Author: Malcolm Scott Date: March 15, 2012 Palestinian nationalism did not become an autonomous, established movement until the

1960s, but the underlying conceptual frameworks for Palestinian nationalism dates back at least

to the late nineteenth century. The formation of these conceptual frameworks began in response

to the increasing divisions within the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, and these conceptual

frameworks became more important after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. While

these frameworks existed, the relevance of ideas for Palestinian nationalism was limited

primarily to intellectuals and local Palestinian elites. Even for that subset of the population,

Palestinian notables divided into factions either supporting Palestinian nationalism or a broader

pan-Arab unity (Muslih 1988, 155-156). For most of the population, there was a need for

familiar institutions such as Islamic beliefs to generate a sense of identity, and there needed to be

greater distinctions between factions of Arab nationalists to limit the viability of Palestinians as

pan-Arab supporters. For Palestinian nationalism to develop in the form seen after the 1940s,

religious institutions were some preexisting institutions supporting an immature nationalist

movement, and tensions within the pan-Arab/Arab nationalist movement were necessary to

interpret Arab identity within a Palestinian perspective. Different sources of preexisting identities

and institutions were necessary to form the basis for Palestinian nationalism.

The union of multiple identities within Palestinian nationalism is not necessarily unusual

or exceptional. During the early twentieth century, this was a common trend among nationalist

movements in counties of the Middle East. In this context, nationalist movements for Lebanon,

Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt all developed based on previous circumstances and preexisting

affiliations (Khalidi 1997, 20). The development of Palestinian nationalism from previous

cultural, informal institutions and the basis on regional affiliation was not unique or unexpected

compared to the rest of the region. Local affiliations were necessary for the development of

nationalism in many areas of the Middle East (Khalidi 1997, 21). These local affiliations

arguably then became a lens through which to interpret other ideologies and movements

impacting the Middle East, such as Zionism, Arab nationalism or Islamism (Khalidi 1997, 21).

A sense of Palestinian identity did not fail to begin its formation towards the end of the

Ottoman Empire (Khalidi 1997, 58). One newspaper Filastin was notable for its increasing

references to ‘Palestine’ and ‘Palestinians’, and this occurred as the Ottoman Empire was in its

final years (Khalidi 1997, 58). In the early twentieth century, there was already a nascent sense

of regional if not national identity in the Palestinian locale. A few newspaper references to a

Palestinian identity were not sufficient to have cultivated a new nation. However, the sense of

identity was already present before World War I, even if this sense of identity was weak. This

Palestinian identity would face additional barriers to its synthesis into a national identity aside

from its immaturity.

Palestinians had a greater focus on local, family or political divisions compared to other

nationalist movements (Khalidi 1997, 25). While other nationalist movements in areas such as

Tunisia and Egypt were stronger and more cohesive, internal social divisions weakened the

nascent nationalism in Palestine (Khalidi 1997, 25). While other Arab nationalist movements

also had internal divisions impeding nationalism (and within nationalist movements themselves

in the case of Lebanon), other Arab nationalist movements still formed a minimal modicum of

consensus and unity despite internal differences (Khalidi 1997, 24-25). A significant advantage

for other Arab nation-states in formation was the presence of central states that reinforced

nationalist narratives, and this was not advantage available for Palestinian nationalists (Khalidi

1997, 20). In addition, the Palestinian was under pressure from the British Empire and the

Zionist movements. Under those circumstances, shifts in cultural paradigms would be much

more difficult for developing Palestinian nationalism, and overlapping, intertwined identities

would become more important for the early formation of nationalistic ideas.

Palestinian identity would not necessarily conflict with other sources of identity such as

Arabism, Ottomanism, or Islam. These identities existed in a framework in which these different

identities were complementary. Such a dynamic can be seen in the mindset of Ruhi al-Khalidi, a

notable born in 1868 of the al-Khalidi family. Ruhi al-Khalidi received traditional religious

education in Jerusalem and attended other schools in Jerusalem, Beirut, Tripoli and France

(Khalidi 1997, 76-77). He eventually received the position of Ottoman Consul-General in

Bordeaux in 1898 (Khalidi 1997, 79). In his mind, local Jerusalem, Arab, Palestinian and

Ottoman identities were overlapping and not mutually exclusive (Khalidi 1997, 85). His

construction of identities could not qualify as part of the Palestinian nationalist movement

necessarily, because Arab identity for him was cultural in form (Khalidi 1997, 85). While under

the Ottoman Empire and as a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (political

organization in the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey), this Arab identity was not yet political in

nature (Khalidi 1997, 85). Ruhi al-Khalidi was not alone in his regard of diverse identities.

Different intellectuals shared the regard for diverse identities espoused by Ruhi al-

Khalidi. His uncle Yusuf Diya’ shared these conceptions of these multiple identities (Khalidi

1997, 87). Nonetheless, intellectuals and notables such as Ruhi al-Khalidi had provided a

framework for these multiple identities to coexist and helped to provide a foundation for

Palestinian nationalism (Khalidi 1997, 85). For most of his life, the Ottoman Empire was

relevant force, but his reconciliation of his different identities provides a demonstration of the

mechanisms facilitating Palestinian nationalism. Additional examination demonstrates a

religious dimension to local Palestinian identity from the late nineteenth to early twentieth

century.

The location of the city Jerusalem in the Palestinian locale was important for the

development of religious movements in association with Palestinian nationalism. The city of

Jerusalem is well known as a holy site for three monotheistic beliefs, Judaism, Christianity and

Islam (Khalidi 1997, 29). It was not only Jerusalem to be of religious significance but also other

cities, including and not limited to Hebron, Bethlehem, Gaza, Acre and Jericho (Khalidi 1997,

29). Prior to the rise of Palestinian nationalism, these sacred spaces created preliminary national

boundaries for a Palestinian locale. Because most Palestinians had a shared connection with the

city of Jerusalem through one of the faiths, the city became a focal point for Palestinian identity

(Khalidi 1997, 35). These dynamics would create at least one means by which religious and

nationalist interests could intersect during the twentieth century.

An additional phenomenon was the contribution of religious families to the foundations

of Palestinian nationalism. A trend was the transition of members of families specializing in

religious authority to roles in government bureaucracy (Khalidi 1997, 70). A demonstration of

this dynamic was a member of the al-Khalidi family, Yusuf Diya’, uncle to Ruhi al-Khalidi

(Khalidi 1997, 70). His father was al-Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ali al-Khalidi (1781-1865), who had

become a qadi in Jerusalem (Khalidi 1997, 65). Likewise, three of the brothers of Yusuf Diya al-

Khalidi had trained to become ulama (Khalidi 1997, 67). By contrast, as part of a growing

broader trend, Yusuf Diya’ acquired additional training in foreign languages and other subjects

aside from Islamic studies, and he eventually became a member of the Ottoman parliament

(Khalidi 1997, 67-68). As illustrated in this instance, Islamic social practices within Palestine

provided a reserve of competent and qualified individuals who could also provide support for

political activity and facilitate the development of Palestinian nationalism. However, the

relationship between local, Palestinian identity and religious identity is deeper than the power of

religious families and geography of sacred sites.

Islam in the early twentieth century Palestine was instrumental to the development of

Palestinian nationalism. Under the mandate system, there was often an alignment of outsider

identities and non-adherence to Islam (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196). Distinction between

peoples of different beliefs could be means to distinguish local Palestinians from deemed

outsiders of others, such as Zionists or European labor forces for the mandate system (Gershoni

and Jankowshi 1997, 196). In this perspective, it is not difficult to understand that religious

institutions could have facilitated the process of “othering” necessary for the development of

Palestinian identity. However, the role of Islamic institutions in nascent Palestinian identity

cannot be ascribed simply to bigotry.

Religious leaders (primarily imams and khatibs) were often instrumental in mass

mobilization. Acts of resistance under the mandate system received a dimension of religious and

spiritual significance in a society with weak local identities (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196).

National identity in Palestine was barely existent and few people aside from intellectuals and

local notables considered it (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196). Islamic institutions and

symbols provided a means of communication familiar to most individuals, which was an effect

of Ottoman power (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196). Through religious narratives

encompassing events as early as the Crusades even, religious discourse began to provide a

foundation for a broader narrative for Palestinian identity, and this discourse provided a history

for the local identity (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196). In this perspective, Palestinian

religious institutions acted as supporting cultural institutions and as scaffolding for a Palestinian

national identity. These institutions themselves did not exert influence on Palestinian society

unilaterally, but these institutions had frequently intersected with narratives for Arab

nationalism.

The broad nature of Arab nationalism had been a feature of its earlier narratives during

the 1920s through 1950s (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997, 7). The primary focus in the foundation

of Arab nationalism had originally been lingual, and the Arab nation was early conceived as the

community of those who spoke the Arabic language (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997, 7). Arabic

speech determined the physical and metaphysical boundaries for what was the Arab nation

(Gershoni and Jankowski 1997. 7). In these early narratives, history of the Arab nation and its

icons and customs formed to create a greater narrative for the nationalists living in the early

twentieth century (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997. 7). Within this narrative, there was an early

distinction between Arab nationalism and regard for more provincial homelands (Gershoni and

Jankowski 1997, 8). Conceptually, the early narrative for Arab nationalism already had a

framework for distinction between the Arab community as a whole and specific, provincial

communities of Arabs within that broader community. This tension was more clearly seen

between Palestinian and Syrian nationalists after World War I. It is important to note that Islam

was incorporated into the narratives for Arab nation, in which Islam was a stage in the

development of the Arab nation (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997, 7). Early in the narrative of

Arab nationalism, there was already a conceptual space for Islam in Arab nationalism, and this

made it easier for the different streams of thought to align.

The alignment of Islamic and pro-Arab sentiments is exemplified in the activities of a

Syrian intellectual known as Muhammad Rashid Rida. Rida was primarily an Islamic intellectual

and moved to Egypt from Syria in 1897 (Muslih 1988, 74). Once in Egypt, he edited a monthly

publication known as al-Mansar, and he attempted to combine pro-Islamic and pro-Arabic

sentiments as an early member of the salafis, those who advocated practices in accordance with

Muslim forbears (Muslih 1988, 74). His interpretation was notable. His intellectual ancestors

were Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh, two leading nineteenth century

thinkers, who focused mostly on the Islamic reform or the advance of Muslims (Muslih 1988,

74). When the Ottoman Empire practiced policies that Rida regarded as detrimental to Arab

interests when the Young Turks deposed the sultan, however, he then became a strong advocate

of Arab Islam and an aggressive anti-Zionist (Muslih 1988, 74). The instance of Muhammad

Rashid Rida is an illustration of different, evolving identities in the wake of the declining

Ottoman Empire; as the Ottoman Empire explicitly assumed Turkish language and culture, the

distinction between Arab and Turkish identities arose and likewise different interpretations of

Islam, which had previously been a broader, more capacious Ottoman Islam.

When the political movement known as the Young Turks seized power from the Ottoman

sultanate in 1909 and the Committee of Union and Progress rose to power in what would become

Turkey, the differentiation between Arab and Turkish identities began. Across the Arab world, in

Mecca, Baghdad and Damascus, there was widespread opposition to the coup of the Young

Turks (Muslih 1988, 57). The reaction among Palestinian elites formerly aligned with the

Ottoman Empire was similar to that of Arab regions of the empire, and the sentiment is

demonstrated in Ihsan al-Nimr and his accounts of their reactions (Muslih 1988, 57). Al-Nimr

described the opposition from older, Palestinian elites to the Committee of Union and Progress,

including that of al-Hajj Tawfiq Hammad, leader of a branch of the Muhammadan Union Society

(Muslih 1988, 57). This is a stark contrast to earlier years of Ottoman Palestine, in which Arabs

and non-Arabs had these identities subsumed under a more capacious Muslim identity (Muslih

1988, 59). This more expansive religious identity was key to the union of the Ottoman Empire

even as Arab and Turkish identities became more distinct during the nineteenth century (Muslih

1988, 60). The role of religiosity in the Ottoman Empire and the emphasis on the umma, the

community of Muslim believers, could have been a precursor for the role of religion in

Palestinian nationalism. However, Turkish nationalism became a matter of imperial politics.

When the Young Turks attempted to impose Turkish language and culture on Arab populations,

Arab nationalism became a more significantly stronger movement than before that time (Muslih

1988, 60). The attraction of Arab nationalism was especially strong for younger Palestinian elites

compared to the older elites who gained power originally through the Ottoman Empire. Some of

these elites had maintained their power via relations with the Committee of Union and Progress

(Mulih 1988, 64). However, from 1909 to the end of the World War I, the Ottoman identity itself

was gradually weakening in Palestine, and this was important for the rise of pan-Arab, Arab

nationalist identities for Palestinians (Muslih 1988, 68).

There had originally been broad aspirations for pan-Arabism as the Ottoman Empire went

into decline. A notable thinker in this regard was Arab nationalist Najib ‘Azuri, who was also a

staunch anti-Zionist (Muslih 1988, 76). In 1905, ‘Azuri published a book in Paris translated into

English as The Awakening of the Arab Nation. Through this book, ‘Azuri advocated that the

Arabs secede from the Ottoman Empire in response to intolerable persecution, as he saw it

(Muslih 1988, 74). More importantly, ‘Azuri had a vision for pan-Arabism in which an empire

would extend through Mesopotamia, Syria, the Arabian Peninsula and Palestine (Muslih 1988,

74). His work contained dimensions of anti-Semitism that could be found in the works of other

Arab nationalists for that time (Muslih 1988, 78). In his opposition to Zionism, ‘Azuri had made

regional and social assessments of Palestine, albeit often inaccurate assessments (Muslih 1988,

78). In the work of ‘Azuri, there is groundwork for the development of Arab nationalism as it

was originally conceived. While this was not the same interpretation of Arab nationalism as

espoused by Arab nationalists in Palestine, an overall principle unity and the foundation of pan-

Arab unity has its beginning partly from the work of ‘Azuri. This emphasis on unity more

closely reflected the general sentiment compelling Palestinian Arab nationalists to unite with

Syria. This would become less feasible as greater distinctions between different factions of Arab

nationalists became prominent after World War I.

The strongest barrier to broader pan-Arab unity was the mandate system, which would

facilitate the development of Palestinian nationalism. The barrier of the mandate system can be

seen through the perspective of ‘Anwi ‘Abd al-Hadi. ‘Abd al-Hadi was a Palestinian lawyer

educated in France who assisted Prince Faisal, son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca, to prevent the

separation of Palestine and Syria under the mandate system (Talhami 2001, 6). In his mind, the

nation of Syria encompassed both Palestine and Transjordan (Talhami 2001, 6). When Prince

Faisal appointed to direct foreign affairs after his return in Damascus in 1920, he had a special

view into the divisions of Arab communities created as a result of the mandate system (Talhami

2001, 6). When the French and British governments began to divide Syria under the mandate

system, ‘Anwi ‘Abd al-Hadi observed how these imposed divisions created divisions within

Arab communities, which was a surprise for him (Talhami 2001, 7). When these divisions within

Arab communities were created through the mandate system, this facilitated the creation of

multiple, locally derived identities within the broader Arab identity espoused for Arab

nationalism. This transformation of Arab identity from the beginning of the twentieth century to

the beginning of the mandate system facilitated regional interpretations of Arab identity,

including in Palestine. The internal weaknesses of Arab nationalism during the first few years

after World War I merely facilitated this process.

Forces within the Arab nationalist movements were pulling Palestinians and other Arab

factions apart after the end of World War I. Originally Palestinian Arab nationalists had immense

power in the government of King Faisal, which they tried to use to great effect for Palestinian

incorporation into Greater Syria (Muslih 1988, 201; 119). Many thousands of Palestinians

worked in different positions of Syrian government in Damascus, and they exerted their

influence to try to incorporate Palestine into this envisioned country (Muslih 1988, 119). Along

with Iraqis, their influence in the government in Damascus provoked much resentment and

contempt from Syrian notables (Muslih 1988, 151). This tension between Syrian notables and

Palestinian and Iraqi advocates weakened the cohesion of the pan-Arab movement (Muslih 1988,

201). Members of the Syrian National Party were the most vehement opponents of Palestinian

advocates and their ideal of Palestinian integration (Muslih 1988, 201). An additional weakness

for the Arab nationalist movement stemmed from policy decisions of Prince Faisal, and this was

simply another factor in the development of Palestinian nationalism.

The pan-Arab unity further underwent weakening in response the policies of Prince

Faisal in response to Zionism. For Prince Faisal, an agreement with local Zionists was useful to

secure British support (Muslih 1988, 202). While this was suitable for Syria as a primary

objective, Palestinians who saw their locale as a primary objective and opposed Zionist

movements found this course of action to violate their highest priorities (Muslih 1988, 202).

Zionism was a highly specific target in their local struggles (Muslih 1988, 202). Both tensions

between Arab notables and the policies of Faisal towards the Zionists revealed crucial

weaknesses in the pan-Arab movement: the movement encompassed and often subordinated to

diverse, local regional interests (Muslih 1988, 203). A primary weakness was there were Arabs

of considerably different backgrounds enclosed within this whole regional movement, and the

local identities were too powerful to be contained with the Arab nationalist movement (Muslih

1988, 203).

This represented a crucial break for Arab nationalists from Palestine. Their Arab identity

would more directly have local elements of Palestinian identity, as there would be for Iraqis and

Syrians (Muslih 1988, 203). By 1920, the political separation of Palestine and Syria had entered

its completion. Even though, this was not the end of an evolving relationship between Palestinian

and Arab identities, there was an evolution of an Arab identity in Palestine that would have

distinctly Palestinian dimensions. From the end the nineteenth century to the early twentieth

century, Palestinian identity was originally Ottoman, then pan-Arab, and then Arab with a local,

increasingly explicit Palestinian dimension. By this time, there was an alignment of Arab and

religious identities, and this was visible in the Young Muslim Men’s Association of the 1920s.

The Young Men’s Muslim Association demonstrated the alignment of Arab and religious

interests for Palestinian nationalism during the 1920s and 1930s. The Young Men’s Muslim

Association (YMMA) was simply a variation of the Young Men’s Christian Association

conception; Palestinian branches for the YMMA were founded, starting in 1928 Jaffa (Yukie

2009, 240). For the creation of the Palestinian branches of the organization, those offices had the

support of the Supreme Muslim Council (Yukie 2009, 241). While the YMMA has had a

reputation in much historical literature as source of terrorism performed in the name of Islam, the

bulk of its activities were political and not religious in nature (Yukie 2009, 240). Although the

YMMA had been dissolved by 1934, many former members were instrumental to the

mobilization of different groups in Palestinian society (Yukie 2009). This organization (its

former members, more specifically) was pivotal to the creation of cohesive movements for the

first stage of the 1936-1939 Great Arab Revolt (Yukie 2009, 238). An additional fact of

importance was that the YMMA was inclusive of multiple Palestinian communities (Yukie 2009,

240). These assessments of the YMMA demonstrate how religious and local institutions aligned

along lines of Arab identity, and this cohesion was part of a developing Palestinian identity. That

this nominally religious organization originally had the support of the Supreme Muslim Council

does not indicate merely that these organizations were more relevant than Palestinian identity.

More importantly, these other institutions had been nurturing Palestinian identity and precursors

for Palestinian nationalism. The involvement of the YMMA and its origins illustrate how

religious and Arab identities could align to enhance a local, Palestinian narrative.

Preexisting religious and Arab nationalist institutions were necessary to cultivate

Palestinian nationalism during and after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. These contributed

auxiliary support and characteristics for the nationalist movement. The institutions created new

features of Palestinian nationalism as they intersected with each other and impacted local

problems such as a lack of social services (Yukie 2009). Arab nationalism became increasingly

local in scope as internal tensions arose within the pan-Arab/Arab nationalist movement, and

religious institutions remaining from the Ottoman Empire provided a means of cohesion for

Palestinian non-elites. The auxiliary institutions were not sufficient to create a fully developed

Palestinian nationalism, but they provided the intellectual groundwork for when this narrative

would have greater appeal.

Works Cited

Gershoni, Israel and James Jankowski. Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East. New

York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Print

Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Print.

Muslih, Muhammad Y. The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. New York: Columbia

University Press, 1988. Print.

Tahami, Ghada Hashem. Syria and the Palestinians: The Clash of Nationalisms. University

Press of Florida, 2001. Print.

Yukie, Tamura. “Turning Social Problems into the Basis for Inclusive Movements: A Study of

the Influence the Young Men’s Muslim Associations Had in Palestine through Their

Charitable Activities in the Late 1920s.” Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies. 3.1

(2009): 237-248. Print.