FORBGXSAlg SJSSSwb* OST/ - OSTI.GOV

MANAGING COMMON RESOURCES IN LOCAL AND GLOBAL SYSTEMS

applying theory across scales

edited by Sylvia Karlsson

SJSSSwb* OST/FORBGXSAlg

Research Report No. 9 from EPOS Environmental Policy and Society Linkoping University <

Managing common resources in local and global systems

Applying theory across scales

Edited by Sylvia Karlsson

Research Report No. 9 from EPOS,Research Programme on Environmental Policy and Society

Institute of Tema Research, Linkoping University

ISSN 1104-4403 ISBN 91-7871-988-7

© 1997 the authors, EPOS and the Department of Water and Environmental Studies, Linkoping University

Layout and typesetting: TiiaRiitta Granfelt

Printed in Sweden by Motala Grafiska, Motala, 1997

DISCLAIMER

Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available originaldocument.

CONTENTS

Preface v

Introduction: 1Managing common resources in local and global systems:Applying theory across scales Sylvia Karlsson

Thou should not know too much... 13When lack of information promotes co-operative behaviour:The case of oil fields in Wyoming, Oklahoma and Texas Bjorn Hassler

Three different CPR management models for 33riverine nitrogen polluters in Sweden Berit Arheimer

Recycling of sewage in Swedish municipalities: 52Policy implications Henriette Soderberg

Bridge over troubled waters? 65The state-NGO interface in governing urban environments Hakan Tropp

Forest management in India: Local vs. state control 97of forest resources Julie Wilk

Protecting International Commons: 110Brief comments on current attempts at establishing new international institutions on persistent organic pollutants (POPs)Henrik Selin

The global commons and United Nations reform 132Sylvia Karlsson

PREFACE

The idea to this publication came up during a course in Common Property Resource Management for PhD students at the Department of Water and Environmental Studies, Institute of Tema Research, Linkoping University, Sweden, in the spring of 1996. Essays written during the course covered a broad range of different common resources and represented approaches from research students with backgrounds in disciplines as varied as political science, natural geography, ecology and hydrology. However, despite the diversity of focus and empirical entry points, the seminar discussions and contents of the essays brought up several common aspects that we felt would contribute to the development of possible further research topics in the area of common property resource management. In this respect, we feel it would be appropriate to share these with a larger audience.

The above course participants all had extensive experience in interdisciplinary communication and exchange since that is what characterises their department. This fact yielded particularly fruitful results when we started digging into the theoretical and empirical aspects of management of common property resources. The seminar discussions were intensive, basic concepts were widened in scope or challenged and new ones tested. We realise that the angles and ideas reflected in the essays to follow afford more questions than answers but this is a crucial part of the research process.

The introduction is intended to bring forward some of the key concepts raised in the essays, furthermore, it includes some of the points that came up in the seminars that preceded the writing of the essays. These discussions constituted the intellectual framework for individual contributions to the publication and will hopefully aid the reader to find the main threads of the ideas presented.

For taking the initiative to and organising the course, for taking part in the review process and for continuous encouragement to proceed with this publication, thanks are due to Professor Anders Hjort af Omas.

This publication came into existence in cooperation with the Department of Water and Environmental Studies, and with support from the research network Environmental Policy and Society, which is gratefully acknowledged.

Sylvia Karlsson Linkoping, April 1997

INTRODUCTION

MANAGING COMMON RESOURCES IN LOCAL AND GLOBAL SYSTEMS

APPLYING THEORY ACROSS SCALES

Sylvia Karlsson

Introduction

The main point brought forward in this publication is the productiveness of applying theoretical elements, developed within common property resource (CPR) literature, to a broader field of cases on different scales. The common framework for the contributions is a series of seminars held at the Department of Water and Environmental Studies in the spring of 1996, covering expanding work during the last decade on common property resource (CPR) management1. It is obvious that there were a broad range of definitions of the concept CPR in the literature. The common pool / property2 resource concepts are both used, often depending on the resource studied, and authors in this volume have used both terms accordingly. The term common resources as a common denominator for a resource which is or could be managed as common property will be used in this introductory chapter.

Certain points are raised from empirical cases presented in this volume that are partly missing or not thoroughly stressed in other work in the area of CPR management and which crystallised much clearer when contrasting the situation for cases from different scales.

Issues of scale and generalisation

Common resources around the globe

Common resources are generally seen to include all cases where a resource is not under the exclusive ownership of either one private actor or the state, and where one actor's individual rational decision may

1

Managing Common Resources in Local and Global Systems

lead to suboptimal collective outcomes. However, cases where the resource is formally owned by one actor e.g. the state, but user rights and management responsibilities are given to at least two appropriators are also included in the definition. The concept of CPR is used mostly for situations where there is some form of joint management of a local resource. The global commons are referred to as those areas that fall outside the jurisdiction of any one state and as those resources which by their very nature transcend state boundaries and over which it is impossible to hold physical control.

The first three essays are located in the industrialised world. Hassler starts the empirical journey with decision-making dilemmas for holders of drilling rights to privately owned oil-wells in the American states of Wyoming, Oklahoma and Texas. The physical characteristics of the resource are such that collectively inefficient resource utilisation results when there are no possibilities to make enforceable controls between individual right holders. Focusing on the decision-making process, Hassler deliberates the favourable role that lack of information may have under certain conditions.

In the second essay Arheimer discusses the management of water resources at national and regional level in Sweden where the ten year political goal of reducing the amount of nitrogen transported by rivers to the Baltic Sea by 50 per cent has failed. In her comparative analysis of three proposed models for water management, Arheimer approaches the problem of riverine nitrogen from the CPR perspective, since the issue has the necessary characteristics of undefined property rights andpossibility for inefficient levels of cooperation. She argues for the creation of regional water administration boards in every river catchment with decentralised choices of locally adapted models of management in each sub-basin.

The industrialised world is still the centre of attention in the third contribution. Soderberg approaches the case of sewage management in Swedish municipalities from an institutional perspective. In several municipalities in Sweden, for example on the island community of Gotland, policy makers are starting to change their view of sewage as a problem to be discarded, to one where it is considered that sewage contains enough valuable resources to motivate recycling. Soderberg discusses what such a fundamental change of view entails in terms of new institutional set-ups; changes of techniques to locally specific solutions, decision making transfer from experts to politicians and revolutionary instead of reformatory process strategies.

Focus is switched to the developing countries in the fourth essay where Tropp explores the efforts of NGOs to collaborate with the state

2

Introduction

to manage the polluted waterways of the city of Madras, India. Viewing urban environment as a common resource, he analyses its management from the normative call for good governance. When arguing that lack of proper governance structures is one reason for the inability to deal with environmental problems, a proposed solution is often to form a partnership between the state, the local NGO sector and communities. This may face considerable difficulties in the case of Madras due to the self-interest of the ruling elite where, inter alia, vested interest andlack of transparency diminish both the capacity and legitimacy of thestate to govern.

In the fifth contribution the context is still India, this time regarding the diminishing forests, the focus of Wilk's paper. In response to the loss of forest cover the Indian government has changed its forestry management strategy which now includes the right of local populations to participate. Wilk claims that measures taken so far will prove insufficient to create real participation of local appropriators, who still have limited access to actual decision-making and unclear legal status. Participation as such is thus not a sufficient factor for successful management. Difficult obstacles include, conflicting goals over the resource, and lack of faith between the local population and the State.

Finally attention is turned to the international and global3 level where sovereign governments must face the challenges of managing common resources. Selin inquires into the international efforts of reducing emissions of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) in the context of two almost parallel negotiations, one regional (within the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, LRTAP) and one global (under the aegis of the United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP). His analytical focus is on the necessity of shared norms and principles for institutional change and factors influencing the probability of establishing such shared norms of international and global level.

The last contribution outlines fire management implications of viewing the global commons as the common heritage and property of mankind. Karlsson centres on the role of the United Nations in this context, the UN being the only truly global institution that could serve as an appropriator organization for the global commons. She examines certain requirements for change in both the working of the organization as such and the behaviour of individual states if a switch from independent to coordinated action is to be achieved.

The empirical material presented in this volume thus covers both local and regional resources in developed and developing countries (Arheimer, Hassler, Soderberg, Tropp, Wilk) in rural and urban settings, and global resources (Karlsson, Selin). We have broadened the use of


the concept of common resources to include as disparate resources as the general environment of towns with both natural and man-made resources (Tropp), privately owned oil-wells (Hassler), and resources that until recently were not considered as such but now fall within the definition (Soderberg). The purpose of bringing such a wide variety of cases together is to identify commonalties and differences when applying elements of the same theory across scales and cultural and socioeconomic settings.

Applying theory across scales

The theoretical dilemmas in all contributions to this volume are similar albeit on different scales. In all cases the theoretical models suggest that collective action is necessary in order to enforce some level of restricted access to a resource. In most cases, is it difficult to exclude outsiders from gaining benefit from the resources, and each user is capable of using the resource at the expense of the welfare of other potential users4.

The various attempts at theory formulation of the management of a local common property resource (McKean, 1992; Ostrom, 1990) show potential for affording important insights in settings other than in those local communities of limited size often in rural and less developed contexts (Arheimer, Hassler) where they were developed. There is nothing in the models developed that precludes analysis of situations other than at small local level (Hassler, Selin). The critical similarity making the same model applicable at different scales, is that the authors focus on the characteristic of the system. Since we are not dealing with the actors' internal qualities, but with the external interaction processes, the analysis is not dependent on any particular scale.

Clearly, many questions are raised when attempting to generalise theory elements between these different scales. In principle social scientists need be just as concerned with the problem of scale5 in social systems, as scientists who focus on understanding issues of scale in physical and biological systems (Young, 1994). There should be even more to consider in a situation where the social systems in question are tightly dependent upon these physical and biological systems. Settings may differ for example in geographical scale, type of resource, and available institutions for common management. Decision-making structures vary markedly in scope and complexity. The immediacy of dependence upon the resource in question varies. The theoretical model is developed for a limited number of individuals and since it is not self-

4

Introduction

evident that a state acts as an individual, care is needed when transferring the model across scales (Hassler).

The following discussions on different aspects of common resource management should be interpreted in the light of the basic approach of seeking congruity in primarily perspectives and problem formulation across the different scales. The conclusion reached is that the application of the same theoretical elements at different levels has been productive.

What knowledge and whose knowledge?

In the theories applied on the management of common property systems, the level of information or knowledge among the appropriates plays a dominant role in determining the outcome of collective action efforts. Studying the role of knowledge across scales and cultural settings confirms the usefulness of the theory. It is generally assumed that a high level of knowledge among the appropriates is advantageous. Arheimer clearly shows the problems in a situation where the lack of awareness among Swedish farmers of the polluting effects of their activities is seen as a major obstacle for cooperative action to reduce pollution of the rivers and the Baltic Sea. However, Hassler shows that in some situations it maybe beneficial for cooperation to have less knowledge of the resource.

Hassler applies the game theory model of a prisoner's dilemma on different phases of depletion in the oil-fields. Negotiations for cooperation between individual right holders (in the form of unitization), if made in the early stages of resource depletion, have a higher likelihood of leading to unitization. One important reason being the lack of knowledge of the exact characteristic of the resource at this stage. The game model applied when knowledge level is close to zero is not then a true prisoner's dilemma, when the predicted outcome is mutual defect. Lack of information renders cooperative strategies more likely to evolve. The case is thus one where it is favourable to know less. As Hassler asserts, such cases may be rather uncommon, but allow for an interesting analysis of the information parameter. Since in a common pool resource situation the actors' perception of both resource characteristics and other actors' behaviour form part of the basis for their choice of action, Hassler stresses that assumptions of full and perfect information may lead to erroneous predictions.

Returning to the more general situation, where the level of information and knowledge among appropriated is positively correlated with

5


facilitating successful management of a common resource, the concept of knowledge extends deeper than a single dimension parameter. The source of knowledge becomes an issue. What is the role and characteristic of knowledge based on science, on experience, intuition, or cultural or religions tradition, and what happens when knowledge from these different sources clash? Wilk asserts to the since long prevalent situation in developing countries, where there is little faith in the existence of local knowledge and capacities. In the Joint Management Programme, aimed at managing India's deteriorating forests, this distrust in local knowledge is built into the structure. All decision-making is executed by experts above village level, and locals are only invited to participate in the operations of the management plans. At local level, differing perceptions on the nature and magnitude of the problem with the common resource pose serious hindrances to action, as Tropp shows in the case of managing water pollution in Madras. In this case the state has made it extremely difficult for the concerned NGO sector, and thus indirectly the public, to obtain information of both the magnitude of pollution, who is responsible for it and what action the government plans to take. In response, one NGO started their own water pollutioninvestigations and made a point of involving the public, such as schoolsin the work. With limited resources for investigations, NGOs are still at a disadvantage in having access to relevant information that could be used in their efforts to put pressure on the state to initiate action. As long as no dear evidence is on the table one actor, in this case the State, can deny responsibility for their role in rivers pollution.

What values and whose values?

At global level, lack of knowledge, i.e. uncertainty of the state of resources and the effects humans have upon them, bears heavily on efforts to get away from the open access regime of the global commons (Karlsson, Selin), and a high level of uncertainty also implies the need for more value-based derisions (Karlsson).

Values are of importance in relation to managing common resources in several aspects. Values are related to the goal of managing a common resource. Studies of CPU systems, to a greater or smaller extent, have the element of evaluation in them. An important part of the theory development in this respect has been to identify elements necessary for the successful management of a CPR. To judge the degree of success it is necessary to have a goal in relation to which it can be measured. It is not always possible to determine the goal formulated by the policy

6

Introduction

makers or appropriates of the common resource. They may not explicitly have formulated a goal or there may be differing opinions on what the desirable goal is. In the case of managing the Indian forests, Wilk outlines how the explicit goal of the States' management programme, where economic interests should be subordinated to the goal of environmental balance and sustainability, is not consistent with their operative goal. The implementing agency, the Forest Department, continues with the goal of getting primarily economic revenues from timber extraction.

There may be multiple uses for a resource with different incompatible goals; should Madras' rivers be used for sewage disposal or recreation (Tropp), should India's forests support biological diversity, timber and natural forest products for the local population or timber for the industrial and export sector (Wilk)?

Managing a resource as common property can have several goals which do not necessarily exclude each other. When such goals are mutually incompatible however, serious conflicts of interest occur and function as a hindrance towards cooperative action (Tropp). The goal is often formulated as follows: To use a resource in the most efficient or effective manner. The most effective management method is that which leads closest to the goal, and it is totally dependent on what that goal is and naturally, the nature of the goal depends on who has formulated it. Economists may strive for the pareto-optimal solution and see measures that lead to that goal as efficient (Hassler). The value given to present compared to future benefits is also included in the goal formulation. It may be very efficient from today's perspective to exhaust a resource during our lifetime or the lifetime of a firm. Another goal may be to preserve the resources perpetually, securing their existence for use of future generations (Karlsson). One has then already partly stated for whom the resources are saved: Future generations. The goal also needs to state for whom the resource is intended in the present generation. The goal may be not only to preserve the resource, but to make sure there is an equality aspect also within the present generation, in the distribution of the resource. This goal would imply to aim for a more just society (Karlsson, Soderberg, Tropp, Wilk).

Can there be other goals for creating a CPR regime that are not related to the management of the resource itself? To answer this we need to know if a CPR system brings benefits apart from securing the continuing provision of the resource. Such benefits could include institution building that are of service to other parts of society, empowerment of previously excluded groups, changing power or ownership relations etc. The goal would then include developing democratic institutions and promoting partnership building (Tropp).

7

Managing Common Resources In Local and Global Systems

The issue of values is further related to how the choice of perspective in different analyses affects reality if and when they are implemented in policy. The researchers perspective may exemplify this. The choice of models may concern whether humans are seen as rational beings or not, how their ability to cooperate and the elements of altruism or shirking behaviour in various cultural settings is assessed. Scientists have to choose one model for their analysis and theory formulation. This choice should be based on sound judgements. The choice may have practical implications. When these models of human behaviour are transferred to policy by policy makers or scientists, there are apparent risks that the models applied influence the behaviour of people. Criticism arose after the Hardin model of the tragedy of the commons became such a strong influence on policy makers. Hardin's model focused on the worst scenarios and failure situations, to a large degree eliminating the possibility of creating collective action around a common resource without strong coercion measures from an outside actor, e.g. the state. Recent literature focuses more on what creates successful CPR management, where humans have been able to create restricted access without coercion from the outside. This model offers some alternatives to policy makers. If the model is convincing enough, people and policy makers may start believing in it, and they may start to act in a way expected of the model. If policies are completely built on impeding shirking behaviour of individuals, such could in fact encourage shirking or free-riding behaviour. If on the other hand, policies focus on people's ability to cooperate, their ability to build up trust among each other and show concrete ways of doing so, then cooperative behaviour may be encouraged.

Institutions as policy implementors

Having discussed the role of knowledge and values in formulating policy options in a CPR management approach, the final issue becomes: Who implements the policy? The answer is: 'Institutions'. The new interest in institutionalism, e.g. in economics, includes both formal and informal institutions (Soderberg, Tropp), which is really the only option when studying CPR situations. In CPR settings, informal institutions with normative sanctions are often of such importance that they can not be ignored (Karlsson, Soderberg, Tropp), whether it is a social rule not to put chemicals in your sewage or moral pressure from other states to reduce pollutants to the atmosphere.

Several of the contributors have taken the institutional requirements for managing a resource successfully as common property developed

8

Introduction

by Ostrom (1990), McKean (1992) and others as a starting point, and some overall conclusions can be seen.

The theories developed up till today do not put enough stress on the importance of a shared value system (Arheimer). This aspect is as important, although much more complex, at international level as it is at local level. Here, the frequently prevailing absence of proper legal frameworks with enforceable sanctions means that informal institutions, norms and principles, are the only available institutions and therefore play a crucial role. Selin argues that current LRTAP negotiations on POPs benefit from the fact that the process was previously managed by a small international network of governmental experts who shared similar values, and who actively promoted such among LRTAP parties.

Karlsson discusses four of the conditions at global level that according to Ostrom (1992) should exist among appropriates at local level if they are to succeed in coordination of actions. One of these conditions is the common perception of mutual trust and reciprocity something that takes time to build and needs continuous interaction to develop. The international system is very young in this context compared to traditional local communities around the world. Another factor that would facilitate the cooperation of states, Karlsson maintains, is their realisation that such cooperative action is in their own interest, something which could be achieved e.g., by expanding the concept of security toinclude environmental and people's security.

Another important requirement for successful management is reasonable equality in the social setting. Extreme differences in the means of appropriators can impede management of a resource as common property. At global level, according to Selin, North/South inequalities have important implications for UNEP work on POPs since the heterogeneity of the participating states plays a considerable role in such areas as availability of economical and technical resources, effective national institutions and knowledge on safe chemical management.

The role of leadership should be of special importance in the process of institution building and institutional change. Leadership exerted in this stage could act in a catalytic fashion, especially in the absence of a legal authority as is the case in the international system (Karlsson, Selin). The crucial element of leadership in institutions needs more analytical attention; questions to be asked are, for example: What are the requirements of leadership in different phases of institution building; at what stage is leadership most important; to what degree does the knowledge and values of leaders affect results, etc.

The issue of legitimacy and trust is essential in a CPR regime, as has been stressed earlier. The existence of a community feeling also pro

9


motes cooperative efforts (Arheimer, Tropp, Wilk). In a local/national setting it is essential to develop a sense of mutual trust not only among the appropriators themselves, but also between them, and e.g. local NGOs, the nested layers above e.g. the state, in solving collective action problems which in this volume are shown to involve serious difficulties in the cases from India (Tropp, Wilk). In his contribution Tropp analyses the many difficulties that the NGO sector concerned with water pollution in their city face when they wish to collaborate with the government. Despite such difficulties the NGOs see no other solution to environmental problems than an active state with NGOs having a facilitating role since they do not have the resources to take any substantive action themselves. From the same country, Wilk concludes that mutual trust is critical if cooperation between local communities and state agencies is to be successful. In the absence of decentralised decision-making and clear legal rules such trust is unlikely to be created.

Due to the lack of monitoring and sanction possibilities it is of critical importance to develop a sense of trust between international actors and states (Karlsson, Selin). Institutions can generate stability in the management of the CPR if they have legitimacy (Soderberg), but creating a stable management system also requires participation of the stakeholders (Arheimer, Soderberg, Tropp, Wilk) which often implies decentralisation efforts when a local or national government is involved.

Soderberg approaches the issue of participation from a similar angle. To have functioning institutions it is imperative that there is congruence between institutional and society norms. If this is to be achieved the affected actors need to be involved. Local factors, environmental and socio-economic, need to be incorporated when the management of sewage is to be changed from sewage treatment plants to local recycling. In Sweden the existence of municipalities with extended autonomy should facilitate this change, and CPR theory can provide useful guidance to the contents of such locally adjusted policies.

In the issue of choosing management models that require institutions, a decisive factor to consider is what model is most appropriate to local environmental, socio-economic and cultural conditions. When Arheimer discusses water management in Sweden this comes up as the major issue. All three models that are compared for managing river basins - the community model, the negotiation model and the market model - require basically the same institutions. Instead of choosing the same model for the whole country Arheimer argues for considering local conditions and reaching different conclusions in different areas. If overall management is carried out at river catchment level, their is even room for using different models at the sub basin level within the same major catchment area.

10

Introduction

Concluding remarks

The aim of this collection of essays has been to show that applying theoretical concepts developed for local classical CPR situations on these disparate cases provides valuable insight into the general problems of cooperation that all kinds of societies face.

When discussing knowledge and values among appropriators of a resource that can be managed as common property several important issues have been stressed. Knowledge is of different kinds, coming from various sources, and how they are compared and valued matters. The different accessibility to knowledge among stakeholders strongly influences the possibility for collective action. Values determine the goals for managing a resource which in turn influence the whole management approach. Therefore the question of who can influence the setting of such goals is critical.

Finally, institutions, the implementors of policy developed on the basis of knowledge and values, are also greatly influenced by the who question. Who is participating in the institution building process? Further, the quality of such participation, of the interaction among the appropriators, has great bearing upon the outcome. Without building a community feeling and a sense of trust, there is little chance of success in managing a resources as common property among a group of farmers or a group of states.

Notes

1 See for example Young, 1994; Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1989.2 The pool concept could be said to be more based on a resource perspective whilst property is based more on an economic perspective.3 Here, the term global represents the extreme cases on the scale where the whole planet is in focus and where the other end of the scale is the local situation in a city or village. In between these extremes regional denotes a region within one state or an area comprised of a limited number of states, the context will clarify which definition is intended. The term international is used in cases when more than one state is involved. Further on in the text global is used when referring to international and truly global commons situations since global commons is a frequently used term for these.4 Berkes, 1989.5 Young (1994:429) defines the problem of scales as something that "resolves around the transferability of propositions and models from one level to another in the dimensions of space and time".

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References

Berkes, F. (ed.) 1989. Common Property Resources. Ecology and community-based sustainable development. London: Belhaven Press.

- Bromley, D. W. 1992. "The Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes".. In D. W. Bromley (ed.), Making the Commons Work - Theory, Practice and Policy, pp. 3-16. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.

McKean, M. A. 1992. "Success on the Commons. A Comparative Examination of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(3): 247-281.

Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

-------- 1992. "The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-Property Institutions", in D. W. Bromley (ed.), Making the Commons Work - Theory, Practice and Policy, pp. 293-318. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.

Young, O. R. 1994. "The Problem of Scale in Human/ Environmental Relationship", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6(4): 429-4A7.

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THOU SHOULD NOT KNOW TOO MUCH...WHEN LACK OF INFORMATION PROMOTES CO-OPERATIVE

BEHAVIOUR. THE CASE OF OIL-FIELDS IN WYOMING,OKLAHOMA AND TEXAS

Bjorn Hassler

Proper assumptions of information levels are of vital importance in all kinds of analysis of interdependent decision-making. In most cases the rule is; the more information the better. In this paper, however, it is shown that such is not always the case. Lack of information can enhance resource utilisation of resources, when the problem of co-operation is of a Prisoner's dilemma type, and when iteration of the interaction game is unlikely. The case of oil-fields in the United States has been chosen as an empirical example of the latter. Optimal drilling procedures tend to be chosen more often the less the drillers know about the resource characteristics. This outcome is explained by the structure of the decision-making problem, where low levels of information render it advantageous to choose co-operative strategies.

Introduction

All kinds of common resource-utilisation face potential problems. Problems consisting of over- or under-utilisation of the resource caused by for example inadequate time-horizons; the actual discount rate is lower, or higher, than the socially optimal rate, resulting in to slow or fast extraction of the resource. In other words; utilisation of the resource is not as efficient as it could be; the way the resource is utilised is not in line with the preferences of the appropriators. The economic rent is not maximised; one or more of the actors could realise more, without anyone suffering. An alternative win-win solution exists.1

In the discourse of common pool resource utilisation, the focus is almost entirely placed on small, rural and not very modem communities (Ostrom, 1990). Such is not at fault, of course, but at the same time, it is important not to forget that the basic way of reasoning in this kind of analyses is general. Not general in the sense that it is applicable to all kind of situations, but in the sense that there is nothing internal to the model being used that inhibits analysis of situations not characterised by small number of actors, rural location or low levels of development.

13


In all situations where co-operation has a potential to enhance the utility of involved actors, the variable level of information is of utmost importance. Since the notion of perfect information is purely abstract - in the realm of reality we can never have such a thing as perfect information, and even if we had, there is no way we could know that we had such - the question always comes down to how much it is reasonable to assume that the actors know (Kreps, 1990).

In most situations it is better to know more than less. This seems so obvious, that it is often just taken for granted. The story goes, that the problem is not when the actors know, but when we suspect that they maybe do not know. In this short paper, we will, try to show that there may be certain situations when it could be better to know less rather than more. It will not be argued that this is very common. On the contrary, the interest of the topic comes with its relative rareness.

The case of oil fields in the United States has been chosen in this paper as an empirical example. This choice has been made primarily for two reasons: (1) the handling of oil fields is especially prone to inefficient use due to their specific, physical characteristics; and (2) the topic has been explored rather extensively, which means that empirical data are easily available and ready for (re-)interpretation. Libecap and Wiggins have rather convincingly shown, that there is a correlation between levels of information and how efficiently the resource is used (Libecap, 1984,1985,1994). But a correlation says nothing about causes. The aim of this paper is therefore to propose an explanation to the seemingly paradoxical observation that less information can enhance efficiency in resource-utilisation.

In all kinds of scientific analysis it is necessary to use both theory and empirical material of some kind. Without theoretical propositions we can say nothing about how different aspects of reality might be related to each other. And without any data from the realm of reality, our investigations become purely abstract, unable to enhance our understanding of the world we live in.

The stance taken in this paper, is that much of the contemporary work being done in the field of common pool resource analysis treats the theoretical parts of the study in a rather sloppy way; assumptions and propositions are not spelled out but lure in the background. This has two major implications: (1) the analysis becomes less transparent, resulting in difficulties in seeing potential shortcomings and outright inadequacies; and (2) the cumulation of scientific knowledge and the refinement of theoretical reasoning becomes unnecessary hampered.

On the other hand, there is a vein - albeit much thinner - of highly theoretical analysis (e.g. some game-theoretical modelling and certain

14

Hassler: Thou Should Not Know Too Much...

studies concerning collective action) (Ordeshook, 1986; Gibbons, 1992; Morrow, 1994).

Purely abstract studies are perfectly legitimate, as a way to sharpen the instruments of theory, as long as the ultimate goal is to apply such instruments to some kind of empirical material. If this is not so, there is a risk that the models never be applied, and our knowledge of the world not enhanced, rendering such to playing theoretical games, which does not seem very legitimate.

Consequently, it is of great value to reach an adequate balance between theory and data. Considering that the mainstream analysis ofcommon pool resources leans rather heavily towards the empirical side (Ostrom, 1990), the approach in this paper will be somewhat more focused on theoretical aspects. The traditional assumptions of utility- maximising in neo-classical economics will be applied in a game-theoretical approach.2 Due interest will be placed on questions regarding what can be said about the relations between data and theory, and what cannot be legitimately claimed.

Basic theoretical assumptions

Utility-maximising

In many cases, the concept of rationality rather than utility-maximising is used, in order to build the platform of an analytical model. Due to the divergent and sometimes unclear definitions of the term, however, it will be avoided here (Elster, 1978). Certainly, it could be argued that the assumption of utility-maximising individuals is a definition of rationality. This is true, but the fact that the term rationality in itself evokes such a multitude of definitions, connotations and value-loaded opinions, makes it very difficult to use. The more neutral utility-maximising assumption is less loaded with epistemological ballast, if only because of less profilient use.

The concept of utility-maximising demands two different assumptions: (1) that in principle utility-functions can be constructed for all involved individuals; and (2) that the preferences of such individuals are transitive. The first mentioned assumption means that the individuals are able to rank all relevant outcomes of a particular choice situation. It is generally not necessary to construct the exact and complete functions in the analysis, but rather to make assumptions about how the individuals rank different states (in a choice situation, which outcome is best, which is next best, and so on). The second proposition - about

15


transitive preferences - implies that cyclical orderings of preferences are ruled out; if an individual ranks {A, B, C} as A>B>C, then A>C.3

The preferences of the involved actors are assumed to be fixed (independent) in the analysis. This assumption warrants some discussion, since the distinction between preferences and perceptions are often blurred (not least in political science studies) (Broms, 1995). In order to build a useful model, we must have at least one variable that we treat as exogenous. If we treat all variables as dependent (which is exactly what we do if we allow preferences to change, without putting any other variable(s) in their place as exogenously given), it will be impossible to make any logical deductions. One becomes stuck in circular modes of reasoning.

It seems like a rather reasonable assumption to treat the preferences as given, at least in the short term. Personal affinities do not change very often. This proposition, however, by no means implies that behaviour could not alter, when perceptions of the choice situation (i.e. level of information) changes. The following example will clarify the distinction: Suppose an individual has four possible alternatives {A, B, C, D} to choose between. The preferences are such that A>B>C>D. The individual, however, does not initially perceive the situation as such, but as a choice between{B, C, D}; she is not aware of the fourth alternative A. She then chooses B as the most preferred alternative. Assume that she now gets to know of a fourth alternative - A - which she prefers to B. If she can remake her choice, she will consequently choose A. Of course, this does not imply that her preferences have changed, but only that she has obtained new information that tells her that a previously unknown alternative - which is better than B - is available. Or in otherwords; the exogenously given ordering of preferences stays fixed, while the information variable is allowed to change value.

The actors

The actors in this analysis consist of the individuals who possess the right to drill wells and realise the oil. Admittedly, in many cases is it not single individuals who make decisions about strategy of resource use, but rather groups of individuals (i.e. companies). This causes potential problems; the assumption of individual, transitive preferences, does not mean that collectives of individuals necessarily have transitive preferences. When a group of individuals is to decide upon a joint ranking, the odds are that it is impossible to find a unique solution that all agree upon; the prevailing ranking will depend on what principles of decision that are being used (Arrow, 1963; Ordeshook, 1986).

16


We need not to dwell on this topic In this paper though, since the main point about the importance of the level of information to be made is not affected. The interpretation of the empirical material, however, presupposes that the actors can be represented as individuals.

Oil wells as "common pool problems"

A common pool resource problem is a resource where the optimal, individual resource utilisation strategy results in a pareto-inferior collective outcome (i.e. a solution exists which renders at least one actor better off, but not at the expense of anyone else, a so-called win-win situation) (Ostrom, 1994). This definition does not rule out private ownership, as long as the entire resource is not owned by a single actor; or in other words, the mode of utilisation of the resource can not be entirely decided upon by a single actor. The key feature is not whether ownership is private or common, but rather whether or not any actor can make utilisation decisions independently of others.

It seems, though, as at least some strain of private ownership of either consumption rights or productive inputs need to be present for a potential resource use problem to arise. For example, if the marginal gain from letting an extra sheep graze on the famous Hardin commons is private to the one who lets it graze, then there is a potential danger of over-grazing, if individual utility-maximising is assumed.

But, if the marginal benefit of an extra sheep is collective (i.e. the user realises the gain from the extra sheep, minus the other actors losses), the individual benefit will be that of the whole resource and there will be no incentives for over-grazing. In fact, the opposite is very likely to occur. The benefit will be that of the marginal utility from increasing the whole herd, while the cost is private to the provider. Then it would probably be rational to decrease ones contribution to the herd, since the cost of providing an extra sheep would probably be greater then the net benefit to the herd when it is marginally increased. The solution would be to also make the investments collective, i.e. the individual actor pays his share of providing an extra sheep, and realises his share of the net increase in herd value.

This is identical with unitising the resource, as discussed in this paper about oil resource use. A single actor is afforded the task of maximising net benefit from the whole resource, which is then distributed to the share-holders according to the size of their shares.

Oil wells in the United States are generally privately owned. Land- owners are the legal owners of the oil beneath the surface, but the right

17


to drill wells can be leased to other parties. Resource utilisation problems may arise when the oil field covers land that belongs to more than one land-owner. Due to the fungibility of the oil in the ground, it is tempting for the individual driller to drill as much as possible; the oil field surface level tends to lean towards the area where oil is taken up, resulting in movement of the oil towards this area.4

As a consequence of these physical resource-characteristics, the optimal individual strategy in resource utilisation will differ from the collective, optimal strategy, as long as the number of rights-holders exceeds one. Libecap & Wiggins (1984,1985) have shown convincing arguments that the number of rights-holders is negatively correlated with the ability to reach an efficient outcome (primarily due to rising transaction-costs) as well as the importance of the institutional framework (more decisive regulation authority on the part of the federal government increases the likelihood of efficiency by unitisation, ceteris paribus). 5

The focus in this paper, however, will be on the somewhat more sparsely described characteristics of the resource utilisation situation. It will be argued, that the information-level itself affects what incentives meet involved actors in a fundamental and general way. In order to make propositions about cause-effect correlations, a simple, logically coherent and very general game-theoretical model will be constructed.

When using this model on the specific resource use data about oil extraction, the goal is to explain patterns of behaviour. Of course, the use of the single information level variable in no way implies that other factors are of negligent importance (convincing single-variable explanations are very rare indeed in social science), but rather that this solitary variable is sufficiently important to be studied for itself, and in some detail.

The model

In order to make some structured propositions of how individual incentives vary depending on level of information, we will build a simple, game theoretical model. Although the model only includes two actors, the conclusions drawn hold true even when the number of actors is larger.6

We will use the famous model Prisoner's Dilemma, though our interest does not lie in the usual, but for most purposes much too simple, outcome of a single one-shot game, but rather what the outcomes will be when we vary how much the actors know about the different outcomes. This particular game got its name from a story:

18


A terrible crime has been committed; a murder. The judge has two suspects in custody, he knows that one of the suspects is guilty, but not which one of them. He then tells each suspect (in separate rooms) the following:Of course, I can not force you to admit to the murder. But you should know that if neither one of you admit, I will sentence you to one year in prison anyway, for some other misdemeanour charges. If, on the other hand, you confess while my other suspect does not, I will grant you immunity and you may walk out as a free man. If you do not confess however, I may very well get information from my other suspect that reveals your guilt, and then you will receive the strongest punishment possible; ten years in prison. Finally, if you both confess, you will of course be convicted for murder, but I will see to that you get a lower sentence - say five years - than if you deny the crime, while my other suspect cheats on you.

Now, what should the suspects do? To understand the individually optimal strategy the suspect must try to think about what the other one will do: If the other one does not confess, I am better of confessing. Then I walk. If, on the other hand, he cheats on me, I am also better of confessing, since I then get five rather than ten years imprisonment. So, the conclusion is; whatever choice the other makes, it is optimal for me to confess!

The peculiar thing about this, is that this outcome is pareto-inferior; both suspects would individually be better off not confessing to anything. It is the non-co-operative characteristics of the situation, that make them choose seemingly paradoxical strategies; what is individually rational is not so collectively.

As will be discussed, it is of fundamental importance to make a clear distinction between models and reality. The model tries to describe a choice situation, which may lead to a sub-optimal outcome, given the utility-maximising assumptions. It is purely abstract and general. The description of the judge and the two suspects is, on the other hand, purely concrete; the empirical counterpart to the abstract model. We must never confuse these two.

In the model, we can talk only about ordinal scales, as the assumptions we made about the actors being able to rank their preferences, but nothing more. We do this by stating the following:

If both choose the co-operative strategy (confessing) they will get (c). If both keep quiet, they get (b). If one keeps quiet, while the other squeals, the first one gets (a) and the cheated one (d).Now, the following must hold if the game shall represent Prisoner's dilemma:

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a>b>c>d and (1)(a+d)/2<b (2)

The last condition is necessary in order to make sure that it is not better to alternate between cheating and being cheated, than to keep quiet.

This can be shown in a game-theoretical matrix, where actor A plays row and actor B column. The actors can choose between Co-operation, C (keep quiet) and Defect, D (confess).

The equilibrium of this game is the lower right-hand cell, where both actors defect. Being in this lower right-hand cell, actor A does not want to change strategy, since c>d. The same holds for actor B, and we thus have a Nas/z-equilibrium (an outcome where no-one wants to change strategy, when the counterpart is given). In the game of Prisoner's dilemma, the Defect-Defect equilibrium is the unique Nash-solution.7 -

Figure 1. Prisoner's dilemma, where mutual defection is the Nash- equilibrium

Actor B

Actor A

c D

b,b d, a

a, d c, c

Regarding the reality of the oil-fields, the empirical counterpart would be a situation where all hurry to drill and pump as fast as possible, resulting in a situation where more oil is taken up at a quicker pace than would be collectively optimal. Although this model is very simple, some interesting inferences can be drawn, which will be discussed in the empirical part of this paper.

Now, let us suppose that the different outcomes become less evidentto the actors; the level of information decreases. In the extreme case, the

20


individual actor knows nothing about whether he is going to be cheated or will be able to cheat someone else. He does not know whether his particular well has "good" or "bad" properties, relatively speaking. In the empirical world, this could be seen as a pre-negotiation phase, where the bid for leases is out but nothing particular is known about the properties of the prospective oil-field.

This would imply, that the particular actor would have to relate to some kind of average value. In terms of our model, actor A then faces a choice between co-operating, which gives him b, or cheating, which would give him the expected outcome - average - of (a+d)/2, which by definition is lower than b in a prisoner's dilemma (equation 2). The game would then look like the following (note though, that is not what the game actually looks like, but rather how it is perceived by the actors; it is their perception of the situation (what else?) that will guide their choice of strategies):

Figure 2. A 2x2 game highlighting the importance of information-levels

C

Actor A

D

Actor B

C D

b,b (a+d)/2,(d+a)/2

(a+d)/2,(d+a)/2 c, c

We now have a game that has changed in fundamental ways. Firstly, it could be argued that the outcomes {(a+d)/2) and c are rather similar. There is no way we could really know this, since we know nothing about the distances between any of the parameters (as said above, we only have an ordinal scale at our theoretical disposal), but they share a common flavour of open access; everyone tries to cheat one another. If(a+d)/ 2 >c we have a unique Nash-solution in the upper left-hand cell; that is, it is optimal for the actors to co-operate and slow down the pumping.

21


But if the reversal is true - (a+d) / 2<c - we have a more unclear situation with two equilibria; the upper left-hand cell and the lower right- hand cell. It is then difficult to make any definitive statements about what outcome will prevail.8

Conclusions

The theoretical conclusions to be drawn from this model are, consequently as follows:

If the information level about the characteristics of the oil field is very low (zero), the actors have no possibility to discriminate between good and bad sites (i.e. such which might afford being cheated or the possibility of being cheated). Therefore, the expected outcome from cheating is perceived as less than mutual co-operation, and the game is no longer a game of Prisoner's dilemma. This transformed game has two equilibria, depending on whether (a+d) / 2 is larger or smaller than c. If these two terms are equal, mutual co-operation is a weakly dominating strategy.9

When, on the other hand, information is perfect, the theoretical outcome is mutual defection, since this is the individual optimal strategy in a game of Prisoner's dilemma.

Somewhere in between these extreme situations the game transforms from a co-operation inducing game, to a Prisoner's dilemma. Where this happens more exactly we cannot tell, since we only have ordinal rankings of the individuals preferences.

The oil-fields10

Resource characteristics

As mentioned in the introduction, oil field resource utilisation is exceptionally prone to inefficiencies, as long as at least two actors can influence the mode of operation, due to the specific, physical characteristics of oil extraction. In any type of common pool resource, the key question is not only whether decision-making is interdependent, but also to what degree; how much can a single actor influence overall efficiency. When the degree of influence is high, the potential for allocation losses naturally rises.

The geological character of the ground affects the potential for migration of subsurface oil. Porosity (air-filled cells) is correlated with migra

22


tory potential, as well as other physical characteristics (e.g. oil viscosity). Ground constitution is generally not homogenous, but differs - sometimes considerably - within the specific acreage where the oil-field is located. Water and natural gas volumes affect the subsurface pressure level; when the pressure is high, it is generally not necessary to pump the oil; the lowering of pressure while drilling a well causes the oil to erupt automatically.The surface land-holders hold the mineral-rights, and according to common law rule of capture, the oil becomes the landholder's private property when extracted from the ground. In most cases, however, the oil is not extracted by the landholder, but by a private company which has acquired a lease-contract from the land-owner.

These landholders generally have rather small holdings, which means that several owners have rights to parts of the same oil deposits. When the lease-holder starts to drill, the subsurface pressure in the surrounding area decreases, causing oil to migrate increasingly to that area the more it is removed. This creates powerful incentives for the lease-holder to extract the oil as fast as possible. By keeping a rapid pace, it becomes possible to drain oil from the neighbouring areas and take advantage of the fact that oil is most easily extracted in the early phases of field development.

Kinds of economic rent dissipation

This process of hasty retrieval causes economic rent to dissipate in several ways. Firstly, the incentives for the individual lease-holder favours excessive drilling of wells; that is, more wells than would be optimal, considering the specific geological conditions and the relevant capital- costs (rent projections). Due to the latter, the number of wells relative to production is very high in the United States; 88 per cent of all wells are located there, while the share of world production only amounts to about 14 per cent (1980) (Libecap, 1985,1989:94—96).

Secondly, it is rather common that water injection wells are created, in order to stop oil from migrating to neighbouring areas. This practicedoes not effect the overall recovery rate, but is a pure dissipation of economic rent.11

Thirdly, high rate extraction lowers the overall recovery of oil. As oil starts to migrate, ground pores easily get clogged, causing pockets of oil to be trapped, and only extractable at very high costs.12

Fourthly, premature venting of subsurface pressure makes it necessary to inject water or use pumps earlier than would have been the case

23


if the optimal route were taken (the natural subsurface pressure would have lasted longer). A pure rent dissipation caused by the divergence between individual and collective optimality.

Fifth and finally, production over time is not optimal, considering expected, future discount rates of income. Additionally larger storage facilities are needed then would have been the case had extraction been less hasty.

Solution; field-wide unitisation

It has been long recognised, that the solution to these inefficiencies is field-wide unitisation,13 Under this practice, a single firm - the unit operator - is given the production rights of the entire field. As the sole producer, the unit operator will maximise profit, and thereby induce economic efficiency.14 The former collective action problem is re-framed to a single actor utility maximisation project, which is - by assumption - successful.

According to estimates of the individual lease holdings and potential contribution to the unit, the stake-holder gets a specific number of shares. Depending on the number of shares, the lease-holder receives a specific per centage of the net revenues.

It is obvious, that if the process of unitization were to be left entirely to the lease-owners, there would be vast difficulties in arriving at an agreement acceptable to all. There is a large number of heterogeneous contractors and estimates of the individual lease-values are very difficult to make. Further more it is necessary to make a final valid allocation of the shares, since the value of the individual sites may alter (which is very likely) when drilling has begun and more information is revealed.

This seems to mean that the information level of the actors affects the possibilities to reach an agreement in a fundamental way and that the level of knowledge increases over time as the process of prospecting and extracting proceeds.

Libecap & Wiggins have in several studies analysed if there is any correlation between how much lease-holders know about oil deposits and the level of unitization in Wyoming, Oklahoma and Texas in the period between 1948 and 1975 (Libecap & Wiggins, 1984,1985; Libecap, 1994.).

There is an interesting difference in land ownership when Wyoming is compared to Oklahoma and Texas.15 In Wyoming most land is federally owned, while in the cases of Oklahoma and Texas regulation is made by the respective state authorities. The federal policy is to encourage unitization early in the process, preferably in the exploration

24

Hassler: Thou Should Not Know Too Much-

stage. Federal land leased production rights for private owners could be held for a period up to 20 years, but the maximum acreage any single firm can control is limited to approx. 250 000 acres.

When a potential oil deposit is located, a plan for unitization is negotiated rather quickly (usually within six months). At this exploratory phase, very little is known about the more specific characteristics of the site:

Negotiations in this contracting setting then are most effective completed behind a veil of ignorance miring exploration before development reveals differential information regarding lease values. (Libecap, 1985:692, emphasis added).16

When unitization is exercised in this early exploration phase, potential benefits are very obvious; the number of wells can be held down (to the optimal number) as can the pace of extraction.

State policy of unitization differs from federal strongly. Inboth Oklahoma and Texas, the statutes allow for unitization (in Oklahoma it is compulsory), but only after deposits have been proven. This means that early unitization - in the exploratory phase - is in practice impossible

In Oklahoma, the Corporate Commission can decide about unitization, if at least 63 per cent of the operators (normalised according to acreage) agree to do so (1945 Oklahoma Sess. Laws at 162; 1951 Oklahoma Sess. Laws at 136). In Texas, the statutes say that unanimity is required for unitization to take place.17 Furthermore, in both these states the federal government does not realise any royalties from oil extraction, as is the case in Wyoming. There is a severance tax on the value of production, but this does not provide the same strong incentives for unitization as royalties (Libecap, 1985: 701).

Analysis

Correlation findings

Using data from the degree of unitization in the three states in the period 1948-75, Libecap & Wiggins have analysed the impact of differing policy rules and regulations on the occurrence of unitization. It is obvious from their material, that unitization is most common in Wyoming, and least in Texas and Oklahoma. But this does not in itself prove the correlation hypothesised above (where difference in the level of information can explain different outcomes), since other, exogenous variables could better explain the incidence of unitization.

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Libecap & Wiggins assume there could be two other, potentially important, variables, namely (1) the size of the field and (2) the stage of depletion. A larger size of field ought to be negatively correlated with incidence of unitization, since increasing field size generally means that the characteristic of the leases is more heterogeneous and a larger number of firms are involved in the process of extraction. The stage of depletion of the deposit is assumed to be positively correlated with unitization, since the level of information increases along with tire extraction process. This is not true in the exploratory and early extraction phase, but rather when primary productionbecomes depleted.18In other words, the chance for unitization is lowest in the mid-term life of the field.19

Using statistical methods, Libecap & Wiggins show that the empirical material seems to support their assumed correlations.20 In the case of Wyoming, where federal ownership affords large incentives for early unitization, field size and depletion variables are not significant, indicating that neither has any large impact (i.e. larger than in the case of Texas, which is used as a base-line).21 The primary effect of early unitization is - on the other hand - as expected, significant. Federal regulation is shown to increase the per centage share of unitization by 58 per cent (significant) when Wyoming and Texas are compared, when sample means of the whole period are used. Comparing Oklahoma and Texas affords a corresponding per centage of 37 per cent (significant). Finally the Oklahoma rule that states that 63 per cent of the lease-holders can force the remainders into unitization significantly increases the likelihood for unitization, compared to the situation in Texas, where unanimity is required.

The result of the analysis shows a consistent pattern of a correlation between early negotiations and large shares of unitization. Having shown this, the question to address now is what cause-effect relationship seems appropriate to explain this correlation.

The model of a one-shot Prisoner's dilemma does indeed seem applicable in this specific case. In most other cases, one-shot games are simply not relevant, since the actors usually interact in a repetitive way; the corresponding model then has to be formulated as a process of iterated games, where reasonable equilibria are quite different from those in a one-shot game (Taylor, 1987). But in this case - of negotiation about unitization in Wyoming, where the negotiations take place in the exploratory phase when little information is available - the situation has certain all-or-nothing characteristics. Either you agree with the unitization plan from the beginning and are stuck with it for the rest of the utilisation period, or you have a continuing process of iterated Prisoner's dilemma.

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Level of information and potentiaifor co-operation

As discussed in the theoretical part of this paper, the prediction of a one-shot Prisoner's dilemma is that both (all) actors will defect (and not reach any unitization agreement). But, when information about individual lease-values is close to zero - as described in the model - the actors are no longer facing a clear-cut Prisoner's dilemma. The mutual- defect outcome is not the single Nash-equilibrium; there are twoequilibria; mutual defection and mutual co-operation (unitization). In a situation with very low levels of information though (as in the exploratory phase), it can be argued that the actors will have great difficulties in distinguishing between the outcomes {(a+b)/2, c}; everyone cheating on each other or some average of being cheated and being able to cheat. In fact, if the information level equals zero, the two outcomes seem to be equal. It could then be argued, that the only reasonable outcome is mutual co-operation (unitization), since the co-operative strategy weakly dominates; the actor can never loose by choosing this behaviour, but potentially benefit. The conclusion then, would be that in the Wyoming case unitization will take place when the information level among the actors is extremely low, while the negotiations may break down if some of the actors have some privileged information about the characteristics of the deposit. This line of reasoning would be able to explain the rather large - but in no way complete - incidence of unitization in Wyoming.

In the cases of Oklahoma and Texas, the situation is quite different. Inboth states, negotiations about unitization starts at a later stage, when privileged information about different lease-values has materialised. The 63-per cent rule practised in Oklahoma clearly affects possibilities for unitising. A random sample of 261 unified fields was taken by Libecap & Wiggins. In 51 per cent approval was less than 100 per cent (approval rates varied between 67 and 99 per cent), indicating that the possibility to force the minority into an agreement played a distinct role. However, this probably has more to do with the possibility to exclude a number of potential cheaters from actually doing so, than with the level of information. Apart from this, it is obvious that the degree of unitization is considerable lower in Oklahoma than Wyoming, and even more so in the case of Texas vs. Wyoming.22

In these two cases, the variables of size and degree of depletion becomes more relevant than in Wyoming. Since unitization is not allowed in the early, exploratory stages, information disparities develop, resulting in the potential strategic use of privileged information. In terms of the model described above, the average term (a+b)/2, zero informa

27


tion, transforms to a, (complete information), and we are back in the traditional Prisoner's dilemma, where mutual defection is the theoretical prediction.23

But, there is a special twist to the story. The data collected by Libecap & Wiggins indicate that in the final phase of extraction, there seems to (sometimes) be a return to co-operative behaviour. In terms of our model, this would correspond to a shift in the preferred strategies of the actors. This does not mean that their utility-functions have changed, but rather that the actual outcome of the defection strategy has changed. The ranking orders of the actors are still the same; a>b>c>d - but the game facing them is now as given below:

Figure 3. A 2x2 game where mutual co-operation is individually as well as collectively optimal

Actor B

Actor A

C D

a, a d, b

b, d c, c

In this game, the solution is rather obvious; mutual co-operation. Thisstrategy strongly dominates all other strategies for both (all) players; there is no reason to defect at all. What empirical situation does this game correspond to then? The proposition presented here, is that when extraction is in its later phase, it will usually be necessary to use active means (such as pumping, injecting water etc.) to raise the oil above the ground-level. Such is very expensive; and the closer to complete depletion, the higher the costs. We then come to a point, where excessive drilling is simply not warranted in terms of maximising profit; costs are prohibitive. By tmitising, at least some profit can be made. If the field does not become unitised, there are simply no profits to make. Or in other words, the incentives for cheating are not there; either there is unitization or production stops entirely.

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Conclusions and future research

The conclusion to be drawn is that according to theoretical reasoning the incidence of unitization should be high in the early (exploratory) phase, then decrease as divergent and privileged information accumulates, and finally start to increase again as the incentives to cheat decrease and privileged information tends to become more and more public. This temporal development is shown by the "inverted" bell-shaped curve in the diagram below.

Diagram I.The propensity to unitise will be high in the early exploratory phase, lower in the mid-term and higher again, when information about the field tends to be very high

probability of unitisation

As it has been argued in this paper, there is a complete split betweentheoretical constructions and empirical materials. An epistemological theory can never really be tested against any ontological data. The way of work is rather to apply a specific model to the empirical material, to see how convincing the proposed explanations will appear. This conceptual split also means that any model has a potential in another empirical context. The specific model is only bound by its potential for fruitful application. Not by anything else.

A general conclusion from this paper may be that the actors levels of information in common pool resource analysis must be handled in some way. When interdependent actors make decisions with the goal to enhance their utility, they necessarily base their decisions on how they perceive the situation; what predictions can be made about resource characteristics as well as other actors future behaviour. In all analysis

29


where assumptions of full and perfect information among all the involved actors do not seem fruitful, information levels may change the analytic predictions in a profound way. The only way to know how, is to test the robustness of the predictions when the assumption about the actors information level is made endogenous to the model.

Notes

1 For a discussion on this, see for example Taylor, 1987; Ostrom, 1990; Young, 1991; and Ostrom, 1994.2 For an introduction to game theory, see for example Morrow, 1994. Regarding neo-classical assumptions of utility-maximising individuals, any elementary textbook in political economy would do.3 A>B symbolises that the individual thinks A is better or as good as B.4 This has particularly severe consequences in the case of oil resource use efficiency; factors such as lowering the gas pressure and low porosity of the ground (the oil may clog and get stuck in the ground) often affects overall efficiency in substantial ways. This will be discussed in more detail in the empirical part of this paper.5 When an oil-field is unitised, the situation resembles a case where monopoly reigns: the user will then maximise profit, rather than producing until the marginal cost equals the price, as is the case in a perfect market. Of course, the regulatory attitude vis-a-vis policies of promoting unitisation is somewhat enigmatic. Unitisation increases resource use efficiency and income to the rights- holders, but the other side of the coin is that consumers have to pay a higher price for the oil (at least if the price is not perfectly elastic)6 Generally speaking, the number of actors is not relevant as long as each faces the same choice situation. What is a preferred strategy towards one actor, must always be preferred against any other opponent when the preferences are identical. If they are not identical, we will have a different kind of game. The critical variable is thus not the number of actors, but rather how many times the

Same is iterated. When the game is iterated infinitely or in an unknown number, le so-called Folk theorem states that not only is it possible to find co-opera

tive outcomes, but - in most cases - an abundance of possible solutions.7 ANash-equilibrium does not always exist, provided that only pure strategies are allowed (i.e. no playing with probabilities). As will be shown later, a more common problem, Tiowever, is the potential multitude of different Nash- equilibria.8 As been pointed out, we are not talking about outcomes in the real world here. It is not here the unclarity lies, but in what outcomes can logically be deduced from our theoretical model and basic assumptions.9 A weakly dominating strategy is better or as good as any other strategy. Since, in this case, (a+d)/ 2=c and c is, by definition, less than b (equation 1), the cooperative strategy weakly dominates defection.10 The empirical part of this paper draws rather heavily on the work of Gary D. Libecap & Stephen N. Wiggins (Libecap & Wiggins, 1984,1985 and Libecap, 1994). Their primary data-sources are Oil Weekly and Oil and Gas Journal.

30


11 The case of the Slaughter field in west Texas can be mentioned as an example. A total of427 water injection wells were sunk, at a total cost of $156 million (Libecap, 1994: 576). Generally, the more fragmented the lease-holdings are, the more common is this practice of reducing oil migration.12This problem of competitive extraction has been known for a long time. In 1926, the Federal oil Conservation Board estimated the overall recovery rate to be only 20-25 per cent, while optimal recovery would be around 90-95 per cent (Libecap, 1994:572). In 1942, Oil Weekly (13/4, 1942) estimated it to be possible to raise the recovery rate rates two to five times that of competitive extraction.13This was recommended already in the 1920:s by both the Federal Oil Conservation Board and the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers (Libecap, 1994:572-3).14Note that this form of institutionalisation is not explained by a reduction of transaction costs as institutions usually are, but (we argue) by the divergence between individual and collective rationality.15 The question why there are differences in regulation will not be addressed in this paper. The main explanation put forward by Libecap & Wiggins is the divergent number (and size) of lease-holders, resulting in different possibilities to influence rule-makers.16 Libecap here uses the famous expression "... behind a veil of ignorance" made by J. S. Rawls in A theory of justice. Rawls however, is interested of a purely hypothetical situation, used to elaborate a normative theory about fairness and equality. In this paper though, we have a quite different perspective. The resource users are actual individuals, trying to make decisions while information is in a very short supply. It consequently has nothing whatsoever to do with equality, fairness or hypothetical situations. The split between theory and data as discussed in the previous chapter, is something quite different..

The equivalent to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission in Texas is theRailroad Commission.18 The production is labelled primary, as long as active measures need not be taken in order to extract the oil; the natural underground pressure is sufficient.19 Libecap & Wiggins do not address the reasons as to why the potential of unitization tends to rise in the later stages of extraction, other than that the information level increases over time. This question will be discussed in the final part of this paper.20 For a more detailed presentation of the data and the statistical analysis, see Libecap & Wiggins, 1985.21 When a correlation is labelled significant henceforth, this means at the .01 level.22 In the period 1948-1975, the per centage of field-wide unit production out of total production increased from 58 to 82 per cent. In Oklahoma, corresponding figures are 9 and 38 per cent respectively, and in Texas 0 and 20 per cent (Libecap & Wiggins, 1985).23 It is not at all certain, that iterated rounds of Prisoner's dilemma necessarily results in defection outcomes. But in this particular case concerning oil-fields, the incentives to cheat seem especially large. This thread will not be taken up however, since the main interest in this paper centres around the importance of information. For an interesting analysis of iterated Prisoner's dilemma games, see for example Axelrod, 1984.

31


References

Arrow, K. 1963. Social Choice and Individual Action. New Haven: Cowles Foundation.

Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Co-operation. New York: Basic Books.Broms, R1995. Environmental Security Regimes: A critical approach. Stockholm:

The Swedish Institute of International Affairs.Descombs, V. 1980. Le meme et l'Autre. Cambridge: Syndicate of the Press of

University of Cambridge.Elster, J. 1978. Ulysses and Sirens: Studies in rationality and irrationality. Cam

bridge: Cambridge University Press.Gibbons, R. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton Uni

versity Press.Kreps, D. M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Hemel Hempstead Hert

fordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.Libecap, G. 1994. "The conditions for successful collective action", Journal of

Theoretical Politics, 6(4): 563-92.Libecap, G. & Wiggins, S. 1984. "Contractual Responses to the Common Pool:

Prorationing of Crude Oil Production", American Economic Review, 74: 87-98.

-------- 1985. "The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: Thecase of Oil Field Unitization", Journal of Political Economy, 93: 690-714.

Morrow, J. D. 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Books.

Ordeshook, P. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory. An introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, G. W. 1994. Rules, Gaines and Common-pool Resources. Ann Arbour: The University of Michigan Press.

Taylor, M. 1987. The Possibility of Co-operation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, 0.1991. International Co-operation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment. London: Cornell University Press.

32

THREE DIFFERENT CPR MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR RIVERINE NITROGEN POLLUTERS

IN SWEDEN

BeritArheimer

Sweden has failed in the environmental goal of reducing the nitrogen transport to the Baltic Sea by 50 per cent in ten years, mainly Because of the large amounts of nitrogen still leaching from arable land. The riverine nitrogen problem can be formulated in terms of a CPR problem, as the property rights of the river water are undefined and it is possible to free-ride in the mantainance of the resource by polluting it for personal gain. Swedish water management at present is dominated by a command-and-control policy. However, to master the situation, various propositions of changed institutional arrangements for better management of water resources have been presented recently. This chapter describes and discusses three models that have been proposed for water management in the Swedish environmental policy debate: the community model, the negotiation model and the market model. To be economically efficient and ecologically sustainable, both of these models must be in accordance with local environmental, socio-economic and cultural conditions. According to the analysis, the proposed management models have about the same institutional requirements, although the sensitivity to various requirements may differ among the models. In the chapter it is argued that new policy implementation in Sweden should include regional water administration boards, where monitoring and problem analysis are kept within single catchments. Problem solution should be decentralised so that subbasins are managed according to the model most in accordance with local conditions. As long as the various requests for model success are met, different management models may be used in different parts of the same watershed. This may be possible since the overwhelming need of institutional arrangements is about the same for the three proposed management models and, consequently, they do not exclude each other.

Introduction

In Sweden water resources have been, and still are, governed according to a centralistic command-and-control policy. The environmental goal of reducing nitrogen transport to the Baltic Sea by 50 per cent in ten years (Helsinki Comission, base year 1987; North Sea/Paris Commision, base year 1985 [Swedish EPA, 1990]) has failed (Swedish

33


EPA, 1996) and the water-quality monitoring is very much of ad-hoc character which has not favoured any active water management (Gustafsson, 1996). These facts, among others, raise questions about the efficiency of the institutions managing water quality in Sweden. What institutional arrangements and policy instruments are used today? Are there propsals of other management models that could be more economically beneficial, favourable to the environment and still suitable for Swedish conditions? This chapter will hopefully enlighten these issues, by describing; first, the Swedish riverine nitrogen problem; second, present Swedish institutions and instruments used for riverine nutrient control; third, three different management models practised in other countries that has been suggested for Swedish purposes. Finally, the prospects of success in Sweden for each of the three model- propositions are discussed. The chapter should be seen as a first analysis for introducing a new water quality policy, and is mainly based on ideas of common property resource theory (e.g. Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992) and ecological economics (e.g. Tietenberg, 1992 & 1994). A new water management strategy would of course include all water related issues. This chapter, however, is focused on the nitrogen problem and on the largest nitrogen polluter; the agricultural sector.

The riverine nitrogen problem

Nitrogen pollution is at the centre of the environmental debate in Sweden as nitrogen is considered to be the limiting nutrient for biological growth in the Baltic Sea. The nitrogen concentration in the sea has increased over the last 20 years (Sanden & Rahm, 1993) and several reports have documented the resulting eutrophication problems (Swedish EPA, 1988; Hansson & Rudstam, 1990; Rosenberg et al., 1990). The Swedish contribution to the marine eutrophication is mainly through river-transported nitrogen (Swedish EPA, 1988), of which 75 per cent originates from non-point sources (Lofgren & Olsson, 1990). As the diffuse leakage mainly derives from arable land (Wittgren & Arheimer, 1996; Swedish EPA, 1996), this chapter concentrates upon environmental policies that might result in measures being taken by farmers to control the nitrogen load on water.

All farming includes some leaching of nutrients as natural vegetation is removed. The amount leaching from a certain field is the combined effect of natural conditions and management practices. Regarding nitrogen for instance, a coarse soil exposed to high water discharge is more sensitive to leaching than a clay soil in a dry region. The type,

34

Arheimer: Three Different CPR Management Models

amount and timing of fertiliser in combination with the type of crop and crop yield are crucial, as well as the drainage system and crop rotation. To avoid nitrogen leaching the soil should always be covered by vegetation, open ditches and ponds should be numerous in the landscape and buffer strips should border all open water surfaces. Fertilisers should be added when crops need them, and in well-adjusted amounts. Cattle contribute to the nitrogen load if their manure is not taken care of properly. If it is used for fertilisation it should be added carefully, and, when stored, it should be on cemented ground that cannot be flooded. Moreover, as ammonia is volatile, the storage should be covered to avoid atmospheric nitrogen deposition.

The management problems involved in riverine nitrogen transport can be formulated in terms of a Common Property Resource (CPR) problem. A CPR is here defined as a resource that is not exclusively controlled by a single agent or source (Tietenberg, 1991). Often these resources are not stationary, such as water, air, fish shoal, or rainfall in an arid landscape, and for that reason it is difficult to identify an owner for the resource. As the property rights are undefined, the user rights, maintenance and responsibility for the resource may also be undefined, which may lead to over-exploitation. The environmental problems of heavily over-exploited resources, used under open-access because of the lack of property rights, are well known in the literature (e. g. Hardin, 1968). So are also the various systems under which CPRs may be managed in an ecologically sustainable and economically efficient way (e. g. Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992; McKean, 1992; Hanna, 1995).

In this chapter, river water and the sea are looked upon as CPRs. Thanks to the hydrological cycle, water is constantly replaced and a single discharge or an overfertilised field may have low impact on the total nitrogen load. Most people prefer clean surface water, and are dependent on it for drinking1, fishing and recreation purposes. On the other hand it is possible to free-ride in the maintenance of the resource by polluting it. It is often more convenient and means higher economical gain for the individual to neglect the polluting effect of everyday actions and, instead, rely on the more abstract "society" or "system" to solve even well-known problems. This is also the attitude among many farmers, who are not very interested in, nor aware of the connection between farming methods and large-scale environmental problems (Lewan & Lewan, 1991,1992; Lewan et al., 1995).

In this broad CPR perspective not only farmers but all consumers of agricultural products may be looked upon as responsable for the pollution involved in the production. Consumers influence in a market economy may be strong and lead the production in a certain direction.

35


However, since the agricultural sector is already loaded with subsidies and regulations, the market forces may be weak and political means must also be considered. The question recently raised in Sweden is whether another management-model than the present could be more efficient in reducing riverine nitrogen-transport and thereby improving water quality.

Present riverine nitrogen management

Swedish environmental policy is dominated by a command-and-control approach, which is the traditional policy of most western countries. According to this policy, national rules dictate when the discharge of pollution should be restricted and from whom the measures should be demanded. Moreover, there are monitoring programs checking that the rules are followed, and a sanction system for those who do not follow the rules. In Sweden emission licences are based on what is technically practicable, economically feasible and ecologically motivated. Environmental protection is handled as a matter of co-operation between parties concerned, and the permits given are often fhe results of negotiations (Lowgren, 1994). The basic idea in such a system is that all pollution discharge is too high and should be reduced in step with economic and technical progress. There are no general rules about pollution levels in the recipients but each polluting activity is considered individually (Swedish EPA, 1993; Berg, 1994). In 1969 water-quality standards were developed for drinking, bathing and fishing, but theyare not formally included in the national legislation for environmentalprotection (Lowgren, 1994).

Polluter-Pays-Principle is applied in the sense that according to the permits emitters are obliged to install and pay for adequate pollution control technology. During the 1970s large subsidies were allocated to industries and local councils to cover the cost of control technology, but these subsidy schemes have nearly ceased to exist (Opschoor & Vos, 1989). Economical instruments are seldom included in the Swedish policy but to decrease the diffuse leakage from arable land a charge was put on commercial fertiliser in 1984. The amounts charged, however, were so low that the demand was not significantly reduced (Lowgren & Segrell, 1991). Charges are also imposed on discharge from point-sources, although, these should cover administration and monitoring and are not aimed at having any incentive impact.

Responsibility for granting permits for water polluting activities is divided on several different authorities: the national Environmental

36


Protection Agency (EPA), the regional Counties (24 in number), and the local Municipalities (286 in number). Regarding the nitrogen leakage from arable land, all farming is defined as an activity of environmental concern under the law. However, the farmer himself can decide what measures should be taken, and only large farmers need permits. Specific restrictions (e.g. animasl per square unit, manure storage and spreading) exist for certain groups of farmers in certain regions. The observance of law and restrictions, however, does not seem to be very good; 70 per cent of the farmers with large animal stocks that need permits for manure storage do not have any permit, and concerning the specific restrictions, about 30 per cent of the farmers controlled by the authorities does not follow the rules of winter green land and manure storage (Swedish EPA, 1996). This might be a result of the low priority of farming control among the authorities; hardly 80 per cent of the Counties' control means was used 1994/95 (Swedish EPA, 1996).

Monitoring programmes are conducted not only by the same authorities as mentioned above, but also by point-polluters and river basin associations. In some places several authorities are measuring the same point without knowing about each other's programs2, but in river- basins covering 75 per cent of Swedish surface there also exist coordinated regional control of water recipients (Lofgren, 1993). Moreover, the measurement stations are often located close to point-sources or on administrative borders, and not at representative units of the landscape or in key positions in the drainage system. Surveys of the coordinated monitoring sometimes show that the aim is confused or lacking, and that the results are seldom if ever used for environmental planning (Lofgren, 1993; Gustafsson, 1996). The data may be very difficult to come across and it may not be available in digital form3.

The planning of land and water resources in Sweden is kept within administrative borders that are not in accordance with the major watershed boundaries, which makes an efficient and holistic management difficult (Castensson et al., 1990). Moreover, it is a top-down policy model that does not give incentives to initiatives from the polluting actors themselves. The importance of user participation and management at the lowest appropriate level are included in Agenda 21, which Sweden has accepted, and in the policy of the EU, of which Sweden has been a member since 1995, but so far Sweden equates local participation to planning at the municipality level. There exist voluntary river-basin associations of professional organisational character in Sweden. However, they are mainly involved in monitoring and not in the planning process (Gustafsson, 1996).

37


Today it is obvious that the Swedish goal to reduce the nitrogen load to the sea by 50 per cent between 1985 and 1995 has not been reached. Considering the different sources, the largest reductions have been made within the agricultural sector, but despite strict restrictions on farming, the diffuse leakage has decreased at most 30 per cent and only by 10 per cent in the most polluted areas (Swedish EPA, 1996). Another argument for a new management model is of economical character; the Swedish government has huge budget deficits and is suffering from its most severe economic downturn since the 1930s4. The problems are of structural character threatening the welfare state, which might not make it politically feasible for the state to spend large amounts on investments for improved water quality as during the 70s and 80s. Thus, to improve the situation there are strong pressures for a policy change and the implementation of a new management model.

Alternative management models

In the Swedish environmental policy debate, at least three models have been proposed lately as alternatives to improve the present situation in water quality management. They will be referred to as the community model (Swedish EPA, 1996), the negotiation model (Gustafsson, 1996) and the market model (Swedish EPA, 1993). Two of these proposed models are designed especially with respect to the diffuse nitrogen pollution problem. When analysing the three propositions, they can be assigned to three different principal ideas, although these models also have a lot in common.

The basic principle all the models have in common, is that water quality management must include some central regulations as the environmental resource in question is part of a larger system. When dealing with matter that have no direct effect on polluters either negative or positive (i.e. externalities) but harm a third party, experience shows that enforcement, e.g. by the government, must be involved in environmental protection and improvement as such cases necessitates large-scale collective action (Kraft & Vig, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Tietenberg, 1992). Consequently, the management models are centralists in the sense that the state regulates water-quality standards. On the other hand, operational rules, policy instruments and management of the system may be decentralised and all models demand the active participation of the water polluters.

Besides state load-regulations and user participation, the models also have similar requirements for institutional arrangements, i. e. adminis

38

Arhelmer: Three Different CPR Management Models

trative authority, water users associations, monitoring programme and sanction system (Ostrom, 1990 & 1995; Kemper, 1996). To be successful, it is important that there is legislative recognition of the institutional arrangements (Curie, 1983; Hahn & Hester, 1989), and either of the models must be in accordance with socio-economics and cultures of involved actors (Folke & Berkes, 1995; Young & McCay, 1995; Ostrom, 1990; Opschoor & Vos, 1989). Moreover, there must be knowledge and agreement about the ecological system and pollution transport mechanisms, _so that the operational rules of the model are not questioned (Hahn &Hester, 1989; Hanna, 1995).

Variations of the three management models have been, and still are, practised in different societies around the world. The text bellow will give a brief idea about theoretical setting, model structure, practical experiences, and the corresponding proposition in the Swedish debate.

The Community Model

The Communal Model is based on the assumption that during certain circumstances it may be rational for CPR users to govern the resource in common and create and follow collective rules, instead of acting selfishly and maximising their own profit at the expense of the CPR (e.g. Ostrom, 1990; Hanna, 1995). The rationality lies in the extended sustainability of the resource, from which all users will gain in the long run. The true community model is arranged voluntarily and spontaneously through self-organisation, and is maintained through self-gov- emance. Ostrom (1990) provided some design principles5 based on analyses of empirical cases where CPRs have been governed collectively with successful results. According to these principles, there should be not only a high degree of direct democracy in the model but also a control and sanction system to avoid free-riding. It is interesting to note that when the CPR is part of a larger system (as in this case) it must also be part of the institutional arrangements of a higher organisational level. The problems in these multiple-nested enterprises may be of different character in various layers, so that the rules on one layer must be accompanied by other rules on another layer, for the whole system to be sustainable. This will result in quasi-autonomous units operating on very small up through very large scales (Ostrom, 1995).

Successful experiences from this model have been reported from many places all over the world (e.g. Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992). The failures of handling free-riding can be assigned to lack of any of the design principles compiled by Ostrom (1990). However, most

39


successful examples concern fisheries or pastures, involving communities with few inhabitants (50-15 000) who are heavily dependent on theCPR for their income. Not so many examples have been reported with the nested enterprises approach, or with focus on externalities.

The Swedish proposition for new water-quality management that may be referred to this theory, is called environmental co-operation (Swedish EPA, 1996). The model only includes farmers and to facilitate the communication among participating farmers, the arable land must be situated nearby within the same watershed, and at most 20-25 farmers should be included in each co-operating group. Water-quality standards for the specific watershed will be decided by county or municipal authorities, who will also have a control function. The schematic structure of the organisation is shown in Figure 1. Together with a coordinator the community shall present its own environmental plan and conduct a monitoring programme. The co-operating farmers will decide together where control measures should be taken and, possibly, where higher leakage maybe accepted. When their environmental plan is accepted by the authorities they have exemption from ordinary regulations, which has to be followed by farmers who do not co-operate. Participation is voluntary, but environmental subsidies will be paid to the participants. Moreover, the model includes compulsory education and continuation courses in nitrogen pollution and control measures for the co-operating farmers.

Figure 1. Schematic structure of the organisation in the environmental co-operation that has been suggested in the environmental policydebate in Sweden (an example of the community model)E-Co = environmental co-operation; F = farmer

Government

Country / Municipal Authority

40


The Negotiation Model

The Negotiation Model is based on the assumption that representative democracy within river basins may be a platform for water management through negotiation and incentive instruments (Gustafsson, 1989 and 1996; Cheret, 1994). The idea is to apply the administrative structure of the traditional European democracies on each river, including a water parliament and an administrative basin agency. The agency is responsible for technical planning, monitoring, financial calculations, operations and maintenance, as well as for information support to the parliament. The water parliament is established by ministerial order and comprises representatives from three similarly large groups: (1) users, qualified local dignitaries, and socio-professional groups; (2) authorities and politicians from regional and municipal levels; (3) authorities and politicians from the state. The water management policy is defined by the parliament, and detailed management plans on longer time- scales (e.g. 15 years), shorter time-scales (e.g. 5 years), and if needed local intensive plans, are established through negotiation between the representatives in the water parliament. To make sure that the management plans are realised and followed by single users, they must be connected to a monitoring and sanction system. The whole system should be self-financing through water fees and pollution charges, according to the user / polluter-pays-prindple. Economic incentives can be used by the water parliament. For instance, subsidies may be given to larger investments for environmental improvement, and high charges will involve high marginal costs, which theoretically should lead to improved technology for environmental control (Bergman, 1994).

The negotiation model has proven to be economically efficient and environmentally beneficial for water management in France (Opschoor & Vos, 1989; Gustafsson, 1996). The model is decentralised, which stimulates public participation and the acceptability of economic instruments by the various actors involved, and yet, there are clear linkages to larger aspects of the system regarding both environmental media and administration levels. However, the model has been developed in France since 1964, and it has been rather difficult to implement it in other countries, e.g. Poland (Kindler, 1994) and Brazil (Franco, 1995). Regarding waterpollution, another weakness of the model is that the negotiation procedure may be very long lasting and negotiation is not always possible. It has been shown that the polluters are only willing to pay when they get financial aid in return, and raising the incentive levels by increasing charge rates has met with strong opposition from industry (Opschoor & Vos, 1989).

41


The proposal to introduce water management similar to the French model in Sweden (Figure 2) is based on the fact that river basin associations already exist in Sweden, although, they have no legislative power or planning function (Gustafsson, 1994 and 1996). The Swedish river basin associations are voluntary professional organisations financed by membership fees. Almost half of the Swedish rivers have an association, and in the southern part (the most densely populated and most polluted areas) the geographic coverage is nearly complete. Each association has on average about 25 members, which may include representatives from municipality and county councils, industries, the farmers union (LRF), angling clubs, land owners, etc. At present, their main activity is to conduct co-ordinated monitoring programmes for the river basin and to write a yearly report on the water quality of the river (Gustafsson, 1996). From a questionnaire by Gustafsson (ibid.) it is shown that the main reasons to why they are not more active are not only lack of money, time and employees, but also lack of interest among the representatives. There do not seem to be any truly credible commitment among the representatives at present. According to the proposal, though, the water associations can be developed into actor-oriented organisations, provided that planners, politicians and the general public realise their existence and competence. A more efficient and holistic water quality policy ispresumed if the associations attain a position in the Swedish decision-making system similar to the water parliaments in France.

Figure 2. Schematic structure of the organisation in the negotiation model, according to the proposal in the Swedish environmental policy debateR = representative; F = farmer; P = point polluter

Government

River basin parliament

R R RHi rh

F F P Prh rh

F F

42


The Market Model

The Market Model is based on an assumption that all polluters are cost- minimisers and that tradable permits or emission reduction credits (ERC) can be substitutes for a the lacking property rights of a CPR. The model attempts to inject flexibility into the manner in which the environmental quality standards are met, by using market forces. By trading the permits or ERC, the higher pollution from one actor will be compensated for by control measures and lower emissions from another. The price level of the permits is established by the market and all polluters in the market will seek to minimise the sum of permit and control measure costs, which will allocate the measures in the most cost- effective way (Tietenberg, 1991), provided that there are many actors in the market and that the transaction costs are low (Bergman, 1994). In the market model the permits or ERC are the currency for pollution, that may be stored and spent according to various policies: (1) Offset ■policy - new or modified emission sources must acquire permits or ERC from "old" sources so that the total emissions are reduced after their entry; (2) Bubble policy - treats multiple emissions as if they were inclosed in a bubble and the total sum of emissions leaving the area would meet with quality standards. Within the bubble the discharge of pollution will be allocated according to market mechanisms; (3) Netting - allows internal trading within single polluters; (4) Banking - mechanisms for saving unused pollution rights for future use in the offset, bubble or netting programmes (Tietenberg, 1991; Hahn & Hester, 1989).

Figure 3. Schematic structure of the market model, according to the proposal in the Swedish environmental policy debate F = farmer; P = point polluter

Government

basin

Environmental protection agency

basin

43


Most experiences from the market model derive from the Emission Trading Program initiated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1975, which has been used under the Clean Air Act. The air pollution trading has resulted in lower control costs and decreased emissions compared to the former command-and-control policy (Opschoor & Vos, 1989; Tietenberg, 1994). Regarding water pollution rights, trading may occur with respect to sets of point-sources and with respect to point and non-point sources. Generally, trading between nonpoint sources has been considered too hard to carry out in practice. There are examples of both failure and success of the market model. The failures are often consequences of shortcomings in the decentralisation process, in the approval of the water quality model, and/or in the interest and commitment among the polluters (Opschoor & Vos, 1989). It has been questioned whether the market model can be successful outside the USA (ibid.), however, design guidelines to include social, environmental and sustainable concerns in the institutional arrangements for the market model have been presented recently (Young & McCay, 1995) which may make it more easily applicable.

The Swedish proposal for implementing the market model includes both point and non-point sources of nitrogen pollution (Swedish EPA, 1993). It is based on the bubble-concept and considers regional nitrogen emissions to water within river basins. To get started, permits of present emission levels will be delivered to the polluters from the EPA (i.e. grandfathering). The permits will be valid for specified time-periods and changes for the legal bubble-emissions shall be preceded by early and clear announcements. The system will be administrated by the Swedish EPA (Figure 3), who will compare reported emissions from the polluters to measurements by the monitoring programme. The diffuse leakage from arable land will be estimated by models, while the nitrogen denitrification in waterbodies will be considered as constant. The proposal includes legislative changes, further research and suggests a pilot scheme in a single watershed.

Discussion

Water quality management in Sweden does not seem to be very efficient at present, at least not when it comes to diffuse nitrogen pollution. Rules for agricultural practices to reduce the nitrogen leakage from arable land are difficult to make on a general level as they must include the physiographical, climatological and hydrological conditions of the specific piece of land in question. If the nitrogen transport to the sea is

44

Arheimer: "Three Different CPR Management Models

in focus, additional notice must also be taken of down-stream conditions in the river-basin and its drainage system (Arheimer & Wittgren, 1994). More detailed rules would probably be difficult to conduct both for the farmers and the administrators as the situation is already tricky today. Even if such rules were established within the command-and-control policy they would demand a detailed and expensive control system. Thus, a more decentralised approach is desirable.

The efficiency and sustainability of either of the above mentioned models very much depend on the compliance of the users (Hahn & Hester, 1989; Opschoor & Vos, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Hanna, 1995; Folke & Berkes, 1995; Young & McCay, 1995). The discussion of a new water quality policy with focus on diffuse pollution, must then include local socio-economic and cultural aspects and be preceded by investigations of land owners' attitudes.

Most Swedish land is owned privately (the arable land almost entirely and about half of the forested land) and normally land owners reside on the land (Lewan & Lewan, 1991). Rural lifestyles in relation to ecology, economy and social issues on the Southern Plain of Sweden were investigated by two research projects in the early 1990s at the Department of Social and Economic Geography, Lund University (Lewan & Lewan, 1991,1992; Lewan et al., 1995). According to these interviews, the land owners are not very interested in, nor aware of, the connection between farming methods and large-scale environmental problems. The results have support from other documents discussing farmers attitude in Sweden (Swedish EPA, 1996). A consequence of this low interest, is that any spontaneous self-organising movement a la Ostrom (1990) among the Swedish farmers to reduce nitrogen leakage is not very likely at present. This result could be expected due to lack of incentives since the land owners are not directly affected themselves by their water management, as in the successful examples reported by Ostrom.

Model prospects

The three management models that are presented in this chapter, all include a top-down implementation strategy. As mentioned above, the different models require about the same institutional arrangements to be efficient and sustainable. However, the sensitivity to the various requirements may differ between the models. An attempt to grade the models according to the dependency of the various requests is shown in Table 1. The results in the table are based on the following discussion:

45


Table 1. Institutional requirements for either of the three models, although, here the model is market for which each requirement is considered most importantC = Community Model; N = Negotiation Model; M = Market Model

REQUIREMENTS C N Mcentrally regulated water quality standardsactive user/polluter participationadministrative authoritywater users associationmonitoring/sanction systemlegislative recognitionconcordance with socio-economics and cultureepistemic capital among users/polluters

The community model appeals to the sense of community and solidarity within the group, and long-term sustainability goals for the CPR. Thus, it is probably most dependent on operational rules being in accordance with the socio-economic and cultural conditions along with the epistemic capital among the users. The negotiation model, on the other hand, require capabilities in administration and compromising, and that there are mutual confidence and agreement between polluters and association representatives in the water parliament. For the market model the monitoring and sanction system are probably of major importance, as the model appeals to greed and enterprising spirit and cheating in discharge levels may be socially accepted among the polluters. Additionally, water quality standards are necessary parts as they constitute the base for its marketing.

Now that the models have been described and discussed, som&pb- jections can be made to the corresponding proposals in the Swedish debate, e.g. first model: The farmers do not gain anything besides the payment for participating in the community model, which is not in accordance with the Ostrom design principles for successful community based CPR management. Subsidies are not a guarantee for active participation unless they are connected to a control system, and in this proposal it will probably be difficult to control single farmers as participation is voluntary and the water quality measurements of the river will be influenced by farmers not included in the environmental cooperation. Second model: The proposed negotiation model includes in

46


stitutional arrangements for each river-basin. It must then be added that in the exemplary French model there are six water parliaments,, situated in six very large river basins. Sweden has no less than 119 river basins to consider, and to give all these a water parliament would probably be less cost effective than in France as large-scale benefits would be lost. Third model: In the proposed market model the Swedish EPA would dictate all operational rules and conduct all trading, which is not a very decentralised approach and includes a great deal of administration at the central level.

Which way to go?

According to the discussion above and Table 1, the community model seems to be most difficult to implement, since the interest in and epistemic capital is so low among the farmers. It has been argued in a study comparing the market and negotiation model for water allocation in Brazil, that a negotiation model can be used as a first step in improving water management (Kemper, 1996). The models do not exclude each other and probably not the community model either, as they have about the same institutional requirements even if sensitivity to the requirements may differ. For Swedish conditions, it might be tempting to build a negotiation system on existing organisations as in the proposal presented above. However, the Swedish water associations do not have the same objectives that a water parliament should have, and their members are often restricted to representing municipal and industrial interests. It would be more appropriate to create new organisations that would, among other things, include the duties of the former associations.

As Sweden possesses so many river-basins, the water parliaments could include several nearby watersheds discharging into the same coastal region. Several basins could then share the same institutional arrangements, while management plans should be made for single catchments. These water parliaments should of course, as mentioned above, deal with all water related issues and not only diffuse nitrogen pollution. It would certainly be beneficial if water related questions were managed within one single institution. The water agency for the region should conduct monitoring and problem analysis. Detailed knowledge of specific sites in the basin would not be available, but could be simulated through mathemathical models. Such models have been developed in Sweden regarding nitrogen transport, both for field-scale analyses (Johnsson et al., 1987) and watershed analyses (Arheimer & Wittgren, 1994; Wittgren & Arheimer, 1996).

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Even if the problem analyses should be made on a river-basin level, the solutions may be even further decentralised in large basins. In the management plans the water parliament should consider management models in accordance with local environmental, socio-economic and cultural conditions. Different regions may be suitable for different management models due to local circumstances, and maybe even for mixtures between various models. This is to be further investigated. The question may not be whether one management model is appropriate for the whole country, but whether it is appropriate for a certain region at a certain period, which would be for the water parliament to decide from time to time.

Notes

1 Sweden is a country rich in lakes, and surface water is the source of most drinking water. High concentrations of nitrate may reduce the oxygen absorption of the blood, Pregnant women and small children are therefore recommended not to drink water with > 10 mg nitrate-N/litre, which is not an unrealistic value in Swedish surface water at present.2 3 These statements are based on the author's personal experiences.4 In the 1990s crisis the rate of unemployment reached over 14 per cent and the deficit/GDP rose to 13 per cent, while the production and productivity fell (Freeman et al., 1995).5 The mentioned design principles by Ostrom include: Clearly defined boundaries, congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition of rights to organise.

References

Arheimer, B. & Wittgren, H. B. 1994. "Modelling the effects of wetlands on regional nitrogen transport", Ambio, 23(6):378-386.

Bergman, L. 1994. Miljdpolitikens mal och medel: Nagra ekonomiska aspekter (Goal and instruments in environmental politics: Some economical aspects). In B. Sodersten (ed.), Marknad och politik (Market and politics), pp. 275-300. Lund: Dialogos (in Swedish).

Berkes, F. (ed.) 1989. Common property resources. Ecology and community-based sustainable development. London: Belhaven Press.

Bressers, H., O'Toole, L. J. Jr. & Richardson, J. 1994. "Networks as models of analysis: Water policy in comparative perspective", Environmental Politics, 3:1-23.

Bromley, D. W. (ed.) 1992. Making the commons work. Theory, practice and policy. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.

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Castensson, R., Falkenmark, M. & Gustafsson, J-E. 1990. Water awareness in planning and decision-making. Swedish council for planning and coordination of research (FRN), Report 90:9. Stockholm.

Cheret, 1.1994. "Managing water: The French model". In I. Serageldin & A. Steer (eds.), Valuing the environment. Proceedings of the first annual international conference on environmentally sustainable development, Sept. 30-Oct. 1,1993, pp. 80-92. The World Bank, Washington D.C., Environmentally sustainable development proceedings series, No. 2.

Folke, C. & Berkes, F. 1995. "Mechanisms that link property rights to ecological systems". In S. Hanna & M. Munasinghe (eds.), Property rights and the environment. Social and ecological issues, pp.121-138 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington D.C.

Franco, R. M. 1994. "Discussant remarks: Brazil". In I. Serageldin & A. Steer (eds.), Valuing the environment. Proceedings of the first annual international conference on environmentally sustainable development, Sept. 30-Oct. 1,1993, pp.96-99. The World Bank, Washington D.C., Environmentally sustainable development proceedings series, No. 2.

Freeman, R. B., Swedenborg, B. & Topel, R. 1995. Economic troubles in Sweden’s welfare state - Introduction, summary and conclusions. Center for business and policy studies, Stockholm, NBER / SNS Occasional papers No. 69.

Gustafsson, J-E. 1994. "River basin entities for integrated water management in Sweden", Vatten, 50:161-165 (In Swedish with English abstract).

-------- 1996. Avrinningsomrddesbaserade organisationer som aktiva planeringsdktorer.(River basin entities for integrated water management in Sweden) VA- Forsk Report No. 1996-05, Swedish Water and Wastewater Association, Stockholm (In Swedish with English abstract).

Hahn, R. W. & Hester, G. L. 1989. "Marketable permits: Lessons for theory and practice", Ecology Law Quarterly, 16 (2):361-406.

Hanna, S. 1995. "Effidences of user partitipation in natural resource management". In S. Hanna & M. Munasinghe (eds.), Property rights and the environment. Social and ecological issues, pp.59-68. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank, Washington D.C.

Hansson, S. & Rudstam, L. G. 1990. "Eutrophication and the Baltic fish communities", Ambio, 19:123-125.

Hardin, G. 1968. "The tradgedy of the commons", Science, 162:1243-1248.Johnsson, H., Bergstrom, L., Jansson, P.-E., & Paustian, K. 1987. "Simulated

nitrogen dynamics and losses in a layered agricultural soil", Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment, 18:333-356.

Kemper, K. E. 1996. The cost of free water. Water resources allocation and use in the Curu valley, Ceara, Northeast Brazil. Linkoping studies in arts and sti- ence, No. 137, Linkoping.

Kindler, J. 1994. "Discussant remarks: Poland". In I. Serageldin & A. Steer (eds.), Valuing the environment. Proceedings of the first annual international conference on environmentally sustainable development, Sept. 30-Oct. 1,1993, pp.93-95. The World Bank, Washington D.C., Environmentally sustainable development proceedings series, No. 2.

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Kraft, M. E. & Vig, N. J. 1990. "Environmental policy from the seventies to the nineties: continuity and change". LnM. E. Kraft & N. J. Vig (eds.), Environmental policy in the 1990s. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Lewan, N. & Lewan, L. 1991. Landskapets framtid. De stora jordegendomarnas betydelse. En arbetsrapport. (The future landscape. The importance of the big landed estates. A working report) Departement of Social and Economic Geography, University of Lund, Rapporter och Notiser, Report No. 99, Lund (in Swedish).

Lewan, L. & Lewan, N. 1992. Landskapets framtid - de stora jordegendomarnas betydelse. Synpunkter frdn markdgare och myndigheter i Skane. (The future landscape - the importance of the big landed estates. Viewpoints from landowners and aufhorirties in Scaunia) Department of Social and Economic Geography, University of Lund, Rapporter och Notiser, Report No. 105, Lund (in Swedish).

Lewan, L., Stenseke, M. & Lewan, N. 1995. Landscape and life. Farmers in the southern plaine. Case study from the parishes ofBosarp, Gylle and Simlinge. Department of Social and Economic Geography, University of Lund, Rapporter och Notiser, Report No. 134, Lund.

Ldfgren, S. & Olsson, H. 1990. Tillforsel av kvave ochfosfor till vattendrag i Sveriges inland. (Load of nitrogen and phosphorous to watercourses in Sweden). Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, Report No. 3692, Solna (in Swedish).

Ldfgren, S. 1993. Samordnad recepientkontroll - erfarenheter ochforslag tillframtida utformning. (Coordinated monitoring - experiences and suggestions for the future). Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, Report No. 4190, Solna (in Swedish).

Lowgren, M. & Segrell, B. 1991. "Environmental issues in Sweden 1973-1989: Science and policy", Environmental Management, 15 (5):613-622.

Lowgren, M. 1994. "Surface water pollution control in Sweden 1965-1990". In M. Lowgren & R. Hjorth (eds.), Environmental policies in Poland, Sweden and the Netherlands. A comperative study of surface water pollution control. Linkoping university, Department of Water and Environmental Studies, Tema V Report No. 19, Linkoping.

McKean, M. A. 1992. "Success on the commons. A comparative examination of institutions for common property resource management", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(3):247-281.

Rosenberg, R., Elmgren, R., Fleischer, S., Jonsson, P., Persson, P. & Dahlin, H.. 1990. "Marine eutrophication case studies in Sweden", Ambio, 19:102-

108.Opschoor, B. & Vos, H. B. 1989. Economic instruments for environmental protec

tion'. Paris: OECD.Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons. The evolution of institutions for collec

tive action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.-------- 1995. Designing complexity to govern complexity. In S. Hanna & M.

Munasinghe (eds.), Property rights and the environment. Social and ecological issues, pp.33-46. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington D.C.

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Sanden, P. & Rahm, L. 1993. "Nutrient trends in the Baltic Sea", Environmetrics, 4:75-103.

Seitzinger, S. P. 1988. "Denitrification in freshwater and costal marine ecosystems: Ecological and chemical significance", Limnol. Oceanogr.,33:702- 724.

Swedish EPA1990. Marine Pollution '90. Action Program for Marine Pollution. Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, Solna.

-------- 1993. Utsldppsramar for narsalter. Naturvardsverkets utredning pauppdrag av regeringen. (Emission permits for nutrients. Investigationby Swedish EPA on request by the Government). Report, Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 719-3766-92 Mm, Solna (in Swedish).

-------- 1996. Kvdvefrdn land till hav (Nitrogen from the inland to the sea). Working Report, Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, Solna (in Swedish).

Tietenberg, T. H. 1991. "Economical instruments for environmental regulation". In D. Helm (ed.), Economic policy towards the environment, pp.86- 110. Oxford review of economic policy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

-------- 1992. Environmental and natural resource economics. 3rd ed. New York:Harper Collins Publishers Inc.

-------- 1994. Economics and environmental policy. Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

Wittgren, H. B. & Arheimer, B. 1996. "Source apportionment of riverine nitrogen transport based on catchment modelling", Water Science and Technology, 33(4-5):109-115.

Young, M. D. & McCay, B. J. 1995. "Building equity, stewardship, and resilience into market-based property right systems". In S. Hanna & M. Munasinghe (eds.), Property rights and the environment. Social and ecological issues, pp.87-102. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington D.C.

51

RECYCLING OF SEWAGE IN SWEDISHMUNICIPALITIES - POLICY IMPLICATIONS1

Henriette Soderberg

The construction of sewage treatment plants, which increased dramatically during the sixties in Sweden, was based on the idea that sewage is a waste, despite the fact that it contains considerable amounts of nourishment. Environmental research today, focuses more and more on recycling and on the potential resource inherent in sewage. This chapter deals with how to manage a change from problem elimination to recycling of resources, and discuss such from an institutional perspective. A shift towards recycling implies a shift of techniques, decision-makers and process strategies. Implementation of recycling will need strategic principles, and thereby results from research focusing common property resource management can be used in the policy process.

Problem elimination or resource utilisation

This chapter addresses the following question: What will happen to existing institutional structure with recycling of resources as the institutional purpose instead of problem elimination?

Human societies generate sewage, the more densely populated the area the more urgent is the necessity of a functional sewage system. In Sweden treatment of sewage has been a municipal responsibility since the beginning of the 20th century. Until the second part of the 19th century sewage was predominantly thrown out or, in rare cases, used for irrigation. Increasing urbanisation rendered this model of handling sewage intolerable. From a medical point of view sewage became a problem since bacteria were easily spread by this medium, especially by the faeces. Thus, transportation of sewage from towns and cities became a necessity. In 1874, a hygiene statute was passed in Sweden, and in accordance with its provisions sewage systems were built into the infrastructure of the cities (Stockholm County Board, 1991).

However, purification was not given priority at the time and society relied on the recipients' purifying abilities, which anew led to an intolerable situation when the recipients became overloaded (Lowgren, 1989). Sewage treatment developed into a problem for engineers and technicians to solve.

52

Soderberg: Recycling of Sewage in Swedish Municipalities

Increasing awareness of the scarcity of many basic productive inputs has directed attention towards the possibility of recycling resources from the flows of extinct products of mass consuming societies. Sewage contains a considerable amount of nitrogen and phosphorous and even potassium, which are central elements in fertilisers.2 With the techniques used today, phosphorous supplies are is estimated to be exhausted within 100-200 years, a process possible to slow down with recycling (Fredriksson, 1994).

Development is encouraged by the emphasis on recycling given in Agenda 21, and the activities this agreement has initiated in Swedish municipalities. As compared with the situation at the turn of the century, the composition of sewage has become more complex due to the variety of chemical pollutants and the increased number of artificial substances used by households and industries. The presence of pathogenic micro-organisms complicates the situation and a recycling process excluding such is a crucial task (Finnson, 1996).

Not only environmental but also economic incentives favour recycling. Production of fertilisers is energy consuming and involves considerable transportation. Construction costs for sewage treatment can decrease by a shift to a recycling approach, as modem treatment plants are likely to be more expensive than development of wetland filters (L. Steen, pers. comm.). Wetland filters is one possible way of treating nitrogen in sewage. However, wetland filters demand quite extensive areas of land and such might be impossible or expensive to achieve in urban areas and coastal regions (O. Eriksson, pers. comm.).

Perception of sewage

Contemporary sewage treatment policy in Sweden is based on the view that sewage is a waste, a problem in need of elimination. As illustrated in Figure 1, a resource perspective distinguishes itself from a waste perspective with respect to how the phenomenon is perceived and how it is managed. The present institution for sewage treatment represents a set of norms, rules, techniques, knowledge and actors which will have to change to make it possible for recycling to succeed.

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figure 1. Two perspectives on sewage water

recycling system

\resource

//

irrigation wetland filters

source separation^ use of sludge /

energy crops + water

soil improv. + water

technical system

- sewage water

/ \ problemtreatment plants wetland filters infiltration

water

The contemporary treatment situation

The dominating contemporary technique for treatment of sewage is at a waste water treatment plant. During the 1960s the construction of treatment plants increased dramatically and was encouraged by state subsidies. Due to regulation of pathogens, municipalities are obliged to have treatment plants when health risks render it necessary, public companies are allowed to ran such plants as long as they are publicly owned (Paulsson et al., 1993). In sparsely built-up areas the municipality usually just exercises supervision but does not run the management process. The amount of water is small and extensive recipient areas exist.

Public authorities are also responsible for regulation concerning the use of sewage and sludge, mostly due to regulation of pathogens, but also to be able to control outlets of nitrogen, phosphorous and heavy metals.

Municipalities have assumed responsibility for sewage treatment during this century. Figure 2 shows that the majority of Swedish citizens are connected to some form of public sewage treatment system in general. The correlation between urban population and connection to public sewage treatment methods is high, correlation coefficient calculated show 0,883. During the 1960s, the contemporary system with sewage treatment plants as a dominating treatment method was implemented with the help of central incentives. A treatment plant is a method with little dependence on surrounding factors and thereby possible to implement in every municipality.

54


Figure 2. Rate of population in Swedish municipalities connected to public sewage treatment methods in general

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

rate of connected people

There were 286 municipalities at the time. The figure is based on statistical material from the Water and Sewage Treatment Association.

The domination of sewage treatment plants as a solution is shown by a correlation calculation between rate of publicly connected population and population connected to treatment plants, a strong coefficient of 0,84. Present public policy can thereby be characterised as focusing on urban population and connection of such to treatment plants. As mentioned earlier this policy implies general solutions which do not have to consider local conditions such as geographical properties and local norms. Resource utilisation can not be executed with just one general technique, but requires different methods due to local conditions, as will be seen below.

Recycling methods

Figure 1 lists the existing techniques used for utilisation of sewage as a resource; use of sludge, source separation, irrigation and wetland filters. Both irrigation and wetland filters can produce energy crops which in turn can produce energy for district heating or methane, a gas e.g. used as fuel for buses. One limiting physical factor is access to land.

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In some ecologically progressive villages in Sweden, water originating from households is treated in wetland systems.4 Today, many Swedish municipalities have implemented wetland filters as a way to reduce nitrogen5, but wetland filters can be used in many other ways. For this purpose different species of grass are used which can assimilate relatively high amounts of nitrogen. Even here access to land is a limiting factor. The grass, in turn, can be used for energy production or gas as mentioned above.

When irrigating, the sewage water can be used without any purification other than a grid for separation of solid material, except in cases of extreme water quality. Energy forestry based on Salix, and similar crops, is advantageous in that optimal growth can be obtained at the N/P-rates (the balance between nitrogen and phosphorous) that are present in fresh sewage water (Perttu, 1992). Water scarcity within a region can also encourage irrigation solutions.6

Deposit taxes are to be introduced in Sweden, which will affect the costs of depositing sludge. Sludge usage is dependent on the type of water treated at the plant. Some municipalities have problems withexcessive heavy metals in the water, metals which end up in the sludge and render it useless. Treatment plant operators have therefore increased their efforts to improve the quality of sludge to make it acceptable as fertiliser (A. Hansson, pers. comm.). However, due to Swedish regulations concerning micro organisms, growth of edible crops on fields fertilised with sludge is prohibited during the first year.7 Use of sludge does not imply large changes in present technical systems, but demands major normative changes since scepticism towards sludge is quite profound (Kommunaktuellt, 1996).

Source separation, where urine and faeces are separated for individual treatment, is not frequently practised. Some ecologically progressive villages have installed separating toilets where the residues are used within the village mainly for cultivation. More general use of this method requires co-operation with farmers willing to use the urine.

In Aneby municipality a school has installed a source separation system which shall be used for educational purposes. Borlange municipality has a more extensive experiment where parts of buildings in the centre of Borlange have been rebuilt to include source separating toilets.8 In addition to needing fields for application, the implementation of source separating toilets has the obstacles of local norms and hygienic scepticism.

The number of municipalities practising existing methods has expanded over the last years.9 Projects previously treated as experiments or involving but a few persons are developing into permanent solu-

56


tions involving several persons. Local conditions are limiting factors regarding every latter method, factors not in need of consideration previously. The development is illustrated in Figure 3.

A development from general towards specific techniques for eachmunicipality is one precondition for recycling sewage. Swedish municipalities have a relatively extended autonomy towards the central authorities (Gustavsson, 1996; Amna, 1993), and the environmental area has undergone a decentralisation process during the last ten years (Loftsson et al., 1993). Specific solutions are thereby possible in a formal way.

Figure 3. Assumed development regarding sewage treatment in Swedish municipalities

sewageproblem----------------------------------------------► resource

techniquesgeneral --------------------------------------------- specific

Recycling of sewage and institutional change

An institution can be said to exist if we have norms, principles, rules and procedures that are issue specific (Hjorth, 1996). Physical attributes are also included, in this case equipment such as pipelines, plants etc. To differentiate institutions analytically from organisations it should be noted that an institution can never equal an actor, which can be the case for an organisation (Lindbom, 1995). An institution is the arena, not a decision-maker.

Scott has created what he calls an omnibus definition where he defines institutions as "...cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour." (Scott, 1995:33). Consequently, institutions can be seen as generators of stability a stability generated if the institution represents a norm system accepted in society which in turn generates legitimacy and predictability. Stability does not imply absence of change though. Institutional properties such as autonomy complexity flexibility and ability to adjust make incorporation of small changes possible (Bostedt, 1991).

57


Recycling is not a small change however, it demands changed patterns of behaviour from citizens, and a change in perception of sewage from everybody involved. How does one generate such a change? Today educated experts make the decisions regarding sewage treatment. Perception of local opinion and implementation of new norms are best executed by local politicians though. They are able to solve possible conflicts between producers and users of sewage, they are familiar with local conditions and they formally represent the citizens, which experts have never done. The assumed development is illustrated in Figure 4 below.

figure 4. The dominating group of decision makers will change when sewage is recycled

problem--------------------sewage------

, techniquesgeneral ------------------------- 1--------

. decision-makersexperts ----------------------------------

resource

specific

politicians

The legitimacy base for the area, with the scenario above, will shift from scientific knowledge to a combination of science, norms and traditional knowledge. Changes illustrated in Figure 4 will be too extensive for incorporation in present institutional structure. Just how one changes an institutional structure is a question which has initiated a lot of research. One can categorise the perspectives into the dichotomy reformatory-revolutionary. The reformatory perspective, here represented by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993), see change as a continuous process. Step by step the existing structure is revised and adjusted to the contextual factors affecting the structure. Rothstein (1986) can here represent the revolutionary perspective where sudden change and brake down of existing structure is prerequisite for change. This dichotomy represents different process strategies, and as a consequence of previous characteristics of the sewage treatment area, a revolutionary process seems to be the way to go, Figure 5.

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Figure 5. Different process strategies connected to the change of sewage treatment

sewageproblem-------------------------------------------► resource

techniquesgeneral ------------------------- '-------------------specific

decision-makersexperts ----------------------- politicians

processreformatory---------------------------------------------► revolutionary

We now have a situation where politicians, as decision-makers, shall implement locally suited techniques in a revolutionary process. Principles, such as goals and strategies will be needed and research dealing with common property resources, CPR, can be used as a providing source.

Common property resource management and how it is accomplished

Common property resource, CPR, research is focused towards co-operation problems. Here, co-operation may be a future problem if conflicts related to sewage use arise etc., buiitis'not the present main target. The limiting factor is contemporary institutional structure, changing it in one way or another is necessary, and CPR-theory can contribute with potential solutions.

The importance of a functioning institution for successful resource management is stressed by Berkes and Farvar (1988) who see predictability as the major benefit generated by an institution. People's unpredictable thoughts and actions, which complicate planning, become constrained and, therefore, more predictable (Feeny et al., 1990). To make the institution work the norm congruence is stressed, accepted institutions are dependent on a congruence between institutional norms and the norms existing in society (Buck, 1989). Oakerson stresses the importance of a close relation between the resource base and "the belief system", out of which decisions will arise (Oakerson, 1992).

He thus reveals the most common perspective within this area of

59


research, the local community and management of a concrete resource such as fish, water, land, etc. Congruent norms are stressed which point to the fact that involvement of affected actors, here households and other producers of sewage, is crucial when managing a resource.

The possibility to exclude non-appropriators is vividly stressed in CPR-contexts, as a way of avoiding tragedy-of-the-commons. If people are going to invest their time and perhaps money in a resource management institution their benefits must be controlled and, furthermore, such benefits should not be possible to achieve by persons not contributing (Bromley, 1992; Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). Institutional rationality must have some congruence with individual rationality. If one separates sewage to render it usable there shall be some benefit for the separator as well. This is accomplished without problems in small villages where they use the resource themselves but is more complicated when a farmer uses sewage from a whole village on his fields.

Ostrom and McKean have focused upon characteristics important for a resource management institution to comprise in their research(Ostrom, 1990; McKean, 1992). As their main interest both authors have institutions originating and existing solely within civil society. The concluding principles are of general interest though.

• Participation and involvement of affected actors are stressed. McKean wantsthe institution to be supervised by the affected actors themselves, whileOstrom puts stress on the aspect of participation.

• Rules for exclusion and withdrawal of resource units.• Monitoring systems must exist with enforcement capacity. Both Ostrom

and McKean want a graduated sanction system.• Conflict-resolution is important according to Ostrom, if conflicts are im

possible to solve within present institutional framework the institution will become illegitimate. McKean sees economic efficiency as a more crucial factor for institutional reproduction since economic benefits continue to motivate involved actors.

When the above principles were applied to a situation in the municipality of Gotland in Sweden, where sewage water has been used for irrigation for a decade, the instability of the situation became visible (Soderberg and Loftsson, 1996). Gotland has a situation of water scarcity and when their recipients for sewage water became overloaded with nitrogen they began to experiment with the use of fresh sewage water for irrigation.

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The water is used as a resource but the institutional framework remains. The municipality has the initiative, there are limited possibilities for participation, no existence of formal rules or monitoring systems except for social control in general. Affected households are directed through norms concerning their outlets to the sewage system. If anybody puts chemicals in the sewage they are aware of the possibility that such chemicals can end up on the farmer's land nearby. This awareness has worked satisfyingly so far. (L. Duvenborg, pers. comm.) Sanctions are only of normative character such as social exclusion. Since there are limited possibilities to handle critical situations the institutions can be regarded as unstable.

The most obvious problem here is the week link represented by the households, their behaviour can change or they can become irritated towards restrictions on their behaviour without any benefits. Congruent norms, do not sustain by themselves, they need supervision and revision.

The principles formed by Ostrom and McKean can be seen as general for a resource management institution and one possible answer to the question - what a revolution of present institutional structure entails. Local factors, such as norms, political situation, access to land, physical properties, water scarcity etc., will influence the institution for sewage treatment in different ways, ending up in more specific institutional structures, locally designed to be able to meet local conditions, compared to the general solution existing today.

A possible future institution

The recycling of sewage and the accomplishment of such has been discussed in this chapter. The existing institutional structure has been shown to be in need of extensive changes to be able to manage resource utilisation without chaos. Stability has been in focus as crucial, with stability follows predictability, decreased transaction costs and a more controllable situation. Changes of techniques, from general to locally specific solutions, decision-makers, from experts to politicians, and process strategies, revolution instead of reforms, have been argued to follow in the steps of recycling.

Resource utilisation demands structural incorporation of local factors of different kinds: Local actors, norms, water quality, access to land etc., which can be formally executed since Swedish municipalities have relatively extended autonomy towards the central state authorities.

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The CPR-theory can provide a possible answer to what locally specific solutions shall be comprised of. To realise a revolution, principles such as participation by affected actors in the process, issue specific rules, monitoring systems and conflict resolving procedures can be used as prerequisites by local politicians, for the implementation of successful recycling solutions.

Notes

1A related study is published as Soderberg, H. and Loftsson, E. 1996 "From refusal to resource - building institutions for new alternatives in sewage treatment" in Hjort-af-Omas, A. (ed.), Approaching nature from local communities - security perceived and achieved. Linkoping: EPOS, Linkoping University.2 See e.g. SEPA Report 4429 for figures concerning content in sewage water3 Correlation coefficients are Spearman's rho.4 In the municipality of Tidaholm, this system has been implemented.5 The municipality of Oxelosund has a large wetland filter as a final step, after the treatment plant, before the water is let out into the Baltic sea.6 This has been the case in the municipalities of Gotland and Borgholm, areas considered as semi-arid.7 SEPA Report 4429, p. 26-27 To exemplify existing differences it can be mentioned that in the Netherlands there are no restrictions for health reasons when using sludge in contrast to Finland which does not allow cultivation within 5 years.8 EVA-network, (Network for Experimental and Eco Designed Sewage Water Treatment) at SEPA, has examples on locations for source separation.9 EVA-network, SEPA, Boije af Gennas, U. 1994 and Magnusson, S. 1993 have lists of examples on municipalities with projects concerning environmental issues.

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-------- 1996. "Introduction" . In Hjorth, R. (ed.), Baltic Environmental Cooperation - A Regime in Transition. Linkoping university, Department of Water and Environmental Studies, Tema V Report No. 23.

Kommunaktuellt 1996. "Aria i taten for motstand", No. 9. The Swedish Association for Local Authorities, Stockholm.

Magnusson, S. 1993. Kommuner pa vag. Stockholm: Naturskyddsforeningen.McKean, M. A. 1992. "Success on the Commons. A Comparative Examination

of Institutions for Common Property Resource Management", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4(3): 247-281.

Lindbom, A. 1995. Medborgarskapet i valfdrdsstaten. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Loftsson et al. 1993. Svensk miljdpolitik. Lund: Studentlitteratur.Lowgren, M. et al. 1989. "Water Pollution Perspectives: Problem, Conceptualiza

tions and Abatement Strategies in Sweden during the 20th Century", Geojoumal, 19(2):161.

Oakerson, R.J. 1992. "Analyzing the commons: A framework". InD.W. Bromley (ed.), Making the commons work - Theory, practice and policy, pp. 41-59. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons - The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.

Paulsson, I. et al. 1993. Den nya kommunallagen. Alvsjo: Kommentus.Perttu, K. (ed.) 1992. Energiskog som vegetationsfilter for slam, avloppsvatten,

lakoatten och aska. Rapport 46, Avdelningen for skoglig intensivodling, SLU, Uppsala.

Rothstein, B. 1986. Den socialdemokratiska staten. Reformer och forvaltning inom svensk arbetsmarknads- och skolpolitik. Lund: Axkiv.

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Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. 1993. Policy Change and Learning. Westview Press.

Scott, R. W. 1995. Institutions and organizations. California: SAGE.Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 1995. Miljoanpassade vatten- och

avloppssystem. Report 4429. Stockholm.-------- 1995. Utdrag ur datoriserade natverket EVA, Experimental and eco-

designed sewage treatment projects.Soderberg, H. and Loftsson, E. 1996. "From refusal to resource - building in

stitutions for new alternatives in sewage treatment", in Hjort-af-Omas, A. (ed.), Approaching nature from local communities - security perceived and achieved, pp. 58-72. Linkoping: EPOS, Linkoping university.

Water and Sewage Treatment Association 1994. Statistical material of municipal water and sewage treatment plants. Stockholm.

Personal Communication

Duvenborg, Leif. Co-ordinator at the Department of Roads and Parks, Visby, Gotland, April 28,1995 and Sept. 4,1996.

Eriksson, Orjan. Water and Sewage Treatment Association, Stockholm, May 15,1996.

Hansson, Allan. Head of the Treatment Plant in Linkoping, Febr. 7,1996. Steen, Lars. Technical office in Oxelosund, April 27,1995.

64

BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS?THE STATE-NGO INTERFACE IN GOVERNING

URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

Hakan Tropp

Environmental degradation and depletion of natural resources are aggravating problems in many developing countries. A particular case about Non-Governmental Organisations' (NGOs) commitment to river water pollution in Madras (south India) is developed here, mainly with regards to the interface between the state and NGO sector. A significant reason behind environmental problems are insufficient structures of governance. An often proposed solution, by both international and local organisations and governments, is to develop a partnership between the state and local organisations and communities. The arguments here show that such increased cooperation or decentralisation may not come easy and is complicated by various meanings of governance, such as discretionary state power, limited transparency of bureaucratic and political processes, red-tapism and different perceptions of causes and solutions to environmental problems.

Local governance and environmental deterioration

In many developing countries local institutional framework and structures have been identified as being inadequate. Sometimes this has been labelled as "the crisis of governance" (see for instance the World Bank, 1992; Hyden & Bratton, 1992; Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 1994). This inadequacy of governance has many symptoms, e.g. a tendency to divert public resources for personal gain, unpredictability in the use of laws and, a number of regulations and licensing practices which impede markets and voluntary action and encourage rent-seeking behaviour among state officials (see World Bank, 1992:9). As a result, outcomes of political and distributive processes become arbitrary, creating misallocations of natural and other resources. Moreover, they contribute to environmental problems. There is a failure to control industrial pollution, citizens are not provided with basic services such as garbage collection, water supply, sanitation and shelter.

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The real test of governance structures and their actors comes when new demands are made from the populace or new problems appear on the agenda (cf. Hyden, 1992:14). If we refer to the development of the urban environmental situation this is exactly what has happened. Various water users demand more water resources for industrial or household uses. Urban dwellers demand improvements in their environment. This last point is linked to the provision of public services, such as collection of solid waste from households, clean air and water, provision of storm water drainage. These demands definitely challenge prevailing institutional framework, in terms of governance. However, the problem is that the institutional framework is already unable to deal with these environmental challenges in an adequate way. Additionally, urban sprawl and rapid urbanisation aggravate these problems.

This paper suggests that much of the urban environmental problems in developing countries can be ascribed to crisis of governance.1 The concept of good governance is here viewed from a perspective of decentralisation. Much of the discussion of good governance centres around an assumption that political decision-making should be made at the "lowest appropriate level" (cf. the principle of subsidiarity). This means to devolve decision-making or management of resources to lower levels within the structure of government or bureaucracy, the market or local communities. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are identified as one important link in decentralising responsibilities and power. Various kinds of NGOs are supposed to be a significant force in bridging the gap between those who govern and are governed. At the same time this implies a new partnership between the state and NGOs.

In the rhetoric there is a wish both from the state and many NGOs to facilitate and expand cooperative. However, in practice this wish may become an illusion. As will be advanced, and which is of major concern here, increased cooperation between the state and NGOs is complicated by local political structures and conflictive perceptions of environmental problems.

In the first section some theoretical aspects of governance are considered. The second part focuses on urban environment, local governance and local NGOs in the Indian mega city, Madras.2 A case about NGOs' response to deterioration of common urban resources is elaborated to highlight some of the points. The particular case is about the pollution of the rivers crossing Madras city in South India.

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Tropp: Bridge Over Troubled Waters?

The meaning of governance

Governance concerns the relations between the state and its citizens, the state and collective initiatives and citizens and collective initiatives. Holm and Molutsi (1992: 75 in Hyden & Bratton) mean that "Governance is the study of the management of a regime's relation with its populace".

March and Olsen argue that good governance is connected to the concept of "good citizen". The good citizen (persons, public officials etc.) is supposed to have a sense of community and act in accordance to common interests and an ability to reason together with other citizens. (March & Olsen, 1995: 37). This focuses upon what I would like to call an individualistic approach to good governance. Another approach is what I call the collectivist. Here discussions centre around the collectivist approach. This approach focuses on different affiliations within civil society, i.e. organisations in the sphere between the family and the state. Different kinds of voluntary organisations (NGOs) are located in this sphere.

Good government is seen as impossible if citizens and officials are concerned only with their self-interest and ignore the common good. Governance relying only on self-interest, incentives and a balance of power among interests is too contingent and may collapse under the pressure of changing circumstances or shift in the balance of power. (Quoted in March & Olsen, 1995:37, who in this particular context are referring to Rawls, 1987).

This quotation points out that the citizen and the collectivity are conditioned to act in accordance with norms and rules (institutions) associated to their roles and thus, not act solely according to own personal interests and gains, i.e. rules and norms (both formal and informal) are of vital importance. The state or NGOs are supposed to act in certain ways - rule-based-action - for the common good.

In a process of desired or actual decentralisation of decisions and responsibilities around common resources, three meanings of governance are important to determine possibilities of decentralisation within a polity. These meanings of governance are closely linked to relationships between various entities, the state, the market, and civil society within a given governance structure. Firstly, socio-political meanings identify basic conditions in the democratic realm. In a rule with undemocratic governance structures, little room is left for decentralisation of responsibilities of natural or other resources, or decisions which surround these resources. Although a polity is considered as democratic, desired decentralisation may not come about, due to power structures

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or limited compliance to rules. Socio-political meanings of governance are seen in a very wide perspective, embracing both formal and informal institutional structures. This perspective of governance deals with distribution of power and resources and associated rules, where systems of political, social, and economical relationships are in focus. As Hyden (1992:14-15) puts it, "...governance is concerned with how rules (or structures) affect political action and the prospect of solving given societal problems".

Secondly, operational meanings of governance refer to the functioning of bureaucratic and political processes regarding efficiency, accountability and transparency. These meanings are tied to day-to-day functioning of rules, habits, norms, and practices within bureaucracy and between the state and society.

Thirdly, situational meanings of governance indicate type of issues around which decentralisation is considered. Different actors could have disparate perceptions about problem identification and how best to solve identified problems. The degree of sensitivity and prioritisation of an issue may also be contemplated as situational considerations.

Both operational and situational meanings are more narrow if we compare with the socio-political approach. In the operational meaning good governance is partially reduced to more technical and managerial matters. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the more narrow view of governance is not of interest. Issues of transparency and accountability are of vital concern, but should be seen in the light of wider relationships between the state and society. If we do not see these relationships clearly we will not be able to understand why some states or NGOs are more legitimate than others, or why some public administrations or voluntary workers are capable of efficiently providing collective utilities and services, separately or in collaboration, while others are not.

Conclusively, in the analysis of governance, local social and political structures must be taken into due consideration. In this perspective fundamental issues like power relations, political culture, the nature of the state and social structures become crucial. Operational meanings of governance only make sense if we understand socio-political meanings. Much of the aid and recommendations from western based experts and financial institutions can be criticised therefore, since they tend to consider symptoms, such as limited transparency and political participation, but fail to see inequalities in power structures and inefficient institutions. In effect, the recommendations, loans and aid that are given, could in the worst case conserve prevailing situation of inequalities in distribution of power and wealth.

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Trapp: Bridge Over Troubled Waters?

What is good governance?

All would agree that good governance4 is sound and worth striving for. Yet, I have never met anyone propagating for bad governance. As indicated, the concept of good governance is certainly not without complications. The use of good, I believe, is to some extent misleading and unfortunate. It gives an unfair normative connotation to governance. This is not to say that the concept is not used in a normative way it is sometimes, but it puts a veil on other usage of the concept. It also gives the impression that there is only one option or system of good governance. In fact, there are multiple institutional solutions of how to govern common resources which depend on circumstances of cultural, political, economical, social and natural resource conditions. Some would call such solutions good, while others would call them bad. It very much depends on whose spectacles we choose to wear. Natural resource institutions which regulate who will get what, when, and how much, can only be said to be good or bad in relation to something. A system of governance might be good for some groups within society, while disfavouring others. Moreover, it is also a question if the natural resource is in focus. Does the prevailing system of governance encourage sustainable resource use or not?

In using good governance it must be specified what we mean by good. If it is good for some users (or others who are affected in one way or another) or if it is good from the view point of the environment -per se, or both. Here I refer to good governance as a democratic institutional set-up which is promoting and encouraging environmentally sound behaviour and production or sustainable, equitable and effective use of natural resources. There will always be groups in the institutional set-up who benefit from new or prevailing governance structures, and those who face new problems and are disfavoured. This implies that there are groups with totally different interests which may dash and cause conflicts.

Basically this perspective does not say anything about whose rules should govern. Should it be in the realm of the state, the market or the voluntary sector? However, experience of the state's environmental performance in many developing countries, suggests that the voluntary sector should be involved to a greater extent, which implies a decentralisation of detision-making and control of common resources.

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Why decentralise?Initially, it was said that governance is here seen from a perspective of decentralisation. Two main rationales for decentralising the control and uses of common resources centre around a debate about "bringing the community back in". This debate has evolved around a critique of "the tragedy of the commons" and the role of the state in managing common resources. In the environmental and natural resources area, this means that the state has only partially been able to fulfil its responsibilities, and that people are in fact capable of cooperating around common resources and other environmental issues (see for instance Ostrom, 1990).

(1) The crisis of governanceThis crisis can be translated into the crisis of the state. During the sixties and seventies development strategies focused on the state as almost the exclusive entity capable of achieving social, political and economic progress. In concrete terms, this meant state intervention in the management and ownership of natural resources, and attempts to structure relations between various actors outside the state.5 This omnipresence of the state has been linked to a conception of the omnipotence of the state. However, the daily visible state (omnipresent) has not been able to realise its responsibilities, on the contrary, it has been argued that state intervention has done more harm than good. This has resulted in a crisis of governance with serious consequences which many countries both developed and developing are facing. The legitimacy of the state declines - it cannot do what it has promised to do - which leads to a vicious circle. People have less faith and trust in state policies and adhere to a lesser extent to rules and regulations set up by the state. This increase in popular disobedience leads to various challenges and threats to the state. In terms of natural resources one result is that communities (and other actors - multinationals, private companies etc.) tap resources in an unsustainable way, since the state cannot control the use of the particular resource. The users have limited obligations or incentives to maintain the resource since this is the responsibility of the state. Conclusively in many cases state intervention has fostered inefficient and unequal practices of resource allocation, distribution and use. However, it is important to point out here that the question is less about the size of the state, rather it is its form which should receive more attention (Marcussen, 1996: 9-10). Thus, this perception of the state means that the neo-liberal notion of the minimalist state is partially challenged. The state has an important role to play in environmental

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and other areas, such as providing regulatory incentive structures, efficient intervention and policy implementation.

(2) The significance of collective action and NGOsThe opinion that people are capable of managing their own resources has received a lot of attention both from scholars and practitioners lately. Many scholars dealing with locally managed natural resources plead for local solutions in the allocation and distribution of natural resources. The notion being that local communities can do so in a more efficient, equitable, and sustainable than the state (see for instance Bromley, 1993; Ostrom, 1990).

Local NGOs play important roles in local management of common resources. They can either act as a link between the state and community or be directly in charge of such management. Much of the competence of NGOs is to be found in their knowledge about the local context. They are aware of the needs and problems of the community. This knowledge is very important regarding what type of solutions are applicable in local contexts. This, in turn, can form a basis for a flexible, innovative and dynamic institutional framework.

Apart from making an environmental difference the impact of NGOs can be seen in a broader context. They also have the potential of changing politics and society. As an impetus for local democracy NGOs can strengthen civil society and at the same time put pressure on the state, so it may become more accountable and responsive to people's needs.

Going from arguments of possible gains from decentralisation of managing natural resources, environment and political decisions connected to these issue areas to realisation of the same may however, prove to be a more futile process. Three important issues are identified in this respect:

(1) What are the options for enhanced cooperation between the state and voluntary sector? As has been suggested three meanings or conditions of governance can explain this option; firstly socio-political conditions; secondly, situational conditions; and thirdly, operational conditions.

The two other specific issues which are partially connected to the above issue are: (2) A decentralisation means that the state has to partially reconsider its role. Decision making is devolved to other actors such as local communities or the voluntary sector. As a result more power is vested into these actors as they gain more influence upon processes of decision-making and implementation. Is the state willing to decentralise and devolve decision-making and implementation? (3) The

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third issue is related to the voluntary sector itself. Is the voluntary sector willing to increase cooperative efforts with the state? And do they have the capacity to be an active and dynamic part of increased partnership?

Local governance and water pollution in Madras6

Here an attempt is made to apply some of the discussions about governance in an urban context. Firstly, the state of Madras waterways and local initiatives connected to pollution of these are explained. In 1991 a network of local NGOs and individuals called Citizens' for Waterways Monitoring Programme (WAMP) joined together to improve the water quality of the rivers of Madras. This is not an evaluation of what WAMP has accomplished, rather an attempt to place NGOs in a local political setting and study the likelihood of increased cooperation between NGOs and the state. Secondly, the local political setting and power structures in Madras are briefly elaborated. As emphasised, the relationship between different actors is important in understanding the realisation of collective action (manifested in NGOs) or the possibilities to decentralise decisions of local common resources. The mode of relationship between the state and local initiatives affects the manoeuvre space and performance of local collective action. These relations are basically a consequence of local socio-political and operational power structures. However, in the particular case about water pollution in Madras, different actors' situational perceptions of environmental problems also seem to play an important role.

The urban environment - a common resource?

The attitude to urban centres has often been confused and ambiguous. On the one hand, they are seen as "heroic engines of growth" creating wealth for the nation and new opportunities for the people: in this sense urban centres are comparable to agricultural land, rivers and other natural resources which contribute to the welfare and wealth of nations: on the other hand, they are seen to have created the most "brutal and inhuman living conditions", with large portions of the population living in slums (Buch, 1993:15-16).

The urban environment can be seen as a common resource7 which society must nourish. It is a complex flow of natural and man-made resources and pollutants which are connected to human activities. For

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instance, water is distributed to different users for different purposes, thousands of people commute daily and solid waste is transported from households to dumping sites.

Much of urban environmental problems are connected to inadequacies in provision of public services, non-control of polluting industries and rapid growth of the population. This means that more people demand more public services and there is also an increase of potential polluters. From this perspective, flows of substances and resources should be minimised or optimised, depending on what kind of resource or substance we refer to. Flows of solid and hazardous waste should be minimised and properly managed, while potable water requires efficient allocation and maximisation of utilising possible water sources, though in a sustainable way.

It should be in the interest of all citizens to protect the urban environment. The quality of urban life increases if rivers are clean. If people were given more sanitation facilities the environmental situation would improve. As a result this would decrease diseases connected to filthy habitats and enhance people's dignity and well-being in general. It could also be presumed that relatively healthy and clean urban habitats would have economical benefits, attracting tourists and new businesses.

The question is how the city can cope with rapid expansion of population and industrial and other urban related activities in a sustainable way, when the environmental situation is already strained in most third world mega cities. Managing the urban environment is partially a question of governing flows of urban resources and substances in an environmentally sound way while at the same time, social and economic demands and expectations have to be met. In practical terms this means reducing pollution through changed patterns of consumption and production, proper management of waste handling and sanitation and provide necessary infrastructure and natural resources. These are not easy tasks however, since the urban centre is supposed to be an engine of growth and an opportunity creator. In practice, the issue of tolerable urban habitats may be in stark contrast to processes of industrialisation and economic growth.

The Madras Metropolitan Area (MMA) which includes the city, semi- urban and rural areas, has a population of 5.4 million the largest share about 70 per cent being concentrated in the city, the rest in semi-urban and rural areas (Census of India 1991). Many of the environmental problems that have become visible in Madras can be ascribed to a combination of a crisis of local governance, poverty, rapid growth of population in already dense areas, and spontaneous expansion of urbanisation into the rural fringe. Population projections that have been carried

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out by the urban planning authority - Madras Metropolitan Development Authority (MMDA) - suggest that MMA will host 7.5 million people by the year 2001. This increase of population puts additional pressure on already scarce water resources, other urban environments and the insufficient supply of public services, such as solid waste management and sanitation.

Water pollution and options for decentralisation?

Water pollution and polluters

Four major waterways cross Madras, Cooum, Adyar and Otter! Nullah rivers and Buckingham canal, and all are highly polluted. Various human activities in the city literally turn these rivers into stagnant and stinking open sewers with ecological, social, aesthetic and highly hazardous health implications. Fishing and navigation which was possible twenty to thirty years ago are not even thinkable due to the present state of the rivers. Estuary eco-systems have degraded significantly.Outbreaks of water borne diseases like cholera and acute gastroenteritis (AGE) are frequent, especially for those who depend on ground water located close to waterways.

At present the waterways are used to receive various kinds of pollutants and transport storm water. The main sources of pollution are given below8:

(1) Areas and properties without proper sewerage connections are found not only in slums but also in developed areas in the city. A number of hotels, hospitals, slum tenements, offices and public institutions discharge raw sewage directly into the rivers and storm water drains. From a technical point of view 80-85 per cent of the city is covered with a sewerage system, but in practice, slum dwellers (one third of the city population of 3.9 million) only have marginal access to use it (MMDA, 1991: 84). Areas outside the city are only covered to a limited extent by an underground sewerage system.

(2) Due to operating problems and insufficient maintenance of treatment plants, sewage is partially treated or not treated at all. The result is that discharges from sewage water treatment plants are heavily polluted and flow directly into the rivers. Since the rivers have limited or no base flow during dry seasons (nine months of the year) sewage is not diluted, and the waterways turn into open sewers.

The specific feature for Madras of being water starved also adds to sewage treatment problems. The low availability of domestic water re

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suits in a discharge of strong crude sewage into the sewers, and an insufficient flow which leads to stagnation of sewage in the system, causing overflows.

(3) Flood and storm water drains are often used for totally different purposes than transporting water during monsoons. At many locations (especially where the sewerage system is inadequate or sewage pump failures occur) the sewerage system has been inter-connected, both accidentally and deliberately with storm water drains. Additionally, the drains are directly used for disposal of sewage in unsewered areas. Consequently, during monsoons sewage is directly discharged into the rivers which are connected to the storm water system.

(4) Storm water drains, sewers and the rivers are also used for disposal of solid waste. Households, hospitals and offices close to waterways which are not provided with adequate collection of solid waste tend to dump it on the river banks or directly into the waterways. Waterways and sewers get clogged and flooding is the ultimate outcome. Dairy and draught cattle within the city form a specific problem. Official statistics, which mainly reflect licensed cattle, suggest a cattle population of 67 000 (1985), while others estimate the number to be the double or even more (MMDA/ERM, 1995) Waste arising from cattle such as dung, straw and other material is often disposed directly into storm water drains or the sewerage system. Pipes get clogged and significant problems are caused at the treatment plant.

(5) Slums, to a large extent, are scattered along the river banks and those living there (approximately 30 000 thousand families) are marginalised with very limited access to waste disposal, potable water, sanitation and other public services. As a result, the rivers and river banks are used as dumps for garbage and other activities such as, laundry, watering of cattle etc. This also means that these slums are disproportionally affected by water related and other diseases.

(6) Industrial effluents also find their way to the waterways. A large industrial belt is located in northern Madras with extensive production of petrochemicals and fertilisers (many of the above industries are government owned). Tanneries are prevalent in south west Madras. Water pollution from industries is frequent, especially in north Madras. Effluents are discharged into the northern part of Buckingham canal which has interconnections with other waterways.

The major source of pollution derives from flows of untreated sewage directly into the waterways. Bacteriological contamination (total coliform and faecal coliform) is very high and levels of bio-chemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemical oxygen demand (COD) are often far beyond acceptable levels.9 These pollution problems are exacerbated by insignificant base flow of the rivers except during monsoon periods.

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Outlets of sewage derive from many sources which from a practical point of view are difficult to trace and measure regarding their actual contribution to water pollution. However, local authorities with responsibility to keep waterways clean are definitely to blame, as well as local authorities which directly contribute with outlets. Metrowater is responsible for Madras' sewerage system, but due to break downs, insufficient capacity and poor system maintenance significant amounts of untreated sewage end up in the waterways. How much sewage Metrowater and other polluters contribute with is disputed, but reports point out untreated sewage water from treatment plants and pumping stations as a major contributor to overall poor water quality of Madras' waterways (Severn Trent Report, 1989). Figures from NGOs (WAMP) suggest that 80 per cent of the water pollution derives from untreated sewage water from Metrowater and that slums contribute only marginally to overall pollution. This figure is not correct according to Metrowater who instead put the blame on unsewered slums, hospitals, government institutions, hotels, industries and other local authorities. As shown below, this issue has been, and still is a stumbling block in WAMP-state interactions.

An environmental paradox creating dilemmas for NGOs

As seen, sources of pollution present a complex picture with a number of human activities contributing to overall water pollution. This also means that a similar complex organisational picture emerges of how to decrease water pollution, which in practice should involve most local authorities, industries and public stakeholders. Planning and coordination by responsible local authorities are required to come to terms with water pollution. However, under present structures of governance these requirements have not been met. Paradoxically, local authorities which are supposed to have basic environmental responsibility i.e. to monitor and maintain urban systems and provide services, end up as one of the biggest polluters. Those who are supposed to be one part of an environmental improvement are in fact a significant part of the environmental problem. NGOs have realised the existence of this paradox and it forms a fundamental dilemma for them: NGOs have to criticise the state for its contribution to environmental deterioration, at the same time, the same NGOs demand increased partnership with the state to deal with environmental issues. Their view is that it is only the state which has the resources and means to make a viable environmental difference, the role of NGOs is to facilitate and catalyst this work. Thus, the dilemma is how NGOs can simultaneously criticise and collaborate

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with the state. Too much criticism would certainly spoil future cooperation and too much cooperation may lead to co-optation or/and delegitimisation of NGOs.

Options for decentralisation of common urban resources - what can NGOs do ?

If by decentralisation we mean privatisation of access to the waterways this would not be a viable solution. Who wants to buy the right to use a polluted river? A probable answer would be: Those who want to use it for more pollution. But, if we presume that there are interested buyers, they would be discouraged as soon as they found out that upstream pollution continues and that encroachment of river banks by slum dwellers cannot be avoided. This means that although one might improve a stretch of a river it is not viable since upstream polluters are allowed to continue their activities. The cost of preventing others from using the river (as a receiver of pollutants and encroachments) is too high and thus not viable. Similar reasoning can be applied to local communities; they have limited resources and cannot exclude anyone from using the river. Presently, local management of the rivers, either by local communities along the rivers, NGOs or private interests does not seem to be a very likely solution. The reasons for this are mainly that heavy investments are required to clean the waterways and the difficulty of excluding free-riders from environmentally unsound uses. Local authorities play an important role here. So far, they have not been able to prevent illegal encroachments of river banks and polluting activities by industries, hotels, hospitals and local authorities. Thus, in practice there are no limitations on how to use the water ways of Madras. The water ways are best characterised as free goods or a situation of open access. Though there is legislation regarding water pollution local authorities have enforced it poorly.

Although it is difficult to decentralise the management of waterways to other entities than the state, decisions around them can be decentralised, i.e. to involve the public, NGOs and industry in actively taking part in policy-making, decision-making and implementation of issues connected to waterways. What should future uses of the waterways be? How do we prevent future pollution? How do we clean up? These are some issues where NGOs could be involved directly in partnership with local authorities. An additional option for local authorities is to use NGOs in public campaigns to increase knowledge and awareness about what causes polluted waterways and how to prevent it. However, in the case of Madras' waterways the state may feel reluctant to adopt the above measures since it is one of the biggest polluters.

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Although they are blamed for being the main cause of pollution, environmental action to clean the waterways must involve local authorities, both in the sense of halting outlets of untreated sewage water, enforcing legislation and making major investments in dredging and cleaning up the waterways. In other words, local authorities are key players in decreasing pollution and restoring water quality. Where does the role of NGOs come into the picture? The first thing the NGO has to decide is how it should relate to the state - cooperation or confrontation? A cooperative approach is an attempt to build a partnership with the state. This means that as an NGO you can only criticise the state up to a level were it is still prepared to cooperate with you. If you cross this line, the state is most probably not prepared to cooperate with you at all, since you have become too oppositional. As a result negotiations with the state may be less meaningful. In many cases NGOs have weak negotiation power (due to their limited popular base) and marginalisation of the NGO and environmental issues may be the outcome. The NGOs involved in Madras waterways have chosen to prioritise cooperation rather than confrontation.10 Their aim is to provide input to local state machinery and also be a link between this machinery and the public. A second role or aim for these NGOs is to mobilise public support to be used as an instrument to put pressure on the state. Thirdly, they also function as "watch-dogs". For instance, they take their own water quality samples and compare such data with official statements about water quality.

Conclusively, options of decentralisation of management of waterways are not found in transferring ownership or issuing rights to exclusive uses to other entities than the state. There is no social and/or economical base for local communities, voluntary organisations or private interests to manage the waterways. The logic behind a decentralisation is to prevent or decrease pollution. But, in the case of Madras waterways, this logic is difficult to realise regarding privatisation of access. Instead, options to decentralise lie in involving the public and NGOs in policy and decision-making processes of present and future uses of the rivers.

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Local governance structures - a socio-political approach

Local elections to municipal bodies (the Corporation, Municipalities and Panchayats) are infrequent in Madras. Due to changes in the Indian constitution the government of Tamil Nadu (GOTN) was more or less forced to hold these elections in October 1996.n The previous elected body in the city (Madras Corporation) was dissolved by the GOTN dueto a corruption scandal in 1973. This infrequency of elections constitutes problems at two levels at least. Firstly, local authorities are responsible for providing a wide range of public services. Secondly, they are the prime bodies for democracy at grassroots level. The lack of elections mean that local municipal bodies are mainly run by bureaucrats with very limited systems of checks and balances for the public. This implies one set of problems regarding performance to deliver and implement public services and policies. The other set of problems bring local democracy to the centre stage.

From the perspective of the state, difficulties to apply methods of good governance may be linked to two factors, which focus around enforcement of rules and regulations and how the state relates to society. Firstly, the urban planning approach has not been adequate. Though urban planning documents and plans are produced, they are poorly implemented.12 Furthermore, environmental consciousness in urban planning has been very limited, if in fact it has ever existed (cf. Buch, 1993: 33, 47-48). This implies that the institutional framework which has formal responsibility to cater for a tolerable environment is too weak and myopic. Secondly, interaction between the state and society is imperfect. There maybe several reasons for this, such as lack of local elections and limited transparency. Basically, the second point is a question of the degree of legitimacy. If the state is non-transparent, and if it cannot be held accountable for its actions, it will affect legitimacy in an adverse way. One outcome is that it will become more difficult for the state to increase citizens' environmental awareness or affect their environmental behaviour in a positive way. Thus, there is a lack of trust between those who govern and those who are being governed. The voluntary sector initiative is partially seen as a response to this lack of locally elected bodies. In the environmental area they have attempted to act as intermediary bodies between the state and local environmental discontent from the public. In other words, NGOs have become a means through which the public can gain access to bureaucrats and politicians. Generally, such access is very limited for common citizens, unless they have appropriate political linkages and connections.

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NGOs and local power structures and relations

Local authorities in Madras do not follow the logic of formal rule-based- action. Much of relations between the state and society and the outcome of politics are governed by what has been labelled as particularism (Blomqvist, 1988). This means that much of the state's action is in the self-interest of the ruling elite, and rules are based on the whims of the ruling elite, nepotism, egoism, corruption, friendship, esteem of leadership etc. Thus, there are vested interests among those who govern and those of the governed who have links to the elite are likely to favour. Allocative and distributive outcomes of politics become arbitrary and local authorities do not stick to the formal institutional setting (rules). This type of rule-breaking or non-compliance is common regarding environmental regulations and relations between the state and NGOs.

This creates an awkward situation for many NGOs and citizens who in their interactions with local authorities can never be sure of the outcomes. In order to minimise the risk of being ignored or met by hostile attitudes even, NGOs attempt to work out proper channels to get information, or influence decision-making. For the ordinary citizen this is hardly possible. In effect, the public has limited or no access to information on what activities that are going on.

The local political context is characterised by personalised relations, populism, patronage and client linkages.13 Briefly, this means that the relation between local politicians and the citizen (voter) is based on exchange of favours. This is especially the case in slums where local authorities often become a vehicle for politicians in this exchange of favours.14 For instance, a development project or programme implemented by local authorities may be allocated to a certain slum area in favour of their votes to a certain political party. This patronage logic is not unique for Madras, it is found both in urban and rural areas in India, and is based on traditional patterns of community structure (Bapat & Patel, 1993);

....especially in poorer settlements, in which leaders are often brokers of (political) patronage. They prop up their own positions as leaders by exploiting their access to information or knowledge (of the working of government agencies, banks, welfare schemes, etc.). They thrive in a situation where people in the community do not have the exposure to the working of such institutions and therefore lack the confidence to seek information themselves. The community leaders use this situation for obtaining gains for themselves. They are, therefore, not interested in changing this situation by building people's capabilities to take on such tasks.

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Local leaders or strongmen have a very strong position in some communities, especially in urban slums. This fact sometimes makes it difficult for NGOs to reach those who have the greatest needs. Put very simply, the local strongman, who is often backed up by political, caste or other vested interests, obstructs attempts from NGOs to operate within his community. This patronage alliance between politicians and local leaders is identified by NGOs as a major hindrance to carry out work in slums. Local authorities in Madras involved in slum clearance and improvement have the same experience. If the local strongmen is reluctant to implement a welfare scheme or some other project, the local authority will not do it. It is necessary to have the consent and participation of the local leader, otherwise very little can be achieved.

The above points out some parts of the political and social context in which NGOs operate. Moreover, it shows that one has to be careful in decentralising some issues to the local community. Instead of solving problems of natural resource distribution and allocation, it is only the problems that will become decentralised. If there are strongmen in the local community they will most likely gain from decentralisation of distribution of various resources.

For local NGOs it becomes a significant question of whether they are just another actor in local politics and directly conserving the prevailing power hierarchies, and patronage logic. NGOs are very well aware that to some extent they have to act in these local political, caste and social structures. Most of the NGOs try as much as possible to stay outside party politics characterised by machine politics and factionalism. Among NGOs in Madras there is a fear of being connected to any political party. This would erode the very idea of NGOs as being nongovernmental. But, there are definitely those NGOs who consciously or unconsciously, play along the lines of conserving local power structures. However, there are also more radical NGOs demanding profound political, economical and social changes.

Local popular response, WAMP, the state and urban water pollution

Local popular environmental responses in Madras are common, but mostly performed on an ad hoc basis. Local communities protest through demonstrations, blocking roads etc., often with disappointing results. In many cases local authorities just ignore the environmental and civic problems that citizens are facing. They know that protests are temporary and that people soon loose interest and the whole thing is forgot

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ten. However, organised and more long-term responses do exist to press for environmental improvements. Citizens' Waterways Monitoring Programme (WAMP) is such an initiative. WAMP is a network of different local NGOs and concerned individuals operating in Madras. The primary goal is to lobby and press for clean rivers in Madras and increase public awareness.

Popular response about Madras Waterways is not a new phenomena. Popular demands to desilt and dredge Buckingham canal were made even before the II World War. During 1967-72 an improvement scheme for the Cooum river was launched by the government which in the end failed mainly for two reasons. Technical solutions to desilt the river mouth did not work out properly and actual sources of pollution were never seriously questioned (Appasamy, 1989: 13). From the late 60s and early 70s problems related to the waterways have gradually changed in character and magnitude. From having been mainly a problem of siltation, the waterways have today literally turned into stagnant sewers with multiple sources of pollution.

Local environmental concern gains momentum

The first major environmental voluntary initiative in Madras waslaunched in 1986. This initiative was called Citizens for Clean Waterways (CCW) and was a forerunner to WAMP. CCW was spearheaded by the local Madras chapter of the Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage (INTACH) with the clear objective of increasing awareness among politicians, bureaucrats, industrialists and the people of the city's deteriorating environment, particularly the Cooum river and other waterways. CCW's approach was to lobby and cooperate with the government which would ultimately lead to concrete environmental improvements they hoped. The partnership approach of CCW was very distinct. CCW found the rationale for such a partnership in the incapacity of the government and local authorities and their under utilisation of the public in shaping and implementing policies. This reasoning is mainly built on the conception of an inefficient but resourceful state and resourceless but active and committed citizens who organise themselves into joint efforts.

The Environmental initiative Citizens' for Clean Waterways (CCW) gained momentum in June 1986 and received a lot of support from the media, academic and business communities, and other middle and upper class groups in Madras. A seminar was held about how to clean the river Cooum and stop future pollution of Madras waterways. The same month a major public campaign was launched with the purpose

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of mobilising public support to put pressure on the government and raise funds for activities. The objective was to get one million signatures and for each signature one rupee. During a period of two years roughly 200 000 thousand people signed. There were also other activities during 1986-88 such as, mass rallies, boat rallies and education programmes in schools. In 1986 GOTN also started to take an interest in the issue and an inter-agency Task Force was formed with, inter alia, four representatives from CCW (Intach). Amain reason behind the initiation of this group was that pollution of Madras waterways had been put on the political agenda by CCW who had also managed to put some pressure on the government to take action. Guiding principles for this Task Force group were; to look into encroachments and relocation of slum settlers along the river banks; management of storm water and sewerage systems and; future uses of the water ways. By the end of 1986 the task force produced a report which was finalised by the responsible local authority and then submitted to the GOTN.

The government turns silent

The Task Force report became technical in its character. As concluded in an evaluation of the report it "...represents an almost exclusive engineering approach to the problem of the waterways" (Appasamy, 1989:143). Social, environmental and ecological considerations were paid very little attention. Additionally, insufficient treatment of sewage water, one main cause of water pollution, was not given enough attention in the report.

After the submission of the report in December 1986 the issue was kept secret from the public by the GOTN. CCW (Intach) which had been included in the task force was now excluded from further involvement in the issue and the cooperation with the government and responsible local authorities came to a halt. The reason given by the GOTN for this silence and non-transparency was that it was negotiating with the British Overseas Development Authority (ODA) to get financial and technical support to improve the water quality of the waterways. The result being that a new report was finalised in 1989 called the Severn Trent Report which was a thorough study of the state of Madras waterways, sources of pollution and solutions.

Apart from the four CCW representatives no other public opinions or actors had the opportunity to raise their voice, e.g. representatives from slums were not involved in any preparation stage of the task force report. Recent estimations suggest that 30 000 slum households are found along the river banks.15 However, the issue of relocating slums is rarely

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taken up for public debate due to its political sensitivity. Many political interests are at stake in this issue and relocation would also involve heavy costs for compensation and alternatives for resettlement of slums dwellers. What slum dwellers feel about relocation of their homes in order to help to clean the rivers is not clear. No one would be against a cleaner river which implies fewer mosquitoes, better health, less odour etc. but there is an uncertainty if slum dwellers are prepared to be relocated to meet such environmental objectives. Slum dwellers often derive their income and livelihood from the particular area in which they live. Relocation means that these sources of income may disappear and in this way slum interests and environmental concern diverge. In other words, participation of slum dwellers is required, but has not been encouraged by the government, and links between NGOs working for environmental improvements in Madras and slums are too weak.

Voluntary efforts lose momentum

From an environmental point of view the outcome of the Task Force was meagre. The Task Force report became more of an action-plan to clean the waterways than a guideline of how to do so and prevent future deterioration of the waterways. The report also suggested a common committee or authority whose task would be to coordinate and monitor the approach and activities of involved local authorities, but this was never implemented.16 Although environmental improvements were insignificant, the action of CCW put the waterways of Madras on the political agenda, and also resulted in some government and local authority action. The Severn Trent Report was an important event and its conclusions and the government's attempt to bury it have played significant roles for WAMP's action and orientation

From a participatory point of view, CCW involvement in preparation of the task force report was a step forward towards enhanced partnership and cooperation between NGOs and the state, though CCW participation abruptly ended after the report was submitted. As one of the leading CCW activists put it in referring to the purpose of these committees and task force groups: "The feeling is that we were neutralised by the government...". Thus, the state shows a cooperative attitude but nothing or very little comes out of it. Ultimately, the question arises as to why NGOs do not by-pass the state and act independently. The dilemma for NGOs is encapsulated in the following conclusion made by the same NGO activist: "...Instead of antagonising, you want the government to cooperate, it is only they who can do anything." Thus, recognition by the state is essential, but as seen here does not provide any guarantee for environmental improvements of the waterways.84


To a great extent the government succeeded in slowing down the CCW criticism and pressure whether this was a deliberate strategy from the government's side is uncertain, but it was nevertheless the result. After CCW's initial success with the task-force report it was cut off from further involvement. In repeated contacts with the government and local authorities it was assured that action would be taken, but ultimately nothing was done by the government. However, reasons for gradually diminishing CCW activities can also be found in the structures of CCW. In 1988 CCW took the decision to register the coalition of NGOs as a formal voluntary organisation. However, this formalisation of routines and networks turned out to slow down the pace of environmental activities. Basically, NGOs felt that their loyalty and allegiance should be to their own group. Additionally, CCW and Intach faced difficulties to recruit volunteers and new leadership.

A new voice with old demands

In December 1991 the previous CCW initiative was revived, but now with a new name, WAMP. This network of NGOs and individuals was initiated by the same organisation in charge of CCW. But, another NGO - Exnora International - took the lead, and currently coordinates and dominates the WAMP initiative.

In similarity with CCW, WAMP has a very clear strategy of cooperating with the state. To a very large extent they have avoided direct confrontation and too much criticism of involved local authorities and government. The reason for this approach is twofold. Firstly, according to both WAMP and CCW a solution to the problem of polluted waterways must involve both the state, NGOs, industries and the public. Hence, a confrontational approach would mean that NGOs would distance themselves from the state with which cooperation is necessary totackle the fundamental problem of water pollution. If environmental action is taken by the state it will certainly not include confrontational or too critical NGOs. The second reason is related to the origin of both WAMP and CCW. By and large these two networks of NGOs are middle and upper-class formations which facilitate negotiations with the state. Established relations already exist between individual officials within local authorities and NGO activists. Moreover, the popular base in CCW and WAMP has been limited, which could make it more difficult to choose confrontation as a way to gain impact on the state and ultimately on environmental change.

WAMP's main objective and target issue is to develop and clean the waterways of Madras. To achieve this the main activities of WAMP are

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various lobbying activities, legal action and preparation of an Action Plan. The purpose of such lobbying efforts is to get the Action Plan accepted and implemented by the government. The second type of activity is involvement and environmental education of the public.

The first stage for WAMP was to assess the situation regarding the state of the waterways and pinpoint sources of pollution. A cadre of twenty youth volunteers from a slum traced direct sources of pollution, and later on a number of schools were equipped with water monitoring kits. Thus, WAMP decided to take water samples on their own, since information was lacking or not made available by local authorities. When responsible local authorities like Metrowater, Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (TNPCB) and the Public Works Department (PWD) were asked to give information on water quality and sources of pollution they were not forthcoming. Essentially, WAMP had to take samples and come up with a result which local authorities already knew but not the public. The purpose was twofold. Firstly to show the government and local authorities that necessary information had been gathered by voluntary initiative to show the state of the waterways and the major polluters, which in turn, would make it difficult for the responsible authorities to hide behind principles of limited transparency and red- tapism. Secondly, the result went public, and local people were involved in taking water samples and tracing polluters.

The second and third stage for WAMP is to clean up and further develop the waterways of Madras. Primarily, this is to be accomplished through the Action Plan. WAMP is now in the process of leaving the first stage and moving on to the second, i.e. they have formulated an Action Plan for further cooperation between WAMP and the government on how to clean and develop the waterways.

WAMP and urban environmental change

The Action Plan for clean waterways is primarily a document which formulates roles and expectations of the state and voluntary sector, respectively. If accepted by the government, the plan provides a common platform for the public, NGOs, local authorities and the government from which environmental improvements and future uses can be planned and implemented. Local authorities are those entities which must carry out technical planning and actual implementation. According to the plan, NGOs can only be of marginal help in implementation. Moreover, the role of WAMP is identified as; "...to provide the necessary input of concerned citizens and the general public." WAMP also views itself as an agent to increase environmental awareness, monitor

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water pollution and give innovative input to local authorities. Thus, there are many roles or aims for WAMP to fulfil (catalytic, lobby, cooperation).

After a lot of effort from WAMP and input from various experts the Action Plan was submitted to the GOTN and all local authorities of concern in September 1995. There was a great deal of hope was that some concrete action would be taken by the government and local authorities to set up a joint committee. However, initial hopes were not met and the Action Plan "...gathered dust in the shelves of the government departments" (The Hindu, 960611). The reason for this lack of interest can partially be ascribed to a general ignorance of NGOs and the GOTN elections which were held in early 1996. After the elections WAMP made a new attempt to revive the Action Plan and put pressure on the new government, this time with slightly better response. Meetings about WAMP's demands for cooperation and implementation of the Action Plan were held with the new political leadership. This resulted in political recognition of WAMP and its activities, though the environmental outcome of this political recognition and assurances remains to be seen.

A government committee was formed in October 1996 consisting of representatives from local authorities and GOTN. Its aim is to improve the Cooum river and Buckingham canal. Neither the public nor NGOs are directly involved in this committee. An official statement from the government stated that it would coordinate with national and international agencies and get their help in expediting projects. From the viewpoint of the public and NGOs the attitude taken by the government is - Do not bother us. When we want your opinion or help we will ask for it.

Meanings of governance and common urban environments

Knowledge and access to experts are by and large not a problem for WAMP. People involved in WAMP are well-educated and have established good relations with academics, lawyers, doctors and other experts. The problem is often more a matter of how to move from information and knowledge to concrete action. However, lack of important information can appear if authorities are unwilling to publish reports and samples or give any information about the state of the environment. This is the actual case in Madras and creates an awkward situation for WAMP and other environmental NGOs. WAMP is aware of the bad state of the environment, but has limited scientific or any other

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evidence to show the public. As long as there are no hard facts and figures the state attempts to deny that there is any problem. Even if the evidence is overwhelming, the state is still reluctant to admit the magnitude of the environmental problem or that some local authorities in fact cause environmental harm. The difficulty to make the local authorities recognise environmental problems, lies in that if they admit that there are great problems, they also indirectly acknowledge that they have been negligent in not affording enough attention to environmental problems. In other words, local authorities do not want to expose themselves. It is with this as a background we have to understand WAMP and its environmental initiatives. In effect, one part of WAMP's strategy is to prove what everybody already knows: The rivers of Madras are stinking filthy open sewers with severe health impacts for people living in the city, especially for those thirty thousand slum households located along the river banks.

Transparency and access to environmental information - operational meanings of governance

Normally, local authorities are very reluctant to reveal information about pollution levels. One reason being a bureaucratic tradition of limited transparency. Transparency, accountability and flow of information from the state to the public have been key-issues ever since the initiation of CCW in 1986. An example of this is the secrecy which surrounded the Severn Trent Report (submitted to the government in June 1989). This was a thorough study of the state of Madras waterways, sources of pollution and recommendations for environmental action. Assurances were made by the government that necessary steps had been taken to improve the waterways after this report. Attempts were made by several NGOs involved in CCW and WAMP to get a complete version of the Severn Trent Report, but the complete report was shared with NGOs only after protracted struggles and efforts.

After the submission of the report to the GOTN, attempts were made by CCW to convene a Task Force meeting and get a copy, but there was no response from the government. Almost one year later in March 1990 The NGO Consumer Action Group (CAG), part of the WAMP network, arranged a meeting with the local authorities. At this meeting demands were made that the government and local authorities have to share information with the public. This demand was particularly in response to the secrecy which continued to surround the Severn Trent Report. The purpose of the meeting was also to find out what programmes the government had prepared and what concrete action had been taken. The

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government responded in favour of almost all demands. It agreed to make a copy of the report available and their programmes would be shared with NGOs. Claims were also made that various action plans had been prepared and were now only to be implemented. For instance, by the end of 1990 the government hoped to remove 85 per cent of waterway pollution. During this meeting there was a consensus about the causes of pollution, though individual polluters were never discussed. Once again this seemed to be a promising meeting with future collaboration among the government, local authorities and NGOs. However, there was a lot of "lip service" from the government and in practice results were limited, and waterway improvements have been going very slowly, if at all.

Later on portions of the report were given to Intach. The notion from tntach was that a lot of details were missing. In early 1992 new efforts were made to get a complete version of the report from the government along with a new request to revive the Task Force. In practice the Task Force had ceased to function properly after the submission of their report to the GOTN in 1986. Eventually, WAMP managed to get a complete version of the Severn Trent Report in 1993. An internal WAMP report concluded:

Among other important WAMP developments is the obtaining of the Severn Trent Reportfrom the government. It took nearly a month's work to get the document. The Severn Trent Report which will form the base of the

2al action of WAMP, places in no uncertain terms, the blame for the bulk lhe pollution of the waterways on the poor maintenance and the non- ictioning of the sewage treatment plants, and pumping stations. It also contains vital information such as direction of sewage flows, capacity of

each pumping station as well as data on the quality of the waterways.

Though it took one month's work in the end to get the report, the whole process to get a complete version took almost four years.

Environmental consensus and disagreements - situational meanings of governance

How aspects of environmental issues are identified and perceived by various actors form one aspect of structures of governance and options of decentralisation. Some issues around which disparate views can occur are: What are the levels of pollution? Who causes pollution? How does one solve environmental problems? How do we best use common urban resources? To some extent these issues are tied to previous parts about operational meanings of governance, for the simple reason that disparate views partially emerge due to non availability of environ

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mental information. Relevant environmental information may be missing or not shared with the public. As shown above local authorities are reluctant to give information. Sometimes information is given by local authorities but received with distrust from NGOs. In the case of WAMP, information from TNPCB had to be verified through a survey of additional samples. Thus, access to and reliability of available information create a situation of distrust - distrust which is mutual.

No one denies that the rivers of Madras are severely polluted, and various sources which contribute to pollution have also been identified. However, what seems to be at the core is to point out major polluters and hold them responsible, and realise a plan for future use of the rivers.

Officially, Metrowater claims that effluents conform to standards, and pumping stations and treatment plants function satisfactorily. However, experience from WAMP and its tests of water quality, suggest the opposite. WAMP's samples show that outlets of untreated or partially treated sewage from sewage pumping stations and treatment plants contribute with the bulk of water pollution. At some locations in the waterways water quality is close to untreated sewage. In official circles many have dismissed WAMP's results as unreliable. But, similar results of water quality have been confirmed by TNPCB which periodically also takes tests of effluents leaving treatment plants.17 This datahad been kept from the public but became known when it was included in a consultants report sponsored by the Asian Development Bank (TNPCB, 1994). What we have is a situation where Metrowater denies that they should be the main cause of water pollution. Instead, Metrowater claims that water pollution mainly derives from unauthorised slums on the river banks and slum clearance apartments, hospitals etc. which are not properly connected to the sewerage system and therefore other local authorities are to blame. The present system of environmental responsibilities is not easy to follow, and for citizens, the question of which local authority to hold accountable often ends up in this passing the buck attitude from local authorities.

The fact that the rivers are highly polluted makes other uses very difficult or impossible. WAMP's objective is to dean the rivers and use them for other potential uses such as navigation and recreation. The basic idea is that clean rivers will form a positive picture of the tity and increase the quality of living. In other words, WAMP sees the rivers as potential urban resources.

At present the rivers are used as drains for storm water and receivers of sewage and garbage. Due to outlets of sewage and limited enforcement of environmental legislation the government has both directly and

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indirectly prioritised uses of the rivers which have had devastating environmental effects. WAMP's environmental demands - based on changed uses of the waterways - have created tensions between the state and WAMP despite the latter's cooperative strategy.

Urban environments and state-NGO partnership

Since the initiation of the voluntary environmental initiative in 1986 the state has been unwilling to involve NGOs in decision-making processes. Committees and task forces involving NGOs have been initiated by local authorities, often as a result of pressure from NGOs, but the environmental difference these groups have made have so far been minimal. It is important to point out both in the case of CCW and WAMP that the initiative for increased cooperation and partnership has come from the NGOs themselves. The state has taken very limited steps to involve the public in environmental decision-making. As Bratton (1989: 76) points out "...the amount of space allowed to NGOs in any given country is determined first and foremost by political considerations, rather than by any calculation of the contribution of NGOs to economic and social development."

The rationale for actively seeking cooperation with the state is embedded in NGOs' perception of their capacity, shared responsibility and ideology. Financially NGOs may be weak and financial resources requisite to take concrete environmental action are mainly vested in the state. Lack of financial resources is also one significant cause of the environmental mess, since the state may face severe difficulties to raise funds from international agencies and banks. The fact that voluntary initiatives emerge, shows partially a commitment among citizens, and a common concern for environmental issues. In other words, environmental issues are too important to leave to politicians and bureaucrats alone. The ideological content of NGOs indicates if cooperation with the state is desirable or not. More radical and confrontational NGOs are less likely to seek partnership and would most probably not be offered any such by the state. But, as in the case outlined here; when it comes to willingness to cooperate and build a partnership there is a situation of one willing partner (WAMP) and one somewhat reluctant partner (the state). The fundamental problem is: It takes two to tango!

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Environmental partnership - not without problems!

The magnitude of environmental problems in Madras and the limitations of both the state and voluntary sector require enhanced cooperation between the state and voluntary initiatives. However, this is easier said than done. In the case of WAMP there are two conflicts based on situational meanings of governance between local authorities and NGOs. The first is about the uses of common urban resources, in this case rivers. Should the rivers serve as recipients of untreated sewage or used for recreation? The second conflict relates to the question of just who the major polluters are; the local authorities or the slums? These two disparate views adversely affect the relation between involved NGOs and local authorities.

A further consequence of the state's reluctance to develop closer relations with NGOs is operational meanings of governance such as limited transparency. As shown in the case of water pollution in Madras the state has been unwilling to present data and reports to the public. In the case of NGOs' functions their role in disseminating information is curtailed by limited state transparency. Simply, there is no or very limited environmental information to share with the public, and there is also a lack of information which can be used to put pressure on the government. As a result a lot of NGO efforts have to be allocated to produce their own data and/or organise pressure on the government to disclose vital environmental information. In WAMP's case both had to be done.

The state's willingness to share information with the public is here expressed in terms of degree of openness or closeness (see Figure 1).

figure 1. Governance structure and options for partnership

Situational meanings

'I

1

Openness

"5 Closeness §O

Agreement Disagreement

Partnership Partnership/ no partnership

Partnership/ no partnership

No partnership e.g. Water pollution in Madras

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This figure summarises some of the discussions and shows options for deeper cooperation between the state and NGOs. The options are based on situational and operational meanings of governance. In the case outlined here we end up in a situation of closeness / disagreement, which provides the most limited incentives to build a partnership between NGOs and the state.

It is important to stress that these four alternatives are options and although there may be a situation of openness/agreement this is not a guarantee for increased cooperation between the state and NGOs. Sociopolitical meanings have to be added to obtain a complete picture. However, the best option for deepened cooperation is a situation of transparent political and bureaucratic processes and consensus concerningissues. Situations of openness / disagreement and closeness / agreementprovide a somewhat unclear picture and do not exclude either enhanced cooperation or conflict. Initially, it was said that prevailing governance structures in many developing countries are not capable to promote environmentally sound practices. In response, increased partnership between the state and NGOs has been identified and emphasised by scholars and practitioners as a way to develop environmental consciousness and sound practices.18 However, this may not come easy. The case of water pollution in Madras shows a pretty gloomy picture about possibilities to enhance and deepen cooperation between NGOs and the state.

Notes

1 See, for instance, Hardoy et al., 1992 for a similar position.2 In September 1996 the name of the city was officially changed to Chennai.3 These three concepts have been used by Wolch (1990). Here they are used in a modified form and meaning. Leftwich (1994) makes a similar distinction between different meanings of good governance, systemic, political and administrative. The systemic and administrative meanings are similar to socio-political and operational meanings. The political meaning refers to the state and its degree of legitimacy and authority This last meaning brings the state to the centre in a discussion of governance. However, governance is just as relevant for the voluntary sector, the market and the interface among the state, the market and voluntary sector.4 Hyden (1992:14) instead uses effective governance. This approach seems to be more fruitful if we want to avoid a too normative approach and a moral discussion about good and bad governance. However, if we only use the concept of efficiency, other important aspects of governance are over-looked, such as equity and democracy.5 State pervasiveness has not not only been restricted to environmental or natural resource issues. The state has intervened in many other policy areas in the economy and voluntary sector.

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6 This empirical part derives from seven months field-work in Madras carried out during 1995 and 1996.7 The usage of common resources are here seen in similarity with Ostrom's terminology common pool resources, which refers to; "...a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude

Sitential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use." (Ostrom, 1990: 30).strom continues with distinguishing between resource system and resource units.

The former is ground water basins, physical infrastructure such as sewerage lines and roads, water basins etc. The latter is what can be used from the resource systems, e.g. fish, quantity of water withdrawn from a lake or a river etc. (ibid.).8 See GOTN (Severn Trent Report), Environmental Improvement of the Waterways of Greater Madras, 1989.9 BOD and COD measure amount of organic contamination in water.10 Webster, 1995:422-427 classifies NGO strategies into antagonism, opportunism and corporatism. If we follow this terminiolgy in the case of WAMP, opportunism has been and is the pattern of strategy vis-a-vis the state.11 The 74th amendment which makes it compulsory to have local elections was recently (1993) added to the Indian constitution. The constitution gives the Corporations (only existing in major urban areas), municipalities and the village or town Panchayats a widened, role in the process of development. Article 243-W regarding the powers, authority and responsibilities of municipalities, states that locally elected bodies (both in rural and urban areas) shall 'function as institutions for self-government". This means a decentralisation of power and responsibilities with respect to "...the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice..." and "...the performance of functions and implementation of schemes..." In other words local urban authorities are requested by the 74th amendment to widen their developmental role in addition to the service provision role they already have.12 The First Master Plan 1971-91 of Madras provides an example. This document has had a limited impact on the urban development and sprawl of Madras. The Second Master Plan was released in 1995 and it instantly received a lot of criticism from both the NGO community and experts within the bureaucracy. Apart from critisising parts of the content, one of the main arguments was; why develop a second master plan when the first one is not yet implemented!13 This pattern of politics emergerd particularly during the 70s under the rule of M.G. Ramachandran. See Lindberg, 1995:40-44.14 See Jop de Wit, 1993, about politics in Madras slums.15 This is the official Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board (TNSCB) estimation.16 Recently the GOTN set up a high-level committee with the purpose to speed up the implementation of programmes to clean the waterways of Madras. A second objective is to coordinate with local authorities, local NGOs and donors. (The Hindu, 961014).17 See TNPCB, 1994, Tamil Nadu Environmental Monitoring and Pollution Control, Vol. 1-4 for details about water pollution. Statistics are presented for the Adyar, Cooum and Otteri Nullah rivers and Buckingham canal from April 1991 - September 1993. The Severn Trent Report which was completed in 1989 also pointed out malfunctioning pumping stations and treatment plants as one of the worst polluters. See also Indian Express 950625; 940612; 940712; 940308.18 See for instance Jain, 1995; Sanyal, 1994; Farrington & Bebbington, 1993.

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References

Appasamy 1989. Managing Pollution in the Waterways of Madras City: An initial assessment. Working Paper No. 88, MIDS, Madras.

Bapat, M. & Patel, S. 1993. "Women, Development: Beating a Path towards Women's Participation", Economic and Political Weekly, March 1993:465- 472.

Blomqvist, H. 1988. The Soft State: Housing Reform and State Capacity in Urban India. (Dissertation), Uppsala University.

Bratton, M. 1989. "The Politics of NGO-Govemment Relations in Africa", World Development, 17(4): 569-87.

Bromley (ed.) 1993. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy. San Francisco: ICS Press.

Buch, M. N. 1993. Environmental Consciousness and Urban Planning. New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Farrington, J., Bebbington, A., Wellard, K. & Lewis, D.J. 1993. Reluctant Partners? Non-Governmental Organizations, the State and Sustainable Agricultural Development. New York: Routledge.

Government of Tamil Nadu 1989. Environmental Improvement of the Waterways of Greater Madras. Report by Severn Trent International, Madras.

Hardoy, J.E., Mitlin, D. & Satterthwaite, D. 1992. Environmental Problems in Third World Cities. London: Earthscan

Hyden, G. & Bratton, M. (eds.) 1992. Governance and Politics in Africa. London: Boulder & Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Jain, R.B. 1995. NGOs in Development Perspective. New Delhi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Leftwich, A. 1994. "Governance, the State and the Politics of Development", Development and Change, Vol. 25:363-386.

Lindberg, S. 1995. While the Wells Went Dry: The Tragedy of Collective Action Among Farmers in South India. Social Movements and Strategies in Third World Development, No. 34.

March J.G. & Olsen, J.P. 1995. Democratic Governance. London: The Free Press.Marcussen, H.S. (ed.) 1996. Improved Natural Resource Management: The Role of

Formal and Informal Institutions and Networks.Mitlin, D. & Satterthwaite, D. 1994. Cities and Sustainable Development. Back

ground document, Global Forum, Manchester.MMDA1991. Madras -2011: Policy Imperatives an Agenda for Action. Madras.MMDA/ERM 1995. Municipal Solid Waste Management Study for the Madras

Metropolitan Area. Madras.Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collec

tive Action. Cambridge University Press.Sanyal, B. 1994. Cooperative Autonomy: The dialectic ofState-NGOs Relationship

in Developing Countries. Research Series 100, ILO, Geneva.TNPCB 1994. Tamil Nadu Environmental Monitoring and Pollution Control, Vol.

1-4. Madras.


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Webster, N. 1995. "The Role of NGDOs in Rural India Development: Some Lessons from West Bengal and Karnataka", Development Research, 7 (2):407-433.

Wit de, J. 1993. Poverty, Policy and Politics in Madras Slums: Dynamics of Survival, Gender and Leadership. (Dissertation), University of Amsterdam.

Which 1990. The Shadow State: Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition.New York: The Foundation Centre.

World Bank 1992. Governance and Development. Washington, D.C.

96

FOREST MANAGEMENT IN INDIALOCAL VERSUS STATE CONTROL OF

FOREST RESOURCES

Julie Wilk

Degradation and substantial losses to India's forests have prompted a change in existing forestry management strategy. The new approach includes recognition of local participation in forestry management schemes but state control over most decisions is still dominant. Seen in terms of a common property resource system, India's forests lack many of the factors usually considered inherent to successful management programs. Though India's latest Forest Act affords more local involvement in forestry management, there continues to be an apparent lack of rights for local management groups over decision-making and the resource itself. Can this system enable the required balance between state and local management of India's forests?

Introduction

Since colonisation by the British, India has enjoyed strong state control of her national forests. The ever growing problems of deforestation and forest degradation plus global interest in sustainable development have, however, forced the national government to critically analyse their present forest management. This has resulted in the National Forest Act of 1988 which proposes that local participation together with the Forest Department is the key to creating successful forest management. After a short historical look at the development of India's forest management, the present joint forestry management system will be approached from a common property resource (CPR) perspective.

Ostrom's (1990) list of design principles of essential conditions accounting for the success of sustainable resource use is well known and often discussed in literature concerned with common property resource management. Does the present system of forestry management in India have the preconditions for successful management according to CPR theory? Is a shift towards local participation groups sufficient to ensure successful forest conservation in terms of providing forest produce to the local poor and sustainability of the resource itself? How much control do the 'participating' forest committees have over local forest management? What role does and should the state play in India's forest management?

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Forest management in perspective

Historically communities throughout the Indian subcontinent had sustainably managed the forest with the use of social and religious control mechanisms (Gadgil, 1989; Guha, 1989; Kumar et al., 1992). With the onset of British colonialism however, forest management became centralised when forests were recognised as a resource to be commercially exploited (Appasamy, 1993). The first National Forest Act in India was put forth in 1865 and subsequent acts followed in 1878 and 1927, each in turn providing the legal framework for more rigid state control of all forests. The Forest Act of 1878 divided India's forests into three divisions: reserved forests, which are closed to the people and under the exclusive control of the state government, protected forests, and village forests which are controlled by the local government. The Forest Policy of 1952 retained the concept of reserved forests, controlled by the state and independence had little effect on forest management. Local people were seen as a threat to the forests and not as guardians, a role which they had for centuries prior to colonialism when forest policy began to favour urban-industrial interests (Gadgil, 1990).

India today has a forest area of 19.4 per cent, vastly under the ForestPolicy's recommendation of a national goal of 33 per cent. Deforestation and degradation are now acknowledged as serious problems by India's central government, and centralised forest management has been deemed ineffective. Hence, decentralised management involving forest-dependent communities in the protection, regeneration, and distribution of forest resources is now promoted. The new National Forest Act established in 1988 is the first concrete step towards this new trend. It states that "The principal aim of (India's) forest policy must be to ensure environmental stability and maintenance of ecological balance... which are vital for sustenance of all life forms, human plant or animal. The derivation of economic benefit must be subordinated to this principal aim." (GOI, 1988). In spite of this statement the intentions of the Forest Department itself remain basically unchanged, i.e. to ensure steady supplies of timber for public works, increase revenues by regulating and taxing a lucrative sector of economic activity and ensure the stability of regional climatic conditions, water supplies and soil fertility (Rangan, 1993). An immediate conflict of interest is evident. Forests provide three main functions, all vitally important in their own right: ecological functions such as the maintenance of biological diversity, subsistence functions to provide timber forest products and food to rural and tribal communities, and development functions to provide timber for industrial and export purposes (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). Effective forest management able to successfully meet all of these criteria is an extremely difficult challenge.

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Does tree planting create forests ?

In the 1980s, India's Forest Department began to be concerned over the steady rate of deforestation and degradation of its forest reserves, and was thus receptive to the World Conservation Strategy. This strategywas specifically aimed at influencing government policy makers to the effect that resource conservation can lead to economic development (Adams, 1990). As a result the trend swung towards greater emphasis on forest conservation. Subsequently major tree planting drives were instituted where both economic and conservation measures were highlighted. Between 1980 and 1989,11.8 million hectares were planted as compared with only 3.5 million hectares between 1950 and 1979 (GOI, 1990). However most did not reach maturity. In the state of Bihar, this was attributed to a lack of faith from local tribes. Because of past experience they judged that when the trees matured they would not gain much economically, so instead, they began to collect firewood as soon as the planted seedlings were thick enough to be used in wood-stoves (Krishnaswamy, 1995). Thus these large tree planting schemes resulted in a very small increase in forest area and new approaches were sought to boost forest conservation.

The first attempt at local participation:Social forestry

The theme for future forestry approaches proclaiming sustainable development became meeting the basic needs of local people through their participation (Krishnaswamy, 1995). These approaches included social forestry which had two main aims: regeneration of degraded forests on community lands to provide fuel, fodder and other needs of the rural poor, and farm forestry where trees are planted on private holdings for the purpose of producing fuelwood for rural consumption. (Appasamy, 1993). The emphasis was on satisfying local needs of forest products so as to reduce the pressure on state-owned forests. One such project was initiated in the Chotanagpur Plateau of Bihar, which defined social forestry as "the creation of sustained forest resources for the people by the people with Government support" (SIDA, 1984). Benefits of social forestry programs were to be shared between local communities and the Forest Department.

A major drawback to the successful attainment of social forestry program goals was the lack of genuine community participation. In the implementation of the first social forestry programs, the Forest Depart

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ment often co-operated with members of the existing local government body, the village panchayat. These people were often educated and 'well to do' and it was they who identified the lands for afforestation (Andersen, 1995). The panchayats did not bring about widespread participation of the poorest members of the local population in community development programs. Later on, special village committees in charge of managing local forests were often created by the Forest Department. In addition, the degraded lands identified for reforestation were often already being used by nearby local communities. It was once again the poorest community members who were dependent on the use of these lands, often for grazing (Andersen, 1995). Thus, social forestry programs created to ease the burden of the poor, often excluded them from any decisions about program implementation, and even worsened their condition.

Local interest in social forestry programs was found to be low, and Krishnaswamy (1995) equates this with a lack of faith from the people, in the promised economic benefits of a successful project. In the initial attempts involving village panchayats, the Forest Department gave a proportion of the revenue from forest produce (varied in different states) directly to the panchayat who should use this money at its own discretion without consultation with dose lying rural groups (Andersen, 1995). Neither were legal nor administrative rights given to the local people over forest produce created by the project, so their sceptitism to realising future project benefits is understandably well justified. This lack of legal recognition accompanying the new management schemes, is a plausible explanation to poor local partidpation in a project that viewed externally, seemed only benefidal to them. Lack of local interest in forest conservation is also demonstrated by the extent of unauthorised removal of fuelwood from reserved forests. The Tamil Nadu Forest Department conducted a study of 324 randomly selected villages from a total of 3072 adjacent to forests. They conduded that the unauthorised extractions of fuelwood and small timbers were equivalent to annually clear-felling 25 000 hectares, or 1 per cent of the total forested area of the state. Of the utilisation of sodal forest produce between 1988 and 1990,53.2 per cent of the goods went to industry and 44.4 per cent was firewood sold to urban users and only a small portion went to meeting subsistence needs of the poor (Neelakantan, 1991), one of the paramount aims of sodal forestry.

Though sodal forestry efforts were not successful in reducing the impact on the quantity of fuelwood extracted from Tamil Nadu forests, they did, however reduce the extent of common land that was previously utilised by the poor for their firewood needs (Appasamy, 1993).

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Some degree of success was however reached in farm forestry. Comparatively richer farmers, subsidised by incentives for tree planting grew trees, often eucalyptus, an exotic but commercially valuable tree on their lands, for commercial gain. This provided some benefit to the local population but often excluded poorer farmers who did not have the luxury of waiting for future economic benefits (Krishnaswamy, 1995) but were forced to grow crops that could provide immediate profit.

Community involvement was considered a vital ingredient in forest management yet in most cases participation alone did not ensure success, as can be witnessed by an analysis of social forestry projects in various states which found that the majority failed to meet their goals of increasing forest resources to local communities (Cemea, 1990; Ritchie, 1992). It now seems that this type of community participation only satisfied a written requirement in the state's social forestry program without any interest in real cooperation with the local communities. The state failed to generate local interest by not allowing them to actively participate in joint efforts. The mere fact that local people physically participate in local management does not compensate for a lack of locally generated interest and initiation of ideas. Without local responsibility for forest conservation and the possibility to influence their own situation, such destructive activities as illegal gathering of firewood will always be commonplace and a direct hindrance to sustainable forest management.

Joint forestry management

In pursuance of the National Forest Act of 1988, yet another innovative approach to forest conservation was launched, joint forest management (JFM). This involved the joint interest and management of forests by locally organised village committees and the state-run Forest Department. In response to poor results of earlier social management schemes, as well as exposure from the media and influence from academics, NGOs and the Ford Foundation pilot projects (Andersen, 1995), the national government had now seen the necessity of lessening its control of forest resources. Subsequently each individual state had the option of adopting the proposals into their own legal statutes. This approach like social forestry is directed at local involvement of communities in the management of state-owned forests. But as social forestry attempts had failed, due to the lack of opportunity for local people to actively join in the administering of projects, an accompanying JFM resolution was passed in 1990, formalising the involvement of local people in forest

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management. According to the resolution, local communities were given all rights over forest products in regenerated forests, if they participated in the protection and management of these forests. The aim was to make forest protection economically rewarding to the local population and thus generate interest through financial reward. Under JFM, access to forest land and minor forest products (grasses, branches, etc.) is given to those who organise themselves in a village organisation for the purpose of forest protection.

Certain issues however remain unclarified. Who should constitute these village organizations and how is membership defined? Andersen (1995) stresses the necessity of defining the concept of 'village'. She states that most joint management institutes framed by Government Orders in India still contain a reference to the village panchayat, at least as ex officio member of the village protection groups. This is the first issue; the second is what extent and limits of power the village forest management groups actually have. The following examples of the duties of village committees and the Forest Department involved in forest management are taken from various states involved in JFM and summarised in Arora (1994). As a general rule, the Forest Department closely supervises all planning and work done by the village committees and all benefits can be withdrawn at the Department's discretion. In all states but two (Bihar and Haryana), the voluntary action committees are expected to 'assist7 the Forest Department in preventing trespassing, encroachment, damage, fire, theft or poaching but are without power to punish offenders. Assistance should also be given to the Forest Department as to the selection of species to be planted in their area, timely execution of the work and distribution of proceeds, again without any right to actually decide over any of these matters. Nor do the committees set the rules for their own functioning (except in Haryana and Bihar) or have the power to regulate their own membership (except in Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir). In six of the participating states, the Forest Department reserves the right to dissolve committees or cancel memberships at will. Thus the actual rights of these local management groups are very limited, and what on paper seems a genuine attempt by the state governments to allow local communities influence over the management of a local resource, is perhaps only an illusion.

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An initial appraisal of JFM

After such a relatively short time since implementation, it is perhaps misleading to speak of successes and failures. As of March 1994,13 of India's 22 states have facilitated the implementation of joint forestry management in their territories but as seen above, large differences exist from state to state as the extent of the people's power and promised benefits. The states of Orissa and West Bengal are often presented as the most successful to date in terms of forest regeneration. This success however is mostly attributed to a large number of villages being already involved in protection work when the JFM approach was promoted. In West Bengal even prior to the adoption of JFM, 1200 protection committees were already in operation (Arora, 1994). Thus, local initiation preceded governmental policy for locally organised forest protection, so any successes in this state can not be solely attributed to JFM. Initiation for forest management had been sparked internally, and once a forest conservation movement had already been established through local interest, a top-down recognition of their rights ensued.

From the viewpoint of the Forest Department, initial appraisals of JFM are positive. According to Sharma (1993), a planning officer for the Forest Department in Orissa, initial success in this state has also been strongly correlated with the existence of village-level institutions such as schools and community centres (Sharma, 1993). The existence of community feeling generates cooperative efforts which are essential to successful forest management. However, despite Orissa's acclaimed success, there are however still shortcomings in JFM. A survey of 210 households in 30 villages revealed that a majority (168 households) recognised the potential of JFM but were unaware of their rights. No formal mechanism had been worked out either by the Forest Department or by the village committees for distribution of produce among the participating villagers (Sharma, 1990).

Another positive response to JFM was also reported from the Conservator of Forests of one forest district in Madhya Pradesh State. Here a "complimentary relationship is developing between the forest staff and the villagers" (Bahuguana et al, 1994). Village forest protection committees had over the last five years encouraged patrolling by villagers against illicit fellers, regulated grazing in forest areas and prepared a fire-fighting plan. Bahuguana reported that the operations of stump cutting, pruning and clearing were being performed under the supervision of local foresters, operations which were now carried out with more enthusiasm than previously because the people 'regard themselves as partners in the management of resources in which they have a

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stake'. Even if decision-making is lacking within the JFM system, it is perhaps seen as an improvement over preceding management attempts. Local populations, perhaps through cooperation with the Forest Department, can have some influence over forest management in their area, if only indirectly. This situation though not ideal, may be at least preferable to the uncertainty of informal institutional management, without any government recognition whatsoever or entirely state-run forest management.

In Table 1, a sketch is provided showing at what scale, either local or national the forest resource is being used, and who is making management decisions. Even though the type of forest utilisation varies with scale, the decision-making element remains fixed at the national level.

Table 1. A two scale overview of the user groups and decisionmaking actors involved in forest management

RESOURCE SCALE

Individual / Village National

Fuelwood X *

Building materials X *

Timber x *

x most probable user groups ^decision making actors

Local initiation of conservation projects and community acknowledgement appear to be an essential element on which successful forest management depends. Even if local groups attain legal rights over their resource, there is still a large gap between legal rights and concrete planning for fair distribution. Even if economic rewards are obtained, decision-making and real management power are still lacking. Is JFM really offering the chance for active local participation or only allowing the absolute minimum amount of local participation, that is to say, participation without power?

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Who should decide ?

Why do externally initiated projects often fail in the implementation of local projects? A widespread phenomenon over much of the developing world is a general lack of faith in local knowledge and capabilities. It is generally assumed that 'experts' coming in from the outside, most often with some type of formal training are better able and equipped to develop lasting management systems. Surprisingly, these assumptions live on despite repeated failures of outside interventions in local matters, well exemplified over India's long centralised reign over her national forests. This implicit trust in expert knowledge is a trait implicit to JFM. On paper the scheme advocates strong support of local participation, yet in practice, the Forest Department is the only entity entrusted with decision-making powers. It is, however, equally naive and dangerous to assume that local forest management is a guarantee to fair play and wise decision-making (Toulmin, 1991). Local initiation and organisation of resource management should not be romanticised since there are many instances where local management systems are far from successful. But as Marcussen (1994) points out, local people have nevertheless as much if not more right to make mistakes, when managing their own resources as outside groups.

The use of the word 'participation' can be widely misleading. In the social forestry cases related above in Bihar, participation described the circumstance where local people involved in management activities were chosen by forestry officials and not internally. Neither does the word participation automatically include decision-making by the included locals on committees as exemplified in JFM. In Orissa, the active participation of women is mainly confined to planting operations (Sharma, 1993). Equally confusing is the term 'joint management', which conjures up an association of equality between involved parties, not at all the case with JFM. When outside interest groups such as India's Forest Department manage a project, the participating locals can only make decisions as long as the outside organisation has given its blessing. The vagueness of the concept of 'village' has previously been mentioned and it is of central importance. Who is most capable of bringing the forests back to productivity, local inhabitants who have an inherent interest in forest conservation for their own sustenance or the Forest Department, with management training and an economic interest? And which members of the local community should be entrusted with this task? Who should decide over India's forests?

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The role of the state

State forest control has enjoyed a long history in India but an alarming rate of deforestation and forest degradation now speak strongly against it as an effective management tool. Despite the growing recognition that natural resource management cannot succeed unless those people relying on the resource manage it themselves (Marcussen, 1994), the state government of India refuses to relinquish its control of forests. Promises and aims of greater local benefits and management options abound in official policy yet any actual decline in government control seems minimal. At the same time the abundance of past failures must somehow signal that the time is ripe for the state to lessen its grasp.

The new Forest Act is a signal that some changes are needed but will such changes be sufficient? Will this minimal amount of local participation be sufficient to spark local interest in forest conservation to the extent that degraded forests are brought back to production, so as to fulfil both the appropriator's subsistence needs, as well as the Forest Department's economic demands? At the same time it is unlikely that forest management in India can exist entirely devoid of any input from the state when her forests are of such great economic interest. Somehow a balance between local and state management must be found to ensure successful management and satisfy economic, sustenance, and ecological demands.

Ideally the state must distance itself from its current position. It must take an enabling rather than an implementing role (Krishnaswamy, 1995), supportive rather than controlling (Fisher, 1993). It must give local participatory groups time and space, to recognise the present condition of and demands on the forest, and be inspired to local interest and management. Needless to say this is not an easy task for an organisation which has carried the responsibility for forest conservation and management for centuries. It is especially difficult to create this space when the state of degraded forests is so acute and one is thus tempted to tighten control to an even greater extent. True joint management is perhaps where national forest policy is headed through these various forest management systems, progressing towards increased local participation, but it may take time. The question is whether India's degraded forests can survive this transition period.

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The future for India's forests P

Of Ostrom's (1990) list of conditions that tend to exist in the majority of successfully managed common properties, most are lacking under JIM. Though policy formulation stresses the role of local interaction, very few if any individuals under previous forestry management systems, have had any decision-making role in modifying rules. Neither have appropriators had the right to devise their own institutions, unchallenged by external authorities, and gained legal recognition of them. Under JIM, where local participatory groups have legal rights over resources, however unclear, and can participate actively in protection of the forest, the Forest Department still retains its decision-making role. Neither has JFM allowed delegated participating locals with a monitoring role or local participants any right to modify the rules. Ostrom has identified her list of factors as those which will increase the likelihood of effective organisation without ranking these in order of importance or pinpointing any as absolutely necessary. The initial indication from this brief summary of Indian forest management however, is that Ostrom's principle regarding the recognition of rights to organise without being challenged by external governmental authorities, seems to be the initial step to a successful forest management system. How the local committee then manages the resource will also play a deciding role, but without legal recognition of local groups as decision-making organs, it seems difficult to initiate and sustain a protective interest of local forests.

In some cases, such as in Orissa and West Bengal, locally initiated forest protection groups have sprouted up as a direct response to the lack of successful management. They have now gained recognition under JFM but the Act also provides legitimacy for the Forest Department to enter the picture. Will local forest protection committees be able to retain their influence in decision-making processes? Only time will tell if JFM can effectively adapt itself to local situations in the interests of good forest management. It will then be interesting to make comparisons between states where different implementations of the Act have been made.

Krishnaswamy (1995) remains sceptic to the state's present forest policy. It is only because of the forest's degraded state that the Indian state is willing to relinquish any economic gains. When the forests are economically viable, it may not be as easy to allow local control of forest products. If legal control over the produce is given by the state governments, is it not just as easy to take it back?

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A successful cooperation of local groups and the state-run Forest Department as exemplified inJFM requires mutual trust. Local groups will not work for sustainable forest conservation if they are afraid that once the forests are stable entities once again, the government will step in and reclaim the economic benefits. To establish this trust, it is likely that more than economic control of the resource must be offered. JFM offers little in the way of true management to local groups, and initial reports indicate that some degree of decision-making must be offered if local interest and cooperation are to be gained and kept. It may however, be the first step towards increased cooperation between local populations and the state, as a smooth transition towards locally controlled forest management.

Conclusion

Since British rule in India, the state has enjoyed almost complete dominion over her forest areas. The trend is now towards a relaxation of government control and a greater interaction between the Forest Department and local inhabitants in forest conservation. What extent this interaction will reach is as of yet uncertain. Initial appraisals of the new system seem promising, but to label it a success is perhaps premature. Local actors are 'participating' in forest management but their legal rights are unclear. This uncertainty over what role local people have and the extent of their influence may become problematic. Mutual trust and cooperation is required from both sides, state and local, but clear legal rights will render the benefits of forest conservation a reality, and encourage genuine local commitment.

References

Adams, W.M. 1990. Green Development: Environment and Sustainability in the Third World. London: Routledge.

Andersen, K.E. 1995. "Institutional Flaws of Collective Forest Management", Arnbio, 24(6)349-353.

Appasamy, P. 1993. "Role of Non-timber Forest Products in a Subsistence Economy: The Case of a Joint Forestry Project in India", Economic Botany, 47(3):258-267.

Arora, D. 1994. "From State Regulation to People's Participation: Case of Forest Management in India", Economic and Political Weekly, March 19.

Bahuguana, V.K., Vinay, L. and Rathor, B.M.S. 1994. "Collective Forest Management in India", Ambio, 23(4-5), July.

Cemea, M.M. 1990. Beyond Community Woodlots: Programmes ivith Participation. Social Forestry Network, No. 11. London: Overseas Development Institute.

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Fisher, B. 1993. "Creating Space: Development Agencies and Local Institutions in Natural Resource Management", Forest, Trees and People Newsletter, Vol.22:4-11.

Gadgil, M. 1989. Deforestation: Problems and Prospects. Foundation Day lecture. New Dehli: Society for the Promotion of Wasteland Development.

-------- 1990. "India's Deforestation: Patterns and Processes", Society and Natural Resources, Vol.3:134r-143.

Gadgil, M. and Guha, R. 1992. "New Forest Policy for Genuine Friendship", The Hindu Survey of the Environment. Madras: The Hindu.

GOI1988. The National Forest Policy of India. New Dehli: Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests.

-------- 1990. Developing India's Wastelands: National Wastelands Development Board1985-89. New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests.

Guha, R. 1989. The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Krishnaswamy, A. 1995. "Sustainable Development and Community Forest Management in Bihar, India", Society and Natural Resources, Vol.8:339- 350.

Kumar, P., Lobo, V., Chatter)!, J. and Khare, A. 1992. "Common Property and Local Institutions", Wasteland News, 7(20):3-10.

Marcussen, H.S. 1994. Improved Natural Resource Management. The Role of the State versus that of the Local Community. Occasional Paper no. 12/1994. International Development Studies, Roskilde University.

Neelakantan, K.S. 1991. Survey ofFuelwood Use in Tamil Nadu. Paper presented at the Twenty-first Interdisciplinary Research Methodology Workshop. Madras Institute of Development Studies, Hyderabad.

Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. NY Press. Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.

Rangan, H. 1993. Of Myths and Movements: Forestry and Regional Development inthe Garhwal Himalayas. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.

Ritchie, D. 1992. A Strategy for Asian Forestry Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Sharma, R.A. 1990. Socioeconomic Planning in Social Foestry. Ph.D. thesis (unpublished). Department of Forestry and Natural Resources, University of Edinburgh.

Sharma, R.A. 1993. "The Socioeconomic Evaluation of Social Forestry Policy in India", Ambio, 22(4):219-224.

SIDA1984. The Bihar Social Forestry Project for Chotanagpur and Santhal Parganas: An Appraised Project Document. New Dehli: Swedish International Development Agency.

Toulmin, C. 1991. "Natural Resource Management in the Sahel: Bridging the Gap between Top-down and Bottom-up". In T. James Winpenny (ed.), Development Research: The Environmental Challenge. London: Overseas Development Institute.

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PROTECTING INTERNATIONAL COMMONSBRIEF COMMENTS ON CURRENT ATTEMPTS AT ESTABLISHING

NEW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS (POPs)

Henrik Selin

When trying to set up international self-regulating institutions to protect international commons, the existence of shared norms and principles is of great importance as a means of securing a high degree of compliance. Two external factors affecting the emergence of such a shared value base can be identified: the setting within, and the method by which the process of institutional change is conducted. This paper focuses on the pre-negotiations phases of two current and partially parallel multilateral negotiations, aimed at reducing overall emissions of persistent organic pollutants (POPs). One is regional within the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), and the other is global under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). It is argued in the paper that both organisational framework withinand the way by which the LRTAP pre-negotiations work has been conducted,have better promoted the emergence of such a jointly held norm base, than in the UNEP process.

The creation of international environmental agreements

Modem environmental problems have increasingly become matters of international co-operation, reflecting a concern that these types of problems demand international solutions if they are to be dealt with effectively. As a result, a series of international environmental agreements covering a broad spectrum of environmental issues and designed to control state behaviour, is currently emerging. Two such recent developments dealing with the issue of pollution prevention, are the now ongoing negotiation processes on persistent organic pollutants (POPs)1: one regional within the framework of the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), and one global under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Both these processes aim at new legally binding international agreements. The UNEP process is striving towards a separate convention, while the

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Selin: Protecting International Commons

work within LRTAP is aimed at adding a protocol to an already existing framework convention, LRTAP.

Pollution prevention was one of the first environmental issues to gain broader international attention, and international environmental institutions, mainly established through inter-state negotiations, have as a consequence become important later date means for trying to reduce pollution.2 However, as pointed out by Larsson, much of the academic work previously done in this field has had a static approach, and failed to take account of the process dynamics of such occurrences.3 Negotiation studies have also predominantly focused on bilateral negotiations, and largely ignored the more complex cases of multilateral negotiations.4

In this context, the two POPs negotiation processes offer an interesting opportunity for a process oriented case study to help us gain understanding of factors affecting attempts at international institutional change. They are two current and partially parallel multilateral negotiation processes, concerning the same basic environmental problem, and the aim is two legally binding agreements. However, the two processes are conducted independently and differently and proceed in separate international settings, thus opening up a possibility for comparative study.

Shared norms and principles play a key part in trying to establish new international institutions. The existence, or at least ongoing emergence of a joint set of fundamental norms and principles among the parties, is an important step towards overcoming the inherent collective-action problems of institutional change.

In international environmental work, the creation of norms and principles largely occurs during the entire process leading up to the adoption of an international agreement, which often plays a fundamental part in broader international institutions. It is mainly in inter-state agreements where the issue is defined and the governing rules and decisionmaking procedures are specified. The pre-negotiations phase, however, is especially important with regard to norms and principles, as it is in this phase that much of the vital agenda-setting and forming of parties' positions occur. It sets the issue frames for upcoming negotiations, and also influences the structure and content of any final agreement.5 In the case of LRTAP, the pre-negotiations phase has ended and a process of formal negotiations has begun, while in global UNEP work the prenegotiation phase has not yet ended, but convention negotiations are scheduled to start in 1997.

It may at this stage be prudent, so as to avoid any unnecessary misunderstandings, to stress that I do not imply that shared norms and principles emerge during formal proceedings specifically designed to

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deal with this specific issue. The parties do not sit down at a negotiation table, look at each other sternly and say: "OK, let's establish some shared norms and principles!" On the contrary, I suggest that it occurs mainly in an informal manner at a deeper level within and between the parties throughout the entire process of institutional change, and that it may or may not result in a joint set of norms and principles. How each party perceives the issue is a key factor. The potential emergence of shared norms and principles is not solely dependent on how the parties individually view the issue, however, but also influenced by external factors, of which at least two broader types can be identified: the setting within, and the method by which negotiation work is conducted. Thus, depending on the structure of the organisational framework within and the way by which work is conducted, the emergence of a shared value base can either be (at worst) discouraged, or (at best) encouraged, in that these factors affect the possibility of the parties achieving a common perception of the problem and how to best approach it.

In this paper, attention will be directed at the two POPs pre-negotiations phases and the different international settings within and methods by which they have proceeded, focusing on how such factors have affected the emergence of shared value bases in the two processes and thereby in the long run, the possibilities for successful international institutional change.

Persistent organic pollutants

POPs are organic compounds that, to a varying degree, resist photo- lytic, biological and chemical degradation.6 The different POPs currently under scrutiny can be roughly divided into three different categories: pesticides, industrial chemicals and unintentional by-products.7 Once these various chemicals are dispersed into the environment, complete clean-up is often technically extremely difficult, and in some cases not even possible. Once used, we suffer the negative consequences for a very long time.

Many POPs were previously thought to be ideal and cheap chemicals that were basically harmless for humans, and as a consequence, were often frequently used in very large quantities. Recent studies, however, have revealed new vital implications, one being that POPs are often semi-volatile, which enables them to cycle through ecosystems and travel long distances, mainly through the atmosphere, although they are also subject to long range transport by river and ocean currents. Atmospheric contamination at any given time, however, is small. The

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important function of the atmosphere is as a transport medium. The oceans on the other hand represent a large reservoir of contaminants. Due to predominant global atmospheric circulation patterns, the semivolatility of most POPs and their propensity for successive revolatilization,there is, regardless of the source of the actual emission, a systematic migration to cooler latitudes, and then especially to the north. Some of the highest levels of POPs deposits in nature have been measured in the Arctic and Antarctic.

The lipophilicity and persistence of POPs permit them to bioaccumulate and biomagnify to relatively high levels in living organisms, even at low exposure rates. This process is what renders these substances so dangerous to humans. Organisms at the top of the food-chain, including humans, experience the greatest exposure, accumulate the highest levels and are consequently most vulnerable to potential health risks. Virtually all major POPs that have been released into the environment in large quantities can also be measured in a wide range of marine, terrestrial and freshwater organisms at all trophic levels.

Due to their resistance to chemical and metabolic degradation and their lipophilicity most POPs are eliminated from organisms very slowly. Females of many species can eliminate significant amounts of their body burden through maternal transfer of POPs to their offsprings via egg production or transplacentally and through breast milk. Laboratory evidence of the harmfulness of many POPs is also corroborated by wildlife studies. Several POPs have been found to exert oestrogenic effects and to disrupt endocrine functions, with observed impairments of immune system functions as well as functional and physiological effects on reproduction capabilities. This includes impaired sperm production in male offsprings and reduced pup survival and growth in both genders. Moreover, POPs have been associated with carcinogenic/ tumori- genic effects.

However, as with most environmental contaminants, it is difficult to prove or disprove conclusively that a particular POP in the environment has caused a particular observed disease or change in a terrestrial or aquatic population. This is due to two reasons. First, POPs always occur in mixtures in the environment and hence it is often difficult to be precise about which POP caused which effect. Second, individual field studies are usually insufficient to prove a cause-effect relationship between a single POP and a specific environmental effect.

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The importance of shared norms and principles

The concept of regimes has attracted increased academic attention since the early 1980s. Within the academic field of international relations an international regime has traditionally been defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations", where "principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights '•and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice".8 The perceived difference (if any) between regimes and institutions is a much debated issue, but one suggested distinction is that an international institution as an analytical concept includes not only the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime, but also the specific organisational setting that often exists in relation to an international agreement.9 Organisations are defined as material entities that possess physical location (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment and budgets.10 An institution as an analytical tool covers then, both the more concrete rules and decision-making procedures as often stipulated in an agreement, the related organisational framework and the more profound but less concrete principles and norms that underlie the agreement, and its connected organisations.

The concept of common-pool resources gained renewed scholarly attention in the mid 1980s, and often in connection with a new found interest in institutions.11 Institutions were then used as an analytical tool for studying attempts at achieving self regulating long term sustainable use of commons. Today, common-pool resource studies is an expanding field of research in its own right of which, if nothing else, this interdisciplinary anthology is evidence. Most of the new common- pool resource literature has focused on local, small scale resources, but the concept has also lately been applied to large international resources.12 There are, however, differences between classical traditional local common-pool resource situations, such as irrigation or grazing settings, and international resources such as dean air or dear water. This has lead some writers on international environmental politics to talk in terms not of common-pool resources, but of common-sink resources in connection with issues of international air and water pollution.13

Ostrom defines a common-pool resource as "a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from abstaining benefits

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from its use".14 From this perspective, a common-pool resource is a resource from which benefits can be individually appropriated, and the problem of regulation is to ensure that the collective limit of what can be withdrawn from the resource without endangering its long term sustainability is not exceeded. International environmental resources on the other hand are often characterised by joint supply and nonappropriability: "The quality of these resources is affected not by the individually appropriable resources that individual actors withdraw,but by the extent to which individual actors make use of them to dispose of their own waste material. For this reason, they may be called 'common-sink resources', since the problem is not to regulate the withdrawal rate of a stock but to control the use of a resource for the purposes of disposal".15

These different characteristics between a common-pool resource and a common-sink resource affect the situation is three main ways.16 Firstly, the difficulties of allocating individual benefits and organising collective monitoring renders problems of free-riding and shirking harder to handle. Secondly, parties value its current use of the common-sink differently and also face different marginal costs with regards to reductions of pollution levels, which makes it difficult to set - what is seen by each party - to be fair pollution reduction targets. Thirdly, over-exploitation of a common-pool resource will primarily affect those who benefit from it, while over-exploitation of a common-sink resource will also affect actors other than those who create the problem. In some respects, this makes it more difficult to try to establish international self-enforced regulations on POPs, than on a local fishery resource.

One previously often heard rational choice based argument, and one which is closely associated with Hardin, claims that there are only two main ways of regulating a local CPR situation and thereby avoid "the tragedy of the commons", i.e. the state and the privatisation solution.17 The state solution refers to a process where property rights to the resource is bestowed upon the government, while the privatisation solution involves the transference of property rights to private actors.In the two POPs cases, due to the anarchical characteristic of the present international system and the nature of the POPs problem, neither thestate nor the privatisation solution is presently available. If Hardin's arguments are to be believed, the inherent logic of the situation implies that the parties in the two POPs cases were thus inevitably facing disaster, since the free rider problem, that given the preconditions is the only option available, would undermine any self regulating attempts. More recent work in the field of common-pool and common-sink resources shows, however, extensive empirical evidence of several situations, both

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nationally and internationally, in which the parties themselves have solved the problem of collective-action and been able to create self-regulating long enduring institutions. The tragedy of the commons can clearly be avoided, without having either to transform the resource to state property or privatise it. There is thus a third option based on self regulation available, and recent studies seem to indicate that an important key to success lies in the existence of shared norms and principles.18

The core question from an institutional perspective in a situation like this is: how can a set of actors who are in an interdependent situation organise and govern themselves so as to obtain continuing joint benefits when all individual actors face temptations to free-ride, shirk or in other ways act opportunistically? This is where the importance of a set of shared basic norms and principles comes into the picture.

In any process of institutional change, vital questions have to be posed by the parties, like "what do we want to achieve, and how do we most effectively achieve those goals?" If no real consensus on the fundamental aspirations emerges among the parties, divergence of interests threatens to undermine the whole attempt at institutional change. With the existence, or at least ongoing emergence of shared norms and principles, the parties will have an important normative base on which they can build a new self regulating institution. This is then even more the case in a common-sink situation, since its specific characteristics, as compared to a common-pool resource situation, make it even more difficult to overcome the inherent collective-action problem.

Actors facing a collective-action situation must sooner or later address three interlocked problems: (i) how to supply a new institution; (ii) how to make credible commitments; and (iii) how to organise effective monitoring.^ These problems must moreover be solved at a reasonable cost. There is no point in creating a new institution if the transformation costs outweigh the actual benefits gained from the new institutional arrangement.

The first problem, the problem of supply, is based on the reasoning that although all parties could collectively gain by a new institutional arrangement, there would still be a failure of supply since an institution is a collective good and rational actors would try to shirk and secure its benefits for free. This means that collective individual incentives to free- ride would undermine the incentive to set up a new regulating institution. The institution per se is thus subject to the very incentive problem it is supposed to resolve: a second order dilemma. If, however, the actors can come to share a common notion regarding the character of the problem, much is won. This can in itself be a very sensitive issue, since that

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by accepting a specific description of a problem, the broader terms of a future agreement have often implicitly already been outlined.20 However, even if a definition of the issue can at least roughly be agreed on, there is still a clear risk that one or several actors say one thing and then when no-one is looking, do the opposite. This leads us to the second problem mentioned above; the difficulty of making credible commitments.

The issue of credible commitments can be illustrated with the following question: How can an individual yet dependent actor be sure that all the other actors will keep their ends of the bargain as promised? It is commonly argued that the answer is through effective monitoring. The parties must find some way to organise a mutual monitoring programme that guarantees that all parties do what they are required to do. The appropriate structure and degree of a monitoring is dependenton the propensities of the resource and what is regarded as necessary by the parties, which yet again leads us back to the issue of shared values. If there is a very strong shared notion on what needs to be done and how to do it, the need for monitoring is reduced. If on the other hand some parties seem to disagree on these fundamental issues, a more stringent monitoring programme is required.

There are already some regional international environmental institutions that partly address the POPs problem, but they are now found to be too scattered and insufficient in scope, since the negative effects of POPs emissions have been found to be more widespread and intense than previously believed.21 As a result, strong forces are now working together to try to establish new, more coherent international regulations to address these perceived deficiencies.

The POPs process within the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution

LRTAP was the first international agreement to recognise the transboundary nature of air pollutants, and was adopted in Geneva, on 13th November 1979, entering into force on 16th March 1983.22 As of 1st January 1996,39 countries and the European Community have ratified the convention, which geographically covers the Russian Federation, Europe and North America. LRTAP is designed as a framework convention. It is a convention that does not regulate environmentally damaging activities in detail, but acts merely as an umbrella to which separate action oriented protocols are added. To date, one protocol for cost

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sharing, and four pollution specific protocols have been negotiated.23 Three new protocols are currently being developed: a Second Nitrogen Protocol, a Heavy Metal Protocol, and then also a POPs Protocol.

A scientific seminar dealing with POPs was held in Stockholm in 1990 on a Canadian/Swedish initiative. As a result, the Executive Body of LRTAP decided to establish a Task Force within LRTAP to be headed jointly by Canada and Sweden, and designed to look further into different aspects of POPs problems. Between March 1991 and February 1994, the Task Force met formally four times. However, extensive informal communication between the parties took place during this time. In addition the Task Force regularly reported back to both the Working Group on Technology and the Working Group on Effects, two permanent committees within LRTAP.

In its final report, which was presented to the Executive Body in November 1994, the Task Force concluded that international controls to restrict POPs emissions were needed and that existing organisations and activities were unlikely to achieve the reductions required.24 The reason being that they are either regional in nature and therefore limited in geographical coverage, or that they merely address co-operative risk reduction and hazard assessment. Therefore, no other organisation is currently exercising a mandate, such as that contained within the LRTAP for the development of a protocol to address long range transport on the scale deemed necessary for POPs. Consequently, the creation of a new specific POPs protocol to be added to LRTAP was recommended by the Task Force.

The Task Force recommended a two track approach for the upcoming negotiations, each track to be pursued simultaneously. Track 1 would be to quickly establish a protocol, covering a small and manageable list of substances which have already been acted upon to varying degrees in many LRTAP countries and/or for which sufficient risk assessment information was considered available. Abatement measures for these substances should be specified in the initial protocol.

Track 2 would be, under the direction of an appropriate LRTAP subsidiary body to identify additional potential POPs for control actions. This combined approach would, according to the Task Force, have the advantage of facilitating immediate action on a short list of substances for which no further information was regarded necessary before control action could be taken (track 1), while allowing more time to conduct risk assessments for other substances in order to determine if additional control actions would be needed (track 2). Such POPs could in that case be added to the protocol at a later date.

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The Task Force also suggested three different abatement categories:a total ban, restricted use and voluntary restrictions. The Task Forcethereby presented a framework for upcoming protocol negotiations which would allow the parties flexibility, both regarding which POPs to regulate initially, and the type of regulations. The parties were then not forced at this early stage to commit themselves to any detailed obligations, which made it possible to move ahead without any unnecessary delay. Mainly as a result of the Task Force report, the Executive Body decided at its meeting in November 1994 that formal negotiations based on the Task Force proposals should begin without unnecessary delay in the Working Group on Strategies, the permanent negotiation committee within LRTAP.

One important part of the Task Force's work, based on the above definition of POPs, was to establish a model for evaluating which specific POPs are harmful and as such should be included in an initial protocol. Early on in the Task Force the parties designed a four stage evaluation model, which as work has proceeded, has been further developed.25 Work on creating such a model and conducting risk assessments accordingly has mainly been carried out by the UK, which has also been working on developing a model for incorporating additional POPs into an initial protocol.26

The discussion on evaluation criteria among the parties is a practical example of the way in which the fundamental question "what do we want to achieve?" is connected to the emergence of shared norms and principles. When the parties discuss which specific evaluation criteria that should be used for identifying POPs and which grounds they should be based on, they touch on important normative political issues as well, for it is not just a question of pure science, but of science inextricably mixed with various political considerations. By, for example, deciding on a specific arbitrary cut off point not only has a scientific decision been taken, but also a more fundamental normative decision that at least partly sets the ground rules for the whole exercise of institutional change.

During the pre-negotiations work, the parties failed to agree on the number of POPs that are to be subject to regulations at an initial stage with national proposals ranging between 12 and 20. Moreover, some LRTAP parties did not participate actively in the preparatory work, causing uncertainties about their positions on which specific POPs ought to be included in an initial protocol.

POPs are being negotiated on their own merits and a separate POPs protocol is the aim, but there is still linkage between POPs and other LRTAP issues. POPs work is conducted within a bigger, loosely fitting

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negotiation package, also including negotiations on a second nitrogen protocol and a protocol on heavy metals. The aim is thus three separate pollution specific protocols to be added to the list of five previous protocols under LRTAP, but the different issues have been linked together informally, and will most likely also affect each other in the future.

Although the parties to LRTAP are a relatively homogenous group of states, different domestic conditions among the parties create problems, affecting chances of designing an effective institution. Some states lack coherent national data regarding the actual use of different POPs, and / or effective national means for enforcement because of the lack of political will and / or because the national institutional structure is weak. International POPs work can in some cases then be used by national environmental authorities as a means of exercising pressure on national organisations to undertake control measures and establish effective means for implementation, and future negotiations on funding and exchange of technology and information, will be important steps towards ensuring effective national enforcement of internationally agreed regulations. This is, however, yet again dependent on which specific goals the parties want to achieve, which in turn will influence the foundation of the new institution and thereby also its structure and content.

Chemical work conducted within the European Union (EU) is another important external influence on the LRTAP process, with the European Commission trying to establish joint community chemical legislation. This affects LRTAP work in two main ways. Firstly, all 15 EU member states are also participating in LRTAP work and future international regulations must be harmonised between LRTAP and the EU. To facilitate future harmonisation, a formal steering group for policy issues has recently been established between the European Commission and LRTAP. Its task is to try to develop joint standards for the use of scientific material and basic principles that should guide their work, which will then of course also affect future LRTAP work on POPs. Secondly, some non-EU LRTAP parties (i.e. former East European countries) are striving towards increased co-operation with, and in some cases even full membership of, the EU, and strengthening of national chemical legislation to EU standards is one minor step in that direction. Environmental concerns with current POPs situations are thereby further enhanced by other political considerations. This further increases the importance of future harmonisation between the EU and LRTAP regarding guiding principles for their chemical work.

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The POPs process under the auspices of the United Nations Environmental Programme

Current pre-negotiations work on POPs within UNEP is largely the result of three partially different processes that over an extended period of time have been either directly initiated or later picked up by UNEP.The first and perhaps most influential part is the work conducted withinLRTAP, as presented above. Hopes have been expressed both within UNEP and the LRTAP, that the LRTAP process can be used as something of a role model for POPs work within UNEP, and also that a future POPs protocol concluded by the politically important LRTAP states can act as a stepping stone for further global work by setting a good example. Most parties to LRTAP are then of course also members of UNEP. UNEP has moreover been taking advantage of the extensive scientific assessment work conducted within LRTAP.

The second process is the work conducted largely under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS). IFCS is an intergovernmental forum dealing with international chemical issues. The idea of such an organisation was first evoked internationally at UNCED in 1992. It was believed that there were too many different organisations directly or indirectly involved in chemical safety issues internationally and that a co-ordinating organisation that exclusively dealt with such issues was needed. As a result of this initiative, IFCS was established in Stockholm in 1994, and was given the task of promoting international co-operation in implementing the goals set out in Agenda 21.

At its meeting in May 1995 the UNEP Governing Council adopted decision 18/32, calling for a global strategy for managing POPs and inviting the Inter-Organization for the Sound Management of Chemicals to work with the International Programme on Chemical Safety, and the DFCS to initiate an assessment process on POPs aimed at developing such a global strategy.27 This assessment process is to start with a UNEP Governing Council initially identified list of twelve POPs, the "dirty dozen", largely based on the then existing LRTAP list of identified hazardous POPs.28 In response to the invitation in Decision 18/32 the IFCS established an ad hoc Working Group on POPs. The IFCS was to oversee different international assessments, and report back to UNEP's Governing Council in January 1997, presenting a comprehensive document with recommendations for further action.

Once Decision 18/32 was taken by UNEP's Governing Council international work was initiated almost immediately. At a meeting in

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Bruges that same month IFCS dealt for the first time with the growing international concern over unrestricted use of POPs. This meeting was followed by another in June in Vancouver, where the governments of Canada and the Philippines held an International Experts Meeting on POPs with over 100 participants from more than 40 countries. In the meeting's final statement it was concluded that there was enough scientific information on the adverse human health and environmental impacts of POPs to warrant coherent global action, to include bans, phase-outs and use restrictions for certain POPs.

The third leg in the global POPs process was a UNEP-sponsored conference held in Washington at the end of October and in early November 1995: the UNEP Conference on Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities. The conference was a result of Decision 18 / 31, also adopted by UNEP's Governing Council at its May 1995 session.29 The decision specifically addresses POPs by calling on states to consider how, within an adopted draft of the so-called Global Programme of Action, appropriate attention could be given to support national and international action on POPs. At the Washington Conference 111 countries adopted by consensus the Global Programme of Action, in which it is stated that international actions aimed at developing a global legally binding instrument on the twelve listed POPs, are warranted.

In June 1996, the IFCS's ad hoc working group on POPs held a final meeting in Manila. Following decision 18/32, a paper was produced based on the work conducted in the different international processes. The document recommends immediate negotiations for a global POPs convention. As a result, UNEP's Governing Council is expected at its meeting in January 1997 to set up an International Negotiation Committee, to commence negotiations on a global POPs convention.

Parallel to POPs work, UNEP, together with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) is working on expanding the already existing voluntary Prior Informed Consent (PIC) programme, aimed at a legally binding international trade convention regarding certain types of chemical substances, of which POPs is one part. This process was also initiated by UNEP's Governing Council at its May 1995 session, when Decision 18/12 was adopted, calling for a legally binding PIC instrument.30 This process will then take place parallel to POPs work and many of the POPs referred to in Decision 18/32 are also covered by the present voluntary PIC procedure as well as included in PIC negotiations.

LRTAP in geographical scope is a regional convention, and the chemical industry has fiercely resisted the idea of any separate trade restric-

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tions in a LRTAP protocol, arguing that such restrictions will not solve any problems but merely transfer them to countries outside the region and give unfair competitive advantages to companies located in countries that are not parties to LRTAP. Broad harmonisation of regulations is important for the industry and any future trade restrictions should from their perspective be implemented globally in either a UNEP PIC and/or POPs convention. This standpoint is also taken by a number of influential LRTAP parties. There is also a risk that if trade restrictions are only implemented regionally within LRTAP, developing countries will be used as a back yard where unwanted hazardous POPs can be dumped. Many developing countries are already struggling with severe disposal problems due to lack of funding and technological means, a situation that could then be made even worse. No formal linkage on trade and trade related issues between the LRTAP and UNEP process has, however, hitherto occurred, but this will be an important future aspect of international work on POPs. It will be made additionally difficult because the two processes are only partially parallel, with the LRTAP process running ahead of the UNEP process.

In UNEP work, parties are divided on whether a POPs convention should be negotiated separately, or be included in a bigger negotiation package aimed at a global framework convention for chemical issues similar to LRTAP. The rationale behind the idea of a global framework convention is that by first creating a broad framework, common overarching rules and principles can be established, which would then facilitate further international chemical work. The main argument against such an idea is that initiating negotiations on a global framework convention would delay current work on POPs and PIC. It is then seen to be better to try first to achieve two POPs and PIC conventions, and then evaluate the need for a framework convention, which in itself is questioned.

The UNEP pre-negotiations phase, as compared to the LRTAP preparatory work, has been much shorter and more rapidly become a politically sensitive issue. The fact that the UN system in general and UNEP in particular as such is currently under severe fire, is also having negative effects, by creating political uncertainties of its future existence. There is in the UNEP POPs process, as with much UNEP work, a clear north/south dimension, that has made the issue more politically difficult. Many of these substances are either banned or under restricted use in most western industrialised countries while, due to their relative cheapness and availability, they are still being used frequently in developing countries. As in the LRTAP case, some, mainly developing countries, are suffering from weak national political structures making the

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implementation of regulations difficult even if the political will to do so exists, which to begin with is not always the case. For such states a global POPs convention, just as a LRTAP protocol can for some of its parties, be an important means to enforce national regulations by providing international backing - politically, economically and technically. The difference in climate between countries in the northern and southern hemisphere and their different needs for POPs has also caused controversy at the meetings. Much time and effort will thus have to be given to try to find solutions that are acceptable to a large number of politically socially and economically heterogeneous countries, with highly different needs for using POPs. There are also high risks of the POPs issue being used for other political purposes during upcoming negotiations, which would then additionally complicate an already complex situation.

Conclusions

LRTAP pre-negotiations work has promoted the emergence of a shared value base among its parties to a greater extent than UNEP preparatory work. This is the case with regards to both the setting within and method by which the LRTAP pre-negotiations work has been conducted.

Firstly, regarding the settings, the LRTAP parties are working within an already existing framework convention. Moreover, before the POPs work began the parties had met regularly for over a decade, during which not only LRTAP, but also five additional protocols have been created. This has allowed the parties over an extended period of time to establish an organisational framework specifically designed to handle issues of transnational air-pollution within that geographical area that is generally accepted by the parties. Within that commonly accepted setting the parties have slowly developed a relationship of mutual trust, which has helped to reduce the broader collective-action problems of making credible POPs commitments. In this respect the parties in the POPs process have benefited from previous successful work within LRTAP, by being able to partly build on an already existing shared value base regarding issues of transboundary air pollution. LRTAP as an existing institutional framework has also through its specific generally accepted organisational design given the POPs process stability while at the same time allowing the parties a certain amount of necessary flexibility, to better adjust POPs work to the specific issues that stem from this particular pollution problem. Some aspects of the POPs problem are unique and demand new approaches and solutions, but the

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parties have in other related areas of transboundary transport of air pollutants, been able to benefit from previous experience.

In the UNEP case, many of the organisational advantages available in LRTAP pre-negotiations are absent. On the global level there is no such framework as LRTAP to which a new POPs agreement can be added, although the idea of developing a global framework convention on chemical issues has been presented. International support for the creation of a global framework convention, however, is currently weak and such a development seems for the time being unlikely. Instead, parties in the UNEP process must start more or less from scratch when trying to develop a POPs convention. UNEP pre-negotiations work has also been divided into more or less parallel processes. This has, as compared with LRTAP work, created a much more divergent process with little ability to benefit coherently from earlier similar international environmental work.

Parties within UNEP are not only more numerous, but also more heterogeneous than LRTAP parties, which has further influenced UNEP work negatively. It has also been argued by both LRTAP and UNEP parties that a quickly negotiated initial LRTAP protocol is needed, albeit that it is smaller in geographical scope than the UNEP convention, since it is much more difficult to try to reach effective global regulations than effective regulations within LRTAP. A rapidly negotiated LRTAP protocol is then seen as a necessary first step, that can also act as a stepping stone for an upcoming global UNEP convention. A global setting of "nested" international environmental institutions will in that case be set up, dealing exclusively or partly with POPs at different levels, from a number of smaller regional ones, via LRTAP, to a global UNEP institution.

Secondly regarding methods, the LRTAP POPs process had been going on for almost five years, with the Task Force trying to collect scientific data and reaching a common politically accepted starting point, before the Executive Body of LRTAP initiated formal negotiations. The Task Force report was also generally accepted. However, since several important issues are not solved, success is not yet achieved. Nevertheless, the remaining differences are not fundamental, having more the character of question marks that have a fair chance of being straightened out during protocol negotiations.

The relative weight given to scientific assessments is in this context an important difference. The scientific work on developing evaluation criteria for identifying hazardous POPs in combination with listing of emission sources, compiling of emission inventories and mapping out transport patterns, have been much more comprehensive within LRTAP

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than within UNEP. This is an important difference that has benefited LRTAP work in at least two ways. Firstly it has given LRTAP parties more scientific material to base important decisions on. Secondly when establishing scientific criteria much of the fundamental issues of basic norms and principles on which a future institution is to be based, are indirectly addressed.

UNEP pre-negotiation work on the other hand has been much shorter, beginning with the UNEP's Governing Council decision from May 1995, which has limited the parties possibilities to examine the issue in the same detailed way as within LRTAP. In the UNEP process, relatively little scientific work of its own has been conducted. The LRTAP Task Force report to the Executive Body of LRTAP is in that respect more comprehensive than the report to UNEP's Governing Council, covering not only the POPs problem, but also detailed recommendations on how to approach it.

The indication that the origin of the UNEP process is more politicised than that of LRTAP is another interesting difference between them. Work within LRTAP was to a large extent initiated and managed for several years on a bureaucratic level by what can be characterised as a small international network sharing the same values. It is only recently that the process has been elevated to a politically higher level, where it is now subject to broader international negotiations. The UNEP preparatory process on the other hand has right from the start been marked by a present day traditional north/south conflict, which makes it more difficult to reach common ground on what needs to be done on POPs and how to do it. This problem is further complicated by the fact that there is still much to be learnt about transportation patterns, emission sources, actual emission levels, deposits in different media in different geographical places, different needs for alternative chemicals and so on.

Both POPs processes are subject to international issue-linkage, although they are formally treated by the parties as independent processes aimed at two separate POPs agreements. This can been seen as a wish of the parties within both processes to attack the POPs problem as specific issues instead of smaller problems in a bigger negotiation package. Still, as stressed by many others before me, international co-operation does not occur in a political vacuum, and three different categories of issue-linkage can be identified: firstly between the two POPs processes as such; secondly between POPs work and other related environmental issues; and thirdly, between POPs work and other mainly non- environmental issues. In pre-negotiations work all three types of issue- linkage have occurred in both processes, but the last kind has been more dominant in UNEP work.

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v In both processes there are strong indications of links between domestic and international politics. Parties are forming positions based

'! on perceived self interests which in turn is often the result of national•! bargaining between various domestic actors. It is also one of the bigger

i tasks within current international institutional theory, to account for1 the mutual influence between the national and international, to under-i stand better this very complex situation. It will also be one of the major

: j challenges in a further more comprehensive process oriented study ofi the two POPs negotiations, to try to understand and describe the con-i nection between domestic politics and international institutional change,

within a specific issue area occurring in complex international systems.■1.!

:!" jVi Notes

. j-! 1 Since Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) is the term used in the official LRTAP

j and UNEP documents, I will also use it here. There are, however, also other deno-| tations used in other contexts referring to the same group of substances, such as| Persistent Organic Compounds (POC) and Persistent Priority Pollutants (PPP).| 2 For an overview of modem pollution politics, see Weale, 1992:1-36.| 3 Larsson, 1996:2.j 4 Larsson, 1996:3.j 5 Berridge, 1995:119-136.

6 Draft Executive Summary of the State of Knowledge Report of the Task Force on Persistent Organic Pollutants led by Canada and Sweden, 25 April 1994:3. For more information on the chemical characteristics of POPs and their environmental implications, see Naturvardsverket, rapport 4136; and Naturvardsverket, rapport4536.

i 7 For a list of the POPs currently under scrutiny in the two processes, see theAppendix.

- J 8 Krasner, 1983:2. For a current overview of the regime literature, see Levy et al.,1 1995! 9 Keohane et al., 1994.

j 10 Young, 1991b:32.11 For more extensive discussions on the concept, see Berkes 1989; Ostrom, 1990;

i and Bromley 1992.1 12 For analyses of global commons, see Wijkman, 1982; and Vogler, 1995. On the

issue of system analysis on different theoretical levels of abstractions, see Young, 1991b; and Keohane et al., 1995.

! 13 Weale, 1992:192-195.14 Ostrom, 1990:30.15 Weale, 1992:193.16 Weale, 1992:193-195.

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17 Hardin, 1968.18 This is one of the central themes argued by the "new institutionalists". See for instance Osborn, 1990.19 Ostrom, 1990:42.20 Berridge, 1995:124-126.21 Regional forums in which POPs actions have been taken, include primarily RELCOM (the Baltic Region); the North Sea Ministerial Conferences; OSPARCOM (Northeast Atlantic); the Barcelona Convention (the Mediterranean); the International Joint Commission (US / Canada Great Lakes); the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation; and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy-22 For more background information on acidification and the establishing of LRTAP, see McCormick, 1990; Levy, 1995; Wettestad, 1995; and Larsson, 1996.23 The five protocols are: i) The Protocol on Long-term Financing of The Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (adopted 28.9.1984 in Geneva, entry into force 28.1.1988); ii) The First Sulphur Protocol (adopted 8.7.1985 in Helsinki, entry into force 2.9.1987); iii) The First Nitrogen Protocol (adopted 31.10.1988 in Sofia, entry into force 14.2.1991); iv) The Volatile Organic Compounds Protocol (adopted 18.11.1991 in Geneva); and v) The Second Sulphur Protocol (adopted 14.6.1994 in Oslo).24 Draft Executive Summary of the State of Knowledge Report of the Task Force on Persistent Organic Pollutants led by Canada and Sweden, 25 April 1994:19.25 Summary of Risk Assessment on Priority Substances for Long range Atmospheric Transport of Persistent Organic Pollutants: Final Report, February 1994.26 Proposed Procedure for Incorporating New substances into the UNECE Protocol on Long Range Atmospheric Transport of Persistent Organic Pollutants, July 1995.27 UNEP/GC. Decision 18/32.28 One POP, heptachlor, was identified by UNEP but was not at that time included in the proposed initial LRTAP list, which led to some confusion on which substances were actually being discussed in the two processes. See also the Appendix.29 UNEP/GC. Decision 18/31.30 UNEP/GC. Decision 18/12.

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References

Berridge, G. R. 1995. Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. London: Prentice Hall/ Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Berkes, F. (ed.) 1989. Common Property Resources: Ecology and community-based sustainable development. London: Belhaven Press.

Bromley, D. W. (ed.) 1992. Making the Commons Work. Theory, Practice, and Policy. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.

Draft Executive Summary of the State of Knowledge Report of the Task Force on Persistent Organic Pollutants led by Canada and Sweden, April 25, 1994. (EB.AIR/WG.6/R.20/Add.l).

Hardin, G. 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science, No. 162:1243-1248.Keohane, R. O., Haas, P. M. & Levy, M. A. 1994. "The Effectiveness of Interna

tional Environmental Institutions". In P. M. Haas, R. O. Keohane & M. A. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Keohane, R. O. & Ostrom, E. (eds.) 1995. Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains. London: SAGE Publications .

Krasner, S. D. 1983. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables". In S. D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes. New York: Cornell University Press.

Larsson, P. 1996. Regimforhandlingar pa Miljdomrddet: Era Studie avforhandlingama om LRTAP-konventionen. Lund Political Studies, 93.

Levy, M. A. 1995. "European Add Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy". In P. M. Haas, R. O. Keohane, and M. A. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection. Cambridge: MTT Press. 3rd edition.

Levy, M. A, Young, O. R. & Zum, M. 1995. "The Study of International Regimes", The European Journal of International Relations, 1(3): 267—330.

McCormick, J. 1990. Acid Earth. The Global Threat of Acid Pollution. London: Earthscan. 2nd edition.

Naturvardsverket, rapport 4136, Ldnglivade Organiska Amnen och Miljon (report from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency).

-------- rapport 4563, POP: Stabila Organiska Miljogifter. Stort eller Litet Problem(report from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency).

Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Proposed Procedure for Incorporating New substances into the UNECE Protocol on Long Range Atmospheric Transport of Persistent Organic Pollutants, July 1995. (AEA/RCEC16419225/2 Issue 4).

Summary of Risk Assessment on Priority Substances for Long range Atmospheric Transport of Persistent Organic Pollutants: Final Report, February 1994. (AEA/CS/16419004/SRA Issue 2).

UNEP/GC. 9th meeting, Decision 18/31, 25th May 1995. Protection of the marine environment from land-based activities.

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-------- 9th meeting, Decision 18/32, 25th May 1995. Persistent organic pollutants.

-------- 10th meeting, Decision 18 /12,26th May 1995. Development of an internationallegally binding instrument far the application of the prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals in international trade, and consideration of further measures to reduce the risks from hazardous chemicals.

Vogler, J. 1995. The Global Commons: A Regime Analysis. Chichester: John Wiley &Sons.

Weale, A. 1992. The New Politics of Pollution. Manchester. Manchester University Press.

Wettestad, J. 1995. "Science, Politics and Institutional Design: Some Initial Notes on the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Regime", Journal of Environment & Development, 4(2):165-183.

Wijkman, P. M. 1982. "Managing the Global Commons", International Organization, Vol. 36(3):511-536.

Young, 0.1991a. International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment. London: Cornell University Press. 2nd edition.

-------- 1991b. "Problems of Scale in Human/environmental Relationships", International Organisation, 45(3):281-309.

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Appendix

Within the LRTAP, there is still some discussions on which substances that are to be included in an initial protocol. Those within brackets are included in the negotiations, but may not be subject to regulations at an initial stage. The UNEP Governing council on the other hand has already identified an initial list of twelve substances, fire so called "dirty dozen", as a primary target.

SUBSTANCES LRTAP UNEP

PesticidesHexacholobenzene X X

Toxaphene X X

Chlordane X X

Aldrin X X

DDT X X

Mirex X X

Dieldrin X X

Endrin X X

Heptachlor (X) X

Chlordecone (X)Lindane (X)Endosulfan (x)Quintozene (X)

Industrial ChemicalsPCBs X X

Hexabromobiphenyl (X)Pentacholrophenol (X)Short-chain chlorin. paraffins (X)

Unintentional by-productsPAH (x)Dioxins X X

Furans X X

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THE GLOBAL COMMONS AND UNITED NATIONS REFORM

Sylvia Karlsson

The emerging view of the global commons as the commonproperty of mankind has implications for possible management strategies. These implications are elucidated by studying the theory developed for creating successful management regimes of local common property resources. United Nations reforms are necessary to create an appropriator organization able to coordinate and execute collective governance of the global commons. States also need to perceive protection of the global commons as being in their own interest. This can be achieved either by expanding the concept or security or expanding the area of responsibility for states. Building real partnership among states and establishing a global culture of law which is based on ethical principles are further requirements.

Introduction

The global commons pose unique challenges to the international community since they are in dire need of more governance at global level. This article argues that much can be learnt about the nature of such global governance and requirements to achieve it, from the study of local common property resource management.

After a short description on how the concept of global commons emerged in the international community, I discuss the global commons as common property and identify some interesting elements regarding institutions and organizations from local common property regimes.

Managing the global commons requires a more effective system of global governance, and today, the only candidate for executing such governance is the United Nations. Discussing management of the global commons therefore necessitates a discussion on the workings of the UN in this area. I bring forward a few of the more critical issues of the UN that are deliberated over as important targets for reform, focusing on discussions in one of the more comprehensive proposals on UN reform, that made by the Commission on Global Governance.

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Karlsson: The Global Commons and United Nations Reform

Some elements are then further elaborated, apart from the mere technical aspects of organization discussed in relation to UN reform, that characterise successful switches from independent to coordinated action in local common property resource regimes, and how these could lend insight to creating a management regime for the global commons. This discussion leads up to the concluding sections which cover why the need for a culture of law based on global ethical principles, is crucial to the creation of stronger global governance.

A period of global change

Some political scientists stress that the linkages between both peoples and countries have a long history stretching back over centuries and millennia. 'Globalisation' did not start after 1945, but now "'globalisation' this, once neglected dimension has become the property of ah" (Halliday 1994). The integration process has reached previously unimaginable dimensions during these last 50 years. A concept that has been used to describe some elements of this process is 'global change'.

The concept 'global change' was first used in the social sciences in the 1970s and referred then to changes in international social, economic and political systems (Price, 1989). Today global environmental change is the concept that has become the hall-mark for more widespread awareness, that we live in an acceleratingly interdependent world. Despite her long history humankind has only very recently developed the ability to alter the environment on a global scale. The list of environmental problems where local actions - if not through other means, then by mere aggregation - directly influence the global environment and where policy decisions at all levels directly influence local actors, is increasing decade by decade, e.g. unsustainable land use, ozone depletion, global warming and global toxic pollution. Several of these areas relate to what has been called the 'global commons'.

The global commons emerge

The 'global commons' is the term used for those areas that no state has jurisdiction over and includes e.g. the oceans and seabeds beyond national jurisdiction, Antarctica, the atmosphere and outer space. All are areas which are impractical for any one nation to lay claims on and can thus be seen as belonging to all nations in common.

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If we go back in history to trace the judicial origins for such common ownership, we come to the various Roman law traditions of res communis omnium and res -publicae which means that "certain property which belongs to no one, belongs to all, rather than to whoever, first-come- first-served, can establish use of that resource" (Imber, 1994:52). Untilthe commons have been specifically governed as res communis they belong to the category of res nulluis a free resource, completely open for everyone's exploitation. It was suggested during the 1960s that the concept of 'common heritage of mankind' (CHM) should be applied to the areas beyond national jurisdiction.1 Several international treaties in the 1950s and 60s implied the use of the CHM concept for the global commons, thus starting the process from a state of res nullius towards res communis for these areas.

In 1959, 12 countries signed the Antarctic Treaty which opened the continent for scientific research and banned it for military or mining purposes. The Outer Space Treaty was signed in 1967, where the outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies were exempt from military use. Today, there are other emerging problems in this domain that need to be dealt with, such as the geostationary orbit which is becoming crowded with satellites. The area where the CHM concept was most boldly and straightforwardly used was in relation to the use of the deep seabed. Negotiations on principles for managing the ocean and seabed lasted for 12 years, and in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was at last ready for signature. The Convention contained unique procedures for global joint management of thedeep seabed, but national self-interest took precedence, and many industrialised nations refused to sign the treaty. In the case of the atmosphere, it has never been claimed as the national territory of any state. That we have the air around us in common has been obvious for a long time, and in a juridical sense, since the trail-smelter case in 1937 that concerned transboundary air pollution between the United States and Canada. With the Montreal Protocol of 1987 and the Climate Convention of 1992, the common air was extended to include the stratosphere.

Up till now the global commons have been seen as separate physical places or spaces, but the definition should be widened so that we see the commons as a 'system' (Cleveland, 1993). Even territorially confined environmental degradation can, in this respect, be an element of the global system of life support that the planet is providing us and all other species with.

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Governing the global commons

The global commons as common property

From the extensive literature on common property resource (CPR) management it is clear that this form of collective ownership and many times successful management of a local resource (such as pasture, fishing grounds, irrigation canals etc.) has been widespread around the world (Bromley, 1992; McKean, 1992; Feeny et al, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 1989). The global commons facing imminent degradation urgently need to be subject to similar successful management.

Can lessons for management learnt at local level be applied at global level? I will attempt to test some of the concluded requirements for successful management of local common property resources on the global commons. Transferring conclusion across such different scales is without doubt difficult, but could be fruitful and has been encouraged as an interesting research agenda (Young, 1994).

Local commons, more referred to as common property/pool resources, can be governed in these different regimes (Berkes and Farvar, 1989):

• open access• communal property• state property• private property

It is when the resource is subject to a communal property regime that the we can refer it to being a local common property resource. The global commons can fall under governance systems of three general kinds (Young, 1992):

• world government• extended national jurisdiction• restricted common property

World government is not foreseeable in the immediate future. Extended national jurisdiction is practically impossible for most of the global commons. It is now being realised that an open access regime, i.e. absence of a governance system, is not acceptable. The only alternative left is then some form of global level communal property regime. Such a situation can be called governance without government and is what the Commission on Global Governance is proposing.

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Scientists of different disciplines have tried to characterise the key elements in those local CPR regimes that have been successful. One general point that has been referred to is that such local CPR regimes are based on cooperative rather than competitive attitudes (Jacobs, 1989). The sense of communalism is more prevailing than in current western societies. The regimes do not depend completely on altruistic behaviour of people in the community however. There is a recognised need for some level of mutual coercion such as monitoring and graduated sanctions (Ostrom, 1990; Gibbs and Bromley, 1992).

Institutions vs. organization

Successful management necessitates that individual strategies of action are replaced by coordinated action. For this to happen a forum for communication is needed where these coordinated actions can be discussed and eventually agreed upon. This forum will have to develop into some kind of organization for the members of the regime - the appropriates - but it can vary from informal regular meetings for discussions to formal organizations with written rules, staff, office etc. In part of the recent literature focus has been on institutions, i.e. the informal and formal rules of the game that build up the regime, and organizations have been seen as completely separated from the institutions. I see organizations as a vehicle for institutions to emerge, be realised and enforced. Organizations constitute a crucial part of a management regime. This view is facilitated by the broad definition of organization referred to above.

That a permanent, formal organization is necessary for creating a CPR regime for the global commons, is self-evident. Frequent interaction and a meeting place for negotiations and arbitration are needed. To achieve that without a formal organization in a world of more than 185 states is unrealistic. The United Nations is the only truly global inter-governmental organization that can come into question for managing the global commons. This motivates the focus on the UN system and proposals for its reform in this discussion.

The United Nations - reasons for criticism

The United Nations has often been given the blame for failures and catastrophes in the international arena. At the same time, its accomplishments and successes are not widely mentioned in the media world. A more balanced discussion on the organization which recognises its

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f

strengths and weaknesses is required, if reform deliberations are to be fruitful. The UN is not a world government but an organization that has 185 members on the governing board and no chairman with a casting vote. The possibility to carry out its mandate is up to the states themselves. Do they provide the means to carry out the mandate? Here I only focus on the aspect of coordination in tire UN-system, but this is not to imply that this is the only or most important means at the disposal of the system. Political will, financial resources and other factors play crucial roles for the ability of the United Nations to carry out its mandate. Coordination, intimately tied with organizational structures is an important element for creating a viable forum from where management approaches of the global commons could be applied in the same framework for one global common, or the global commons as a system.

Coordination

The UN system has expanded and proliferated since its inception. Programmes, subsidiary organs and committees have been added in response to new demands. Such development brings challenges of coordination. The area of responsibility for the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), under whose responsibility environmental issues lie, is especially troublesome in this respect. The sector has some 150 subsidiary organs (Childers and Urquhart, 1994) and the UN, in this case represented by ECOSOC, shall according to article 58 of the Charter "make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of the specialised agencies". The pluralism of the UN system affords potential for rich diversity in the work of the system, with agencies focusing on their specific issues with a unique approach, but severe problems arise if the mechanism of coordination is not fulfilled. Lack of coordination is a much repeated criticism against the UN and rightly so. Many agencies work on the same issues, whereas other issues are not dealt with anywhere. Attempts have been made to increase coordination, for example, in the area of the environment but without much success.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was especially created at the instruction of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, to coordinate the activities of other UN organs in issues of the environment. To carry out the latter it was given a small secretariat and its headquarters was placed in Nairobi, quite far from the other major organs it was assigned to coordinate. UNEP has


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its own governing council with 58 member states on a rotating bases who direct the work of the programme. UNEP reports to ECOSOC, who should supervise policy coordination between UNEP and the rest of the system. In ECOSOC there are another 54 representatives out of which some might represent the same governments as in UNEP governing council. ECOSOC reports to the General Assembly. The agencies and organs that UNEP is set to initiate and coordinate environmental activities with, are themselves governed by separate governing councils which are lead by executive directors, that often take pride in acting as independently as possible from the UN-proper. Notwithstanding article 58 of the Charter quoted above, a decision by the intergovernmental board of a UN organ or specialised agency cannot be changed by any UN body such as ECOSOC or the General Assembly (Childers and Urquhart, 1994).

Does this structure of management with a range of decision-making fora regarding environmental issues have to be a problem? Not if the governments who send representatives to these different bodies give the same instructions on policies they should advocate. That is if the representatives call for the same priorities in policies, whether they sit as members in the General Assembly, ECOSOC, UNEP or any other body then a higher likelihood would be afforded of reaching decisions that at least do not contradict each other, but rather strive towards similar goals. Unfortunately such is not often the case. Governments send representatives from different ministries to the different bodies, and they seldom coordinate their positions (Childers and Urquhart, 1994). The frequent call upon the UN to increase coordination to a large extent falls back upon the governments. It becomes a call to governments to start coordinating themselves. When that is achieved, prospects would improve profoundly for more effective world wide coordination in the UN system.

Proposals for United Nations reform

The challenge of adequately managing the global commons has been one major motivation to review the United Nations. In recent years the call for increased global governance has been raised more frequently, especially on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. The nations face a turning point in choosing future patterns of governance for issues of global concern (Commission on Global Governance, 1995; UNRISD, 1995; Childers and Urquhart, 1994; Imber, 1994). Nations face a choice regarding the United Nations, a choice between

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reducing the demands and expectations of the organization so as to give it a chance of carrying out its mandate properly, or giving it greatly improved resources, functions and coordinating powers (Kennedy & Russett, 1995).

The Commission on Globai Governance

Among the stream of articles and books addressing UN reform the report of the Commission on Global Governance entitled "Our Global Neighbourhood" is one of the most broadly based and comprehensive. Under the shadow of its most recent predecessor the World Commission on Environment and Development report "Our common future", has not by far received the attention of the same magnitude which that report received. The series of international commissions during the last decades have taken separate parts of the global puzzle and suggested solutions. Their chosen areas of deliberations have been broad, e.g. South and North inequalities, human security and survival and sustainable development. It does show some logic that probably the last commission of this century targets 'global governance'. Central in the report of the Commission on Global Governance is the stress put on the difference between government and governance. They repeatedly underline that their call is not for world government but for improved governance at global level.

"Our Global Neighbourhood" covers many aspects of global governance in general and the United Nations in particular. I will briefly discuss their UN system coordination proposals.

Coordination

In view of many years of criticism of a weak and poorly functioning ECOSOC, the Commission suggest it be closed down. The 54 member body is seen as too big with too little power to fill the function of governing the social and economic issues of the world. They propose instead the creation of an Economic Security Council (ESC), resembling the present Security Council in structure, but one which would work by consensus and without vetoes. The Economic Security Council they propose differs in one vital respect. It would only be able to recommend policy strategies in the areas of its mandate. The idea is to raise the prestige, credibility and authority of the Council by using experts of high standing and by ministers giving it high priority. The proposal has

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several advantages, for example that it aims at raising the priority of global economic and social development, giving the responsibility of these issues to a smaller and possibly more effective body.

Doubts have been raised whether this would be enough to facilitate a coordination of UN policies in all social and economic areas. The prestige and importance of the Security Council must partly be a result of it being the only UN organ that can take binding decisions and obligate states to act. There might then be a risk that too high expectations, if ESC attempts to draw credit from the Security Council and does not have the same power, will lead to future disappointment. An other argument against creating an ESC stems from the discussion on the expanding use of the security concept (see below). The issues suggested to be referred to ESC can then be seen as being closely connected with issues of peace and national security. An alternative course of action would then be that the agenda of the Security Council should be expanded so that a holistic approach to global governance could be taken.

The Commission further suggests that the global commons should be referred to the Trusteeship Council which fulfilled its mission of administering territories during the process of decolonisation, and could therefore be given the global commons in their trust, to administer and manage. The body would act as trustees for all nations and future generations. The Commission envisions that this Council could be the forum for negotiating international conventions and deliberations on environment and related matters. The Commission on Sustainable Development would report to the Trusteeship Council instead of ECOSOC.

Giving the management of the global commons to a renewed Trusteeship Council, seems to be a logical consequence of the last decades emerging view, that these areas should be jointly managed as a common heritage of mankind. Having one single forum for the soft and hard law-making process on environmental issues, would probably make the process more efficient, more comprehensive and coordinated. To some extent UNEP is attempting to be that forum at present but the Trusteeship Council is situated much closer to the General Assembly, the core of the United Nations system, and this should be advantageous.

Another aspect of coordination is the question of leadership. In the absence of legal authority the United Nations system must lean more heavily on intellectual leadership. Effective coordination, even if legal authority was in place, needs an executive function that renders the intellectual respect of its employees (Childers and Urquhart, 1994). The place and importance for individual leaders in the system itself, has been shown (Rowlands, 1992) e.g. in various successful environmental negotiations where in the initial phase such individuals acted as "interna

ls


tional people in leading, insisting, inspiring, sharing knowledge, and generating a climate of trust.." (Cleveland, 1993:52).

From independent to coordinated action

The suggested measures for improving the situation in the current working of the United Nations mostly concern the mere technical aspects of creating an effective organization. Such measures maybe necessary but are not sufficient. There are other requirements that have to be fulfilled to create an effective organization of appropriators. To learn more of the nature of these requirements I return to what has been learnt at local level in common property situations.

Ostrom has outlined some key variables for the creation of an organization of appropriators, and switching from independent to coordinated action at local level (Ostrom, 1992). The four situations required among appropriators in the organization are:

• Common understanding of the problem• Common understanding of alternatives for coordination• Common perceptions that decision-making costs do not exceed

benefits• Common perception of mutual trust and reciprocity

Local communities often have a long history of living with a scarce common resource and individuals are the primary actors. In the global community states are the primary actors and they are just recently starting to realise that some of the global commons contain scarce resources. Scientists have discovered the threats to the global commons and brought them to the attention of states and policy makers. But not even scientists have reached a common understanding of exactly how big the threats are, and the uncertainty of future scenarios of further degradation of the global commons is substantial. Notwithstanding disagreement between scientists in magnitudes and time-scales of threats to the global commons, a common understanding of the problem is emerging among states. The peak in the process of reaching common understanding was at the United Nations Conference for Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 where the Rio Declaration and the plan of action, Agenda 21, was endorsed unanimously. The Rio Declaration contains the precautionary principle which states that lack of full scientific certainty should not prevent action if there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage.

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Earlier sections have briefly described successes and failures in reaching agreement on strategies for the common management of the global commons. Agenda 21 constitutes a bench-mark also in the process of reaching a common understanding of alternatives for coordinated action. It covers suggested courses of action for all sections of the environment including the global commons. The suggested strategies of action in Agenda 21 were not only for the national and local level but also for international coordination. Recommendations in this area were, however, expressed in vague language. There were no far-reaching proposals for reforming the UN-system in Agenda 21 as anticipated and hoped for by many since the need for such reforms was stressed in the report "Our Common Future", which was the guiding document for the UNCED process (Gordon, 1994).

A common understanding that decision-making costs do not exceed benefits seems to be limited. If calculating costs of decision-making can be made with traditional economic methods, it is not at the moment possible to calculate the benefits. Some economists are trying to develop methods to calculate the costs of environmental damage. Progress in the area is slow and methods tried so far are insufficient and muchcriticised. It appears to be rather impossible to reach a common understanding in detail in this area. What should be possible, is to agree that experience has shown, that preventive action is cheaper than mitigating action. It only depends on what time-frame the costs and benefits are calculated. The dominant theme of Agenda 21 is the challenge it raises for the unsustainable short-term economic growth patterns. The concept of sustainable development is in itself a sign of a switch to not ignoring effects for future generations.

Local communities have had to interact closely for centuries in cooperating for scarce resources. Close observance of each others behaviour and close reciprocal dependence which facilitates trust were developed over long periods. The global community is very young and has had little time to knit social bonds across the globe. A history of war and power struggles between states is not quickly erased from the memories of governments and peoples. Mutual trust and reciprocity is but slowly built by e.g. continuous interaction. Interaction between individuals and governments across the globe is growing on an unprecedented scale. So is the possibility for observing each others behaviour. Both processes are facilitated by new information and communication technology. Positive social forces towards a more just society are growing stronger (Huddleston, 1989), e.g. democracy and respect for human rights, which support the development of trust and reciprocity. In the preamble of the Rio Declaration it reads:

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...With the goal of establishing a new and equitable global partnership through the creation of new levels of cooperation among States, key sectors of society and people...Recognising the integral and interdependent nature of the Earth, our home.

In whose interest?The increased frequency of broad international summits in recent years, which have been open for many different groups of civil society as well as governments, shows that there is an understanding that the first step of solving global problems is reaching a common understanding of the problems and strategies for solving them. But clearly common understanding in the four areas discussed above at international level is not yet deep enough to lead to a substantial switch from independent to coordinated action.

A key element that is lacking for states to further common understanding, is that states do not perceive it to be in their own interest to act in coordinated ways, and "All decision-makers need a private reason for collective success" (Bromley, 1992:10). In this aspect the definition of governance by the Commission on Global Governance is interesting:

Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest (Commission on Global Governance, 1992:2)

Stronger governance relating to the global commons is accordingly dependent upon states perceiving this to be in their interest. If they do not, what could enhance their insight? Broadly speaking, I see two ways in which the latter might be realised:

(1) The state and its citizens are faced with more acute and visible negative effects, catastrophic in nature, resulting from continuous degradation of the global commons.

(2) States' perception of what consists a threat to their security are widened.

The first alternative is highly undesirable, but could very well become a reality if the second alternative is not consciously chosen by states. In the second alternative I see two possible approaches for attaining such

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a wider perception; their perception of what should be considered as threats to their security is widened and / or their perception of their area of responsibility is widened. These two approaches are discussed in the following two sections.

Expanding the concept of securityThe conventional meaning of security in international tradition has been the protection of the state from external attack. Yet in relation to military threats between countries, but in a more global context, the concept has been expanded to terms like: common security, collective security and comprehensive security (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). In the report from the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) the concept was widened to include ‘'environmental' security. Since then, several scientists have discussed environmental degradation as a source for violent conflict (Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Homer-Dixon, 1993).

There has also been criticism against using the same language for environmental security as for military security, with respect to the fundamental differences in several dimensions; diffuse threats vs. specific threats, enemy as ourselves vs. enemy as others, unintended harm vs. intended harm, long time scales vs. short time time-scales, common benefits vs. mainly zero sum benefits (Imber, 1994). Criticism of the expanded use of the security concept along this line however shows, that the picture has been too simplified. For example, environmental threats can cause a lot of harm in very short time-scales, and in an integrated world the enemy is both ourselves and all the 'others'. The most important argument against this criticism is the real and perceived danger environmental threats pose, to states and people.

Security can be defined as 'a secure condition or feeling'. Secure, according to the dictionary, can be read as 'untroubled by danger or fear'. People and states can fear for their survival from a potential rise of sea level could engulf the whole country, as much as they can fear the potential invasion from a hostile neighbour. When environmental threats pose as big a risk to human survival as nuclear war, the concept of 'planet security' becomes necessary (Commission on Global Governance, 1995).

There are other non-military threats that lead to further redefinition of the security concept. Today many people feel more insecure than ever despite living in states that are very secure from being attacked by neighbouring states. Poverty related diseases have actually lead to a

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rate of child mortality that exceeds the death rate of the Second World War (Imber, 1994). The ever augmenting gap between North and South, rich and poor, developed and developing, privileged and marginalised would, if it occurred within the border of a single country, "be recognised as the classic condition for a massive and probably violent revolution" (Childers and Urquhart, 1994:14). In other words, it would be seen as a major threat to national security. From this perspective, but more importantly from a fundamentally ethical standpoint, focus is shifting from states to people. The recently coined concept of 'people security' is gaining much attention (Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Kothari, 1995). Here the focus is individual humans' perceived security, based on human dignity. It is naturally connected to both planet or environmental security and conventional notions of security, since the main target will in all cases be individual humans with a reduced quality of life.

Expanding the areas of states' responsibility

The discussion on people and planet security leads to the central issue of the process of global change; the role of the nation-state and its sovereignty. The United Nations is built upon the concept of national sovereignty, it is an organization of collaboration at governmental level between fully independent states with responsibility only for their own territory and citizens. But today it is increasingly difficult for states to exercise full sovereignty over their internal affairs and it is evident that other actors in global civil society are gaining importance and influence in world affairs.

The global commons, it seems from the previous exploration of the CHM concept, have lead the way in challenging the salience of sovereignty. The principle of full national sovereignty does not seem to be realistic from a management perspective in a world where the behaviour of people affects the global commons no matter what country's name is stamped on the soil upon which they live. It could work if sovereignty entailed full responsibility in that the actions in ones own territory did not affect neighbour states. States seldom take such responsibility.

The fact that international negotiations for creating soft and hard law are taking place in continually increasing magnitude on environmental issues, and the global commons, points to countries asking for some kind of regulation or governance of their neighbours behaviour. If they want other countries to take action for the benefit of not only

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their own nation, but for all nations, it means that in the end they haveto accept such governance for their own country too.

The development of international law in the environmental realm affords ample demonstration of the situation of states holding on to the sovereignty principle, while acknowledging the ethical standpoint of the common responsibility of all states. Discussions on the global commons have also been widened to include other forms of natural resources that are found within the territory of states. The question has been raised as the responsibility of states not only to its own people but also to the rest of humanity.

Ethics and law as a basis for action

A culture of law

The discussions on a wider concept of security and greater responsibility of states to the rest of humanity leads to questions of moral principles as a basis for action. Moral and ethical issues lie at the very core of the process of creating a regime of effective governance of the global commons, much more so than at local level, the reason for this will be discussed:

If appropriates of a CPR regime have reached sufficient commonunderstanding to start acting in coordination, there are some further requirements for the regime to work well. These have mostly been described for local level (Ostrom, 1990). There is a needfor example, for some mutual coercion, such as monitoring and sanctions, so that each appropiiator can feel assured that free-riding behaviour will nearly always be discovered and punished. Those choosing to follow the rules do not risk becoming suckers. I call this a need for the 'rule of law' in a CPR regime. Generally speaking there are different kinds of such a 'rule of law'. Laws can be formal, expressed in judicial terms and supported by the enforcement apparatus of the state. Laws can also be informal, originating in the community and enforced through pure social pressure.

Transferring this conclusion to a CPR regime for the global commons implies a call for the rule of law at global level. There are only rudimentary elements of an international legal system, there is no legislative assembly the International Court of Justice is only legitimate in the eyes of a minority of states, and there are very limited possibilities for law enforcement. Although 'social pressure' on states from the 'world public opinion' and other states exists and can not be seen as negligible it

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does not constitute enough pressure. Governing the global commons without a world government empowered to enforce the law, implies depending largely on ethically motivated behaviour from states. Without law enforcement, compliance to international treaties or soft law is dependent upon the goodwill of states. The Commission on Global Governance (1995) formulates it as "The emerging global neighbourhood needs to live by a new ethic that is underpinned by a culture of law" (p. 331).

Why is there a need for moral values to change the behaviour of states and people? To quote the Commission on Global Governance: "People have to see with new eyes and understand with new minds before they can truly turn to new ways of living." (p. 47).

A global ethic

What changes the eyes and minds of people so that they take responsibility for the effects of their actions, whether they appear locally or globally, today or tomorrow? What does an ethical foundation of global governance look like? Do we have universal norms to build a culture of law on? All values, incorporated in the UN Charter and the Declaration on Human Rights, can really be derived from the golden rule of the major religious traditions of the world. This is the rule which in different variations of formulation reads as "...people should treat others as they would wish to be treated..." (Commission on Global Governance, 1995:49). The golden rule should not be confined to relations between governments and people, as is the case in the UN Charter and the Declaration on Human Rights, but needs to be upheld by all citizens of the world. Indeed, rights do not exist by mere passive allegiance to their existence. Rights are created by fulfilment of obligations. The fundamental obligation necessary for promoting human rights has already been phrased as the golden rule. In the same way as true liberty is only possible with other peoples liberty ending where our own starts, human rights are only viable as long as they do not infringe on the rights of our neighbours. The same logic is valid for the protection of the environment and the provision of secure livelihoods for people.

Recognising the fact that the proposed Economic Security Council have to work on the foundation of universally accepted principles of global environmental governance, the Commission sees one of the first tasks for the Council as being to "...ensure a global adoption of an Earth Charter..." (ibid. 217). Several NGOs and governments are already working on the formulation of such a Charter that could not be agreed upon atUNCED.

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Reaching a common understanding of a global ethic for behaviour relating to the global commons, and the environment in general, can be seen as the fundamental requirement for reaching a common understanding in the other four areas discussed earlier. Ethical principles can guide decision-makers who face high degrees of uncertainties in problem description and guide them in choosing strategies for coordinated action. Ethical principles can also guide decision-makers in the process of calculating the costs and benefits of coordinated action and guide them in developing trust among each other.

Summary and concluding remarks

The global commons have been subject to unsucessful efforts of management intended to create some form of restricted common property regime. In this paper I argue that elements of the theory developed for reaching successful local CPR regimes can give interesting insights when applied at global level. The exercise brings central issues for managing the resources in focus. It also gives indications of the role the United Nations need to play in this context. The conclusions are far-reaching, and reveal the necessity for new levels of partnership between states and people, if coordinated action to protect the global commons is to be achieved. It has not been the intention to consider the feasability of creating a switch towards such coordinated action, merely to indicate the measures necessary.

Discussions on stronger global governance are vital for managing the global commons. Those physical areas that belong to no state need to be managed to escape the fate of complete degeneration. I have argued that the only plausible solution is collective governance of the family of nations. In the present world order, the United Nations is the organization available to carry out such collective governance. To realise the latter, some thorough changes to the UN system are required, e.g. in the areas of coordination. Reform efforts in this area alone however, will not suffice. An environment encouraging cooperative behaviour is needed at global level and the international community would be well-served learning from local cultures characterised by this. The anarchical international system striving for governance without government, will have to rely more heavily on actions based on ethical principles, if it is to achieve a culture of law at global level and establish a successful management regime for the global commons.

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Note

1 The UN ambassador of Malta that first spelled out the 'common heritage of mankind' concept in the General Assembly in 1967 in connection with discussions on the use of the deep seabed. The resulting resolution2749 (XXV) on the topic was endorsed in 1971 and part of it reads "The seabed and ocean floor, and the sub-soil thereof, beyona the limits of national jurisdiction as well as the resources of the area are the common heritage of mankind".

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Berkes, F. & Farvar, M. T. 1989. "Introduction and Overview". In F. Berkes (ed.), Common Property Resources, Ecology and community-based sustainable development, pp. 1-17. London: Belhaven Press.

Bromley, D. W. 1992. "The Commons, Property, and Common-Property Regimes", in D. W. Bromley (ed.), Making the Commons Work - Theory, Practice and Policy, pp. 3-16. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.

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Huddleston, J. 1989. The Search for a Just Society. Oxford: George Ronald.Imber, M. F.1994. Environment, Security and UN Reform. New York: St. Martin's

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Publications from EPOS

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Monographs

Approaching Nature from Local Communities: Security perceived and achieved (ed. A. Hjort-af-Omas, 1996) ISBN91-7871-821-X

The Environment and International Security(ed. A. Hjort-af-Omas & S. Lodgaard, 1992) ISBN 91-506-0932-7

The Environment and Free Trade (eds. AM Bengtsson & A. Hjort- af-Omas & J. Lundqvist & J. Rudengren, 1994) ISBN 91-506-1038-8

Security in African Drylands(ed. A. Hjort-af-Omas, 1992) ISBN 91-506-0891-6

African River Basins and Dryland Crises (ed. M.B.K. Darkoh, 1992) ISBN 91-506-0908-4

The Multi-purpose Camel: Interdisciplinary studies on pastoral production in Somalia (ed. A. Hjort-af-Omas, 1993)ISBN 91-506-1009-0

Somali Pastoral Work Songs (A.C. Abokor, 1993)ISBN 91-506-0936X

The Milk of the Boswellia Forests: Frankincense productionamong the pastoral Somali(A.Y. Farah, 1994) ISBN 91-506-1010-4

Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: Human and ecological consequences of warfare (ed. T. Tvedt, 1993) ISBN 91-506-0972-6

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Livelihoods from Resorce Flows: Awareness and contextualanalysis of environmental conflictPapers presented at the conference published electronically in:http://www.tema.liu.se/epos/l_h.htmConference Abstracts, 1996, ISBN 91-7871-824-4

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Research Reports ISSN 1104-4403

1. The Fall of the Forest Villages: Ecological and cultural conflicts in the Russian taiga (A. Lehtinen, 1993) ISBN 91-506-1023-6

2. Household Energy Consumption Behaviour in a Pre-Saharan Small Town in Morocco (A. Najib, 1993) ISBN 91-506-1024-4

3. Decentralisation and Transformation. Alternative approaches for decentralising assessment (I. Christoplos, 1994)ISBN 91-506-1058-9

4. The Role of Indigenous Range Management Knowledge for Desertification Control in Northern Kenya (G. Oba, 1994)ISBN 91-506-1079-1

5. Perspectives on Environment, State and Civil Society. The Arctic in transition (J. Kakonen, 1994) ISBN 91-506-1080-5

6. Representation, Poverty and PRA in the Mekong Delta (I. Christoplos, 1995) ISBN 91-7871-656-X

7. Ethnic Minorities and the State. Conflicting interests between shifting cultivators and governments in Peru and Vietnam(M. Lundberg, 1996) ISBN 91-7871-819-8

8. Ephemeral Rivers in the Tropics. Hydrological processes and water resources assessment and management: A review and pathfinder (K. Sandstrom, 1997) ISBN 91-7871-987-9

9. Managing Common Resources in Local and Global Systems: Applying theory across the scales (ed. S. Karlsson, 1997)ISBN 91-7871-988-7

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EPOS is an acronym for Environmental Policy and Society, an interdisciplinary research network. It started in 1991 with exploratory research within five subprogrammes: (1) The Environment and International Securities; (2) Environment and Dryland Securities; (3) Environment, Trade and Development; (4) Livelihoods from Resource Flows; and (5) Local Conceptual Models for Environmental Change. The common feature highlighting these programmes is their concentration, from different angles, around key issues related to societal impact analyses of environmental policy change. Local, national and global institutions' relations to material and non-material resources appear central, as well as studies on concept formulation, conceptual models and institutionalising of environmental questions. The findings lead to increasing attention paid to political processes. The formation of a comprehensive security concept with both conceptual models and established institutions among the prerequisites appear central. The main research focus is on the conflicting interests and demands which occur in competition for material and non-material resources both within and between communities at different levels; local, regional, national and global.

EPOS is built upon a network structure with research groups in Linkoping University, Uppsala University and Stockholm School of Economics. Within the framework of Environment and Dryland Securities EPOS has sub-projects with research co-operation in the Eastern African countries (through Nairobi University and OSSREA, Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern Africa, in Addis Abeba).

Activities are financed by FRN (Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research) and Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency). Professor Anders Hjort-af-Omas is the Programme Director.

For more information, please contact the secretariat at:

EPOSInstitute of Tema ResearchLinkoping UniversityS-58183 Linkoping SWEDENTel: +46-13-284420Fax: +46-13-284415E-mail: [email protected]: http: / / www.tema.liu.se / epos

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