Foreign assistance legislation for fiscal years 1986-87 : hearings before the Committee on Foreign...
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212 $1.2 million worth of 500 and 750 pound iron bombs. Beginning in 1932: the U-5- 315° Pr°Vi¢ed the "nose rods" to convert the iron bombs (which normally explode when they hit the ground) to anti-personnel . fragmentation devices that explode in the air. U.S. intelligence may also have helped to pinpoint bombing targets: the step-up in bombing raids by the Salvadoran Air Force coincided with published reports that U.S. pilots were flying reconnaissance missions out of bases in Honduras and Panama. The Executive Branch denies that there is any "indiscriminate" bombing, and asserts the A-37 pilots have developed "near surgical precision" in their bomb deliveries. (38) These assertions have been challenged by a growing body of evidence from U.S. journalists, both Salvadoran and U.S. independent monitors of the war, and - ' President Duarte himself -- who last September actually issued new regulations to the Air Force to minimize damage to civilians and encourage respect for human rights. The core of the problem appears to lie in the Salvadoran officers‘ failure to distinguish between civilians and guerillaa in zones of conflict; this failure is reflected in the remarks of a Salvadoran officer who, explaining an incident where 42 peasants died, said "there are no people living in those hamlets -- only terrorists." (39) But perhaps the most direct evidence of the effect of the bombing is its contribution to the swelling population of displaced persons: displaced persons registered by the Red Cross in zones of conflict increased from 80,000 to 105,000 between January and July of 1984; and displaced persons in government-controlled areas rose from 262,000 to 342,000 from November 1983 to May 1984. (40) In less than eight months, over 100,000 civilians were driven from their homes. Generated on 2015-10-31 19:54 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/pur1.32754074684386 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
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"U.S. intelligence may also have helped to pinpoint bombing targets: the step-up in bombing raids by the Salvadoran Air Force coincided with published reports that U.S. pilots were flying reconnaissance missions out of bases in Honduras and Panama."
Transcript of Foreign assistance legislation for fiscal years 1986-87 : hearings before the Committee on Foreign...
212
$1.2 million worth of 500 and 750 pound iron bombs. Beginning in
1932: the U-5- 315° Pr°Vi¢ed the "nose rods" to convert the iron bombs
(which normally explode when they hit the ground) to anti-personnel .
fragmentation devices that explode in the air. U.S. intelligence
may also have helped to pinpoint bombing targets: the step-up in
bombing raids by the Salvadoran Air Force coincided with published
reports that U.S. pilots were flying reconnaissance missions out
of bases in Honduras and Panama.
The Executive Branch denies that there is any "indiscriminate"
bombing, and asserts the A-37 pilots have developed "near surgical
precision" in their bomb deliveries. (38) These assertions have
been challenged by a growing body of evidence from U.S. journalists,
both Salvadoran and U.S. independent monitors of the war, and -'
President Duarte himself -- who last September actually issued
new regulations to the Air Force to minimize damage to civilians
and encourage respect for human rights. The core of the problem
appears to lie in the Salvadoran officers‘ failure to distinguish
between civilians and guerillaa in zones of conflict; this failure
is reflected in the remarks of a Salvadoran officer who, explaining
an incident where 42 peasants died, said "there are no people living
in those hamlets -- only terrorists." (39) But perhaps the most
direct evidence of the effect of the bombing is its contribution
to the swelling population of displaced persons: displaced persons
registered by the Red Cross in zones of conflict increased from
80,000 to 105,000 between January and July of 1984; and displaced
persons in government-controlled areas rose from 262,000 to 342,000
from November 1983 to May 1984. (40) In less than eight months,
over 100,000 civilians were driven from their homes.
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