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Former Soviet Biological WeaponsFacilities in Kazakhstan:Past, Present, and Future

Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project

Occasional Paper No. 1

CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIESINSTITUTEMONTEREYOF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Gulbarshyn BozheyevaYerlan KunakbayevDastan Yeleukenov

NOTE FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER

The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies (MIIS) is the largest non-governmental organization in theUnited States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues.The CNS has a staff of more than 45 full-time and 60 part-time personnel, withoffices in Monterey, CA; Washington, DC; and Almaty, Kazakhstan. The mission ofthe CNS is to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the nextgeneration of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information andanalysis.

The CNS is pleased to inaugurate, with this volume, a new series of OccasionalPapers. Each paper will provide extensive new information and analysis on animportant proliferation problem. The papers will be written by leading experts,including senior scholars and talented newcomers to the nonproliferation field.

William C. PotterDirector, Center for Nonproliferation Studies

For more information on the projects and publications of CNS, contact:

Center for Nonproliferation StudiesMonterey Institute of International Studies

425 Van Buren StreetMonterey, California 93940 USA

Tel: 831-647-4154Fax: 831-647-3519

E-mail: [email protected] Web Site: http://cns.miis.edu

Monterey Institute of International Studies, June 1999

PAPERS AVAILABLE FROM CNS:

Occasional Papers

No. 1 Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, and Future,by Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov,June 1999

Working Papers

No. 1 International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas, by Peter Hayes, March 1993

No. 2 Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, compiled byRoland M. Timerbaev, Lisa Moskowitz, and Jacques Vos, June 1993

No. 3 The Ukrainian Nuclear Arsenal: Problems of Command, Control, and Maintenance, byMartin J. DeWing, October 1993

These publications are available for $5 each. Please contact:

Managing EditorCenter for Nonproliferation Studies

Monterey Institute of International Studies425 Van Buren Street

Monterey, California 93940 USATel 831-647-3596Fax 831-647-6534

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CONTENTS

Foreword iiby Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D.

Brief History of the Soviet Biological Weapons (BW) Program 1

The Biopreparat Complex 2Other BW-Related Centers 3

Kazakhstani Elements of the System 4

Vozrozhdeniye Island 4Infrastructure and BW Development 5Dessication of the Aral Sea 6

Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental and Production Base (SNOPB) 8Research and Development Work 9Infrastructure of the Facility 10

Scientific Research Agricultural Institute (NISKhI) 11Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute 12

Initial Efforts at Conversion 13AO Biomedpreparat—Heir to SNOPB 14NISKhI 17Anti-Plague Institute 17

Prospects for Conversion 17Structural and Technological Constraints on Conversion 18Role of Foreign Assistance Programs 19

Conclusions 19

Photographs of SNOPB(1) Building 600, where research was conducted Not Included(2) View of Buildings 600 and 241-244, from Building 221 Not Included(4) Refrigeration units at SNOPB Not Included(5) Buildings 251-252, used to store finished products Not Included(6) Entrance to bunker next to helicopter landing pad Not Included

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FOREWORD

In April 1992, Russian President BorisYeltsin admitted that the Soviet Union and thenRussia had conducted a top-secret offensivebiological warfare (BW) program in violation ofthe 1972 Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention banning the development,production, stockpiling, and transfer of theseweapons. After his admission, President Yeltsinissued an edict committing Russia to eliminateits offensive BW activities and to comply fullywith the treaty. Nevertheless, a number offormer Soviet microbiological research centersunder the control of the Russian Ministry ofDefense remain shrouded in secrecy, and theUS government has assessed that “somefacilities [in Russia], in addition to beingengaged in legitimate activity, may bemaintaining the capability to produce BWagents.”*

Four major BW research, production, andtesting sites also existed in the Soviet republicof Kazakhstan, which in 1991 became anindependent country. In contrast to Russia, theKazakhstani government has been remarkablyopen with respect to the former Soviet facilitieson its territory. Thus, a study focusing on thehistory and status of the Kazakhstani sitesoffers a valuable window into the nature andscope of the Soviet BW program.

In January 1998, the Center forNonproliferation Studies (CNS) at theMonterey Institute of International Studiescommissioned three Kazakhstani experts toprepare a report on the former Soviet BWfacilities in Kazakhstan, their current status, andthe prospects for economic conversion andenvironmental remediation. The authors of thisreport are all superbly qualified. GulbarshynBozheyeva holds a Candidate of Sciences(Ph.D. equivalent) degree in chemistry fromKazakhstan State University and graduatedfrom the Program in InternationalDevelopment Policy at Duke University in theUnited States. She is a member of the CNSCore Group of Nonproliferation Specialists and

* US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ThreatControl Through Arms Control: Annual Report to Congress 1996(Washington, DC: ACDA, 1997), p. 87.

worked at CNS as a Visiting Scholar andResearch Associate. Yerlan Kunakbayev has anM.S. in biology from Moscow State Universityand worked at the Kazakhstan National Centerfor Biotechnology in Stepnogorsk. DastanYeleukenov is an Advisor to the KazakhstaniMinister of Foreign Affairs. He holds aCandidate of Sciences (Ph.D.) degree in physicsand is a member of the CNS Core Group ofNonproliferation Specialists. He is alsoaffiliated with the CNS branch office in Almaty.

Commissioning local Kazakhstani expertsto conduct the data collection and analysis notonly resulted in better quality information thanif foreign analysts had done the work, but itfurthered the CNS mission of buildingcommunities of nonproliferation specialists inthe Newly Independent States of the formerSoviet Union. The study was carried out withthe cooperation of the Government ofKazakhstan and the United States Embassy inAlmaty, whose assistance is much appreciated.

This report should make a significantcontribution to increasing public understandingof what remains a dark chapter of Soviethistory. It is also to be hoped that the RussianFederation will follow Kazakhstan’s lead byproviding a full account of the offensive BWactivities that took place on its territory duringand after the Soviet era. Only by confrontingthe past will the successor states of the formerSoviet Union be able to move forward withother nations, in a spirit of mutual confidenceand security, to build a more stable andprosperous future.

Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., Director Chemical and Biological Weapons

Nonproliferation ProjectMonterey Institute of International Studies

June 1999

Bozheyeva, Kunakbayev, and Yeleukenov

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FORMER SOVIET BIOLOGICAL WEAPONSFACILITIES IN KAZAKHSTAN:PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Kazakhstani facilities involved in theresearch and development, production, andtesting of biological weapons (BW) played a keyrole in the former Soviet BW program.1

Although a number of open publications haveaddressed the former Soviet program in recentyears, few have examined the Kazakhstaniportion of the system.2 This report provides ahistory of Kazakhstani BW facilities anddescribes their current status and futureprospects. The example of Kazakhstan alsohighlights the technical, economic, andfinancial problems associated with convertingformer BW facilities to peaceful activities in thepost-Cold War era.

The first part of this report is devoted toan overview of the Soviet BW system. Thesecond part deals with the history and currentstatus of the four major BW facilities inKazakhstan. The third part examines thepotential for commercial production at thesefacilities and the obstacles they have faced onthe road to conversion. The final part discussesthe future prospects for conversion andenvironmental remediation and makes somepolicy recommendations.

1 In terms of BW capability within the former Soviet Union,Kazakhstani BW facilities were second only to those in Russia.Anthony Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities inKazakhstan,” Center for Russian and East European Studies,the University of Birmingham (UK), undated research paper;interview with specialists from the National Center forBiotechnology (NCB; the umbrella organization for most ofthe former Soviet military and civilian biotechnology facilitiesin Kazakhstan), 1998. Kazakhstan is not a signatory of theBiological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) forfinancial reasons, but it participated as an observer at theFourth Review Conference of the BWC in 1996.2 Rimmington has prepared the most comprehensive report onKazakhstani BW facilities. Rimmington, “Conversion of BWFacilities in Kazakhstan.” Recently, the Kazakhstani authorSamantay Tleubergenov provided some information on theSoviet BW program in Kazakhstan. Samantay T. Tleubergenov,Poligony Kazakhstana (Kazakhstan’s Test Sites) (Almaty: Gylym,1998).

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOVIETBIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM

The Soviet network of facilities involved indeveloping biological weapons consisted of twomain groups: a system under military controldating back to the late 1920s, and a second,top-secret program under civilian cover thatwas created in the 1970s.3 The Red Armyopened the first laboratories for research onpathogenic microorganisms in 1928.4 BWfacilities under the direct authority of the SovietMinistry of Defense (MOD) included theScientific Research Institute of Microbiology inKirov (now Vyatka),5 the Center for Military-Technical Problems of Anti-BacteriologicalDefense in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg),6

and the Center of Virology in Zagorsk (now

3 Only the major elements of the Soviet BW system relevant toKazakhstan are discussed here. Detailed material on otherSoviet BW facilities can be found elsewhere. See, for example,Anthony Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex?The Conversion of Biological Weapons Facilities in theRussian Federation,” Contemporary Security Policy 17 (April 1996),pp. 81-112.4 In 1928, Red Army authorities decided to create a laboratoryon vaccine and serum research at the Vlasikha estate, 30kilometers from the village of Perkhushkovo. The youngscientist Ivan Velikanov was appointed head of the laboratory.In 1931, a laboratory for anthrax research was established inTobolsk, Siberia, and in 1933, a secret bacteriologicallaboratory was opened at Pokrovskiy Monastery in the town ofSuzdal to research highly pathogenic agents. The famouspolitical and military official Kliment Voroshilov was one ofthe first heads of the Soviet BW program in the 1930s.Interview with specialists from the NCB.5 The Red Army’s Scientific Research Institute ofMicrobiology was opened in 1933 in the village ofPerkhushkovo near Moscow. In 1942, it was relocated toKirov, 900 kilometers from Moscow, to avoid capture by theadvancing German Army. Rimmington, “From Military toIndustrial Complex,” p. 83.6 The facility was previously named the Scientific ResearchInstitute of Vaccine Preparations. It was built in 1947 andlocated within Military Compound No.19 in the city ofSverdlovsk. Rimmington, “From Military to IndustrialComplex,” p. 86.

Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan

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Sergiyev Posad).7 These facilities wereadministered by the 15th Directorate forBiological Protection of the MOD.8 AnotherBW facility, the Scientific Research Institute ofMilitary Medicine in Leningrad (now St.Petersburg), reported to the Military-MedicalDirectorate of the MOD.9 VozrozhdeniyeIsland, in the Aral Sea, reported to the 15thDirectorate and was the main testing groundfor biological agents developed at MODfacilities.10

In addition to the centers developingantipersonnel BW agents, another group offacilities worked on microbial agents harmful tolivestock and plants. One such facility, theScientific Research Agricultural Institute(NISKhI) in Gvardeyskiy, Kazakhstan, wasestablished in 1958. While formallysubordinated to the USSR Ministry ofAgriculture, the institute was probablysupervised by the MOD. After the instituteopened, a military unit was posted there toguard the facility and, as a rule, the director ofthe institute held a high military rank. Facilitiesin Russia involved in the development of anti-livestock and anti-crop agents included theScientific Research Institute for AnimalProtection in Vladimir11 and the center in

7 The Sergiyev Posad facility is located about 70 kilometersfrom Moscow. Rimmington, “From Military to IndustrialComplex,” p. 86.8 The 15th Directorate for Biological Protection of theGeneral Staff was headed by General Yefim Smirnov.Interview with specialists from the NCB; Rimmington, “FromMilitary to Industrial Complex,” p. 99.9 The Leningrad institute was created in 1969. The CentralMilitary Medical Directorate, established in 1930, was thehighest administrative body for medical institutions in theMinistry of Defense. Rimmington, “From Military toIndustrial Complex,” pp. 86-87, 99, 102.10 The Kirov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk centers also had theirown small testing grounds. Rimmington states incorrectly thatthe Vozrozhdeniye site was under the authority of the Centerof Virology in Zagorsk. In fact, the Vozrozhdeniye site wasoperated by the Soviet MOD, which sent orders to itsZagorsk, Kirov, and Sverdlovsk facilities to conduct certaintests at the island. The types of agents tested at the islandincluded anthrax and plague bacteria developed at Sverdlovskand Kirov, and viral agents developed at Zagorsk. Interviewwith specialists from the NCB.11 “Informatsiya ob obyektakh i biologicheskoy deyatelnostiRossiyskoy Federatsii, svyazannykh s Konventsiyey o

Sverdlovsk. Biological agents harmful tolivestock and plants were tested at a special sitenear Novosibirsk. Munitions for the delivery ofall types of biological agents were assembled atthe Sverdlovsk facility.12

The Biopreparat Complex

In the early 1970s, the Soviet authoritiesbegan creating a new network of BW facilitiesparallel to the military system. In 1972, theUSSR signed the Biological and ToxinWeapons Convention (BWC), under which itwas supposed to stop all offensive BW work.The new “civilian” network of biotechnologyinstitutes conducted some civilian research, butit also served as a cover for military-related BWactivities. These sites were formally run bycivilian authorities and involved a large numberof civilian biotechnological specialists andenterprises.13 In 1972, the USSR Council ofMinisters established a secret Interagency zapreshchenii razrabotki, proizvodstva i nakopleniya zapasovbakteriologicheskogo (biologicheskogo) i toksinnogo oruzhiyai ob ikh unichtozhenii” (“Information on facilities andbiological activities of the Russian Federation related to theBiological and Toxin Weapons Convention”), declaration bythe Russian Federation under the confidence-buildingmeasures for the BWC, Moscow, May 2, 1994, p. 339.12 BW tests on military hardware were also conducted inAfghanistan. Soviet mobile missiles equipped with BWwarheads were stationed in the Arctic. Interview with NCBspecialists.13 The new network of facilities increased the capability of theSoviet BW system by attracting new human and materialresources and supplementing military research withtechnological developments in the civilian sector. As early asthe late 1960s, the Soviet authorities took measures toaccelerate the development of the biotechnology industry as awhole. In 1966, microbiological enterprises were integratedinto one industrial branch under the Main Directorate for theManagement of Microbiological Industry (Glavmikrobioprom).On August 8, 1970, the Central Committee of the CPSU andthe USSR Council of Ministers adopted the decree “OnMeasures for the Accelerated Development of theMicrobiological Industry,” which envisioned the creation of anumber of new microbiological plants. Based on this decree,Glavmikrobioprom ordered the construction of the civilianbiotechnological plant Progress in Stepnogorsk that laterprovided a cover for the nearby BW facility. Eduard I. Perov,“Trudnyye shagi ‘Progressa’” (“The Difficult Steps of‘Progress’”) in Stepnogorsk: Zdes propisany nashi serdtsa. Stranitsyistorii goroda Stepnogorska Akmolinskoy oblasti (Stepnogorsk: Ourhearts are registered here. Pages from the history of the city of Stepnogorsk,Akmofa Oblast) (Almaty: Atamura, 1994), p. 107.


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Science and Technology Council on MolecularBiology and Genetics, consisting ofrepresentatives of the Ministry of Defense, themilitary-industrial complex, the SovietAcademy of Sciences, the Ministry of Health,and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Councilwas chaired by the well-known virologistVladimir Zhdanov and the members wereapproved by General Secretary of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)Leonid Brezhnev and Chairman of the USSRCouncil of Ministers Aleksey Kosygin.14

The All-Union Production AssociationBiopreparat, created in 1973 by a decree of theCentral Committee of the CPSU and the USSRCouncil of Ministers, was tasked withimplementing the programs approved by theInteragency Council. This organizationcomprised some 40 research and devel-opment(R&D) and production facilities. In addition tomanaging the civilian biotechnological industryand R&D, Biopreparat was actively involved inmilitary BW programs.15 Although formallysubordinated to the civilian MainAdministration of the Microbiological Industry(Glavmikrobioprom), Biopreparat was fundedby the MOD and the head of the organizationheld the rank of lieutenant general.16

Leading Biopreparat facilities included theState Scientific Center of Applied Microbiologyin Obolensk, the Institute of ImmunologicalStudies in Lyubuchany, the State ScientificCenter of Virology and Biotechnology (knownas Vector) near Novosibirsk, the State 14 Vyacheslav Yankulin, “Sindrom chumy, ili Khozhdeniye pomukam odnogo iz sozdateley bakteriologicheskogo oruzhiya”(“Plague Syndrome, or A walk through the torments of one ofthe creators of biological weapons”), Izvestiya, October 15,1997.15 Biopreparat, known by its postal code P.O. Box A-1063,controlled the world’s second-largest antibiotics industry andproduced a number of biopharmaceuticals and veterinaryproducts, which were exported to many developing countries.Western sources believe that as many as 2,000 of Biopreparat’s9,000 scientific employees were experts on deadly pathogens.Laurie Garrett, “Inside Russia’s Germ Warfare Labs,” Newsday,August 10, 1997, pp. A5, A38-A39; Rimmington, “FromMilitary to Industrial Complex,” p. 87.16 Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 87;Yankulin, “Sindrom chumy.”

Scientific Institute of Ultrapure BiologicalPreparations in Leningrad, and the ScientificExperimental and Production Base inStepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.17 The 15thDirectorate of the MOD supervised the workof the Biopreparat facilities and coordinatedtheir activities with those of the MOD’smilitary biotechnological centers. As theKazakhstani example will show, in addition tobeing run by the same upper echelon of theMOD, the military and Biopreparat BWsystems shared some technologies andpersonnel.18

Other BW-Related Centers

In addition to the aforementioned centerswithin the offensive part of the Soviet BWprogram, other facilities were involved mainlyin defensive BW developments. The system ofanti-plague research institutes and fieldmonitoring stations under the authority of theMain Directorate of Quarantine Infections ofthe USSR Ministry of Health included theMikrob Scientific Research Anti-PlagueInstitute in Saratov, the Rostov Anti-PlagueInstitute, the Volgograd Scientific ResearchAnti-Plague Institute, and the Irkutsk Anti-Plague Institute for Siberia and the Far East.19

These institutes were mainly responsible forcivilian epidemiological investigations and didnot have direct links with MOD or BiopreparatBW facilities.20 As follows from the example ofthe Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute inAlma-Ata (now Almaty), however, the anti-plague institutes developed vaccines and 17 The center in Obolensk, about 100 kilometers fromMoscow, was founded in 1974. The institute at Lyubuchany,near Chekhov, Moscow Oblast, was created in 1980. Vector, inKoltsovo near Novosibirsk, was established in 1985.Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” pp. 86,108.18 Rimmington indicates that Nikolay Urakov, former deputydirector of the MOD Kirov facility, became the director of theBiopreparat facility in Obolensk in 1986. Rimmington, “FromMilitary to Industrial Complex,” p. 108.19 “Informatsiya ob obyektakh,” pp. 339-341.20 The network of Anti-Plague Institutes could provideassistance to MOD conventional forces by monitoringoutbreaks of natural endemic diseases in the areas wheretroops were stationed.


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diagnostic materials for microbial pathogensmodified by the military. Moreover, given theexchange of top-ranking specialists between theanti-plague institutes and offensive BWfacilities, their participation in some offensiveBW programs cannot be ruled out. Forexample, Igor Domradskiy, the deputychairman of the Interagency Council and afounder of Biopreparat, had previously headedthe anti-plague institutes in Irkutsk and Rostov-on-Don.21

Finally, some institutes of the USSRAcademy of Sciences represented in theInteragency Council may have been indirectlyinvolved in BW developments. A commonpractice among Soviet scientific institutes wasto seek research contracts from well-financedmilitary-industrial organiza-tions. One academicinstitute that may have been indirectly involvedin BW work was the Shemyakin Institute ofBioorganic Chemistry (IBKh) in Moscow,which was founded in 1980 and did research onadvanced methods of genetic engineering andindustrial microbiology.22 The first director ofIBKh, Academician Vadim Ovchinnikov, alsoserved as head of the Biological SciencesDepartment of the USSR Academy ofSciences. It was widely believed among Russianscientists that Ovchinnikov actively soughtresearch funding for his institute from militarybiotechnology programs.23 As described in thenext section, IBKh had links with theBiopreparat center in Stepnogorsk.24

21 Yankulin, “Sindrom chumy.”22 The IBKh building was constructed by Finnish builders andhad up-to-date foreign and Soviet equipment not available atmany other microbiological institutes of the Soviet Academyof Sciences. Interview with NCB specialists.23 Ovchinnikov wanted to discover how the three-dimensionalstructure of the protein albumin is determined by its primaryamino acid sequence, hoping to win the Nobel Prize for hisresearch. However, achieving this ambition proved to beimpossible at the time. Interview with a former IBKhemployee.24 Interview with NCB specialists.

KAZAKHSTANI ELEMENTS OF THESYSTEM

Kazakhstani BW facilities belonged tovarious parts of the Soviet BW structure andreported to different central authorities inMoscow.25 The four main facilities were theVozrozhdeniye Island open-air test site in theAral Sea, the Scientific Experimental andProduction Base (SNOPB) in Stepnogorsk, theScientific Research Agricultural Institute(NISKhI) in Gvardeyskiy, and the Anti-PlagueScientific Research Institute in Alma-Ata.These facilities are described in greater detailbelow.

Vozrozhdeniye Island

The Vozrozhdeniye Island test site in theAral Sea was part of the older, military BWsystem. The island was apparently chosen foropen-air testing of biological weapons becauseof its geographical isolation.26 Vozrozhdeniye is

25 This study of the structural links of the Kazakhstanielements shows how the Soviet BW system was organized.First, the system was clearly divided into separate parts, whichwere funded and managed by different authorities inaccordance with technological specialization (anti-personnel vs.anti-crop and anti-livestock agents, defensive vs. offensivedevelopments), military or civilian participation, and the levelof involvement in the BW program (direct or indirect). Unifiedstrategic guidance and top executive management over the far-flung system were provided by the Interagency Council andthe MOD. Although the system observed the strictest secrecyrules, corporate links between facilities with similar orcomplementary expertise and the transfer or exchange ofhuman, technological, and material resources were common.The expanded horizontal links and the short vertical chain ofcommand, with little delegation of authority to intermediateelements, would probably have been the most effectivemechanism in the event of wartime mobilization.26 Vozrozhdeniye Island was discovered by A. I. Butakov,Lieutenant of the Russian Fleet, on the Konstantin in September1848. Butakov named it Nicholas Island after Tsar Nicholasthe First. Seven miles northwest from Nicholas Island, hefound another island, which he named Naslednik (Heir). Tothe south of Naslednik Island was one more island, which henamed Konstantin Island after Grand Duke KonstantinRomanov, the official chairman of the Russian GeographicSociety. Together, the three islands were called the Tsarskiye(Tsar) Islands. During the Soviet era, Nicholas and NaslednikIslands were renamed Vozrozhdeniye (Rebirth) andKomsomolskiy Islands. Due to the dessication of the Aral Sea,the three Tsar Islands later merged into one big island. ZhenisDarmenov, “Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya: Tayn stanovitsya


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situated in the middle of the Aral Sea,surrounded by large, sparsely populated desertsand semi-deserts that hindered unauthorizedaccess to the secret site. The island’s sparsevegetation, hot, dry climate, and sandy soil thatreaches temperatures of 60° C (140° F) insummer all reduced the chances thatpathogenic microorganisms would survive andspread.27 In addition, the insular locationprevented the transmission of pathogens toneighboring mainland areas by animals orinsects. The northern part of VozrozhdeniyeIsland, which Kazakhs call Mergensay, is onKazakhstani territory. The southern two-thirdsof the island is in the Karakalpak autonomousregion of Uzbekistan.28

In 1936, Vozrozhdeniye Island wastransferred to the authority of the Soviet MODfor use by the Red Army’s Scientific MedicalInstitute.29 The first expedition of 100 people,headed by Professor Ivan Velikanov, arrived onthe island that summer. The researchers were menshe” (Vozrozhdeniye Island: There are fewer and fewersecrets”), Put Lenina, Aug 14, 1990, p. 2.27 Interview with a member of the 1990 Kazakhstanidelegation to Vozrozhdeniye Island, November 1998.28 It appears that no clear border demarcation yet existsbetween Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the territory ofVozrozhdeniye Island. Whereas the northern part of the islandis owned by Kazakhstan, the airspace over the island iscontrolled by Uzbekistani air traffic authorities, and thesouthern part of the island is under the authority of theUzbekistani Ministry of Defense. Residents of Aralsk recalledthat Uzbekistani authorities prevented the mayor of the cityfrom traveling to the island by helicopter. A similar incidenthappened to some Kazakhstani fishermen in 1994 when theylanded on a part of the island that Uzbekistani authoritiesclaimed was their territory. In May 1998, the authors of thispaper and BBC television journalists, who had permissionfrom the Kazakhstani government to travel to the island byhelicopter, were forbidden to approach the island byUzbekistani authorities.29 Previously, Vozrozhdeniye Island and the city of Aralskwere used as exile camps for kulaks (private farmers) by the15th Special Commandant’s Office of NKVD (People’sCommissariat of Internal Affairs, later the KGB). One suchsettlement in Aralsk was named “New America.” GennadiyKruglyakov, “Kazakhstanskiye ‘Solovki’” ( “Kazakhstan’s‘Solovetskiye’ Islands”), Kazakhstanskaya pravda, October 28,1998, p. 3. The Red Army’s Scientific Medical Institute,established in 1933, was transferred to Kirov in 1942 and isnow known as the Scientific Research Institute ofMicrobiology. Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” p.2.

provided with special ships and two airplanesand reportedly conducted experimentsinvolving the spread of tularemia and relatedmicroorganisms. In the fall of 1937, however,the expedition was evacuated from the islandbecause of security problems, including thearrest of Velikanov and other specialists.30

In 1952, the Soviet government decided toresume BW testing on islands in the Aral Sea.A biological weapons test site, officiallyreferred to as “Aralsk-7,” was built in 1954 onVozrozhdeniye and Komsomolskiy Islands.The MOD’s Field Scientific ResearchLaboratory (PNIL) was stationed onVozrozhdeniye Island to conduct theexperiments.31 Military unit 25484, comprisingseveral hundred people, was also based on theisland and reported to a larger unit based inAralsk.32 The PNIL developed methods ofbiological defense and decontamination forSoviet troops. Samples of military hardware,equipment, and protective clothing reportedlypassed field tests at the island before beingmass-produced. During the Soviet interventionin Afghanistan, military protective geardeveloped for Afghan conditions was tested atthe PNIL.33

Infrastructure and BW Development

The BW test site on Vozrozhdeniye Islandwas divided into a testing complex in thesouthern part of the island and a militarysettlement in the northern part where officers,some with families, and soldiers lived. Thesettlement had barracks, residential houses, anelementary school, a nursery school, a cafeteria, 30 Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” pp. 2-3.31 Interview with NCB specialists; Rimmington, “Conversionof BW Facilities,” p. 3.32 Interview with an official from the US Department ofDefense (DOD), May 1998. The Aralsk military base was animportant source of jobs for local residents, who supplied thetroops with food and other services. Civilians also workedamong sailors on dry cargo barges and tankers. Interview withlocal citizens in Aralsk and Kzylorda pilots, May 1998;Darmenov, “Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya.” Rimmington indicatesthat over 1,000 people were stationed at the island.Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 86.33 Darmenov, “Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya.”


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warehouses, and a power station. Personnelwere subjected to regular immunizations andreceived hardship benefits.34 PNIL laboratorybuildings, located near the residential area,possessed up-to-date equipment and aBiosafety Level 3 containment unit.35 Alsolocated in the northern part of the island wasBarkhan Airport, which provided regular planeand helicopter transportation to the mainland,and a seaport at Udobnaya Bay. Special fastpatrol boats protected the island fromintruders.

The open-air test site in the southern partof the island was used for studying thedissemination patterns of BW agent aerosolsand methods to detect them, and the effectiverange of aerosol bomblets with biologicalagents of different types.36 The testing groundswere equipped with an array of telephone poleswith detectors mounted on them, spaced atone-kilometer intervals.37 BW agents tested atthe Vozrozhdeniye site had been developed atthe MOD facilities in Kirov, Sverdlovsk, andZagorsk, and the Biopreparat center inStepnogorsk, and included anthrax, tularemia,brucellosis, plague, typhus, Q fever, smallpox,botulinum toxin, and Venezuelan equineencephalitis. The experiments were conductedon horses, monkeys, sheep, and donkeys, andon laboratory animals such as white mice,guinea pigs, and hamsters.38 In addition tocommon pathogenic strains, special strainsdeveloped for military purposes were tested atthe island.39 Bacterial simulants were also used

34 For example, one year of service counted as two.35 Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 86.36 Biological aerosols can be disseminated over a distance ofup to 20 kilometers. Interview with specialists from the NCB.37 Interview with an official from the DOD, May 1998.38 Interview with NCB specialists.39 For example, special strains may be resistant to standardantibiotics and vaccines and may have other militarily usefulproperties such as high virulence or greater environmentalviability (resistance to ultraviolet rays, heat, desiccation, andshear forces). Such strains can be developed by simpleselection techniques or by genetic engineering methods. Sovietscientists appear to have developed genetically modified strainsof anthrax and plague. On BW technologies, see Office ofTechnology Assessment, United States Congress, Technologies

to study the dissemination of aerosol particlesin the atmosphere.

The fact that the island’s prevailing windsalways blow toward the south, away from thenorthern settlement, was probably animportant factor in designing the site. The BWaerosol tests were also conducted in such a wayas to avoid contaminating the northern militarysettlement, and a special service on the islandwas responsible for environmental control.40

Nevertheless, the activities on the secret islandcaused serious concerns among local residentsbecause of repeated epidemics and the massdeaths of animals and fish in the area.41

Individual cases of infectious disease alsooccurred in people who spent time on theisland.42

Desiccation of the Aral Sea

By the early 1990s, the desiccation of theAral Sea, which had been taking place since the1960s because of the diversion of water intoirrigation projects, had begun to impair theoperation of the Vozrozhdeniye test site.

Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, Background Paper,December 1993, pp. 71-117.40 Accidents could not be completely avoided, however. In1960, the wind shifted during a BW test on Konstantin Island,leading to widespread contamination and forcing an emergencyevacuation. Thereafter, the island was never used again.Interview with NCB specialists.41 In 1976, a mass death of fish occurred in the Aral Sea. InJune 1986, outbreaks of plague were noted in the region andentire flocks of sheep lost their wool. In May 1988, over thecourse of only about an hour, approximately half a millionsaiga antelope dropped dead in the Turgay steppes northeastof the Aral Sea. “‘Green’ Activists Suspect Removal of BWEquipment from Aral Sea Site,” JPRS-TAC-92-015, 8 May1992, pp. 27-28. Rimmington indicates that during the massdeath of the saiga, the entire human population of the area wasevacuated as a precautionary measure. Rimmington,“Conversion of BW Facilities,” p. 3. The cause of mass deathsamong animals in the area remains unclear. It might be relatedto the unfavorable environmental situation in the Aral regioncaused by the desiccation of the sea, the heavy pesticidepollution of tributary rivers, or natural endemic outbreaks ofplague.42 Dr. Aykimbayev of the Almaty Anti-Plague Institute recalledthat once an ichthyologist was urgently transported to an anti-plague station in Aralsk. She appeared to have contractedsmallpox after accidentally reaching the island. Interview withDr. Aykimbayev, October 1998.


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Although the island was initially 200 squarekilometers in size, it expanded to 2,000 squarekilometers by 1990.43 The shrinkage of the AralSea increased operational expenditures at thetest site, particularly the cost of importingnecessary items.44 The site’s port had to berelocated several dozen kilometers away fromthe settlement, increasing the need for groundtransportation and the size of the labor forceneeded for loading and unloading operations.45

Kazakhstani specialists believe that by 2010, theisland will be connected to the mainland; thereis already a shallow zone between the islandand the settlement of Muynak on theUzbekistani coast. The emergence of a landbridge would eliminate the major securitybenefits of the island.46

The Moscow authorities did not allowKazakhstani public representatives to visitVozrozhdeniye Island until 1990.47 The firstKazakhstani commission, headed by N. I.Ibrayev, Deputy Chairman of the KzylordaOblast Executive Committee of the CPSU,visited the island in August 1990. The visit washosted by Valeriy Sinevich, the commander ofthe military unit stationed on the island, andVictor Donchenko, deputy head of the PNIL.48

In the spring of 1992, a second Kazakhstanigovernment commission headed by SvyatoslavMedvedev, Minister of Ecology and

43 Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” p. 344 Fuel, food, and construction materials were regularlydelivered to the site. Annually, the site required tens ofthousands of metric tons of drinking water. Darmenov,“Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya.”45 Ibid. Initially, transport ships used Udobnaya Bay near themilitary settlement, but the pier had to be moved several timesas the sea shrank.46 Ibid.47 Kazakhstani public activists, particularly from the Nevada-Semipalatinsk international anti-nuclear movement, the non-governmental organization Tamshy in Aralsk, and the Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan public movement, have made considerableefforts to penetrate the veil of secrecy over VozrozhdeniyeIsland.48 The delegation included parliamentarians, representatives ofthe Aral and Kazalinsk regions, and journalists, making a totalof 24 people. Defensive means against BW, equipment fordetecting air admixtures, and some tested military hardwarewere demonstrated to the public representatives. Darmenov,“Ostrov Vozrozhdeniya”; “‘Green’ Activists Suspect.”

Bioresources, visited the island. In August1992, an independent expert commission ofthe Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan non-governmentalorganization also visited.49 The Russian militaryauthorities claimed that no offensive testing orresearch had been conducted on the island andthat the site had tested only defenses againstbiological weapons.50

Evacuation of Russian military personnelfrom Vozrozhdeniye Island began in 1991,when the PNIL specialists left and thelaboratories were mothballed.51 On January 18,1992, the Supreme Soviet of newlyindependent Kazakhstan issued the edict “OnUrgent Measures for Radically Improving theLiving Conditions of Aral Area Residents,”which officially closed the Vozrozhdeniyemilitary site. On April 11, 1992, RussianPresident Boris Yeltsin’s Edict No. 390, “OnEnsuring the Implementation of InternationalObligations Regarding Biological Weapons,”ordered that all offensive BW programs be shutdown. Following this decree, the Russiangovernment declared that the Vozrozhdeniyesite was closed, the special structures would bedismantled, and within two to three years theisland would be decontaminated andtransferred to Kazakhstani control.52 In August1995, specialists from the US Department ofDefense visited Vozrozhdeniye Island andconfirmed that the experimental field lab hadbeen dismantled, the site’s infrastructuredestroyed, and the military settlementabandoned.53

After the Russian authorities leftVozrozhdeniye Island in 1992, local residents

49 Ivan Chasnikov, Ekho yadernykh vzryvov (The Echo of NuclearExplosions) (Almaty, 1996), p. 75.50 “‘Green’ Activists Suspect.”51 Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 86.52 The evacuation from Vozrozhdeniye Island continued in1992. Local authorities and environmentalists were concerned,however, by the lack of Kazakhstani control over thedismantlement of the site. On March 7, 1992, Bigali Kayupov,head of the Aralsk Regional Administration, attempted todetain a convoy from Military Unit 25484 that was removingheavy trucks, tractors, tanker trucks, and other equipment.“‘Green’ Activists Suspect.”53 Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 86.


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of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan flocked to theisland to seize abandoned military equipmentthat the Russian forces had been unable to takewith them. It is to be hoped that the lootingoccurred in the safer, residential part of theisland. Kazakhstan has not yet used the portionof the island under its jurisdiction for economicpurposes, and specialists remain concernedabout environmental contamination.

Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental andProduction Base (SNOPB)

The Scientific Experimental andProduction Base (SNOPB) at Stepnogorsk wasunder the authority of the Biopreparatorganization.54 Known only by its post officebox, No. 2076, this facility tested and certifiedpilot-scale and large-scale methods ofproducing BW agents developed in thelaboratories of Biopreparat and the MOD, andissued technical documentation andrecommendations.55 SNOPB was also one ofsix mothballed plants in the Biopreparat systemdesigned for the large-scale production andweaponization of biological agents during theso-called “special time”—mobilization for totalwar. It specialized in anthrax. Western andRussian experts have referred to SNOPB as theSoviet Union’s main facility for themanufacture of biological weapons and one thelargest installations ever created for thispurpose.56 Since the war did not materialize,the Stepnogorsk facility was never used at fullcapacity.

Construction of SNOPB began in 1982 onthe desolate, windy Kazakhstani steppes, 14 54 SNOPB stands for Stepnogorskaya nauchnaya opytno-promyshlennaya baza (Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental andProduction Base). The facility had other names: theKazakhstani Branch of the Biokhimmashproyekt Institute, theStepnogorsk Scientific Research Institute for Biotechnology,and the Biopreparat Kazakhstani Scientific Research Complex.Since 1993, it has been called the Biomedpreparat Joint StockCompany, or AO Biomedpreparat.55 Interview with an official from the DOD, May 1998;Gennadiy Lepyoshkin, “Flagmanu farmindustrii byt” (“To bethe flagship of the pharmaceutical industry”), in Stepnogorsk:Zdes propisany nashi serdtsa, p. 126.56 Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” p. 2.

kilometers from the city of Stepnogorsk, amilitary-industrial town under the authority ofthe Ministry for Medium Machine-Building(Minsredmash) and Glavmikrobioprom.57

SNOPB was built in the backyard of a civilianbiotechnological plant called Progress.58

Documents concerning the construction of thefacility show that the design incorporated themost advanced developments in industrialbiotechnology at the time, including the use ofspecial materials. The availability of power andheat-generating facilities, as well as qualifiedbiotechnological and construction specialistsfrom Progress and the city of Stepnogorsk,facilitated the building of SNOPB.59 EduardPerov, the former deputy director of Progress,headed SNOPB during its construction.60 Atthe end of 1983, Kanatjan Alibekov, who hadpreviously headed the Biopreparat facility inOmutninsk, was appointed director ofSNOPB.61 His deputy was Gennadiy 57 Other names of Stepnogorsk were Makinsk-2, Tselinograd-25, and Aksu. It is located about 200 kilometers north ofAstana (formerly Tselinograd), the new Kazakhstani capital.Aksu is situated nine kilometers from the city of Stepnogorsk.Dual-use enterprises in Stepnogorsk included the TselinnyyUranium Mining and Chemical Combine (TsGKhK) and the16th State Ball-Bearing Plant, which produced ball bearings fortractors as well as for tanks. The area has a number of uraniumdeposits, which was why Minsredmash, the USSR nuclearindustry ministry, decided to create a city there. Lepyoshkin,“Flagmanu farmindustrii byt,” p. 126; Perov, “Trudnyye shagi‘Progressa’,” pp. 107-109; M. S. Koyshibayev, “Na krutompovorote vremeni” (“At a sharp turn in time”), in Stepnogorsk:Zdes propisany nashi serdtsa, pp. 5-6.58 The construction of the Progress plant started in 1970 bythe order of Glavmikrobioprom. It was done to implement theAugust 8, 1970 Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSUand the USSR Council of Ministers “On Measures for theAccelerated Development of the Microbiological Industry.”The plant, worth 170-180 billion rubles, was the largest andmost technologically advanced in the Soviet microbiologicalindustry. Perov, “Trudnyye shagi ‘Progressa’,” pp. 107-108.59 The Progress plant produced herbicides, supplements foranimal feeds (amino acids, vitamins, antibiotics), and ethanol.It occupies an area of 300,000 square meters and employs2,000 workers, including 800 engineers. The plant has hugestainless-steel fermentation tanks. Interview with NCBspecialists.60 In 1983, Perov became director general of Progress. YuriyDavydkin headed SNOPB for a short time until he wasreplaced by Kanatjan Alibekov at the end of 1983. Lepyoshkin,“Flagmanu farmindustrii byt,” p. 127.61 In 1988, Alibekov, an ethnic Kazakh, became the firstdeputy director for research and production at Biopreparat, the


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Lepyoshkin, who came to SNOPB from theMOD facility in Kirov in 1984.62

Research and Development Work

At Stepnogorsk, Alibekov directed theresearch team that in 1988 developed theSoviet Union’s most deadly weapons-gradeanthrax agent.63 SNOPB continued researchand development work on anthrax thatpreviously had been conducted at the MODinstitute in Sverdlovsk, but that had to becurtailed in 1979 after an accidental release ofanthrax spores from the facility killed some 70people. The accident in Sverdlovsk increasedWestern suspicions of the existence of aclandestine Soviet BW program in violation ofthe 1972 Biological and Toxin WeaponsConvention. From 1984 to 1987, corespecialists and equipment from Sverdlovskwere transferred to SNOPB.64 In addition toanthrax, the Stepnogorsk facility produced second-in-command of this organization. His formercolleagues in Stepnogorsk describe him as an impressive,highly energetic person and a man of great erudition. In 1992Alibekov (now Ken Alibek) became the highest-rankingdefector from Biopreparat to the United States. He wrote acomprehensive classified study on the Soviet BW program thatplayed a key role in revealing and subsequently halting thisformidable program. Rimmington, “Conversion of BWFacilities,” p. 6; Richard Preston, “The Bioweaponeers,” TheNew Yorker, March 9, 1998, p. 52; Tim Weiner, “SovietDefector Warns on Biological Weapons,” New York Times,February 25, 1998, pp. A1, A8.62 Lepyoshkin, having previously worked at the MOD facilityin Kirov, brought to Stepnogorsk his expertise from the MODBW system. Currently, he is Director General of the NationalCenter for Biotechnology (NCB), which includes theBiomedpreparat Joint Stock Company (formerly SNOPB),NISKhI in Gvardeyskiy, and several Kazakhstani academicmicrobiological institutes. Rimmington provides a detailedbiography of Lepyoshkin in “Conversion of BW Facilities,” p.15.63 Alibekov’s anthrax was ready in 1989. The anthrax agentdeveloped at SNOPB was reportedly four times more effectivethan the standard product and was resistant to a widespectrum of antibiotics and vaccines. Preston, “TheBioweaponeers”; Garrett, “Inside Russia’s Germ WarfareLabs,” p. A39; Rimmington, “Conversion of BW facilities,” p.2.64 In particular, the Sverdlovsk facility had weaponizationequipment necessary for loading biological agents into bombsand missile warheads. Sergey Volkov, “U Yekaterinburga bylsvoy Chernobyl” (“Yekaterinburg had its own Chernobyl”),Uralskiy rabochiy, April 11, 1998, p. 3.

staphylococcus toxin.65 SNOPB also conducteddevelopment and experimental production ofseveral civilian products, including vaccines,diagnostic tools, herbicides, and medicines.66

The best biotechnologists and talentedyoung scientists from Russia were invited towork at SNOPB, and specialized courses atleading Russian research institutions wereorganized for new personnel.67 The facilityemployed 350 people in 1984. By 1991, thestaff had grown to about 800 people, amongthem 17 scientists with doctoral degrees and100 researchers.68 Some SNOPB specialistsheld military rank. Although subordinate toBiopreparat, SNOPB exchanged technologicalexpertise with MOD facilities involved insimilar research. In addition to staff fromSverdlovsk, specialists from the MOD researchcenter in Kirov worked at SNOPB. The facilityalso appears to have had links with the Instituteof Bioorganic Chemistry (IBKh) in Moscow.In 1989, IBKh specialists prepared technicaldocumentation for the civilian production ofhuman insulin at SNOPB, documentation thatrequired detailed knowledge of the facility’sproduction equipment.69

Although civilian access to the facility wasstrictly limited, SNOPB had technological linkswith and received specialists from Progress, theneighboring commercial biotechnologicalplant.70 In addition to its role as a civilian cover

65 The Sverdlovsk facility, which supplied personnel andtechnology to SNOPB, appeared to have expertise instaphylococcus organisms. Under conversion programs, theRussian Center of Military-Technical Problems of Anti-Bacteriological Defense in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg)has worked on anti-staphylococcus preparations. Rimmington,“From Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 95.66 Commercial products produced at SNOPB were profesim,ginseng biomass, and BCG vaccine. Perov, “Trudnyye shagi‘Progressa’,” in Stepnogorsk: Zdes propisany nashi serdtsa, p. 118.67 Lepyoshkin, “Flagmanu farmindustrii byt,” p. 127.68 I. Fatkuldinova, “Neskolko tayn sekretnogo Progressa” (“Afew secrets of the classified Progress”), Leninskaya smena, April4, 1992.69 The documents bear the signature of Ivanov, who replacedOvchinnikov as director of IBKh. Interview with NCBspecialists.70 While both Progress and SNOPB were formallysubordinated to the civilian ministry Glavmikrobioprom,


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for the military-controlled SNOPB, Progresssupplied electricity and heat to the facility.SNOPB also implemented its civiliantechnological developments at Progress, suchas an improved process for ethanolproduction.71 The two facilities began tocooperate more openly in 1989, when Sovietauthorities decided to convert some ofSNOPB’s production lines to manufacturecivilian preparations such as human insulin andto mothball the rest of the equipment.72 Theseplans were never implemented, however,because of the breakup of the USSR and thesubsequent cessation of funding from Moscow.

Infrastructure of the Facility

Occupying an area of about two squarekilometers, SNOPB consisted of 25 buildings atwhich more than 700 people worked in 1991.73

Building 211 held production equipment forthe preparation of nutrient media and a storagecomplex for receiving and storing dry andliquid raw materials. Building 221 was the mainproduction facility for the large-scalefermentation of microorganisms, and it alsohoused a genetics research laboratory. Buildings241 to 244 were designed for theweaponization of the biological agentsproduced in Building 221. Building 231 wasused for drying and milling of microbiologicalproducts, Buildings 251 and 252 for storingthese products, Building 600 for conductingresearch and laboratory tests on biologicalagents, and Building 277 for waste treatment.Besides the numbered buildings, SNOPB had anumber of support facilities, including an

SNOPB was a separate, military-run BW organizationreporting to the Biopreparat authorities.71 Interview with NCB specialists.72 Ibid. Note that in 1989, Vladimir Pasechnik, amicrobiologist from Biopreparat, defected to Great Britain. Inaddition, US President George Bush and British PrimeMinister Margaret Thatcher were putting pressure on Sovietleader Mikhail Gorbachev to open up BW facilities in theUSSR to international inspection. Preston, “TheBioweaponeers,” p. 58.73 The following description of SNOPB is based on theauthors’ visit to the Stepnogorsk facility in August 1998 andinterviews with NCB specialists.

animal house, an administrative building, and amedical unit.

The SNOPB research laboratoriesemployed highly qualified specialists and hadthe most modern equipment. From 1984 to1990, research and development on technologyfor producing special microbial formulationswas conducted in Buildings 221 and 600.Building 600 had a high-containment systemand a specialized chamber for testing BWmunitions. Made of stainless steel, the chamberwas about 200 cubic meters in volume and hadwalls 1.6 centimeters thick. It was mounted onan octagonal cement platform, with a wastetrap below. Monkeys, rabbits, and otheranimals kept in cages in the facility’s vivariumwere used for tests in the aerosol chamber.74

The numbered SNOPB buildings werecomponents of an integrated technologicalchain. In Building 211, 17 different types ofnutrient media could be prepared, with aproduction capacity of about 30,000 metrictons per year. Building 211 was linked by asystem of pipes to Building 221, the six-storycentral production plant where cultures ofmicroorganisms were grown in giantfermentors. Selected strains of biological agentsfrom the bacterial culture collection weretransferred to a high-containment (BiosafetyLevel 3) laboratory on an upper floor of thebuilding. This laboratory was equipped withsubmarine doors, a shower, and a medicalroom where employees were examined beforeentering the laboratory and changing intodisposable suits. After cultivation in small, one-cubic-meter fermentors, the bacterial massdescended by gravity into giant, 20-cubic-meterproduction fermentors located on the lowerfloors. Ten such production fermentorsoccupied four floors of Building 221. Thesolution of bacteria grown in the fermentorswas then transferred to seven centrifugalseparators on the lower floor. Spinning at 5,000revolutions per minute, these centrifugesseparated the bacterial cells from the nutrient

74 Interview with a DOD official, May 1998.


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media and other waste products. In a singlethree-day production cycle, 1.5 metric tons ofconcentrated bacterial slurry could beproduced.75

Buildings 241-244 and 251-271 wereunderground bunkers with reinforced-concretewalls two meters thick, reportedly capable ofsurviving a nuclear attack.76 From the outsidethey resembled small hills covered by soil andgrass. Bunkers 241-244 containedweaponization lines where special machinesfilled the concentrated slurry of pathogenicmicroorganisms into bomblets and then sealedthem. Weaponization could be completed byinstalling explosive bursters in the bomblets.77

The bomblets would then be installed in a largeweapon, such as an aerial bomb or a missilewarhead.78 Bunkers 251-271 containedrefrigerated rooms for storing biological agents,capable of maintaining temperatures down to -40° C in a volume of 800 cubic meters.Buildings 251-271 were connected by a railwayspur with loading equipment, and had a smallhelicopter landing site nearby.

Buildings 221, 241-244, and 231 wereequipped with biocontainment systems for theprotection of plant personnel and thesurrounding environment. These buildings hadhigh efficiency air filters,79 fans for maintainingnegative air pressure, individual air supplies,sterilization autoclaves, and submarine doors.All wastes from the production process werehandled in the waste-treatment building.

According to estimates by Westernexperts, the SNOPB facility, once mobilized,could produce 300 metric tons of weapons-grade anthrax over a ten-month period. 80 Full-scale production never took place, however.Financing for construction was reduced in 1990 75 Ibid.76 Rimmington, “Conversion of BW Facilities,” p. 2.77 Interview with a DOD official, May 1998.78 The weaponization equipment was removed to Russia in1990-1991. Interview with a DOD official, May 1998.79 Known as Petryanov filters, they were probably a Sovietversion of the High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtersused in the West.80 Interview with a DOD official, May 1998.

in response to the scaling down of BWprograms. After the collapse of the SovietUnion, Moscow stopped providing financialsupport for SNOPB, resulting in a largeoutflow of biotechnology specialists. A numberof them left to work in commercialorganizations, while others left Kazakhstanaltogether. After work had ceased in thebuildings at SNOPB, special decontaminationmeasures were undertaken, and some military-related equipment was dismantled anddestroyed.81

Scientific Research Agricultural Institute(NISKhI)

The Scientific Research AgriculturalInstitute (NISKhI) belonged to a separategroup of Soviet BW facilities that developedagents harmful to livestock and plants. Theinstitute was the only BW research center inKazakhstan specializing in viruses. It hadcooperative ties with Russian centersconducting similar research in Vladimir (underthe Ministry of Agriculture), in Sverdlovsk(under the MOD), and at Vector inNovosibirsk (under Biopreparat),82 where theagents produced at NISKhI were tested. Theinstitute did not have direct links with theStepnogorsk and Vozrozhdeniye facilities,evidently because of its special-ization in anti-crop and anti-livestock agents.

One of the oldest Soviet BW developmentcenters, NISKhI was established in 1958 in thesettlement of Gvardeyskiy outside the city ofOtar, about 180 kilometers from Almaty.83

81 By order of Biomedpreparat authorities in 1991, the aerosoltesting chamber was cut up and destroyed. Currently, only theoctagonal platform remains at the facility. Interview with BBCjournalists who visited Building 600 in May 1998.82 Among other facilities, Vector incorporated theExperimental Agricultural Production Enterprise.Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p.111.83 NISKhI stands for Nauchno-issledovatelskiy selskokhozyaystvennyyinstitut. Gvardeyskiy, in the Korday region of Zhambyl Oblast,is 3 kilometers from the Otar railroad station and has apopulation of about 5,000. Information obtained during theauthors’ visit to Gvardeyskiy in October 1998; “NISKhI.Scientific Research Agricultural Institute. Settlement ofGvardeyskiy. National Center for Biotechnology of the


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Although the institute was subordinated to theUSSR Ministry of Agriculture, its director heldmilitary rank. Moreover, the institute waslocated within a military settlement and it wasnecessary to pass three security posts to reachit.84 It occupied a territory of 19 hectares,including 15 laboratories, a vivarium,greenhouses, agricultural technology, and avaccine production facility, and employed morethan 400 people.85

Research on anti-crop agents possiblybegan in the 1970s, when NISKhI receivedorders from military authorities to study theresistance of crops to various biologicalpathogens.86 The institute had broad expertisein highly pathogenic and exotic diseases oflivestock, fowl, and crops caused by viruses andother agents, including Rinderpest virus,Newcastle disease virus, African swine fevervirus, sheep pox virus, goat pox virus, fowl poxvirus, blue-tongue virus (catarrhal fever ofsheep), herpes virus (Aujeszky’s disease), andcereal rust fungi.87 In 1991, Moscow terminatedall military research and left the NISKhIwithout central administration or funding. Thedirector of the institute and some specialistsleft to work at institutes in Russia.88

Republic of Kazakhstan,” brochure presented by NISKhIDirector Dr. Seydigappar Mamadaliyev, October 1998, p. 1.84 The military guards have remained to the present daybecause the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defense operates a largetraining center in Gvardeyskiy.85 Interview with Dr. Seydigappar Mamadaliyev, Director ofNISKhI, October 1998.86 Anne M. Harrington, “Briefing on Stepnogorsk InitiativeDiscussions in Almaty, October 22-25, 1996. InstituteDescriptions and Proposal Abstracts,” p. 76.87 The agents listed are considered to have potential BWapplications. See The Royal Society, “Scientific Aspects ofControl of Biological Weapons,” Report of a Royal SocietyStudy Group, supported by the Leverhulme Trust, July 1994,pp. 16-17. The pathogenic microorganisms studied by NISKhIwere indicated in “NISKhI,” pp. 4-5; and S. Mamadaliyev,“Determining the Probability of Bringing in ParticularlyDangerous Infections to the Territory of the Republic ofKazakhstan and Developing Scientifically Based Measures ofControl and Prophylaxis,” in Harrington, “Briefing onStepnogorsk Initiative Discussions in Almaty,” p. 46.88 Interview with Dr. Seydigappar Mamadaliyev, Director ofNISKhI, October 1998.

Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute

The Anti-Plague Scientific ResearchInstitute was established in 1949 in the suburbsof Almaty under the authority of the MainDirectorate for Quarantine Infections of theUSSR Ministry of Health. It was part of theSoviet system for the control of highlypathogenic diseases and operated a CentralAsian network of 19 epidemiologicalmonitoring stations.89 During the Soviet era,the Anti-Plague Institute employed about 450people. The institute had four laboratories,including one devoted to genetic research, anda vaccine preparation plant with a capacity of21 million vaccine doses per year. The institutedeveloped diagnostic tests and vaccines forseveral infectious diseases, including anthrax,plague, tularemia, brucellosis, cholera, andlisteria. In addition to serving civilian needs, theinstitute was involved in military-relatedresearch and development on defensivemeasures against BW agents. To this end, theinstitute received Soviet intelligence onbiological agents developed by Westernmilitaries, including pathogenic strains modifiedfor military purposes, and prepared vaccinesand diagnostic preparations against them.

The Almaty Anti-Plague Institute had nodirect links with the BW research centers underthe Soviet MOD, the Ministry of Agriculture,or Biopreparat, although it participated inexchanges of scientists and of technicalknowledge.90 Nevertheless, the possibility thatthe Anti-Plague Institute was involved inoffensive BW developments cannot be ruledout.91 In 1992, Moscow terminated funding forthe institute’s research and all military-relatedwork ceased.

89 About 1,600 square kilometers of Kazakhstani territory,mostly located in Kzylorda and Atyrau Oblasts, containendemic plague areas. Interview with Dr. Alim Aykimbayev,Deputy Director of the Anti-Plague Institute, Almaty, October1998.90 Ibid.91 Ibid.


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INITIAL EFFORTS AT CONVERSION

After the collapse of the Soviet Union,one of the many tasks facing independentKazakhstan was to address the Soviet military-industrial facilities on its territory. In 1991-1992, Russia cut off funding for the formerSoviet BW centers in Kazakhstan, closed downtheir military programs, and abandoned thesites. Since these facilities had all beensubordinate to central Moscow agencies, localKazakhstani authorities had little idea abouttheir activities.

The government of Kazakhstan wascommitted to converting the former SovietBW facilities to peaceful activities. In 1991, theMinistry of Health and the Ministry ofAgriculture began planning the conversion ofSNOPB and NISKhI, respectively, but theseefforts were unsuccessful because the ministrieslacked the necessary expertise. In 1992, theKazakhstani government launched the StateConversion Program and allocated somebudget funding for the civilian reorganizationof the former BW facilities in Stepnogorsk. Itwas not until 1993, however, that new civilianinstitutions were established for this purpose.

At that time, Galym Abilseitov, thenminister of science and new technologies,clustered together former military facilities andrelated civilian institutes of the KazakhstanNational Academy of Sciences into nationalcenters for nuclear research, radioelectronicsand communications, and biotechnology,which were financed and managed by theMinistry of Science. The new centers weredesigned to use the advanced expertise offormer military facilities for Kazakhstan’speaceful needs. By organizing these centers, theKazakhstani government introduced itsadministrative control and local specialists intobiotechnological institutions that formerly hadbeen operated exclusively by Moscow andstaffed by Russian specialists.92

92 Before he was appointed minister, Galym Abilseitov wasdirector of one of the large laser centers outside of Moscow.His reform of the scientific research structure elicited the

The National Center for Biotechnology(NCB), founded in 1993, brought togethermost of the former Soviet military and civilianbiotechnology facilities in Kazakhstan.93 Inaddition to SNOPB and NISKhI, the Centerincludes three civilian facilities: the Progressplant and the Institute of PharmaceuticalBiotechnology (both at Stepnogorsk) and theAlmaty Biological Combine.94 Also under theNCB umbrella are the microbiology institutesof the Kazakhstan National Academy ofSciences.95 The NCB’s main goal since itsestablishment has been to foster theapplication of biotechnology—including thatdeveloped at former military facilities—tomedicine, agriculture, and industry, and toimplement the most promising ideas andtechnologies.

The NCB has significant researchpotential: about 40 doctors of science and 160candidates of science participate in its research

opposition of the Kazakhstani National Academy of Sciencesbecause of the transfer of a few academic institutes to the newcenters and the loss of the Academy’s privileged financing.Abilseitov was also a deputy prime minister, and after steppingdown from his post, he became one of the leaders of theAzamat political opposition movement.93 The NCB was founded by Presidential Edict No. 1090,dated January 21, 1993, and Decree of the Cabinet ofMinisters No. 1140, dated November 16, 1993.94 The Progress factory, which served as a cover for SNOPB,was constructed in Stepnogorsk from 1971 to 1975. A total of3,000 people worked at Progress and produced a variety oflegitimate products, including antibiotics, amino acids, andfeed additives. In 1993, Progress became a joint stockcompany (AO), and it was subsequently divided into threecompanies. The Institute of Pharmaceutical Biotechnology(IPB) in Stepnogorsk is a state enterprise created in November1993 by reorganizing the Biomedpreparat KazakhstaniScientific Production complex. IPB has a modern laboratoryand experimental base that is developing technology forobtaining new drugs from microbial and animal sources. TheAlmaty Biological Combine was founded in 1931. Until 1991,it was subordinate to the Main Directorate for BiologicalProduction of the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture; it becamepart of the NCB in November 1993. The facility, located incentral Almaty, prepares vaccines and other preparations forthe prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of infectious diseasesof livestock and fowl.95 The institutes include the M.A. Aytkhozhin Institute ofMolecular Biology and Biochemistry; the Institute of PlantPhysiology, Genetics, and Bioengineering; and the CentralLaboratory for Biological Control, Certification, and Pre-Clinical Experiments (all based in Almaty).


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and development activities. Biotechnologicalfacilities belonging to the NCB also haveconsiderable production capacity. The AlmatyBiological Combine has a production facility of40,000 square meters, suitable for the large-scale manufacture of vaccines. In Stepnogorsk,the Progress plant and the former SNOPBconstitute a unique biotechnology complexwith a combined production area of 500,000square meters.96

The NCB participates in the Programs forFundamental Research of the KazakhstaniMinistry of Science-Academy of Sciences, andis also the head organization for implementingthree National Special Scientific and TechnicalPrograms (NSSTPs): on the use ofbiotechnology methods and geneticengineering in medicine, agriculture, andindustry; on scientific support for the agro-industrial complex of the Republic ofKazakhstan; and on the development andindustrial production of phytochemicals toprovide domestic medicines to medicalinstitutions and the Kazakhstani population.NCB scientists also conduct joint researchprojects with universities and institutes inBelgium, Brazil, Germany, Hungary, Israel,Russia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, andthe United States. In the fall of 1998, under theUS Department of Energy (DOE) Initiativesfor Proliferation Prevention program, the NCBand DOE’s Pacific Northwest Laboratorylaunched four projects worth a total of$771,000.97

96 "Interview with specialists from the NCB; Interview withMr. S. Ababkin, Deputy Director of Almaty BiologicalCombine, 1998."97 The four projects are the following: “Production ofCarotenoids and Related Products Using FungalFermentation,” “Roseofungin-Macrolide: The Basis forMicrobiological Production of the Pharmaceutical Product,”“Phytoremediation: Phytosiderophore Augmentation forEnvironmental Cleanup,” and “Diagnostic Probes for PlantPathogen Identification.” One more IPP biotechnologicalproject, entitled “Development of a Process for a NovelTherapeutic Product for the Prevention of FoodContamination,” was signed between the Kazakhstani Ministryof Science and the DOE Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The status of efforts to convert threeformer BW facilities in Kazakhstan—SNOPB,NISKhI, and the Almaty Anti-PlagueInstitute—is discussed below.

AO Biomedpreparat—Heir to SNOPB

In early 1993, SNOPB was reorganizedinto a joint stock company called AOBiomedpreparat.98 Initial funding for this effortwas provided by the Kazakhstani StateProgram on Conversion.99 At that time, theKazakhstani government developed plans forreconstruction and technical renewal of thefacility that required a capital investment ofapproximately 58.9 million rubles. TheGiprobioproyekt Institute in Moscow wasgiven the task of designing productionequipment for genetically engineered insulin,the antibiotic roseofungin, and otherpharmaceutical products. The facility alsobegan to manufacture disposable syringes andpolymer products, and organized for theproduction of nutrient media and substrates.100

Biomedpreparat had high expenses,however, because of the costs associated withmaintaining and amortizing the buildingsowned by the enterprise, high energyconsumption, the large workforce, andmanagement and transport costs. As a result,the company’s products were overpriced andnoncompetitive. Kazakhstani governmentsupport, totaling about $1 million in 1993-1994,was not sufficient to fully reconstruct thefacility for civilian needs or to provide all of theformer BW specialists with civilian jobs.101

Cooperation between the governments ofthe United States and Kazakhstan on BWdisarmament began at a March 1994 meeting

98 Initially, the facility was called the Kazakhstani Branch of theBiokhimmashproyekt Moscow Scientific Research Institute.Lepyoshkin, “Flagmanu farmindustrii byt,” p. 126.99 Decree No. 661of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republicof Kazakhstan, dated June 17, 1994, “On Measures toImplement the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan ‘OnConverting Defense Industries.’”100 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."101 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."


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between the US and Kazakhstani committeeson defense conversion, at which the two sidessigned an agreement to allocate $15 million forthe development of industrial cooperation. At afollow-on meeting in November 1994, theUnited States agreed to sponsor a conferencefor managers of US and Kazakhstanienterprises, at which Biomedpreparat receiveda grant for civilian industrial development. Toimplement the conversion of the formerSNOPB, a joint venture called Kamed-Resources was founded with support from theUS Department of Defense’s CooperativeThreat Reduction (CTR) program. The twopartners in the joint venture, Biomedpreparatand the US firm Allen & AssociatesInternational, agreed to undertake thecommercial production of vitamins, antibiotics,and other pharmaceutical products atStepnogorsk. Funding for the project was $5.8million, of which $2.8 million was provided bythe US government and the remainder by theUS partner-firm. Unfortunately, the jointventure with Allen & Associates Internationalfailed for a number of reasons. The mainproblem was the lack of infrastructure tosupport the venture after the facility supplyingutilities cut off service due to lack of paymentby Biomedpreparat. Another problem was thatcontracts were drawn up and signed before athorough evaluation of both sides could beundertaken. A poor working relationshipbetween the two partner-firms also hinderedprogress.102

From 1993 to 1995, the Kazakhstanigovernment maintained a “life support” regimefor the buildings and structures at Stepnogorsk,but the costs of heat and power were high andthe facility’s debts to workers, the government,energy suppliers, and others rose quickly.Repaying these debts through production wasimpossible for the aforementioned reasons, sopartial repayment was undertaken by sellingunused equipment and other non-liquid assets.In 1995, the Kazakhstani government stoppedproviding funds for the conversion program at 102 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."

Biomedpreparat. In response, the enterprisehalted production and cut power, and measureswere taken to mothball the energy andtechnical systems and the production buildings.Personnel were laid off and workers tookforced vacations. In June 1996, a specialinteragency committee appointed by decree ofthe Deputy Prime Minister reviewed thesituation at Biomedpreparat. The committeeissued its conclusions and prepared a draftgovernment decree, but neither document hadany effect. Most of the equipment at theStepnogorsk plant was not converted to civilianuse and remained virtually untouched foryears.103

During a visit by Ambassador RichardMorningstar and Assistant Secretary ofDefense Ashton Carter to Kazakhstan inMarch 1996, the parties reviewed a USproposal for cooperation between the UnitedStates and Kazakhstan at the Stepnogorskfacility. The United States proposed that itevaluate the factory infrastructure atBiomedpreparat and, based on this analysis,arrange to dismantle or destroy any militarilyrelevant equipment and systems that still poseda proliferation risk. The two sides alsodiscussed the possibility of converting theremaining infrastructure and scientific expertiseto civilian research and production. US officialsindicated that the project would attract supportfrom private foundations and would help tofocus the efforts of various US governmentagencies and nonproliferation programs.104

On the basis of these intergovernmentalnegotiations, Kazakhstan and the United Statessigned a contract on December 5, 1996, thatprovided for dismantling the main and auxiliaryequipment at Biomedpreparat designed for

103 When program participants visited Biomedpreparat in June1998, they found that the main production facility, Building221, was not operating and needed massive repairs, but thatthe basic equipment—fermentors, pipes, and power lines—was in good condition.104 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."


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military microbiological production.105 InFebruary 1997, a technical conference was heldin Washington, DC, to discuss the future ofcontract work under the Stepnogorsk initiativewith the participation of leading specialists ofthe NCB and Biomedpreparat. In addition toagreeing on a list of dual-use equipment thatwould be subject to dismantlement,participants addressed the issue of setting up amodern environmental monitoring laboratoryto determine the levels of microbialcontamination at the facility. This Laboratoryfor Ecological Monitoring was founded inFebruary 1998 and supplied by the UnitedStates with modern analytical equipment at acost of $750,000.106

After the President of the Republic ofKazakhstan issued the edict “On DevelopingSmall Business and Entrepreneurship” in June1997, Biomedpreparat created a number oflimited partnerships based on its subdivisions,using charter funds it had received. The goal ofthis restructuring was to provide the limitedpartnerships with the opportunity tomanufacture profitable goods and, in theprocess, to start paying wages and taxes andcontributing to the pension fund. Foreconomic reasons, the production facilitiesused vacant space in Stepnogorsk. As of 1998,Biomedpreparat was managing the followinglimited partnerships (TOO, in Russian): TOOPlimed (production of disposable syringes, 31employees); TOO Media (production ofnutrient media and substrates, 10 employees);TOO Biogal (production of probioticpreparations, 52 employees); TOO Biotim(production of pharmaceutical tablets, sevenemployees); TOO Tulpar (production ofagricultural products, five employees); TOOBiotrade (sale of unused equipment andmaterials, five employees); and Bioaz Joint

105 “Preparation for Dismantling Infrastructure Equipment atAO Biomedpreparat,” DSWA Contract 01-97-C-0018, datedDecember 5, 1996.106 Interview with Laboratory Head Dr. Aleksandr Kosinov,Stepnogorsk, July 1998.

Venture (production of medicines and supplyand distribution activities, three employees).107

In September 1998, a new contract worth$1.5 million was signed for the dismantlementof main and auxiliary systems atBiomedpreparat.108 The following month, in aneffort to support and expand the cooperativeprogram, a group of US experts inpharmaceuticals and industrial engineeringvisited Stepnogorsk. The main purpose of thevisit was to find ways of reorienting work at theformer BW facilities while retaining the existingpersonnel. The US experts visitedBiomedpreparat, the Institute ofPharmaceutical Biotechnology, the Laboratoryfor Ecological Monitoring, and the NCB, andtook part in discussions of joint biotechnologyprojects submitted earlier to internationalconversion foundations. After their visit, theexperts prepared a report designed to attractinvestment from US companies in civilian jointventures.

Although the economic situation atBiomedpreparat remains difficult to this day,there is reason to believe that if sufficientfinancing were available, the company couldproduce profitable items that would find amarket in Kazakhstan and in the Central Asianregion as a whole. A team of US specialistsvisited Biomedpreparat in 1997 and studied thecondition of the buildings, equipment, andcommunications infrastructure. Theyconcluded that if the facility is to be used toproduce pharmaceuticals, a significant capitalinvestment will be required because thebuildings do not meet international quality-control standards for pharmaceuticalproduction. As it currently stands, however, thefacility could be used to manufacture productsthat do not require a sterile environment, suchas ethanol or biological insecticides.109

107 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."108 “Dismantlement of Biological Weapons Infrastructure atAO B,” DSWA Contract 01-98-C-0165, dated September 10,1998.109 “Summary Report on Conversion of Enterprises (BiologicalWeapons) in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.” Prepared by the


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At present, the NCB is trying on its ownto set up a production line for disposable,sterile syringes at Biomedpreparat, but it doesnot have sufficient funding to purchase therelatively low-cost equipment it still needs.Another problem is the lack of experience onthe part of facility managers in adapting tocivilian market conditions.110

NISKhI

After Moscow stopped funding NISKhI,the institute fell under the administrativecontrol of the Kazakhstani Ministry ofAgriculture, but the ministry was unable tomake effective use of the institute’s resources.Seydigappar Mamadaliyev, the new director ofNISKhI, began to convert the institute topeaceful research. After the NCB was foundedin 1993, NISKhI became a part of it.

At present, 230 individuals work atNISKhI, which consists of 15 researchlaboratories and a culture bank containingvarious strains of viruses, bacteria, and fungiharmful to plants and animals. The instituteconducts fundamental research into themolecular biology of these pathogens. It alsodevelops methods of preparing nutrient mediafor virology research. NISKhI’s vaccinepreparation plant can meet all of Kazakhstan’sdemand for vaccines, diagnostics, and antiserafor veterinary diseases.111

The institute participates in six nationalprojects on using genetic engineering andbiotechnology in medicine, industry, andagriculture. Its two main lines of work aredeveloping diagnostic tools and vaccines forcombating animal viruses, and increasing theresistance of wheat to fungal plant diseasessuch as yellow and brown rust. NISKhI hascommercial ties with Kazakhstani agriculturalenterprises that need sera, vaccines, and otherbiological preparations. The institute has

Technical Department of SKS, Huntsville, Alabama,500DD(205)971700, 1997.110 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."111 "Interview with Dr. Mamadaliyev."

received two grants from the multilateralInternational Science and Technology Center(ISTC) and financing under the DOE’sInitiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)program.112

Anti-Plague Institute

The Anti-Plague Institute in Almatycurrently employs 332 individuals, including100 researchers. It is not part of the NCB andis under the authority of the KazakhstaniMinistry of Health, Education, and Sport. TheAnti-Plague Institute is the scientific andmethodological center for the eight anti-plaguestations in Kazakhstan (Uralsk, Atyrau, Aktau,Aktyubinsk, Aralsk, Shymkent, Kyzyl-Orda,and Taldy-Korgan).

At present, the Anti-Plague Institute isdeveloping diagnostic preparations andvaccines for particularly virulent infectiousdiseases, conducting epidemiologicalmonitoring, and training specialists. Over thepast few years, the institute has developed threediagnostic tests for anthrax, and in 1995, itdeveloped a diagnostic test for a new naturalstrain of cholera from India, called “Bengal,”that eludes all known diagnostic sera. The Anti-Plague Institute was also named as one of fourWorld Health Organization regional centers onplague for Central Asia. Although the institutehas experienced financial hardship since itstransfer to Kazakhstani control in 1993, it hasmanaged to obtain some foreign assistancefrom the ISTC and European foundations.113

PROSPECTS FOR CONVERSION

Through the Stepnogorsk initiative, the USgovernment is pursuing the following goals: (1)to reduce the threat of facilities beingconverted back to production of dangerouspathogenic microorganisms; (2) to assureWestern companies that Kazakhstan is

112 "Interview with Dr. Mamadaliyev."113 Interview with Dr. Aykimbayev, Deputy Director of theAnti-Plague Institute, October 1998.


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committed to putting the past behind it,thereby improving prospects for foreigninvestment; (3) to reduce the possibility ofproliferation of BW-related knowledge byproviding peaceful work to scientists formerlyinvolved in biological weapons development;and (4) to reorient production at theStepnogorsk facility to peaceful purposes.114

Preventing “brain drain,” the exodus ofspecialists from military microbiologyenterprises in Kazakhstan to countries of BWproliferation concern, is a key objective of theprogram. Economic decline, the prospect ofunemployment, and the reduced prestige ofscientific work may lead specialists to sell theirknowledge and experience to countries of BWproliferation concern. Indeed, scientists in theformer Soviet republics receive an average of20 to 25 times less pay than their Westerncounterparts.115

Although much of the evidence for braindrain and the smuggling of biotechnologymaterials and technology is anecdotal, theseproblems appear to be real. According to datafrom the Russian Institute of EconomicProblems of the Population, the number ofscientists in the former Soviet Union hasdecreased over the last decade from 3.4 millionto 1.3 million. Taking into account a smallinflux of young scientists, at least 2.5 millionindividuals have been forced to leave the field.People who spent numerous years inlaboratories are now working in unskilled jobs.Moreover, the official statistics do not take intoaccount the departure of scientists who goabroad on contracts for a few months to a fewyears.

NISKhI and the Anti-Plague Institutehave retained at least half of their personnel,

114 “Disarmament of the Biomedpreparat complex inStepnogorsk,” Report of the Joint Kazakhstan-United StatesCommission, November 19-20, 1996.115 N. Milashevskaya, “Nauka v zerkale statistiki” (“Science inthe mirror of statistics”), Direktor, No. 7, 1998, p. 23; Ya.Tudorovskiy, “Kogda ne kormyat svoyu nauku, kormyatchuzhuyu” (“When you don’t feed your science, you feedsomeone else’s”), Direktor, No. 1 (1998), p. 32.

but since 1992, Biomedpreparat has lost 500 ofa total of 700 biotechnologists with variouslevels of training. A few of the specialists whoformerly worked at Biomedpreparat have beenable to stay in Stepnogorsk, having securedjobs at the Institute of PharmaceuticalBiotechnology. Most of those who have lefthave gone to work in commercialorganizations, or have moved to Russia,Ukraine, Belarus, and other former Sovietstates. Unfortunately, this process iscontinuing. As a rule, the scientists who leaveare accomplished specialists who are confidentthey will be able to find work in a new location.Defense conversion at the former BW facilitiesin Kazakhstan is therefore essential to preventthe recruitment of former weapons specialistsby countries of proliferation concern.

Structural and Technological Constraintson Conversion

Because of the large scale of equipment tobe dismantled or destroyed, the civilianconversion of Biomedpreparat will requireconsiderable financial and material resources.NISKhI, which had fewer and much smalleritems of military-related equipment todismantle and convert, could make thetransition to civilian production on its own.Most of the Almaty Anti-Plague Institute’sequipment has always been suitable for civilianapplications. Nevertheless, the task ofconverting weapons-related expertise topeaceful production will require considerableeffort at all of the former Soviet BW facilitiesin Kazakhstan.

Although the Kazakhstani government hasmanaged to incorporate former BW facilitiesinto new administrative structures, it does nothave the financial resources to complete theconversion of these centers. In particular,Biomedpreparat production facilities lack theGood Manufacturing Practice (GMP) quality-control systems needed to attract investmentby Western pharmaceutical companies.


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Another problem has been a lack ofmanagerial expertise needed to adapt theformer military biotechnological facilities tonew civilian market conditions. While thesefacilities were reorganizing, foreignpharmaceutical and biotechnology firms movedinto Kazakhstan’s domestic market, leavinglimited opportunities for local producers.Kazakhstani biotechnology plants have alsoencountered tough competition for marketshare from Russian enterprises that played acomplementary role in the former integratedmilitary system. As a result, Kazakhstanibiotechnological plants that once served theentire Soviet Union are now being crowded outof the domestic market. The low demand forspecialists in agriculture, medicine, andbiotechnology caused by the poor state of theKazakhstani economy and competition fromforeign producers has created considerabledifficulties in finding civilian jobs for formerbioweapons scientists.116

Role of Foreign Assistance Programs

Because of the lack of adequate resourceson the part of the Kazakhstani government,foreign assistance programs have played animportant role in the civilian conversion offormer Soviet BW facilities. The USDepartment of Defense’s CTR program hasbeen oriented mainly toward thedismantlement of military BW infrastructure,while the DOE’s IPP program has sought topromote the development of marketablecivilian technologies at former weaponsplants.117 These assistance programs have beenslow to get started at Kazakhstani BW facilitiesand, because of insufficient funding, the paceof conversion has been slow.

A great deal of hope rests on individualscientific grants provided by the ISTC, amultilateral conversion foundation based inMoscow. ISTC grants seek to enable former

116 "Interview with specialists from the NCB."117 Interview with official from the US Department of State,April 1998.

Soviet weapons scientists to use theirknowledge and experience for peacefulpurposes, to integrate them into civiliansociety, and to support the transition to amarket economy. Nevertheless, ISTCprocedures for the expert evaluation of NCBprojects have been painfully slow: projectsproposed in 1996 are still undergoingevaluation. Besides the ISTC, a number ofother international foundations and programssupport former Soviet weapons scientists, andsome financing has been provided throughprivate Western investment and the creation ofjoint ventures.

Until now, the implementation of theconversion program at the main former BWfacility—AO Biomedpreparat—has been verydifficult because of insufficient financing.Although foreign research grants have beenhelpful in slowing the emigration ofKazakhstani BW scientists with dangerousknowledge, they provide only a temporarysource of support.118 As an alternative, theconversion of Biomedpreparat to productionof pharmaceuticals and other products for thecivilian market could help it to becomeeconomically self-sufficient over the long run.

A model for cooperation withinternational foundations has beendemonstrated by a former Biopreparat facilityin Russia, the Institute of ImmunologicalStudies in Lyubuchany. As part of a jointinternational project, the institute received $1million from the ISTC, as well as additionalsupport from NASA, the Soros Foundation,the European Union, and the British RoyalSociety. The money from these grants hasallowed the institute to raise the salaries of itsworkers to $400 to $600 a month, comparedwith the typical salary of Russian scientists ofno more than $50 per month. Many of thespecialists who left Lyubuchany in search of

118 In October 1998, financing was received for four NCBprojects under the IPP program. NISKhI and the Anti-PlagueInstitute have also received a few ISTC grants.


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better work and pay are now returning, and thefuture of the institute looks bright.119

CONCLUSIONS

Kazakhstan faces challenging problemswith regard to the economic andenvironmental prospects of its former BWfacilities. The direct subordination of thesefacilities to the Moscow authorities during theSoviet period, their huge military-designedinfrastructure, and the weapons-relatedexpertise of their personnel have complicatedthe process of conversion and integration intoKazakhstani civilian structures. Because of thelack of local resources, international assistanceprograms have provided most of the supportfor converting former BW facilities andreducing the exodus of personnel with militaryexpertise.

More efforts are needed to helpKazakhstani biotechnological centers tobecome economically self-sufficient, so theyneed not rely in future on temporary foreignassistance programs. Although Kazakhstanibiotechnological centers possess significantproduction facilities, the lack of financialresources and managerial expertise forreconstruction, delays in the conversionprocess, and stiff competition from Westernand Russian firms in the domestic market havecreated serious economic difficulties. In thisregard, Russia’s successful strategies forattracting international financial assistance forthe industrial conversion of its own BWfacilities should be imitated in Kazakhstan.Collaborating with experienced foreign firmsand attracting foreign investment could helpKazakhstani biotechnological facilities toestablish their place in the civilian biotech andpharmaceuticals market.

Another priority is to attract theinternational expertise and assistance needed todeal with the environmental consequences ofSoviet BW development and testing in

119 Rimmington, “From Military to Industrial Complex,” p. 97.

Kazakhstan. Specialists from the NCB haveexpressed concerns that because of past BWtests, Vozrozhdeniye Island may remaincontaminated for many years by pathogenicmicroorganisms, some of them military strainsresistant to standard antibiotics. Anthraxspores can survive in soil for decades, creatingan enduring source of contamination.Moreover, burrowing rodents such as gophers,field mice, and marmots are natural hosts ofplague and other pathogens, and can migrateover long distances spreading infectiousdisease.

The contamination of VozrozhdeniyeIsland presents a growing threat to the nearbypopulation and the environment because of thedesiccation of the Aral Sea, which has increasedhuman and animal access to the formerlyisolated island. As mentioned above, after theRussian military left in 1992, local residentsstarted visiting the island to collect abandonedequipment. Economic activities in the area mayincrease in the future because someKazakhstani and Uzbekistani oil companiesplan to conduct oil exploration in the AralSea.120 In 1997, specialists from the NCB andthe Almaty Anti-Plague Institute submitted aproposal to the Kazakhstani government tostudy the environmental situation onVozrozhdeniye Island, but the government stilllacks the funds to support this research.

In conclusion, Kazakhstan hasdemonstrated an extraordinary degree ofopenness and transparency with respect to itsrole in the former Soviet BW program. It hasalso been a leader in cooperative efforts todestroy the infrastructure for producingweapons of mass destruction, setting a positiveexample for other countries. Yet Kazakhstanhas not yet received the financial support itneeds to convert former BW facilities topeaceful production activities. In return for its

120 Specialists from NCB and Dr. Aykimbayev indicated thatthey had been approached by some foreign oil companiesoperating in Kazakhstan requesting a map of VozrozhdeniyeIsland. The specialists recommended refraining from anyactivity on the island.


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exemplary behavior, Kazakhstan deserves theactive support of the world community insolving its conversion problems.


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Building 600, where research was conducted

View of Buildings 600 and 241-244, from Building 221


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Fermentors in Building 221

Refrigeration units at SNOPB


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Buildings 251-252, used to store finished products

Entrance to bunker next to helicopter landing pad

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