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Forensic Science & Microbial Forensics In

Bioterrorism & Bioproliferation Investigations and Decision Making

Randall Murch, PhD

Professor in Practice and Research Lead

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), Arlington Virginia, USA

Today’s Presentation

• Investigative and Legal Context for Forensic Science and “Attribution”

• Introduction to Forensic Science: Background, Uses, Legal Context

• Setting the Stage: “The Bio Problem Space”

• Introduction to Microbial Forensics

• State of the Science and “Path Forward”

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When a Crime or Event of Interest Occurs: Key Investigative, Legal and Policy Questions

• Did A Crime/Event of Interest Occur? • What Happened? • How Did It Occur? • When Did It Occur? • Where Did It Occur? • Why Did It Occur? • Who Was Involved or is Responsible? • What Evidence Exists? What Does It

Tell Us? How Strong are the Links? • How Reliable and Credible is the

Evidence? • What Alternative Explanations are

There for the Evidence? • Can We Defend Our Conclusions and

Actions?

-Answers are Developed from a Variety of Sources

-Science Can Help Answer These Questions

Standards of Proof in US Criminal Justice System

• No Cause or Suspicion

• Reasonable Suspicion (Events/Circumstances, Contacts, Interviews/Interrogation, Non-Intrusive Methods—No Expectation of Privacy)

• Probable Cause (Arrest and Search Warrants, Orders)

• Beyond A Reasonable Doubt (Trial, Conviction: What Does a Reasonable Juror or Judge Believe?)

• Burdens of proof rest with the Government, not the accused • Generally, once legal counsel is engaged, the process is adversarial and all evidence generated and used by the Government is discoverable to the accused’s legal representative • Many rules and procedures apply to the admissibility, presentation and consideration of evidence presented by prosecution and defense in legal proceedings • There are differences between countries and their systems!!

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Forensic Science

• Application of science in the investigation of legal matters (criminal and civil)…and now intelligence and operational matters

• Scientific knowledge and technology are used to serve as independent witnesses

• Science may not offer definitive solutions for all scenarios; it does provide a special investigative role

• Goal is “attribution” – i.e., who committed the crime or is responsible for the act or event

Terms of Reference • Forensics: Collection, preservation, analysis and interpretation of

physical evidence to determine its relevance to events, people, places, tools, methods, processes, intentions, plans – Identification and Characterization (What is it? Does it add value to the

investigation and legal actions? Can the evidence lead us to “who”?) – Inclusion toward Attribution or Exclusion (Where did it come from? How

does it relate to something, some place or someone of interest and how?) • Scientific Attribution: Assignment of a sample of questioned origin

to a source of known origin to a high degree of scientific certainty (at the same time excluding origination from other sources) – Attribution requires comparison of samples from questioned sources (“Q”)

with samples from known sources (“K”) – Quantitative and qualitative expression, based on what the science or

analysis can provide and how it can be communicated – Increasingly and more intensely, the science underlying “attribution” is

being scrutinized, expectations are increasing for accuracy, reliability, validity

• Legal/Policy Attribution: “Who Did It and Who is Involved?” (“beyond a reasonable doubt” or acceptable level of uncertainty)

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Introduction to

Forensic Science

Some Key Objectives When Applying Forensic Science

• Identify and provide useful (“probative”) information from physical evidence that aids investigation, prosecution or exoneration

• Provide leads; help inform and guide investigations and investigative questions, prosecutive or defense theories and processes

• Help with “rule in-rule out” during investigations or similar activities, to direct and “shape” choices, decisions, foci and actions taken

• Narrow or limit the number of sources that evidence could have originated from; ideally one source to definable/acceptable certainty

• Help to support, modify or discount prosecutive or defense theories and strategies before, during (and sometimes after) trial

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“Forensics” Integrates Science with Investigative and Legal Processes

Fields Include: • Biology (DNA) • Chemistry • Materials • Trace Evidence • Impression and Pattern • Engineering • Digital-Computer • Reconstructive • Medicine & Pathology

Phases of Forensic Investigations

• Intelligence & Information Gathering – Based on Triggering Event or Information – Seek to Lay Foundation for and Justify Investigation, (Intelligence Activities)

• Field Investigation – Multidisciplinary, Multi-Source and Time-Driven – Rule In and Rule Out Process, Buttress or Re-Direct

• Crime Scene Investigation – Evidence Identification, Collection, Preservation, Transport – Includes Presumptive Testing

• Laboratory Analysis – Includes Deeper Characterization and Intercomparison of Samples from “Questioned Sources” and “Known Sources”

• Interpretation, Conclusions In Context – Transition to Real-Time and End Users – Includes Alternative Interpretations

• Building, Shaping Decisions and Actions – Iterative, Aids Meeting “Burden of Proof” – Part of Build toward Prosecution, Can Support Exoneration

• Communication and Decision Making – To Legal & Policy Decision Systems, Other Stakeholders – Unbiased Rendering of Results, Conclusions, Explanations (including Alternative)

Leads

Wh

o, W

hat,

Wh

en,

Wh

ere,

Wh

y, H

ow

?

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“The Forensic Continuum” Individual Sample Types and Compilation

Exclusion Attribution

Co

uld

No

t H

ave

Co

me

Fr

om

Did

Ab

solu

tely

C

om

e F

rom

Power of and Confidence in Analysis, Interpretation, Meaning

Integrate with Other Evidence & Intelligence “Not Guilty”

“Guilty”

Consistent With Having Originated From

Goals for Forensic Methods

• Robust Collection & Preservation of Evidence

• Relevant Exploitation of Sample

• High Discrimination

• Enables Comparison of

K and Q Samples

• Utility Across Known, Encountered Sample Types

• Accuracy

• Reliability

• Defined & Acceptable Error Rate

• Speed & Responsiveness

• Repeatability

• Transferability

• Validity Can Be Independently Established

• Results Probative, Interpretable, Explainable, Defensible

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U.S Legal Framework for Admissibility

of Scientific Evidence, aka “Daubert” (Federal Rules of Evidence)

• Rule 401 “Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

• Rule 402 Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. • Rule 702 [Expert testimony is admissible if]

– The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, – The testimony is a product of reliable principles or methods, – The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts

of the case.

• Rule 901 [There must be foundational evidence] showing that [a scientific] process or system produces an accurate result.

US Policymakers are increasingly using this framework to test the expectations for science to support policy decisions

Validation & Quality Are Very Important in Forensic Science

• Baseline: – Foundation has been laid down through 25

years of moving new science and technology into the U.S. Courts

– Criminal justice system is well sensitized and has developed “tests” landmark cases and subsequent case law to examine validity of new science and technology for admissibility

• Courts seek: – Evidence that is testable – Confidence that evidence is based on legitimate scientific foundations,

has been peer-reviewed, is relevant, is applied by trained and qualified

personnel in properly equipped, run and managed laboratory systems

- Application of science and interpretation of results stays within bounds of what science permits

Clash of Cultures: Research Science v.

Applications Science v. Legal v. Courts: •Challenge in an Adversarial Environment

•Lawyers (not Scientists) in Charge

•“Rules of Engagement” are Different

•Lawyers Influence and Judges

Make Key Decisions

•Deciders of Fact are Non-Scientists

Demands for Increased Accuracy,

Reliability, New & Better

Science and Accountability: •Wrongful Conviction Cases Based on Bad Science

•Greater Understanding of Flaws or Lack of Science

By Legal and Judicial Communities

•US National Academy of Sciences Report in 2009

Identified Many Problems and Gaps and Provided

Recommendations that US Government and Others

Are Acting On

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Ideal Forensic Science System

Field Assessment/

Analysis

Interpretation/ Conclusions

Lab Analysis

Compare K-Q

Reporting/ Communication

Comprehensive Quality Assurance & Control

Collection & Preservation

Evidence/ Samples

•Capabilities Matched to Submitter & Stakeholder Needs and Requests

•Appropriate Deployable Assets & Facilities with Sufficient Resources for Operation & Maintenance

•Field, Transport & Laboratory Evidence Integrity & Security

•Properly Credentialed, Trained and Certified Personnel

•Full Suite of Equipment, Fully Validated Methods: Matched to Samples Received & Questions Asked

•Comprehensive Quality Assurance & Control Program

•Appropriate Repositories and Data Bases

•Appropriate Resources: Research, Development, Validation, Technology Transfer

Bioproliferation, Biowarfare, Bioterrorism & Biosecurity

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Biological Weapons are Fundamentally Different than Other WMD—Ex: Comparing Nuclear and Bio

• Fissile Materials (Nuclear, U or Pu) – Do not exist in nature

– Non-living, synthetic

– Difficult and costly to produce

– Not diverse, Pu and U are the only fissile materials used in nuclear weapons

– Can be inventoried and tracked in a quantitative manner

– Can be detected at a distance as ionizing radiation

– Weapons-grade fissile materials are stored at a limited number of military or otherwise secure sites

– Few non-military applications (research reactors, thermoelectric generators and production of radioisotopes)

• Biological Pathogens – Generally found in nature – Living, replicative – Easy and cheap to produce – Highly diverse, at least 20 pathogens

are suitable for biological warfare (up to 1000s more for bioterrorism)

– Because pathogens reproduce and can be easily transferred or pilfered, inventory control is unreliable

– Cannot be detected at a distance with available technologies

– Pathogens are present in many facilities worldwide and multiple locations within facilities

– Many legitimate applications in biomedical research and pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry (“dual use”)

– Many ways to inflict harm, scalable

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Reconstructing the WMD Process: “Business Cycle” of Bioadversaries (or Enablers, Some Steps)

• Concepts & Intentions • Designs • Plans • Acquisition, Logistics & Movement • Experimentation • Production & Testing • Training & Preparation • Operations & Attack • Evasion & Escape • Denial & Deception

If event that occurs is a complete surprise, then

this would be used to structure the “event

reconstruction process”

With forewarning, very dynamically

reverse reconstruction,

tested by construction forward

Forensic science can assist with informing all of these

Focus on People, Places, Things and Processes

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Targeting

• Populations

• Consumable

Commodities

• Systems

• Facilities

• Events

• Symbols

• Mass Psychology

& Perception

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Centers for Disease Control Priority Biothreat Agents

• Category A:

– Can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person-to-person; results in high mortality and have the potential for major public health impact; might cause public panic/social disruption; requires special attention for public health preparedness

– Anthrax, Botox, Plague, Smallpox, Tularemia, Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers

• Category B

– Are moderately easy to disseminate, result in moderate morbidity and low mortality rates, require specific enhancements of CDC diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance

– Brucellosis, Epsilon toxin of C. perfringens, Food safety threats (e.g., Salmonella, E. coli O157:H7, Shigella), Glanders, Meliodiosis, Psittacosis, Q Fever, Ricin toxin, Staphylococcus entertotoxin B, Typhus fever, Viral encephalitis (VEE, EEE, WEE), Water safety threats (V. cholerae, C. parvum)

• Category C

– Future threats, could be engineered: availability, ease of production and dissemination, potential for high morbidity and mortality

– Nipah and Hanta viruses

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Framing the Microbial Forensics Discussion • High Impact Bio Attack (Small Large), No Warning

• High Impact Attack (Small Large), Warning

• Surgical Strike, Military vs. Civilian Targets

• Suspicious or Anomalous Disease Outbreak

• Intelligence, Investigation Suggesting Attack

• Possible Attack or Claim, Hoax

With some reporting/foreknowledge, the investigative, scientific and intelligence processes would be engaged prior to the intended/actual event or release

Global Leaders’ Questions

• What is or was it?* • How bad are the effects, and how much worse will it get? • Who did it?* • Did it come from a program or labs we know about?* • Will there be more attacks?* • What are we and the nations involved doing about it?* • What can we know, by when, and with what confidence?*

Min Hours Days Weeks Months

Consequence Mgmt

*Forensic Contributions Can Inform

Crisis Mgmt

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Decision Frameworks • What are the drivers for an attribution decision?

– Prevention, interdiction/disruption or attenuation of an anticipated or planned/impending attack?

– Prosecution following an attack (e.g., Diplomatic, Military, Economic, Legal)?

– A subsequent attack or serial attacks?

• What type, quality and amount of evidence, information and intelligence is needed to make an “attribution” decision? – What should decision makers expect of scientific evidence and those

who provide it?

• How accurate, reliable, timely, credible and defensible is the evidence, information and intelligence used to base a decision? – What should decision makers expect of scientific evidence and those

who provide it?

Forensic Science and Security: Policy and Legal Cooperation are Also Required

• Forensic science is not developed and used in a vacuum

• Successful investigations, actions or initiatives will not be based on science alone

• Science supports legal and policy processes and decisions

• Legal and policy requirements shape and define the science that is needed, and how it is tested and used

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Simplified Attribution Assessment Enterprise (Many Components Contributing)

Law Policy

Science & Public Health

Intelligence

Investigation

Operations

Science is one potential contributor; likely that attribution decision or prosecution will not be possible without science but won’t rely on science alone

Introduction to Microbial Forensics

Application of Forensic Science and Related

Sciences to Problems Involving the Use or

Potential Use of Biological Threat Agents, Their

By Products and Associated Physical Evidence

Collect, Preserve & Transport, Triage, Analyze, Interpret, Communicate, Inform

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Microbial Forensics (b. 1996): A Brief History

• Established ca. 1996 as a derivative of the U.S. Capability to Support Bioterrorism Investigations (Hazardous Materials Response Unit, FBI Laboratory; Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Forensic Response and Investigation) – Provide Leads – Support Interdictions, Prosecutions, Exonerations – Special Events (e.g. 1996 Olympics, Political Conventions)

• Drew from Legacy Science • Incorporated Forensic Science, Principles & Practices • Sensitive to Legal Requirements • Immediate Outreach to Public Health; US Military Medical and Hazardous

Materials Units, Department of Energy National Laboratories, Certain Other US Government Agencies, State and Local Agencies; Academia

• Early Thinking: Also Apply to Biowarfare and Bioproliferation, Not Just Law Enforcement/Bioterrorism

• Early Considerations: Apply at Onset, During and After Suspicious and Nefarious Activities and Events

• Tightly Couple Robust Science to Informing Key Investigative, Legal and Policy Questions

Forensic Science Bacteriology

Mycology &

Virology

Epidemiology

Genomics

Metagenomics

Ecology

Analytical Chemistry &

Biochemistry

Informatics

Biostatistics &

Population

Genetics

Plant Pathology Biomedical Sciences

& Public Health Veterinary

Medicine

Materials

Science Process Engineering

Food Science

Microscopy Physical Sciences

View From the Outset: Multi- and Cross-Disciplinary

Microbial Forensics

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Special & Dynamic Collaboration is Required for Investigating Possible Bioattacks

(Pre-Event) Event Outset, During Event, Post-Event

Law

Enforcement,

Intelligence,

Defense

Public

& Ag Health

Force Health

Public Health Labs

Epidemiology

Biosurveillance

General Forensics-

Microbial Forensics

Deliberate? Accidental? Natural?

Support Provided by Additional Government and Non-Government Resources

Manage Health

Response

Support “Prosecution”

Magnitude of the

Microbial Forensics Workspace

• Any infectious agent can be used as a biological weapon, not only those on the CDC List

• Over 1000 agents known to infect humans*

– 217 virus species – 538 bacterial species – 307 fungi – 66 parasitic protozoa

• Numerous strain variations • Emerging and re-emerging pathogens • Potential bio-engineered organisms • Pathogens of economically important plants and animals not counted (x 1000s) • Biological toxins have been and can be used as weapons

*Taylor et al, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2001) 356, 983-989

While it is certainly true that some biological threat agents have been and are of greater interest than others as weapons, the development and use as

weapons of any of the rest cannot be discounted.

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Tools/Information to Determine Key, Relevant Information

• What organism was used? • What is the genetic sequence and what other organisms and strains share that

sequence or variations? • What type of growth media was used? • What special additives or equipment was used? • What residual markers remain? • What is the size and sophistication of the operation? • Can we infer the processing methodology? • What is the relationship of what was found in background (the environment) to

what was found in the samples of interest? • Can we correlate samples to specific source materials or to other samples? • How do we understand uncertainty and the effects on our results, interpretations

and conclusions? • If a toxin was used, how definitively can we identify and characterize it and can we

learn anything that can tell us how it was produced, who might have produced it and where the source materials came from?

What is It? Is it Probative/Relevant? Can It Be Linked to A Source?

How Robustly & Precisely Can It Be Linked? What is the Meaning & Weight of the Conclusion?

Sample from A

Questioned

Source (Q)

Identity?

Relevance to Event?

Power of Methods to

Characterize - Discriminate?

Confidence Limits?

Q Known Source (K)

Side by Side Comparison

Could Not Have Originated From

Consistent With Having

Originated From (Weak

Strong)

Absolutely Did Originate From

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Basis for Biology-Based Analysis: Identification, Characterization, Phylogenetics and Phylogeography

Major Current Technology Focus Areas: Genome Sequencing and Informatics

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Forensic Challenge Using Biology Alone: Source Exclusion, Association and “Attribution”

Ex: West Nile Virus

Volgograd-1999-1 AF239988

Volgograd-1999-11 AF239988

Kenya-1998 AF146082

Romania-1996M AF260969

Senegal-1993 AF001570

Italy 1998 AF205883

Morocco 1996 AF205884

•Are these isolates the same or different?

What are the discrimination criteria?

•How dependent is our conclusion on the

samples taken, analytic methods used,

interpretative approach?

•What would an exclusion, association or

“match” really mean? How precise can or

should we be?

•Do our methods and interpretation

account for variation, evolutionary change

(genome dynamics) and influences

imparted by environment and ecology?

•How do we assign significance to a

comparison? What are the confidence

limits? Can we assign a (credible,

defensible) probability or likelihood?

Can we determine and explain these

characteristics for organisms with larger,

very complex or dynamic genomes?

How should we reconcile

attributes such as species, isolate,

serotype, pathovar, biovar, geovar et al.

with phylogenetics and forensic science?

The Challenge for Any Forensic Analysis of a Bioweapon: Source Exclusion, Association and “Attribution”

This is dependent on several key factors, with more value and weight derived when the possible sources are limited to

as few as possible. Uncertainty and confidence must be stated.

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Simplistic Overview of the Microbial Forensics Process

Conceptual Analytic Pathway for

Microbial Evidence

Issues: Control material

Control environment

Maximize recovery

Maintain Integrity

Recover

/Transmit

Evidence

Bacteria/Virus ID Classic bacteriology,

virology

Genetic/Genomic

Analysis, Bioinformatics

Strain ID Bioinformatics

Genetic

Engineering

Spore density Cfu/ml

Percentage viability Dead vs live spores

Particle sizing

Analytical chemistry

Inorganic Silica

Silicates

Cations and anions

Heavy metals

Organic Carbohydrates

Agar (Agarobiose)

Peptones

Headspace

Electron Microscopy (EM)

Scanning EM

Transmission EM

After B. Budowle, FBI Laboratory and J. Burans, NBACC

But, Don’t Forget! •Traditional Physical •Evidence

•Contaminated Traditional Evidence •Adventitious Physical Evidence •Good Intelligence and Investigation •Apply Proper Interpretation •Integrate Forensics into Investigation •Validated Methods by Qualified, Certified Personnel •Method Development Support as Required •Robust Quality Assurance and Control

Forensic Analysis of Associated Traditional Evidence (including Hazmat Contaminated)

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Fore

nsi

c, In

vest

igat

ive,

Dec

isio

n P

roce

ss

Hit and Run Covert Bio Attack

“Attribution”

Paint Chip (Q) Collected from Victim’s Body, Other Evidence Collected from Victim

Chemical & Physical Analysis, Compare to National Data Base, Make, Model, Year, Color Determined

Event Detected

Vehicle Record Check, Licensed Vehicles Same Characteristics, Locale and Neighboring Areas

News Report, Witness Reports on Neighbor in Vicinity of Event, Police Investigate, Interview Owner and Others, Collect Physical Evidence

Paint Chip (Q) Consistent with Vehicle (K), Blood from Damage (Q) Matched with Victim (K), Police Investigation Indicates Owner’s Son Involved, Arrest, Trial, Conviction, Sentence

Microbial Evidence Collected from Event Scene and Victims (Q)

Unknown International Terrorist Group Claims Responsibility, Fragmentary Intelligence, No Link to Group Identified

Full Forensic Characterization Q Samples; Investigation Initiated, Phylogenetic Analysis Consistent with K (Known) Lab Samples, Interviews of Lab Personnel

Theft of Cultures Uncovered, Suspects Identified, Full Investigation and Intelligence Identifies Locations, Associates, Aspects of Modus Operandi

Makeshift Lab Located, Q from Attack Site Consistent with Q from Lab, Phylogenetics Consistent Both Qs and K Lab; Other Forensics & Investigation Link Suspects to Q & K Lab, New Intelligence Consistent & Identifies Group, Policy Decision Made & Punitive Action Taken

Current State of Microbial Forensics

• Science is drawn from other, closely related disciplines but is applied to inform different questions (investigative, legal, operational, policy)

• Various testing and analysis that is applied can provide various types and fidelity of answers, some of this is technology or knowledge limiting WRT the source materials (much is unknown about microbes)

• Science can provide varying levels of useful information depending on the sample, but usually must be caveated

• Unlike human DNA analysis, with which the source of a sample can be determined to a high degree of scientific certainty, or with fingerprint that it is accepted that it can (not proven), microbial forensics cannot achieve such at present (and may never be able to) – Toxin analysis is more limited to identification, with some exceptions/special conditions

• Microbial forensics for most threat agents has not been developed and validated as yet

• Considerable gaps in the science and use exist, some of the science gaps are related to those that exist in other basic and applied science disciplines

• Like with other forensic disciplines, science alone will not “make the BW case” (probably never)

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The Emerging Future for Microbial Forensics?

Metagenomics

Biosurveillance/ Endemism

Other “Omics”

Clever Informatics

Faster Throughput Sequencing,

Smaller Platforms

Whole Genomes

Deeper Toxin Analysis

Microbial Forensics: Newer, Emerging and Future Science & Technologies as Threats to Address?

• Creative, Even Subtle Genetic Engineering

• Bioprospecting, Exploiting Natural Diversity

• Gene Shuffling &

Directed Evolution

• Small Footprint Design &

Production Systems

• Creative Denial and Deception

• Synthetic Biology

Research, Development, Test and Transition of New Methods and Tools are Needed!

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Framing Microbial Forensic “Grand Challenges”

• Significant scientific problems or needs which have been recognized and persisted for a considerable period of time with little or no progress

• Scientific or science-informed gap for which a solution would provide a considerable leap in “operationally useful” capabilities and knowledge

• Significant opportunity, which if developed, tested and implemented would provide huge boon to the investigation and prosecution of events involving biological threat agents, and possibly hold perpetrators at increased risk for attribution

What Might Addressing

Grand Challenges Provide? • New integrative pursuits to join fundamental science,

advancing technology and forensic applications and those other related fields for multivariate benefits

• Push the value of and expectations for microbial forensic investigation and attribution capabilities to the limits of what science, technology and knowledge will permit

• Recognition of pragmatic priorities that must be designed and implemented to deal with chokepoints and barriers that impede progress and success

• Ultimately advance respective national, as well as global, biosecurity for a broader community of stakeholders

• Foster international, cross-disciplinary collaboration in ways not yet recognized…not only for microbial forensics but to benefit both basic and applied fields and performers

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Some “Microbial Forensics Grand Science Challenges”

• High Confidence Determination of Natural, Accidental or Deliberate, Similarly-Presenting Outbreaks, Approaching t = 0

• Establishing the Limits of What Current and Near-Term Microbial (Forensic) Characterization Methods are for the Identification of Priority Threat Agents Below the Strain/Isolate Level

• Very Rapid and Agile Development and Validation of New Highly Exploitative Forensic Analytic Methods in Response to “Surprise”

• Sampling and Forensic Characterization of Relevant Microbial Background On Demand on an Operational Time Scale

• International Microbial Forensics Data Sharing Forums and Standards

• International Repositories with Verifiable Access to Reference Materials

Our Path Forward Together?

• Develop and Implement a Global Strategy (within the BWC framework?) and move forward with demonstration initiatives, which could include: – Identify and pursue “grand science challenges” collaboratively – Establish standards/guidelines for collection, preservation, analysis and

reporting and interpretation of results for priority organisms, toxins and sample types

– Accepting quality management standards (ISO 17025) – Provide standardized introductory and advanced training, personnel

certification protocols for voluntary or selected participants – Establish one or more accredited UN-authorized microbial forensics

laboratories based on international quality management standards, and modus operandi to include transparency

– Establish accepted sample sharing, analysis protocols – Establish an international microbial forensics repository which leverages

existing, related resources, to include specimens which help to describe relevant geotemporal microbial background

– Develop and validate legal & policy requirements for microbial forensics capabilities that support UN-sponsored investigations, and then criteria and guidelines for use of science in UN actions

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Questions? Discussion?

Randall Murch, PhD rmurch@vt.edu 1.571.858.3080 (office)