published by the Refugee Studies Centre in association with the Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

18September 2003

reviewDelivering the goods:rethinking humanitarian logistics

In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War oneof us (Tim) was involved with a mission to

evaluate how well a major NGO hadresponded to the mass displacement of Kurdsin the Zagros Mountains. In a northern Iraqwarehouse the mission found a million dol-lars’ worth of climatically inappropriateplastic sheeting lying unused. This had notbeen reported to the agency’s HQ. Neitherwere there plans to send it to a warmer partof the world where it would have been used.

This issue of Forced Migration Review is about improving communications betweenlogisticians and programme managers to make such mix-ups a thing of the past. We aregrateful to the Fritz Institute for drawing our attention to the importance of humanitarianlogistics and for the very generous grant which has made this issue possible. We aredeeply indebted to our Guest Editors, Anisya Thomas (Fritz Institute's ManagingDirector) and Ricardo Ernst (Georgetown University), and to Lynn Fritz for hispersonal support.

Are you reading FMR for the first time – perhaps having been introduced to usdue to the dissemination of this issue through Fritz Institute networks? FMR has a globalreadership – 6,500 copies are distributed in three languages to 150 countries – andcirculates throughout the humanitarian community. We hope that you will remain readersand contribute to ongoing debate and reflection as future FMR issues follow up thelogistical challenges set out in this issue.

FMR needs your support! We currently only have pledges for half the funding weneed to maintain our current level of distribution – at a time when our printing andpostage costs are rising and the number of agencies and individuals wanting to be addedto our mailing lists continues to increase. Subscription income covers only a tiny propor-tion of the costs of getting this magazine to a predominantly Southern audience. Couldwe ask those of you who work for humanitarian agencies – both those whose work isprofiled in this issue and others of you working under similar constraints and pressures –to contact us to discuss taking out a multiple subscription for your HQ/field staff andpartner agencies? A number of major agencies already support our work in this manner.Our subscription rates are modest. Please email us at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk.

The theme sections of the next three issues of FMR will examine: reproductive healthfor refugees and IDPs, refugee/IDP livelihoods and reintegration of IDPs. Deadlines forsubmissions: 1 October 2003, 15 January 2004 and 15 May 2004 respectively. Moredetails can be found on our website at www.fmreview.org.

With our best wishes

Marion Couldrey and Tim Morris, Editors, Forced Migration Review

from the editorsForced Migration Review

provides a forum for the regular exchange of practical experience, information and ideas between

researchers, refugees and internally displaced people,and those who work with them. It is published in

English, Spanish and Arabic by the Refugee StudiesCentre/University of Oxford in association with theGlobal IDP Project/Norwegian Refugee Council. The

Spanish translation, Revista de Migraciones Forzadas,is produced by IDEI in Guatemala.

EditorsMarion Couldrey & Dr Tim Morris

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Feinstein InternationalFamine Center

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Fritz Institute

ISIM, Georgetown University

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Front cover photos: Local transport in Cambodia. · WFP/Jim HolmesPage 37 photos: (centre) East Timor · WFP/Jim Holmes

(right) Afghanistan · WFP/Clive Shirley

Copyright and disclaimer: Material from Forced Migration Review may be freely reproduced but

please acknowledge the source. Photographs should only be reproduced in the context of the

articles in which they appear (and credited). Materials and information contained in Forced

Migration Review are the opinions of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the

Editors, the Refugee Studies Centre or the Norwegian Refugee Council.

Why logistics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4by Anisya Thomas

The academic side of commercial logistics and theimportance of this special issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

by Ricardo Ernst

Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . 6by Lars Gustavsson

A logistician’s plea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9by John Rickard

Towards improved logistics: challenges and questions forlogisticians and managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

by Donald Chaikin

UN Joint Logistics Centre: a coordinated response to commonhumanitarian logistics concerns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

by David B Kaatrud, Ramina Samii and Luk N Van Wassenhove

The central role of supply chain management at IFRC . . . . . 15by Bernard Chomilier, Ramina Samii and Luk N Van Wassenhove

The World Food Programme: augmenting logistics. . . . . . . . . 17by Peter Scott-Bowden

Logistics under pressure: UNICEF’s Back to School programmein Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

by Paul Molinaro and Sandie Blanchet

Coordination in the Great Lakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23by George Fenton

Lean logistics: delivering food to northern Ugandan IDPs. . . 25 by Margaret Vikki and Erling Bratheim

Food aid logistics and the southern Africa emergency . . . . . 28 by Jon Bennett

The humanitarian use of the military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32by Rupert Wieloch

Marrying logistics and technology for effective relief . . . . . . 34by H Wally Lee and Marc Zbinden

Humanitarian mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35by Rupert Douglas-Bate

Complex emergency – complex finance? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36by Guy Hovey and Diana Landsman

Fritz Institute programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

General articles

PRTs – guaranteeing or undermining a secure future inAfghanistan?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

by Paul O’Brien

Post-literacy for refugees and IDPs in Sudan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40by Hashim Abuzeid, Naomi Lockwood, Rashida Abdel Mutalib

and Tony Wrightson

Promises without solutions: Iraqi refugees left in thelurch in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

by Bashir Osmat, Michael Kagan and Samira Trad

Settling refugee disputes in Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43by Fatemeh Keyhanlou, Hani Mansourian and Negar Azimi

The EU and asylum: towards strategies to reduce conflictand human rights abuses in countries of origin. . . . . . . . 45

by Stephen Castles, Heaven Crawley and Sean Loughna

Debate

Internal displacement in Afghanistan ends for some, not for others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

by Sarah Petrin

Response to FMR 16 article on Sudanese refugees in Cairo . 48

Regular features

Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

RSC: ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ and its phantom millionIraqi refugees plus Kabul kids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Norwegian Refugee Council: Liberia – hope for peace? . . . . . 53

Global IDP Project: Enhancing camp management fordisplaced people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

UNHCR EPAU: Why do we know so little about refugees? . . 55

Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement: Civil society initiatives can improve nationallaws and policies for IDPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Encouraging self-sufficiency for displaced populations. . . . . 60

Delivering the goods:rethinking humanitarian logistics

FMR 18 3

contents

ften referred to as shipping,the function had a lowly placeand logisticians were located

in basements and at shipping docks.Today, logistics or supply chain man-agement is recognised as a strategicand value-producing component in theoverall operation of commercial organ-isations. Graduate and doctoralprogrammes at major universitiesassure ongoing research that docu-ments and disseminates examples ofbest practice. There is a professionalcareer path for logisticians, a numberof magazines that chronicle their workand a community of peers that sharesknowledge in meetings sponsored byorganisations such as the Council ofLogistics Management (CLM)1.

Research conducted by Fritz Institutesuggests that logistics is central torelief for several reasons:

■ Logistics serves as a bridgebetween disaster preparedness andresponse through the establish-ment of effective procurementprocedures, supplier relationships,prepositioned stock and know-ledge of local transport conditions.

■ The speed of response for majorhumanitarian programmes involv-ing health, food, shelter, water andsanitation interventions is depen-dent on the ability of logisticiansto procure, transport and receivesupplies at the site of a humanitar-ian relief effort.

■ Since the logistics department isusually involved in every stage of arelief effort, it is a rich repositoryof data that can be analysed toprovide post-event learning.

Logistics data encompasses all aspectsof execution, such as the effectivenessof suppliers and transportationproviders, the cost and timeliness ofrelief efforts, the appropriateness ofdonated goods and information flowsbetween the field, headquarters anddonors. In a relief effort, logistics isthe nexus of information for donors,operations managers, finance depart-ments and field relief activities.

Despite being a critical function to thesuccess of relief efforts, humanitarianlogisticians are under-recognised andunder-utilised in many humanitarianorganisations. Often classified as asupport function, their roles are con-fined to executing decisions after theyhave been made. This places an enor-mous burden on logisticians who havenot been given an opportunity to artic-ulate the physical constraints in theplanning process. It also tends tocause tensions with people in pro-grammes as they cannot understanddelays and breakdowns in the supplydelivery process.

This issue of FMR

Fritz Institute is very proud to sponsorthis special issue of Forced MigrationReview in which the crucial role ofhumanitarian logistics is discussed inthe voices of logisticians who havebeen part of practically every majorrelief effort over the past decade. Webelieve that the perspective of thelogistician is a strategic and centralcomponent to the planning of effectiverelief efforts. The articles in this issuehighlight the multidimensional chal-lenges facing humanitarian logisticiansas well as their ingenuity, commitmentand heart as they rise to meet the chal-lenges.

This special issue is organised intofour broad sections. It begins with aseries of personal observations bypractitioners at World Vision, IRC andOxfam about the state of their fieldand ideas that can help advance thepractice of humanitarian logistics. Theseinclude: creating a community of prac-tice, greater investments in technologyand preparedness, and pleas for recog-nition and voice.

Next, it profiles concerted and organ-ised efforts to broaden the role oflogistics at the UN, the InternationalFederation of Red Cross and RedCrescent Societies and the World FoodProgramme, highlighting progress anddelineating some challenges thatremain. This section concludes with anexample of an innovative logistics col-laboration to achieve bettercoordination among humanitarian

players participating in relief in theDemocratic Republic of Congo.

The third section discusses dilemmasfacing the relief community, such asthe GMO issue in southern Africa andits implications for logisticians.

Finally, some practical possibilities forthe execution of effective logistics aredetailed including some innovativeuses of technology.

The people who made itpossible

Many have gone above and beyond thecall of duty to make this special issuepossible. The editorial team at ForcedMigration Review has been the anchoron which we have all relied. Theauthors of the articles and those whosubmitted pieces we could not includedeserve special recognition. Their workwas done after-hours, often in the fieldduring time they did not have. RicardoErnst, my fellow guest editor, has beenan able partner responding with feed-back from all corners of the globe. TheFritz Institute team, and especially IvyCohen, has provided ideas and inputcrucial to pulling the images andwords together. A special thanks isalso due to Lynn Fritz whose commit-ment, philanthropy and vision tofurther the cause of the humanitarianlogistician has made this special issuepossible.

Most importantly this issue is a saluteto the work of humanitarian logisti-cians who work each day in countlessways to ensure speedier relief forvulnerable people. Your teams andorganisations are enriched by thepresence of logisticians. Take one outto lunch today.

Anisya Thomas is the ManagingDirector, Fritz Institute. Email: anisya.thomas@fritzinstitute.org

1. See www.clm1.org

4 FMR 18

Why logistics?by Anisya Thomas

Two decades ago logistics was rarely a subjectdiscussed in the executive suites of large corporations.

O

FMR 18 5

ogistics, in its conventionaldefinition, is the process ofmanaging the flow of goods,

information and finances from thesource (suppliers) to the final con-sumer (customers). The topic hasreceived significant attention in the‘for-profit’ or commercial world sinceit represents today one of the mostimportant sources of profitability. Thatrole belonged for many years to manu-facturing and that is why we saw anincrease in the spread of manufactur-ing facilities around the world (e.g.searching for cheap labour).

The global environment that charac-terises the business world highlightsthe importance of developing strate-gies that go beyond the geographicalboundaries of one country. Wage-ratedifferentials, expanding foreign mar-kets and improved transportationbreak down barriers of time andspace between countries and force thelogistics function to take on a globaldimension. Global logistics is theresponse to the increasing integrationof international markets as firms tryto remain competitive. The term ‘sup-ply chain management’ has beenextensively used to depict the newmanagerial challenge to compete inthe marketplace.

The humanitarian world relies on logis-tics for the same basic reasons. It alsorequires a process for managing theflow of goods, information andfinances from the donors to the affect-ed persons. The fundamentaldifference with the commercial worldis in the motivation for improving thelogistics process – going beyond prof-itability. Most logistics applications inthe humanitarian community are theresult of ‘experience’ and ad hoc reso-lution of problems that have resultedin innovative applications of the kindillustrated in this special issue of FMR.

In general, when structuring andanalysing the activities involved incommercial logistics, three mainprocesses are included: demand man-agement (customer service and orderprocessing), supply management (pro-curement, production planning andinventory), and fulfilment management

(transport, distribution and warehous-ing). In the humanitarian world thereare many players that are not directlylinked to the benefits of satisfyingdemand. Suppliers (humanitariandonors) have different motivations forparticipating (e.g. civic duty and chari-ty) and therefore the performancecriteria could be difficult to measure.Customers (those assisted) are notgenerating a ‘voluntary’ demand andhopefully will not generate a ‘repeatpurchase’. However, the basic princi-ples of managing the flow of goods,information and finances remain validand there is a critical role for logisti-cians when it comes to managingdemand, supply and fulfilment.

It is widely argued that there aremany lessons and practices from thecommercial world that could be usedin the humanitarian world. In fact, thecommercial world has developed andimplemented numerous applicationsthat have improved their logistics solu-tions in many significant ways. Froman academic perspective we have seena significant demand from students formore courses on the topic; one of thefastest growing courses in most busi-ness schools has been on subjectsrelated to supply chain management.Academic research in this field hasalso increased significantly, driven bycommercial companies’ support andthe availability of data. In fact, the aca-demic approach has elevated the roleof the logistics function by allowingthe development of:

■ an understanding of the state ofthe art of strategic managementthinking as it applies to firmswith global operations

■ a capacity for analysing logisticsproblems on a functional, busi-ness and company-wide basiswhich goes beyond local optimisa-tion into a global view of linkages

■ a set of metrics that allows forstructured measurement of per-formance aligned with the overallobjectives of the organisation

■ an awareness of the organisation-al structures used in logistics andthe strengths and weaknesses ofthose structures.

It is conventional wisdom that thecommercial world is the source oflessons and practices for the humani-tarian world. However, articles in thisspecial issue could easily suggest thatthe opposite is also true. Many goodpractices implemented in the humani-tarian world could be used in thecommercial world. The ideal scenariois for the two worlds to work moreclosely in the exchange of ideas.Organisations and logisticians shouldbe more reflective and push theboundaries of their work.

If it is true that Wal-Mart is the bestexemplar of logistics innovations andimplementations in the commercialworld, it is equally true that WFP,World Vision, Oxfam, the Red Crossand other NGOs have found a way toaccomplish results that deserve spe-cial attention by the commercialworld. Rather than offering a set ofsolutions, this special issue intro-duces the perspective of logisticiansto the humanitarian world. The FritzInstitute has been instrumental inserving as the bridge between the twoworlds. The rewards of cooperationand exchanges could only be benefi-cial to us all.

Ricardo Ernst is the Co-Director of the Global Logistics ResearchProgram, McDonough School ofBusiness, Georgetown University,Washington, DC. Email: ernstr@georgetown.edu

The academic side of commerciallogistics and the importance ofthis special issue by Ricardo Ernst

L

6 FMR 18

hether there is actual orpotential large-scale dis-placement, agencies have

to get the right assistance to the rightplace at the right time at the rightcost. The challenges faced in achiev-ing this are many and complex.

i. Meeting reconstruction challengesin Kosovo

After the end of the war, a massivereconstruction programme was need-ed to provide adequate housing forreturning refugees and IDPs. In theimmediate post-war period, 100% ofthe building materials and tools hadto be externally sourced fromKosovo’s neighbours. Hundreds oftrucks had to be mobilised to bringgoods to Kosovo and then severalthousand trucks, farm tractors withtrailers or other light vehicles wereneeded in country to take these goodsto final destination points. The roadshad not been built for such heavy traf-fic; adequate supplies of fuel were notavailable; storage and transfer facili-ties had been destroyed or looted;utilities had not yet been repaired;security was still a concern; and traceand tracking systems were often man-ual. Local staff had to be trained inmost of the relevant aspects of supplychain management.

ii. Iraq: speed of delivery

On a Saturday morning in March2003, I got a call from our regionalmanagement team in Amman request-ing an urgent airlift of emergencysupplies, materials and vehicles. Iimmediately called our head logisti-cian who proceeded to make calls toour logistics staff in Italy, Germanyand the US. By Monday morning bidswere being answered. By Tuesdaymorning the transporter had beenselected and mobilised. By Wednesdaymorning all the goods were preparedfor shipment. By Thursday morning

the aircraft was on the tarmac atBrindisi airport. That afternoon itlanded with 40 tonnes of goods inAmman and was cleared and off-loaded within a couple of hours.Three transport trucks, 10,000 col-lapsible water containers andpurification tablets, 6,300 blanketsand 1,800 plastic tarpaulins wereamong the goods landed. By the week-end – seven days after the initialphone call – these goods were enroute to regional destinations in pre-paredness and readiness for possibleinflux of refugees from Iraq.

iii. Movement of people from conflictzones

When conflict erupts, large numbersof people often have to be moved outof conflict areas to safe zones – totemporary transit centres, tracing cen-tres, IDP camps and refugee camps.Although this is usually the role ofthe UN, NGOs and other organisationsare often asked to participate.Logistics is critical for a successfuloperation: to locate and mobilise thelarge vehicles needed, and to ensuresufficient amounts of fuel, not an easytask when fuel is not available in localmarkets. In addition all the supportneeds of the transported peopledepend on logistics: food, water, sani-tation and shelter.

iv. Influx of humanitarian staff

An often under-estimated variable –and formidable logistics challenge – inlarge humanitarian crises is the move-ment of staff. How do you get largenumbers of relief workers to the fieldand ensure their safety and shelterwithout distorting the economies? Inthe Caucasus as in so many otheremergencies, the cost of housing roseten fold from pre-emergency localcosts with the influx of non-local aidworkers. The housing supply in Bakuwas limited. With the arrival of thou-

sands of aid workers willing to payinflated prices, large numbers of thelocal population started to move outin order to be able to take advantageof the economic gain from renting outtheir homes. The ripple effect wasthat local merchants also raised thecost of services; costs of supplies inthe markets rose accordingly, makinglife very difficult for the local popula-tion that stayed. These are just someof the logistical challenges confrontedby humanitarian agencies. How suc-cessful are they in meeting them?

NGOs have been willing to operate inmany places which the corporate sec-tor may shun. Creating andimplementing complicated logisticssolutions and dealing with ‘the lastmile’ – the leg between the final distri-bution centre and the beneficiary orclient – NGOs have been willing toinvest an inordinate amount of timeto make things work. They have con-siderable expertise and experience inmovement and accountability mecha-nisms around food aid and effectveuse of gifts-in-kind (GIK) from corpo-rate sponsors. Agencies haveestablished or are establishing globaland/or regional pre-positioning unitscapable of delivering critical emer-gency supplies, materials, vehicles andtechnical assistance to any place inthe world within a short timeframe.

Gaps in NGO capacity

NGOs can and do play a key role inlogistics management, particularly atthe field level. Much of this is donevery well. But systems and approachesare often antiquated. For example,documentation relating to transporta-tion is often produced electronicallyat point of origin and is often onlyavailable on-line. Unfortunately, eventhough the commercial world is welladvanced in full-electronic handlingprocesses, the majority ofNGOs typically do not have the elec-tronic infrastructure investments inplace. Therefore, access to this infor-mation is not necessarily possiblealong the whole supply chain and

Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges

by Lars Gustavsson

Logistics and supply chain management underpinresponses to humanitarian crises.

W

7FMR 18 Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges

often moves quite early on in the han-dling process from electronic systemsto paper. This typically meansincreasing the time required to handleinformation and process a shipmentand can lead to reduced efficiencies,duplication of functions, increasedinaccuracies in reporting andincreased costs.

In today’s world of modern technolo-gy, greatly improved approaches tologistics and supply chain manage-ment and greater access to know-howand information, it is critical forNGOs to learn from the corporate andfor-profit sector and incorporateemerging best practice. Their abilityto do this, however, has been hin-dered by a number of factors.

i. Lack of depth in knowledge

Most humanitarian NGOs are rootedin emergency response of one form oranother. Many NGO leaders begantheir careers with a background in thesocial sciences, development studiesor law. NGO leaders tend to be value-led ‘activists’ and few have corporateexperience of logistics management.

Humanitarian logistics involves organ-isational components such asprocurement, transportation, ware-housing, inventory management, traceand tracking, bidding and reverse bid-ding, reporting and accountability. Inthe corporate sector, these compo-nents are supported by expertstaffing, know-how, IT systems, MISsystems, framework agreements,corporate relationships, infrastruc-ture, standardisation and collab-orative initiatives. In the humanitarianworld, these key support mechanismsare rare. Much of the essential logis-tics work undertaken by humanitarianagencies is not industry standard andNGOs could learn a lot from the cor-porate community.

Furthermore, the humanitarian envi-ronment is becoming increasinglycomplex, requiring a deeper under-standing of conflict, security andlocal, national and international poli-tics. Each year about one in three fieldstaff quits because of burnout. As aconsequence, the NGO communityand multilateral and internationalorganisations such as the UN agenciesand the Red Cross need to focusmuch more on capacity building.

ii. Funding biased towards short-term responses

NGOs tend to be highly dependentupon grants which are generallygeared towards paying for direct pro-ject and programme inputs in thefield. Projects and programmes aretime-bound, often short and under-funded. NGOs live from grant to grantand project to project. This does not

allow for a healthy corporate strategicprocess to develop as both planningcycles and funding cycles are general-ly unpredictable. And it does notencourage investment in improvedsystems.

iii. Lack of investment in technologyand communication

Very little capital (from any source)has been invested in the developmentand implementation of modern man-agement information systems (MIS),information technology (IT) or logis-tics systems. Most NGOs lack modern‘systems capacity’ in just about anycategory. Most NGOs have indeed alsogreatly undervalued the role of logis-tics, supply chain management andintegrated systems support. This is anarea that, if better valued by seniormanagement, could have a significantfinancial return on investment. Millionsof dollars could be saved each year bysimply being able to work more‘smartly’ – more efficiently.

For example… Procurement is part ofthe overall logistics process. An NGOwith an organisation-wide capacity touse a common procurement manage-ment software programme would beable to see what their top 100 high-frequency or high-cost items were atany given time during the year.Regardless of programme or projectlocation, a common software technol-ogy application would enable eachuser to function independently, mak-ing local procurement decisions, whilecreating and contributing to a globalpurchasing-power mechanism benefit-ting the whole organisation. Management would have the informa-tion power to be able to negotiatehigh-volume purchasing agreementswith global suppliers, global vendors,manufacturers or distributors. Betterstill, NGOs could group together as

consortia to gain even higher purchas-ing-power discounts and frameworkagreements.

Communication systems are not acore strength for the humanitariancommunity yet are a critical part ofhumanitarian operations. In crisis sit-uations, communication with donors,other parts of the organisation andthe outside world is vital.

Recommendations

i. Enhance knowledge

■ What the corporate sector learned10 to 15 years ago is where manyNGOs are today. We need to catchup fast and NGOs cannot do thisby themselves. Corporations cangreatly assist humanitarian agen-cies by sharing their know-how,systems and resources. Collabor-ation should ultimately meanmore efficient, more cost-effectivelogistics operations – to benefitthose affected by conflict and dis-aster.

■ Logisticians in the field are oftennot trained professionals but havedeveloped their skills on the job.Competency-based capacity-build-ing initiatives and mechanismsneed to be developed and sup-ported so that humanitarianlogisticians’ skills and know-howare raised to more professionallevels, and supported by appro-priate training discipline andaccreditation. New employeescould be sourced from feederschools and corporate environ-ments where they might have coreprofessional skills though needingto learn more about the humani-tarian context. In addition, thereneeds to be a greater emphasis onmentoring and coaching withinorganisations.

■ No single agency can single-handedly meet the challenges out-lined above. What is required is amuch higher degree of collabora-tion across agencies in the formof workshops and shared special-ist pools. It is also important thatthe sector draw on the brain trustof the commercial sector, particul-arly in its proven areas of

Millions of dollars could be saved by simplybeing able to work more ‘smartly’

Humanitarian logistics: context and challenges FMR 188

competence – systems and soft-ware, technical and engineeringexpertise, etc. Corporations couldprovide their own staff withopportunities to work alongsideNGOs. The corporate communitycould also create a pool of logis-tics experts available to thehumanitarian sector for deploy-ment on an on-call/as-neededbasis. Humanitarian demand isoften ‘seasonal’ with need oftendictated by the specific require-ments of an emergency. Corporateexperts could work alongsideNGOs in the field in both pre-emergency and during-emergencyphases.

ii. Broaden the scope of funding

■ Donors need to realise that unlessthey adopt an actively hands-onapproach to changing organisa-tional logistics managementfunds will often not be used asefficiently as they could be. Thecurrent donor practice of fundingprojects and programmes doesnot enable NGOs to tackle thisproblem. Donors need to takeownership of the problem andbroaden their scope of funding toinclude serious investment inlogistics management, IT and MISsystems.

■ Potential for using goods-in-kindis not being exploited. The corpo-rate sector often has excesses ininventories, product over-runsand over-supply, often driven byunforeseen market demands orchanging fads. These can be putto good use by NGOs but NGOsneed to establish a list of criteriathat such goods must pass beforeacceptance/use.1

iii. Invest in technology and comm-unications

■ NGOs must come to grips withthe important role that logisticsand supply chain managementcan play. Senior managers need torecognise that there are great sav-ings to be made by consolidatingand standardising a host of oftenscattered logistics functions.Middle management must investtime and energy in order to per-suade senior leadership.

■ A key area of concern that needsa collaborative contribution byboth private sector and NGOs isthat of global communications.One idea would be for a consor-tium of NGOs to work with theprivate sector, drawing on theirresources, expertise and knowl-edge in radio, satellite, licensingand hardware. One outcome couldbe a communications unit to servethe wider humanitarian communi-ty during a large-scale disaster.

■ It is one thing to have logisticsplans, logistics software and logis-tics staff in place. If communic-ations issues are not alsoaddressed, however, today’s man-ual non-integrated style of dealingwith logistics will continue – andthe logistics chain will remainincomplete and inefficient.

Recent initiatives

Various articles in this issue highlightsome recent initiatives, such as UNJLC[pp11] and ALITE [pp17].

Other developments include theestablishment of a HumanitarianLogistics Council2 to heighten thevisibility of the sector and stimulateimproved logistics management. Itbrings together key logistics managersin the humanitarian sector with theaim of encouraging collaboration,integration, standardisation, synergyand joint product development.

World Vision has established pre-positioning units in three places:

Denver, US (primary focus serving theAmericas); Brindisi, Italy (primaryfocus the Middle East, Central Asiaand Africa); Hanover, Germany (asmaller unit serving diverse logisticalneeds). World Vision’s unit isdesigned to deliver supplies world-wide within 72 hours; for moredetails, contact the author [emailbelow]. IFRC and WFP are each estab-lishing four regional pre-positioningunits [see articles on IFRC and UNJLC].

World Vision is working with otherNGOs and Fritz Institute to a) identifywho is doing what, b) map currentand future capacity needs and c)explore where collaboration is possi-ble, where shared investments couldbe beneficial and what educationaland training provisions are needed.World Vision International is alsoworking with donors such as thegovernment of Australia and theAustralian Ministry of Education tocreate competence-building andcertification initiatives which arebeing shared with affiliates in the AsiaPacific region; it is planned to expandthis initiative globally by 2005.

Lars Gustavsson is Director,Emergency Response and DisasterMitigation, World VisionInternational. Email: lars_gustavsson@wvi.org

1. World Vision procures GIK based on ‘criticalneeds lists’ identified by its international anddomestic offices. Criteria for procurement includedetailed information regarding the donation, itsvalue and whether donor will cover freight cost,any restrictions (eg specified recipient country)and requests for publicity.

2. Established in 2002 by the Fritz Institute.

Food distribution in Afghanistan

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f so, take comfort from knowingthat you are not the first.Unfortunately you are unlikely to

be the last. At best, scenarios like thisreduce support functions to a con-stant state of ‘fire-fighting’ –inefficient, frustrating and stressfulfor all concerned. At worst, projectimplementation can be delayed andpeople suffer needlessly.

To some degree, in almost everyagency and nearly every situation, thisscenario is not uncommon. There isindeed a myriad of internal and exter-nal factors affecting our ability toplan and coordinate: poor or unreli-able local infrastructure, rapidlychanging market conditions, poorcommunications and security, fluidpopulation movements, over-workedstaff, short donor lead-times for pro-posals, donor regulations, institut-ional memory, inter-agency relations,staff turnover, staff capacity and soon. These factors do make it difficultfor managers to plan and coordinate.The problem is that in response,rather than review those elementsthat we can control, managers tend tode-prioritise the whole planning andcoordinating process.

Not so long ago, smaller projects wereoften implemented by managers wear-ing several hats – such as ‘projectmanager’, ‘administration and logis-tics’, ‘Country Representative’ and‘finance’. Given the scale of the opera-tions, this was generally manageableand, given the limited number and theproximity of staff, planning wasalmost automatically coordinated.However, recent projects involvingdozens of expatriate and local staffhave involved expenditures of millionsof dollars. Yet despite the multiplica-tion in complexity of our responsib-ilities, we seem to have neither setpriorities nor made plans to makeessential changes and modernise themanagement, administrative and col-laborative structures that would allow

us, as organisations, to plan and coor-dinate our expansion.

At field and organisational levels wesee programmes structured intoProjects, Administration, Logistics andFinancial Support (or minor variationsthereof). This evolution is necessaryto manage large programmes effec-tively but I would argue that our basicmentality of being led by projectimplementers has not changed.Information flows can be – and are –initiated, maintained and stopped byprojects – the latter normally fromoversight, overwork or inexperience.We may think of ourselves as integrat-ed when in fact our projects and theirsupport services are ‘stove-pipe’ instructure and mentality. The supportfunctions are often considered asappendages rather than integral ele-ments of the whole.

How many times have managersstayed up alone into the small hoursto submit a proposal before the morn-ing deadline? More often than wewould probably care to admit. Are pro-posals routinely reviewed by Financeand Logistics staff? No. The resultscan range from insufficient fundingsolicited for warehouse infrastructureto unrealistic lead times on necessaryequipment or supplies (and thereforedelayed project implementation).

Coordinated planning is also impededby a general lack of understanding ofwhat good logistics does and canoffer: improved efficiency, contin-gency plans, accountability andreduced cost. This creates a catch-22situation. Logistics are not includedbecause managers are not sure whatadditional value they add… logisticsrequirements are not fully met, result-ing in fire-fighting…. managers seelogistics struggling (rather than seeingthe underlying problems) and con-clude that, for subsequent proposals,a logistics review is not advantageous….

This is not an exercise in assigningblame, rather one of highlighting therealities of operating under alreadydifficult circumstances, within struc-tures that do not insist on or fullyvalue the integration of all players inthe operation.

As a community, however, we are notunique and therefore do not necessar-ily have to learn all new tricks thehard way. Many of the concerns andconstraints facing humanitarian logis-tics mirror the substance of discussions in the private sector 15 yearsago. There, technological advance-ments in parts of the manufacturingand retail sectors had made their coreactivities almost as efficient as theycould be – the only area remainingthat could yield improved serviceand/or reduced costs was that of howthese companies interacted with theirsuppliers and how they got theirproducts to market. This is supplychain management – what many of uscall logistics.

Concluding plea

Planning and coordination need to beseen as essential rather than merelydesirable. We need investment in sys-tems – and investment in theintegration of our systems and struc-tures. We need to hold consultation inhigh esteem, both internally andexternally, and we need to seek advicefrom experts. Given the will, theinvestment, today’s technology andthe private sector’s best practices,there are significant improvements inefficiency to be made by the donorand aid community. Underpinning itall should be a solid flow of informa-tion within an integrated team,throughout project planning andimplementation. It seems simple andrather obvious, yet it struggles to gainacceptance.

John Rickard is Director ofLogistics, International RescueCommittee, New York. Email: jrickard@theirc.org

A logistician’s plea by John Rickard

As a logistician, have you ever first learned of a newproject when the purchase requisitions appeared onyour desk? Or received a vehicle request 20 minutesbefore it was urgently required?

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Underpinning it all should be asolid flow of information withinan integrated team

10 FMR 18

Towards improved logistics:challenges and questions forlogisticians and managers

by Donald Chaikin

ogistics questions affecttimescales, appropriateness ofsupplies, methods of implemen-

tation, asset management and manyother aspects integral to programmemanagement.

The Fritz Institute’s HumanitarianLogistics Council initiative [see pp37]to bring together logisticians is usefuland productive. What we need now,however, is to expand the discussionforum to include management. Couldthis be a next step for the Council? Inaddition, logisticians themselves needto put time and effort into explainingand promoting the role of logisticswithin their organisations, makingmanagement more aware of theadvantages – financial as well as tech-nical – of logistics being fullyintegrated into their planning process.

Agencies need logisticians with man-agement experience. Field logisticiansare relatively easy to find but there isonly a very small pool of manage-ment-level logisticians. One of theproblems is that individuals – such aslogisticians – get pigeonholed and it ishard for them to break out into man-agement. Individuals in all disciplinesneed to be given the opportunity byagency managers to be encouraged/trained for management roles.

We need more professionalism in thesector – and for that professionalismto receive greater recognition.Certification may help in this (thoughproven hands-on experience remainsessential), particularly in some regionswhere certification is culturally heldin greater esteem. There are only afew logistics courses in Europe. Thebest ones are run by Bioforce1 in

France – but in French and thereforenot accessible to many. We need simi-lar courses in other languages.

Agencies need to develop emergencypreparedness plans in country –plans that include logistics. Theseshould include developing localsources of supplies and agreeingspecifications. Oxfam’s logisticsdepartment is currently working withits eight Regional ManagementCentres to build up a database foreach region. This resource should beshared among agencies.

Cooperation should be encouraged inother areas as well. Oxfam GB and theInternational Rescue Committee havecollaborated on the development ofan IT logistics system which hasproved to be effective, fairly inexpen-sive and relatively painless to getunderway. It was designed to supportOxfam/IRC’s specific needs but otheragencies such as Save the Children UKand the UK NGO Merlin have sinceexpressed interest in it. It can be usedoff-line – an essential attribute if it isto be used effectively in many of thesituations in which Oxfam’s staff and

partners have to operate.Are regional/global pre-positioningunits necessary and/or desirable?They may prove useful in some casesbut their usefulness may be restictedby shelf-life constraints; they mayalso require considerable financialinvestment, particularly where bondedwarehouses have to be used. Agenciesusually have some warning ofimpending emergencies and are ofteneven able to get equipment out to thefield in advance. Even in unexpectedemergencies, Oxfam can activate char-ter flights within 24 hours and getemergency equipment from its ware-house near Oxford to any locationwithin 2-3 days. If necessary, however,could agencies make use of the pre-positioning units of WFP, IFRC andWorld Vision, for example?

As head of logistics for Oxfam overthe past six years, one of my key chal-lenges has been to get theorganisation to recognise logistics asa vital support function that needs tobe incorporated into planning andmanagement decisions. We’ve takenmany steps in the right direction – butmany challenges remain.

Donald Chaikin is head ofLogistics at Oxfam GB. Email: dchaikin@oxfam.org

1. See www.bioforce.asso.fr

Effective programmes require efficient supportfunctions. Logistics is a key support function andneeds to be incorporated into planning and man-agement decisions from inception to close-down.

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t takes only a glance at a typicalhumanitarian logistics planner’schecklist to understand the range

and depth of information required tooptimise operational effectiveness andcope with the variety of bottlenecksthat may hinder humanitarianresponse at the outbreak of a disaster.The difficulties of completing such achecklist are compounded when large-scale complex emergencies involve amultitude of actors. How many organ-isations in the humanitariancommunity are ready to meet suchchallenges, let alone in a cost-effectiveand efficient manner?

Under-budgeting for logistics manage-ment capability means that alreadystretched logistics staff are unable toproperly compile vital informationneeded to adequately develop a logis-tics strategy. In addition, agenciesmay not have the skills, humanresources and time to liaise, coordi-nate and negotiate effectively withother stakeholders – the military, hostgovernments, neighbouring countrygovernments, other humanitarianorganisations, donors and logisticsservice providers.

As far as the UN system is concerned,the Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) may notalways have the requisite technicalskills for the level of logistics coordi-nation which most emergencyoperations demand. The need for aspecialised form of inter-agency coor-dination mechanism to dealexclusively with logistics issues inincreasingly complex operational envi-ronments and to make the best use oflimited and expensive resources led tothe establishment of the UN JointLogistics Centre (UNJLC).

The UNJLC

Originally conceived as a short-termemergency response facility, theUNJLC was born out of the humanitar-ian response to the 1996 Eastern Zairecrisis which demanded intensifiedfield-based coordination and poolingof air assets among UNHCR, WorldFood Programme (WFP) and UNICEF todeliver relief assistance to refugeesstranded inside Eastern Zaire and totransport those returning to theirplace of origin. This intensified coor-dination was necessary for theduration of the crisis in order to opti-mise the use of expensive aircraft by

planning, prioritising and controllingthe movement of critical food andnon-food items and returnees.

Since then the UNJLC has beendeployed in other large-scale disasters– the Balkans, East Timor, Mozamb-ique, Angola, Afghanistan and Iraq –where intensified inter-agency logis-tics coordination was required.Although it began in an ad hoc manner,the UNJLC was formally recognised bythe UN’s inter-agency humanitarianpolicy-making body in early 2002 andplaced under the custodianship ofWFP, the UN’s largest logistics actor.Thus the UNJLC is able to draw uponWFP’s extensive logistics resources tomeet a wide range of logistics chal-lenges. When deployed, the UNJLC isintegrated into the UN’s responsecoordination structure on the ground.The UNJLC is configured to supporttwo response models: inter-agencylogistics coordination only or coordi-nation plus asset management, suchas a donated fleet of aircraft.

The UNJLC approach underlines theneed to preserve and respect each andevery agency’s logistics system. Byviewing the humanitarian effort as a‘modular’ system, it seeks to enhanceand strengthen individual logisticssystems, develop synergies acrossagencies and improve efficiency forthe humanitarian community as awhole. For example, the UNJLC – with-out interfering in an agency’sestablished air chartering arrange-ments – can facilitate the pooling oflimited airlift capacity with the aim ofmatching eventual excess capacitywith outstanding demand.

To best fulfil its coordination man-date, the UNJLC sets up a host oftemporary satellite offices around aregional coordination office estab-lished for the duration of theemergency. Without its own perma-nent staff, the UNJLC depends onvoluntary agency secondments. Thesesatellite offices serve as a) logistics

UN Joint Logistics Centre:a coordinated response to commonhumanitarian logistics concerns

by David B Kaatrud, Ramina Samii and Luk N Van Wassenhove

Typically, humanitarian agencies tend to under-estimate the importance of logistics.

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A typical humanitarian logistics planner’s checklist

Status and availability of in-theatre infrastructure assets, installationsand services

❑ Airfields ❑ Ports & barges❑ Airport off-loading equipment ❑ Fuel depots❑ Airport warehouses ❑ Fuel❑ Primary roads ❑ Country-wide warehouses❑ Bridges ❑ Truck fleet❑ Railways

Status of and accessibility to overland corridors and border crossing points❑ All the above along the border crossing points, plus❑ Customs clearance procedures, duties❑ Visa requirements

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information collection nodes and b)coordinating bodies for local, inter-agency logistics activities. Wherelogistics bottlenecks affecting thecommon humanitarian effort are iden-tified, the satellite offices prepare andimplement a collective response toeliminate the impediments. Whenrequired, UNJLC officers also helpframe logistics-related policy issuesaffecting humanitarian logistics oper-ations. With the disappearance ofbottlenecks, the satellite offices aredemobilised.

Information platform

Throughout a crisis, the humanitarianlogistics planners’ need for informa-tion and data analysis is enormous.No single agency in a large-scale emer-gency has the resources to cover vastareas in continuous evolution in termsof status of infrastructure, accessibili-ty, availability and prices. Acting as aninformation platform in support ofagency logistics planners, the UNJLCgathers, collates, analyses and dissem-inates relevant information from andamong humanitarian and non-humani-tarian actors. This includes spatialinformation in the form of GIS(Geographic Information Systems).Agencies can then optimise theiractivities in terms of response, costand stock pre-positioning. In addition,the UNJLC can help avoid wastefulcompetition among and duplicationwithin humanitarian organisations.

At the outset of the Afghan crisis, forexample, UNJLC developed a crisis-specific website containing relevantinformation for logistics planners. Thewebsite became increasingly compre-hensive with the systematic feedbackreceived from site visitors. Throughthe website, logistics planners hadimmediate access to updated and reli-able information on planned strategicand regional airlifts; corridor and in-country infrastructure installationsand assets; transport rates; agencystock positions; contact details of thelogistics personnel of the variousagencies; status of corridors and bor-der crossings; customs information;and any common UN passenger airservice and commercial airline sched-ules.

Addressing logistics bottlenecks

Logistics bottlenecks may result fromthe actions of neighbouring states,

recipient governments or militaryforces in control of such assets aswarehouses or fuel depots. Individualagencies usually do not have theresources to engage in simultaneousnegotiations in multiple locations withdifferent actors. Even if suchresources were available, it would bethe least cost-effective and efficientoption if the issues at hand were ofcommon concern.

By performing these tasks on behalfof the whole community the UNJLCaugments the overall humanitarianlogistics capability. It was thus able tostreamline and hasten the transit andmovement of humanitarian cargo andpersonnel from Afghanistan’s neigh-bours and enter into negotiations withlocal customs, rail, port and borderauthorities on issues related to cus-toms clearance, duties and visarequirements.

During the Afghan crisis, the northerncorridor constituted a bottleneck forthe humanitarian community. TheUzbek corridor, through the bordercity of Termez, was the only economicalternative as it had a port, rail con-nections and asphalted roads on bothsides of a bridge over the Amu Darya

river. However, in 1998 it had beenclosed down by the Uzbek govern-ment. To address this bottleneck, aUNJLC operation was set up inTermez to provide a logistics interfacebetween local authorities and humani-tarian agencies.

UNJLC Termez speedily negotiated anagreement with the Uzbek authoritiesfor the transport of humanitariancargo by barge to Afghanistan andestablished a system to prioritise andschedule barge cargo. The UNJLC thenfocused its efforts on negotiating theopening up of the bridge for reliefitems and personnel. Appropriateclearance procedures were agreedwith the Uzbek customs authority andsurface transport resumed betweenthe two countries. The resulting avail-able capacity was more than enoughfor the planned humanitarian require-ments. The logistics bottleneckdisappeared and with it the need forintensified coordination. After theestablishment of an efficient localinter-agency logistics coordinationstructure, the UNJLC Termez officewas closed.

Lack of adequate storage facilitiesconstitutes another critical and recur-

12 UN Joint Logistics Centre: a coordinated response to common humanitarian logistics concerns FMR 18

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ring logistics constraint for humanitar-ian agencies as they move into acountry or a new region. To addressthis, the UNJLC often brokersexchange agreements between agen-cies in need of storage facilities andthose who have them, coordinatessharing of storage space and liaiseswith military or local civil authoritiesin possession of these assets in orderto speed up their transfer to humani-tarian organisations.

Host country logistics serviceproviders are another important setof actors that can either facilitate orconstrain the operational effective-ness of humanitarian logisticsoperations. Only a common negotiat-ing platform can help humanitarianorganisations exercise their collectivebargaining power. During the Afghancrisis humanitarian agencies unknow-ingly engaged in wasteful competitionby bidding up the price of transportto secure access to truck capacity inHerat. The cargo transport cartelresulted in a 300% price increase overa six-month period. After conductinga technical study on the Afghan trans-port sector, the UNJLC presented atransport price proposal intended foruse by all agencies. By threatening to

bring in a UN trucking fleet in theevent of non-agreement and publish-ing agreed rates on its website, it putan end to the price hike. Overall, mil-lions of the humanitariancommunity’s dollars were saved.

Need to ‘de-conflict’

Humanitarian response in militaryenvironments is complicated. Securityconcerns usually result in the tempo-rary evacuation of humanitarian staffand overshadow relief operationsthroughout the crisis. Operations insuch environments create an opera-tional dependency on borderingcountries’ infrastructure. Contrary tonatural disaster environments, duringmilitary interventions the militaryoften assumes de facto control ofcommon services, assets and trans-portation infrastructure such asairfields, warehouses and transportcorridors equally required by thehumanitarian organisations. The‘de-conflicting’ of humanitarian andmilitary activities operationally depen-dent on the limited infrastructurecalls for a ‘legitimated’ coordinatedeffort. As was the case in bothAfghanistan and Iraq, the UNJLC oftentakes on this coordination and ‘decon-flicting’ role in support of UNhumanitarian operations.

At the outset of the hostilities inAfghanistan the country’s airspace,under the de facto control of the US-led Coalition, was closed tohumanitarian air operations. Afterintense negotiations with theCoalition forces, the UNJLC arrangedcorridors for humanitarian air opera-tions and successfully increased thenumber of landing spots for humani-tarian cargo at various key airfields incountry. Likewise in Iraq, after theconclusion of the war, the UNJLCopened up the Iraqi airspace forhumanitarian operations.

An evolving concept

The humanitarian community needs torespond to the increasingly dynamicand demanding emergency oper- ationalenvironment by developing more timelyand specialised forms of inter-agencycoordination. Since its inception, theUNJLC has provided a temporary sup-port structure to operationalhumanitarian actors in those emergencyenvironments requiring intensifiedcoordination and pooling of logisticsassets, including both natural disasters,

such as the Mozambique floodresponse, and complex emergency envi-ronments, such as Afghanistan andIraq. The relevance of its services hasensured a high level of voluntary coop-eration from the participating agenciesin terms of staff (secondments) andinformation sharing.

Since its first deployment, theUNJLC’s coordinating role has expand-ed to encompass various stakeholdersincluding the donor community. Forexample, to help the development of acommon UN strategy for the vitalrehabilitation of Afghanistan’s roadnetwork, the UNJLC embarked on anumber of infrastructure survey pro-jects. After assessing Afghan roadconditions and traffic capacity, ithelped the humanitarian communitydevelop proposals for donor andCoalition funding. By organising reha-bilitation seminars, it facilitatedinteraction between the parties andhelped prioritise and speed up repairinterventions.

The recent experience of UNJLCdeployments has underscored thedynamic and flexible nature of thefacility. In Afghanistan, the UNJLCsupported two major non-humanitari-an activities requiring considerablelogistics planning and execution.As government and institutions had‘disappeared’, the UNJLC contributedto the logistics operations of the LoyaJirga process that led to the electionof the new Afghan government and tothe currency exchange exercise involv-ing the collection and destruction of4,000 MT of old bank notes and thedistribution of 800 million newbank-notes.

The UNJLC concept has continued toevolve, responding to new demandsand learning from experience. It istaking on board the lessons learnedfrom each crisis. It has addressed theproblem of delayed deployment deci-sions, an issue faced during theGujarat earthquake in 2001, throughthe newly established ActivationProtocol.1 To ensure the availability ofsufficient start-up staff, it has con-ducted training sessions for agencylogisticians. To date, UNJLC has runtwo training sessions for agency/NGO logisticians: one in Brindisi(September 2001) and one inCopenhagen (November 2002).Another two sessions are tentativelyscheduled for late 2003. Lastly, to beable to run as it hits the ground, it

13FMR 18 UN Joint Logistics Centre: a coordinated response to common humanitarian logistics concerns

UN convoy in Angola.

has taken the necessary measures toensure the availability of the mini-mum equipment through theestablishment of standardised‘fly-away’ kits.

The UNJLC is now able to provide arange of logistics coordination ser-vices from the preparedness toemergency response phase as well asassessment of existing inter-agencylogistics coordination mechanisms foron-going emergency operations. As itcontinues to establish itself, theUNJLC’s principal challenges relate to:

■ properly diagnosing the logisticssituation to identify the mostappropriate UNJLC response andensuring that all concerned par-ties are fully aware of this role

■ being careful to avoid the trap of‘coordination for coordination’ssake’ and striving to provideadded value in the overall logis-tics response effort of a givenemergency

■ being sensitive to the absorptioncapacity of agency logistics staffand designing its informationmanagement and disseminationstructures accordingly. In thisregard, the UNJLC must recognisethat in the emergency contextinter-agency data is imperfect andinformation management is rarelywell structured. Emphasis willcontinue to be placed on develop-ing new information managementtechniques and technologies insupport of logistics planning func-tions.

■ giving due attention to explainingits role clearly to all stakeholders atthe field and headquarters levels(being a relatively new emergencyresponse mechanism, the UNJLC’smandate is not widely under-stood)

■ making every effort, after deploy-ment, to obtain continualfeedback from its main users onthe most appropriate services,information and assistance theyrequire from the UNJLC.

David B Kaatrud is Chief ofLogistics, WFP and Head of theUNJLC, Rome (www.wfp.org andwww.unjlc.org). Email: david.kaatrud@wfp.org.

Ramina Samii is Visiting ResearchAssociate at the INSEAD businessschool, Fontainebleau, France(www.insead.edu). Email: ramina.samii@insead.edu.

Luk N Van Wassenhove is theHenry Ford Chaired Professor ofManufacturing at INSEAD. Email: luk.van-wassenhove@insead.edu.

1. The Activation Protocol provides a guideline forthe inter-agency consultation process leading tothe activation of a UNJLC (whether it is required,its size, duration, resources required, mobilisationprocedures, etc.). More info on the guideline isavailable at: www.unjlc.org/home/core/down-load/UNJLC_ Concept%20_18_Feb_2003_AnnexD_Activation.pdf

14 UN Joint Logistics Centre: a coordinated response to common humanitarian logistics concerns FMR 18

This article and the following article on the IFRC draw on the

following INSEAD case studies:

by Ramina Samii and Luk N Van Wassenhove: ■ The United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC): The Genesis of a

Humanitarian Relief Coordination Platform’, INSEAD case study 02/2003-5093.

■ ‘UNJLC: The Afghanistan Crisis’, INSEAD case study 02/2003-5092.www.fritzinstitute.org/images/FI.pdfs/UNJLC%20afghanistan.pdf

■ ‘Logistics: Moving the seeds of a brighter future (UNJLC’s second year inAfghanistan)’, INSEAD case study, 2003.

by R Samii, L N Van Wassenhove, K Kumar & I Becerra-Fernandez: ■ ‘IFRC – Choreographer of Disaster Management. The Gujarat Earthquake’,

INSEAD case study 06/2002-5032.■ IFRC – Choreographer of Disaster Management. Preparing for

Tomorrow’s Disasters’, INSEAD case study 06/2002-5039.

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he Disaster Relief EmergencyFund allowed operations to beswiftly initiated. The arrival of

a Field Assessment CoordinationTeam 48 hours after the disasterhelped gauge relief requirements anddevelop plans for resource mobilisa-tion. The quick deployment of theEmergency Response Units allowedrelief activities to be swiftly kickedoff. The relief mobilisation table1 andthe commodity tracking systemhelped mobilise, organise and coordi-nate the arrival of relief supplies. Thistogether with IFRC’s code of conductlimited the arrival of unsolicitedgoods. And finally the frame agree-ments with key suppliers ensured thequality of relief items and theirprompt delivery at competitive prices.Three days after the Gujarat earth-quake, IFRC’s response plan wasalready in full swing. In the next 30days, the IFRC’s Logistics andResource Mobilisation Department(LRMD) organised the delivery, by 45charter planes, of 255,000 blankets,34,000 tents and 120,000 plasticsheets, plus other relief items forsome 300,000 people.

What was behind this level ofresponse and coordination, unimagin-able just five years before? IFRC had,after all, faced great difficulties inresponding to Hurricane Mitch thathit a number of Central Americancountries in late 1998. During thatemergency, it had failed to coordinatethe relief contributions of the donat-ing National Societies; its technicalstaff and relief delegates had arrivedon the disaster scene far too late; itsspecialised equipment was only

deployed at the eleventh hour; andbasic supplies took weeks to mobiliseand distribute to the population.

The major lesson learned fromHurricane Mitch for IFRC was theneed to work hard during disastersbut even harder between disasters. Itwas agreed that two elements of dis-aster management have to bemastered before the right goodsarrive at the right place at the righttime: disaster preparedness and disas-ter response. The lead role taken bythe LRMD was what made the differ-ence during the Gujarat earthquake.The LRMD had geared up its supplychain preparedness, a pre-conditionfor effective simultaneous planningand execution.

Supply chain management:improvements

i. Organisational structure

Traditionally IFRC’s logistics andresource mobilisation unit’s activitieswere centred on the purchasing func-tion. Over recent years, however, therole of the unit expanded to includeall relevant supply chain activitiesfrom planning and warehouse man-agement to training and reporting.In 2000 IFRC went through a majorrestructuring exercise that led to aclear separation between on-goingdevelopment programmes and disas-ter management and coordination.During this restructuring, theenhanced profile of logistics was for-mally recognised and the unit wasupgraded to a department.Improvements introduced over this

period of time focused on operationaland process preparedness and stan-dardisation of all processes andactivities including procurement pro-cedures.

IFRC’s standardisation efforts, frameagreements, code of conduct and abasic commodity tracking systemhelped expedite mobilisation anddelivery of relief goods during theGujarat earthquake. The frame agree-ments with international and localsuppliers for key relief items such asblankets and plastic sheets drasticallysimplified the procurement process.These agreements specify the good’sprice, quality and delivery require-ments; in addition they obligesuppliers to stock at their ownpremises a certain level of inventory.

ii. Unsolicited goods

IFRC’s code of conduct2 regulates pri-vate sector cash and in-kinddonations. By setting standards thatinclude ethical and operational issues,the Federation retains the right torefuse certain donations and thusavoid goods being pushed through itsnetwork. The newly institutionalisedcommodity tracking system of theLRMD helps contain the arrival ofunsolicited goods. The system – stillto be refined – enables IFRC head-quarters as well as the field staff tomonitor, in real time, who is sendingwhat, with what means, where andwhen.

Compared to the Bangladeshi earth-quake some ten years ago this systemallowed for a drastic improvement.During the earlier crisis, a substantialamount of time and energy was spenton the management and disposal ofunwanted goods constituting 95% ofall goods received. In the case ofGujarat, the amount of unsolicitedgoods was kept as low as 5%. The sys-tem also allowed IFRC to providedonors with reliable information onthe status of goods required,mobilised and on site.

The central role of supplychain management at IFRC

by Bernard Chomilier, Ramina Samii and Luk N Van Wassenhove

The Gujarat earthquake was a watershed for IFRCand more specifically for its Logistics and ResourceMobilisation Department. It was the first time thatall IFRC’s preparedness tools, mechanisms andpractices, developed to better manage emergencysupply chains, had come together.

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16 The central role of supply chain management at IFRC FMR 18

iii. Emergency Response Units

What worked particularly well duringthe Gujarat earthquake was thedeployment of the newly developedEmergency Response Units (ERUs)with specialist equipment and person-nel. There are four generic types ofERUs: logistics, health care, telecom-munications, and water andsanitation. Six were requested by theLRMD for the Gujurat crisis: three inthe health care area (referral hospital,emergency unit and basic health care),one logistics, one telecommunicationsand one water and sanitation. Withindays of the Gujarat earthquake, acombined referral hospital comprising310 beds, a basic health care unit, anemergency clinic and over 100 special-ist personnel was deployed. Thespecialised water and sanitation unitsupported these units. A telecom unitoperational within three days fromthe quake established a communica-tion link between all units involved.

Typically activated before the arrivalof the other ERUs and relief items, thelogistics ERU is instrumental in build-ing the appropriate operationalenvironment around relief activities.Based on the relief mobilisation tableand the conditions of the local infra-structure, this ERU estimates theneed, size and number of requiredtent warehouses and determines theoptimal erection site. It obtains spe-cial agreement (tax exemption for theimported goods) before clearing thegoods through customs and arrangesfor the transportation (trucks, fuel,drivers, insurance, etc) of the goods towarehouses.

Support for supply chainmanagement

These developments within IFRC’ssupply chain management were sup-ported by improvements in itspreparedness in terms of humanresources, knowledge managementand finance.

i. Human resources

IFRC’s improved level of human pre-paredness allowed it to respondpromptly to the Gujarat earthquake.IFRC has developed its field assess-ment and coordination capability byestablishing a Field AssessmentCoordination Team (FACT) composedof experienced Red Cross/RedCrescent disaster managers, trained in

specific areas such as relief, logistics,health, nutrition, public health andepidemiology, water and sanitation,finance and administration. The LRMDis represented on the FACT through alogistics expert.

FACT is deployable within 12-24hours for up to six weeks anywhere inthe world. Its mandate is to carry outrapid field assessment immediatelyafter a disaster, recommend and acti-vate an appropriate relief operation,and ensure coordination with dozensof actors. Before the establishment ofFACT, each donating and host countryNational Red Cross/Red CrescentSociety used to send its own assess-ment team with obvious cost andcoordination implications.

In order to build and maintain a corepool of about 200 experts from whichFACT staff can be drawn, IFRC con-ducts FACT training sessions aroundthe world. These sessions aim toimpart a consistent methodology andbuild team spirit and a common poolof expertise. The training programmesare supported by on-the-job training.

ii. Knowledge management

IFRC is currently developing aDisaster Management InformationSystem (DMIS) to ensure that theexisting knowledge within the IFRCand its network of National Societiesis captured, codified and made acces-sible to staff at large. In anemergency, IFRC needs to assembleand disseminate information on thegeography, climate, population, foodhabits, living conditions and customs,infrastructure, duty customs and reg-ulations of the affected region. One ofthe features of DMIS is the identifica-tion and creation of links to relevantwebsites that hold this type of keyinformation. Immediately after theGujarat earthquake, IFRC – using itsDMIS – consulted a number of web-sites holding relevant information onthe region in order to estimate thesize of the affected population.

iii. Finance

One of the oldest tools available atIFRC is its Disaster Relief EmergencyFund. The Fund is called upon imme-diately after a disaster and before theissuance of a disaster-specific appeal.It provides seed money to initiate aspeedy response on the ground – suchas fielding FACT members, down-pay-

ments for initial supply purchasesand deployment of ERUs. The Fundallowed IFRC to be the first humani-tarian organisation to reach Gujaratand activate its disaster-specific emer-gency supply chain. This in return hada direct impact on its resource mobili-sation capability and responseoutreach.

Challenges remaining

To further improve the level of supplychain preparedness and responsetime, IFRC’s LRMD has implementedan end-to-end humanitarian logisticsplanning and tracking system in col-laboration with the Fritz Institute [seearticle by Lee pp34] which includes anautomated and standardised 6,000item catalogue. Together theseimprovements will allow greatercoordination in a relief operationbetween logistics and finance, infor-mation technology, donor reportingand disaster operations.

However, like other relief organisa-tions, the IFRC continues to facechallenges in several areas includingobtaining funds for disaster prepared-ness and capacity building, identifyingoptimal structures for coordinationbetween headquarters and the field,and clearly defining the role of thesecretariat in relation to those of theNational Societies.

Bernard Chomilier is Director ofthe Logistics and ResourceMobilisation Department, IFRC,Geneva (www.ifrc.org). Email: bernard.chomilier@ifrc.org.

Ramina Samii is Visiting ResearchAssociate at INSEAD (internationalbusiness school), Fontainebleau,France.Email: ramina.samii@insead.edu.

Luk N Van Wassenhove is theHenry Ford Chaired Professor ofManufacturing at INSEAD. Email: luk.van-wassenhove@insead.edu

1. A Relief Mobilisation table is a list of reliefitems plus quantities thereof that the IFRC believesare required to address the needs of an emergency.IFRC prepares and circulates this table among itsNational Societies in order to raise funds and/orin-kind contributions. The table helps to minimiseunsolicited goods and as National Societies committo the provision of an item, the table is updatedand made accessible to them all.

2. See www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct

17FMR 18

s response teams take stockof unfolding news and events,humanitarian agencies have

to plan for emergencies in an extraor-dinary range of operating environ-ments and geographical locations.Planners who focus on logistical chal-lenges are often in a better position toprovide effective assistance.

With operations in over 80 countries,the World Food Programme (WFP) hasbecome one of the largest providers ofassistance to both refugees and IDPs.Whilst acknowledging that there is nocommon definition of logistics, aug-menting logistics is about providingextra resources to meet operationalrequirements. Over the years WFP hasdeveloped both preparedness andresponse measures for supportingand augmenting its operations.

ALITE

Over the last eight years, WFP hasdeveloped a specialised unit to aug-ment its field operations with avariety of support services. TheAugmented Logistics InterventionTeam for Emergencies (ALITE)1 isspecifically tasked with addressinglogistical preparedness as well as pro-viding key operational support duringemergencies. This includes developinglogistics capacity assessments, rapid

response equipment, standby arrange-ments, civil military cooperationguidance and inter-agency work on theUN Joint Logistics Centre concept.2

ALITE strengthens WFP logistics activi-ties by working closely with fieldlogisticians and programme, resource,telecommunications and procurementofficers to apply standby capacities,develop operational plans and, wherenecessary, design special interventionprojects. ALITE’s goal is to provide arange of rapid and effective emer-gency services to support WFP fieldoperations, primarily throughincreased resource availability. It isalso responsible for the operationalmanagement of the UN HumanitarianResponse Depot (UNHRD) in Brindisi,Italy. This facility is used by both UNagencies and NGOs to store pro-gramme supplies available forimmediate distribution to beneficia-ries and operational supportequipment for responding agenciesand NGOs.

WFP often needs to establish its owninfrastructure for field operationsincluding offices, warehouses and allthe equipment for a supply chain sys-tem. In such circumstances, theCountry Office can augment its ownoperation by drawing on reservesstored in UNHRD and can build up the

infrastructure to establish both opera-tions at the country office and sub-office levels. The pre-fabricated build-ings are flat-packed and pre-wired andcome with office equipment and sleep-ing quarters. One Hercules C-130 cantransport about six of these ‘packs’ –and while a forklift is preferable at thedestination it is not essential.

In addition, WFP has now built up itsown ICT support unit named FITTEST(Fast Information Technology andTelecommunications EmergencySupport Team). Besides its work forWFP, FITTEST provides a growing rolein the provision of inter-agency securetelecommunications. Recent deploy-ments of equipment include thoseduring the large-scale emergencies inAfghanistan and Iraq.

In the past three years, WFP has carriedout extensive work to strengthen itslogistical preparedness and capacity.The overall goal has been to improverapid response facilities so as to allowtimely delivery of food aid in bothsudden- and slow-onset emergencysituations.

Augmentation throughpartnership

To complement its emergencyresponse, WFP has developed agree-ments over the years with ‘standby’partner organisations – organisationsthat it can call on to guarantee addi-tional capacity in key vulnerableregions. These agreements have beenupdated with a view to streamlining

The World Food Programme:augmenting logistics

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the approach and procedures to befollowed whenever standby partnersare deployed. This is becomingincreasingly pertinent to issues suchas war risk insurance and liability/indemnification and associatedresponsibilities.

The standby partners can be classifiedinto three categories: governmentalentities, NGOs and donors from theprivate sector. They may provide indi-vidual experts and/or deployed servicepackages which comprise both staffand equipment. Opposite is a tablewhich illustrates some of the servicepackage deployments made since1999.

While most agreements have focusedon logistical expertise, some standbypartners also have members on theirrosters with expertise in other skillssuch as needs assessment, food secu-rity, nutrition, security and mineawareness/clearance. WFP can deploysuch assets fast, having developedStandard Deployment Procedures(SDPs) with its partners. More impor-tantly, WFP has built relationships oftrust and mutual understanding.Training is critical to this success,along with joint evaluations of pastdeployments.

Because of the diversity of areas andcomplexity of environments in whichWFP is called upon to make interven-tions, ALITE is frequently asked todevelop the means to support WFP’score operational mandate throughcollaborative partnerships. For exam-ple, the Swiss Foundation for MineAction (FSD - Fondation Suisse deDeminage) provided expert advice andtechnical assistance to WFP. It under-took mine risk education for staff(both theory and practical trainingexercises) and demonstrated theimpact that mine awareness can haveon WFP operations. This effort, incoordination with the UN Mine ActionService, played a crucial role in secur-ing transport corridors as well asclearing offices and warehouses forWFP during the early months of theIraq operation in 2003.

During the 2001-2002 Afghan emer-gency, a mountaineering andavalanche control team from CARECanada contributed to major effortsto keep the Salang Tunnel open. Thisteam prevented avalanches of snowand ice from blocking vital supplyroutes into remote areas inAfghanistan. Such interventions

enabled WFP and other humanitarianagencies to transport crucial suppliesto those stranded by the conflict. Oneadditional positive outcome was thatit stimulated the reactivation of thelocal economy through opening trans-port routes and the movement ofpeople displaced by years of war.

Other examples include:■ rescue boat operators deployed in

Mozambique to assist in floodrelief efforts

■ Swedish Rescue Services Agencyinternational convoy teamsdeployed in Kosovo, Afghanistanand the Palestinian Territories

■ ICT support teams (from theNorwegian Refugee Council andDanish Refugee Council) deployedin most regions, working closelywith WFP’s FITTEST team, co-ordinated in Dubai

■ UK’s Department for InternationalDevelopment air operationsspecialists

■ Red R Australia logistics officersdeployed in Iraq

■ Swiss Humanitarian Assistanceengineers deployed for road andinfrastructure rehabilitation

■ TPG experts deployed to assist inair support of operations in south-ern Sudan.

Private sector partners

In meeting the challenge of develop-ing new business processes, WFP hastaken the initiative of building rela-tionships with the private sector. Thisinvolves examining ways in which theprivate sector can assist WFP in meet-

ing its challenge of feeding peopleacross the world. Although not allbusinesses are a paradigm for effec-tive practice, WFP receives supportfrom organisations such as TPG –the Dutch-based international mail,express and logistics company (previ-ously known as the TNT Post Group).4

TPG, through its TNT logisticsdivision, initially identified threeshort-term logistics areas where itcould support WFP. The UNHRD ware-house (soon to accommodate otheragencies) needs to grow significantly.TPG will support its expansion andanalyse its efficiency and effective-ness in order to determine optimallayout and stock availability. TPG isalso looking at a number of smallerprojects, including evaluating ware-house management systems,assessing the global warehouse infra-structure and determining keylogistics performance indicators.

TPG also played a significant supportrole in the southern Africa emergencyoperation as well as more recently inthe Iraq operation. However the rela-tionship is not just about movingsupplies between A and B; it is per-haps more importantly about forginggreater links and understandingbetween commercial experts andthose within the public sector, andabout exchanging ideas, practices andnew business concepts. One of thefirst private sector companies to pro-vide surge capacity support wasEricsson with the deployment of atelecommunications team toAfghanistan, which provided mobile

The World Food Programme: augmenting logistics FMR 18

Standby support to WFP Ops Country/region1999 – 2003 (list not comprehensive)

Base camp Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, (office, living accommodation) Mozambique, Iraq

Telecommunications teams Balkans, East Timor, Iraq

Mobile bakery Albania, Kosovo

Boat teams Mozambique

Avalanche control unit Afghanistan

NBC3 training teams Iraq, UAE, Cyprus, Kuwait

Mine Action teams Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Sri Lanka,Sudan

Trucking fleets Afghanistan, Balkans, Palestinian Territories, Eritrea, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho

Road and bridge rehabilitation teams Angola, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Turkmenistan

telecommunications not only for WFPbut also for the other emergencyrelief agencies operating there.

Drawing on the success of the UNHRDmodel, WFP is now developing a ‘four-corner’ concept in collaboration withTPG. This will involve establishingstrategic response depots to cover thefour quarters of the world. The cen-tres will provide storage capacity andact as staging areas for response. Thisconcept does not necessarily involvelarge stockpiles; much of the stockingwill be ‘virtual’ – with the focus onrapid local procurement capability.WFP and UNHCR have also agreedshared access to each agency’s ‘LongTerm Agreements’ with suppliers,increasing procurement capabilities.WFP aims to draw upon both commer-cial and public sectors, and is in closecontact with IFRC and UNICEF whoare developing similar modules andstrategies.

Lessons learned

Recent feedback from standby part-ners (in the Afghanistan operation)and internal discussions have high-lighted a number of issues for WFPto tackle:■ For new standby partners, WFP

must provide clearer, more trans-parent overall guidelines ofoperation. In a large-scale emer-gency, partners have to learn fast.WFP has in the past provided com-plex, generic training tools.Training and learning tools must,however, be simple and specific tothe operation.

■ WFP – as other agencies – deploysstaff/partners to increasingly inse-cure areas yet has few medical/safety experts to support thosedeployed. This needs to beaddressed.

■ WFP’s capacity for learning lessonsfrom field operations needs to beenhanced. The military conductrigorous ‘lessons learned’ exercises

and WFP could learn from theirapproach.

■ WFP could learn much from thecommercial sector in terms ofknowledge transfer.

■ WFP’s donors have recentlydemanded greater operational coor-dination. WFP has responded bydeveloping a competencies matrixof its standby partners which hasproved extremely helpful. In Iraq,one third of the emergency person-nel deployed in support of the WFPoperation came from among the 15standby partners. Without detailedknowledge of their capabilities, thiswould not have been possible.While WFP continues to addressthis issue, it is also asking the samequestion of the donors – coordina-tion is required on both sides.

Continuing challenges

■ Integrated planning: Contingencyplanning is successful when it isan integrated undertaking to iden-tify gaps and requirements in thesupply chain process. Buildingrelationships with partners takesinvestment – in time and money.It must be done thoroughly withclear parameters and procedures.Fast response demands trust, espe-cially when security is an issue.

■ Capacity building: WFP avoidsbringing into a region ‘outside’transport assets wherever there isindigenous capacity. Increasingefforts are being made to supportsustainability and when the opera-tion is nearing completion,‘transition strategies’ are imple-mented to support transfer ofknowledge and skills to thoseorganisations and entities stayingbehind. Much more needs to bedone. The next major challenge forthe ‘Northern’ NGOs and agenciesalike is to expand their networkand invest in building flexiblestructures within regions.

Frequently, at huge cost, assets areflown half way around the worldto supply urgent supplies.Questions should be asked aboutthe cost benefit of such strategicresponses. Donors too shouldquestion their own ‘justification’for such deployments. Augmentinglogistics should maximise thetenet ‘small investment, large gain’and do all it can to develop region-al capacities. Such relationshipscan yield benefits for the donorsthrough efficient utilisation oftheir resources and can also buildlinks with and between Southerncountries.

■ Public versus commercial sector:Agencies will have to be careful, atthe beginning of each relationship,to agree ethical practices and toclarify which areas of their workrequire support/involvement andwhich do not. It should be recog-nised that both commercialorganisations and relief agencieswill have their own agendas – andtheir own accountability require-ments. Though they may shareareas of commitment to humani-tarian needs, the commercialversus humanitarian principlesneed careful examination and navi-gation. And relief workers need tobe persuaded that commercialpractices can be useful. How do weencourage the ‘we have alwaysdone it this way’ person to adaptto new technologies/methods?

Within the humanitarian community,as within the corporate sector, ‘logis-tics’ may be redefining itself. Supplychain management with concrete data– on what is available or what is not –may improve programme allocationand in turn maximise benefits forbeneficiaries. Equally, developing anintegrated approach helps to bridgedivides within and between organisa-tions.

Peter Scott-Bowden is Head of theWorld Food Programme’sAugmented Logistics InterventionTeam for Emergencies (ALITE).www.wfp.org/operations/logis-tics/contingency_planning.htmlEmail: Peter.Scott-Bowden@wfp.org

1. ALITE was established in 1995 by Ramiro Lopesda Silva (current Humanitarian Coordinator for theUN in Iraq) and David Kaatrud, Coordinator,UNJLC. See www.wfp.org/operations/logistics/con-tingency_planning.html2. See article on UNJLC on pp113 Nuclear, Biologicial and Chemical training.4. See www.tpg.com/wwwenglish/community/movingtheworld/

19FMR 18 The World Food Programme: augmenting logistics

UN convoys in Afghanistan are preceded by snow-clearing teams and/or an Avalanche Control Unit,

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he first stage of the Back toSchool (BTS) programmesought to enable 1.78 million

children in the war-ravaged country toreturn to school by the end of March2002. Since then, an additional twocampaigns have been undertaken,reaching 1 million children inSeptember 2002 and 4.5 million inMarch 2003. The evolution of theseoperations has had three main effects:

■ It has raised the profile of thelogistics profession within UNICEF.The organisation now recognisesthe need to further strengthen itsin-country logistics operations.

■ It represents a new approach tosupply and logistics operations ingeneral, by recognising that suchoperations can be an importantand useful vehicle for buildinglocal capacity and assisting nation-al institutions in making thetransition from emergency todevelopment. This also helps toprepare those same institutionsfor coping with future emergen-cies, where supplies and logisticswill always be a huge element inresponse planning.

■ It has shown that large-scale edu-cation interventions can be animmediate element of an emer-gency response, and not be limitedto post-crisis reconstruction. InAfghanistan, the response to re-start education for all was one ofthe first interventions led by theInterim Administration and theinternational community.

Genesis of the BTS operationand early errors

Initial planning began in earlyDecember 2001 and was inevitably achallenging experience in light of the

complexity of the local situation andof the operation itself. At this timethe war in Afghanistan had only justended and the new transitional gov-ernment had not yet been agreedupon. UNICEF staff were also in theearly stages of deployment. The firstlogistics staff arrived in Pakistan on 1December to be confronted by themore pressing issues of providingnutritional, health and winter sup-plies, and establishing logisticssystems to move and monitor them.Critical elements of the procurementsection, the education section and thenascent logistics sections were alloperating separately; information flow– within and between the Afghanoffice and the support offices in NewYork and Copenhagen – was restrict-ed, hampered not least by the lack ofreliable and available communicationsin a country with little infrastructure.

UNICEF Supply Division had to iden-tify, procure, assemble, pack anddistribute thousands of educationalkits for children living in a countrywhere the human and financialresources and infrastructure had beenseriously weakened by years of war.Looking at the volume of supplies inquestion it became obvious thatUNICEF was facing one of the mostdaunting challenges it had ever facedand was clearly confronted with majordifficulties in dealing with the magni-tude of the operation. Ten thousandboxes, providing teaching/ learningmaterials for 800,000 children, wereflown in from the UNICEF warehousein Copenhagen. But it was far fromenough. It was also apparent that thesupplies being ordered from Pakistanisuppliers would not be sufficient tocover the requirements – which wereconstantly changing due to uncertain-ties about the numbers of Afghanschoolchildren (starting at around 1million then jumping to 1.5 million,

then to roughly 1.8 million). By theend of December UNICEF faced a two-and-a-half month deadline (for a 23March school opening) to receive,pack and distribute the supplies.Based on supplier promises of a six-week lead time for delivery, UNICEFplanned to begin operations on 15February against a distribution planthat had yet to be written, with datathat was not readily available, andimplemented by human resources anda logistics infrastructure that werestill being developed.

Staffing

In January the country office had onlytwo logistics personnel in place, onein Islamabad as coordinator, and onein Peshawar, on the Pakistan/Afghanborder. UNICEF was drastically inneed of extra personnel. However,when the new government announcedthat Back to School would be one ofthe pillars of its reconstruction pro-gramme, the operation took on animmediate political dimension.UNICEF made a public commitment toproviding the necessary suppliesbefore 23 March 2001 and immediate-ly deployed senior staff to the field.The BTS operation reshaped itself,taking on a stronger logistics focusand requests for resources originatingfrom the logistics office now carriedfar more weight.

The senior human resources appara-tus in New York that covered SouthAsia was temporarily relocated toIslamabad to facilitate and expediterecruitment for BTS. By mid February,BTS Logistics had recruited 11 logis-tics officers who between them hadhad field experience in almost everymajor complex emergency sinceBosnia in 1992.

Distribution planning andNowshera logistics base

The first priority was to develop adistribution plan that, though com-plex, was coherent and easily

Logistics under pressure:UNICEF’s Back to School programme in Afghanistan by Paul Molinaro and Sandie Blanchet

For the last eighteen months in Afghanistan, UNICEF hasbeen involved in one of the largest education operations inthe history of the organisation.

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understood. For the purposes of plan-ning, education programme officershad no real distribution data to workwith except a 1999 UNESCO survey.Planning was therefore finalised bytaking the 1.8 million student figurethat UNICEF had actually procuredfor, and dividing this figure by thepopulation percentages for eachregion, thus giving us an idea of howmany kits were needed where. For lan-guage breakdown UNICEF sought localexpertise and settled on an averageDari/Pashto percentage split for eachprovince. This was a critical element fortext book distribution. For teacher num-bers UNICEF took its student figure anddivided by 35 and for schools it workedon a figure of 1 per 70 students.

The first key element in the distribu-tion network was the establishment ofa major logistics centre where bulksupplies could be received, packedinto kits and dispatched. A packingcentre was established in the NorthWest Frontier Province town ofNowshera which belonged to theNational Logistics Cell (NLC), a gov-ernment organisation staffed byPakistani military officers and civil-ians. NLC subcontracted all labour(guards, packers and loaders) as wellas catering services. Workers wereemployed on two shifts, the shopfloor supervised by warehouse staffflown in from Copenhagen. In less

than two months, the Nowshera ware-house produced 50,000 educationalkits at a rate of two boxes per minute.In addition, smaller warehouses inTajikistan and Uzbekistan producedover 10,000 kits, 400 recreational kitsand 600 school tents.

Kit design

UNICEF’s Education section providedthe original list of items that were tobe given to students, teachers andschools. Logistics section translatedthese lists to ‘kit form’ and were givenleeway to change items or item num-bers in order to make the exerciselogistically feasible. A generic Grades1-6 kit was designed so that thiscould be prioritised in order to meetthe 23 March deadline, as well as theTeacher and School kits. Any specialistcomponents would follow later. Thismade the task logistically possible.In addition to the kits, UNICEF pro-cured some 6 million textbooks to bedistributed simultaneously. Thesewere made up of 86 different titles intwo languages and including Teacherguides.

Distribution

The hubs in this case were Kabul,Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad andKandahar, locations with UNICEFoffices, logisticians and warehouses.

Each hub covered a number ofprovinces and received total kits forthe combined provinces. In general,UNICEF supplied transport from hubsto drop zones but this was not alwaysthe case. In Kabul, peacekeeping per-sonnel from the International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF) were used toferry to drop zones and to individualschools. In Mazar-e-Sharif, the UnitedNations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC)organised helicopters to drop zones.Beyond drop zones, UNICEF providedcash either to district education offi-cers or to UNICEF-hired distributionassistants. This cash funded transportby smaller vehicles, private cars, don-keys and porters and also allowedUNICEF to set up some 250 smallstorage facilities at district level. Inother areas of Afghanistan UNICEFwas able to work with NGOs, suchas the Swedish Committee forAfghanistan. In each case, mode oftransport was left to the logistics offi-cer at the hub. With Afghanistan beingso geographically diverse, a ‘one modefits all’ system was not attempted.

Problems encountered

Procurement:1. Issues arose over the quality ofsome supplies procured locally, dueto the short lead-in times and thehigh volumes being requested.2. Local suppliers were often opti-mistic about delivery dates, causingfrequent stock-outs on the packinglines and forcing UNICEF to takeurgent measures, such as hiring addi-tional aircraft to transport delayeditems from nearby countries. 3. Supply lead times were underesti-mated on some occasions.

Distribution:Afghanistan was still in an emergencyphase and it was the end of winter.The infrastructure (both human andphysical) had been destroyed by yearsof war. The logistics involved in dis-tributing the kits embraced techno-logical extremes – from aircraft andhelicopters to taxis, wheelbarrows,donkeys and porters. Hundreds oftrucks were used to transport the kitsto Kabul for onward distribution toprovincial centres. UNICEF staff werein daily contact with almost 100 sup-pliers and manufacturers to trackprogress and identify problems.Thousands of health workers involvedin the national immunisation networkwere mobilised to help distribute kits.Countless obstacles were encoun-tered: obtaining exemption

FMR 18 Logistics under pressure: UNICEF’s Back to School Programme in Afghanistan

Nowshera packing centre

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certificates; getting customs clearanceon time; negotiating demurrage andport storage charges; flooded roads;identifying local focal points andensuring that they were ready toreceive the supplies and simultane-ously coordinating operations inseveral countries.

Capacity building

One of the objectives of BTS was tohelp build capacity in Afghanistan’sMinistry of Education. In July 2002,UNICEF identified a disused and badlydamaged former industrial centre thatalready belonged to the Ministry ofEducation and had been the centre forschool furniture production. UNICEFspent $50,000 on rehabilitating whatis now called the Ministry of Educat-ion Logistics Centre. In addition, sixUNICEF warehouses were handed overto the Ministry to form the nervecentre of the supply and distributionoperations for schools across thecountry. Under the supervision ofUNICEF Supply Division staff, the newworkforce – all Afghans – was trainedin warehouse management, the use ofdatabases and basic health and safety.UNICEF installed a classroom at thewarehouse, equipped with 20 comput-ers, and provided on-site literacyclasses.

One sensitive issue was the employ-ment of women in the warehouse.UNICEF wanted to ensure that at leastsome of the 200 new jobs would beaccessible to women. According tolocal custom, women could not workin the same room as men so the ware-

houses were divided with simple plas-tic sheets, so that women could workon the production line with therequired level of privacy.

Conclusion

Lessons have been learned, sometimesthe hard way. New ideas have beentried and adopted. Iraq will be thefirst time the BTS model will beexported outside Afghanistan andthere are already marked differencesin how UNICEF is planning to proceed.

The supply operation for education inAfghanistan, especially the logisticscentre in Kabul, represents a newapproach to emergency logistics. Theobjective is to assist countries in tran-sition to bridge the gap betweenemergency and development by build-ing national capacity so that a countrybecomes self-sufficient in the plan-ning, production and distribution ofeducational or other supplies.

When a commitment is made and keypersonnel deployed and with backingfrom the highest levels, UNICEF canmove incredibly fast and effectively.

In the case of Afghanistan, UNICEFpulled out the stops in order to makethings happen. The institutional ele-ments that allow such a high impactproject to occur can have rippleeffects throughout an organisation. Inthe case of UNICEF, BTS has put logis-tics operations back on the map.Recently there have been high leveldiscussions on how logistics profes-sionals are supposed to fit into futureframeworks. Entwining UNICEF’srecognised ability in procurementwith a new approach to logisticsaugurs well for an operational futurethat can only be described as pre-dictably unpredictable.

Paul Molinaro is Logistics Officerfor Afghanistan and coordinatedlogistics for all three BTS opera-tions. Email: pmolinaro@unicef.org

Sandie Blanchet is CommunicationOfficer for UNICEF Supply Division. Email: sblanchet@unicef.org.

For more information, visit UNICEF’s AfghanistanBack to School website at www.unicef.org/notewor-thy/afghanistan/bts. Details of the School in a Boxconcept are at www.supply.unicef.dk/emergen-cies/schoolkit.htm

The basic distribution chain was designed as follows:

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ue to the civil war that hasraged there from 1998, atleast 3.3 million people have

either been killed or have died ofhunger and disease – more peoplekilled in any war since the end ofWorld War II1. Huge numbers ofCongolese civilians have been dis-placed. According to the Global IDPDatabase, over 2.5 million out of anational population of some 50 mil-lion are now internally displaced. In2002 alone, over 500,000 people weredisplaced, mainly because of intensi-fied violence in the north-eastern Ituriand eastern South Kivu regions. Theaid organisation, World Vision, isattempting to provide emergencyshelter and water for over 50,000 peo-ple who fled from atrocitiesperpetrated by rebel groups near thetown of Bunia. However, due to inse-curity, supply convoys have beendelayed on the Uganda/DRC borderfor up to two weeks.

The scattering of so many peopleacross such a huge area while conflictcontinues would make the problemsfaced by logisticians difficult enoughin a country with good roads and airconnections. In DRC, however,decades of under-investment,exploitation, corruption and neglecthave left the nation’s infrastructure ina pitiful state.

The war has also caused the countryto be divided de facto into differentterritories, further eroding what com-mercial, economic and physical linksthere once were. According toRefugees International, lack of accessdue to insecurity and poor infrastruc-ture makes the DRC the mostexpensive country in the world inwhich to deliver humanitarian aid2.

Hopes of a gradual improvement inthe situation have been raised by thesigning in April 2003 of a peaceagreement between the Kinshasa gov-ernment and the largest rebel groups.Efforts are under way to restore com-merce throughout the Congo andreopen commercial links. If peace ismaintained, this could lead eventuallyto the integration of Congo’s dis-parate regions, bringing benefits forlogistical operations.

Lack of teamwork

The increased frequency and magni-tude of emergencies throughoutAfrica, and particularly in the GreatLakes Region, have created a need foraid organisations to improve theirlogistics capability and capacity. Whilesome organisations have risen to thechallenge and are beginning to recog-nise the value of inter-agencycoordination and collaboration, othersstill tend to regard logistics as anunfortunate – though necessary –

expense rather than an importantcomponent of strategic management.

Many humanitarian organisationsappear to be at a similar stage in theirapproach to supply chain manage-ment as the commercial sector was inthe 1970s and 80s, when personnelengaged in logistics were underpaidand poorly trained. Many businesses,realising that significant financial sav-ings can be made through theimplementation of efficient controls,now take logistics very seriouslyindeed. In addition, the outsourcingof key tasks such as procurement toexperienced service providers oftenallows a company (or organisation) tofocus on its core expertise. Theseissues are just as salient for aidorganisations as they are for the sup-ply chain operations and skilledlogisticians of the commercial world.

Problems of inter-agency coordinationare often most evident in the initial,frantic stages of response to ahumanitarian emergency when aid

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Coordination in the Great Lakesby George Fenton

The Democratic Republicof the Congo (DRC) is oneof the most inhospitable,insecure and operationallycomplex countries of theworld in which to deliverhumanitarian relief.

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IDPs from Bunia build new shelters near the villageof Eringeti, Ituri province, DRC.

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agencies often fail to make the effort,or simply find it too difficult, to col-laborate effectively. In addition to thelogistical problems of coordination, itis a sad reality that all too often emer-gencies trigger a huge scrambleamong aid organisations for donormoney to support their own relief ini-tiatives. This is often to the detrimentof valuable coordination. Sometimeslittle attention is paid to what otheragencies are doing amid single-mind-ed approaches to maximise marketingopportunities.

Donors can perpetuate this problem,tending to distribute money tofavoured organisations, and are oftenguilty of failing to coordinate amongthemselves and with the wider aidcommunity. There appears to be aneed for donors to promote betteremergency preparedness and collabo-ration, not only among aid organis-ations but also among themselves.

Partly as a result of the failure withinaid organisations to address logisticalissues in a professional manner –their focus being more on humanit-arian need – rifts have sometimesdeveloped between logistics and pro-gramme management functions. Thishas led to a need within many organi-sations to find ways of ‘selling’ theimportance of logistics, ultimately toensure the success of humanitarianactivities. In addition, there appear tobe few established common standardsand systems – for relief supplies, forexample – and a very wide variety ofapproaches to the provision of logis-tics services. Unless action is taken torectify current logistical inefficiencies,improve coordination and ensuregood operating standards, aid organi-sations will continue to waste millionsof dollars.

Moves to improve coordination

Realising that better coordination isvital, some aid agencies are beginningto come together to find ways to poolresources, prevent operational overlapand boost efficiency. An EmergencyPreparedness and Response WorkingGroup has been formed for the EastAfrica and Great Lakes Regions: a firststep in improving practical collabora-tion and information exchange in keyareas between aid organisations at aregional level. The group, which cur-rently has 17 members comprisingNGOs, international organisations andUN agencies, was formed in Kenya in2002 under the auspices of the United

Nations Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHAwanted to encourage better inter-agency collaboration due to concernsover the many logistical constraintson humanitarian operations that existin central and eastern Africa.

Regional Logistics Managers fromWorld Vision International and theInternational Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies estab-lished the core group and jointly chairmeetings every two months. Fourtechnical sub-groups have been set upto discuss initiatives on emergencypreparedness logistics, humanresource development, joint responsecapacity and telecommunication tech-nologies. The aim of the group is todevelop joint solutions to some of themany practical difficulties all mem-bers face when providing humanit-arian aid, primarily to people withinthe East Africa and Great Lakesregions.

For example, the group is currentlyworking on:

■ developing innovative and poten-tially money-saving initiatives suchas the sharing of procurement ser-vices (joint supply/frameworkagreements) and the sharing oflogistics resources such as charterflights, personnel and contingencystocks. The InternationalFederation of the Red Cross andRed Crescent Society in Kenyarecently offered to loan some ofits emergency stocks of sheltermaterials to member agencies sothat they could respond quickly tothe DRC crisis.

■ establishing joint emergency pre-paredness and response trainingevents. In July, staff from severalmember organisations attended aseries of security managementcourses in Nairobi. Other joint

courses are planned, covering sub-jects such as disaster prepared-ness and logistics management.

■ improving the utilisation and com-patibility of key tried and testedlogistics systems. Some systemsused by, for example, commercialtransport companies have beenfound to be suitable for the man-agement of humanitarianoperations.

■ contributing to the development ofcommon standards (such as theSphere Project3) and specificationsfor emergency equipment. Canagencies agree to collectively pur-chase shelter materials that arebranded with multiple logos andprinted statements conforming tocertain relief standards?

The core working group has foundthat, although they meet primarily todiscuss and share technical informa-tion, perhaps the greatest valuecomes from personal and professionalcontact with a variety of colleagues.This brings greater knowledge of part-ner organisations and betterunderstanding of ways in whichorganisations, as well as donors, canbetter collaborate and coordinate dur-ing a crisis. The group’s greatest hopeis that their efforts should comple-ment existing structures and avoidthe need to constantly ‘reinvent thewheel’, leading to better, cheaper andmore efficient logistical operations.

George Fenton is LogisticsManager for World VisionInternational’s Global RapidResponse Team. Email: george_fenton@wvi.org

1. According to a recent report from theInternational Rescue Committee: ‘Mortality in theDRC – Results from a Nationwide Survey’, April2003: http://intranet.theirc.org/docs/drc_mortali-ty_iii_exec.pdf2. Refugee International ref: www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/ri/country?cc=000033. Sphere Project: www.sphereproject.org

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he operation had only limitedsuccess. Intent on vengeance,the rebels slipped back into

northern Uganda. Atrocities, attackson civilians and soldiers, abductionsand burning of houses ensued. As aresult, most of the population ofnorthern Uganda is now internallydisplaced, concentrated in ‘protectedvillages’ with extremely limited accessto food and water and entirely depen-dent on food distribution through theWorld Food Programme. In the depop-ulated countryside agriculturalproduction has ceased and marketshave closed. Movement of people andgoods is greatly restricted. People whooriginally grew some food to supple-ment WFP rations are now not able tosustain their livelihoods without helpfrom the international community.

Regardless of how the tragedyunfolds, IDPs are likely to remainextremely vulnerable and heavilydependent on food distribution forthe foreseeable future. If the insur-gency continues into 2004, IDPs willbe forced to remain in camps and theneed for food distribution will persist.Should security improve to the pointwhere IDPs can begin returning totheir former homes or resettle else-where, there will still be a tremendousneed for assistance due to the severityof disruption to agriculture. At leastone productive harvesting season willbe needed to improve the food securi-ty situation. It is likely that, during theinitial return phase, the majority ofthe population will still want to sleepin camps for security reasons. Most ofthe IDPs will still depend on foodreceived through WFP/NorwegianRefugee Council (NRC).

Distribution arrangements

Food is currently distributed to 700-800,000 persons located in about 60

IDP camps in the districts of Gulu,Kitgum and Pader. Funding is provid-ed by WFP and the NorwegianMinistry of Foreign Affairs. NRCcarries out General Food Distribution(GFD) as a WPF implementing partner.WFP is responsible for the procure-ment of food items and transport-ation to the extended delivery point,while NRC supervises transportationto the final delivery point as well asdistribution to the beneficiaries. NRCis responsible for the reception, stor-age, handling and distribution of WFPfood aid commodities.

WFP, NRC and a contracted transportcompany meet on a monthly basis todraw up the food distribution opera-tional plan. WFP provides the foodand determines rations based onanalysed household food securityassessments. NRC’s role in the trian-gular partnership entails:

■ provision of competent personnelfor GFD implementation

■ collection of (gender-disaggre-gated) data and assessments in theIDP camps to enable joint analysisand appropriate intervention withWFP

■ monthly reporting to NRC HQ andto WFP

■ carrying out mobilisation and sen-sitisation of beneficiaries and localcommunities – usually prior to dis-tribution but when security is badby the use of a loudspeaker on theday of distribution

■ hiring and training of volunteerswho assist in crowd control andGFD supervision

■ liaising with local administrationand camp managements to deter-mine who is entrusted withresponsibility for identifyinglegitimate beneficiaries.

For an operation which provides somuch for so many the logistical

structures in place are remarkablysimple. They consist of standardwarehousing procedures, labour-intensive loading of vehicles usinglocal labourers and locally hiredtransportation making optimum useof the limited number of locally avail-able freight vehicles.

Warehouse facilities have capacity tocope with the highest turnover offood predicted in a worst-case sce-nario. They also meet the basicstandards in terms of structure/infrastructure, damp control duringthe rainy season, security and loadingarea capacity.

In warehouses in the towns of Guluand Kitgum, sacks can be stackedfour metres high. Food is stacked byitem and chronologically in order toensure that the first delivered stocksof any one item are first to be deliv-ered to beneficiaries. This preventswastage of stocks that have reachedtheir expiry dates. Each stack is of astandard base size in order to simpli-fy the counting process. A simplestock card system is in place which isdone manually and later transferredto a computer database used fortracking and archival purposes. Astock card is held for each differentstack of food, with a central registeralso being updated to hold an overallpicture of stocks in place, their arrivaldate and exact location within thefacility. Due to the weakness of com-puter facilities and the potential for

Lean logistics: delivering food tonorthern Ugandan IDPs

by Margaret Vikki and Erling Bratheim

Uganda’s 17-year civil conflict entered a new phasein mid 2002 when the Ugandan army launchedOperation Iron Fist and entered southern Sudanwith the objective of finally wiping out the Lord’sResistance Army (LRA).

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WFP requires heavymilitary escort for itsfood aid convoys innorthern Uganda.

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software and hardware failure, thecomputerised aspects of the system(the central register of all items) arebacked up by the retention of paperrecords.

In order to guard against theft, thecompounds of both warehousing facil-ities are completely fenced off with asingle constantly guarded accesspoint. Within each compound, individ-ual warehouse buildings are keptpadlocked except for loading, unload-ing or stock checking. Daily checks ofall stored items are conducted toidentify any cases of interference ortheft of stocks. Constant attention isalso given to the protection of food-stuffs against contamination.Warehouses are kept immaculatelyclean and fumigated on a periodicbasis. Regular inspections are made toensure that entry points for insectsand small animals are blocked wher-ever possible.

Vehicles are supplied by a localfreight company which is responsiblefor recruitment and management ofdrivers. Vehicles are loaded slightlyunder their capacity in order to allowfor breakdown and redistribution ofstocks en route to the final distribu-tion point. Although this incurs aslight extra cost per delivery, therehave been substantial gains in opera-

tional effectiveness. Roads are in avery poor state and if vehicles breakdown the risks of looting are veryhigh. It is essential to maintain capaci-ty to redistribute loads when vehiclesare stranded in the countryside.

Security constraints

The security environment in northernUganda is particularly challenging.LRA fighters regularly ambush vehi-cles, using maximum brutality.Captured drivers are killed. Once loot-ed, vehicles are burned. Refugee andIDP camps are targeted in order tosteal food and personal possessionsand to abduct and forcibly recruitchildren. Both the LRA and the armyhave planted landmines. Staff officesand accommodation are at risk of rob-bery.

Given the dangers of any travel, WFPdemands military escorts for all fooddeliveries. Each convoy of trucks isaccompanied by two army vehiclesand around 70 armed soldiers.Drivers are taught convoy skills, tonote the presence of vehicles to thefront and rear and briefed to stay atleast 100 metres from the nearestarmy vehicle in case it runs over amine or is ambushed. In the event ofa mechanical breakdown drivers ofthe vehicle in front are instructed to

stop. In the event of an ambush thevehicle in front of the incident willdrive on while those behind will eitherturn around or reverse out of troubleas the situation dictates. In desperatesituations vehicles drive into the bushbefore their occupants disembark.

NRC is incorporated into the UN secu-rity system which operates a five tiersystem in which one is the lowest per-ceived threat level. Northern Ugandais currently rated at security levelfour, meaning that only essential staffshould be deployed and only opera-tions of an urgent nature conducted.Level five requires evacuation.

Delivering food

On an average day food is distributedto about 20,000 beneficiaries. Whensecurity permits, each camp is visitedonce a month. It is an important prin-ciple for NRC that once food isbrought to camp distribution pointsthe beneficiaries should take on asmuch responsibility as possible forthe actual distribution. They are thusinvolved in unloading sacks from thetrucks, scooping the food and ensur-ing orderly and controlled distribution.If the village social structure survivesintact within the camps then food isdistributed to the traditional villageleader who further distributes it to

27FMR 18 Lean logistics: delivering food to northern Ugandan IDPs

individual families. Otherwise it is thehead of family, often a woman, whoreceives the ration.

On several occasions distribution hashad to be stopped for weeks on end,leaving the IDPs with no assistance.WFP/NRC are engaged in regular dia-logue with the authorities to supply asufficient escort force for the convoysand, equally importantly after foodhas been distributed, a military pres-ence in the camps to deter rebelraiders from stealing it.

The amount of food distributed toeach family is done in accordancewith the number of members regis-tered on the cards of each head offamily. As the population fluctuates,both due to movements betweencamps and through arrival of newIDPs to the camps, it is a constantchallenge for the staff to ensure thatthose entitled to the rations are thosewho actually receive them. They mustalways try to be one step ahead of thebeneficiaries when it comes to identi-fying ingenious ways of getting extrarations by presentation of false identi-ties, bogus new family members andnon-registration of deaths.

Staff training is crucial to meetingthese challenges. Staff need to bemade aware of both the importance of

getting the right rations to the rightpeople but also of how to counter pres-sure and manipulation from groups orindividuals, many of them well-connected persons with authority.

Staff members are also under intensepressure to travel on convoys in verydifficult conditions. The security situ-ation is so dire that military escortscannot be dispensed with. At thesame time the presence of an escortof soldiers increases the risk of rebelattack, thus putting NRC staff atgreater risk. Only the dedication ofhighly qualified national staff makesit possible to carry out the workunder these extreme conditions.Management has to constantly consid-er when it is defensible to put staff atrisk and go to the camps and when itis necessary to stay put.

Under the present circumstances innorthern Uganda, the number of dis-placed persons is increasing and morethan half of the population is depen-dent on food assistance primarilyprovided by NRC. This puts a continu-ous pressure on the capacity and themanagement of the logistics necessaryto assist the population with the mostbasic needs.

Though the unpredictable securityconditions in northern Uganda have

posed a great challenge to the project,NRC has succeeded in delivering foodto the needy population most of thetime. Over the last year, however, thedeterioration of the security situationhas forced NRC to suspend distribu-tion to some of the beneficiaries forlong periods at a time. Furthermore,the movement of people back andforth between the camps and their vil-lages, as well as between camps,whenever the security situationallowed it, has made registration andidentification of beneficiaries moredifficult.

In this type of long-lasting conflict,the greatest challenge, however, lies intrying to counter the dependency ofthe population on food aid. NRC andother parties involved have very limit-ed possibilities to address issues suchas the loss of skills and people’s abili-ty to secure their own livelihood andbecome more self-reliant.

However smooth the logistics, andhowever satisfied we are that basicneeds are being met, there are ques-tions that should constantly troubleand challenge us in our role ashumanitarian actors:

■ What is the effect of long-term dis-tribution on the ongoing conflict?

■ Is there scope for NRC to combinefood distribution with peace and rec-onciliation initiatives to nudgeprotagonists in a positive direction?

■ Should we set a time limit to howlong even a successful operationshould be allowed to continue if thepolitical situation remainsunchanged and prospects for peaceremain elusive?

Margaret Vikki is DistributionAdvisor in the Norwegian RefugeeCouncil’s Strategy andDevelopment Department. Email: margaret.vikki@nrc.no

Erling Bratheim is ProjectManager, Food Distribution,NRC Uganda. Email: nrcpro@africaonline.co.ug

For further information on displacement in Ugandasee the recently updated country profile from theGlobal IDP Project at www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Uganda

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n the six countries of theSouthern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) –

Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia,Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland – ajigsaw of accumulative factors was tobring about a heightened crisis: thevolatile mix of drought, floods, dis-ruptions to commercial farming, theabsence of effective food security andgovernance policies, depletion ofstrategic grain reserves, poor econom-ic performance, foreign exchangeshortages and delays in the timelyimportation of maize. The sub-regionhas the worst HIV/AIDS prevalencerates in the world – a major contribut-ing factor towards household foodinsecurity that will have long-termdevelopment implications.

One might have expected a fairlystraightforward response to the crisisgiven that (a) the 1992 food crisis hadprovided useful lessons and helpedbuild early warning capacities in theregion; (b) the regional infrastructurewas relatively robust – good roads,rail and port facilities; and (c) in spiteof political obstacles, significantamounts of surplus maize were stillbeing grown and governments gaveearly indications that they would meetdomestic shortfalls through commer-cial imports and subsidies. Fulladvantage was taken of the strengthof the commercial sector in southernAfrica. The World Food Programme(WFP), by far the largest food aiddelivery agent, was able to outsourcethe handling at the ports and manage-ment of rail transport in South Africa,transhipment points and warehouses.

What was not foreseen, however, wasthe series of extraordinary events sur-rounding the GMO (GeneticallyModified Organisms) issue. It is thisissue in particular that is examined

here, for it was to have both positiveand negative consequences for therelief operation, with a steep learningcurve for those agencies adaptingtheir approaches to unfolding events.

Attitudes towards GM

In mid-July 2002, UN agencieslaunched a special appeal forSouthern Africa – OCHA’s ‘RegionalHumanitarian Assistance Strategy’ –requesting some US$611 million ofwhich 90% comprised food aid. WFPled inter-agency coordination, infor-mation exchange and advocacy asWFP’s Executive Director served as theUN Secretary-General’s Special Envoyfor Humanitarian Needs in SouthernAfrica. The WFP appeal alone initiallyinvolved the provision of 992,459tons of food over nine months,with some additional tens ofthousands of tons to comethrough NGOs.

As with most large-scale food inter-ventions, the US Department ofAgriculture (USDA) was to provide themajority of in-kind contributions inthe form of whole maize. What theyhad not anticipated was the rejectionof this food aid by some governmentsbecause it was genetically modified. Itwas difficult to distinguish politicalmanipulation and obfuscation fromgenuine environmental, health andeconomic concerns. There were politi-cal interests on both sides of thedebate. The USDA clearly did not wantto create a precedent for governmentsto reject its food surplus exports asaid. WFP’s official policy is essentiallyone of neutrality, stating that theacceptance or rejection of any suchfood donations is the prerogative ofthe recipient government. A UN jointstatement of 27 August2002 on the use ofGM foods in southernAfrica went furtherby indicating thatno scientificevidence isyet avail-

able to

Food aid logistics and thesouthern Africa emergency

by Jon Bennett

The recent protracted crisis in southern Africastretched the ingenuity and capacity of theinternational community.

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suggest a risk to human health fromGM foods. On the issue of potentialspillage and cross-fertilisation, thestatement leaves this to the judge-ment of recipient countries.

Though initially in favour of acceptingGMOs, Zambia began to take a morehard-line attitude in 2002 just as theinternational community was gearingup for a major food aid intervention.By mid-August it had banned allimports of GM products, includingthose on the high seas already com-mitted to the aid operation. WFP andother major donors were required towithdraw all existing stocks from thecountry at considerable cost. Thisincluded food destined for the130,000 Angolan refugees in camps(though the government would acceptmilled maize for these people).Meanwhile, Kenya and Tanzaniaoffered ‘natural’ maize to offset anyfurther deficit once Zambia had pur-chased 300,000 tons from SouthAfrica.

The Zambian decision had somethingof a domino effect. Bureaucraticdelays and procrastination meant thatquite significant amounts of GMmaize had already been distributed inall countries but by December 2002the following positions were con-firmed:■ Zimbabwe banned all GM maize

grain (unmilled) but was willing toaccept some quantities for millingin Bulawayo prior to distribution(milled maize has neither re-planti-ng/cross-fertilisation risks, nor therisk of consumption by cattle1, butobviously still does not addresspotential human health risks).

■ Mozambique banned grain butaccepted in-country milling, pro-vided extra funds were madeavailable to meet this cost.

■ Lesotho and Malawi in theory didnot accept grain but existing andin-transit supplies were accepted.

■ Swaziland was the only SADCcountry to accept GM maize.

Implications for logisticaloperations

i. Shipments and milling requirements

The immediate consequence of thecrisis was a disruption of aid suppliesto vulnerable populations for at leasta month. Large shipments of GM

maize were stranded at the ports ofentry; if these were in areas of highhumidity, milling problems andwastage occurred later. WFP had tomake immediate arrangements to milllarge quantities of GM maize in SouthAfrica. Previously mothballed millswere re-opened but owners insistedon some kind of guarantee of forth-coming quantities, always difficult inan internationalappeal with a stag-gered response.Milling extraction inSouth Africa (wherethe majority wasdone) involves 25% reduction in thetotal cereal available for distributionfrom this source, since the offtakeand some of the maize meal are takenas payment. Finally, the additionalhandling, superintendence, tallyingand transport costs required to moveGM maize and resultant maize meal inand out of mills further increasedalready high overland costs incurredby aid organisations.

ii. Local purchases

Two positive results came from theneed to mill GM maize. It gave WFP anunexpected opportunity to fortify themaize meal at the mills, so meetingmicro-nutrient needs of many benefi-ciaries in the region. Perhaps mostimportantly, it triggered the largestlocal and regional procurement offood in WFP’s history, using cash thatnormally would not have beenacquired for an operation of this size.Local purchases have the immediateadvantage of timeliness and a stimu-lus to local markets – no long wait forport dispatches, and an increased useof local suppliers and transporters.

Much of the food was procured inSouth Africa. Compared to the previ-ous 12-18 months, maize pricesalmost doubled in South Africa inNovember-December 2002, presum-ably influenced by expectations ofhigh demand in neighbouring coun-tries due to crop shortfalls. Thedepreciation of the rand against thedollar also became a key factorbehind price rises since maize isbought in dollars. Although for itspart, WFP usually bought in small lotsas a deliberate policy to avoidadversely affecting the market, maizeprices nevertheless rose to $195/ton.This, and pipeline delays on interna-

tional deliveries, meant that planneddistributions were not alwaysachieved. Ideally, WFP would like topurchase less expensive maize fromcountries such as China rather thanregionally produced white maize soldat premium rates but limited and lateavailability of funds meant this wasnot possible in the given timescale.

iii. Widening of donor base

WFP paid for over 45% (332,000 tons)of its food commodities in the south-ern Africa region (as opposed toin-kind contributions, primarily fromthe US, that in many emergencies else-where in the world would haveaccounted for as much as 70% of com-modities). An unusual array ofnon-traditional donors was found –more than 40, including from devel-oping countries.

In a recent book Edward Clay haspointed to the gradual erosion of themultilateral character of WFP2 as onedonor in particular (the US) dominatesthe global food aid arena. Could thesouthern Africa emergency have beena turning point? Perhaps, though notwithout a cost: with cash donations,many new donors do not provide thesame generous overheads per ton ofpurchased food as the US in-kind foodallows. Also, economies of scale –precisely the strength of WFP – maybe compromised by having a largenumber of small and dispersed mar-kets to deal with. There can be severalmonths between the confirmation of apledge, the release of money and thepurchase and delivery of food. In thisoperation distribution targets werebelow 50% in most countries for thefirst five months.

Lessons and questions

The response to the GMO crisis wasgreatly facilitated by the early settingup of an impressive regional manage-ment and logistics centre in the WFPregional office in Johannesburg. Itincluded a web-based information sys-tem (ReLogS – ‘Regional Logistics –Southern Africa’) that was updateddaily with pipeline information,

FMR 18 Food aid logistics and the southern Africa emergency

it triggered the largest local and regionalprocurement of food in WFP’s history

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country-specific situation reports,port operation and other relevantlogistics and programme information.Much appreciated by all stakeholders,this brought a welcome degree of cohe-sion into a complicated operation.

One clear lesson was the need todevelop a more reliable and compre-hensive way of assessing the ‘foodgap’. Currently, the UN Food andAgriculture Organisation (FAO) andWFP do joint Crop and Food SupplyAssessment Missions (CFSAM).CFSAMs were undertaken in all coun-tries in May/June 2002. They arebased on four sets of data: (a) project-ed national production of key crops;(b) what percentage of these will beconsumed or exported; (c) commercialimports; and (d) levels of governmentfood aid from existing stock (forexample, grain held in reserve by theGrain Marketing Boards).

The resulting deficit becomes a guide-line for quantities of food aid requiredfrom external sources or purchasedregionally. All national figures on pro-duction, consumption, importationand government aid rely upon accu-rate forecasts by governmentministries. This has two basic weak-nesses: first, the capacity of someMinistries of Agriculture has declinedin recent years; and second, there canbe important differences betweennational macro figures and provin-cial/local differences that are oftennot reflected in the balance sheets ofthe CFSAM.

Apart from deficiencies in governmentdata, there were also some shortcom-ings in the way internationallysupported early warning systems pro-duced forecasts in 2002. In Malawi, forinstance, there was a wrong assump-tion that the household consumptionof locally produced roots and tuberswould compensate for cereal deficits.This did not happen on the scale pre-dicted, so the overall balance sheetforecasts were underestimated.Interestingly, it can also work theother way: in Lesotho in July 2003,there were reports of beneficiaries notturning up to food aid distributionssince in some areas their harvest hadbeen better than predicted. The dominance of the food aid opera-tion and the projected needs foreseenby the unique VulnerabilityAssessment Committees (VACs)3 set

up in each country may have over-shadowed more fundamentalquestions. In Zimbabwe logisticiansfaced problems of inflation, fuelshortages and restrictions on hardcurrency that worked against thesmooth running of an operation ofthis scale. Some governments, notablyZimbabwe, were only too happy toaccept the mantle of ‘drought emer-gency’ to divert attention from seriousgovernance, economic and policy fail-ures. In Malawi donors were subduedby the extraordinary sale of most ofthe Strategic Grain Reserve in late2001 – a combination of ill-conceivedIMF advice and domestic corruption.4

And still today little is known of theextent of informal cross-border tradethat would have cast a different lighton the grain import/export balancesheets that determined exactly whatthe food ‘gap’ was.

Conclusion

Southern Africa faces a protractedchronic and structural challenge.Declining development indices com-bined with the HIV/AIDS ‘permanentemergency’ mean that short-term foodaid has a limited impact. The GMOcrisis and the unusually large regionalpurchases it prompted have high-lighted the need for:

■ the larger international agencies todevelop a new set of analyticalskills to better understand boththe economic variables that deter-mine grain supply and demand,particularly in the informal mar-ket, and the decisions that farmersmake over whether to sell or retaintheir produce

■ understanding the effects of illegalcross border trade in state-domi-nated markets such as Zimbabwe

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■ greater inter-agency knowledgesharing on the potential adverseeffect that aid demands have ongrain prices and the commercialtransport sector

■ close liaison between high leveladvocates such as the SpecialEnvoy, whose role it is to negotiategovernment concessions over suchthings as import duties and bordercontrols, and those logisticianswho face day-to-day difficultiestranslating these policies intopractice with sometimes unhelpfullocal authorities.

The lessons from the emergency, thegreater emphasis given to livelihoodsapproaches and the attendant pro-gramme adaptations already underway should ensure more sus-tained attention in future to problemsfacing the region.

Jon Bennett is Director of OxfordDevelopment Consultants andrecently led a ‘real-time’ evalua-tion of the emergency response insouthern Africa.Email: jon.bennett@dsl.pipex.com

1. This was only a perceived risk, since the EU – amajor importer of dairy and meat products fromsouthern Africa – declared that cattle that con-sumed US maize would still be acceptable. 2. Edward Clay, ‘Responding to Change: WFP andthe Global Food Aid System’ in Food Policy Old andNew, edited by Simon Maxwell and Rachel Slater,Development Policy Review 21 (5), OverseasDevelopment Institute, London (forthcoming).

3. See text box below.

4. See ‘Structural damage: the causes and conse-quences of Malawi’s food crisis’, WorldDevelopment Movement, October 2002,www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/debt/Malawi%20Final.pdf

FMR 18 Food aid logistics and the southern Africa emergency

Vulnerability assessment

SADC member countries established the Vulnerability Assessment Committee

(VAC) in 1999 with a regional office in Harare. During the 2002/3 regional

emergency, its resources and staff were boosted by the secondment of UN

staff, involvement of NGO partners and additional financial support from

USAID, DFID and the WFP Regional Emergency Operation.

The VAC keeps abreast of and encourages coordinated development in the

field of vulnerability and livelihoods assessment in the SADC region. It col-

lates and coordinates data from existing sources and supplements these with

additional information derived from on-site periodical surveys. In each coun-

try, a national VAC comprises government and partner agencies, with field teams drawn from relevant government

departments, NGOs and some UN staff. Advice on methodology and training is provided by the regional VAC team based

in Harare, which is also responsible for data collation, analysis and publication.

Throughout the emergency, ‘rolling assessments’ were undertaken to regularly gauge needs on the ground in order to

prioritise districts according to food aid needs (and rations) and to derive a national level food assistance total (indicat-

ing how long the requirement will stand before the situation may change again). VACs are supplementary to the

FAO/WFP Crop and Food Assessment Missions (CFSAMs) in that they provide sub-national food aid targeting require-

ments, including a breakdown of socio-economic groups and special needs targeting (such as HIV/AIDS and orphaned

children).

Translating the VAC updates on targeting priorities and overall food aid requirements into programme action has pre-

sented a challenge. Limitations in NGOs’ capacities as well as differing priorities of village/district committees and

redistributions at village level make quick adjustments to a revised needs analysis difficult.

There was initially a hope that the VAC methodology might be adapted to move from ‘needs assessment’ towards an

impact analysis of the emergency response. In the event, although it was possible in 2003 to include a few questions

that would help understand the effects of the emergency response, the VAC was not actually an appropriate vehicle for

impact assessment. By April, there was already a broadening of the assessments to include HIV/AIDS food security link-

ages but further expansion may have reduced the quality of the data and overstretched the capacity of the VACs.

Maintaining the high level of inter-agency consensus on VAC findings will depend on continuing investment and govern-ment commitment. There is a risk that too many expectations will be made of the VAC.

For more information, see: www.sadc-fanr.org.zw/vac/vachome.htm

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s the humanitarian role of thearmed forces has evolved, dis-cussion has focused around

three separate categories: militarysupport to emergency or disasterrelief efforts, the problematic notionof humanitarian intervention and theprovision of humanitarian assistanceduring combat operations. The firstcategory is the least contentious anddescribes recent British experiencesin places like Mozambique andMontserrat. In these types of humani-tarian disaster relief operations, theUK military acts as a sub-contractor tothe wider foreign relief effort throughthe Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID). The military isdeployed for a specific task within apermissive environment which allowsus to adopt a benign force posture.

During the past two years we haveworked with DFID to develop a plan-ning process framework which can beadapted for the particular circum-stances of natural or man-madedisasters. This process involves dia-logue between the stricken state, theBritish Embassy or High Commissionstaff (who conduct an assessment ofthe disaster), DFID’s Conflict andHumanitarian Affairs Department(CHAD), the Ministry of Defence(MOD) and British Forces HQ staffresponsible for deploying the troopsrequired to conduct the operation.Key planning considerations include:

■ the ability to deploy quickly oncethe decision has been taken tosupport the international reliefeffort

■ multifunctional coordination withsuch other actors as the UN, theInternational Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement and otherNGOs

■ sensitivity in conveying casualtyinformation and disseminatingcoherent messages to the media

■ a coherent exit strategy to avoidpremature withdrawal or, just asundesirable, over-dependency onthe military

■ the amount and availability of hostnation support which will affectthe size and make-up of thedeployed force.

These planning considerations andcharacteristics have now been consoli-dated in an unclassified pamphletpublished by the Joint Doctrine andConcepts Centre (JDCC)1. Althoughprimarily aimed at a military reader-ship, it may be useful for civiliansinvolved in humanitarian operationsand is available free of charge.2

Humanitarian interventions

The use of force for humanitarianintervention is, for many people, con-tentious both from a legal and moralperspective.3 Much has been writtenon this subject and countless semi-nars have been held since theperceived failures of the internationalcommunity to prevent genocides inRwanda and Srebrenica in the mid-nineties. From the military perspective,we fully acknowledge the need forcivilian control of armed forces andthe important role of the UN in pro-viding legitimacy for our actions but,nevertheless, also recognise that wework to a different ethical principlefrom the humanitarian community.Using medical terminology, our funda-mental position is based onbeneficence, encapsulated by the term‘force for good’. However, this cancause tensions when we work withsome NGOs, especially those foundedon the basis of non-maleficence, or‘do no harm’. For military personnel,the conviction that our purpose ismorally and ethically sound has adirect bearing on good morale and isencapsulated in our capstone militarypublications.

Whatever the philosophical differ-ences, we agree that the military muststick to the rule of law. In 2002 theGeneral Officer Commanding,Northern Ireland, described the rea-sons why this is so important to us,including: "common humanity"; "prac-ticality" or what he called "the law ofunintended long-term consequences";the standards applied in the contem-porary operational environment by"organisations and bodies prowlingthe touch line watching for everyinfringement of the rules"; and "a mat-ter of history". In this last respect, the

effect of the way we work on futuregenerations of military personnel iscrucially important. None of us wishesto be held up by journalists or humanrights bodies as pariahs. Nor do wewish to land in court facing lawyersseeking compensation for their clientsor to be held responsible for theunnecessary death of innocents.However, from an individual perspec-tive, the most important reason is thefirst: for, as the GOC said, "remorse isno doubt an uncomfortable compan-ion as one passes through life…"4.

Humanitarian assistance

As far as provision of humanitarianassistance in a less benign environ-ment is concerned, the militaryrecognises that the provision of reliefis principally a function of humanitar-ian and development agencies.However, there may be circumstances,especially during combat, when theseagencies are unable to deliver aid orwhere there may be a shortfall. Thiswas the case during my first tour toBosnia, when all but one of the aidagencies withdrew from my tacticalarea of operations due to the deterio-rating security situation. As a result,there was a need to fill the gap forabout six weeks and my unit wasdrawn into humanitarian assistancetasks in order to save lives. Othermore recent examples include: themilitary organisation of refugeecamps during the Kosovo crisis, theresponse to the earthquake inAfghanistan in 2002 and the BritishArmy’s work to destroy anti-personnelland mines in Sierra Leone and else-where.

While there is no such thing as a stan-dard operation, the key tenets coveredin our Humanitarian/Disaster ReliefOperations pamphlet are likely to beapplicable. We suggest that militaryforces engaged in such activitiesshould, whenever possible, takeadvice and overall direction from acoordinating civilian authority orhumanitarian agency and should handover responsibility for the humanitari-an task at the earliest opportunity.When the international community

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The humanitarian use of themilitary by Rupert Wieloch

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decides to take action, there is a needfor integrated joint operations whichprovide mechanisms for all the civil-ian and military actors in complexgeopolitical environments to tacklethe underlying causes of conflict.

British Forces have a great deal ofexperience of peace support opera-tions. We have learned that a widerange of actors is involved and thatwe, the military, cannot act in isola-tion. The UK military approachemphasises the need for a compre-hensive campaign plan, whichidentifies the means of achieving thedesired effect or acceptable steadystate agreed by the international com-munity. Such a plan requires action toenforce the rule of law (via function-ing judiciary and civilian police),revive education, encourage restora-tion of commerce and reconstruction,disseminate information and promotegood governance. These activity linesshould move forward together. It canbe counter-productive if one speedsahead at the expense of the others asthis may be exploited by those whoresort to violence and by oppor-tunists, who profit from insecurity.

CIMIC

A key enabler to facilitate missionsuccess is Civil Military Cooperation,which we see as a process rather thanan activity. Through formal and infor-mal mechanisms, CIMIC provides anopportunity for civilian organisationsto raise the awareness of military per-sonnel responsible for delivering thesecure conditions required for individ-uals to pursue their own goals and forordinary day-to-day business to beconducted safely. Much progress hasbeen made in recent years. In conjunc-tion with DFID, we have assisted theUN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and theEuropean Commission HumanitarianAid Office (ECHO) to develop therecently published Guidelines On TheUse Of Military And Civil DefenceAssets To Support UN HumanitarianActivities In Complex Emergencies(‘MCDA Guidelines’).5 The UK Ministryof Defence has published its firstCIMIC policy and we are developing anew capability to be called the JointCIMIC Group which will take accountof lessons identified from Afghanistanand other theatres of war. This will

take forward the task of providing aninterface for dialogue on operationsfor what we call ‘Minimum BarrierPeople’, the high calibre people whocan operate in a complex, multidisci-plinary environment, making thingshappen in the absence of strategicdirection.

In conclusion, NGOs who still denythat troops can do anything humani-tarian at all are in danger ofperpetuating ill-informed and out-of-date opinions. There have been majordevelopments in the way the UK mili-tary approaches its deployments sincethe Strategic Defence Review of 1998.In the light of our recent operations,and with the assistance of a widerange of contributors, we have refinedour thinking about the humanitarianuse of the armed forces. We are work-ing now towards a wider understand-ing of the issues and concerns sur-rounding this role so that we will bebetter prepared for the next time weare required to undertake this sort ofmission, wherever that may be.

Rupert Wieloch has spent 25 yearsin the British Army. He was aspokesperson for the Army Boardin the UK during the Kosovo, EastTimor and Sierra Leone interven-tions. Lieutenant-Colonel Wielochrecently left the Joint Doctrineand Concepts Centre, where hewas a strategic advisor, and isnow Chief Press InformationOfficer, NATO Stabilisation Forcein Bosnia and Herzegovina. Email: rupert.wieloch@sfor.nato.int

This article is extracted from a talk given to theWyndham Place Charlemagne Trust (www.wpct.co.uk),a UK-based society bringing together people of dif-ferent cultural, political and religious backgroundsto address European and world issues.

1. A UK Ministry of Defence think-tank establishedas part of the UK’s Strategic Defence Review.2. ‘Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations’,available free of charge from DSDC(L) 3d, DefenceStorage and Distribution Centre, Mwrwg Road,Llangennech, Carms, South Wales SA14 8YP, UK.Tel: +44 (0)1544 822347. Fax: +44 (0)1544 822515.3. It should be noted that the expression ‘humani-tarian intervention’ is not used in British militarydoctrine and the notion never stemmed from themilitary but from publications such as HardChoices: Moral Dilemmas in HumanitarianIntervention, published under the auspices of theICRC in 1998. 4. Address by the General Officer Commanding,Northern Ireland to the Royal United ServicesInstitute conference on ‘Morality in AsymmetricWar and Intervention Operations’, 20 September2002.5. See: www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/UNID/6005B9C845DDBD0DC1256D520029ED39

FMR 18 The humanitarian use of the military

Humanitarian distribution in Basra, Iraq

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uring an emergency, logisticsdepartments have the primarymission to procure and track

food, non-food items and gifts-in-kind(solicited and unsolicited) from appealthrough to delivery while simultane-ously monitoring the commodity andfinancial information along the reliefpipeline. Timely and accurate avail-ability of information is key. Aneffective operation depends on theemergency manager being aware ofthe changing needs of the field andcommunicating these to donors.Despite being the conduit connectingdonors to beneficiaries, logisticiansare seldom active participants in theacquisition and implementation of ITsolutions pertaining to relief opera-tions.

The relief technologylandscape

The way information technology isused varies widely among humanitari-an relief organisations. Thetechnology landscape in the humani-tarian sector is often extremelyfragmented, limiting the availability oftimely and accurate information.Organisations either buy large off-the-shelf commercial packages that needextensive customisation or createsmall in-house solutions for each fieldlocation. In the former instance, thedynamic variables and context ofrelief are not captured. Customisationto address this problem is very expen-sive and inhibits absorption of routineupgrades. Attempts to scale up home-grown solutions are rarely effectiveand are often dependent on the tran-sient expertise of the organisation’sIT staff.

Despite large investments by organisa-tions, origin to destinationinformation about the money, foodand non-food supplies and gifts-in-kind is not readily available todecision makers in real time. Inaddition, manual, non-standardised,error-prone processes still dominate.

IT resources which could enhanceinformation availability, reporting andlearning are often not put to best use.Some of the deficiencies of currentrelief information systems include:

■ Data has to be written out ontomultiple forms and keyed intomultiple spreadsheets.

■ Budget control is inadequate;funds may be misspent as a result.

■ Usage of funds is not tracked tothe extent that donors haverequested.

■ Procurement procedures are diffi-cult to enforce; integrity is lacking.

■ Tracking and tracing of shipmentsare done manually using spread-sheets.

■ There is no central database of his-tory on prices paid, transit timesor quantities received/purchased.

■ Reports are done manually.Therefore, little reporting and per-formance analysis is undertaken,other than reporting to donors onquantities of relief items deliveredfor a given operation.

Harnessing technology

Humanitarian relief organisationshave a common need for integratedinformation systems that are com-plete, timely and transparent. Theyshould act as a repository for infor-mation from operations and integratewith other systems such as financeand human resources. In such a sce-nario decision makers would haveaccess to valuable information before,during and after a relief operation. A snapshot of the possibilities is pro-vided opposite:

New information technologies enablemodular design to connect existingsystems and introduce new ones toprovide visibility and informationabout the entire relief supply chain.

Humanitarian LogisticsSoftware

Fritz Institute has used the latesttechnologies and partnered with logis-ticians to build an origin to destinationtracking system, especially designedfor the dynamic relief context. It isbased on commercial best practicesand adapted to humanitarian require-ments through extensive researchwith many leading relief organisa-tions. Currently implemented at theInternational Federation of the RedCross and Red Crescent Societies, theHumanitarian Logistics Software (HLS)is being made available free of chargeto other humanitarian relief organisa-tions. Its modularity allows it to beused as a framework tool which canincorporate current systems thatunderlie the relief supply chain andfill the functional gaps that may exist.

Humanitarian Logistics Software con-sists of four main modules:mobilisation, procurement, trans-portation and tracking, and reports.It connects to financial systems toprovide real-time visibility for costs,purchases and in-kind donations inthe relief pipeline. Information onceentered populates all relevant mod-ules.

The mobilisation module simultane-ously tracks the needs of thebeneficiaries and agency fundingappeals, reconciling them with dona-tions. The procurement modulecontrols purchase orders, performscompetitive bid analysis and recon-ciles received goods against invoicesawaiting payment. The transportationand tracking module allows consolida-tion of supplies for transportationand allows the automatic tracking ofmajor milestones in this process. Overtime, the procurement and transporta-tion modules become a repository forinformation about the performance ofsuppliers and transportation vendors.Finally, the reporting module providesdetailed standard and customisedreports for donors as well as internaldecision makers.

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Marrying logistics and technologyfor effective relief by H Wally Lee and Marc Zbinden

Logistics links all the stakeholders in the reliefdelivery process.

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Conclusion

More comprehensive and timely infor-mation provision can enhance theeffectiveness of decisions madebefore, during and after a relief opera-tion. However, to realise thispotential, humanitarian organisationsmust develop forward-looking inte-grated information technologystrategies which incorporate the valu-able perspective of the logisticsfunction. HLS may be a first step. It isonly though collaboration acrossfunctions and organisations that thereal potential of information can beharnessed for humanitarian relief.

H Wally Lee is Chief TechnologyOfficer for the Fritz Institute.Email: wally.lee@fritzinstitute.org.

Marc Zbinden is Fritz Institute’sLogistics Programme Manager.Email: marc.zbinden@fritzinsti-tute.org.

For further information about HumanitarianLogistics Software see: www.fritzinstitute.org

1. The conclusions of this article are based onresearch into the technology underlying the reliefsupply chains of ten major humanitarian agencies:American Red Cross, CARE USA, Catholic Relief

Services, International Committee of the RedCross, International Federation of the Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies, International RescueCommittee, Médecins San Frontières- Belgium,WFP, UNICEF and World Vision International.

FMR 18 Marrying logistics and technology for effective relief

n order to better serve thoseaffected by conflict and disasters,there is a real need among aid

agencies to better understand theirlocations, numbers and needs.Geographic Information Systems (GIS)are computer mapping software sys-tems. Currently they are being usedby relief and development agencies toimprove decision making and assist inthe presentation of information relat-ing to public health, epidemiology andhumanitarian aid. To be most effec-tive, maps must be:

■ Timely: Maps should be availablefor use the moment a missionstarts, so it may be worth a visit toyour local bookshop to try andfind paper maps relevant to thearea you will be working in. GISfile formats can be updated withinformation as the situationunfolds. The presentation of suchmaps at sectoral coordinationmeetings can have an electrifyingeffect on understanding: mapsspeak louder than words.

■ Simple: Maps that contain morethan eight colours are too compli-cated. The scale needs to be

appropriate to the situation, forexample 1:10,000 for refugeecamps and 1:100,000 for townsand surrounding villages. A provenidea is to draw a freehand mapthat contains the style and form ofthe desired map but not yet thecontent. Once this objective map isobtained the team can work back-wards in terms of designingquestions and data collectionstrategies.

■ Accurate: Information on benefi-ciary needs that goes into maps ismostly numerical; therefore thequestions to obtain this informa-tion need to be very carefullythought through. Systematic sur-vey technique is important.

■ Culturally sensitive: Radios, satphones, vehicles and, indeed, mapsmay be treated with suspicion bylocal governmental authorities inconflict zones. The best wayaround this is to request a govern-ment person to be seconded on afixed term contract to work withthe mapping team. This will helpdispel suspicion and enhancecapacity building.

■ Relevant: Given the advent of GIS,maps may now be rapidly generat-ed and updated, within the abovecriteria. Placed upon a basicground layer, overlays may includeinformation such as populationnumbers, shelter, agriculture, hos-pitals, water and mass graves.

■ Planned and trained for inadvance: The manufacturers ofGIS have donated their softwarefor free to aid agencies but learn-ing to use a GIS package is likelearning a new language: a basicunderstanding is achievable in afew months but real understandingmay take years. If you can, findsome volunteers in industry orgovernment already using GIS andask if they will work within yourorganisation and help providetraining.

Rupert Douglas-Bate isDevelopment Director of AidFor Aid, a UK charity: www.aid-foraid.org.uk. Email: rdouglasbate@aidforaid.org.uk

A longer version of this article was originally pub-lished in Aid Workers Exchange: seewww.aidworkers.net/exchange/20030514.html

Preparedness During operations Post-operations

■ Historical profile ofdisaster types withgeographic informa-tion to predictbeneficiary needsmore accurately.

■ Past performance ofsuppliers, logisticsproviders anddonors to plan effec-tive and reliablerelief.

■ Market price andhistorical price byregion to preparecontingency stock.

■ Reconciliation ofquantities neededand quantities sup-plied to accuratelyadapt to the reliefsituation.

■ Tracking costs ofeach operation tocalibrate againstincoming donations.

■ Visibility of stock enroute and stored inwarehouses to deter-mine procurementneeds.

■ Accountability ofdonations (use andadministrative costs)to maintain integrityof relationship withdonors.

■ Performance ofrelief operations i.e.time from appeal todelivery.

■ Loss and damage foraccountability andclaims.

Humanitarian mappingby Rupert Douglas-Bate

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Complex emergency – complexfinance? by Guy Hovey and Diana Landsman

nterventions require speed andflexibility. It is in this context thatfinance and accountability often

become early casualties.

Emphasis is quite rightly put onimmediate assistance to displacedpersons and other disadvantaged peo-ple. However, financial andaccountability procedures are oftenoverlooked. This can lead to fundsand aid going missing with a corre-sponding loss of confidence in theNGO on the part of beneficiaries andeventually on the part of the donorcommunity. In the long run it cancause donors and governments to re-evaluate their funding strategytowards NGOs. A good example ofthis would be the hundreds of mil-lions of US$ which have gone missingin Bosnia/Herzegovina since 1993.1

However, it is both possible and prac-tical to incorporate simple yeteffective financial accountability mea-sures. A complex emergency does notneed to entail a complex financial pro-cedure.

We recommend a three-stage financialentry strategy in complex emergenciesand the phases following the initialcrisis. Each stage is designed to pro-vide the minimum accountability andtransparency requirements, whilsttaking into consideration the over-arching need to render immediateassistance to those who need it.

1. Emergency phase

a. Cash handling and disbursementInevitably, large amounts of procure-ment will be undertaken. While somewill be done in a neighbouring coun-try where banking systems mayoperate reliably, provision must bemade to procure in country via cashtransactions. The safe transportationof cash will be found in any NGOsecurity manual so will not be dealtwith here. However, the payment ofcash is often where NGOs run into

difficulties, in particular proving whatwas purchased how, when, where andfor how much. To pay cash for goodsrequires receipts and each team mem-ber should be issued with a receiptbook. All receipts should be counter-signed by the team leader or a teamwitness.

b. Basic accounting ledgerA basic ledger showing cash in hand,cash out and in, with vendor details,will, when combined with the receipts,provide enough information for HQfinance staff to process. This will pro-vide an accountability and audit trailduring the following months whenset-up staff have left and it may bedifficult to explain the need to makeemergency purchases to an auditorunfamiliar with the vagaries ofhumanitarian emergencies.

c. Insert emergency finance staffIt is often not feasible to send a dedi-cated finance person into anemergency situation. However, at leastone of the emergency team shouldhave enough basic accountancy train-ing to be the point of financialcontact. They should also be able toundertake a financial assessment ofthe banking and financial systems ofthe country where the NGO is opera-tional as well as operating a simpleledger system.

d. Support from NGO HQIt is important for HQ staff to under-stand that emergency staff working ina complex emergency will, in all prob-ability, not be able to generate thecomplex financial reports required bydonors. HQ should therefore be will-ing and able to generate these reportsfor the field during the emergencyand part of the transitional phase. Itis at this point that many NGOs devel-op poor reputations with donors asthe needs of the emergency, the finan-cial ability of the staff dealing with itand the needs of donors collide.

2. Transitional phase

As the emergency phase gives way toa more secure environment and regu-lar programme implementation, it isrecommended that at the earliestopportunity a dedicated head offinance and appropriate staff arrive toprovide administrative and financialback up. With the arrival of thesestaff, the emergency staff will be ableto hand over the simple ledger and itcan be upgraded to an appropriateaccounting system such as anaccounting and sales support package(ACPAC) run by trained and qualifiedstaff.

3. Operational phase

As the operation becomes entrenched,all financial responsibility at fieldlevel currently being undertaken byHQ staff can be transferred to thefield finance department. However, itis important to try and maintain somecontinuity of staff from the emer-gency phase as financial reportingquestions will arise and lack of insti-tutional knowledge has led in the pastto confusion in financial reporting.

This is a very brief overview of ourrecommendations from our complexemergency experiences. Each organi-sation will have its own ideas as tohow best to cope with the problemsposed in an emergency interventionand how to balance the programmeneeds and the financial accountabilityneeds. Without adhering to somebasic principles, however, problemswill continue to occur with the resul-tant drop in donor and clientconfidence which has at times becomean all too familiar NGO problem.

Guy Hovey is the Head of Missionand Diana Landsman is theFinance Director, UMCOR (theUnited Methodist Committee onRelief) in Bosnia/Herzegovina.http://gbgm-umc.org/umcor/.Email: guy@umcor-bosnia.org.

1. There is an often-quoted figure that of approxi-mately $6 billion spent on aid in Bosnia, $1 millionhas gone missing.

Complex emergencies and NGO response mechanismsentail rapid deployment of staff and resources,immediate recruitment and accelerated distributionof relief supplies.

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espite, (or perhaps because of)worldwide attention on Iraq,the Bush Administration still

needs a success story for the war onterror. Afghanistan remains their besthope. In search of a viable self-polic-ing state and a plausible exit strategy,they look hopefully towards June2004 – the end of the Bonn processand the date proposed for nationalelections – as a possible moment todeclare ‘success’ in Afghanistan.

In April 2003 US Defence SecretaryDonald Rumsfeld declared that mili-tary-led Provincial ReconstructionTeams (PRTs) are the "best thing thatcan be done to ultimately providesecurity" in Afghanistan. This articleargues that US policy makers areoverly optimistic to think they canuse the PRT model to achieve quickand cheap success in Afghanistan.

Security on the cheap?

In February 2002 the US Army initiat-ed the first PRT in Gardez, followedsoon afterwards by other US-led PRTSin Kunduz and Bamyan and a British

PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif. Germany andNew Zealand are considering runningPRTs in Herat and Ghazni. Each PRThas a contingent of 60-100 soldiers,civil affairs officers and aid profes-sionals. They face differentreconstruction needs and securitythreats. While Bamyan is relativelypeaceful and well served by NGOs, theGardez region has seen repeated mili-tary attacks by warlords andneo-Taliban and has only a limitedpresence of the assistance communi-ty. In Mazar-e-Sharif, feuding betweenmilitia leaders impedes reconstructionwhile Ismail Khan’s iron grip on Heratpermits reconstruction while clamp-ing down on political freedoms.

At first glance, the PRTs appear aplausible response to Afghanistan’smyriad security challenges. Theirsmall size gives them flexibility torespond in a tailored fashion. Staffedby civil affairs officers and psycholog-ical operations experts, they aresupposed to negotiate with localpower brokers to expand the space inwhich security and reconstruction canthrive and the writ of the central

government be strengthened. They arealso expected to contribute to theinternational war on terror by collect-ing intelligence about the Taliban andal-Qa’ida. Sometimes they engage inreconstruction directly. More oftenthey contract with local business peo-ple or NGOs to do reconstructionprojects. Their reconstruction budgetis small but stretches well, as theirhuman resource costs fall into mili-tary defence budgets.

Civilian assistance organisations inAfghanistan expressed scepticismsoon after the US Defence Departmentannounced the PRT concept inNovember 2002. In June 2003 morethan 70 international relief organisa-tions in Afghanistan publicly statedthat Afghanistan is facing a securitycrisis and needs more internationalattention. Humanitarians argue that:

■ the military should restrict itsengagement in assistance to situa-tions where logistical capacity orinsecurity gives them uniquecapacity to reach people in need

■ by ‘blurring the lines’ between themilitary and humanitarians theyput civilian aid workers at risk andpoliticise, and even militarise, aidwork

■ PRT personnel do not have theexpertise or the mandate to facili-

tate community-drivenreconstruction■ PRTs are a waste of pre-cious resources: it is 50 timesmore expensive to keep a USsoldier on the ground than topay a senior Afghan aid pro-fessional working for an NGOor the Afghan government.

Some believed that NGOswere being naïve and eventerritorial and that in post-conflict settings donorgovernments have a legiti-mate interest in promoting

PRTs – guaranteeing or under-mining a secure future inAfghanistan? by Paul O’Brien

Afghanistan may be ‘the war before’ but it remainsa critical test case for post-11 September US foreignpolicy.

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39FMR 18 PRTs – guaranteeing or undermining a secure future in Afghanistan?

overtly political and security goals.Some NGOs in Afghanistan havestruggled to make the transition fromthe days of humanitarian crisis whenthey wore their political neutralityfrom donors and the Taliban on theirsleeves. Today, there is a functioning,quasi-legitimate government that theinternational community wants tostrengthen. Donors like USAID want

NGOs to work hand-in-hand with theAfghan government and the US mili-tary, to wear donor political supporton their sleeves and to suspend anylevel of disbelief that the Karzai gov-ernment is not here to stay. They arebeing asked not just to accept thepolitical dimensions of their work(which is fair) but to subjugate theiranti-poverty missions to broader,more complex political and some-times military goals (which may notalways be either fair or smart).

Problems with the PRTs

Six months after their launch, PRTsare not only still operational but theyare expanding. Despite the fact thatthere has been no serious impactanalysis, they have, in effect, beendeclared a successful model by inter-national donors. Increasingly, thecriticism of the PRTs is not aboutwhat they are – whatever their flaws,they remain a tiny part of both thereconstruction and security equations– but about what they are not.

Ironically, the military seems to agreewith NGOs about what they are and

are not. NGOs in Afghanistan have yetto hear a military officer describe thePRTs as an adequate internationalresponse to Afghanistan’s currentsecurity needs. Even the PRTs them-selves concede that their role is not tokeep peace, to protect civilians, to dis-arm militias or intervene militarilybetween fighting factions. They sim-ply do not have the resources or the

mandate to do so.While militias aregrowing stronger by

charging illegal taxes and customs,the PRTs are powerless to intervenedirectly. Neither can they prevent thedramatic post-Taliban rise in poppycultivation and heroin production.They are unable to call on coalitionforces for military back-up and oper-ate under different chains ofcommand that only meet at the high-est levels. With less than one PRTmember for every 50,000 Afghans,their mandate is restricted to negotia-tion, intelligence gathering, smallreconstruction projects and otherforms of hearts and minds work.

Apparently reconciled to the fact thatthe PRTs are here to stay, many NGOsnow argue that they should be given achance at success, should focus onsecurity and should be renamed asProvincial Security/Stability Teams.

With immense pressures to deliver acost-effective ‘success’ in Afghanistan,PRTs provide a useful talisman forinternational policy makers. Althoughthere are fewer than 400 PRT soldierscurrently operational, and additionalPRTs unlikely to add more than 300new personnel this year, policy mak-

ers can, nevertheless, talk about ‘sol-diers on the ground all overAfghanistan’ while placating the pub-lic that they are neither spendingtheir taxes nor risking the lives of toomany troops as would be the casewith a conventional large-scale peace-keeping force. They can point to howPRTs are helping not just to bringsecurity but to rebuild Afghanistan(even though the current PRT budgetis less than 1/1000th of Afghanistan’sreconstruction needs).

All this hype and promotion will notbe without its cost. On 11 August,NATO took over the InternationalSecurity Assistance Force in Kabul(ISAF). If the PRTs did not exist, NATOmight seriously consider expandingISAF beyond Kabul; NGOs, who havelong called for expansion of ISAF, stillhope they will. But with the PRT suc-cess story already declared, Afghansmay end up losing this critical oppor-tunity for a more appropriatelyresourced international effort to pro-vide real security for ordinary people.

Afghanistan’s successful emergencefrom violence is under threat. Peacehinges on commitment by the interna-tional community to help fill thesecurity vacuum. Our response willhelp to define the terms of interna-tional relations, not just for Afghansbut for all those who live in fear ofviolence. They will ultimately be thereal judges of Afghanistan’s ‘success’story.

Paul O’Brien is the AdvocacyCoordinator for CAREInternational in Afghanistan.Email: pobrien@care.org

the PRTs are powerless to intervene directly

IDPs at Dasht-i-Qala, Takharprovince, Afghanistan

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oth groups of displaced peoplelack adequate education provi-sion. Refugees and IDPs alike

are excluded from formal educationand employment opportunities due tolanguage barriers, gender/ethnicprejudice and lack of basic skills.

In the Arab World illiteracy eradica-tion programmes have traditionallyfocused on schools. Adults who hadmissed out on schooling were given asecond chance and exposed to class-rooms, rows of desks, teachers, textbooks and teaching methods drawnfrom the pedagogy of teaching chil-dren. Mass mobilisation campaigns –enrolling illiterates in literacy classesfor a short period – were charac-terised by a high rate of relapse backinto illiteracy, due to poor post-litera-cy activities.

More recent programmes have beeninfluenced by ‘andragogy’ – the theoryof adult learning that sees adults asself-directed and able to take deci-sions. Moving away from theclassroom and from one-size-fits-allapproaches to adult literacy, andra-gogical approaches focus more on theprocess and less on the content.1

As NGOs and the Sudanese govern-ment become increasingly aware ofthe problems confronting literacy pro-grammes and the need to developappropriate post-literacy strategies,the Sudan Open LearningOrganisation (SOLO) is playing a piv-otal role. Set up in 1984 by theUK-based International ExtensionCollege (IEC), SOLO has been workingwith NGOs and displaced communi-ties to promote and deliver a range ofnon-formal and open learning pro-grammes. Through face-to-face adult

literacy classes, SOLO has reachedover 6,000 learners.

Despite initial successes, barriers tolearning still remained. There was nofollow up to the literacy classes, no‘next step’. Once literacy courses wereover, people were considered ‘literate’and provision ceased. The profoundlack of reading and writing materialsfor the newly ‘literate’ and their socialexclusion made it virtually impossibleto apply their new skills.

Confidence-building literacy

In response IEC and SOLO have pio-neered the ‘Building Literacy in Sudanwith SOLO Press’ project (BLSP) pro-ject. BLSP is a post-literacy projectwhich enables newly literate refugeesand IDPs to write and publish theirown stories in the form of books,magazines and newsletters. BLSPseeks to encourage displaced readersto read on a daily basis. From modestbeginnings SOLO Press has become afully-fledged commercial educationalpublisher generating income to pro-vide SOLO with a more secure base tosustain its education activities.

BLSP has created 28 ‘circles’ amongrefugees and IDPs with some 1,800

members, the vast majority of whomcombine circle membership with addi-tional community activity – buildingdrainage systems, carrying out income-generating activities and awarenessraising. On an individual basis, peopleare now writing letters to family mem-bers, reading to their children, readingnewspapers and teaching other familymembers to read and write.

SOLO has recruited CommunityLiaison Workers (CLWs) from thecamps and settlements and trainedthem in selecting participants, facili-tating circle development andencouraging participants to write,read and edit their own stories.CLWs were initially encouraged togather participants in circles, whichwere to focus on reading and writingactivities at prescribed times andvenues. This had a semblance ofunintended formality about it whichseemed consistent with the earlydemands from some participants(especially those in urban areas) for amore formal, classroom-type of‘instructional literacy’ approach withcertification of competence upon‘completion’.

FMR 18

Post-literacy for refugees andIDPs in Sudan

by Hashim Abuzeid, Naomi Lockwood, Rashida Abdel Mutalib and Tony Wrightson

Thousands of Eritreans, many of them second- orthird-generation exiles, live in refugee camps in thenortheast of Sudan. Millions of southern Sudanesehave fled to the north where IDP settlements arescattered around urban outskirts.

B

IEC writing circle

IEC

/Su

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Samira, Karkora refugee camp

The circle has helped her to feelconfident while exchanging ideaswith friends. She says also thatfriends show each other how toimprove handwriting and otherskills. She is showing her neigh-bours what she has learnt in thecircle and helps them to learn.

41FMR 18 Post-literacy for refugees and IDPs in Sudan

It was a slow process to consolidatecircle numbers, expand the types ofreading, writing and discussion-basedactivities undertaken and generateoutputs which would promote anintrinsic motivational energy and thusdefuse the demands for somethingmore ‘formal’. However, once ideasgenerated by the circles resulted inpublished stories and community-based sensitisation campaigns, theinterest and motivation of partici-pants and potential participants grewdramatically. The desire for formalityand certification died a natural death,overtaken by the obvious benefits ofactivities that led to enhanced individ-ual and community self-esteem.

The volume and range of writingproduced in the groups has beenimpressive, with hundreds of personalstories already written in severallanguages. A comprehensive com-missioning process enables projectstaff and beneficiaries to choosewhich stories go through for publica-tion. A new spirit of self-confidence,motivation and coordination can bedetected. This form of applied confi-dence-building literacy is empower-ment, rather than simply a processof empowering.

In recent years enthusiastic andvisionary first-generation circle partic-ipants (known as Group Leaders) haveled expansion groups while stillretaining membership of their originalcircles. The range of activities withinsuch groups has grown to include:editing, designing reading materials,participatory rural appraisal, commu-nity work, income generating,organising lectures, PRA-related infor-mation collection and distribution ofliteracy publications. The list of activi-ties continues to grow.

Participant groups, while still clearlyactive in writing and reading, havebecome much more holistically ‘com-municative’ and ‘developmental’.Community leaders and participantsthemselves talk about the ‘dignity’that group activities bring them.Individuals are learning, sometimesfor the first time, skills of cooperationand organisation, problem identifica-tion and planning.

Challenges and discoveries

A danger for all post-literacy projectsis that participant expectations rise

beyond the capacity of the project tocater for them. The challenge is forthe participants themselves to cre-atively meet these expectations. Thegroups have grown and developedfrom their own energies, fuelled bytheir own skill bases and vision.These, in turn, have become an appro-priate foundation on which to buildother integrated development initia-tives, including income-generatingprojects that are highly likely to suc-ceed. This contrasts with the morecommon scenario of a developmentagency ‘creating’ a development initia-tive (e.g. an income-generating ornutrition project) and imposing it ona ‘group’ formed for the purpose.This is highly likely to fail.

The methodology employed by thisproject has seen highly organised,focused and competent groupsemerge, which have identified theirown needs and developed their ownmanagement structures to suit theirneeds. Groups and communities areacquiring social and financial capital.The challenge for the project now ishow to work with the potential part-ners who may provide financialcapital.

The project is confronted with arange of dilemmas and questions:

■ Will the circles be able to survivein their current form? How willthey evolve?

■ Should we be worried about seek-ing stability of participantmembership, or accept a muchmore fluid kind of membership orattachment by the various cate-gories of participants?

■ How will the CLWs evolve?■ How can the range of more ‘inte-

grated development’ activitiesexpand while still allowing a focuson facilitating the depth and fre-quency of reading and writingexperiences for participants?

■ Are we achieving applied empow-erment – written work with socialconsciousness and awareness?

■ Will different contexts see differ-ent groups of participantssurviving and developing in theirown, unique ways?

■ How should we feel if groupsmove in entirely different direc-tions with the use of their appliedliteracy?

■ Does the aim of the communitymovement remain the same as theproject?

■ If we are a project, and if there is aprocess or system of ‘post-litera-cy’, when does ‘completion’ come?

BLSP is a model with its own momen-tum, a momentum which is createdand owned by the communities them-selves. The ownership by participantsof the process is due to the fact thattheir words are transformed into tan-gible, published and widelydistributed texts. Their voices, theirwords, are ‘out there’ for people likethem who previously lacked access tothe world of reading.

Hashim Abuzeid is an experiencedSudanese adult educator. Email: hashimasafi@hotmail.com.

Rashida Abdel Mutalib is Director,Sudan Open LearningOrganisation (SOLO), Khartoum.Email: solo123s@hotmail.com.

Naomi Lockwood is ProjectCoordinator, InternationalExtension College, Cambridge, UK (www.iec.ac.uk). Email: naomi@iec.ac.uk.

Tony Wrightson is an educationconsultant (with the InternationalExtension College). Email: tony.richard@xtra.co.nz

1, For more information on the theory of andra-gogy, see www.andragogy.net

Ashirim, Dar El Salam IDP settlement

"SOLO has improved my life andin turn others’ lives."

Since becoming a CommunityLiaison Worker, Ashirim hasbecome confident. He is facilitat-ing circles in post-literacy andalso mobilising communitychange, from water drainage tocleanliness to health and widereducational activities. He is com-mitted to changing people’s lives.He explains that his wife was illit-erated, but she is nowparticipating in the circle. He hasbrought experts to talk to the cir-cle about health and educationalissues and is making relation-ships with other organisations

42 FMR 18

ebanon has not signed the1951 Refugee Convention andrefugees live in fear of arrest

and detention. Refugees in Lebanonhave no right to residence or workpermits and UNHCR provides onlyminimal financial assistance. Mostsurvive on the informal economy.Since August 2000 hundreds of Iraqishave been deported from Lebanon toIraq, including dozens of recognisedrefugees and asylum seekers.

On paper, Iraqi refugees in Lebanonseem prime candidates for third-coun-try resettlement – one of the threedurable solutions for refugees pro-moted by UNHCR. UNHCR guidelinesmake a high priority of resettlementfrom countries that threaten refugeeswith deportation. Yet, UNHCR’s com-mitment to seek durable solutionsdoes not correspond to an actual rightto enjoy one. No country is requiredto accept resettlement of refugeeswho first seek protection in anotherstate.

Resettlement programmes forrefugees who cannot find protectionin the first country they reach are sep-arate from the normal asylumsystems operated by many govern-ments for people who arrive directlyon their shores. Refugees who arrivein Lebanon hence encounter a kind ofparallel protection system with addi-tional hurdles to overcome.

For asylum seekers in Lebanon, thefirst step along the long and windingroad to resettlement is refugee statusdetermination. In 2001 24% of Iraqiasylum seekers were accepted byUNHCR’s Beirut office. UNHCR thenconsiders whether to refer refugeesfor resettlement to third countries. Ofthe 653 Iraqis resettled by UNHCR in2001, the majority went to the US.

As with other refugees referred byUNHCR in the Middle East, refugees inLebanon waited for periodic visits byUS asylum officers. Refugeesapproved by US asylum officers in2001 received a letter that said, sim-ply, "The Immigration Officer hasdetermined that the case is tentativelyapproved pending post-interview pro-cedures." Post-interview proceduresnormally included health and securityscreening.

Refugee resettlement is optional ininternational law and governmentsretain the power to stop the processat any point. After 11 September, theUS resettlement process in Lebanoncame to a near halt. Though process-ing from other countries in the MiddleEast recommenced in spring 2002, byspring 2003 no US asylum officershad returned to Lebanon.

Broken promises?

In May 2003 the Frontiers Center inBeirut interviewed 20 Iraqi refugeeswho had been referred to the US, 16of whom had received tentativeapproval letters. Almost all hadassumed that travel was imminent in2001 and had made decisions accord-ingly. This cost them dearly. Theyresigned from their jobs, sold or gaveaway their belongings, bought articlesfor travel and took out loans. Theirmost common comment was thatAmerica had made them a ‘promise’and should be required to keep it.

These Iraqis report that, when theyapproached the UNHCR office inBeirut to ask for information, UNHCRturned them away with vague, incom-plete or inaccurate information. Mostsaid that they were only able to speakwith the receptionist, a guard or apoliceman at the office gate. Theycomplained that UNHCR and the UN

system in general had not adequatelyrepresented their interests. They per-ceived that the US had failed todischarge its obligations to provideassistance or compensation for theunexpected delay in resettlement."The US knows very well our suffer-ing", one Iraqi said. The US did notsend the Iraqis any correspondencerevoking their acceptances. "Becauseof their promise, they kept me hop-ing", said another.

As the prospect of war in Iraq rose inearly 2003, the Iraqi refugees inLebanon wondered whether the USwould ever accept them. After the warUNHCR announced preliminary plansto repatriate Iraqis and the Lebanesegovernment organised the repatria-tion of more than 1,000 Iraqis.

Eventually the US did begin allowingpreviously approved Iraqis to travelfrom Lebanon but at a snail’s pace. In2002, 27 Iraqi refugees travelled tothe US, followed by 59 in the first halfof 2003. Yet, in July 2003, 191 Iraqisin Lebanon who were tentativelyapproved by the US before 11September 2001 were still awaitingofficial word on when, or if, theycould travel.

The concerns raised by Iraqi refugeesin Lebanon highlight the need forreform of the durable solutionssystem:

■ UNHCR and governments mustchange the way they treatrefugees, allowing them to beinformed decision makers in theresettlement process.

■ UNHCR and countries participatingin refugee resettlement shoulddraft and agree to a Code ofRefugee Relations governing com-munication with refugees duringresettlement processing.

■ Such a code should guarantee thatrefugees will be provided completeinformation about the proceduresand timetable involved in theirresettlement and notified of anychanges.

Promises without solutions:Iraqi refugees left in the lurch inLebanon by Bashir Osmat, Michael Kagan and Samira Trad

The US decision to halt refugee resettlement follow-ing the 11 September 2001 attacks1 has left Iraqirefugees in Lebanon in limbo.

L

43FMR 18 Promises without solutions: Iraqi refugees left in the lurch in Lebanon

■ UNHCR should provide refugeeswith regular counselling, access toknowledgeable officials and infor-mation about the steps the agencyis taking to promote a solution.

■ The international community mustdo more to fill the gap betweenthe UN's promise to seek solutionsfor refugees and governments’willingness to actually deliver solu-tions.

Bashir Osmat is Professor ofSociology, Lebanese University(bashiros@hotmail.com).

Samira Trad is the director of theFrontiers Center in Beirut (fron-tierscenter@fastmail.fm).

Michael Kagan is a lawyer andconsultant with Frontiers Center(mikekagan@fastmail.fm).

The Frontiers Center is an inde-pendent counselling and researchorganisation providing profession-al services to marginalised people.

1. See FMR15 pp 48-49.

an mediation systems be devel-oped which are sensitive to thevalues of tribally-based cul-

tures yet also in accordance with thejudicial norms of the host country?Iran, host for two decades to one ofthe world’s largest refugee popula-tions, has been pioneering anapproach which could be replicated byother host states.

Uncertainties and fears surroundingjudicial processes are the normamong members of social groupslacking official legal status. Theyoften suffer from high rates of illitera-cy, poor access to social services andpsychological instability born ofdepression, anxiety, post-traumaticstress disorder, paranoia and/orsurvival guilt.

Afghan refugees in Iran are no excep-tion. So great are their doubts anduncertainties ("Do I have the right toclaim?"; "Does my claim seem ratio-nal?"; "If I do not win, what will theydo to me –lock me up, lash me, repa-triate me?") that most are deterredfrom risking stepping inside any for-mal judicial arena. Coming from asociety where disputes are mostlyresolved by mediation by elders, theyare unfamiliar with the concept ofjudicial action.

In Iran – a state with myriad politicaland judicial ambiguities – few canafford a lawyer. They are afraid of

being treated unfairly in court due totheir dubious immigration status andtheir otherness. In the absence of anyalternative to a judicial procedure,Afghans resign themselves to theirfate or may embark upon actionswhich result in imprisonment orforcible repatriation.

The Special Legal Committees for theSettlement of Afghan RefugeeDisputes (hereinafter, ‘the commit-tees’) are a means of providing freelegal advice to Afghan refugees whowould otherwise be unable to reestab-lish their rights. They arose fromrecognition in the early 1990s thattraditional provision of legal assis-tance to Afghan refugees was

impossible due to the costs involvedin dealing with a vast number ofcases.

As an affordable alternative, thenotion of using Afghan refugees withlegal or counselling skills to offer peersupport was developed. In accordancewith a tripartite agreement on repatri-ation procedures signed by UNHCRand the governments of Iran andAfghanistan, the first committeeswere established in Mashdad in 1993.Supported by the Hizb-i Wahdat (acoalition of Afghan Shi’a political par-ties forged by the Iranian government)the concept soon spread to otherareas of Iran where Afghan refugeesreside. In 1994 a second committee,based at the Afghan Embassy inTehran, was established followedshortly afterwards by another admin-istered by the Hizb-i Wahdat in theIranian capital.

Settling refugee disputes in Iranby Fatemeh Keyhanlou, Hani Mansourian and Negar Azimi

Legal systems are notoriously refugee-unfriendly.Are there alternative means of adjudicating refugees’legal disputes?

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Afghan refugeemerchant, Gulshahrbazaar, Mashhad,Iran

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44 Settling refugee disputes in Iran FMR 18

The majority of cases brought to thecommittees involve financial and fam-ily disputes. Penal cases and thoseinvolving refugees in dispute with theIranian authorities are also heard.

The committees’ objectives are to:

■ provide refugees with unhinderedaccess to information and adviceto complement that provided byUNHCR

■ detect legal problems, identifytheir origins and explore the possi-bility of mediation

■ arrange negotiation meetingsbetween the parties involved, writeletters and give advice with theview to an amicable solution

■ provide refugees with counsellingon personal security and socialwelfare assistance

■ refer cases requiring specialisedlegal advice.

All committee members are tertiaryeducated and there are severallawyers. Originally all committeemembers were men. In response tothe rise in the number of family casesand the reluctance of Afghan womento raise personal or legal issues in thepresence of a male legal advisor, awomen’s committee was establishedby the Afghan Embassy.

UNHCR provides managerial and coor-dination support. Some of themembers are employed by UNHCR. InMashhad a permanent UNHCR legaladvisor attends all meetings. If mem-bers of the two Tehran committeescannot find a suitable solution, or ifthey judge that formal proceduresmust be invoked, a UNHCR legal advi-sor is called in to liaise with therelevant authorities. The UNHCR legaladvisor plans to consolidate the activi-ties of the Tehran committees into aregistered NGO to give them legal andofficial status.

The Mashhad committee is located atthe Bureau of Aliens and ForeignImmigrants Affairs (BAFIA). An Iranianjudge chairs the committee and workswith an Afghan cleric, a UNHCR-pro-vided legal advisor and a BAFIA staffmember. The committee meets once aweek for four hours. Claimants sub-mit cases and documentary evidencein writing. On receipt of complaints,the chairman formally invites bothparties for mediation. Ninety per centof those summonsed attend on time.

If the dispute is settled, a consentorder is signed. If claimants are notsatisfied with the outcome they mayask for a hearing in the Iranian courts.However, the fact that an Iranian

judge is a member of the committeedeters many as they anticipate thatthe court would be likely to come toa similar judgment. The committeeadvises on procedural matters andpoints out the risk of litigation. It isup to the parties to decide whetherthey wish to go to court.

Conclusion

These committees present an idealand cost-effective means of disputeresolution for those whose status ina host country is precarious.Committees retain local flexibilitywith regard to their membershipstructures, their relations with thegovernment and how they go aboutresolving disputes. They fill a usefulgap for communities in which peopleare not familiar with their citizenshiprights and fear both the consequencesof punishment from kinsfolk and dis-crimination suffered in the formalIranian legal system.

Fatemeh Keyhanlou is a PhDstudent in international law atTehran University.Email: noushinke@hotmail.com.

Hani Mansourian is an NGOactivist and researcher. Email: ehya@parsonline.net.

Negar Azimi is a journalist. Email: neg@stanfordalumni.org.

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45FMR 18

pon arrival, they are oftenaccused of deception by politi-cians, the press and the

public. So far the European Union andits member states have focused onstrengthening the borders of FortressEurope. A new study suggests thatthey would do better to address theroot causes of forced migration:underdevelopment, conflict andimpoverishment in countries oforigin.

A report from the Institute for PublicPolicy Research critiques current EUpolicies to address the phenomenonof illegal and forced migration. Itwarns that those in need of protectionwill seek sanctuary in Europe as longas violence and human rights viola-tions go unchecked.

During the 1990s, the top ten coun-tries of origin of asylum seekers wereformer Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey,Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina,Sri Lanka, Iran, Somalia and theDemocratic Republic of the Congo(DRC). The report identifies common‘push factors’ in all these states: eth-nic/religious discrimination, humanrights abuses, civil war and a largeproportion of internally displacedpeople relative to the total population.

Europe’s fight against illegal migra-tion has diverted attention fromaddressing its root causes. Changes inprocedures and criteria for asylumdetermination, such as the introduc-tion of temporary protection regimes(used to ensure those fleeing theBalkan wars went home) and declaringCentral European states as ‘safe thirdcountries’ to which asylum seekerscan be returned, have made it moredifficult for those genuinely in need

of protection to get asylum, whileencouraging smugglers and traffickers.

The authors stress that:

■ Flows of forced migrants toEurope are comparatively smallwhen considered against globaldisplacement movements: coun-tries such as Guinea, Iran,Pakistan, Sudan and Tanzania havemuch greater refugee populations.

■ There is evidence that underdevel-opment and impoverishment arenot direct push factors for forcedmigration. Rather they create theconditions for weak states, humanrights abuse and conflict, whichforce people to flee.

■ Even when fleeing violence or per-secution and in need of protection,some asylum seekers have adegree of control over where theygo and how they travel.

■ Policy makers may aspire to makeclear distinctions between econom-ic and forced migrants but themigration-asylum nexus defiessimplistic judgement: manymigrants have multiple motiva-tions for moving.

■ Once a migratory flow is estab-lished it may be driven by socialnetworks and chain migrationpatterns even where policies inrelation to asylum seekers change.

■ Discrimination against Kurds is akey factor behind the large num-ber of Iranian, Iraqi and Turkishnationals seeking asylum.

The report shows that EU policymakers have been aware of suchissues since the early 1990s but havefailed to achieve concerted measuresby the relevant Directorates-Generalof the European Commission, and theministries for justice and home

affairs, foreign affairs, trade andinternational cooperation within eachstate. There is an urgent need forcommon policies to address the rootcauses of forced migration.

Sustainable reduction of migrationflows requires:

■ long-term joined-up policies toaddress issues of conflict preven-tion and development

■ ending arms exports to regimeswith poor human rights recordsand those engaged in internaloppression or violence againsttheir neighbours

■ concerted action against illicittrading in diamonds, coltan, cobaltand other commodities which fuelconflicts

■ ensuring that the EU’s High LevelWorking Group on Asylum andMigration operates more transpar-ently, values expertise from allpolicy areas and develops measur-able policies and programmes.

Stephen Castles is the director ofthe University of Oxford’s RefugeeStudies Centre. Email: stephen.castles@qeh.ox.ac.uk.

Heaven Crawley directs theMigration and EqualitiesProgramme at the Institute forPublic Policy (www.ippr.org).Email: h.crawley@ippr.org.

Sean Loughna is the ResearchOfficer of Forced MigrationOnline (www.forcedmigration.org).Email: sean.loughna@qeh.ox.ac.uk.

This is a summary of States of Conflict: Causes andPatterns of Forced Migration to the EU and PolicyResponses, ISBN: 1 86030 216 5, obtainable for£9.95 from the Institute for Public Policy, 30-32 Southampton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 7RA, UK. Tel: +44 (0)207 470 6100. Further information is available at www.ippr.org.uk/publications/index.php?book=359

The EU and asylum: towardsstrategies to reduce conflict andhuman rights abuses in countries of origin by Stephen Castles, Heaven Crawley and Sean Loughna

Most asylum seekers in Europe come from statesaffected by high levels of violence, oppression andconflict.

U

Internal displacement inAfghanistan ends forsome, not for others

by Sarah Petrin

he last issue of FMR providedan arena for ideas on when dis-placement ends that was both

informative and engaging. Mooneyintroduced an integrated approach,requiring both solutions-based andneeds-based criteria based on a rangeof human rights indicators. Frelicksuggested that IDPs who no longerneed international protection are nolonger IDPs. Kalin emphasised thatdisplacement ends gradually.However, there was no conclusion,no clear definition of internal dis-placement’s end.

Let me offer a simple definition.Displacement ends when IDPs haveestablished their place in a self-select-ed community of choice. What does itmean for an IDP to ‘establish a place’?The end of displacement may requirea policy choice on the part of theauthorities or an end to certain condi-tions but the actual end to the stateof being uprooted must be completedby the displaced persons themselves.The displaced persons must feel thatthey are in a place and a communitythat will not force them to be uproot-ed again.

I use the phrase ‘established theirplace’ instead of reintegration for anumber of reasons. Whether IDPs arein a displacement location, are reset-tled or choose to return to their areaof origin, they need certain settlementresources in order to establish a place– resources such as land, waterand/or housing. For instance, housingis a key issue for displaced people.Often people in IDP camps who live intents but have the opportunity tobuild homes will consider themselves‘settled’ once the home is built. Thisis the case in Zhare Dhast IDP camp inKandahar as well as the ChamanWaiting Area on the border ofPakistan. IDPs who return to theirplace of origin without land or are

unable to recover lost property willoften not settle in their place of originbut go to relatives in another areawho have a house or land. A lack ofsettlement resources will lead IDPs tobecome secondary migrants, seeking‘a place’ elsewhere. This phenomenonhas been duly noted in Cambodia.

This question of ‘establishing a place’can also be applied to nomads, who inAfghanistan for example suffer mostfrom insufficient water resources.When Kuchi transhumants in IDPcamps in southern Afghanistan wereasked whether they had a place of ori-gin or a place to which they wished toreturn, many would say that theywished to relocate to Helmandprovince because there is “water inthat place” or they have distant rela-tives who are settled there. Otherswanted to remain in the IDP camp foran indefinite period. Recognising thatwater and animals would be scarce tocome by for some time, someone saidhe wished “to keep the house I builthere in Zhare Dhast and learn to work”.

The idea of a ‘self-selected communityof choice’ recognises that return isnot a viable option for everyone andthat other forms of forced settlement,such as villagisation in Rwanda,should not be an acceptable standardof settlement by the internationalcommunity. This idea of a self-select-ed community could also apply to acamp situation like Zhare Dhast,where 50% of camp residents are hop-ing to reside permanently should thecentral government give rights for theuse of land.

Do IDPs have a say?

While previous definitions of an endto displacement do stipulate that theviews of IDPs should also take prece-dence in determining whendisplacement ends, most of FMR 17’sdiscussion focused on when the inter-national community could safelymake the determination that the dis-placed have ceased to be so. Who isand who is not an IDP matters mostto the international community, in so

much as humanitarian agencies havelimits on whom they can assist andhow much assistance can be given, sothat logical decisions to exclude cer-tain persons become necessary.

In the aid world, IDPs often have littlesay in determining how they areregarded and how they will be assist-ed. The problem of local peoplecoming into IDP camps to seek mater-ial assistance is widespreadthroughout Afghanistan and hascaused agencies, with limitedresources, to come up with IDP statusdetermination guidelines that can

exclude certain persons from bothassistance and camp residence. As Iwas walking around Shaidyee campjust outside Herat with the local campmanager, a woman showed us a pieceof paper that explained she was notan IDP and was thus not eligible toreceive food allocations from theWorld Food Programme or to live inthe camp. The woman asked, "Howcan they say I am not an IDP? I am notfrom here and I cannot leave here. Myson is very sick and is in the campclinic for treatment." While there mayhave been legitimate reasons for deny-ing this particular person assistance,her reaction to the news highlightsthe increasing insensitivity that inter-national agencies show to theindividual circumstances of displacedpersons in the face of overwhelmingneed.

Protection for the internallydisplaced

The most engaging debate on whendisplacement ends concerned how todetermine when IDPs no longerrequired protection and whether the1951 refugee convention cessationclauses could be apply to IDPs.UNHCR’s position emphasised that nolegal need to declare an end to inter-nal displacement exists. Yet, UNHCR’sperspective came largely from draw-ing an analogy between an end todisplacement and refugee return,stipulating that persons are of

46 Debate FMR 18

FMR17’s feature section was on ‘When does internal displacementend?’. Sarah Petrin takes the debate further:

T

debate

"How can they say I am notan IDP?”

47

concern until they are fully integratedinto the local community, enjoy anormal livelihood in safety and digni-ty and have equal access of protectionfrom the national authorities.

UNHCR, like some other contributors,also stated that a removal of the rootcauses of displacement is an essentialfactor to determining displacement’send. Bonoan also pointed out that therefugee cessation clauses, stipulatingthat there has to be a fundamentalchange of circumstances in the placeof origin, lend guidance to an answer.However, Cohen rightly reminds usthat a fundamental change in thepolitical conditions which led to dis-placement do not always make itpossible for IDPs to then return orresettle. While Cohen uses the exam-ple of Tajikistan to illustrate thispoint, numerous other examples canbe drawn from Rwanda, East Timorand Afghanistan.

IDP protection in southernAfghanistan

Let us look at the example ofAfghanistan more closely, drawingfrom the Informed Decision Making(IDM) project carried out by theInternational Catholic MigrationCommission (ICMC) in Kandaharunder the auspices of UNHCR fromNovember 2002 to May 2003. The pro-ject aimed to find those displacedpeople located in five major camplocations in the south who originatedfrom the western provinces to deter-mine whether they wished to remainin their displacement location, returnto their area of origin or seek alterna-tive settlement options.

The IDM programme first began work-ing with camp populations fromBadghis province, an area northwestof Herat where fighting between theTaliban and Northern Alliance forcesin early 2002 was particularly acute,leading thousands of ethnic Pashtunsfrom the area to flee to the southernprovinces. UNHCR offices in Kabul,Herat and Kandahar believed thatPashtuns from Badghis who were not

politically involved inthe Taliban regimecould return to theircommunities of originin safety and dignity.They came to this con-clusion for two reasons;firstly because Talibanand Northern Alliancefighting in Badghis hadcome to an end andsecondly becauseUNHCR’s Field Officerin Badghis provincereported that no majorprotection issues in thearea impeded the safereturn of non-politicalpersons.

As the ProgrammeManager for the IDMproject, I was able tolocate substantial infor-mation in returneemonitoring reports onwhether material, edu-cational and healthresources were avail-able at the district levelin Badghis. However, Icould not locate any

factual evidence that there were noongoing, low-level conflicts in thearea. However, such protection indica-tors were aptly supplied by the IDPsthemselves. The project found thatmore than half of the IDPs in ZhareDhast camp feared local commanderswho took their women, homes, ani-mals and other possessions duringthe period of Taliban-NorthernAlliance fighting. They wanted toknow whether specific individualswere present in their places of origin,whether they were occupying theirproperty and especially if they werepart of new government forces.

The IDM project team collected thenames of 28 local commandersimpeding the return of hundreds offamilies who would otherwise like toreturn. This information was given tothe UNHCR office in Kandahar, withthe suggestion that the UNHCR officein the west provide information con-cerning these individuals fordissemination to the IDPs. The infor-mation was disregarded, based on thefact that the ‘circumstances which ledto displacement had fundamentallychanged’.

Yet, many IDPs felt that conditions intheir place of origin had not funda-mentally changed since the time offlight. While they recognised thatmajor fighting between Taliban andNorthern Alliance had ceased, theywere aware of low-level conflictbetween commanders that I could notconfirm from other sources. AlthoughUNHCR felt this information was notcredible, several weeks after reportingthe IDPs’ concerns, fighting broke outbetween commanders in two districtsof Badghis which led the UN to evacu-ate its staff from the entire province.An important lesson was learnedhere. The factors by which displacedpeople make the decision to return ornot are more intricate than thosewhich can be determined from achecklist survey. The quantitativefacts that are gathered from askingIDPs more probing questions aboutthe situation in their place of origincan unearth important political indi-cators that could be easily overlookedwithout such investigation.

FMR 18 Debate

IDPs at Dasht-i-Qala, Takhar province, Afghanistan

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48

Conclusion

Does internal displacement end? Yesfor some, no for others. The case ofsouthern Afghanistan shows thatsome people ‘establish a place’ basedon where they build a home, havewater or find relatives; others whowish to return to where they hadproperty or livelihoods may be wait-ing for some time before they canfind out whether return to their areais safe or not. Ironically, camp life hasinformally ended internal displace-ment for some, though such peopleremain under UNHCR auspices andwait for the new government to for-mally grant land ownership rights.While rain will end internal displace-ment for others, many will remaindisplaced until they rest assured thatreturn will not subject them to futurediscrimination and loss.

Sarah Petrin is a formerProgramme Manager for theInternational Catholic MigrationCommission (ICMC) inAfghanistan. Email: sarahpetrin@hotmail.com

FMR16 had an article onSudanese refugees in Cairo (‘In‘closed file’ limbo: displacedSudanese in a Cairo slum’ byPascale Ghazaleh). Below areedited versions of commentsreceived by Vincent Cochetel,former Acting Representative,UNHCR Cairo, and a reply fromthe author.

appreciate the time spent by MsGhazaleh in her research and theinterest shown by FMR to examine

the plight of Sudanese asylum seekersbeing denied refugee status in Cairo.

However, the statement that UNHCRadmits using a restrictive refugee def-inition at its office in Cairo is notaccurate. UNHCR Cairo applies allrefugee definitions in accord with itsmandated Refugee StatusDetermination (RSD) procedures. Thefact that someone was an IDP in

Sudan prior to coming to Egypt doesnot mean that article 1.2 of the 1969OAU Convention, governing the spe-cific aspects of refugee problems inAfrica, applies automatically. A largenumber of former Sudanese IDPs arerecognised as refugees by UNHCR.Others are not because their refugeeclaim does not fall within the scope ofexiting refugee definitions or becausetheir refugee claim seriously lackscredibility.

My question "why don’t they moveon?" should not have been taken outof context. I was referring to the factthat several asylum seekers, who hadbeen denied an appeal refugee status,choose every week to return to Sudanby steamer via Wadi Halfa (and wereobserved doing so). This suggests thatnot all "rejected asylum seekers" arestranded in Egypt.

My comment "no one had forced thesepeople to come to Egypt" should nothave been negatively presented. TheUNHCR Office in Cairo has not pre-vented any asylum seeker fromcoming to Egypt to apply for refugeestatus. Many asylum seekers, whowere for many years IDPs in Sudan,have moved to Egypt because theywere dissatisfied with the decreasingassistance programmes there or unre-alistic prospects of resettlement viaUNHCR Cairo. Many have been materi-ally assisted and encouraged,including by aid organisations, toleave Sudan to become asylum seek-ers in Egypt. For those not qualifyingfor refugee status, their move to theCairo slum of Arba’a wa Nuss resultsin a lowering of their standards of liv-ing and an increased need forprotection.

I have been attributed a quote on"clientelism", which should also becontextualised. Many refugees andasylum seekers coming from Sudanhave reported to UNHCR Cairo howvarious forms of religious clientelismare favoured by some Christian orMuslim aid groups in Sudan. Thosepractising traditional African religionsare the most exposed to such unethi-cal approaches. This practice of

creating religious dependence doesnot exist in Egypt. Church groups areproviding, in a remarkable manner,assistance to refugees and asylumseekers in Egypt irrespective of theirreligion, ethnic background or nation-ality. Without their committedinvolvement in humanitarian reliefefforts the life and well being ofrefugees and asylum seekers in Cairowould be in serious jeopardy. UNHCRhopes that Muslim and Coptic charita-ble organisations in Egypt will in thenear future start to take a similarinterest in providing support to allpersons in need of basic humanitarianconsideration.

Vincent Cochetel Email: cochetel@unhcr.ch

s a journalist, I am alwayscareful to transcribe inter-views accurately and check my

sources. The topic of Sudaneserefugees in Egypt – and RSD proce-dures applied to them – is of greatsensitivity to the Egyptian authorities,UNHCR and the church groups whichprovide assistance. Any discussion ofthis subject is certain to arouse objec-tions.

I am delighted that Mr Cochetel hasagreed to qualify the comments hemade to me that "they [Sudaneserefugees] don't have to come here."When I cited this comment I neitherstated nor implied that UNHCR hadprevented anyone from coming toEgypt. If anyone is to blame for pre-venting displaced people fromcrossing borders it is the Egyptianand Sudanese governments. Withregard to religious clientelism, editingof the version of the article whichappeared in FMR removed referencesto the ‘slave emancipation’ movementand thus allowed no scope for dis-cussing clientelism within Sudan.Clientelism is an accurate term for thetendency of various religious organi-sations to privilege their memberswhen distributing material assistance.

Pascale Ghazaleh Email: ghazaleh@link.net

Debate FMR 18

I

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49

Palestinian refugee protec-tion needs go unmet

Participants from Lebanon, Syria andPalestine met in Beirut in early June todiscuss protection rights, needs andstrategies for Palestinian refugees.Organised by the A’idun Group(Lebanon and Syria) and theBethlehem-based BADIL ResourceCentre for Palestinian Residency andRefugee Rights, the workshop washosted by the Institute of PalestineStudies (Beirut).

Debate and discussion focused onclarification of the concept of refugeeprotection as it applies to Palestinianrefugees, the similarities and differ-ences in protection gaps in varioushost countries and the question ofwhich international body or bodies –the UN Conciliation Committee forPalestine (UNCCP), UNRWA and/orUNHCR – should be responsible forprotection of Palestinian refugees andthe search for durable solutions.

Specific attention was given to differ-ent marginalised groups of Palestinianrefugees such as the former inhabi-tants of Gaza who now live in Jordan,Palestinians in US/UK-occupied Iraqand the Palestinian residents in Egyptwho suffer from a protection gap noless serious than that of the betterpublicised case of Palestinians inLebanon [see FMR11 pp40-41].

Participants called for:

■ efforts to identify and find themost appropriate remedy to pro-tect the basic rights of Palestinianrefugees to durable solutions(right of return, restitution andcompensation) as affirmed inResolution 194 and internationallaw

■ engagement of a wider spectrumof the refugee community in edu-cation, awareness raising andpopular mobilisation on needs andstrategies for internationalprotection

■ curricula in UNRWA schools toaddress concepts and principles ofrefugee rights and refugeeprotection

■ coordination between NGOs andcivil society in host countries tomore systematically identify andpublicise problems concerningaccess to employment and educa-tion, freedom of movement andright to documentation and tolobby governments and politicalparties to introduce effectiveremedies

■ advocacy to ensure compliance ofArab host states with internationalconventions to which they are sig-natories

■ more systematic efforts to raiseawareness in the internationalcommunity about the protectiongaps facing Palestinian refugeesand the need to provide funding toenable UNRWA to maintain health,education and social services, withspecial attention to the problemsin Lebanon

■ urgent efforts to resolve the ques-tion of which internationalmechanisms are responsible forthe protection of Palestinianrefugees and leading the searchfor durable solutions

■ expanding the mandates ofUNCCP, UNRWA and UNHCR inorder to ensure that refugee pro-tection and identification ofdurable solutions are guided bystandards of international law –and not subject to political inter-ference.

For additional information, see www.badil.org orcontact Jaber Suleiman, A’idun, atjsleiman@inco.com.lb.

Offshore processing: out ofsight, out of mind?

by Diana Quick

Responding to rising numbers of asy-lum seekers and growing anti-refugeesentiment in the UK, the British gov-ernment plans to set up holdingcentres for would-be immigrants inthe regions they are fleeing. Despiteopposition expressed by several mem-bers of the European Union at theJune 2003 European Council meeting,the UK and other interested nations,such as the Netherlands and

Denmark, plan to go ahead with pilot‘zones of protection’, possibly in theHorn of Africa.

The British government argues that byallowing protection for people inareas where there is a risk of ahumanitarian crisis they would beable to return to their homes moreeasily when it is safe to do so. Failingthat, asylum claims could beprocessed on the spot. People whoclaim asylum in the UK, includingwomen and children (but not unac-companied minors), could also be sentto the protection zones.

The idea has, in theory, the support ofUNHCR whose proposed ‘three-pronged approach’ to improve theglobal asylum system would meandonor states supporting refugees intheir original host countries, helpingthem to return home, to resettle toother countries or start new liveslocally. However, the agency has notsaid whether it will participate in theUK’s pilot project.

Opponents, including AmnestyInternational, Human Rights Watchand the British Refugee Council, havevoiced strong opposition, calling it aneffort by Britain to dump its responsi-bilities towards refugees onto poor,distant countries. They have statedthat the plan could violate interna-tional laws, including the 1951Refugee Convention, the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights andpossibly the Universal Declarationof Human Rights. They are alsoconcerned that refugees and asylumseekers in the zones of protectionwould face protection issues, includ-ing sexual assault, gender-basedviolence, forced recruitment of chil-dren by armed militias and peopletrafficking.1

An early draft of the UK proposalsuggests it would include primaryhumanitarian assistance (food, shelterand health services), protectionagainst refoulement and compliancewith Article 3 of the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights (i.e. norisk of torture, inhuman or degradingtreatment). There is no mention,

FMR 18 Update

update

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50

however, of human rights or legalprotection.

Many questions about the ‘zones ofprotection’ remain unanswered.Whose law will run the camps? Howcan the human rights of refugees beprotected? Who will fund the campsand who will monitor them? How longwill refugees be required to stay insuch zones before decisions arereached on their claims? Details of

how claims will be processed, howlegal advice will be provided forclaimants and whether they will befree to come and go are still unclear.

A recent report by the British HomeOffice2 revealed that ‘get tough’ asy-lum policies lead to more illegalimmigration and people traffickingand that the restrictive measures thatwere most successful at reducingunfounded claims also forced genuinerefugees to go underground.

Diana Quick is Director ofCommunications, Women’sCommission for Refugee Womenand Children (www.womenscom-mission.org.) Email: diana@womenscommission.org

1. For critiques of the UK proposals, seewww.amnesty.org.uk/action/camp/refugees/action/index.shtml and www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/news/june2003/relea122.htm2 See www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hors259

Update FMR 18

FMR EditorialAdvisory Board

Although the EAB members’ institutionalaffiliations are listed below, they serve in

an individual capacity and do not necessarily represent their institutions.

Sanjib BaisyaDFID

Jon BennettOxford Development Consultants

Stephen CastlesRefugee Studies Centre

B S ChimniJawaharlal Nehru University

Mark CuttsUNHCR

Jens EschenbacherGlobal IDP Project

Maurice HersonOxfam GB

Erin MooneyBrookings-SAIS Project on

Internal Displacement

Bonaventure RutinwaUniversity of Dar es Salaam

Dan SeymourUNICEF

Marit SorheimNorwegian Refugee Council

Laurence WhiteheadUniversity of Oxford

Richard WilliamsRefugee Council, UK

RSC pays tribute to victims of

UN Baghdad bomb attack

Staff at the Refugee Studies Centre would like to

extend their sympathy and condolences to all those

affected by the bombing of the United Nations head-

quarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003. The victims

were working to resolve residual conflicts and to

support the Iraqi people during this period of post-war

reconstruction. Because of their close connection to

the RSC we would like to mention two by name.

Gil Loescher, who lives in Oxford, has been closely

associated with the work of the Centre; since its early

days, he has provided invaluable teaching support,

good advice and friendship. As FMR goes to press Gil is

in a critical condition in hospital in Germany. Our

thoughts are with him and his family.

Arthur C Helton of the Council on Foreign Relations

was killed by the blast. Arthur was a noted expert on

refugee and international law and had worked and

talked with many of us on humanitarian issues. He

gave a lecture at the RSC last year on the theme of his

latest book which stressed the need for a more

comprehensive and sympathetic refugee regime.

He will be sadly missed.Too late to be included in this FMR but available on our web-site at www.fmreview.org (see ‘supplementary articles’) is anarticle submitted on 22 August by Brian Gorlick, RegionalProtection Officer, UNHCR Stockholm, on ‘A problem fromhell: humanitarian operations in a vengeful world’.

51

n November 2002 the UNSecurity Council voted unani-mously to back an Anglo-

American resolution (no. 1441) requir-ing Iraq to reinstate weaponsinspectors withdrawn by the UN in1998. The following month, asdemanded by the UN, Iraqi officialspresented the UN with a 12,000 pagedocument disclosing Iraqi’s pro-grammes for weapons of massdestruction. On 5 March 2003, aftermonths of intense diplomatic efforts,the foreign ministers of France, Russiaand Germany issued a join declarationstating that they would not permit asecond resolution to pass the UNSecurity Council to authorise militaryaction against Iraq. The US and the UKabandoned hope of gaining SecurityCouncil support for launching a waron Iraq. On 20 March, the US launchedits first set of air strikes on Baghdadand ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ wasofficially underway.

Throughout the period betweenNovember 2002 and March 2003 therehad been estimates that such a mili-tary engagement would cause displace-ment of more than a million peoplewithin Iraq and across its borders.

UNHCR and numerous NGOs hadmade preparations to receive thiswave of humanity in Jordan, Syria andIran. In Syria, UNHCR negotiated theupgrading of the El Hol campsite ineastern Syria and two additionalcampsites were agreed to with theSyrian government at Al Yarubiyahand Al Tanf border crossing. UNHCRpre-positioned non-food items suffi-cient for 5,000 people in the countrywith additional items available fortransfer from the Turkish port ofIskenderun or the Jordanian port ofAqaba in a matter of hours. In Jordan,UNHCR worked closely with theHashemite Charitable Society to set

up a refugee site near Ruwaishid ineastern Jordan. In addition, UNHCRstockpiled relief items at the southernport of Aqaba for immediate dispatchto Ruwaishid, should that prove nec-essary. In Iran, the government’sBureau for Aliens and ForeignImmigrants prepared ten campsiteswith the help ofUNHCR. Four of thesesites were providedwith basic facilities such as sanitationand water services and could initiallyhost 60,000 refugees.

Despite the dire predictions, no Iraqirefugees crossed the border into Iran.Up to 30,000 Iraqis, however, gath-ered near the border at Badrah ineastern Iraq and requested help fromIran. Iranian authorities responded bysending food, water and medicine tothe border where they requested thatIraqi elders take charge of distributingthe relief items. In Syria just over 200Iraqis crossed the border and tookrefugee at El Hol camp. Perhaps as aresponse to US warnings that no sanc-tuary should be given to any Iraqigovernment loyalists, 44 Iraqi refugees,including 23 children, were laterremoved from the El Hol camp andtransported back to Iraq. This group ofrefugees were all residents of Tikrit,Saddam Hussein’s birthplace.

In Jordan, more than 1,200 refugeesarrived at the Al-Karma border cross-ing between Iraq and Jordan andfound themselves trapped, unable tocross over into Jordan and unwillingto go back into Iraq. These were main-ly third country nationals trapped in a‘no-man’s land’: Iranian Kurds, IranianPersians, Arabs and Palestinians. Twomonths after ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’had begun, some 550 Palestinians anda few hundred other Arab refugeeswere allowed entry into the Jordanianrefugee camp at Ruwaishid.

How did the international humanit-arian aid community get it so wrong?How were the estimates of 1 millionrefugees calculated and why were thefigures so readily accepted?

We now know that inside Iraq some300,000 people were displaced by the

war, mainly Arabs who had recentlybeen forced by Saddam Hussein’sregime to settle in Kurdish villagessurrounding the northern Iraqi townof Kirkuk. Relatively few peoplesought refuge across internationalborders and those who did were main-ly nationals of other countries whowere resident in Iraq.

Perhaps the fundamental error wasin assuming that Iraqi citizens wouldflee their homes once the Anglo-American military attacks began. Formost Iraqis, ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’was not regarded as a liberation cam-paign but as a neo-colonial assault ontheir homeland. Most Iraqis preferredto stand their ground and, by shelter-ing among familiar neighbours andkin, safeguard their holdings whileaffirming their Iraqi-ness. TheWestern assumption that Iraqis mightflee across international borders fortheir personal safety and later returnto recover their property and posses-sions was not one that many Iraqis,or Arabs for that matter, would make.The lessons of Palestine have beendeeply engrained in the Arab psyche.If you flee war in your homeland, youmay not be allowed to return whenfighting ends

Dawn Chatty is the RSC’s DeputyDirector. Email: dawn.chatty@qeh.ox.ac.uk

FMR 18 Refugee Studies Centre

www.rsc.ox.ac.uk

Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House,

21 St Giles, Oxford OX1 3LA, UK.Tel: +44 (0)1865 270722.Fax: +44 (0)1865 270721.

Email: rsc@qeh.ox.ac.uk

‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ and itsphantom million Iraqi refugees

by Dawn Chatty

O

Most Iraqis preferred to stand their ground

52

ew places evoke images ofdestruction and suffering creat-ed by war more strongly than

Kabul. Kabul’s children have featuredin news reports and aid agencyappeals to illustrate the devastationand displacement wrought by morethan two decades of armed conflict.It might be assumed that many youngpeople are traumatised by their expe-riences and now require the care ofmental health professionals in orderto begin rebuilding their lives. A studyjust published by Save the ChildrenUSA and UNICEF challenges thisassumption and encourages us toreflect on established approaches toworking with war-affected children.

The Children of Kabul: discussionswith Afghan families is the product ofsix months’ intensive research withmore than 600 residents of Kabul,nearly 450 of whom were aged 7-18.The scale and duration of thisresearch project set it apart from themajority of assessment exercisesundertaken by humanitarian organisa-tions working with war-affectedchildren. It is methodologically innov-ative. Researchers did not focus onconflict-related events and their con-sequences for children’s mentalhealth but adopted a broaderapproach: an exploration of children’ssocial relationships and well-being inlight of a range of problems and chal-lenges including, but not limited to,those created directly by conflict anddisplacement. Children were involvedin research design, commenting ontheir lives and analysing their circum-stances. The children emerge from thereport as survivors actively engagedin the daily struggles of life, ratherthan victims who require ‘expert’analysis and help.

A central research finding is the over-riding concern with the material andsocial consequences of war and dis-placement. Inevitably this includespoverty which, in turn, affects chil-dren’s responsibilities, nutrition,ability to play, family relationshipsand access to health care. Destructionof basic infrastructure has greatly hin-dered many aspects of children’sdaily lives including the undertakingof tasks such as collecting water andfirewood. The numerous destroyed

buildings – and the ghosts believed tohaunt them – are a significant causeof fear. Alongside the challenges cre-ated directly by war anddisplacement, concerns about every-day matters similar to thoseexperienced by young people aroundthe world are also clearly expressed.These include teacher discipline, thesickness or death of relatives, roman-tic problems and genderdiscrimination.

Perhaps the most startling and salu-tary finding, however, is the extent ofchildren’s concern about conditionsthat have come about as a result ofthe supposed peace. The clearestexample of this is traffic. With the fallof the Taliban came a massiveincrease in the number of vehicles onthe streets of Kabul, a sudden andfearsome development for childrenand a direct threat to their physicalsafety.

The authors conclude that "…a childis much more likely to be preoccupiedwith the difficulties of crossing amine field to fetch water today, thanremembering an experience of fight-ing which happened several yearsago." The implications of this studyfor the work of humanitarian agenciesare significant. Given the range ofconcerns expressed, a multi-facetedresponse seems essential: one thatfocuses principally on helping chil-dren overcome diverse problems intheir current lives. Save the ChildrenUSA and UNICEF are presentlyengaged in developing such aresponse, which includes a project toimprove road safety, provide play andleisure opportunities and supporthealing practices in keeping with localreligious belief and popular senti-ment.

In other parts of the world affectedby conflict, a fairly standardised, trau-ma-focused response continues to bepromoted by many agencies. TheChildren of Kabul project illustratesthe importance of devoting seriousefforts to the study of local contextand to working with children towardsan holistic response that addressesdirectly their particular experiences,concerns and aspirations.

Jason Hart is an RSC ResearchOfficer. Email: jason.hart@qeh.ox.ac.uk

The full text of The Children ofKabul is online at: www.savethechildren.org/pdf_publications/ChildrenofKabul.pdf

Kabul kids by Jason Hart

F

Refugee Studies Centre FMR 18

RSC Announcements

Voices out of Conflict: youngpeople affected by forced migra-tion and political crisisCumberland Lodge, Windsor GreatPark, UK : 26-28 March 2004[see page 58 for details]

RSC Southeast Asia RegionalSchool in Forced Migration8-18 December 2003 : Bangkok,Thailand

RSC International Summer Schoolin Forced Migration 20045-23 July 2004 : Oxford, UK

Forced Migration Onlinewww.forcedmigration.org

For more details visitwww.rsc.ox.ac.uk or contact theRSC at address opposite.

53

verybody has heard ofSlobodan Milosevic and SaddamHussein but up until last spring

few had heard of Charles Taylor, theLiberian militia leader turned politi-cian whose regime exacerbatedconflicts throughout West Africa.Homicide, torture, rape and expulsionmarked everyday life for those underTaylor’s rule. In June, the difficultsecurity situation forced humanitarianaid organisations to evacuate theirpersonnel. Even though humanitarian

needs were greater than ever, theinternational community only con-tributed a fifth of the amountrequested by the UN for emergencyrelief programmes in Liberia.

The Norwegian Refugee Council sup-ported the UN High Commissioner forRefugees, Ruud Lubbers, when hecalled on the UN to mandate and dis-patch a peace force to this war-torncountry. In July the US sent the firstsoldiers to prepare the ground for alarger peace operation. ECOWAS (theEconomic Community of West AfricanStates) offered to field 3,000 soldiersto a peace operation. In August the USdeployed 200 soldiers after Taylortook refuge in neighbouring Nigeria.Shortly after, the government and thetwo leading rebel groups agreed on apeace treaty including a new interimgovernment and new elections in2005. Backed by the UN and with aUS-led peace force in place, there isnow a fair chance that this war-wracked country will get back on itsfeet.

For many years Liberia was a safehaven for rebel groups in neighbour-ing countries. Illicit trade in weaponsand diamonds flourished, earninghuge sums for Taylor and his family.Regional political instability wasessential to the continuation of this

steady income flow. Taylor’s regimewas an important protagonist in thehorrific civil war in neighbouringSierra Leone. Taylor also played a rolein the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire andattempted to destabilise the govern-ment of Guinea.

Two different rebel groups in north-ern and eastern Liberia were steadilypressuring Taylor, whose regime onlyheld sway over a small part of thecountry and the capital, Monrovia. An

International Contact Groupon Liberia led by ECOWASinitiated several meetingsbetween the rebels and

Taylor. The steady escalation of fight-ing had a dramatic humanitarian toll.Between 500,000 and 600,000 peopleare in desperate flight inside thecountry while almost 300,000 havesought the limited and precariousprotection available in neighbouringstates. Approximately 200,000 IDPsare presently in and around Monrovia.

In Sierra Leone the international com-munity has mobilised to maintain thefragile peace. The UN’s peacekeepingoperation consists of 17,000 soldiers,the largest operation of its kind in theworld. War criminals are being prose-cuted and improved security isenabling humanitarian organisationsto provide aid. In just a couple ofyears the situation of the civilian pop-ulation has turned from abysmaldespair to a new sense of hope.

This is in striking contrast to Liberiawhere the volatile security situationprevented humanitarian aid in largeareas for years. Earlier this year aNorwegian humanitarian worker waskilled. For some periods of time theWorld Food Programme has had tointerrupt food distribution in largeparts of the country. While formalcolonial powers have intervened inthe region (the British have taken theinitiative in Sierra Leone and Francehas dispatched 4,000 troops to Côte

d’Ivoire) Liberia was left to her owndevices.

Since the Liberian state was foundedby emancipated American slaves in1847 it has enjoyed close ties to theUS. Liberia was a staunch US ally dur-ing the Cold War. The country was nolonger of strategic interest to theworld’s leading power. The global waron terror caused changing prioritiesand the suffering of Liberian civiliansaccorded a low priority.

The Norwegian Refugee Council isback in Liberia to assist IDPs. It is ourhope that the international communi-ty will extend its efforts to supportthe people of Liberia to establishpeace, democracy, human rights andsocial and economical growth in theirwar-wracked country.

Raymond Johansen is theNorwegian Refugee Council’sSecretary General.

For further information on Liberia see theNRC/Global IDP Project country profile:www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Liberia

FMR 18 Norwegian Refugee Council

Liberia: a hope for peace?by Raymond Johansen

E

The steady escalation of fighting had a dramatic humanitarian toll.

For more information about theNorwegian Refugee Council,

visit www.nrc.no/engindex.htm

54

n October 2002 an inter-agencyworking group (comprising OCHA,UNHCR, NRC, the International

Rescue Committee and the SierraLeone government’s NationalCommission for Social Action) set upthe Camp Management Project. Theinitiative sprang from the urgent needto focus on management of displacedpeople’s camps following the sexualexploitation scandal involving human-itarian agencies in West Africa.1

While comprehensive guidelines andminimum standards already exist forcamp design, construction and servicedelivery, there has not been a system-atic and holistic approach to campmanagement – from negotiating camplocations through to camp closure.Neither is there any comprehensivedocumentation with a camp manage-ment perspective which could be apractical tool to complement existingsectoral guidelines.

Camp management agencies play acritical role in delivering assistanceand providing protection for dis-placed people in both IDP and refugeesettings. However, the capacities ofmanagement agencies vary widelydepending on their expertise,

experience and ability to secure donorsupport. These differences in manage-ment and approach are particularlyclear between refugee and IDP set-tings. The inter-agency working groupin Sierra Leone has focused on identi-fying key areas of camp managementresponsibilities, reviewing lessonslearnt and identifying good practicefrom refugee camp situations whichcould be transferred to IDP campmanagement. By combining all of this,the working group aimed to develop acomprehensive overview from a campmanagement perspective. The productthat was developed became the CampManagement Toolkit.

The objectives of the CampManagement Toolkit are:

■ to define and compile informationon all aspects of camp operationsrequired by a camp manager (thereare 19 chapters2)

■ to define the roles and responsibil-ities of camp managers in relationto each subject

■ to provide a list of essential read-ing for each subject

■ to provide both practical and ref-erence tools to support campmanagers in their daily work,including checklists, monitoringforms and practical guidelines.

The toolkit addresses both the techni-cal and social aspects of campmanagement and is meant to be aniterative document, open to additionsand changes. This initiative specifical-ly focuses on individual campmanagers and camp managementagencies. It does not aim to beexhaustive and there is no intentionto duplicate or revise existing guide-lines or standards. Ultimately, thetoolkit aims to provide a comprehen-sive, holistic and practical overview ofa full spectrum of camp managementresponsibilities.

The Camp Management Project is nowmoving to a global level. FromOctober to mid-December 2003, thetoolkit will be field-tested in selected

countries in Africa, Europe, Asia andSouth America in order to identifygaps in information and tools, assessthe effectiveness of the tools, reviewand assess the present design,enhance the revised toolkit withnewly identified good practices andidentify which operational areas ofthe toolkit are consulted more fre-quently.

For the field testing to be as reliableas possible, it will take place in across-section of conflict-prone orpost-conflict countries. The main cri-teria for selecting field-testingcountries are: ■ a non-emergency refugee/

internally displaced situation■ an established IRC and/or NRC

presence alongside UNHCR andOCHA country offices or otherpartners willing to coordinatein-country field testing in closecooperation with the CampManagement Project coordinatorat NRC-Oslo

■ a well-established humanitarianpresence.

For further information pleasecontact Nina M Birkeland.Email: nina.birkeland@nrc.no

1. See FMR15 pp16-19 and FMR16 pp45-46.

2. The 19 chapters are: negotiations; camp design,care and maintenance; camp management team;camp committees; food distribution and non-fooditems; water and sanitation; registration and datacollection; security; protection; child protection;community participation; formal education;enhancing livelihood strategies; sexual- and gen-der-based violence; recreation and youth; healthcare and health education; psychosocial care;peace building and reconciliation; and camp clo-sure.

Global IDP Project FMR 18

The Global IDP Project is pleased to presentthe inter-agency Camp Management Project:

The Global IDP Project is an interna-tional non-profit organisation that

monitors internal displacement causedby conflicts.

The IDP Database (www.idpproject.org)provides public information about

internal displacement in 50 countries.

The Project is part of the NorwegianRefugee Council (NRC), an organisation

that works to provide assistance andprotection to refugees and displacedpeople in Africa, Asia, Europe and the

Americas. NRC was founded in1946 in Oslo.

The Global IDP ProjectChemin Moïse-Duboule 59

CH 1209 Geneva, SwitzerlandTel: +41 22 799 0700Fax: +41 22 799 0701

Email: idpproject@nrc.ch

IDP newsIDP news is a weekly summary of

news on IDPs in conflicts. It iscompiled by the Global IDP Project,

based on public information.Subscribe by email to:idpproject@nrc.ch or

visit our website www.idpproject.org.

I

55FMR 18 UNHCR

number of recent UNHCRevaluations suggest that theorganisation knows less and

less about the refugees it is mandatedto protect. Recent events in WestAfrica, where a number of humanitari-an personnel were implicated in thesexual exploitation of refugee girls1,confirmed the impression that UNHCRand other aid organisations have avery limited understanding of thesocial dynamics of refugee situations.

Seeking to understand the origins ofthis problem, UNHCR’s Evaluation andPolicy Analysis Unit (EPAU) asked anumber of staff members why theagency has lost contact with its bene-ficiaries. The answers receivedprovide valuable insight into thechanging conditions under whichhumanitarian personnel are obligedto work.

Many respondents pointed to the factthat security in refugee-populatedareas is much weaker than it was adecade ago – a development evi-denced by the abduction and murderof UNHCR staff in a number of loca-tions. While UNHCR staff were onceable to live and work amongstrefugees, they are now more common-ly based in provincial centres, a longand often difficult drive away fromthe nearest refugee camp.

Many staff members also pointed tothe way in which email and the inter-net have penetrated even the mostremote UNHCR offices, making it pos-sible for staff to spend much longerperiods of time in their office – andmuch less time interacting withrefugees. The organisation’s reportingrequirements have increased substan-tially in recent years, obliging fieldstaff to sit at their computers forhours on end. Ironically, the newemphasis on accountability in thehumanitarian sector has thus dis-tanced UNHCR from the very people itis supposed to protect!

Our staff also told us of their con-cerns about the limited number ofUNHCR personnel in frontline refugeelocations. The difficulty of fillingposts in difficult duty stations, cou-pled with the introduction of newregulations allowing staff posted tosuch locations to take regular ‘restand recuperation’ breaks, has led to areduction of UNHCR’s field presence.This trend has been reinforced by thedelegation of many operationalresponsibilities to NGOs and otherimplementing partners.

Employees also pointed out that theimpetus to get out of the office and tomingle with refugees has been consid-erably reduced by UNHCR’s inabilityto provide them with the protection,assistance and solutions which theyneed. "It’s very difficult to talk withpeople when you know you cannotsatisfy their requests for relief orresettlement opportunities, and whomay be quite angry as a result," sug-gested one respondent.

Others told us that UNHCR’s interac-tion with refugee communities,especially those which have lived inexile for long periods of time, is ham-pered by the unrepresentative natureof the committees established to pro-vide refugees with some form oforganised leadership. As Tania Kaiserconcluded when she visited Guinea toundertake an evaluation for UNHCR,"the refugee committees are extremelyvariable, and some ordinary refugeeshave nothing to do with them.Committee members are often consid-ered to be ‘big people’, in some casescorrupt and self-serving." This prob-lem is evidently compounded whenUNHCR and other humanitarian per-sonnel deal only with committeemembers and fail to interact withother refugees.

Confronted with the challenge oflearning more about refugees andother people of concern to UNHCR,EPAU is:

■ experimenting with ‘beneficiary-based evaluations’ which set outto solicit the opinions and percep-tions of women, children and otherpowerless people who tend to beignored in more conventional eval-uations

■ awaiting the results of a majorreview of UNHCR’s monitoring sys-tems and procedures: initialfindings indicate that, despite allthe obstacles identified above,UNHCR and its partners continueto collect large amounts of infor-mation about refugees and otherbeneficiaries but data analysis isoften weak and information col-lected is not used to informpolicymaking and programmedesign

■ examining the way that samplesurveys can be used as a means oflearning more about refugee popu-lations and their aspirations: themethodology of surveys under-taken has often been uneven inquality and little guidance materialis currently available to humanitar-ian organisations that wish toundertake or commission samplesurveys.

FMR readers experienced in theuse of sample surveys in refugeesituations are invited to contactEPAU at hqep00@unhcr.ch.

Some of the issues raised in thisarticle are also examined in‘Researching refugees: somemethodological and ethical consid-erations in social science andforced migration’ by KarenJacobsen and Loren Landau, ‘NewIssues in Refugee Research’, no. 90,available under ‘Publications’ onthe UNHCR website www.unhcr.ch.

1. See FMR15 pp16-19 and FMR16 pp46-47.

Why do we know so little aboutrefugees? How can we learn more?

by Jeff Crisp

A

This is a regular page of news anddebate from UNHCR’s Evaluation andPolicy Analysis Unit (EPAU). For furtherinformation, or suggestions regardingthis feature, contact Jeff Crisp, head ofEPAU. Email CRISP@unhcr.ch

56 The Brookings-SAIS Project FMR 18

awyers associations and NGOsaround the world can play animportant role in promoting

better laws and policies in their owncountries for internally displacedpersons (IDPs). Take, for example,the recent initiative in the SouthCaucasus, home to more than amillion IDPs, where teams of lawyersfrom Georgia, Armenia and Azerbai-jan evaluated their national laws andadministrative regulations in terms ofthe Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement and came up with rec-ommendations for legal reform.

Their findings are the basis of a newstudy1, published by the AmericanSociety of International Law in collab-oration with the Brookings-SAISProject on Internal Displacement, theGeorgian Young Lawyers Association(GYLA) and the Office for DemocraticInstitutions and Human Rights of theOrganisation for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR).

The idea for the study arose at aregional seminar on InternalDisplacement in the South Caucasus,held in Tbilisi, Georgia, in 2000.During the following two-year period,local lawyers analysed their nationallaws in terms of the GuidingPrinciples to determine whether leg-islative reforms were needed toenhance legal protection for IDPs.Professor Walter Kälin, author of theAnnotations to the Guiding Principles,chaired the process, while GYLA actedas Project Coordinator; OSCE/ODIHRand the Brookings-SAIS Project onInternal displacement provided over-all supervision and support.

The new study includes the Englishtranslations of the lawyers’ reportsand the summaries of roundtable dis-cussions convened in Baku, Tbilisi andYerevan at which the lawyers present-ed their findings. Among the majorissues they addressed are rights relat-ing to citizenship, return orresettlement, property restitution and

compensation, education, employ-ment, housing and politicalparticipation.

In Armenia, the lawyers recommendedthe drafting of a specific national lawon IDPs that would establish a defini-tion of IDPs and clearly delineate theirrights. They also proposed amend-ments to a variety of existing laws tobetter protect IDPs. In Georgia, wherethere already exists an extensive bodyof law relevant to IDPs, the lawyersrecommended that IDPs be guaran-teed the right to vote in local andparliamentary elections without lossof assistance benefits. And they calledfor: improvements in the govern-ment’s registration system to enableIDPs to more effectively exercise theirrights; the elaboration of standardsfor adequate living quarters; and legalprovisions to regulate property resti-tution. In Azerbaijan, which since1992 has had a law on refugees andIDPs, the lawyers recommended sepa-rate laws for IDPs and refugees inorder to clarify and better ensure theprotection of both groups. They alsosuggested revising the existing legaldefinition of IDPs to include thosedisplaced for reasons other than con-flict, called for special protections forthose IDPs with particular vulnerabili-ties, and proposed legislation for IDPreturn and property compensation.

The roundtable held in each countrybrought together senior governmentofficials, parliamentarians, localNGOs, IDP representatives, and inter-national organisations and experts.

The lawyers’ recommendations arebeing studied by the governments andhave already begun to stimulateimportant legislative reform, forinstance in Georgia with regard to vot-ing rights. The process is also provid-ing important follow-up to the recom-mendations of the Representative ofthe UN Secretary-General on IDPs who,in his missions to all three SouthCaucasus countries, had recommended

the development of national policiesand programmes in accordance withthe Guiding Principles. Just as signifi-cant, the Representativerecommended stronger governmentpartnerships with civil society.

Overall, this process of legal review inthe South Caucasus provides a trulynoteworthy example of the significantcontribution that civil society canmake to promoting more effectivelaws and policies for the internallydisplaced. It is to be hoped that thepublication of the results of thisprocess will stimulate similar initia-tives in other parts of the world andprove instructive to lawyers, parlia-mentarians and IDP organisations whoobserve a need in their own countriesto improve national laws and policiesfor IDPs.

The Brookings-SAIS Project onInternal Displacement would be inter-ested to hear from lawyers groups inother parts of the world ready toundertake similar processes.

1. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacementand the Law of the South Caucasus: Georgia,Armenia and Azerbaijan, edited by Roberta Cohen,Walter Kälin and Erin Mooney. For a copy contactCharles Driest: cdriest@brookings.edu Tel: +1 202 797 6168. Fax: +1 202 797 6003.

The Brookings-SAIS Projecton Internal Displacement

Civil society initiatives can improvenational laws and policies for IDPs

L

From Persecution to Prison:The Health Consequences ofDetention for AsylumSeekersby Physicians for Human Rights andthe Bellevue/NYU Program forSurvivors of Torture. 2003. 219pp.Available online at www.phrusa.org/campaigns/asylum_network/deten-tion_execSummary/detention_pdf.pdf

From Persecution to Prison is a sys-tematic and comprehensive scientificstudy examining the health ofdetained asylum seekers. Many asy-lum seekers have suffered trauma,such as torture, prior to immigration,which contributes to high rates ofpsychiatric morbidity in this popula-tion. Detention may exacerbate priorsymptoms or even foster developmentof new problems.

Contact: John Heffernan, Physiciansfor Human Rights, 100 Boylston Street,Suite 702, Boston MA 02116, US. Tel: +1 617 413 6407. Email: jheffernan@phrusa.org. Website: www.phrusa.org In UK, contact Moyra Rushby, Medact,601 Holloway Road, London N19 4DJ.Tel: +44 (0)20 7272 2020. Website: www.medact.org

Women Asylum Seekers inthe UK: A GenderPerspectiveRefugee Women’s Resource Project,Asylum Aid. 2003. 178pp. Availableonline at www.asylumaid.org.uk/PublicationsThis report, based on the study of102 cases, reveals that in many casesin the UK the decision to refusewomen asylum seekers protectionunder the 1951 Refugee Convention ismade on the basis of a gender-blindapproach to their claim. It includesrecommendations urging the govern-ment to adopt measures to guaranteea fair treatment of women asylumseekers’ claims in the UK and torespond to their specific needsthroughout the asylum determinationprocess.

Contact Asylum Aid, 28 CommercialStreet, London E1 6LS, UK. Tel: +44 020 7377 5123.Email: info@asylumaid.org.uk

Psychosocial Concepts inHumanitarian Work withChildren: A Review of theConcepts and RelatedLiterature Eds Maryanne Loughry and CarolaEyber. Roundtable on the Demographyof Forced Migration, National ResearchCouncil and Program on ForcedMigration and Health at the MailmanSchool of Public Health, ColumbiaUniversity. 2003. ISBN 0-309-08933-b.142pp. Available online atwww.nap.edu/catalog/10698.html

This publication reviews the literatureon research of psychosocial issues inhumanitarian work, especially as itrelates to children who have beenexposed to prolonged violence andarmed conflict. Includes an annotatedbibliography.

Contact: National Academies Press,500 Fifth Street, NW, Lockbox 285,Washington DC 20055, US. Website: www.nap.edu Email: zjones@nas.edu Tel: +1 888 624 8373.

Supporting Refugee childrenin 21st Century Britain -NEW REVISED EDITION by Jill Rutter. June 2003. 320pp. ISBN1-85856- 292-9. £19.99/ ¤30.00.

Since the first edition of this com-pendium was published in 2001,important new legislation has alteredthe prospects of refugee children. Thefirst is the Race Relations AmendmentAct (2000) which came into force inApril 2002, the second the newAsylum Act. This revised edition takesaccount of the changes in the law. Itdescribes the backgrounds of 35 ofthe major refugee groups in Britain,including Albanians, Eastern European

Roma and people fleeing the formerSoviet Union, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.The author notes how educationalprovision for pupils for refugee com-munities has progressed anddescribes those which have provedeffective in promoting their learning,from pre-school through the statutoryyears and up to age 19. Additionalsections include healthcare issues,emotional and psychological issues,using the expressive arts with youngrefugees, and parental involvementand family literacy.

Contact: Trentham Books Ltd,Westview House, 734 London Road,Stoke on Trent ST4 5NP, UK. Tel: +44 (0)1782 745567. Fax: +44 (0)1782 745553. Website: www.trentham-books.co.ukEmail: tb@trentham-books.co.uk

An assessment of the impactof asylum policies in Europe1990-2000by Roger Zetter, David Griffiths, SilvaFerretti and Martyn Pearl. Home OfficeResearch Study 259. June 2003.168pp. Available at online atwww.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hors259.pdf

Commissioned by the ImmigrationResearch and Statistics Service of theImmigration and Community Group inthe UK’s Home Office Research,Development and StatisticsDirectorate, this study reviews theavailable evidence on the legislation,policies and practices that may havehad an impact on the number andpatterns of asylum applications to theEU between 1990 and 2000. It bringstogether an extensive body of litera-ture and data on refugees and asylumseekers in Europe. The study shouldbe of interest both to those involvedwith research in this area and withasylum policy.

For a hard copy, contact: RDSCommunications Development Unit,Room 264, 50 Queen Anne’s Gate,London SW1H 9AT, UK. Tel: +44 (020) 7273 2084. Fax: +44 (020) 7222 0211. Email: publications.rds@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

57FMR 18 Publications

publications

58

Taking Stock and Chartingthe Future: International

Symposium on the Mandate of theRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs

Brookings Institution-SAIS Project onInternal Displacement. 2003. 88pp.

This is the report of an InternationalSymposium held in December 2002 inAustria, on the occasion of the 10thanniversary of the Representative’smandate. The principal objectives ofthe meeting were to assess the workand challenges of the mandate as wellas the progress made by the interna-tional community and to explorefuture strategies at the international,regional, national and local levels forpromoting enhanced responses to theglobal crisis of internal displacement.The publication includes a summaryreport on the Symposium as well as abackground paper by ProfessorThomas Weiss on ‘InternationalEfforts for IDPs after a Decade: WhatNext?’

Contact: Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli,Brookings-SAIS Project on InternalDisplacement, The BrookingsInstitution, 1775 Massachusetts AveNW, Washington DC 20036, US. Tel: +1 202 797 6145. Email: gsanchez@brookings.edu

Survey of PalestinianRefugees and InternallyDisplaced Persons 2002Badil Resource Center for PalestinianResidency and Refugee Rights. June2003. ISSN 1728-1679. 200pp. $10.Available in English and Arabic.

This annual survey covers root caus-es, demographic characteristics, legalstatus, socio-economic status, interna-tional protection and assistance, andframework for durable solutions. Italso provides recommendations con-cerning the implementation of therights of Palestinian refugees andIDPs in the context of a just and com-prehensive solution to the conflict inthe Middle East.

Contact: Badil Resource Center, PO Box728, Bethlehem, Palestine. Tel/fax: +970 2 274 7346. Email: info@badil.org Website: www.badil.org

The World Refugee Survey2003US Committee for Refugees. May 2003.258pp. $25.

The 2003 Survey reviews refugeeconditions and government policiesaffecting refugees and displaced per-sons in 134 countries worldwide.It includes 13 pages of statistics onrefugees, IDPs and asylum seekers.The 2003 Survey features articles onproblems in international refugee pro-tection in the aftermath of 11September by Ruud Lubbers (UN HighCommissioner for Refugees) and theplight of North Korean refugees bySen Sam Brownback.

Contact: US Committee for Refugees,1717 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite200, Washington DC 20036, US. Tel: +1 202 347 3507. Email: uscr@irsa-uscr.org Website: www.refugees.org

Anywhere but War: InternalDisplacement and ArmedConflict in Acehby Cynthia Buiza & Gary Risser, JesuitRefugee Service-Asia Pacific. March2003. ISBN 974-91284-9-4. 108pp.Free – but donations welcomed.

This book presents data collectedabout those displaced in Aceh andattempts an analysis of the situation –but also looks beyond the data to thelives and suffering of the people rep-resented.

Contact: Cynthia T Buiza, JRS-AsiaPacific, 24/1 Soi Ari 4 (South),Phahonyothin 7, Bangkok 10400,

Thailand. Tel: + 66 2 279 1817. Email: cynthia.buiza@jrs.net Website: www.jrs.th.com

Publications FMR 18

Forthcoming Conference

Voices out of Conflict:young people affected byforced migration andpolitical crisis

Cumberland Lodge, Windsor Great

Park, UK : 26-28 March 2004

Humanitarian aid agencies have

tended to see protection in terms

of national or regional security,

and do not give enough recogni-

tion to other aspects of protection

which are far more vital to young

people in situations of political

crisis or forced migration. For

these young people, aged 10 to 25

years, protection from sexual

abuse and labour exploitation,

and the creation of the conditions

under which they can have safe

access to education, employment

and healthcare, and consequently

become self-sufficient, are much

more immediate concerns. Recent

research and experience suggests

that these young people are still

too rarely listened to even by the

agencies and NGOs whose goals

are to help them. This internation-

al conference will be hosted by

Cumberland Lodge in partnership

with the RSC and by the Internat-

ional Rescue Committee (UK) and

the Women’s Commission for

Refugee Women and Children.

It will address these issues in a

unique way, by bringing young

refugees to Cumberland Lodge to

put their experiences and solu-

tions directly to funders, agencies

and academics.

For more details, visit

www.rsc.ox.ac.uk or contact the

RSC at address on page 51.

No Refuge: The Challenge ofInternal DisplacementOCHA Internal Displacement Unit.2003. ISBN 92-1-132023-2. 153pp. $28 (plus $12 p&p).

No Refuge: The Challenge of InternalDisplacement outlines the emergenceof internal displacement as an issueon the international humanitarianagenda, and explores conceptual chal-lenges that confront policy makersand humanitarian actors. It analysesinternal displacement against thebackdrop of the major themes thatdelineate the policy framework ofhumanitarian action and diplomacy –such as sovereignty, access, protec-tion of vulnerable people (especiallycivilians caught in armed conflict) andthe problems that must be addressedin order to create conditions fordurable solutions. The principalauthor is Kathleen Newland and con-tributing authors are Erin Patrick andMonette Zard of the Migration PolicyInstitute in Washington DC, who inter-acted closely with the InternalDisplacement Unit’s editorial teamand many institutional partners andexperts.

Contact: UN Publications, Room DC2-853, 2 UN Plaza, New York 10017, NY,US. Email: publications@un.org. Or goto www.un.org/Pubs/whatsnew/order-frm.htm and quote UN Sales No.E.03.III.M.1 on order form.

Problems of Protection:The UNHCR, Refugees,and Human RightsEds Niklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney andGil Loescher. May 2003. 304pp. ISBN0415945747. £24.95.

The process of refugee protection isone that is complex and controversialand always more political thanhumanitarian. Problems of Protectionaddresses the shortcomings of relyingon an international system in whichthe richest countries often set the agen-da, shifting attitudes among affectedcountries, and the difficulty of rebuild-ing societies in which the refugeesituation continues to intensify.

Contact: Routledge, 29 West 35thStreet, New York, NY 10001, US.Website: www.routledge-ny.com Email: info@routledge-ny.com

Eroding Local Capacity:International HumanitarianAction in Africa Eds Monica Kathina Juma and AstriSuhrke. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.2003. ISBN 91-7106-502-4. 203pp.£16.95/$27.95.

Eroding Local Capacity focuses oncases from East Africa and the Horn.It considers institutional capacity inthe public and private sector, as wellas legal and social norms of humani-tarian action. Includes chapters by theeditors plus Bonaventure Rutinwa,Mutoy Mubiala, Peter MwangiKagwanja, Bertha Kadenyi Amisi andJoakim Gundel.

Order online at www.nai.uu.se/webb-shop/ShopGB/index.html or emailorders@nai.uu.se. Tel: +46 18 562200. Fax: +46 18 562290. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, PO Box1703, SE-751 47 Uppsala, Sweden.

State of the World’s Mothers2003: Protecting Womenand Children in War andConflictSave the Children USA. May 2003. 44ppAvailable online at www.savethechil-dren.org/sowm2003/index.shtml

This report focuses on the millions ofmothers and children whose liveshave been shattered by armed con-flict. It suggests actions required tosupport women and shield childrenfrom the brutal excesses of war. A‘Conflict Protection Scorecard’ analy-ses 40 of the world’s most dangerousconflict zones and shows where abus-es against women and children aregreatest. A ‘Mothers’ Index’ docu-ments conditions for mothers andchildren in 117 developed and devel-oping countries.

Contact: Save the Children USA, 54Wilton Road, Westport, CT 06880, US.Website: www.savethechildren.org

59FMR 18 Publications

Encouraging self-sufficiency for displaced populationsThe Developing Countries Farm Radio Network (www.farmradio.org) is a Canadian-based, not-for-profit organisation working in partnership with radio broadcasters in over 70 countries to fight poverty and food insecurity. The Network gathers information about successful, low-cost practices in sustainable agriculture, nutrition, health and community development. These are turned into radio scripts which aredistributed to partner-broadcasters and others engaged in rural development for free dissemination.

The Network has produced a package of scripts – with guides to further sources of information – designed to meet theneeds of refugees and IDPs:

■ rebuilding local seed supplies after armed conflict or other emergency situations

■ ‘survival’ crops provide food during times of need

■ an innovative farmer grows food for refugees

■ sharing the load after conflict: villagers start a revolving loan fund

■ growing vegetables in a refugee camp

■ dispute over a sacred stream: villagers describe the conflict

■ conflict over natural resources: a short story

■ women face many challenges after conflict

■ health considerations for refugees

■ rebuilding local seed supplies after armed conflict

or other emergency situations■ Mummy Tiger and her babies: how children

experience conflict

They can be downloaded at:www.farmradio.org/en/publications/scripts_en.php

For further information and to register to receive scripts, contact Naomi Fraser, Developing Countries Farm Radio Network,416 Moore Avenue, Suite 101, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4G 1C9. Email: nfraser@farmradio.org

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