investigation of

Noriega. (And as John Dinges suggests in his book on Noriega

(1990: 214) it was unlikely that Nieves who was new in the U.S.

Embassy in Costa Rica, was going to present Spadafora's accusations

to hardline anti-communist Ambassador Lewis Tambs who was a key

person along with Noriega in the anti-Sandinista supply network.)

Spadafora told Nieves that he could produce He said he would get

it from Panama. Hugo already had considerable proof of Noriega's

involvement in drug trafficking. Much was written down in his

notebook, including the flight dates for cocaine shipments made by

Floyd Carlton and the amounts paid to Noriega by the Cartel for

the protection and transshipment. But Hugo also had some leads to

more conclusive hard evidence in Panama.

In The Iran Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert

Operations in the Reagan Era, authors Marshall, Scott and Hunter

report that

In the autumn of 1985 Alvin Weeden, a Panamanian attorney and former secretary general of the Popular

Action Party (PAPO) said that Gen. Manuel Antonio

Noriega, commander-in-chief of the Panama Defense Forces, obtained the "material needed by the Southern

Front to continue its struggle" from Israel. Noriega then distributed the supplies to ARDE, and, according

to Weeden, in the process made himself some money.

Weeden said his information came from Dr. Hugo

Spadafora. Spadafora, a Panamanian physician who had

fought with other guerrilla movements, had been

fighting with ARDE and had enlisted Weeden to

represent him in declarations he planned to make about

Noriega’s malfeasance and links with narcotics

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traffickers. Spadafora was murdered soon after.

Weeden says the physician left ARDE because of

Pastora's close connection with Noriega (1987: 99-

100).

The Murder of Hugo Spadafora

Hugo decided to return to Panama to get more evidence on

Noriega's drug trafficking. He told people in his group that he was

going there to sell a family apartment house to raise money for the

Brigade project. He met alone with Risa and Vidal. Others who knew

about his trip were contacts in the Costa Rican intelligence agency,

DIS, and the in the DEA.

Guillermo Sánchez Borbón wrote a moving investigative report

on the murder of his old friend ("Hugo Spadafora's Last Day -- A

Murder in Panama Undoes a Regime," Harper's, June, 1988, pp. 56-

62).

On the day they were going to kill him --Friday the

thirteenth of September 1985 -- Dr. Hugo Spadafora got

up at six in the morning to do his yoga. Later, after his shower, he put on a striped, long sleeve shirt and

coffee-colored trousers and had breakfast with his wife Ariadne. Then he packed his bag, a canvas sports bag,

placing in it his diary (it was book-size, bound in vinyl, with a page for each day, the sort professionals

keep for noting appointments) and some copies of the memoir he'd published in 1980. He’d been living in San

Jose, Costa Rica, and commuting to the war in Nicaragua,

but today he was going home to Panama.

Hugo flew in a light plane to an airstrip near the border,

took a taxi to the border, crossed at Paso Canoa and at 1 2 :15

P.M. caught a minibus for David where he intended to get a fast

bus bound for Panama City. But Francisco Eliécer González, a

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sergeant in the PDF and an G-2 agent, got on the minibus with Hugo

and at Concepcion, a PDF garrison 20 miles south of the border,

Gonzalez and another PDF sergeant, Omar Vega Miranda, took Hugo

off the bus and to the PDF base.

Sánchez Borbón writes, "The 'operation' that followed wasn't

an impromptu affair. I'm sure the PDF knew exactly when Hugo left

San Jose, probably knew it the moment he booked his passage" (1988:

60).

Some days earlier, General Manuel Antonio Noriega had been in

Cuzco, Peru, 11 for a meeting with Bolivian drug lord William Pizarro

-- this according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs in

Washington, which says the subject discussed was Hugo Spadafora,

his declarations to the DEA, and what should be done with him

(Sánchez Borbón, 1988: 60).

Noriega was in Paris when Hugo was taken off the minibus and

brought to the PDF post at Concepcion, in Chiriquí Province.

Sánchez Borbón reports (1988:60) that on September 13, the U.S.

National Security Agency monitored a telephone conversation

between General Manuel Noriega in Paris and PDF Major Luis

Córdoba in Chiriquí:

Cordoba: We have the rabid dog.

Noriega: And what does one do with a dog that has rabies?

At Concepcion and in other locations during the afternoon and

evening, Hugo was beaten and tortured. According to Sánchez

Borbón, the autopsy showed that sharp objects were jabbed under

his fingernails, severe and prolonged beatings were done, his

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inner thigh muscles were cut through so he couldn't close his legs

and then they beat his testicles and rammed a pole or some other

piece of wood up his rectum, his kidneys were -- damaged by blows

-- perhaps kicks or rifle butts -- and two of his ribs were broken,

and then they tattooed an “F-8” on Hugo's shoulder (F-8 is a torture

squad made up of PDF psychotics). Early in the evening, mutilated

but still alive, he was taken to PDF post at Corozo where they held

him down on the cement floor of the barracks while the cook sat

astride his chest and used a butcher knife to cut off Hugo's head.

The headless body was placed in a

U.S. mailbag and dumped in a ravine in Costa Rica, just across the

border (Sánchez Borbón, 1988: 60-62).

Hugo's last trip to Panama threatened to expose Noriega and

the drug trafficking network, and, potentially, the arms supply

network. Noriega was a key figure in these two overlapping systems

with their linkages to anti-Sandinista groups, Colombia, Israel,

El Salvador, the United States, Cuba, and, of course, Panama itself

and top people in the PDF and government.

Who called ahead to tip off the General and his PDF sadists

that Spadafora was on his way to Panama by the usual route?

Noriega's Panamanian intelligence operatives? Someone in ARDE or

Misurasata who were threatened by Hugo's plan to move the supply

pipeline inside? Someone involved in the drug- or arms-running

operations who didn't want anybody to jeopardize anything for any

reason? Or someone in Hugo's Group, such as Risa and Vidal who

chaffed under Hugo's commitment to seek weapons free of drug

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trafficking and his idealism to carry the next war to Panama, and

Colombia, if need be, to clean out the corruption and

totalitarian regimes, communist or non-communist.

According to people who were there in San Jose when Risa and

Vidal learned that Hugo was dead, no anguish or surprise was

expressed.

At the memorial service for Hugo held in Costa Rica, his wife

Ari told two in the group, "You will always be my friends because

you were Hugo's friends, but I never want to see Risa again in my

life."

With Hugo out of the way, some real money could be made -­ and

better yet, all in the name of fighting communists and without the

messy business of dealing with the liberation of indigenous nations.

Risa and Vidal took over Hugo's Group and began to try to skim

some profit from the arms supplies. In June, 1986, they were in

charge of logistics for an operation that involved sending 15

fighters from Costa Rica inside by sea to Monkey Point with seven

barrels of bullets, four marked AK-47 and three marked FAL. Risa

and Cuban Max told the men that automatic rifles were to be

delivered by another boat from a mother ship off the coast. No arms

came, the barrels contained pieces of heavy chain instead of

bullets, and the men were on the beach near a Sandinista EPS

garrison with but three weapons between them. A U.S. Government

Accounting Office investigation in August found a bill for $15,000

for boots (bullets) submitted by Risa and Vidal in the name of

Kisan Sur -- a splinter group they assisted.

393

On June 12, 1986, Seymore Hersh in a front-page New York Times

article broke the story about Noriega's participation in cocaine

trafficking, illegal arms trade and money laundering. On February

5, 1988, in Miami, U.S. attorneys announced indictments of General

Manuel Antonio Noriega.

Risa was transferred from Costa Rica to Honduras in 1986 to

work as a CIA contract agent on logistical supply from "private

sources" and the Honduran Fifth Battalion to the Kisan resistance.

Vidal stayed in Costa Rica until 1989 where he led a very reclusive

life. It was rumored that he trembled and was visibly afraid at the

sound of every telephone call or door knock. Something haunted him.

Both Risa and Vidal have been indicted by the United States

and Costa Rica for various alleged gun- and drug-running crimes.

Neither has been apprehended. To avoid criminal charges for drug

trafficking, Sebastian "Guachán" Gonzalez fled Costa Rica in 1984

for Panama where he worked as a veterinarian for President

Delvalle’s race horses and continued his close friendship with

General Noriega. Guachán disappeared before the December 1989 US

invasion of Panama and is rumored to be in Colombia or Bolivia.

Hugo's killers, Luis Cordoba and Mario del Prado, are still free.

When Hugo was murdered the Yapti Tasba resistance lost its

leading advocate of building up an Indian army to topple the

Sandinistas. And the plan for the Brigada Internacional Simón

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Bolivar will wait for the next visionary. Ironically, Noriega's

hand in murdering Hugo to protect himself from being exposed as a

drug trafficker backfired and ultimately led to his exposure and

overthrow. Perhaps Hugo haunts him too.

Sept. 7, 1977 Torrijos-carter Treaties on Canal••• December 31,

1999.

July 31, 1981 General Omar Torrijos dies in a plane crash. Replaced

by General Florencio Flores and later by Genera Ruben Dario

Paredes...who begins to develop pro-U.S. position.

August 1983 General Manuel Noriega replaces General Ruben Dario Paredes. Soon after the National Guard changes its structures and becomes the Panamanian Defense Force.

June 6, 1987 The Ex-chief of the PDF Colonel Roberto Dias Herrera makes serious public denunciations against the leadership of the military. These accusations are taken up by the leaders of the opposition who are the same people who were displaced by the military in October 1968.

590

Spadafora, Hugo

1980 Experiencias y Pensamiento de Un Médico Guerrillero. Panama.

1983 "Entrevista.11 La Nacion Internacional, November 3, San Jose, Costa Rica. (also reprinted in Las Derrotas...)

1983 Las Derrotas Somocista y Nicaragua. San Jose, Costa Rica. edition published in 1984.)

Comunista en

(second, longer

Spadafora, Hugo and Bernard Nietschmann

1984 "La Lucha de Los Indios en Nicaragua y La Comisión Kissinger," La Nacion Internacional, January 26. (also reprinted in Las Derrotas...)