FORM A FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT · FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT ... it as a...

FORM AFILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT

ECJ NO : 003/2004

PARTIES: HEATHER OSNER APPLICANT

AND

PAUL FREDERICK MICHAEL OSNER RESPONDENT

REFERENCE NUMBERS -

• Registrar: 499/2004

• Magistrate:

• Supreme Court of Appeal/Constitutional Court:

DATE DELIVERED: 3 JUNE 2004

JUDGE(S): PLASKET J

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES -Appearances:

• for the State/Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): SH COLE• for the accused/respondent(s): RWN BROOKS

Instructing attorneys:• Applicant(s)/Appellant(s): NETTELTONS• Respondent(s): WHEELDON, RUSHMERE & COLE

CASE INFORMATION -• Nature of proceedings : PROHIBITORY INTERDICT

• Topic: PRESERVATION OF ASSET PENDING DIVORCE SETTLEMENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION)

CASE NO: 499/2004

DATE DELIVERED:3/6/04

In the matter between:

HEATHER OSNER APPLICANT

and

PAUL FREDERICK MICHAEL OSNER RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

PLASKET J

[A] INTRODUCTION

[1] The applicant brought an ex parte urgent application against the respondent,

her husband, in which she sought and was granted a rule nisi calling upon him to

show cause why ‘he should not be finally interdicted and restrained from

removing the yacht “Ballyhoo” from South African waters, pending the finalisation

of the divorce proceedings between the parties’ and why the respondent ‘should

only be permitted, pending finalization of the aforesaid divorce proceedings, to

undertake charter trips with the yacht “Ballyhoo”, to a distance of no more than

2

2

15 nautical miles from the East London harbour, subject to the respondent giving

the Harbour Master, East London, 48 hours notice of his intention to embark on

any such charter, and the destination of such charter.’

[2] She also sought the usual order that the above orders operate as temporary

interdicts pending the return day, and a costs order that differed from the usual,

namely, that ‘the cost of this application be and are hereby reserved for

determination in the divorce action … between the parties’. An order was granted

on 7 May 2004 by Chetty J. By notice dated 17 May 2004, the respondent

anticipated the return day, setting the matter down for hearing on 20 May 2004.

On that day the matter was postponed further to 24 May 2004 to enable the

applicant to file a replying affidavit. The costs of the postponement are still in

issue before me.

[3] The applicant and respondent have been married since April 1981. They are

in the throes of what appears to be an acrimonious divorce. In the divorce

proceedings, the applicant claims, inter alia, a redistribution order in terms of

s7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. She claims to be confident of succeeding in

claiming 50 percent of the respondent’s estate. In a counterclaim, the

respondent also claims a redistribution order in terms of s7(3) of the Act, and he

too expresses confidence of being awarded 50 percent of his wife’s estate on

divorce.

[4] The yacht is the single biggest asset in respondent’s estate. He alleges that

its value is in the region of R1 400 000.00. (Whether that is its true value or not is

not relevant at this stage.) It is common cause that he plans to sail in it from East

London up the east coast of Africa to Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya. This is

at the heart of the applicant’s case.

3

3

[5] It is trite law that, in order to establish the requirements for the granting of an

interim interdict, an applicant must establish: (a) a prima facie right in the subject

matter of the dispute; (b) an apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief

is not granted and the final relief is granted in due course; (c) the balance of

convenience in his or her favour; and (d) the absence of a satisfactory alternative

remedy.1

[6] Whether an application such as this – in which a socalled antidissipation

interdict2 is applied for is to be treated differently is an issue to which I shall

return in due course.

[B] THE APPLICANT’S CASE: HER FOUNDING PAPERS

[7] The applicant stated that, as the result of her ‘ongoing work within the family

over the past 23 years’ and particularly because the marriage ‘has broken down

solely and exclusively by reason of the respondent’s gross and ongoing

misconduct’ she has a ‘clear right’ to an order in terms of s7(3) of the Divorce

1 Erasmus Superior Court Practice Cape Town, Juta & Co: 1994, E 88 to E 89; Harms Civil Procedure in the Supreme Court Durban, LexisNexis Butterwoths: 1990, A40: Van Winsen, Cilliers and Loots The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa (4 ed) Cape Town, Juta & Co: 1997, 1065.2 There is some debate as to the appropriateness of the term ‘antidissipation interdict’ or other terms that have been proposed for the type application in issue in this case. It is not necessary for me to involve myself in this debate. See, however, Knox D’Arcy Ltd and others v Jamieson and others 1996 (4) SA 348 (A), 371I372C in which EM Grosskopf JA stated: ‘As far as its name is concerned, the petitioners referred to it as a Marevatype interdict after the term used in English law. The Court a quo did not like this name since the use of the English term might suggest that English principles are automatically applicable (see 1994 (3) SA at 705A706B). I agree with this criticism. The alternatives suggested by Stegmann J were not, however, much more felicitous. Thus he referred to an interdict in securitatem debiti and an antidissipation interdict. The former expression may suggest that the purpose of the interdict is to provide security for the applicant's claim. This is not so. The interdict prevents the respondent from dealing freely with his assets but grants the applicant no preferential rights over those assets. And “antidissipation” suffers from the defect that in most cases and, certainly in the present case, the interdict is not sought to prevent the respondent from dissipating his assets, but rather from preserving them so well that the applicant cannot get his hands on them. Having criticised the names used for the interdict I find myself unfortunately unable to suggest a better one. I console myself with the thought that our law has recognised this type of interdict for many years without giving it any specific name.’

4

4

Act. Whether she does or not is a matter for the trial court to determine in due

course. I accept that she has established the first element of an interim interdict,

namely a prima facie right, even if that right is open to some doubt.3

[8] She then turns to the crux of the matter – the reason why this application was

brought – when she alleges that, if the application is not granted, she will suffer

irreparable harm. She states:

‘I state further that if the respondent is allowed to remove the one

significant asset in his estate, to the jurisdiction of a foreign country, or

even into international waters, I have a well grounded and overwhelming

apprehension of irreparable harm to myself; the respondent will be able to

liquidate his smaller assets and leave me with virtually nothing in South

Africa with which to satisfy any judgment in my favour on the conclusion of

the divorce.’

[9] The buildup to this point in her papers is instructive. She states in this regard:

‘19. During the course of preparations for trial, it came to my attention

that it was rumored in the yachting circles in East London that the

respondent was going to take the yacht “Ballyhoo” away from East

London, out of South African waters and to charter the yacht along

the Mozambican coast.

20. Until the present time, the yacht “Ballyhoo” has never been taken

by the respondent out of South African waters and has been used

exclusively for local charters around the East London harbour

3 See Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221, 227; Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W), 11891190; Gool v Minister of Justice and another 1955 (2) SA 682 (C), 688E; Olympic Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan 1957 (2) SA 382DF. For a more recent exposition of the test see Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and others 1995 (2) SA 813 (W), 817G, in which Streicher J held: ‘It has, up to now, been accepted that in order to establish a prima facie right entitling an applicant to an interim interdict, an applicant has to make out a case that he is entitled to final relief. If on the facts alleged by the applicant and the undisputed facts alleged by the respondent a court would not be able to grant final relief, the applicant has not established a prima facie right and is not entitled to interim protection.’

5

5

mouth, for a distance of approximately 10 nautical miles from East

London, on charters that last for a few hours at a time.

21. I was most concerned that the respondent may be planning to take

the yacht “Ballyhoo” from South Africa as it is the one true asset of

value in his estate, and in respect of which any judgment in my

favour in a s7(3) distribution claim, would stand or fall.’

[10] In order to confirm her suspicions that the yacht was to be sailed out of

South African waters, the applicant engaged the services of one Darrell Els, a

private investigator. He went to the respondent’s restaurant – the Ballyhoo

Restaurant – posing as a potential client wishing to hire the yacht for a birthday

party. He learnt that the yacht was being refurbished and that there were plans

afoot to sail to Bazaruto Island in Mozambique and further up the East African

coast where the respondent intended to take charters. Indeed, he learnt from the

partner of the respondent at the time, one Bernadine Bush, that the respondent

had charter work booked until 2005. (In his affidavit, the respondent said that this

was incorrect.)

[11] The applicant contends that the balance of convenience favours her

because she does not ‘seek to interdict the respondent from continuing with his

nautical activities in the manner in which he has conducted it in the past namely

to take short charters in the vicinity of East London for a duration of a few hours

at a time; I only requested the respondent be interdicted from removing the yacht

“Ballyhoo” from the jurisdiction of this honourable court pending the finalization of

the divorce action which can be fully resolved within six months from now’. She

states that this will mean that the respondent ‘will merely be required to delay his

departure for foreign waters but, in the interim, can continue to charter the yacht

in the manner he has done previously to sustain himself financially should he

need to do so’. She also says that she requires the order to be supervised by the

6

6

Harbour Master, East London, ‘to enable me to have some ability to monitor the

situation pending the finalization of the divorce action’.

[12] She claims that she has no alternative remedy once the yacht has left South

African waters. She states:

‘Even were the respondent were to return to South Africa for finalization of

the divorce proceedings, if the yacht was to be left moored somewhere up

the African coast this would have the effect of rendering nugatory any

judgment in my favour for a redistribution order in respect of respondent’s

assets. For this reason the interdict sought in these papers is my only

relief. The respondent does not have sufficient assets in South Africa to

satisfy any judgment that this court may grant in the divorce action, should

the respondent be successful in placing the yacht “Ballyhoo” beyond my

grasp.’

[C] THE RESPONDENT’S ANSWERING PAPERS

[13] The respondent does not deny that he intends to sail the yacht out of South

African waters to Mozambique and further up the African coast. Indeed, for all

intents and purposes it is common cause between the parties that he intends to

make the yacht available for charter along the East African Coast. He states:

’19. I confirm that I have been planning to take the yacht “Ballyhoo”

away from East London to charter the yacht along the Mozambican

coast. This has not been any secretive or covert arrangement on

my part, but has been completely open and is in fact general

knowledge. I planed to take the yacht for charter to Bazaruto, off

the Mozambican coast with effect from the 23rd June, with my

leaving East London harbour with effect from the beginning of June.

The reasons for this are as follows:

7

7

19.1 I generate my living expenses and the running expenses of

the yacht from the chartering of the yacht;

19.2 The chartering of the yacht during the winter time in East

London is very quite and it is far more economical to charter

the yacht off the island of Bazaruto during the winter time;

19.3 A further important complication is the fact that my fare

paying passenger limit has been reduced from 30 to 12

since April 2004, due to the new SAMSA safety rules and

regulations which have come into effect over the past

several months and which has been enforced upon me since

the 5th April 2004. I have anticipated this for several months.

…

19.4 My licenced “skipper” is only entitled to skipper the yacht

until the 8th June 2004, thereafter his qualification will be

insufficient;

19.5 There are no similar strict limitations off the island of

Bazaruto with regard to the skippering and carrying of paying

passengers;

19.6 The weather conditions will be most unfavourable after the

month of June due to the contrary winds that arriving

thereafter for yachts moving north up the east coast of

Africa.’

[14] The respondent states further that the fact that ‘I might have an asset

temporarily in Mozambican waters will not have any effect on the applicant’s

claim or judgment against me, should this be granted’. He also says the

following in response to the applicant’s allegations that she has met the

requirements for the granting of an interim order:

‘26.1 The contents of this paragraph are denied. On the contrary, I

8

8

submit that the substantial part of the applicant’s estate has been

established because of my direct involvement in the construction of

the large Mgwalana Mouth beach house. I submit that I am

reasonably entitled to a redistribution order in this regard. I

furthermore deny that the marriage relationship between the

applicant and myself broke down by reason of my alleged gross

misconduct. I respectfully submit that the cause of the breakdown

of the marriage is as more fully set out in my counterclaim, a copy

whereof is attached hereto. In the circumstances, I deny that the

applicant has a clear right to a redistribution order in terms of

section 7(3). …

26.2 The contents of this paragraph are denied. I respectfully submit that

the applicant has not one shred of evidence to indicate that I intend

dealing with my estate in order to cause the applicant harm or to

defraud her. The applicant furthermore has not one shred of

evidence to indicate that I intend liquidating my assets in order to

leave the applicant with virtually nothing in South Africa with which

to satisfy any judgment which may be in her favour on the

conclusion of the divorce. I respectfully submit that I have at all

times been bona fide in my dealings with the applicant both in

respect of the issues in the divorce and my attempts to reach a

settlement with her.

26.3 I strongly deny that the balance of convenience favours the

applicant in this instance. For the reasons set out above, my ability

to earn a living from the chartering of the yacht out of the East

London harbour has been severely limited and in fact will cease on

8th June 2004 unless I am able to find and employ a skipper with

the necessary qualifications. To the best of my knowledge there are

no skippers available with the necessary qualifications for

9

9

employment by me on a flexitime charter basis in East London. In

any event, I am only limited to 12 passengers at a time, which is

uneconomical. I have in this past year contributed a substantial

amount towards my daughter’s university fees. I will be unable to

continue to do so from income unless I leave the East London

harbour in order to charter the boat in more lucrative areas such as

Bazaruto. The applicant will still be in a position to pursue her

alleged claim against me, whether or not my yacht is in Bazaruto or

in South Africa.

26.4 I strongly deny that the applicant is not without an alternative

satisfactory remedy. I have no intention of selling the yacht and

respectfully submit that I will meet any order against me made by

the above honourable court. I furthermore submit that I have

sufficient assets in South Africa in the form of immovable property

to satisfy any judgment that this court may grant in the divorce

action.’

[15] The respondent makes it clear that he has no intention of leaving the yacht

permanently beyond the territorial jurisdiction of South African courts or that he

intends to alienate it. He state that it is ‘certainly not for sale and I will definitely

be returning to South Africa with the yacht. The yacht is my life, livelihood and

home and the applicant is well aware of this’. He also states that he never

indicated that he might be willing to sell the yacht, that the applicant was well

aware of this and that she has ‘made no suggestion that I have such intentions’.

Later in his affidavit (where he states, incidentally, that he does not have charter

bookings in 2005, as had been stated by Ms Bush, according to the evidence of

Mr Els) the respondent says that ‘the intention has always been to return at the

end of October 2004’ but that ‘in view of the enforcement of the SAMSA safety

regulations now upon me, I may well decide not to bring the yacht back then,

10

10

unless I am able to obtain the services of a skipper with the necessary

qualifications and dependant upon the charter business available after October

2004. I will however fly back during the period away, from time to time to deal

with my affairs in East London’.

[D] THE APPLICANT’S REPLY

[16] In her replying affidavit, the applicant makes much of her discovery of

additional assets in the estate of her husband: it would appear that, by mistake, a

bank statement that indicated that a policy worth R108 000.00 had been

surrendered by the respondent and a IT3B form referring to an investment of

R169 930.19 were erroneously posted to the applicant’s address. Although they

were not meant for her eyes, she opened both. Why she decided to do this is not

explained.

[17] The inference that the applicant wants me to draw from her discovery is that

the respondent is intent on hiding his assets and will therefore secrete the yacht

in foreign waters to defeat her legitimate claim to half of the respondent’s estate.

She seeks to add weight to this line of reasoning by attaching an affidavit from

Captain PHC Kroon, the Principal Officer of the South African Maritime Safety

Authority based in East London. The upshot of Captain Kroon’s evidence,

however, is that the yacht may not leave East London harbour until certain

matters have been attended to. He also confirms that it may only carry 12

passengers.

[E] FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE PAPERS

[18] The discovery of the assets mentioned above does not necessarily give rise

to the inference that the respondent intends to deal with the yacht in an

11

11

underhand or dishonest way – to dissipate his estate to the prejudice of the

applicant. One does not know what his explanation could be: he may well have

an innocent explanation. Similarly, Captain Kroon’s evidence does not go any

further than establish that the respondent may not leave the harbour before his

yacht meets the necessary standards, even though he was mistaken about the

effect of the safety regulations on the ability of the skipper of the yacht to

continue with his work. I am unable to see how it assists the applicant.

[19] In any event, it was never the applicant’s case that the respondent was

involved in a scheme, actuated by bad faith, to deny her the fruits of the

judgment that she claims will be handed down in her favour in due course. Her

case, on her founding papers was that the respondent planned to sail the yacht

out of South African waters to convey paying passengers around the island of

Bazaruto and beyond, and that activity had to be interdicted to safeguard the

biggest asset in the respondent’s estate so that it could be available to her on her

anticipated victory in the divorce trial.

[20] In my view, there is little in dispute on the papers. While there may be

disagreement as to detail and as to effect, it cannot but be accepted by the

applicant that the respondent intends to sail the yacht out of South African waters

so that he can take advantage of more lucrative opportunities to charter it than

those that present themselves in winter in East London. This, after all, is

precisely what Mr Els ascertained when he posed as a potential customer.

[F] THE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN

[21] I stated earlier in this judgment that I would return to the issue of what

elements have to be established to justify the granting of an antidissipation

interdict and consequently whether they differ from the usual elements of an

12

12

interim interdict. From the authorities that I will deal with below, it appears to me

that it is still necessary for an applicant to establish those wellknown elements,

although he or she may, in some instances, be assisted by a presumption that

operates in his or her favour.

[22] In Knox D’ Arcy Ltd and others v Jamieson and others4 EM Grosskopf JA

dealt with whether it was necessary for an applicant to establish that the

respondent was, in fact, dissipating his or her assets, or was likely to, with the

intention of defeating the applicant’s claim to those assets. He held as follows in

this regard:

‘The question which arises from this approach is whether an applicant

need show a particular state of mind on the part of the respondent, ie that

he is getting rid of the funds, or is likely to do so, with the intention of

defeating the claims of creditors. Having regard to the purpose of this type

of interdict, the answer must be, I consider, yes, except possibly in

exceptional cases. As I have said, the effect of the interdict is to prevent

the respondent from freely dealing with his own property to which the

applicant lays no claim. Justice may require this restriction in cases where

the respondent is shown to be acting mala fide with the intent of

preventing execution in respect of the applicant's claim. However, there

would not normally be any justification to compel a respondent to regulate

his bona fide expenditure so as to retain funds in his patrimony for the

payment of claims (particularly disputed ones) against him. I am not, of

course, at the moment dealing with special situations which might arise,

for instance, by contract or under the law of insolvency.’

[23] In Fedsure Life Assurance Co Ltd v Worldwide African Investment Holdings

(Pty) Ltd5 Cloete J held, after setting out the requirements for the granting of an

4 1996 (4) SA 348 (A), 372FI.5 2003 (3) SA 268 (W), paras 2728. (References within the above quote have been omitted.)

13

13

interim interdict, that the test was less stringent in some cases:

‘[27] There are two exceptions to the requirements set out in Eriksen.

They occur in applications for interim relief pending vindicatory and “quasi

vindicatory” actions. A vindicatory action has been categorised as one in

which the plaintiff claims delivery of specific property as owner or lawful

possessor; and an action has been categorised as “quasivindicatory”

when delivery of specific property is claimed under some legal right to

obtain possession. I do not wish to be detained by terminology. In all such

cases it has been settled law in this Division for over half a century that

“(T)he court is entitled to ensure that the thing shall be preserved until the

dispute is decided finally”.

[28] The two exceptions are the following: the applicant need not allege

irreparable loss inasmuch as there is a presumption, which may be

rebutted by the respondent, that the injury is irreparable; nor need the

applicant show that it has no other satisfactory remedy.’

[24] In Fey NO v Van Der Westhuizen and others6 Meer J held that it was not

necessary for the applicant to establish an intention to dissipate because the

matter involved a ‘quasiproprietary or a quasivindicatory claim’ in which the

applicant ‘claims delivery of specific property under some legal right to

possession’.7 She held too that the case ‘being under the law of insolvency, and

one in which the claim is quasivindicatory is, I believe, an exceptional case, in

which intention is not required to be shown by the applicant’.8

[25] It was argued by Mr Cole, who appeared for the applicant, that I should

follow and apply Fey’s case and, in particular, that I should hold that it was not

necessary for the applicant to establish that the respondent was acting with the

6 [2003] 2 All SA 679 (C).7 At 691h692a.8 At 692cd.

14

14

intention to dissipate. He argued, in the alternative, that the necessary intention

had, in any event, been established. Mr Brooks, who appeared for the

respondent argued that Fey’s case did not properly reflect the law and that I

should not follow it: it was necessary in this case for the applicant to allege and

prove an intention to dissipate on the part of the respondent, and this she had

failed to do.

[26] In my view, Fey’s case is distinguishable. The most important point of

distinction is that the acts of dissipation in issue in that case flowed from the

unlawful theft of funds and hence there could be no talk of the bona fide

utilisation of the funds. In this case there is no sustainable suggestion that the

respondent’s use of the yacht is anything but bona fide.

[27] I am also not convinced that Meer J was correct in stating that because the

matter was quasivindicatory in nature, it was exceptional, and it was not for this

reason necessary for an intention to dissipate to be established. If that is what

she meant, I am in respectful disagreement with her. I do not believe that Knox

D’Arcy can be read this widely. In instances of vindicatory or quasivindicatory

claims, according to the judgment of Cloete J in the Fedsure case (that I have

quoted above), a rebuttable presumption arises that the applicant has suffered

irreparable harm, and it is not necessary to establish that no other satisfactory

remedy is available to the applicant. Meer J used the quasivindicatory nature of

the claim to free the applicant from the obligation of establishing the necessary

intention and to free him from having to establish irreparable harm and the

absence of an alternative remedy was available.9

[28] I have my doubts too that the claim of the applicant to half of the estate of

the respondent in terms of s7(3) of the Divorce Act can be properly categorized

9 At 692ef.

15

15

as quasivindicatory: if anything, it is analogous to the damages claim in Knox

D’Arcy.

[29] The facts of this case cannot be described as exceptional. This, in other

words, is not one of those ‘special situations’ contemplated by EM Grosskopf JA

in Knox D’ Arcy in which it would be justified to limit and regulate the

respondent’s legitimate use of his own property for the possible payment, in due

course, of funds to the applicant should her claim in terms of s7(3) of the Divorce

Act succeed and the counterclaim of the respondent fail.

[30] The applicant has failed, in my view, to establish that she will, indeed, suffer

irreparable injury if the applicant is allowed to sail his yacht out of South African

waters: wherever the yacht may be, it remains part of the estate of the

respondent and whatever its value, that value will be part of the value of his

assets. If the order that the applicant seeks is made in terms of s7(3) of the

Divorce Act in due course, that order will bind the respondent wherever his yacht

is. Secondly, I am of the view that the balance of convenience favours the

respondent. The order that the applicant has applied for in these proceedings

would not only limit his right to freedom of movement (through the medium of

sailing his yacht) to the territorial waters of South Africa, but also to within a

distance of 15 nautical miles from the East London harbour: he could not even

sail to Port Elizabeth or Durban. I take the view that to grant the order sought, in

these circumstances, would be unduly and unjustifiably oppressive of the

respondent.

[31] One further issue remains. That is the question of costs for the

postponement of this matter on 20 May 2004, the anticipated return day. The

respondent gave notice on 17 May 2004, in terms of rule 6(8), of his intention to

anticipate the return day on 20 May 2004. The applicant had two court days to

16

16

draft and file her reply. She required more time on the anticipated return day and

applied for a postponement, which was opposed. The matter was then

postponed to 12h00 on 24 May 2004 and the applicant was ordered to file her

reply by 09h00 on that day.

[32] I take into account the facts that: the applicant moved this application as one

of urgency (and without notice to the respondent); the respondent was entitled to

anticipate the return day as he did and could have done so on 24 hours notice;

he gave two court days notice, which was reasonable in the circumstances; and

his freedom of movement was limited by a temporary interdict that operated

against him. In these circumstances, it is, in my view, equitable that the applicant

should pay the costs of the postponement.

[33] I make the following order:

a) The application is dismissed with costs.

b) The applicant is directed to pay the costs of the postponement of the

matter on 20 May 2004.

_____________________

C PLASKET

JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

17

17

FORM A FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT · FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT ... it as a...

Documents

Transcript of FORM A FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT · FILING SHEET FOR EASTERN CAPE JUDGMENT ... it as a...