FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - World Bank...MAVIM Mahila Arthik Vikas Mahamandal MELTRON Maharashtra...

Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 19218

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

INDIA

MAHARASHTRA EMERGENCY EARTHQUAKE REHABILITATION PROJECT

(CREDIT 2594-IN)

June 14, 1999

Infrastructure Sector UnitSouth Asia Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bankauthorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

-_-

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit Indian Rupee (Rs.)AppraisalYear (1994)US$1.00 = Rs. 31.00Intervening Years US$1.00 = Rs. 34.70Completion Year (1998) US$1.00 = Rs. 41.22

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 foot = 0.3048 meters1 mile = 1.6093 kilometers1 square foot = 0.0929 square meters

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CIG Central Implementation GroupDE Deputy EngineerDMIS Disaster Management Information SystemDRC District Resource CenterDST Department of Science and TechnologyGOI Government of IndiaGOM Government of MaharashtraHUDCO Housing and Urban Development CorporationIMD India Meteorological DepartmentJR Junior EngineerMAVIM Mahila Arthik Vikas MahamandalMELTRON Maharashtra Electronics CorporationMRSAC Maharashtra Remote Sensing Applications CenterNGO Non Governmental OrganizationPMU Project Management UnitR&S Repair and StrengtheningSE Superintending EngineerSPARC Society for Promotion of Area Resources CentersTISS Tata Institute of Social SciencesUNCHS United Nations Center for Human SettlementsUNDP United Nations Development ProgramVLC Village Level Committee

FISCAL YEARApril 1 - March 31

Vice President: Mieko NishimizuCountry Director: Edwin R. LimSector Manager: Frannie HumplickTask Leader: Jelena Pantelic

- II -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TABLE OF CONTENTSPage No.

PREFACE

EVALUATION SUMMARY.

PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENTA. Background ................................................................ 1B. Evaluation and Achievement of Objectives ................................ ................... 5C. Major Factors Affecting the Project .............................................................. 6D. Project Sustainability ............................................................... 9E. IDA Performance ................................................................ 0F. Borrower Performance ............................................................... 11G. Assessment of Outcome ............................................................... 11H. Future Operation ............................................................... 13I. Key Lessons Learned and Photographs of Project ......................................... 14

PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXTable 1: Summary of Assessment .18Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credit .19Table 3: Project Timetable .20Table 4: Credit Disbursement: Estimated and Actual .20Table 5A: Performance Indicators .21Table 5B: Key Indicators for Project Implementation .22Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Oper'ation .23Table 7: Studies Included in Project .24Table 8A: Project Costs .25Table 8B: Project Financing .26Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits .26Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants .27Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements .28Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs .28Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions .29

APPENDICES:A. Mission's Aide Memoire with Plan for Future Operations ............................. 30B. Borrower's Evaluation.

B-1. Government of Maharashtra .......................................................... 42B-2. Government of India-Department of Science and Technology ........ 54

MAP: IBRD 25479R1

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.


INDIA

MAHARASHTRA EMERGENCY EARTHQUAKE REHABILITATIONPROJECT

(CREDIT 2594-IN)

PREFACE

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Maharashtra EmergencyEarthquake Rehabilitation Project, for which Credit 2594-IN in the amount of SDR 177 million(US$ 246 million equivalent) was approved on March 31, 1994 and made effective on June 27,1994. SDR 21.0 million (about US$30,235,170.00 equivalent) of projected savings from theCredit was canceled in December 16, 1996. This was an emergency investment operation.

TheBritish Government provided co-financing in the sum ofUK£10 million. An additionalUK£5 million were made available in parallel through the former British Overseas DevelopmentAdministration, now Department for International Development (DFID) to assist projectimplementation. The Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Development Program(UNDP) contributed parallel assistance of US$600,000 each, to support project implementation.

The Credit closed on December 31, 1998, after two extensions totaling one and a half years.The Credit was fully disbursed, and the final disbursement of US$78,921.05 was made on March3 1999. The UK£LO million co-financing was disbursed during the first year of the project.

The project team comprising Jelena Pantelic (SASIN), Chandra Godavitarne and AllysonThirkell (Consultants) prepared the ICR. A separate external consultant, Sati Achath, traveled toMaharashtra, visited the field, had discussions with stakeholders to make an independentassessment and prepared a report, the contents of which have been incorporated into this ICR.The ICR was reviewed by: Ms. Frannie Humplick (Sector Manager, Infrastructure Sector Unit,South Asia Region), Richard Beardmore (Team Leader, India Urban and Water), Mr. RobertPanfil (SASIN-Quality Assurance), and Peer Reviewers: Ms. Alcira Kreimer (TWUGL), EugeneMcCarthy (LCSFP), Ms. Marjorie Greene, (Special Events Coordinator, Earthquake EngineeringResearch Institute, California), and Miha Tomazevic (Director, Slovenian Building Research andCivil Engineering Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia). The Borrower provided comments on the ICR,assisted in the preparation of the statistical information, and provided evaluations that are includedin the Appendix B. The co-financing agency (DFID) was provided a copy of this report forcomment. In addition, Irene Christy, SASIN, provided active support in the preparation of thereport.

Preparation of this ICR was begun during the Bank's final supervision/completion missionin November 1998. It is based on a review of the Memorandum and Recommendation of thePresident and Technical Annex, the legal documents, supervision reports and project files, as wellas field visits and discussions with representatives of beneficiaries, non-governmental agencies,field project staff, officials of the Project Management Unit, implementing agencies, and projectconsultants.

-i-


INDIA


(CREDIT 2594-IN)

Evaluation Summary

Project Objectives

1. Objectives of the project were to: (i) assist with rehabilitation and reconstruction in theearthquake affected areas (restoration of assets and basic services), (ii) increase the earthquakeresistance of buildings and infrastructure through the development of improved standards fordesign and construction, and (iii) develop the ability of the Government of Maharashtra (GOM) torespond more effectively to natural disasters, including earthquakes. An additional projectobjective was to improve scientific monitoring and the research capability of the Government ofIndia (GOI) in order to improve scientific knowledge of seismic activity in the Peninsular Shieldof India.

Implementation Experience and Results

2. Project implementation experience was highly rewarding, especially because of thechallenges faced during this process. The project provided all stakeholders new experiences, andthe opportunity to: adopt new management methods and implementation strategies, fully delegateadministrative and financial powers to the project unit, develop partnerships with NGO's andbeneficiaries, address gender issues relating to women, and utilize the expertise of private sectorconsultants.

3. Despite the challenges encountered, the GOM's rehabilitation program was successfullyimplemented. The results are: restoration of housing for 225,000 families; repair andreconstruction of infrastructure facilities including roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, orphanagesand civic amenities; restoration of economic assets lost; preparation and dissemination ofGuidelines and Manual for Non-Engineered Masonry Construction; implementation of a statewidedisaster management plan; and full disbursement of the Credit. A small component to restoremonuments component was cut back due to problems related to management by the concernedimplementing department.

4. The GOI's seismic strengthening component (costing US$8 million) was substantiallycompleted with procurement of modern seismic equipment which were installed in the monitoringstations in the Indian Peninsular Shield, and setting up of a National Seismological Data Center.However, the GOI Department of Science and Technology has placed restrictions on free accessto data by researchers.

H ii -

5. A majority of the challenges stemmed from continuing disagreements, disputes, andlitigation, over damage assessment. The number of complaints totaled about 7 percent of thenumber of beneficiaries, and about 2 percent was redressed. These included complaints regardingbuildings allegedly not surveyed despite two surveys, and the survey categorization, in thebeneficiary's view, not consistent with the extent of damage. Even partially damaged unoccupiedhouses deteriorated rapidly, and some of the claims were difficult to substantiate. Since thefinancial benefit was linked to the damage category, there was considerable pressure frombeneficiaries to change to categories with a larger entitlement. The second major challenge wasthe mobilization about 200,000 families to undertake their own housing repair and reconstructionactivities. The task of motivating and informing beneficiaries to repair and strengthen houses, andto use new building methods was a time-consuming exercise,, which took nearly two years to getinto full swing. The final challenge arose from the communities' involvement and interest insupervision of construction in the relocation villages. This resulted in slowing down constructionworks, interference with contractors, and on one occasion, closing down the site for over eightmonths.

Project Sustainability

6. The ownership of new houses constructed (about 70 percent of project cost) is withindividual families. The beneficiaries place a high value on their new houses, have alreadycommenced extensions, and will maintain them as necessary. The GOM plans to create a DisasterManagement Unit in the Department of Rehabilitation of GOM as a permanent unit, along withspecialist staff to operate the satellite communications network and disaster managementinformation system (DMIS), and has made budget provision for these operations for FY00. TheCenter for Disaster Management at the Yashwantrao Chavan Academy for DevelopmentAdministration (YASHADA), which coordinated the preparation of the response plans for 25districts, will be strengthened to be the primary training center in disaster management. TheGOM will make annual budget provisions for maintenance of the new off-site infrastructureconstructed, under its normal maintenance budget. The capacity of the local governments (ZillaParishads/Gram Panchayats) to operate and maintain the physical infrastructure and the watersupply system would depend on their ability to enhance resources and provide staff for operations.This is not certain, although the new houses have been registered and levy of land taxes andproperty taxes can begin. As these are yet to begin, and are dependent on the political will of thelocal governments, sustainability of these assets is not certain at this stage. The GOI will makeannual budget provision for maintenance of the seismic monitoring facilities set up as part of theproject.

Key Factors Affecting Achievement of Major Objectives

7. The GOM successfully overcame the project implementation challenges and achieved allproject objectives. Sustained achievement of these objectives in the future would be affected by:(i) the non-adoption of earthquake resistant features in house construction in this earthquake-prone region; and (ii) the lack of capacity in the local governments to enforce building regulations,and operate and maintain assets created. The unwillingness by the GOI agencies to share datawith other researchers is unlikely to achieve the objective of advancing scientific knowledge of

* iii -

seismicity in the region.

IDA Performance

8. IDA responded to the Government's request for assistance within two weeks of theearthquake. Project approval took about five months as a number of issues relating to damageassessment, project management and strategy for implementation took some time to develop andagree. IDA staff worked closely with the GOM throughout the project.

Borrower Performance

9. Performance by the GOM has been consistently pro-active and of high caliber. The GOM:(i) actively engaged beneficiaries and NGOs in project planning and implementation; (ii) appointedcapable and experienced staff and consultants for project implementation and management; (iii)provided funds as required; (iv) successfully managed to resist public and legal demands to changethe scope of the project; (v) developed the strategy for the repair and strengthening componentafter much consultation and study, although the task took about two years; and (vi) stopped thedisruptive transfers of District Collectors, whose continued leadership was essential forimplementation of the repair and strengthening component. Performance by the Department ofScience and Technology (DST) and agencies it coordinated was reasonably satisfactory.

Project Outcome

10. The main project outcome has been the successful completion of repair and reconstructionof 225,000 homes for nearly one million people affected by the earthquake, in one of the largestrehabilitation projects (costing about US$348 million) implemented in a period of four and a halfyears. Specific project outcomes include: (i) preparation and use of simple and effective guidelinesfor earthquake-resistant features for non-engineered masonry construction; (ii) construction of28,000 new houses in 52 relocation villages; (iii) repair, reconstruction and strengthening of about197,000 houses under the repair and strengthening (R&S) component; (iv) repair andreconstruction of roads, bridges, irrigation structures, water supply systems, civic amenities, andsocial infrastructure; (v) replacement of economic assets lost in the earthquake; (vi) mobilizationof beneficiaries and community-based organizations and NGOs as partners in implementation;(vii) implementation of a statewide multi hazard disaster management system including a GIS-based disaster management information system, a modern VHF and V-SAT communications todeal with disasters, to undertake mitigation measures and reduce future losses; (viii) creating acadre of highly experienced officials in Maharashtra with experience in improved projectmanagement systems; and (ix) implementation of measures to empower women (home ownershipfor widows, joint property titles, revolving fund, etc.).

11. The project has been nominated for the United Nations (UN)-Sasakawa Award in DisasterPrevention, and has been selected by United Nations Center for Human Settlements (UNCHS)HABITAT as one of the best 100 projects in human settlement.

- iv -

Summary of Findings and Future Operation Plans

12. Overall, the performance by the GOM exceeded expectations, and the rehabilitationprogram of the GOM has been successfully completed. A number of innovative projectimplementation procedures and management systems were adopted. The GOM, communities,NGOs and consultants developed a collaborative partnership for project implementation. TheCredit has been fully disbursed. GOM has prepared a satisfactory plan for future operation.However, the local governments (Zilla Parishads/Gram Panchayats) are weak, and woulddepend on the GOM for support to operate and maintain facilities created under the project.

13. The GOI Department of Science and Technology (DST) functioning as the umbrella agencyfor a number of research and service agencies completed most of the seismic monitoring andresearch component. GOI has not agreed to share data from the National Seismological DataCenter with other researchers. The DST is expected to budget funds for operation andmaintenance of the facilities created.

Key Lessons Learned for Future Projects

14. Key lessons learned are: (i) long-term disaster management planning and managementshould form part of the Bank assistance strategy for emergency rehabilitation projects; (ii) damageassessment criteria should be: appropriate for local conditions, include fewer categories,technically specific, widely publicized, and without room for different interpretations; (iii)importance of ownership of solutions by potential beneficiaries to ensure sustainability; (iv) thedesirability of partnership of government, beneficiaries, community-based women's organizationsand NGOs to ensure sustainable development; (v) the need for economic and social rehabilitationas well as long-term disaster management and planning; (vi) demonstration that projectimplementation can be assured through a fully empowered project management unit withcompetent leadership; (vii) the need to address capacity of local governments and impact onsustainability, and a long-term approach to maintenance and maintenance funding, and (viii)project design for emergency projects should allow for a longer project period than the typicalthree years for developing and implementing disaster management systems.


INDIA


(CREDIT 2594-IN)

PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

A. Background Statement and Evaluation of Objectives

Background

1. The State. Maharashtra is the third largest state both in terms of land area (309,000 squarekilometers) and population (79,000,000). It is India's most heavily industrialized state with thehighest percentage (35.7%) of state revenues contributed by the industrial sector and a relativelylow percentage coming from the agricultural sector. The region where the earthquake occurred isagricultural with primary crops of mustard, sunflower, sugar cane, and grapes.

2. The Earthquake. A series of earthquakes of magnitude of about of 6.4 on the Richter scalestruck the southeastern region of Maharashtra at 3.56 AM on September 30, 1993. The epicenterwas near the village of Killari located in the Latur district, about 300 miles south east of Mumbai.A number of aftershocks followed, and since then, tremors have been felt in the region, includinga tremor of magnitude of about 3.4 on the Richter scale in December 1997.

. -The earthquake severely affected 67 villages in the districts of Latur and Osmanabad whereabout 8,000 people were killed and 16,000 were injured. Considerable damage also took place ineleven other districts including Satara. In total, approximately 225,000 houses were destroyed ordamaged, and more than 58,000 families were left homeless.

4. The deaths were mainly caused by collapse of old traditional village houses that were of anextremely heavy construction. Typically, the walls were 4 -5 feet thick and made of small stoneboulders (about 1 ft. nominal size) and bonded with dirt/clay. The stones were irregular in shape,therefore having relatively little binding and bearing capacity. The roofs were constructed withwooden beams and a light framing covered with 1-2 ft. of dirt. During the quake, the wallsshattered and the heavy roofs collapsed, crushing the sleeping residents below. It is reported thatapproximately 2.5 million houses of the same type of construction still exist in this region.

5. Apart from extensive damage to public buildings, especially school buildings, damage alsooccurred to roads, bridges, water towers, electricity and telecommunication systems.

6. Seismicity of the Regioni. The northern portion of the Indian sub-continent is earthquake-prone, and the causes of seismicity are well understood. However, seismicity in the relatively

- 2 -

stable crust of the Indian Peninsular Shield are less clearly understood. Some faults that in thepast had been associated with seismic events were weil demarcated, while the presence of otherscould only be inferred. Although smaller tremors have been registered in this region, availablerecords show relatively long periods of no earthquake activity, alternating with short periods ofgreater earthquake activity. A previous major earthquake in this region occurred on September13, 1967, of magnitude 6.5 on the Richter scale, near Koyna dam in the Satara District ofMaharashtra. Some scientists speculate a correlation between the increase in frequency andintensity of tremors and the reservoir filling that began in 1962.

7. The Killari earthquake of September 30, 1993, was the largest earthquake to have beenrecorded in the region covering Latur and Osmanabad districts, and one of the most devastatingearthquakes of its kind. For a year and a half prior to this date, the region had been experiencingmore pronounced seismic activity.

8. Soil Conditions. Although the region is arid with summer temperatures of 45 degreesCentigrade, the soil is fertile arJd productive. These fertile lands adjacent to the rivers arecomprised of expansive clayey soils (black cotton soil) up to seven feet thick in places.

9. Social and C'ultulral Con7text. The communities in the region have extended families withmarried sons living in the same complex. As families grow, houses are expanded to accommodatethe new sub-families. Houses have small decorative entrances, rooms to entertain visitors next tothe entrance, and rooms built around a courtyard in the rear, which provides privacy for women.These communities are male-dominated, and hereditary rights pass on only to male members offamilies.

10. IDA Response. The Bank fielded a reconnaissance mission within ten days of theearthquake. The framework for damage assessment and other project preparation steps werediscussed and quickly agreed.

11. Bank Approach to Project Preparationi. Based on the findings of a larger mission inNovember 1993, the following elements were considered necessary to develop an appropriaterehabilitation program: (i) participation of beneficiaries to ensure ownership and enhancesustainability; (ii) a clear and technically specific damage assessment to limit political pressures toexpand the program; (iii) simple earthquake-resistant features for non-engineered masonryconstruction that could be adopted and applied by the villagers; (iv) the use of locally availablebuilding material as much as possible; (v) a policy for rehabilitation, and a framework for anefficient project implementation that was to be agreed before project approval; (vi) grievanceredressal measures to ensure fair play and transparency; (vii) consideration of the plight ofwidows who became destitute due to traditional lack of hereditary rights; and (viii) introductionof disaster management as part of the government's long-termi strategy for disaster mitigation andloss reduction.

12. Perceptions of the Affected Persotns. The design of the rehabilitation program was, to adegree, influenced by government decisions, social and cultural considerations, and someprejudices. These were: (i) the scale and circumstances of the deaths that occurred; (ii) theperception that 'stone kills' and hence could not be used again for building; (iii) the belief that

- 3 -

black cotton soil was the cause of house collapses, hence new houses had to be built on hard soils;(iv) families so traumatized that they would not even sleep inside the new houses for a while; (v)choice of light-weight but climatically unsuitable galvanized iron sheets for roofing in rehabilitatedhouses; (vi) while stone was not used in re-construction, an oveiwhelming preference developedfor brick which is not widely available in the area; (vii) community preference for moving enmnasse to firm ground where there was no black cotton soil, (viii) preference for framed reinforcedconcrete structures similar to some houses of this type that were constructed by localcharities/business houses prior to the Bank-assisted project; and (ix) the belief that traditionalvillage layouts had to be 'modernized' to grid layouts akin to urban areas.

13. Commitment Made by the Government. Before the Bank commenced discussions on therehabilitation program, the Government of Maharashtra (GOM) had agreed to: reconstruct allhouses that were destroyed, relocate all villages located on black cotton soil; construct about25,000 temporary shelters of galvanized iron sheets with about 400 square feet for each family;and allocate about 10 villages to local business houses, national and international charities forreconstruction of whole villages wilth the only requirement that three house types of 250 squarefeet, 400 square feet and 750 square feet be constructed.

14. Framework for Project Fornulation. The Bank project set a number of principles forproject formulation: (i) damage assessment criteria based on the International Association ofEarthquake Engineering (IAEE); (ii) criteria for relocation of villages eni masse, thus limiting thenumber of villages to be relocated to 52; (iii) simple earthquake resistance features for newconstruction and for strengthening of damaged houses; (iv) community participation as a formalprocess for project implementation, through consultations with individual communities on siteselection, village layouts, house designs, and plot allocations, and promoting Village LevelCommittees (VLC) for monitoring of construction, plot allocation and maintenance of assetscreated; (v) NGOs participation in project activities including dissemination of information andtraining, to assist beneficiaries in the construction of their houses, and to demonstrate the use ofavailable local material for reconstruction; (vi) quality assurance through independent consultants;(vii) special measures to empower women through joint ownership of properties, specialprograms for skills training, and a self help credit organization for women; (viii) programs to carefor orphans through construction of orphanages; and (ix) social and economic rehabilitation ofbeneficiaries.

15. The Project. As formulated at appraisal, project components included: (a)for the State ofMaharashtra (i) reconstruction of 52 new villages including 28,000 new houses and associatedinfrastructure; (ii) repair and strengthening of 211,000 houses that were partially damaged, ofwhich approximately 30,000 were to be re-built in situ; (iii) pilot. strengthening of 5,000undamaged but vulnerable houses to demonstrate strengthening techniques; (iv) construction of500 model houses to demonstrate construction with earthquake resistant features; (v) restorationof infrastructure such as roads, bridges, buildings, water supply, and monuments; (vi) economicrehabilitation of families who lost their economic means of livelihood, such as livestock andartisan kits; (vii) social rehabilitation through construction/repair of schools, hostels for women,orphanages, creches for children, district resource centers for women, and hospitals; (viii)preparation and implementation of a statewide disaster management plan for Maharashtra; and (b)for Government of India, implemented through the Department of Science and Technology

-4 -

(DST): (i) a seismic monitoring and research component to upgrade seismic monitoring facilitiesin the Indian Peninsular Shield, and (ii) setting up a National Seismological Data Center to receivereal time information of seismic activity, and to make data available on-line to all researchers, toimprove scientific knowledge on seismicity in the region.

16. InstitutionalArrangements. The following institutional arrangements were put in place forproject implementation and management: (i) a Rehabilitation Policy, Project Implementation Planand Project Management Plan approved by the GOM Cabinet; (ii) a Project Management Unitwith all Cabinet powers delegated to the Project Director, thus creating an autonomous unit withthe necessary administrative and financial powers; (iii) the Central Implementation Group headedby the Chief Secretary of the State to coordinate and monitor project activities; (iv) a projectmanagement and monitoring system supported by project management consultants; (v)consultants to carry out social mobilization, assure beneficiary participation, and design andsupervise the relocation villages; (vi) private sector consultants for project implementation,management and monitoring; (vii) the District Administration headed by District Collectors fullyresponsible for implementation of the repair strengthening (R&S) program, including proceduresfor transfer of cash installments, setting up materials stores and financial controls at the Districtlevel; (viii) about 700 engineers to manage the repair and strengthening program; (ix) NGO'sassigned a formal role to take part in the rehabilitation program; (x) procedures for beneficiariesto make decisions on planning and overseeing of implementation, including creation of VillageLevel Committees to play a key participatory role; (xi) a voice for communities and NGOs indecision-making regarding design and construction works in the large and complex owner-drivenrepair and strengthening component; (xii) a Disaster Mitigation Council headed by the ChiefSecretary of Maharashtra and preparation of a disaster management plan for the state; and (xiii) athree-tier grievance redressal mechanism starting with the Village Level Committee, the DistrictCollector, and finally, the Project Director of the Project Management Unit (PMU).

17. Environment. The project was classified as Category B. Overall, the project had a positiveenvironment impact. In respect of each of the new relocation village, the GOM prepared anenvironmental statement prior to commencement of physical planning, and consultations with thecommunities. In the case of only one village (Makni), located in a disused quarry, seriousenvironmental concerns arose regarding its suitability for housing development due to thelikelihood of water logging and lack of adequate drainage. Mitigation measures including majorearthworks to grade and landscape the site, retaining walls and drainage were implemented priorto commencement of construction.

18. The Government of India's program for strengthening seismic monitoring and research wascoordinated by the Department of Science and Technology (DST), and implemented by aconsortium of research institutes. The largest of these were the National Geophysical ResearchInstitute (NGRI), Hyderabad, and the India Meteorology Department (IMD). An InternationalAdvisory Committee was set up to advise on technical matters and a National Steering Committeewas also set up under the Secretary of Science and Technology, GOI. Procurement of equipmentunder this component was carried out by two of the larger agencies under the DST umbrella.

- -

B. Evaluation and Achievement of Objectives

19. Evaluation of Project Objectives. Project objectives were to assist GOM in therehabilitation and reconstruction of earthquake affected areas, formulation of earthquake resistantfeatures for building construction, and development of a long-term disaster management plan; andto assist the Government of India to strengthen its capacity for seismic monitoring and research.The first objective was appropriate considering the severity of the earthquake that causedconsiderable loss of life, and damage to property. The second objective of developing earthquakeresistant features for buildings was an essential pre-requisite, as the Marathwada region hascontinued to experience seismic activity, and has over 2.5 million vulnerable houses of similarconstruction that caused heavy casualties. The third objective of long-term disaster managementwas essential for a state that has frequent natural disasters due to floods, droughts and, recentincreased seismic activity. Two critical decisions that should have featured prominently in projectformulation are: sharing of seismological data with all researchers to advance scientificknowledge, and cost sharing for rehabilitation as full grant programs are not affordable norsustainable.

20. Achievement of Objectives. All project objectives relating to the GOM component havebeen achieved: (i) Rehabilitation and recon7struction has been achieved with the completion of therepair, strengthening and construction of 225,000 houses, public and community infrastructure,and social rehabilitation programs. A small component of monuments repair was only partiallycompleted. Completion of a small number of houses and commissioning of communicationsfacilities are expected by June 1999 (ii) Improved earthquake resistance of buildings has beenachieved through simple and effective earthquake resistant features introduced in all construction,with wide acceptance and use by beneficiaries, and the training of about 7,000 artisans in theearthquake-resistant building technology. The Government of Maharashtra (GOM) will ensurethat local governments (Zilla Parishads and Gram Panchayats) enforce these requirements infuture building construction in the earthquake-prone areas. (iii) Capacity building to respondmore effectively to manage fuiture natural disasters was achieved through setting up a modemdisaster management apparatus in the state, and assisting the Government of India to strengthenits capability to undertake more effective seismic monitoring and research. The GOM's disastermanagement plan, financed by the GOM, the Credit and the UK Government's Department forInternational Development (DFID), comprises vulnerability and risk analysis methodology, stateand district plans, GIS-based Disaster Management Information System (DMIS) for all districts at1:250,000 scale and six districts at 50,000 scale, an emergency operations center in stateheadquarters, control rooms in all divisional and district headquarters, intra-district VHF networkfor the entire state and inter-district V-SAT and e-mail network for the entire state. At the GOIlevel, the project provided high technology equipment to improve seismic monitoring and datacollection, and research. Sharing of data from the National Seismological Data Center with otherresearchers is unlikely to occur due to the reluctance by DST to share information.

21. A number of factors contributed to the achievement of project objectives. These included:(i) the project management and implementation framework which provided for an autonomousProject Management Unit with financial and administrative powers fully delegated to the ProjectDirector, having jurisdiction over a number of implementing departments; (ii) continuous qualityassurance and technical audit carried out by independent consultants reporting to the Project

- 6 -

Director on quality issues, asset verification, and meeting program objectives; (iii) the extensiveuse of private sector specialist consultants; (iv) the implementation strategy that includedparticipation by beneficiaries, community-based women's organizations and non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) in project planning monitoring, construction, construction supervision,information dissemination and facilitation; (v) development, dissemination and use of simple andeffective technology for earthquake resistant construction of dwellings; and (vi) the commitmentand support of the political leadership.

22. The nature and scale of participation within communities was unprecedented in this largeand complex rehabilitation project, and has led to the building of social capital withincomrnunities, such as mahila mandals, Village Level Committees (VLC) and community-basedorganizations. Most importantly, it allowed women to participate in administrative structures(especially in the R&S program), where they maintained close contact with village level groups,taluka officials, NGOs and junior engineers to facilitate implementation, report on progress andpotential problems, and to provide feedback on achievement of project objectives. Participation ofthese social groups helped improve structures of accountability, greater dialogue, and contributedto good governance at the local level.

23. The Mahila Mandals (community-based women's organizations) were inducted through asocial development consultant - SPARC (Society for Promotion of Areas Resource Centers), toassist in the R&S program in the following manner: (1) SPARC supported the formation ofMahila Mandals, and briefed them on their proposed role; (ii) Mahila Mandals establishedcontact with community leaders; (iii) Mahila Mandals recruited Samvad Sahayaks (villagevolunteers) from the same villages, and advised the District Collector, who would reimburseMahila Mandals the honoraria paid to Samvad Sahayaks; (iv) SPARC provided training forSamvad Sahayaks in earthquake resistant construction (v) the Samvad Sahayaks were dispersedin 1300 villages of Latur and Osmanabad; (vi) Samavad Sahayaks worked with house owners andjunior engineers to spread the message about the R&S program. As a result, house owners weremotivated to repair and reconstruct their houses according to their preferences, leading topersonal investments of time, labor, resources and finance in addition to the grant given by theGOM. Another positive experience was the use of two NGOs for post-relocation activities tobuild local capacity within community-based organizations (CBOs) and village groups to ensurethat information and training targeted communities and provided a sustainable local base ofactivities. Monthly NGO meetings were held with the District Collectors to discuss progress,problems and other issues, ensuring a close working relationship between NGOs and the districtadministration.

C. Major Factors Affecting the Project

24. Major factors that affected project implementation resulting in delays and disputes were: thefully grant-based program that encouraged more demands, increased dependence on the state andreduced motivation of beneficiaries; weaknesses in damage assessment process; complexity of theowner-driven repair and strengthening program; litigation; contractor performance; and staffrelated problems. These factors are summarized under the following categories:

-7 -

(a) Grant-based Program. The fully grant-based rehabilitation program made it difficult tomotivate the beneficiaries to take control of their own housing reconstruction. It served toincrease dependency on the state, with the exception of beneficiaries in the repair andstrengthening program, who made contributions averaging between 10 to 20 percent of theconstruction cost. The feasibility of introducing risk insurance should be explored.

(b) Damage Assessment and Beneficiary Lists. Apparent deficiencies in the three attemptsat damage assessment, and the time taken to finalize beneficiary lists in the early stages of theproject due to disputes and disagreements. Throughout the project period, there were continuingdemands for inclusion of more beneficiaries in the program. The decision by the newly electedState Government (of 1995) to expand the beneficiary list resulted in a flood of new applications(about 150,000), until the gravity of the decision was recognized and was subsequently revoked.Litigation by over 70 petitioners resulted in adverse lower courts orders including survey/re-survey of 63 villages, until the Supreme Court suspended all litigation at lower courts, as a resultof a petition by the GOM. In total about 17,000 complaints or claims were received, and about4,000 cases were redressed, amounting to about 1.8 percent of the total number of beneficiaries.

Damage assessment was done in accordance with the International Association ofEarthquake Engineering (IAEE) classification of five categories. In this case, it was difficult todifferentiate damage between Category 2 and 3, and such a categorization was not necessary asthe entitlement was the same for both categories. Categories were subsequently reduced to three.Although damage assessment was done more than once, problems persisted because: damageassessment was not rigorous enough, damage was expressed in general terms amenable to varyinginterpretations, guidelines for damage assessment lacked precise technical definition, the IAEEdamage assessment categories were not modified to suit the specific conditions of this earthquake,and damage assessment had no relation to the intensity of the earthquake and the assistancepackage.

(c) Commtnity Participation. While participation by stakeholders was successful, andjustified the adopted strategy, it took time for the field staff, beneficiaries and NGOs to developharmonious working relationships. In the end, the NGOs played a major role in the constructionof over 6,000 houses on behalf of beneficiaries. Some villagers/VLCs reneged on community-ratified agreements, held up construction starts, demanded bifurcation of villages or newrelocation sites, dictated the house building material, delayed house allocations, and interferedwith contractor's works. In the epicenter village (Killari), unruly groups manhandled contractors'staff, and caused considerable damage to partially constructed houses, resulting in a workstoppage of over eight months.

Community participation was more problematic in larger villages and those with strongpolitical leadership. Problem areas were: the difficulty of information dissemination to the familylevel, decision-making occurred mainly through Village Level Committees; decisions on plotallocation, eligibility, construction quality and other issues remained controversial and difficult toresolve. Disputes and misunderstandings thus persisted.

- 8 -

(d) Implementationi Strategy for Repair and Strengthening. Motivating the 211,000families to undertake repair and strengthening (R&S) of their houses, and setting up theprocedures for this operation proved to be one of the greatest challenges to project managers.Initially, beneficiaries wanted new houses constructed for them. Secondly, there was anoverwhelming preference to build one safe room (of about 200 square feet) rather than repair andstrengthen damaged houses. Different approaches were tested, and actions taken, whichultimately proved to be a valuable learning experience, including: decentralization of R&Sresponsibility to the District Collector assisted by a large contingent of engineers and consultants,setting up procedures for advancing cash and materials in installments, mounting informationdissemination campaigns to propagate technology, training of artisans, preparation of estimatesand agreeing with each family their reconstruction choices, deploying of a large contingent ofjunior engineers (on contract), and setting up of 16 materials stores. Despite all of the aboveactions, progress was slow for about two years until social development consultants (SPARC)and local community organizations (such as Mahila Mandals, Samvad Sahayaks - women'sorganizations and village facilitators, respectively) were mobilized into a formal structure to assistin the motivation of beneficiaries. About 14,000 beneficiaries defaulted after receiving the first andsecond installments.

District Collectors were given additional staff, and administrative, financial and managementpowers to implement the R&S component. An important provision was for the DistrictCollectors to write the 'annual confidential reports' of the engineering staff who belonged todifferent implementing departments. This arrangement was vastly different to the traditional roleof the District Collector who only coordinates and monitors development activities ofimplementing departments. A total sum of US$74 million was passed through the DistrictAdmrinistration for the component. The District Collectors were: empowered to recruit andmanage engineering staff; provided annual funds requirements to implement the R&S program;provided consultants to set up financial management structure to handle receipt, management andadministration of the grant funds in stages with certification; encouraged to liaise with NGOs andsocial development consultants, and most importantly; instrumental in mobilizing women'sorganization (Mahila Mandals) and community-based organizations.

(e) Water Scarcity. Despite numerous positive outcomes of the project as mentionedabove, the issue of water scarcity remains a perennial problem. In addition to the fact that thevillages are located in drought prone areas, water supply is disrupted very often for two mainreasons: (i) frequent failure of electric supply and load shedding which limits water pumpinghours; and (ii) frequent bursting of asbestos cement (AC) pipes used in the water supply network.Even though AC pipes were usedfor economic reasons, they may not be suitable for use in blackcotton soil which expands and shrinks, depending on moisture content. The stresses caused byexpansion of black cotton soil with change in moisture content are believed to lead to the burstingof AC pipes. The situation has been remedied with the replacement with ductile iron and PVCpipes, of critical sections of the pipelines.

(t) Procurement. Contractors' lackluster performance also affected works in some villages,as well as the regional water supply scheme. No large contractors from Mumbai were interestedin these works, which were finally done largely by contractors from the neighboring state. Thelargest contract, for a regional water supply scheme to supply water to 36 villages, was delayed

- 9 -

for nearly three years, and resulted in considerable delays in house allocations, and additionalexpenditure to provide temporary water supplies. This contract was finally completed, butinvolved remedial works costing an additional US$1.0 million, which was financed by the GOM.

(g) Staff Related Problems. Disruptions and delays in the R&S component resulted fromthree occasions of work stoppages by the 700 junior engineers who were on six monthlycontracts, as part of their campaign to get permanent positions within the GOM system. Therewas a high turnover of key District level staff (Collectors and Additional Collectors) during thefirst two years. Subsequently, agreement was reached between the Bank and the GOM regardingthese disruptive transfers.

(h) Relocation? of Villages. Although the GOM considers the relocation villages the mostvisible symbol of the project's success, there were no strong technical reasons to support thedecision to relocate except for: cultural, emotional and pragmatic reasons; the high cost of debrisremoval, and the strength of the existing foundations. An overwhelming preference for reinforcedconcrete framed houses of the type built by donors, led to delays and rejection by beneficiaries ofload-bearing masonry houses proposed under the project, and obstruction of work of the PMUand NGOs. Resolution of these problems necessitated changes to house designs in some villages.Beneficiaries went back on earlier community-ratified agreements and demanded construction ofhouses on or near individual farms, bifurcation of villages on communal grounds, and modificationof oiriginal layouts, requiring new agreements before work could proceed.

(i) Use of Stone as Building Material. Beneficiaries in the R&S program were veryreluctant to use widely available stone for house construction because they perceived stone as amajor cause of the many deaths. After much persuasion and information dissemination, dressedstone was used in foundations and up to window sill levels. Cement concrete blocks made out ofcrushed stone were used extensively for house construction in relocation villages.

6) Seismic Monitoring and Research. Procurement performance by agencies under theDepartment of Science and Technology (DST) was characterized by delays in bid evaluation andaward decisions. Lack of clarity in specifications and poor evaluation of bids resulted in rejectionof bids for telemetry clusters on two occasions, the procurement of which was finally abandoned.The India Meteorological Department was unable to evaluate bids for accelerographs receivedover one year earlier; consequently, no contract was awarded. Contrary to an earlier'understanding', the DST restricted access to and sharing with other, national and internationalresearchers seismological data generated at the National Seismological Data Center, thusfrustrating advancement of scientific knowledge on seismicity in the Indian Peninsular Shield.Requests and reminders for confirmation of agreement and action by the DST on this matter wentunanswered. Notably, this requirement was not covered by a legal covenant, and application ofremedies did not arise.

D. Project Sustainability

25. The major portion (about 70 percent or US$220 million) of project investments in housingare individually owned. Families have already commenced improvements and additions using theirown savings. This trend is likely to continue, and is likely to be sustained through extensions

- 10 -

utilizing their savings, maintenance, and the construction of safe buildings. As most of the damagewas to individual housing, this is a major achievement.

26. The sustainability of on-site infrastructure created in the 52 new villages depends on localgovernments (Gram Panichqyats and Zilla Parishads) and the Water Users Committees. Housesin the new villages have been registered with the Gram Panclhayats, and Water Users Committeeshave been formed, but it is too early to say whether the Zilla Parishads and Gram Panchayatswill be sufficiently strengthened and resources enhanced, to provide the organization and fundingfor effective operation and maintenance. The GOM Department responsible for these localgovernments has formulated an action plan to strengthen thern.

27. The GOM has already taken action to assure sustainability of long-term disastermanagement activities. The current Project Management Unit will be converted to a permanentDisaster Management Unit (DMU) in the Department of Rehabilitation of GOM. TheMaharashtra Remote Sensing Applications Center (MRSAC) has recruited seven GeographicInformation Systems (GIS) experts to manage and maintain the disaster management informationsystem. One GIS expert from MRSAC will work full time at the DMU. GOM plans to appointnetwork managers to operate and maintain V-SAT and e-maiil networks. The Center for DisasterManagement at YASHADA will become the primary training center for disaster management.The GOM has already budgeted funds for these operating costs for the fiscal year FY00.Sustainability of disaster management will be further assured by a UK Government's DFIDproject to continue completion of the DMIS and to train communities in disaster responseactivities.

28. The Local Governments (Zilla Parishads and Gram Panichayats) in the heavily affecteddistricts (Latur and Osmanabad districts) have had almost no income over the past three years,except for government transfers in the wake of the earthquake. In the past year, the GOM hadmade special grants to the local governments for funding maintenance. Infrastructure installed inthe 52 new villages is of a higher standard than what is available normally, and will requireenhanced resources to provide adequate maintenance. The new houses have been registered withthe local governments, and levying land and property taxes needs to be commenced. There is nolonger a reason not to do so because the economy has revived to the pre-earthquake level, andincomes have been restored. The water supply schemes are modeled on the Maharashtra StateWater Supply and Sanitation Project implemented with Bank assistance, under which consumersare required to meet the costs of operation and maintenance through the newly formed waterusers committees. Regrettably, the restoration effort has also encouraged an undesirable degreeof dependency, and people are finding excuses not to pay for services. Participation bybeneficiaries did not resolve this issue. All these factors indicate that the prospects ofsustainability of the new physical assets within the villages is uncertain, unless there is a concertedeffort by the local governments, and some financial assistance from the GOM for a period of time.Off-site infrastructure will be maintained by the GOM under its normal maintenance budgets.

E. IDA Performanice

29. IDA staff worked closely with the GOM throughout the project, and contributed todeveloping strategies for i mplemen.tation of the Repair and Strengthening (R&S) component, and

- I1 -

finding solutions to the numerous problems that arose during implementation. IDA fielded teamswitlh diverse expertise for project supervision, including a sociologist, community participationexperts, community housing experts, financial analysts, seismic engineer, earthquakereconstruction specialist, disaster management specialist, small-scale industry specialist, civilengineer, procurement specialist, and disbursement specialist. Close supervision was providedthroughout the project period, especially during the period when the task leader was located in theDelhi office. IDA performance was facilitated by the assistance provided by the Department forInternational Development of the lBritish Government which provided additional funds (outsidethe formal co-financing) to provide and finance consultants for project implementation to both theGOM and the Bank.

F. Borrower Performance

30. GOM has demonstrated full commitment to this project. Strong support extended by theprevious and the current Governments as well as by all the political parties and their non-interference, were crucial factors in the success of the project. The delegation of all Cabinetpowers with respect to project execution to the Project Director of the Project Management Unitenabled effective project management and expedited the project implementation. The powersdelegated to the Central Implementation Group (CIG) with respect to policy matters alsoaccelerated the decision making process, removed any constraints, and enabled greatercollaboration between project staff, other implementing departments, and external agencies. TheBorrower was supported by DFID for implementation support and for some elements of thedisaster management plans, by ADB for project management, and by the UNDP for thepreparation of district disaster management plans and specialist consultants.

31. The GOM performance was always proactive as it: supported effective projectmanagement; provided adequate funding at all times; invited participation by all stakeholders;supported the use of consultants for project management and implementation; resisted legal andpublic demands for the change of project scope; and completed the entire rehabilitation programwith only minor changes. The performance by the GOI's Department of Science and Technologyand agencies it coordinated, was reasonably satisfactory, except for procurement problems, andrestrictions on sharing data from the National Seismological Data Center. The Credit was fullydisbursed in March 1999. The GOM has provided funds in the current fiscal year for completionof remaining works, and for recurrent expenditures for operation and maintenance of the facilitiesestablished under the project.

32. The project has been nominated for the UN-Sasakawa Award for Disaster Prevention by theHousing and Urban Development Corporation (HUJDCO) of India, and has been chosen byUNCHS (HABITAT) as one among the best 100 projects in human settlement. It is one of thelargest Bank-assisted rehabilitation projects covering nearly one million people, that has beensuccessfully completed in four and a half years.

G., ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME

33. Government of Maharashtra. The outcomes of the project include: social and economicrehabilitation in addition to asset restoration; formulation of simple, effective and easy to use

- 12 -

earthquake resistant features for building construction; establishment of a successful experience ofutilization of community participation as a tool for project implementation and to build ownership;partnership between Government, NGOs and the beneficiaries for project implementation;introduction of fully delegated project management, use of monitoring tools, and the extensive useof the private sector (consultants and contractors) for project implementation; the empowermentof women through special initiatives, and through their role to facilitate project implementation;creation of a workforce of trained artisans; formulation of procedures for NGOs to operate ofmajor social facilities (hospitals, homes for the aged and handicapped, and orphanages);implementation of a disaster management system for the state; and creation of a permanent unit inthe government to continue disaster management activities in the future.

34. Government of Indlia The Government of India's capacity for strengthening seismicmonitoring and research has been enhanced. The 36 seismic monitoring stations have beenupgraded, portable seismometers have been procured, seismic monitoring facilities have beenmodernized, and India Meteorology Department (IMD) now has enhanced capacity to record awider range of seismic activity down to magnitude 3.0 on the Richter scale. Ten new digitalobservatories have been set up in the Peninsular Shield region, and they have started functioning.Real time seismic data is being received at the National Seismological Data Center in New Delhiset up under the project.

35. Some of the significant outcomes of the GOM component are elaborated below:

(a) Communiity Participationi. Strong involvement and participation of the localcommunities' throughout the project cycle significantly contributed to the success of the project.Involvement of NGOs, communities and the Village Level Committees contributed to effectiveimplementation, despite some abuses

(b) Earthquake Resistaant Con1struction?. The formulation of simple and effective earthquakeresistant features for new construction as well as for improving seismic resistance of existinghouses, and their wide dissemination and use, will benefit a much larger population than originallytargeted, as these techniques would be used in future house construction. Training of about 7,000local artisans in earthquake-resistant techniques was a major input to introducing safeconstruction practices.

(c) Empowerment of Womeni. Community-based women's organizations (Mahila Mandals)were formed and inducted to the administrative structure to facilitate project implementation.Women have taken the lead role as field mobilization staff under NGOs (Nari Prabhodhan Manchand BAIF), for creating social, economic, and legal awareness among women as part of the postrelocation activities. The program to create women's self-help savings groups (about 500) in therelocated villages has proved effective as a means to foster savings and to credit facilities. Usingthese credit facilities, some women have started small-scale businesses. For the first time, womenwere given title to property jointly with their spouses, and widows were recognized for housingentitlement. Fifty-two community centers and two district resource centers were constructed foruse by women.

- 13 -

(d) Creating Awareness of Civic Responisibilities. Subsequent to the government's reliefoperations in the aftermath of the earthquake, beneficiaries have become too dependent ongovernment grants, and expected all services to be provided free of charge even afterrehabilitation. However, with different strategies such as poster campaigns, street plays, groupmeetings, and house visits by the teams consisting of NGO and government representatives,beneficiaries are being informed and educated on their civic responsibilities to pay taxes and usercharges for services. The project has also been effective in creating awareness of the benefits ofimproved sanitation (through use of toilets provided), the need to maintain public buildings andfacilities, and importance of social forestry.

(e) Strengtheninig the Network of NGOs. A positive outcome of the project is that thenetwork of NGOs has been strengthened even in other areas of work beyond the projectcomponents. Many NGOs have now developed deeper involvement with the village communitiesin the region and are diversifying their activities to areas such as AIDS-related social work andincome-generation programs. NGOs also gained experience as facilitators, contractors, and inmanagement.

(/) Statewide Disaster Management Plan. Main elements of the disaster management planare the state and district disaster management plans, a mitigation strategy and an implementationstrategy. The mitigation strategy includes: (i) risk assessment and vulnerability analysis, (ii)applied research and transfer, (iii) public awareness and training, (iv) institutional mechanisms, (v)disaster management legislation and relief and rehabilitation policy, (vi) incentives and resourcesfor mitigation, and (vii) land use planing and regulations. The implementation strategy includes:the establishment of an emergency operations center at the state headquarters and in the districts,a communications network for wireless (VHF) and satellite (V-SAT) networks, a GIS-baseddisaster management information system, community disaster preparedness programs, and trainingand support to regularly update the plans.

(g) Team Work. This project is a clear manifestation of teamwork at its best. IDA staff,GOM officials, PMU staff, NGOs, consultants, and donors, district and village officials worked asa well-coordinated team, and this was a major factor in the success of the project.

(h,) Extensive Documentation. The Project Management Unit (PMU) has producedextensive documentation on the project, covering areas on community participation, NGOs, mediaanalysis, resource and relief, beneficiary survey, earthquake rehabilitation policy, consultancy,implementation, and financial management. In addition, it has also created a comprehensive socioeconomic database of the 28,000 families in the 52 relocation villages including their pre-earthquake and post-earthquake status, and 5 % of the 197,000 beneficiaries in R&S program.The PMU maintained an exceptional record keeping system that documented every aspect andactivity undertaken from the time of the earthquake. This valuable documentation on CD-ROMsis available freely to researchers and other agencies planning rehabilitation programs.

H. Future Operations

36. At the district level, two major activities are required for future operations: the localgovernments need to organize a system (through issuance of building permits and capacity to

- 14 -

oversee enforcements) to ensure that all new buildings incorporate earthquake resistant features;and the local governments should enhance resources and develop the capacity to operate andmaintain the physical infrastructure installed in the 52 new villages.

37. At state government level, the GOM plans to develop the capacity of the DisasterManagement Unit to utilize the disaster management planning facilities provided under the projectto manage disasters, reduce losses, and undertake mitigation activities. In addition to continuingthe Disaster Management Unit, the GOM will continue the contractual arrangements withMRSAC and MELTRON to provide support to operate and maintain the disaster managementsystem. YASHADA is being strengthened as the primary training institution for disastermanagement. A budget of Rs. 100 million has been provided for FY00. In addition, the GOMwill continue to provide grants to NGOs who have been contracted to operate social facilitiessuch as orphanages, homes for the aged and handicapped, and hostels for women.

I. Key Lessons Learned and Photographs of Project

38. The key lessons learned from this project experience are given below:

(a) Long-term Disaster Mitigation and Loss Redluction. Bank assistance for emergencyrecovery and restoration projects should include long-term hazard mitigation planning and lossreduction measures as the primary development objective. A three-year project period is notadequate to prepare and implement disaster management plans.

(b) Rehabilitation with Cost Sitaring. While circumstances may dictate the need forsome grant assistance for rehabilitation in the aftermath of natural disasters, the amount of grantshould be limited so that beneficiaries contribute their own savings and time for rehabilitation,thereby reducing dependence on the state. Even though people have no insurance and haverelatively low incomes, full grant-based rehabilitation on a large scale is neither affordable norsustainable.

(c) Danmage Assessment. Damage assessment should: (i) include modification of IAEEcategory criteria to avoid overlapping, to suit local conditions and building practices, (ii) be basedon specific and clear technical details to avoid different interpretations, (iii) include post-earthquake safety evaluation and training to determine if buildings are habitable, (iv) includedevelopment of uniform damage assessment criteria and forms, and (v) have a correlationbetween damage category, government assistance to beneficiaries, and earthquake intensity. Aspart of emergency response planning, criteria appropriate for different types of disasters should bedeveloped for different disasters, and also well publicized before commencement of damageassessment. The criteria should be freely available, and periodic training should be given toselected staff who could be used as needed.

(d) Public/Private Partnerships and Ownership. Large and complex programs can besuccessfully implemented as public-private partnerships that include: open and transparent policiesand procedures, opportunity for constructive participation and involvement of communities,NGOs and community-based women's organizations, and efficient and autonomous projectmanagement, supported by expert consultants. Ownership of solutions by potential beneficiaries

- 15 -

are essential to ensure sustainability. The roles and responsibilities of different stakeholdersshould be defined beforehand to avoid abuse of privileges. Community participation from theplanning stage can assure successful and sustainable implementation. Emphasis should be givento post-project infrastructure and community-based environmental management, and obligationsto pay user charges and taxes.

(e) Grievance Redressal. Grievance redressal should be transparent and user-friendly, andshould be done by parties not connected with project management.

W Comprehensive Rehabilitation. Social and economic rehabilitation, as well as long-term disaster management and planning should be part of a rehabilitation and recovery strategy.

(g) Maintenance Management and Financing by Local Governments. Capacity of localgovernments should be strengthened to ensure sustainability, through a long-term strategy formaintenance and maintenance funding.

(h) Information and Transparency. Comprehensive and continuous informationdissemination should form part of any developmental activity in order to elicit partnership with theintended beneficiaries. Project management and implementation should be fair and transparent inorder to win the confidence of beneficiaries.

(i) Women in Developntent. Women's organizations are able to play an important andhighly influential role in projects that involve intensive social interaction, and should be inductedinto formal administrative structures for developmental programs.

(i) Project Management Efficient project management is possible in the public sectorprovided there is interest and willingness to delegate full administrative and financial powers tothe implementing entity.

- 16 -

A typical scene of earthquake damage

Traditional village housing Repair and strengthening bybeneficiaries

- 17 -

Repair and strengthening with the assistance of NGO's

Typical relocation village

- 18 -

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTINDIA

MAHARASHTRA EMERGENCY EARTHQUAKE REHABILITATION PROJECT(Credit 2594-IN)

PART II: STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1: Summary of Assessments

A. Achievement of Objectives Substantial Partial Neibe Not alicable

Macro Policies 0 O O E

Sector Policies 0 0m 0 0

Financial Objectives 0 0 0 0

Institutional Development E3 0 0 0

Physical Objectives 0 0 0 .l

Poverty Reduction O 0El 0 0

Gender Issues 03 0 0 0

Other Social Objectives 0 0 0 0

Environmental Objectives 0 0 El 0

Public Sector Management 0E 0 0 0

Private Sector Development E 0l 0 E

Community Participation 0m E E E

B.Proiect Sustainability vkehl Unlikely Uncertai(VI) (VI) (1)

0E 0 0

Hiehlv

C. Bank Performance satisfact Satisfactory Deficient

Identification E 0 E

Preparation Assistance El 0 0

Appraisal 0EE 0 0

Supervision [EE 0 0

Hiehiy

D. Borrower Performance satisfactorv Satisfactorv DeficientD. orowrerfrmnc() 1) (1)

Preparation 0 0 0

hnplementation 0m 0 0

Covenant Compliance 0E 0 0

Operation (if applicable) El 0z 0

Highly HighyE. Assessment of Outcome satisfactory Satisfactory Unsatisfactorv unsatisfactorv

(0 (0E (El

El 0 0 0

- 19 -

Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits

Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Statusapproval l

Preceding operations l

1. India - Uttar Repair and reconstruction of 1987 Closed onPradesh Urban roads, bridges and public March 31, 1996Development Project buildings, following the ICR No 16579(Loan 2797- Uttarkashi earthquake of 1991 AnIN/Credit 1780-IN) amount of SDR1O million was

allocated following an amendmentto the legal agreements.

2. India: Andhra Repair and reconstruction of 1990 Closed onPradesh Emergency roads, bridges, electricity, and March 31, 1994Cyclone Recovery irrigation facilities, after the 1990 ICR No. 14662Project (Ln. 3260- cyclone and storm surge damage.IN/Cr 2179-IN)

FollowingOperations I I

Andhra Pradesh Preparation of a hazard mitigation 1997 UnderHazard Mitigation framework for the state, and Implementationand Emergency reconstruction of damagedCyclone Recovery infrastructureProject

- 20 -

Table 3: Project Timetable

Steps in Project Cycle Date Planned Date ActuaULatest Estimate

Identification/Preparation (Executive October 5, 1993 October 5, 1993Project Summary)

Appraisal November 8, 1993 January 4-29, 1994

Negotiations December 20, 1993 March 2, 1994

Board Presentation January 05, 1994 March 31, 1994

Signing April 6, 1994

Effectiveness March 5, 1994 June 27, 1994

Midterm review November 1995 November 27-30,1995

Project Completion December 31, 1996 December 31, 1998

Loan Closing June 30, 1997 April 30, 1999

Table 4: Loan Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual(US$ Million)

FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99

Appraisal Estimate 30 80 160 240 246 0

Revised estimate following 25.6 73.7 153.9 216.6surrender of credit

Actual (Year-Wise) 0 26.8 51.3 80.9 38.3 23.4

Cumulative 0 26.8 78.1 159.1 197.4 220.8

Actual as % of Estimate 0 33.5 48.6 66.3 80.3 0

Amount canceled on December 16, 1996 - USD 30,235,170.00Date of Final Disbursement: March 3, 1999

-21 -

Table 5A: Performance Indicators

Key Indicators in MOP/TA MOP/TA Revised Actual1. Relocation Villages._1 Number of Villages _ 52 52 52

_2 Number of Houses _ 23,394 27,919 27,551(368)2. Model Housesl2. 1] Number of houses/buildings 528 475 4753. Repair and Strengthening Houses I

3.1 Repair and Strengthening Houses 211,341 197,755 192,256 (4,599)3.2 Pilot Strengthening Public Houses 5,000 3,876 3,8763.3 Pilot Strengthening Public Buildings 46 464. Infrastructure4.1 Access Roads (kms) 17 371 3714.2 Culverts and Minor Bridges (No.) 140 131 1314.3 Missing Culverts (No.) 10 156 1564.4 Water Supply (Number of Villages)

(i) Repairs to PWSS 53 53 53(iii) Interim Water Supply 52 51 51

4.5 Irrigation(i) Repairs to Lower Terna Dam (No. of 5 1 Deleted

items)(ii) Repairs to Talni Aqueduct 1 1

(iii) Embankments of Percolation Tanks 137 125 125(iv) Strengthening of KT Wiers 218 218 218(v) Offices and Other Buildings (Rooms) *35 293 293

(vi) Embankments > 10 meters height 56 92 924.6 School Building (Rooms) *257 3,772 3,7724.7 Public Buildings (No.) 26 168 1684.8 Zilla Parishad Buildings (Rooms) *35 1642 16424.9 Strengthening of Major Bridges 33 18 185. Economic Rehabilitation

(i) Replacement of Fann Inplements 37,002 37,002 37,002(ii) Replacement of Milch Cattle 3,461 3,346 3,346

(iii) Replacement of Sheep and Goats 9,843 9,611 9,611(iv) Replacement of Bullocks 829 829 829(v) Reconstruction of Dug Wells 473 337 337

(vi) Rehabilitation of artisan businesses 1,164 979 9796. Social Rehabilitation6.1 Anganwadis 744 1,140 11406.2 Community Centers for Women 52 52 526.3 District Resource Centers 2 2 26.4 Homes for Handicapped 1 1 16.5 Homes for the Aged 1 1 16.6 District Trauma Centers 2 26.7 Women's Self Help Savings Groups 200 500 4766.8 Educational Complex at Vagholi 1 1 1 ||7. Restoration of Monuments 16 9 6(3)

Note: (i) Figures in parenthesis in the last column indicates works that are still ongoing, and are expected to becompleted by June 1999. (ii) * Indicates number of buildings, other numbers in row indicate rooms

- 22 -

5 B. Key Indicators of Project Implementation and Management

Performance Indicator Action to Provide External Supp ort/Consultant Cost (Rs)1. Program Monitoring and Tata Consulting Services., India 17,300,000Management DHV Consultants, The Netherlands 19,000,0002. Seismic Engineering Advice Professor Drazen Anicic, Croatia 400,000

Dr. Svetlana Nikolic-Brzev, Canada 4,100,000Indian Institute of Technology, Powai, Mumbai. India 13,300,000

3. Engineering, Architecture and Kirloskar Consultants Ltd.. India 63,200,000Project Design and Supervision Tata Consulting Engineers, India 10,500,000

Consulting Engineering Services, India 23,900,000STUP Consultants Ltd., India 8,500,000MHADA, India 36,000,000Mahendra Acres Consulting Engineers, India 18,000,000

4. Community Participation and Social Tata Institute of Social Services, India 7,000,000Development Society for Promotion of Areas Resource Centers

(SPARC), India 7,000,0005. Pilot Repair Demonstration Central Building Research Institute, India 1,400,0006. Design of Water Supply Systems Task Consultants, India 1,600,000

Network Associates, India 1,200,0007. Design and Strengthening of STUP Consultants Ltd., India 1,400,000Bridges Tandon Consultants, India 1,400,000

Consulting Engineering Services, India 3,100,0008. Survey and Assessment of Damages Gherzi Eastern Ltd., India 2,700,000

Structwell Design and Consultants Ltd. India 1,300,0009. ICB Procurement of Building RITES, India 14,400,000Materials _________________ _

10. Materials Management and Tata Consulting Services, India 18,000,000Distribution __.

11. Quality Assurance and Technical Lee Associates Private Ltd., India 37,400,000Audit _ _ _ _12. Communications and Publicity Ramesh G. Pense, India 3,400,00013. Rehabilitation Action Plan J. Bapat, India 400,00014. Design and Supervision of College- Ranade Consultants Pvte. Ltd., India 5,700,000cum-Orphanage.15. Dam Safety Deuskar Committee, India 200,000

S. T. Deokule, India 100,00016. Disaster Management Plan YASHADA, India 5,900,000

CSSD, India 1,500,000MELTRON, India 1,500,000

17. Probabilistic Earthquake Hazard Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Columbia 4,300,000Map for Maharashtra Universily, NY18. Documentation of Project EPW Research Foundation, India 2,500,000Experience _____19. NGO Coordination BIAF Development Research Foundation, and Nanr

Prabodan Manch. India 9,400,00020. Database of Beneficiaries Center for Studies in Social Development, India 2,100,00021. Disaster Management Infonnation Maharashtra Remote Sensing Applications Center 35,900,000System __

22. Financial Audit of R&S Mehra, Venkatesh and Associates, India 4,000,000Component Cash Disbursements _

-23 -

Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation

Indicator Action takenFacilitation of quality 1. Training of PMU Engineers by seismic engineering consultantsof implementation, 2. Training of artisans in earthquake resistant construction by GOM and consultantsphysical rehabilitation 3. Quality assurance and technical audit through consultantsand construction 4. Materials procurement through consultant

5. Materials stores management through consultants

Promotion of local 1. Community participation througlh consultantsownership and 2. Funds to support NGO activities in relocation villagesparticipation, 3. Documentation of project innovative processes through consultantsinfonration 4. Training village contact/facilitation persons through consultantsdissemination, 5. Appointment of Sanwvad Sahayaks (community facilitators) through Mahila Mandalseducation and (women's organizations)communicationsstrategDevelopment of 1. International workshop on disaster managementdisaster mitigation and 2. Expert seismic advice through national and international consultantsresponse capacity in the 3. National consultants for disaster managementstate 4. District disaster management committees and national workshops

5. Communication network survey for disaster management by consultants6. Disaster management information system tlhrough MRSAC7. Setting up of central and district emergency response centersl

_ ~~~8. Implementation of disaster management plan_Other Miscellaneous 1. Seminar on 'Management of Emergencies and Disasters' by British Council for 3Activities to Facilitate personsQuality of Project 2. Rehabilitation action plan for those wvhose lands were acquired for project

3. Village Development Fund to provide credit to for wYomen through self help grOUpS4. Educational complex and orphanage for 1,500 children5. Support to District and Tehsil (sub-districts) staff in financial management and

accountingProject evaluation and I. Comprehensive database of all beneficiaries in the relocation villages, and about 10lessons learned percent of beneficiaries under the repair and strengthening component

2. Project completion reports by Chief Engineer and Executive Engineers for both therelocation and the repair and strengthening components

3. Documentation of innovative measures adopted in the project comprising sevenreports prepared by consultants

Future Operations 1. Completion of remaining (Supreme Court-ordered) houses in category B villages2. Creation of the pennanent Disaster Management Unit3. Operation of the emergency response centers4. Management and updating of disaster management information system5. Continuation of NGO support to communities to complete fence building, tree

planting, and maintaining the environment6. Strengthening local governments (Zilla Parishads and Gram Panchayats) to levy

property taxes, ensure earthquake resistant features in house construction throughissue of building pennits, and maintaining of infrastructure in the new villages

7, Annual budget allocations by GOM to meet recurrent expenditures for: DMU staffand contractor salaries, operation of emergency response centers, license fees for VHFand V-SAT wavebands, maintenance of DMIS, and for grants to NGOs operating

_______________________ social facilities

- 24 -

Table 7: Studies Included in Project

Study Purpose as Defined Status Impact of Study

at Appraisal/Redefined l

Strategy for Reconstruction, To define the approach, procedures, terms and Completed Formed the basis of theRepairs and Strengthening conditions of the shelter components relating to the rehabilitation program

relocation of villages and the repair andstrengthening programs

Guidelines for Repair, Detailed description of damages with step by step Completed Primary technical document usedStrengthening and procedures for repair and strengthening of houses by engineers, artisans andReconstruction Program, and damaged in the 1993 earthquake beneficiariesGuidelines for PilotStrengthening

Manual for Earthquake Detailed description for incorporation of earthquake Completed A formal document that will formResistant Construction and resistant features in non-engineered masonry the future development controlSeismic Strengthening of construction (includes retroftting of existing efforts for incorporation ofPrivate Houses in Rural Areas buildings as well as new construction). This same earthquake resistant constructionof Maharashtra document will also be used by the Local for non-engineered construction

govenmments as the guidelines for developmentcontrol

Disaster Management Action The detailed report on the disaster management plan Disaster Long-term impact for disasterPlan for Maharashtra State for the state management plan mitigation and loss reduction

completed.Extension of DMISto all districts andtraining ofcommunities to becontinued withDFID assistance

DMIS Guidelines for Land Describes guidelines for preparation of thematic Completed Useful in hazard managementUse/Land Cover Mapping and mapping such as land use, and land cover mappingFormat for Report Writing for hazard mitigation

Documentation of Innovative Seven documents describing the innovative Completed. Lessons for future projectExperiences in the processes used in project management: community implementation, dealing withRehabilitation Program participation, project management; earlhquake disasters, and construction to

resistant construction, publicity and infornation ensure loss reductiondissemination, etc.

Developing People Though A report describing the process of community Completed Promotion of communityHouse Building in the participation in the repair, reconistruction and participation in developmentRehabilitation Program strengthening programs

Information Dissemination Documents prepared to itnform and educate the Completed Major impact in informing anddocuments: beneficiaries to undertake repair and strengthening educating beneficiaries in the

of houses programlBuild your home with Iearthquake protection

Another step forward

Stories to tell

Marathwada Earthquake - AYear Later

Earthquake Hazard Map for To be used as a framework for hazard mitigation Completed To be used in the futureMaharashtra planning l

Ongoing Seismicity in the Research report on seismicity in the regions with Completed Improved scientific knowledge onvicinity of Koyna and Warna large reservoirs seismic activity in the regionReservoirs

The Killari Earthquake in Research report on seismicity in Central India Completed Improved scientific knowledge onCentrba India: A New Mesozoic seismic activity in the regionBasalt Flows

- 25 -

Table 8A: Project Costs

Appraisal Estimate (US$M) Actual/LatestEstimate(US$M)

Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total

Costs Costs Costs Costs

1. Housing 144.3 15.6 159.9 220.33 220.332. Infrastructure 64.9 6.8 71.7 76.71 76.713. Social Rehabilitation 10.4 0.7 11.1 11.09 11.094. Economic Rehabilitation 4.8 0.3 5.1 3.68 3.685. Community Rehabilitation 7.7 0.9 8.6 8.23 8.236. Technical Assistance, 12.2 5.6 17.8 26.09 2.12 28.21Training and Equipment l

Sub-Total - Program Base Cost 244.3 29.9 274.2 346.14 2.12 348.26

7. Total Physical 6 0.1 6.1Contingencies l

8. Total Design, Supervision 13.6 1.2 14.8and MG9. Total Price Contingencies 31.2 1.5 32.7

Sub-Total - Total of 50.8 2.8 53.6Contingencies _

TOTAL PROGRAMME COST 295.1 32.7 327.8 346.14 2.12 348.26*

Average Dollar/Rupee rate: $1=Rs.36.18*Indicates actual project cost at December 31, 1998. Estimated project cost to completion byJune 1999 is US$363.62 Million.

- 26 -

Table 8B: Project Financing

Appraisal ActuaULatestEstimate Estimate(US $M) (US$M)

Source Total Total

IDA 246.0 221.00

GOM 40.0 86.61

GOI 1.0

DONOR 41.0 40.65

TOTAL 328.0 348.26

Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits

Economic Analysis was not done for this Emergency Project.

- 27 -

Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants

Agree- Section Covenant Present Original Revised Description of Commentsment type status fulfillment fulfill- covenant

date mentdate

DCA 202(b) 01 C India to open and maintain a Special Account Complied with.at RBI.

DCA 3.04 13 C 06/30/1994 India to establish an Advisory Group with Complied with.international participation for the purpose ofimplementation of earthquake monitoring andresearch.

DCA 4.01(b) 01 C 12/31/1994 India to provide Special Account Audit Report Complied with.to IDA no later than 9 months after the end ofthe fiscal year.

DCA 601(a) 05 C 07/05/1994 GOM have appointed consultants for design Complied withand management of all works under Part A of by date ofthe project. effectiveness.

DCA 6. 01(b) 10 C 07/05/1994 GOM to provide to IDA the program Complied withimplementation plan. by date of

effectiveness.

PA Schtedule 07 C GOM to implement the Rehabilitation Action Complied with.2 Plan dated March 12, 1994, agreed upon

between the IDA and GOM.

PA 3.01(a) 01 C GOM to maintain records and accounts of Complied with.project expenditure.

PA 3.01(b) 01 C 12/31/1994 GOM to provide project accounts audit to IDA Complied with.no later than 9 months after the end of thefinancial year.

PA 3.02 13 C 05/01/1994 GOM to establish an independent dam safety Complied with.panel to review proposals for strengtheninglarger dams in the earthquake affected areas.

Covenant types:

1. = Accounts/audits 8. = Indigenous people2. = Financial performance/revenue generation from 9. = Monitoring, review, and reporting

beneficiaries 10. = Project implementation not covered by categories 1-93. = Flow and utilization of project funds 11. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource4. = Counterpart funding allocation5. = Management aspects of the project or its executing 12. = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/ regulatory/institutional

agency action6. = Environmental covenants 13. = Other7.= Involuntary resettlement

- 28 -

Table 11: Compliance with Operational Manual Statements

All applicable Operational Directives or Operational procedures have been complied with.

Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs

Stage of ActualProject Cycle

Weeks US$

Preparation to Appraisal 68.1 198,000

Appraisal-Board 10.4 26,400

Negotiations through 10.2 33,200Board Approval

Supervision 205.2 511,400

Completion 9.0 30,600

TOTAL 303.9 799,600

-29 -

Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions

Performance Rating

Number Specialized Implemen Develop-Stage of Month/ of Days in Staff Skills -tation ment Types of

Project Cycle Year Persons Field Represented Status Objectives Problems

Through Appraisal 10/93 3 2 EC, ME, RE _ _

11/93 7 24 ME, RE, AC, SP, HS, RE, PC

Appraisal through 01/94 8 25 ME, RE, AC, SP, HS, ES, PC - _Board Approval _

Supervision

04/94 10 17 ME, SB, CP, UP, HS, SE, RS I _

09/94 7 10 ME, SB, UP, HS, GE, EG HS P

10/94 2 12 ME, UP HS

02/95 2 10 ME, UP S P

05/95 4 10 ME, UP, DM, SE S P

09/95 4 6 ME, SO, HE, CD S I P

10/95 4 6 ME, SO, UP, DM S P

Mid-Ternm Review 11/95 4 4 CD, SO, ME, UP S I P

03/96 2 5 ME, PO

06/96 2 4 ME, PO U 2

07/96 2 4 ME, PO S 2

10/96 2 6 ME, PO S 2

01/97 4 6 ME, UP, SO, PO S _

08/97 4 11 RC,PC,SO,PO HS

11/97 3 5 RC, PC, PO HS _

03/98 3 6 RC, PC, PO HS .

06/98 4 19 RC, PC, IN HS

Completion 0 1/98 4 I I RC, IN, AN, FA HS HS -

Specialization: Anthropology (AN), Community Development Specialist (CD), Community Planner (CP), Disaster Management Specialist (DM),Financial Analyst (FA), Geologist (GE), Housing Specialist (HS), Institutional (IN), Municipal Engineer (ME), Procurement (PC),Project Coordinator (PO), Reconstruction (RC), Rehabilitation Specialist (RS), Seismic Engineer (SE), Small Business Specialist(SB), Sociologist (SO), Urban Planner (UP),

Ratings: Satisfactory - S, Highly Satisfactory - HS

Minor Problem - 1, Moderate Problem -2

Problems: Project Management - P

30

Appendix A

INDIA


CREDIT 2594-IN

Project Completion and Implementation Completion ReportMission

AIDE-MEMOIRE(January 4-14, 1999)

In continuation of this review and discussions, a World Bank mission comprising ChandraGodavitarne, Allyson Thirkell, and K. S. Sidhu visited Mumbai and the project affected areasduring January 4 through 14, 1999 to discuss detailed arrangements for the preparation of theICR and to make preliminary assessments on project implementation and management. Themission had discussions with Mr. Narayan Rane, Minister for Revenue, Rehabilitation andForests, Mr. P. Subrahmanyiam, Chief Secretary, Government of Maharashtra (GOM), Mr. JohnyJoseph, Revenue Secretary and the Project Director of the Earthquake Rehabilitation Cell, keyofficials of the Project Management Unit, District Administration officials, project consultants,implementing agencies, NGOs, and beneficiaries. This Aide Memoire covers the Maharashtracomponent (about 96 percent of total project cost), and summarizes the preliminary findings andrecommendations of the mission, and agreements reached with the GOM on post-projectoperations. . The mission expresses its gratitude for the assistance and cooperation extended to it.

Preparation of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the MaharashtraEmergency Earthquake Rehabilitation Project (MEERP) was initiated at a review meeting held inWashington during December 1-3, 1998, between the Mr. Johny Joseph, Project Director and Mr.Krishna S. Vatsa, Deputy Secretary, Earthquake Rehabilitation Cell (ERC) and Jelena Pantelic,Task Leader. Discussions were also held with Dr. R. K. Midha, Head (Earth System Science),Department of Science and Technology, Government of India in November 1998 regardingproject implementation progress and arrangements to complete the Borrowers Assessment for theICk

Overall achievement. Overall project achievements have exceeded the project targetsset at formulation, despite some initial start-up problems. A number of secondary benefits havealso been derived. The largest housing component- the repair and strengthening component -had a difficult start, and took over one and a half years to take off solely due to its complexityand the time taken to organize a large community-driven effort involving over 200,000 families.

3 1

The strong commitment, receptivity to innovative approaches, and the extremely proactive stanceof the GOM facilitated maximization of the achievements.

By project completion, the following have been achieved: (i) construction of 27,444 newhouses in 52 villages (8,406 by various donor business houses, and 19,038 by the PMU throughEngineering Consultants, Contractors and NGOs); (ii) construction of 6,732 new houses adjacentto existing villages on lands provided by beneficiaries, NGOs and the GOM; (iii) reconstruction,repair and strengthening of 183,819 damaged houses; (iv) completion of rehabilitation of otherinfrastructure of roads and bridges, and public buildings; (v) social rehabilitation comprisingreconstruction of schools, angarnvadis (creches), home for the aged, home for handicapped,hostel for backward communities, rural hospitals, shopping centers, including an NGO-operatedorphanage for over 1,000 children and a modern hospital in Sastur; (vi) economic rehabilitationthrough replacement of livestock lost, and other artisan equipment; (vii) training of over 7,000building artisans; (viii) preparation of guidelines and manuals for non-engineered masonryconstruction, and widely disseminated in the affected areas and throughout the state; (ix) activeinvolvement of other donors (business houses, religious organizations, charitable institutions bothnational and international for provision of housing, health facilities; (x) setting up a disastermanagement framework for the state; (xi) specific programs for women including a savings andcredit facility (assisted by DFID); and (xii) limited improvements to Government of India'sseismic monitoring and research capacity. However, free access to seismic data to researchers,which was an objective for this component was not achieved.

The solutions for seismic resistance in buildings developed are simple, widely used byvillagers, and serve as examples of how to make these non-engineered masonry structures safer.However, soon after commencement of project implementation, this objective was given agreater emphasis following agreement between the GOM, the United Kingdom Government'sDepartment for International Development and the Bank to support implementation of the planproposals. This resulted in an additional allocation of UK£2.5 million and allocation of about Rs.150 million (US$ 3.5 million) to put in place the framework for disaster management in the state.The disaster statewide disaster management plan has been prepared and implemented, includingthe preparation of a disaster management information system.

Through choices made by the affected communities, new villages with an urban characterhave come up, and appearances of class differences are no longer visible in the new villages. Theacquisition of a soundly built house achieved a basic need. The grant of joint ownership of thehouse in the names of both husband and wife, the creation of a village development fund solely forwomen and other programs focused on women have empowered and assisted in the emancipationof women. A beneficiary survey conducted at the end of the project has demonstrated a highdegree of satisfaction among the beneficiaries.

Schedule for Completion of Balance Works. Most remaining physical works relate tohouse construction. The late commissioning of contractors due to Supreme Court order requiringconstruction of nearly 3,227 houses for families originally classified under in situ rehabilitation,late acquisition of pockets of land in specific villages, and minor delays arising out of the heavyrains in the region. The schedule for completion of these works is as follows:

32

(i) 477 houses in relocation villages: 31 March 1999(ii) 3,227 houses being constructed under court order: 30 April 1999(iii) 4,672 houses under the R&S component: 31 March 1999(iv) 2 monuments: 30 April 1999(v) Commissioning of the V-SAT communications system: 31 March 1999(vi) Completion of house allocations (relocation villages): 31 March 1999

For the Government of India component for seismic monitoring and research, theprocurement of the 3 telemetered clusters were bid twice and abandoned. The IMD was not ableto evaluate the bids for 50 free-field accelerographs for over nine months, and that procurementwas also abandoned.

Next Steps

The following activities have been agreed with the GOM, and are expected to beimplemented in the next three to four months:

Government of Maharashtra. (i) Bring the project to a formal closure, and undertake nonew works; (ii) Provide budget for recurrent expenditures, and few remaining capital works; (iii)Resolve issues of sale tax exemption, rates adjustment, and the reduction of Rs.3,000 from NGOsundertaking construction; (iv) Issue directives to Zilla Parishads and Gram Panchayats toassume planning, taxation and maintenance functions, and provide necessary assistance tostrengthen them to perform their statutory roles; (v) Create a library for project documentation;(vi) Ensure financial support arrangements for NGOs operating facilities e.g., Sastur DistrictHospital and orphanage at Vagholi etc.; and (v) Ensure that social amenities (such as Districtresource Centers and Home for the Handicapped) are assigned to NGOs or GovernmentDepartments, and are operating satisfactorily.

MAVIM. Continue to monitor operations of the Village Development Fund, and providereports directly to DFID in New Delhi.

District Collectors. (i) In conjunction with communities, the village level committees,complete allocation of shops and houses; and (ii) Advise NGOs working in the VillageDevelopment Program regarding future sources of official Government funding.

Chief Executive Officer and Zilla Parishad. (i) Ensure that property registers forvillages are completed; (ii) Remove of any encroachment; and (iii) Commence collection of waterrates.

Village Level Committees. Complete allocation of houses in consultation with thecommunities.

Maharashtra Water Supply and Sewerage Board. (i) Complete remedial works; (ii)Make arrangements for maintenance; (iii) Remove of illegal connections; (iv) Make provision foroverlap with contractors and the Water Board for operation and maintenance through the Zilla

33

Parishads; (v) Advise Zilla Parishads on role and activities of Community-based WaterCommunities; and (vi) Discuss,water rates collection with Zilla Parishads.

Maharashtra State Electricity Board. (i) Complete installation of meters; (ii)Disconnect and discourage illegal connections; and (iii) Implement cost recovery from users.

Communities. (i) Pay user charges, and taxes owed; and (ii) create communityorganizations to improve environment and maintenance.

Incorporation of Seismic Resistant Features in Non-engineered Construction. (i)Zilla Parishads and Gram Panchayats will institute issue of building approvals in the Districts ofLatur and Osmanabad, and (ii) Disseminate widely guidelines for earthquake resistanceconstruction in non-engineered construction.

Department of Science and Technology, GOI. (i) Operate the National SeismologicalInformation Center, and (ii) Continue seismic research to improve scientific knowledge ofearthquake.

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS

Achievement of Project Objectives. All project objectives have been achieved: (i)Rehabilitation and reconstruction. By Credit closure on December 31,1998, all projectcomponents including the repair, strengthening and reconstruction of 225,000 houses andinfrastructure, and the soft components have been substantially completed. Some additionalworks still under construction include 3,227 houses ordered by the Supreme Court in mid-1998following resolution of a long-standing dispute over eligibility for a higher category of benefit byfamilies in six villages, and minor works under the reduced component for restoration ofmonuments component. All of the above works are expected to be completed by April 1999.(ii) Improved earthquake resistance of buildinigs. Simple and effective earthquake resistantfeatures have been introduced in all construction, and these have been widely accepted by thebeneficiaries. Guidelines and manuals for non-engineered masonry construction have beenprepared. The Government of Maharashtra (GOM) will ensure that local governments (ZillaParishads) will enforce this requirement in all future building construction in the earthquake-prone areas. (iii) Capacity building to respond more effectively to manage future naturaldisasters. The GOM has prepared a statewide disaster management plan, and a major portion ofthe plan has been implemented. With funding from GOM, the Credit and the UK Government'sDepartment for International Development (DFID), hazard management plans, disastermanagement information system for 8 out of the 31 districts, emergency operations centers, andinstallation of an advanced VHF and V-SAT communications network, have been completed orare under commissioning.

The GOM has budgeted Rs. 490 million (US$11.4 million) to meet expenditures for theperiod January 1 through March 31, 1999. The DFID will continue to work with the GOM for afurther period of three years to complete the DMIS, training and vulnerability reduction incommunities with a pre-assigned budget of UK Pounds 2.5 million.

34

Implementation Strategy. With the active support of the GOM, communityparticipation, creation of village development committees, empowerment of women'sorganizations (the Mahila Mandals), and the induction of NGOs in various roles was adopted asthe strategy for project implementation. These involved empowering communities through thevillage development committees, creating an effective grievance redressal mechanism, deployingconsiderable resources to assisting beneficiaries to undertake the repair and strengthening (R&S)program, inducting NGOs as consultants, facilitators, disseminators of information andcontractors, inducting village level facilitators (Samnovar Sahayaks) through Mahila Mandals,and actively involving communities in site selection for new villages, developing layouts of newvillages, selecting housing types, location of amenities, and reconstructing nearly houses underthe owner-driven program.

Participation by communities, and NGOs has been successful and a worthwhileexperience for all stakeholders. Participation, however, is perceived differently by differentstakeholders. Participation by beneficiaries of the relocation component has been limited toactivist roles to include additional beneficiaries, site layouts and house designs, quality controland house allocations in the case of the relocation component. Participation by R&Sbeneficiaries as individuals has been most striking through planning house improvements,mobilizing additional savings, organizing and taking an active role in construction. This 'owner-driven' repair and strengthening component took off after considerable difficulties of launchingthis highly complex operation. However, retrofitting damaged houses, use of stone or concreteblock as envisaged during project formulation did not happen. GOM has had to devoteconsiderable effort and resources to launch this component (the district administration, NGOconsultants and Mahila Mandals and village-level facilitators Samvad Sahayaks, nearly 800engineers, 17 materials stores, inforrnation dissemination campaigns, and 7,000 trained artisans).

There has been an overwhelming selection by beneficiaries to construct one safe room inpreference to retrofitting their old houses. A variety of designs have emerged, and on average,about an additional 30 percent of additional funding has been mobilized by communities toconstruct larger housing units than that would be possible with the entitlement provided. Simplebut effective earthquake resistant features introduced under the project have been easilyunderstood and widely adopted in the project and for construction outside the project. Use of thewidely available local material (stone) was not preferred building material with beneficiaries(probably due to associating stone with death), and preference for modern building material ofbrick.

Infrastructure rehabilitation (roads, water supply, public buildings, and irrigationstructures) have all been restored, except for the restoration f monuments. The restoration ofmonuments had to be curtailed due institutional problems in the implementing department.

Field Development. Field development was effected through various means: (i)responsibility for implementing the R&S component was assigned to the District Collectors; (ii)cash disbursements (of over Rs. 2,591 million, US$ 74 million) to R&S beneficiaries was donethrough the District Administration; (iii) the PMU operated through consultants, 17 materialsstores that handled over $ 32 million worth of building materials using a fully computerizedsystems; (iv) the PMU set up a decentralized engineering department in the field comprising of a

35

Chief Engineer at Solapur with a contingent of two Superintending Engineers, 11 ExecutiveEngineers, 56 Deputy Engineers, nearly 800 Junior Engineers; (v) created and supportedcommunity organizations comprising village development committees, community-basedorganizations to support consolidation activities such as Mahila Mandals; (vi) inducted NGOs towork with the communities ad house builders, small contractors, facilitators and informationdisseminators; (iv) set up the institutional arrangements for implementing a DFID-supported (Rs.24 million) Village Development Fund to encourage self-help savings groups for women,including employment generation.

The above institutional arrangements at the Maharashtra State level have ensured thesuccessful implementation and management of the project. Procurement and loan administrationhas been a particular strength of this PMU, where there were no procurement-related delays. Allcontract awards have been decided within the original bid validity period, often within two tothree weeks of receipt of bids. Financial management has been exemplary, and disbursementspeaked at US$ 72 million in one year. With applications pending with the Bank, the Credit hasbeen fuilly disbursed by Credit closure. GOM has been in compliance with all covenants, includingaudits that have been complied in the specified time. This operation has been carried out with asmall number of project management staff, but using consultants as much as possible. The totalcost of project management (including the support provided by DFID totaling about UK£2.5million), amounted to Rs. 735.8 million (US$ 21 million) - about 5.8 percent of total project cost.

The project was able to set many standards for effective project management in the areasof financial management, project management, monitoring and trouble-shooting, and qualitycontrol above the normal supervision effort of the implementing departments. A highlyexperienced and efficient cadre of government officials, consultants, and NGOs (in variouscategories) have emerged from this experience. The GOM has documented many of the projectmanagement improvements, and plans to retain the core unit in the Department of Revenue andForests to carry out the remaining works, operation of the disaster management activitiesincluding maintaining the GIS/disaster management information system and the VHF and V-Satnetwork, work with the DFID for detailed implementation of the disaster management plan. Thiscore unit, with an annual recurrent budget of about Rs. 100 million, will be headed by a DeputySecretary, and will have a Network Manager (on contract), a full-time GIS expert (one of theseven GIS experts that will be recruited by the MRSAC which will manage and update theDMIS), the state-owned electronic corporation (MELTRON) that will manage and maintain theVHF and V-SAT communication network, and other core staff. The GOM is in the process ofsetting up a statewide electronic mail facility based on the V-SAT network provided under theproject, thus achieving a substantial secondary benefit that would improve efficiency inadministration. In addition, the GOM is currently exploring ways to impart the managementexpertise gains into its own routine operations.

Project implementation support was provided by the Bank, the DFID, UNDP and ADB.DFID was the key partner along with the Bank and GOM. In addition to co-financing of UJK£1Omillion, the DFID provided an additional UK£5.0 million for project implementation support. Inaddition, the DFID made available to the Bank, the services of a full-time Project Coordinatorresident in Mumbai, and a social development expert for supervision of project implementation.

36

r4ajor Factors that Affected Project Implementation

The major positive factors that facilitated project implementation were: community, andNGO participation in various roles, participation by reputable and capable charities and otherdonors, mobilization of village level organizations, the project management and monitoringsystems installed at the outset, the use of various specialist expertise on contract, the fullydelegated project managers and technical staff, the District Administrations, the quality assuranceprocess, the commitment and support of the GOM, and the complete absence of any (politicalinterference) interference from any party.

Numerous other factors affected the project and the pace of implementation, and aredescribed below:

Difriculties in Implementing the R&S Component. Implementation of the R&Scomponent was delayed until mid-1995, due primarily to its complexity, search for an appropriatestrategy, and the time taken to put all systems and procedures in place. The reasons for this weremany: lack of community-based facilitation and effective information delivery mechanisms, projectemphasis on retrofitting that was not popular with beneficiaries, the preparation of estimates thattook a very long time, the role of the junior engineers who would not adhere to targets, about sixmonth delays due to three work stoppages by junior engineers in support of their demands forpermanent employment, the absence of incentives for project implementation staff, specially juniorengineers, the delays created by the initial damage assessment categorization (of three categories)for R&S benefits, the introduction of concrete and steel bands for earthquake resistance, and newbuilding techniques, the time taken for training of over 7,000 artisans, delay in setting up materialsstores, the frequent transfers of key field staff in charge of implementation, and the complexprocess for certification of utilization of installments

Dynamics of Community Participation. Facilitating community participation within theprogram created a new working environment for all stakeholders and took time to adapt and toform new working relationships. The political and other influences may have played an importantrole in influencing the manner of community participation. The GOM has tried to accommodateall these concems, and provided the forum to resolve these differences through communitygroups, village development committees, rural settlement planners, incorporating villagefacilitators (Mahila Manidals, Samvak Sahayaks), inducting NGOs for various activities, andproviding a grievance redressal mechanism, and the NGOs a forum at the highest level ofGovernment (at the CIG) when specific issues arose.

Court-Ordered Actions. In the initial stage of the project, resorting to litigation andobtaining court orders was common and delayed implementation. These cases were resolvedthrough the effective intervention by the apex courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court. TheSupreme Court appreciated the difficulties the GOM faced in the implementation of the program.It 'stayed' a large-scale demand for the re-survey and re-categorization of villages, which assuredthat the project retain its scope as originally envisaged. The Supreme Court's interventions alsodiscouraged excessive litigation, which would have distracted the attention of the GOM. Thecontinuous monitoring of the Supreme Court over the progress of the project facilitated project

37

implementation a great deal. The project has demonstrated a very positive example ofconstructive judicial intervention.

Regional Water Supply Project. The problems with the major water supply scheme (theproject worth Rs 443 million- US$12 million) that was to provide water to 37 villages had amajor impact on the project. Apart from taking two years longer to complete, workmanship ofthe contractor, poor resources of the contractor, allocation of completed houses was difficult, ascommunities were unwilling to.move due to lack of permanent water supply even thoughtemporary water supply was available. The quality of works, the design problems led to the GOMhaving to undertake remedial works worth about Rs. 45 million (US$1.0 million).

Community Participation and Contractors. The program brought communities andcontractors into close contact. Although contractors accepted the presence of villagers on-site,regular inspection became time consuming and problematic for the contractors. Equally villagerswere keen to review progress and give opinions on construction. This relationship was notalways smooth especially in Killari - the largest epicenter village. Beneficiaries were encouragedto visit the houses and familiarize themselves with their individual houses under construction. Atone point in Killari workmanship was criticized and villagers stopped the work on site. Theresumption of the work created much delay and remedial work took almost eight months tocomplete. The involvement of beneficiaries in overseeing contractor work largely continuedthrough village construction committees that visited the site with the supervisory staff.

Restoration of Monuments. Although it did not affect the main project objectives, theimplementation problems in the Department of Culture, necessitated the curtailment of therestoration of monuments, after about three years of deliberations and preparations. Finally, asmall amount of work (Rs. 12.3 million) that could be implemented using force accountprocedures was undertaken and the work is still being completed.

Financial Management. Efficient financial controls, accounting and audit procedureswere set up as part of the project management structure, which included posting a senior financialadviser. As adequate accounting skills were lacking a the District level, a consultant was hired toprovide training and support in accounting to the implementing agencies, through a computerizedproject management system. This support greatly facilitated financial control, proper accountingand record keeping in various offices. These tools assisted the task of coordinating and managingthe compilation of periodic reimbursement claims, and monitoring financial progress of theproject.

Cash disbursements to beneficiaries of the repair and strengthening component were paidinto bank account of beneficiaries specially opened for this purpose which were regularly audited.The withdrawal of the total credit is expected with the processing of pending applications. TheDF1ID (ODA) grant of Pound Sterling 10 millions administered by the Bank (TF 23356) is fullydisbursed. Year-wise disbursements of the Credit, in US Dollars, for FY95, FY 96, Y97, FY98and FY99 were 26.8 million, 51.3 million, 74.6 million, 44.7 million, and 22.7 million,respectively. As some beneficiaries defaulted, the grants made become ineligible for financingunder the Credit. The mission recommends that the PMU identifies such amounts and adjustthese from eligible expenses to be submitted for withdrawal during February / March 1999.

38

The mechanism adopted by GOM to channel funds to implementing agencies isnoteworthy. Once the annual budget was approved by the state legislature, PMU required nofurther clearances or approvals from either the Finance or Planning Departments. The PMUreleased 75% of the annual budget amount to the implementing agencies, thereby facilitatingproject implementation.

The project generally was on time in submission of annual audit reports to the Bank.PMU was able to provide satisfactory clarifications to auditor's queries.

The mission has requested PMU to furnish the audit report for FY99 through December1999, expeditiously.

Assessment of Outcome

The project has: introduced simple and effective earthquake resistant features for non-engineered construction; adopted participatory project implementation in a formal and fullysupportive manner, and used the strengths available within communities and the government. Inaddition, created the capacity in the state to respond to future disasters through setting up aneffective disaster management apparatus; adopted many improved and effective projectmanagement and monitoring tools that were adapted to a dynamic and complex project, and setup a disaster management system with a modern communications network, including an electronicmail facility connecting all districts of the state. The capacity of the Government of India tomonitor earthquakes down to magnitude 3 intensity was achieved and data on seismic activity isautomatically downloaded at the data center, which greatly enhances the response time.

Lessons Learned

Implementation of Community Participation Approaches in Large InfrastructureProjects. Community participation was widely emphasized through the MEERP. The repair andstrengthening component targeted individual households and provided finances, materials andtechnical advice on an individual basis. This program demonstrates a wide range of housingoptions, owner decision making and household investment way beyond that given by the program.Thus, participation was assured as it was on an individual basis. The strategy adopted inrelocation villages ensured that the entire village participated in the key decision-making onvillage layouts, house designs and eligible beneficiaries. Participation thereafter was done throughthe Village Level Committees (VLC) which comprised representatives from Gram Panchayats,women's group, minorities and depressed classes. The VLC, as the representative body,participated in all subsequent activities.

Under a different strategy, greater participation could have been achieved by strengtheningthe networks and interactions between different neighborhood and social groups within thevillages to ensure representation from a greater constituency. This would have required thepreparation of a community participation strategy for individual villages, its compulsoryimplementation, and allowing more time for mobilization and participation. It would have beendifficult to adopt this strategy in an emergency project such as this.

39

Housing Options in A and B Categories. The Government encouraged a range ofagencies including NGOs, donor agencies and private agencies to reconstruct villages. Designsand costs were in many cases determined by individual agencies and approved by the Collectorsresulting in differences between house types, size and styles, project approach and house value.This resulted in the demonstration of a number of house models and features including excessivestructural strengths (as in framed concrete buildings), which resulted in the escalation ofcommunity aspiration for framed houses, and higher value features. The presentation of requestsfor greater benefits became a common feature of community participation in Category A & Bvillages.

Methodologies for Damage Assessment. The lack of a rational damage assessmentmethodology has created continuing problems for the project with persistent demands fromvillagers for inclusion in the program. This resulted in ad hoc decisions and hasty preparation ofinstructions to the assessment teams. Methodologies for damage assessment under variousnatural disaster conditions should therefore be developed under the disaster managementframework. During damage assessment, a social assessment should be conducted alongside thedamage assessment concentrating on the following features of the house; social and economicuses, layout and a value audit of housing features and characteristics for different income andsocial groups. This would enable a list of priority features and designs to be established based onhouse usage and housing aspirations. This would then inform the design parameters of newhouses and avoid unnecessary investment in features that the community may not have prioritized.

The Use of Sanivad Sahayaks and Mahila Mandlals. The involvement of local women'sgroups and village women as motivators and communicators in the repair and strengtheningprogram was a highly successful participation strategy. Targeting local women created thevehicle needed for disseminating information over a large number of dispersed villages. MahilaMandals formed the linkages between villages and the administration needed to implement andmonitor the project. In addition it created opportunities for institutional development of MahilaMandals, individual training opportunities for village based women in earthquake technology andsustained relationships between groups and the Zilla Parishads and Gram Panchayats, thebenefits of which extend well beyond the span of the program.

The Impact of Model Houses and Pilot Strengthening in Demonstrating EarthquakeTechnologies: Model houses constructed under the project served a linited purpose. Firstly, notenough of them were constructed early in the project to provide a demonstration effect, andsecondly, the earlier donor-built higher standard (and cost) houses served as models for thecommunities. The project should have exercised greater influence on the design of donorhousing, and appropriate models should have been built early in the project implementation cycle.Pilot Strengthening of houses in surrounding villages had a limited demonstration effect as fewlarger houses could be incorporated. The reasons for this are that the investment by thebeneficiary needed to retrofit larger houses was greater than the amount offered by the scheme,requiring significant personal investment by the beneficiary. The perception of risk in unaffectedvillages and the perception that stone houses might be weaken by such techniques meant that fewlarger houses were incorporated. By contrast low-income households participated in the schemeas the payments led to significant improvements in smaller houses with little personal contribution.However the demonstration effect was diminished as these houses offered less scope to

40

demonstrate the techniques and owners had less influence than larger house owners within thevillage.

Retrofitting in Repair and Strengthening Villages: Emphasis was placed on retrofittingfor repair and strengthening old houses but this did not meet the expectation of many of thebeneficiaries. The result was that very few beneficiaries opted to retrofit old houses, despiteliterature and technical advice by Junior Engineers but chose to build a small additional room totheir house with earthquake features.

Financial Management. Creation of the PMU with financial powers, with powers toallocate funds following appropriation, proper accounting and financial controls, a computerizedproject management system facilitated timely project implementation and efficient financialmanagement of the project.

41

Appendix A

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTMAHARASHTRA EMERGENCY EARTHQUAKE REHABILITATION PROJECT

CREDIT 2594-IN

OPERATION PLAN

PRESENTAND FUTURE PLANS PERFORMANCEINDICATORS TARGETDATEGovernment of Mahsarashtma___________________

1. Completion of Balance Houses Completion of project obligation June 19992. Disaster Management Plan Operation:(a) Continue Disaster Management Council chaired by (a) Commitment of the GOM to disaster (a) DMC formed in 1996

Chief Secretary; management(b) Create Disaster Management Unit headed by a (b) Continuation of institutional arrangement on a (b) July 1999

Deputy Secretary, one Network Manger from permanent basisMELTRON, one GIS expert from MRSAC;

(c) Budget aniually for salaries of DMU staff, annual (c) Appropriation of necessary recurrent funds to (c ) Commenced in FY99 withlicense fee for VHF and V-SAT waveband, and operate and maintain comununications network Rs. 100 million budgetemergency response centers; allocation

(d) Maintain and update disaster management (d) Capability to provide efficient emergency (d) Completed for S districts ininformation system; response in disasters March 1999

(e) Complete disaster management infonnation system for (e) Capability to provide efficient emergency (e) July 1999remaining districts with DFID assistance response to the whole state, with $4 million from

DFID(f) Train communities for disaster management activities (f) Training of conummunities in loss reduction and (f) July 1999

with DFID assistance hazard mitigation activities to continue with DFIDassistance

(g) Operate Emergency Response Centers and conduct (g) Constant readiness to take action in the event of (g) Two years starting Julydrills at specified times disasters 1999

(h) Set up an earthquake engineering research facility for (h) State capacity building for seismic monitoring (h) September 1999Maharashtra and research

3. Recurrent Funds for NGO-Managed SocialFaciltIes

(a) Provide grants to NGOs operating schools, hospitals, (a) Appropriation of necessary recurrent funds to (a) Commenced in FY99education complexes, homes for handicapped and aged facilitate operation and maintenance of social

facilities4. Recovery of Loans and Advances(a) Recover loan repayments from beneficiaries who (a) Enforcement of the terms of the loan agreement (a) July 1999

received houses larger than 250 sq. feet area; made at the allocation of houses in relocationvillages

(b) Recover advances from defaulters in the R&S (b) Recovery of funds misused by beneficiaries of (b) July 1999component repair and strengthening component

5. Zilla Parishads and Gram Panchayats(a) Register and value new houses, and commnence (a) Preparation for levy of land and property taxes (a) January 2000

property tax collection on aunual and bi-annual basis;(b) Organize and finance maintenance of infrastructure; (b) Delivery of civic services by local governments

(c) Awareness raising for safe building techniques (b) January 2000(c) Disseminate model guidelines for earthquake resistant incorporating earthquake resistant features

construction for masonry buildings; (d) Development control functions exercised by (c) Continuing activity bylocal governments NGOs

(d) Issue building pernmits for building construction inLatur and Osmanabad (d) January 2000

6. Communities and Water Users Committees(a) Form Water User Comnittees (a) Assumption of responsibility for village water (a) Formed in late 199S

supply(b) Water Users Comminees Prepare Operation Plans (b) Development of procedures for managing (b) July 1999

systems(c) Commnence collection of user charges (c) Community payment for water supply (c)September 1999(d) Organize operation and maintenance of facilities with (d) Efficient operation and maintenance of service (d) January 2000

local govemmentsGOI Department of Science and Technology __L1. Budget annually for recurrent costs of the seismic (a) Assurance of system operation through (a) Continuous from FY99

monitoring system; operation and maintenance2. Operate National Seismological Data Center, and (b) Advancement of scientific knowledge of (b) Center operational, but no

share data with all researchers earthquakes agreement on data sharing

42

Appendix B-I


INDIA


CREDIT 2594-IN

Borrower's Evaluation

EVALUATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA

Introduction

The state of Maharashtra experienced a devastating earthquake of 6.4 on the Richter scale onSeptember 30, 1993 in Marathwada. In Latur and Osmanabad districts, which were worst affected in thisregion, 7,928 people died and 16,000 people were injured. The damages were most severe in 67 villages,where most of the houses collapsed, and in other 1500 villages, houses suffered considerable damage. Theloss to livestock was considerable, with 15,847 cattle perished. The earthquake also had an impact onhouse and property in 11 other districts of the state. The total loss of public and private property wasestimated in excess of Rs. 1,1000 million.

The Government of Maharashtra drew up the Maharashtra Emergency Earthquake RehabilitationProgramme, in consultation with the Government of India and the World Bank and the other stakeholders.The MEERP commenced in July 1994, and after having run its full course of implementation concluded onDecember 31, 1998. In terms of physical reconstruction and rehabilitation, the MEERP in its four and halfyears of implementation has accomplished all the objectives it set out in the beginning. Financially, theproject has done equally well, having utilized the entire credit of US $ 220 million extended by the WorldBank. It is one of the largest rehabilitation programs implemented in India, and has come up as the mostdemonstrable example of a successful post-disaster reconstruction program in the country.

In view of the mass of achievements the MEERP has to its credit, it would be a very usefulexercise on the eve of its conclusion to place the entire process of relief and rehabilitation in a long-termperspective. Through the years of colossal activities that started with the earthquake of September 301993, several practices and innovations have emerged which are the most remarkable achievements of thisproject, and which could very well be standardized and emulated in any post-disaster reconstructionProgramme in a developing country.

Relief & Rescue Activities

It began with the relief operations immediately after the earthquake on September 30 1993, whenthe Government of Maharashtra (GoM) moved with a great speed and urgency in mounting swift rescueand relief operations. The scale of state response and management of disaster at the field level was

43

recognized and appreciated at the national and international levels, and it set the standards for all thesubsequent activities. It was a remarkable display of the political leadership dealing with the situation upfront, which produced a great speed and coherence in the decision-making. The Chief Secretary's officeconverted itself into the state control room, the nerve center of all the decision-making, which galvanizedthe resources of all the departments and agencies within the government. The state effort received atremendous fillip when the arned forces joined the rescue operations almost instantly and further when thenational and international aid organizations and NGOs participated in the relief operations in the mostspontaneous show of human sympathy and solidarity. The rescue and relief operations in the aftermath ofthe Latur earthquake were one of the most efficient and organized ever seen in India.

In the wake of this tragedy, one of the most far-sighted decisions taken by the GOM, was that therewould be no cash assistance to the people affected, except the ex gratia payment to the next of the kin ofdeceased and those who were disabled. The GOM arranged medical help, food, drinking water, temporaryshelter, and other supportive services to all the affected people in the area, but no cash was handed out inlieu of these services. The ex-gratia payment to the next of the kin of the deceased or to next of kin of thedeceased or to the injured was given through individual bank deposits.

This deliberate decision to avoid the cash transaction as much as possible in the relief administrationsucceeded in avoiding the complaints that are generally associated with such situations i.e.,misappropriation of cash or doling out cash to undeserving individuals. A survey of beneficiaries recentlydone under the project shows an overwhelming appreciation of the entire relief operations among thepeople. It could very well be suggested said that a number of lessons in terms of management andleadership could be learnt through these relief operations in Latur & Osmanabad districts, which providedinmmediate support and succor to the people without giving way to populist measures characteristic of thesesituations.

Policy Support for Rehabilitation

The blueprint of a massive rehabilitation Program was drawn up simultaneously, along with therescue and relief operations. The GOM's project proposal for the rehabilitation, which was submitted tothe World Bank, provided a frame of reference for a wide-ranging consultations. The Government of India(GOI) set up an advisory committee comprising professionals and NGO representatives, chaired by Mr.Padmanabhaiyya, Secretary, Urban Development, to assist the GOM in formulating the rehabilitation plan.The World Bank was involved with these preparatory activities from the beginning, as the GOI signed theMOU with the World Bank for supporting the rehabilitation program merely 5 days after the earthquake,on October 5 1993. The GOM discussed and finalized the entire strategy and scope of the Program afterextensive consultations with the World Bank. The guidihg principles of the rehabilitation Program weredefined in a policy document that was put together in December 1993, for the first time as a draftdocument. This draft policy evolved through various inputs and comments from the GOI, World Bank, andthe NGOs, which were duly incorporated in the final policy document. The earthquake rehabilitationpolicy as it shaped finally received the approval of the Cabinet and the State Legislature, and the ChiefMinister formally declared this policy on March 19, 1994.

The entire process of developing the rehabilitation policy and plan was consultative andparticipative in nature, and the policy reflected broad consensus underlying the rehabilitation Program. Ittook into account the rehabilitation needs, local sensitivities, the organizational strength available with thegovernment, and the financial estimates of the plan. The declaration of a coherent policy was one of themost defining moments of the project implementation. It clearly brought out that the rehabilitation couldnot be an activity conceived on an ad hoc basis; it must have a well-formulated policy support.

44

It was a first of its own kind that a rehabilitation Program in this country was supported by a policydocument, which presented an exposition of objectives and strategy systematically, and spelt out theentitlement of beneficiaries. The policy document also laid down the organizational framework for theimplementation of plan and formally incorporated all the institutional features of a community participationeffort into the Program. It emphasized the seismic strategy for the entire rehabilitation plan, and laid downthe criteria for damage assessment. All the components of the rehabilitation Program came to be wereclearly defined in the policy document. It also laid the foundations of an ambitious disaster managementplan the state prepared and implemented during the project. Thus, the invocation of a policy document,which was an expression of the collective will of all the stakeholders, has been one of the most crucialfactors responsible for the smooth course of the Program.

Political Context

The political context of the earthquake rehabilitation Program has been extremely conducive fromthe beginning itself, which made a big difference to the pace and quality of the rehabilitation Program. Inthe entire process involving the preparation of rehabilitation plan, the negotiations with the World Bank,and the Program implementation, the political executives extended their complete leadership support. Thissupport continued even after the government changed and the opposition parties took over the government.There was no attempt at changing the strategy or the scope of the Program. The entire Programimplementation proceeded apace without any undue political interference. Again, it was the wide-rangingconsultations in the course of drawing the rehabilitation plan that was responsible for the unity ofperception among the political class regarding the rehabilitation needs. It also suggests that therehabilitation Program must follow a democratic process for building a consensual package, and once theentitlements are defined in accordance with the democratic norms, there would be little scope for an undueinterference or meddling in the implementation.

Programme Management and Implementation Plan:

Project Management Unit

The GOM set up an independent Program management structure for the implementation ofMEERP, which proved to be the most workable institutional arrangement. The nucleus of this structurehas been the Programrme Management Unit (PMU), headed by the Secretary-level officer of the GOM. TheGOM provided a considerable autonomy and flexibility to the PMU to facilitate decision-making andimprovise the modalities of implementation. Two Chief Engineers, two Deputy Secretaries, one FinancialAdvisor, Programme Management Consultants and a number of other consultants and field agencies havesupported the Secretary. Since the PMU was solely and exclusively responsible for the earthquakerehabilitation, it could concentrate itself upon the Program, dealing with all the management andimplementation issues. All the procurement and contractual decisions were taken within the PMU, andthere was no reference to the planning and finance or any other department of the GOM for any project-related decision. Internalization of these powers within the PMU accelerated the pace of implementation,and brought a consistency to the procurement issues. The project authorities acquired the confidence introuble-shooting local issues, and improvised and innovated in all the situations.

Cabinet Sub-committee & Central Implementation Group

At the apex of policy-making structure, the GOM set up a cabinet Sub-committee headed by ChiefMinister. This sub-committee, which had other senior Cabinet Ministers as members, took all the policy

45

decisions. It was followed by the Central Implementation Group (CIG), which proved to be the mostefficacious and influential in decision-making on all the aspects of the Program. The Chief Secretary, thechief of the civil service heads the CIG, and it has the Secretary, Finance, Secretary, Planning andSecretary, Earthquake Rehabilitation as the permanent members. It would invite Secretaries and senior-ranking officials of other departments if they Nvere required for taking decisions on issues concerning theirdepartments. The CIG worked as an empowered committee, and it would take decision on almost all thepolicy matters related to the project. The CIG would meet every fortnight in beginning of the project fordecisions on specific issues. As the project progressed, the frequency of the meetings came down.However, it would meet periodically and take decision on the basis of agenda notes on specific issues,which would be circulated among the conmmittee members. The CIG eliminated the need for a long andcircuitous movement of files for taking quick decisions on pressing matters. It also yielded the benefit ofcollectively committing the government to a decision. The CIG has been one of the effective spin-offs ofthe MEERP in institutional terms, and now the GOM is contemplating setting up of similar mechanism forother projects as well.

District-Level Implementation Agencies

At the district level, a series of representative committees were constituted. A district levelcommittee functioned under the chairmanship of the Guardian Minister of the district, which represented allthe leading political functionaries of the district. There was also an executive committee headed by theCollector by comprising all the district officials. The field-level agencies proved to be a very useful blendof the existing authority structure in the district and the incremental requirements of projectimplementation. At the district level, the Collector who is the chief of the district administration heads thePMU. In this capacity, the Collector has the traditional clout and authority over all the agencies anddepartments functioning within the district. The Collector ensured that all the local problems were settledthrough his supervision and intermediation. The Collector also ensured the cooperation of all thedepartments and agencies within the district to implement the rehabilitation program in a time-boundmanner. In the relocation category, acquisition of land for the construction of new houses was one of themost critical components. The acquisition of land has been one of the primary duties of the Collector, and,therefore, the Collector played an extremely useful role by making the land available either throughnegotiation or acquisition. An administrative as well as a technical wving supported the Collector. TheAdditional Collector, an experienced officer in the revenue and relief admninistration, heads theadministrative wing. The Additional Collector provided the most important link between the governmentand the beneficiaries, and he was the most identifiable officer for working with various departments. Thetechnical wing led by one Superintending Engineer each in both the districts provided all the technicalsupport and services to the PMU at the field level, while it interacted with the PMU at the central level forall the procurement matters. The entire project management structure was, therefore, unique in terms ofreinforcing different levels and units for implementing decisions within the project.

Construction and Engineering Consultancy

The GOM decided to resettle 52 worst damaged villages on a new location. In order to carry outthe construction work of houses and amenities in these 52 relocated villages, the GOM appointedconstruction and engineering consultants. This was yet another innovative feature of the Programmanagement, whereby the engineering consultants substantially replaced the Public Works Department'straditional role and responsibilities, thus doing way with the deputation of a large contingent of engineersfrom the PWD. The engineering consultants played a pivotal role in the preparation of the village layout,design of houses, tender documentation, supervision and billing of works. There was yet anotherexperiment of associating the rural resettlement planners along with the engineering consultants in

46

preparing village layouts. This experiment was extended further when the community participationconsultants joined the planning process by drawing in the villagers. For the first time, the social andcommunity aspects of housing were subsumed into the role of engineering consultants. The engineeringconsultants, community participation consultants, and rural resettlement planners participated in the villagemeetings and consulted the concemed villagers before finalizing the village/ house plan. It widened theconsultative process and brought together different perspective in the rehabilitation Program. The mostimportant lesson to record here is that the appointment of engineering consultants has set an irreversibletrend of privatization of engineering services in all the technical projects.

Reconstruction, Repairs and Strengthening (R, R & S) Programme

In the R, R & S Program, the largest component of the MEERP, the GOM adopted a totallydifferent strategy. The GOM acted as a facilitator for the entire Program, instead of being theimplementing agency. It was an owner-driven Program, under which the beneficiaries took theresponsibility for carrying out the repairs and strengthening of the houses, with financial and technicalsupport from the GOM. It was organizationally a great challenge for the GOM, with 197,755 beneficiariesparticipating in this Program, spread geographically over 2500 villages in 13 districts of the state.Accessing these beneficiaries, and motivating them to undertake repairs / reconstruction required a multi-pronged effort. Firstly, the GOM tied up with the local banks, which would route the cash assistance to thebeneficiaries. Secondly, the GOM set up material depots at different places, where the beneficiaries couldcome with the coupons issued to them, and collect cement and steel. It was one of the most innovatingarrangements, through which 10,329 metric tonnes of steel and 423,061 metric tonnes of cement weredistributed among the beneficiaries. Thirdly, the GOM appointed around 800 junior engineers on acontract basis, who provided technical assistance to the beneficiaries. Finally, the GOM took up a majorProgramn of information dissemination through the community participation consultants. Since the issue ofsafe housing was close to women in the households, the community participation aimed at the involvementand participation of women. Training of women masons and formation of women's self-help groups gavean added impetus to the entire process. The entire gamut of efforts created a dynamics of its own throughwhich the beneficiaries became very aware of their entitlements, and conscious of the steps involved in therehabilitation process. The R, R & S Program soon acquired the dimension of a housing movement. Thepeople invested their own money, in addition to what they received as assistance, in their reconstructioneffort, which enhanced the scale of activities further. The quantitative mass of works in the R & S broughtabout a qualitative transformation, as the housing stock in the R, R & S villages rejuvenated itself, andvillages acquired a renewed look. The R, R & S Program has emerged as the most demonstrable exampleof self-help rehabilitation Program. It has effectively shown the results people's efforts can produce in afacilitating environment. People's own contribution to the Program made it a complimentary Program,rather than a dole-out. The R, R & S Program is the crowning success of this project, and, amnong otherthings, its great importance lies in being a replicable example of mass housing Program and people'spartnership with the government in this core sector.

Procurement

The MEERP implementation involved an enormous amount of procurement. The procurement wasof three types: civil works, goods, and services. Altogether, there were 9 ICBs costing Rs. 1905 million,and 27 LCBs, above Rs. 50 million, costing a total of Rs. 3103 million, 43 consultancies costing a total ofRs. 401 million, and 518 LCBs of less than Rs. 50 million. In relocation villages, the GOM awarded alarge number of bids for the construction of houses and amenity buildings, following the World Bankprocedure. The entire bidding process was smooth and efficient, and all the bids were decided well withinthe time-schedule laid down by the World Bank for this process. Similarly, for the R & S category, the

47

GOM procured cement and steel in huge quantity for the material depots it set up. The bid evaluation,quality of supplies, transportation arrangements, warehousing operations- a wide gamut of processesassociated with the procurement did not have any procedural or financial shortcoming. The World Bankaccepted and approved all the bid recommendations of the PMU. Audit inspections, internal as well asexternal, provide a very good testimony to the transparency and fairness of the procurement operationsfollowed in the project.

A very important outcome of the project, which needs to be preserved and fostered, is the buildingof institutional expertise in the procurement procedures. A pool of professionals worked on procurementissues within the PMU continuously, and the experience and familiarity they acquired in the course ofProgram, contributed to the quality of procurement decision-making. It is important that the expertise andreputation the PMU has built over the years be utilized for other projects in the government.

Outsourcing of Services

Under the MEERP, the outsourcing of services was undertaken on a large scaie. A large numberof consultancies, technical and non-technical, national and intemational were built into the implementation.The international consultants broughlt a new perspective to the project, especially in area of seismictechnology and disaster management. The PMU officials effectively supervised all the consultancies, andensured the quality of outputs. In the process, the PMU acquired a very good capacity for theadmninistration and supervision of consultancies, which could be utilized in other GOM projects. Thisrepresents another institutional gain for the PMU.

The most important consultancy, which could become part of a standard prcject management, hasbeen the Programme Management Consultancy (PMC). The PMC has been very helpful to the PMU insetting up of a management infornation system, monitoring of the performance indicators, a-nd developinga reporting mechanism on a monthly and quarterly basis. The management support provided by the PMCon a continuous basis meant a very important professional input into the MEERP implementation.

However, it may also be mentioned that the PMU officials were, at times, over-stretched in dealingwith a large number of consultancies. It put tremendous strain on the officials to allocate time to a numberof consultants, monitor their work and admninister their contracts. It would be a more efficient arrangement,if all the consultancies are delineated in sufficient details in the beginning of the project, and the capacity ofproject management is built accordingly.

Technical Audit & Quality Assurance

The quality of construction has been was an important concern of the MEEERP. To ensure thequality of work under different components of the MEERP, the GOM outsourced a technical audit andquality assurance group on a continuous basis. This group reported upon the quality of Work on afortnightly basis, making observations on the work in progress in all the categories of works. A systemwas evolved through which the compliance and rectification followed the technical observations Thepayment would be cleared only after the concerns of technical audit were suitably met.

It was for the first time in the state that an external mechanism for quality supervision was made partof a project on a continuous basis. It helped the project management to get a regular feedback on thequality of work. It also minimized complaints regarding the quality of work, and enstured that the minimumstandards of quality are observed in all the works taken up under the MEERP. Such an arrangement,

48

which produced very satisfying results for the MEERP, could again be a part of standard projectmanagement.

Financial Management

The financial management of the project distinguished itself by building an excellent system ofcompiling accounts of expenditures, preparing claims for submission to the DEA, and seekingreimbursements. The PMU would submit all the claims for reimbursement within a month of the actualexpenditures, and get the reimbursement from the World Bank within a period of two to three months. ThePMU incurred expenditures in accordance with its annual projection, and has succeeded in realizing theentire proceeds of the World Bank credit. All the internal and external audit inspection of the project,which has been on an annual basis, has not yielded any serious shortcoming in the financial accounting andprocedure.

Training

There was a strong emphasis on training and orientation under different components of theMEERP. The Indian Institute of Technology, Mumbai organized training in seismic technology for all theengineers participating in the Program. Similarly, the accounting staff received specialized training in thepreparation of accounts and reimbursement claims. All the senior officials of the project were sent abroadfor training courses.

A number of seminars and workshops were organized to deliberate and evolve mid-coursecorrections on different aspects of the Program. One of the most important events was the organization ofthe international workshop on Disaster Management Plan in Mumbai during July 6-8, in which all theactivities related to disaster management plan were presented before a wide audience of internationalexperts, NGOs, and government officials. The GOM's presentations on the MEERP and DisasterManagement Plan in June 1997 and December 1998 in the World Bank in Washington were also greatlyappreciated.

Social & Community Aspects of the MEERP Implementation:

Community Participation

All the stakeholders recognized that the people's participation in the reconstruction Program wascritical to its success. The MEERP has been one of the first experiments of conimunity participationstructurally built into the Program, and a social activity being organized on the basis of consultancies. Thenature of people's participation, however, differed between the government-driven relocation activity andthe owner-driven R & S Program, and the consultancies for these components were organized separately.

The design of rehabilitation components impinged upon the method of community participation. Inthe relocation villages, the village-level committee became an institutional vehicle of communityparticipation, whereas in the R & S villages, the campaign was undertaken through the involvement andparticipation of conumunity and wvomen. The character and depth of community participation in relocationcomponent varied to the extent the village-level committee was representative of the collective interests ofthe village. The village-level committee also reflected the power equations and community alignmentsexisting in the village, another defining factor for the community participation process. Further, the entireconstruction Program being managed by the government or the NGOs, the opportunities for communityparticipation were not as many as in an oxvner-driven R & S Program. The R & S villages did not have the

49

universal coverage of entitlement as was the case in relocation villages. The village-level committee,therefore, could not become effective in these villages. The strategy in R & S villages was to reach thehouseholds, spread the awareness, and make them participate in the reconstruction Program. As theawareness about the entitlements and owner-driven Program spread, the people, especially women, cameforward, and participated in the Program en masse. The R & S efforts became a great mobilization ofpopular initiative.

The grievance redressal that took place in the midst of community participation became a dynamicactivity. It opened up the entire process, and brought in an ethos of accessibility and transparent decision-making. The MEERP has been, in true sense of the term, a people's project.

Partnership with NGOs

The NGOs joined the GOM soon after the earthquake, making it one of the most enduringpartnerships. The nature of partnership evolved as the relief operations moved into the rehabilitation phase.A vast number of NGOs participated in the relief work, assisting the government in providing all thesupport and assistance to the people affected by the earthquake. As the relief phase wound up, only thoseNGOs, which had the resources and organizational capacity to participate in the rehabilitation Programcontinued. These NGOs adopted villages for relocation, and started reconstruction effort through their ownresources. The NGOs had limited resources, and therefore, the GOM stepped in. Soon the NGOs startedbuilding houses with the government support. The NGOs constructed a large number of houses, more than20,000, with the GOM's financial support. The scale of NGOs' participation in the MEERP has been verymassive.

it was for the first time that the GOM utilized this important resource for building activities onsuch a large scale. It was done along with the contractor-managed building Program, which speaks of theimprovisations made in the project implementation. That the NGOs emerged as an alternative resourcegroup for the construction activity, also signifies the strength and capability of the NGO sector in the state.A great volume of financial transaction took place between the GOM and the NGOs, which again testifiesto the trust between them, and a performance-oriented relationship. A number of corporate companiesparticipated in the Program as donors, and worked as the NGOs in the rehabilitation Program, validatesfurther the legitimacy and usefulness of this approach.

The nature of rehabilitation Program, however, characterized the nature of NGOs' participation.Only large and resourceful NGOs and corporate companies continued in the Program; the others withdrewimmediately after the relief phase was over. The denominational NGOs, as compared to the secular NGOsand advocacy groups, played a much greater role in the rehabilitation Program. The local resource-personsorganized themselves into NGO groups, and became very effective catalysts in the Program. Anothernoticeable feature was that the NGOs were active only in 'A' and 'B' category villages, where theconstruction was undertaken on a large scale. In 'C' category R & S villages, the NGOs played a negligiblerole. Since the R & S Program involved contacting every household individually over a big geographicaldispersion, the NGOs found it difficult to intervene in this Program. The varying levels of NGOs'participation in many components of the same rehabilitation Program, also indicates changing nature ofpriorities and activities of NGOs.

Gender Empowerment

The PMU acknowledged it in the inception of the MEERP that the women represented the mostcritical resource group for the implementation of the Program. It was important that women were aware of

50

their entitlemerts and joined the rehabilitation process as a social group. The objective was women'sempowerment, which was built into all the decisions the GOM took. The ex gratia assistance that thefamilies received in case of deaths was deposited in a joint account, in which women participated. Thewidows were entitled to a house in relocation villages. All houses allotted under the MEERP have the jointtitle of male and female members of the family. In all the village-level commnittees, the women wererepresented. It synergized very well with constitutional representation of women in Panchayat Rajinstitutions. The representation of women extended into diverse areas, and generated its own dynamics inthe course of implementation.

In the R & S Program, the women's groups worked actively, and they organized awarenesscampaigns. The Samvad Sahayak, generally a woman, worked as a facilitator at the village level. Oncete women participated actively in the R & S Program, and contributed to the construction effort, itscoverage had a phenomenal growth. It received added impetus with training to women masons andparticipation of womeni junior engineers. The GOM also took the initiative of setting self-help groups ofwomen, and promoted savings and economic activities through these groups. This effort has taken deeproots, with a number of NGOs engaged in working with self-help groups. Till now, 476 self-help groupshave been fonrmed. The GOM has contributed Rs. 24 million to the Village Development Fund, which hasstarted disbursing loans to these self-help groups, and the recovery rate of these loans is above 90 per cent.

In relocation villages, a better availability of civic amenities such as schools, hospitals, women'scentre, etc., would increase social opportunities to women and imjprove the quality of life. More important,the small houses following the patters of urban settlement would promote nuclear families in these villages,which would improve the reproductive health of women.

The MEERP has actively targeted women both as a beneficiary as well as a valuable change agent.'Tle success of R & S Program which drew a great participation of women's group underlines the-pronounced gender orientation of this project.

Mitigation Aspects of the MEERP Implementation:

,eismkic Technology

One of the riost significant features of the MEERP has been the appropriation of seismictechnology into -the popular building lexicon in rural areas of Maharashtra. A vast Program of earthquakemitigation created strong awareness about the seismic technology and convinced the people of its efficacyand usefulness. However, it was not a passive, uncritical acceptance of an expert technical prescription. Itwas based o n a careful assessment of people's spatial planning.

In the beginninlg of the Program, retrofitting of houses was the most advocated technical strategyfor the R & S Program. The beneficiaries were reluctant to accept it. Their perception was that theretrofitting was more a patchwork and it would not bring any change in the structural strength or featuresof house. In their view, the probability of a retrofitted house surviving an earthquake was not very high.What they wanted instead was a new brick and cement structure, which would withstand an earthquakebetter. They also considered the reconstruction Program an opportunity to increase living space availablein their houses. For one year, the Program did not make appreciable progress because of these differencesover technical strategy. Finally, the selection of technology was left to the beneficiaries, and the peopleoverwhelmingly preferred the option of reconstruction. Once the Program took off, the famirliesinternalized seismic technology, through the technical assistance of junior engineers and communityawareness carnpaign. All the technical terms-- bands, corner stones, through stones-- becarne part of the

51

common parlance in this area. The GOM took other steps to institutionalize the popular learning. Thetraining programs ,f9r engineers and the members of local self-government, posters and pamphlets forschools and village Panchayats, and finally the manual for non-engineered buildings-- these represent theGO:M's long-term measures to bring this essential mitigation technology closer to the people. The popularuse and acceptance of seismic technology has been the most important learning point of the MEERP.Backed up by a right mix of incentive and awareness, a relevant and appropriate technology could alwaysbe made an integral part of the people's living environment, has been effectively underscored by theMEERP.

Disaster Management Plan

The most far-reaching contribution the MEERP rendered in terms of capability building was in theform of preparation and activation of the disaster management plan. Starting as a sub-text in the creditagreement, it acquired a dimension and momentum of its own, and became a full-fledged and independentactivity. The disaster management plan activities attracted the full support of all the international agencies-- the World Bank, DFID, and the UNDP, and the GOM reciprocated this support with an exceptionalcommitment to the entire process.

The disaster management plan activity grew into several sub-components. It originally began withthe preparation of state and district plans, following a well-defined structure of risk assessment andvulnerability analysis, response plan, and mitigation strategy. The state plan envisages an elaboratereinforcing and supporting role for the state agencies in case of all the disasters in the state, while thedistrict plans are characterized by a vulnerability analysis, resource database and action plan specific to therespective districts.

The other sub-components of disaster management plan soon followed. These sub-componentsincluded setting up of the Emergency Operations Centre in the state headquarters, and the control rooms inall the divisions and districts, the VHF and VSAT network for intra-district and inter-districtcommunication, and a GIS-based Disaster Management Information System for the entire state. Theseactivities, which have institutional arrangements for their maintenance and sustainability, provide anoperational context to the disaster management plans. The communication and GIS support have their ownmultiplication use, for instance, a statewide intra-government e-mail network, which is being set up. Overa period of time, the information and communication support they make available to the government, wouldhelp introduce a new operating environment for decision-making. The disaster management plan activitieshave emerged as the most important capability-building exercise for the state government, and anintemationally acclaimed example of disaster management planning in developing countries.

An Assessment of the World Bank's contribution

The World Bank, which was the principal funding source for the MEERP, provided the mostefficient support and competent guidance to the project authorities throughout the course of Programimplementation. The Bank's response to the tragedy of the earthquake was in the best humanitarian spirit;on October 6, 1993, within a week of the disaster, the GOI signed a MOU with the World Bank for therehabilitation Program. The Bank's commitment to the project from the very beginning made a qualitativedifference to the project design. The World Bank's professional inputs made it a policy-oriented Program,with a well-defined entitlement structure. The Bank also articulated the need for an integrated Programmanagement, which the PMU embodied, to be institutionalized up front. The continuous supervision of theWorld Bank missions, and the most practical approach of the team task members, Jelena Pantelic, andChandra Godavitarne, in solving problems afid evolving mid-course corrections have been extremely

52

valuable to the project authorities. The Bank's support also facilitated the participation of otherinternational multilateral agencies, the DFID, UNDP, and the ADB, and a host of professional agenciesand organizations.

The MEERP's identification with the World Bank has been very strong. There is no aspect of theProgram implementation on which the GOM has not conferred with the World Bank. The consultationsbetween the project authorities and the World Bank were on a continuous basis; and it could be cited as anexample of the best professional relationship. In fact, one of the most important factors for the success ofthe MEERP has been the keen understanding and appreciation the GOM and the World Bank shared aboutthe requirements of Program implementation.

One of the most remarkable features of the multilateral assistance to the MEERP has been thesynergy and synchronicity achieved among all the international agencies, the World Bank, the Departmnentfor International Development (DFID), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Whilethe World Bank supported the components related to construction, hardware, and technology, the DFIDand VNDP assistance ivere very important for providing a significant social and community dimension tothe Program. These two international agencies supported the cost of all the community participation effortsorganized through consultants in the both the categories of Relocation and R, R & S. In addition, theseagencies extended financial support for a number of consultants providing technical and professionalservices to the project. The documentation of Disaster Management Plans for the state and all the districtswas accomplished, largely due to support available through these agencies. One of the most importantrequirement of the project was the human resource development, to which both the agencies devoted a lot ofattention. All the training support for the MEERP officials within the country and abroad was madeavailable by these agencies. The flexibility the DFID and UNDP showed in leveraging the massiveassistance provided by the World Bank has been one of the most positive experiences of the projectimplementation. The MEERP has made a very strong case for the simultaneous participation of a numberof international agencies in big projects, as they together provide professional depth and multi-facetedcharacter to the project. These organizations in accordance with their organizational priorities andprofessional ethos bring together diverse professional elements in a, complimentary manner, which enhancethe social value and productivity within the project considerably, as demonstrated in the case of theMEERP.

Implementation Constraints

The MEERP faced a long list of constraints in the course of implementation, which may not bepossible to enumerate here. However, some of the most serious constraints may be mentioned here. Onewas the populist expectation, which the vast scope of the Program stirred up among a large number ofpeople. The people tended to look upon the MEERP as an inexhaustible source of assistance. The demandfor inclusion of more and more beneficiaries was persistent. It was a very difficult situation for the projectauthorities to screen a massive pile of applications, and include deserving families in the list ofbeneficiaries. The pressure came from different sources, and it became part of the working environment ofthe MEERP.

The next most important constraint came from the legal activism. A lot of people approachedcourts for getting included in the list of beneficiaries. A large number of cases, which the projectauthorities had to attend to on a continuous basis, were very distracting. The Supreme Court couldappreciate this difficulty of project authorities, and its stay on all the legal proceedings in the lower courtsbrought a great relief to the project authorities. Without the Supreme Court's intervention, the MEERPwould have been seriously jeopardized due to an unmanageable number of legal proceedings. Among other

53

constraints, one of the most challenging was achieving coordination among a large number of agencies/departnents participating in the Program. Getting progress reports and expenditure details from all thedepartments required a continuous monitoring and persuasion. Another major constraint came from thedemand for regularization of the junior engineers who were recruited on a contract basis. These juniorengineers resorted to strikes, which slowed down the progress of work in the R, R & S component.

Conclusion

Despite these constraints, the MEERP achieved its objectives. It has been a remarkable project, interms of striking a sensitive balance between the human aspects of post-disaster rehabilitation and thepractical requirements of a construction Program. The administrators and engineers worked with thepeople traumatized by a great disaster, and the project mirrored their will and aspirations. The project'saccomplishments helped the people put their life back on course. The entire experience of involvement of avast section of people was cathartic; it put the tragedy in shade. The entire Program was in the besttraditions of human endeavor. The MEERP symbolizes the synergy that the agencies and organizationsand professional built across different professional environment. Above all, the MEERP signifies thetriumph of human spirit that survived the tragedy of the Latur earthquake.

54

Appendix B-2

EVALUATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DEPARTMENTOF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTON

WORLD BANK ASSISTED PROJECT ON'SEISMOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION UPGRADATION

AND RELATED GEOPHYSICAL STUDIES IN INDIAN PENINSULARSHIELD'

CREDIT. 2594

1. Introduction

Following the devastating earthquake of 30th September, 1993 which occurred in Laturdistrict of Maharashtra, an area hitherto considered as stable shield (reference Seismic ZoningMap of India, IS: 1893-1984, Bureau of Indian Standards), the Government of India took severalinitiatives, short and long term, aimed at improving the then available understanding of thegeological and geophysical set-up of the area. This would lead to better assessment of earthquakehazard and enable adoption of proper scientific mitigation measures. Improvements in theearthquake monitoring & data dissemination capabilities, mapping of crystal strain and delineationof basement topography were identified as priority items, on the basis of inputs provided by theIndian scientific community and the reports of B. K. Ro Committee (November, 1993) and the-JNDP assisted team that visited the earthquake affected areas during January-February, 1994.Accordingly, the Department of Science and Technology, Government of Lydia, submitted aproposal to the World Bank for upgrading earthquake monitoring and research capabilities in theshield region. The proposal was included as a component of the Maharashtra EmergencyEarthquake Rehabilitation Project approved in March 1994.

The Implementation Completion Report details the progress made during the tenure of theproject, September, 1994- 31st December 1998.

2. Project Goal

The project was aimed at improving the existing scientific knowledge about the earthquakeprocesses and mechanisms operating in the peninsular shield and bringing up to world standardsthe level of earthquake monitoring and research in the country. Ultimately, it would help inmitigating the earthquake hazard in the region, to the benefit of the large resident population.

55

3. Project Objectives

* To improve the detection and locational capability of the seismic network by lowering thethreshold close to magnitude 3 earthquakes in the peninsular shield region.

* To collect near- source seismic acceleration data for determination of near-sourcecharacteristics and attenuation laws for designing cost-effective earthquake resistant structuresin a few critical seismogenic areas.

* To set up a modern database for archival, easy handling and dissemination of data tointerested users.

* To psovide better communication links for quicker data transmission needed for near real-timedata compilation, processing and analysis.

* To develop a sound interface between seismic data collection and earthquake engineeringpractices for disaster mitigation.

* Conduct integrated geophysical and geological studies for understanding subsurface featuresin selected seismogenic areas.

* To evolve and implement a programme of manpower development compatible withrequirements of new instrumentation.

4. Financial Allocation

The financial approval for the project was accorded in September 1994 with an allocation of Rs.39 crores, comprising of US$7.5 million (Rs. 25 crores at the then prevailing exchange rate) asIDA loan and Rs 14 crores as GOI component. The IDA loan was principally earmarked forpurchase of equipment, hardware and software, for upgrading the seismic network and theassociated geophysical research and field investigation capabilities. The operational and recurringexpenses were borne by GOI through the allocated budget.

5. Project Components *

The details of the Project activities were worked out in consultation with the InternationalAdvisory Committee (IAC) during the first meeting held at DST, New Delhi from 13-16December 1994. During the review of progress in the second meeting of IAC held at NGRI,Hyderabad, from 6-7 September 1995, the activity list was finalised, as given below. Figure 1gives the configuration of the upgraded network.

* Jpgradation of 10 existing seismological observatories of national network of IMD to GSNstandards for monitoring regional earthquakes and tele-seisms.

56

* Setting up of 20 digital seismological observatories (10 new and 10 existing ones, upgraded)with three component broad band sensors.

* Setting up of 3 telemetered seismic clusters, one each in Koyna-Wama, Khandwa and Laturareas.

* 20 portable seismographs for rapid deployment following significant earthquakes

* 50 free-field accelerographs for site response studies

* 5 small (10 instruments each) strong motion arrays for structural response studies.

* Creation of telecommunication facilities for data transfer.

* Establishing a computerised database at IMD and strengthening of computer facilities atNGRI.

- Crustal deformation measurements by GPS studies and repeat levelling.

- Magnetotelluric and other collateral geophysical studies.

*Four broad band observatory equipments, two strong motion accelerographs and six portableseismographs were additionally procllred tltilising the 15% variation clause as per the WorldBank norms.

6. Participating Institutions

The project was executed in a consortium mode by involving several research, academicand service organisations. The India Meteorological Department, Indian Institute ofGeomagnetism, National Geophysical research Institute, Survey of India, Geological Survey ofIndia and Roorkee University have made notable contributions in the execution of the Projectactivities. CESS, Trivandrum, Pune University, IIT, Bombay, IIT Kanpur and OsmaniaUniversity have taken up important research studies. A complete list of participating institutions,activity- wise has been provided under para. 8.

7. Management and Monitoring Mechanism

A multi-tier management structure was set up to oversee the implementation of theProject. The National steering Committee (NSC) under the chairmanship of Secretary, DSTconstituted the apex level. NSC evolved the policy guidelines for execution of the Project andmonitored the progress. A seven-member International Advisory Committee (IAC) was set-up toprovide the scientific and technical back-up. An Executive Committee under the Chairmanship ofDirector, NGRI, defined the details of the project activities and the implementation mechanism.The Earth System Science Division of the Department of Science and Technology did the overall

57

co-ordination. The composition and Terms of Reference of the three Committees are given atAnnexure-1

8. Implementation Details:

The Project was implemented in consortium mode with the participation of severalagencies. The responsibilities and tasks were distributed as follows:

ITEM ORGANIZATION

GSN equipments/Procurement Indian Institute of GeomagnetismInstallation/maintenance India Meteorological Department

Broad band digital observatoriesProcurement Indian Institute of GeomagnetismInstallation/maintenance 10 by IMD at existing observatories

10 new by identified institutionsPortable seismographsProcurement National Geophysical Research Inst.Deployment/operation 10 NGRI, 13 IMD, 3 MERI

GPS UnitsProcurement Survey of India/ IIGField deployment SOVIIG/research Institutions on a

campaign modeStrong Motion equipmentsFor structural response studiesProcurement Dept. Earthquake Engineering, UORInstallation/operation DEQ, UOR

50 free- field accelerographs*Procurement India Meteorological DepartmentInstallation/operation IMD

Equipment for NationalSeismological Data Centre at IMDAnd computing Facilities at NGRIProcurement National Geophysical Research Inst.Installation IMD and NGRI

Controlled Source Magneto-Telluric UnitProcurement Osmania UniversityField deployment and operation Osmania University

58

9. 3 Telemetered clusters*Procurement National Geophysical Research Inst.Installation/deployment NGRI,GSI,IMD*not completed

9. Research Initiatives

(i) In addition to upgrading the seismological network, as detailed above, DST took theinitiative of evolving a number of research projects targeted at geophysical and geologicalmapping of the sub-surface structure and elucidating the paleo-seismic history of the region. Anumber of publications have resulted from these efforts.

10. Training of Man Power

A concerted effort was made to establish a core group of personnel capable of operatingand maintaining the new equipments. Scientists from participating institutions were sent abroadfor short-term training on these aspects. Selected scientists were also trained in the currentmethods of data analysis and interpretation. A total of 18 scientists availed of the opportunity oftraining. abroad. The University of Mexico and the University of Bergen were particularly co-operative in organising training courses for Indian scientists. The University of Bergen also lentthe services of Mr. L Ottemoller for setting up the SEISEN software at IMD, New Delhi. Theseefforts were supplemented by conducting training courses within the country, as per the listbelow.

1. Training course on 'Digital seismic instrumentation and related processing software',National Geophysical Research Institute, Hyderabad, 12th, May to 9,' June 1995.

2. Training course on 'Strong motion instrumentation' Department of Continuing Education,University of Roorkee, Roorkee, 12-24, Feb, 1996.

3. Sort-term course on 'Active faults using geomorphology' Indian Institute of Technology,Bombay, Mumbai, 6-1 0 May 1996.

4. Short Course on' Active tectonics and paleoseismology', J.N. Centre, Bangalore,14-19 September, 94

5. Training course on 'Seismic monitoring and data analysis' National Geophysical ResearchInstitute, Hyderabad, 15-30 Nov. 98.

6. Training course on 'GPS data acquisition and processing' Wadia Institute of HimalayaGeology, Dehradun, 5-15 Jan 1999.

11. Important National/International Conferences

59

1. Workshop on 'Shield Seismicity', 2-5 Sep, 1995, National Geophysical Research Institute,Hyderabad.

2. Chapman Conference on' Stable Continental Regions', 25-29 Jan 1998, NationalGeophysical Research Institute, Hyderabad.

3. Conference on 'Disaster Management', 6-19 Feb 1998, Tezpur University, Tezpur.

4. Conference on 'Earthquake Engineering', 17-19 December 1998, DEQ, University ofRoorkee, Roorkee.

5. International Symposium on' Earthquake Hazard Assessment and Earth Interior RelatedTopics', 1-3 Dec 1998, National Geophysical Research Institute, Hyderabad.

12. Research Publications

A representative list of relevant papers published during the course of the World Bankassisted project is given below at Annexure 3.

13. Performance of the Borrower

The Department of Science and Technology successfully formed a team of institutions,which worked in a cohesive manner to achieve the objectives of the Project. The norms, asspecified by the World Bank, were strictly followed in all the procurements. Periodic ProgressReports were submitted to the Bank. Assistance from the members of IAC, as required, wasreadily forthcoming.

14. Performance of the Bank

The World Bank provided ready co-operation in the activities of the Project. The advicerendered on various aspects of the procurement was timely and helpful. However, in some cases,the procurement norms were applied a little too rigidly, especially in the case of telemeteredclusters, leading ultimately to a stage where this item had to be dropped from the procurementlist. Reposing greater confidence in the Borrower and the ultimate user of the equipment wouldhave led to smoother and more efficient functioning of the Project.

60

15. List of procurement planned under the project with estimated expenditure

Equipment Estimated expenditure

1. 10 GSN equipment US$ 12068712. 24 Broad Band Systems US$ 7605283. 26 portable seismographs US$ 6923224. 12 GPS Units US$ 296709.67

12 Laptop computers Rs. 19,54,000/-5. 10 GPS Units US$1902856. Strong motion equipment S.F.4882007. 50 free field accelerographs Rs. 2.6 crores8. Equipment for National Seismological

Data Centre and computing facility US$227416 &Rs. 71,57,689/

9. Controlled Source MagnetoTelluric Unit US$276512

10. 3 telemetered clusters Rs. 6.10 crores

16. Procurement carried out with details of supplier and cost

Equipment Supplier Cost

1. 10 GSN equipments M/s Quanterra, USA US$ 1206871

2. 24 Broad Band Systems Refraction Technology US$ 760528USA

3. 26 portable seismographs M/s Refraction Technology US$ 692322USA

4. 12 GPS Units M/s Leica AG, Switzerland US$ 296709.6712 Laptop computers M/s Birla International Rs. 19,54,000/-

New Delhi5. 10 GPS Units M/s Trimble International US$190285

England6. Strong Motion equipments SIG-SA, Switzerland S.F.488200

7. Equipment for National MIs Wiproinfotech US$227416 &Seismological Data Centre Secunderbad Rs.71,57,689/-at IMD & computing facilityat NGRI

8. Controlled Source Magneto M/s EMI, USA-Telluric Unit US$276512

61

17. Procurement not completed

* 50 accelerographs for free-field studies.

* This procurement was entrusted to India Meteorological Department, New Delhi.Procurement could not be done due to local procedural delays.

* 3 Telemetered Clusters

The National Geophysical Research Institute floated the tender twice. The World Bank,however, did not accept the recommendations of TEC. Ultimately, this item had to be droppedfrom procurement.

18. Total Disbursement Claimed And Received

The reimbursement claims were submitted to the office of the Controller of Aid Accounts andAudit, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India. The details are given below:-

Equipment Contract Amount StatusAmount claimed

10 GSN equipments: US$ 1206871 US$1195043.96 Cleared by DAE24 Broad Band Systems: US$ 760528 US$530457.20 80% for 20 units and 20%

for 4 units cleared by DAE.Remaining balance to beclaimed.

26 portable seismographs: US$ 692322 US$681767.22 Cleared by DEA12 GPS Units: US$ 296709.67US$296709.67 Cleared by DEA12 Laptop computers Rs. 19,54,000/- Rs. 19,54,000/- Cleared by DEA10 GPS Units: US$190285 US$171256.5 Cleared by DEA(90%)

10% to be claimed.Strong Motion equipments: S.F.488200 SF5234.88.00 Cleared by DEA

20% for 2 addnl.Units to be claimed.

Equipment for NationalSeismological Data Centre at IMDand computing facility at NGRI US$227416 & .US$ 151060.80 Cleared by DEA

Rs. 71,57,698/- 20% of FE component& 100% INR part tobe claimed.

Procurement of controlledSource Magneto Telluric US$276512 US$271651.26 80% cleared by DEAUnit 20% clearance

awaited.

62

19. Lessons Learned

Execution of the Project has been a rewarding experience for all the associated agencies.The new equipments installed in the field are functional. Jabalpur earthquake of May 1997 wasrecorded by all the ten GSN observatories, producing high quality broad band data sets. The fielddata is now automatically down loaded to the National Seismological Data Centre at IMDHeadquarters, improving considerably the response time.

The challenge of implementing a difficult project within a well-defined time frame generated ahealthy team spirit amongst the organizations and led to the success of the operations. Theproject has laid the foundation of a strong and scientifically sound national Program on the studiesof Stable Continental Earthquakes.

20. Project Sustainability

As per the commitments given at the time of formulation of the project, the Governmentof India has taken over the activities from 1.1.99. The various activities will be sustained andstrengthened through GOI support.

63

Annexure

Institute Number ofLocations Observatories

National Geophysical Research 3 Bhadrachalam(AP)Institute Mahabaleswar(Maharashtra)Cuddapah(AP)

Indian Institute of 2 Rewa (MP)Geomagnetism Kolhapur(Maharashtra)

Geological Survey of India I Jabalpur(MP)

Osmania University I Bhiknoor(AP)

National Institute of I Kolar(Karnataka)Rock Mectanics

Centre for Earth Science I Peechi(Kerala)Studies

Gujarat Engineering and I Dharoi(Gujarat)Research Institute

64

AnnexureBooks/Memoirs

Gupta, H. K., 1994, "Latur Earthquake" 35, pp. 149, edited by H. K. Gupta; published by Geological Society of India.

Research papers

Baumbach, M., H. Grosser, H.G. Schmidt, A. Paulat, A. Rietbrock, C.V. Ramakrishna Rao, P. Solomon Raju, D.Sarkar, and I. Mohan, Study of foreshocks and aftershocks of the Intraplate Latur earthquake of September 30, 1993,India, in Latur Earth-Quake, edited by H.K. Gupta, Mein. Geol. Soc. india, 33, 33-63, 1994.

Chetty, T.R.K., and M.N. Rao, Latur earthquake of September 30, 1993; Surface deformation and linearnent pattern,in Latur Earthquake, edited by H.K. Gupta,Mem. Geol. Soc. India, 35, 65- 73, 1994.

Chadha, R.K., H.K. Gupta, H.J.Kumpel, P. Mandal, A.Nageswara Rao, Narendra Kumar, LRadhakrishna,B.K.Rastogi, I.P.Raju, C.S.P. Sarma, C. Satyamurtrhy and H.V.S.Satyanarayana, Delineation of Active Faults,Nucleation Process and Pore Pressure Measurements at Koyna (India), PAGEOPH, 150 (3/4), 551-562, 1997.

Gupta, H.K., Earthquakes exceeding magnitude 5 occur again in the Koyna region (notes). J. Geol. Soc. India 42,413-415, 1993.

Gupta, H.K., I. Mohan, B.K. Rastogi, M.N. Rao, C.V.Rao, A quick look at the Latur earthquake of 30 September1993, Current Science, 65(7), 517-520, 1993.

Gupta, H.K., B.K. Rastogi, R.K.Chadha, P. Mandal and C.S.P. Sarma, Enihanced reservoir induced earthquakes inKoyna region, India, during 1993-95. Joul. Seismology, 1(1), 47-53, 1997.

Gupta, H.K., The deadly Latur earthquake, Science, 262, 1666- 1667, 1993.

Gupta, H.K., 1994a. Introduction to the volume "Latur Earthquake", Mem. Geol. Soc. India, 35, v-xii. Gupta, H.K.,1994b. Stable continental region earthquakes. J. Geol. Soc. India, 43, 618-619.

Gupta, H.K., B.K. Rastogi, L Mohani, C.V. Ramakrishna Rao, D.C. Mishra, G.V. Rao, R.U.M. Rao, M.N. Rao andT.R.K. Chetty, Investigations of Latur earthquake of September 30, 1993. GSI Spl.Publ., No.27, 1740, 1995.

Gupta, Harsh K., B.K.Rastogi, C.V.R.K.Rao, I. Mohan, S.V.S Sarma and R.U.M. Rao, An investigation of LaturEarthquake of September 29, 1993 in South India, Tectonophys.287, 299-318, 1998.

Gupta,F, K. R.K. Chadha, M.N. Rao, B.L. Narayana, P. Mandal, M. Ravi Kumar and Narendra Kumar, The Jabalpurearthquake of 22 May, 1997 in the stable continental region of Peninsular India, Jou. Geol. Soc. Ind., v. 50, 85-91,1997.

Gupta, H.K. and Dwivedy, K.K., Drilling at Latur Earthquake Region exposes a Peninsular Gneiss basement - a shortcommunication, J.Geol. Soc. India, 47, 129-131, 1994.

Indra Mohan and M.N. Rao, A field study of Latur (India) earthquake of 30th September, 1993. Mem. Geol. Soc.India, 35, 7-32, 1994.

Jain, S.K., C.V.R: Murty, N. Chandak, L. Seeber, and N.K. Jaim, The September 29, 1993, M6.4 Killari,Maharashtra, earthquake in central India, EERI Ne%vsl., Vol. 28, 8 pp., 1994.

Mandal, P., Manglik, A. and Singh, R.N., Three-dimensional intra-plate stresses distributions associated withtopography and crustal density inhomogeneities beneath the Killari, India, region, Jou. Geophys. Res., 102, 11,719-11,729, 1997.

Mandal, P., and R.N. Singh, Three- dimlensional intraplate stress distributions associated with topography and crustaldensity inhomogeneities beneath the Deccan Volcanic Province, Proc. Ind. Acad. Sci., Earth Planet. Sci., 105, 143-155, 1996.

65

Mishra, D.C., S.B. Gupta, and M.B.S. Vyaghreswara Rao, Space and time of Gravity field in earthquake affectedareas of Maharashtra, India, Memoir Geol. Soc. India, and 35, 119-126, 1994.

Prantik Mandal and B.K. Rastogi, A frequency-dependent relation of coda Qc for Koyna-Warna Region, India,PAGEOPH, 153, 163-177, 1998.

Prantik Mandal and B.K. Rastogi, Source: Parameters of Koyna Earthquakes, India, Bull. Seis. Soc. Am., 88(3), 833-842, 1998

Rajendran, C.P. and K. Rajendran. 1999. Geological investigations at Killari and Ter, central India and implicationsfor palaeoseismicity in the shield region, In Press, Tectonophysics, special issue on Paleoseismology

Rajendran, K and C.P.Rajendran 1999. Seismogenesis in the stable continental interiors: An appraisal based on twoexamples from India, In Press, Tectonophysics, special issue on Tectonics of the continental interiors.

Rajendran, C.P., and K. Rajendran 1999. The 1993 Killari (Latur) earthquake: a paleoseismological perspective,submitted for inclusion in the special publication by the DST.

Rajendran, K. 1999. Triggered seismicity at Koyna: An assessment based on relocated earthquakes during 1983-1993, submitted for inclusion in the special publication by the DST.

Rajendran, C. P. and Rajendran, K., ]996. Commeints on the "The 1993 Killari earthquake in central India: A newfault in the Mesozoic basalt flows?" by Seeber et al. JGR-Solid Earth.Jour. Geophys. Res., vol. 102, NO.Bll, pp.24,561-24,564.

Rajendran, C.P. 1997. Defonnational features in the river bluffs at Ter, Osmmanabad

District, Maharashtra: Evidence for an ancient earthquake. Curr: Sci., 82:750-755.

Rajendran, C. P., Rajendran, K. and John, B., 1996. The 1993 Killari(Latur) earthquake: An example of faultreactivation in the Precambrian crust. Geology, v. 24(7), p.65 1-6 54.

Rajendran,C. P., Rajendran, K., Unnikrishnan, K. R. and John, B., 1996. Palaeoseismic indicators in the rupture zoneof the 1993 Killari (Latur) earthquake. Curreni Science, vol. 70 (50), p.38 5 -39 0.

Rajendran, K. and Rajendran, C.P. 1998, Characteristics of 1997 Jabalpur earthquake and their bearing on itsmechanism, Current Science, Indian Acadeany of Science, vol. 24 (2), 168-174.1998.

Rajendran, C. P. and Rajendran, K., 1995. Application of paleoseismological methods in seismic Hazard evaluation:An overview based on some examples of intraplate seismicity. Proc. Group Discussion on Geological Hazards in theHimalayan Region: Assessment and Mitigation, Himalayan Geology, vol. 16.

Rao, C.V.R., and P.S. Raju, Study of the aftershock activity and source parameters of the Latur earthquake ofSeptember 30, 1993, J. Geol. Soc. India, 47, 243-250, 1996.

Rao, G.V., G.K. Reddy, R.U.M. Rao, and K. Gopalan, Extraordinary Helium anomaly over surface rupture ofSeptember 1993 Killari earthquake, India, Curr. Sci., 66, 933-936, 1994.

Rastogi, B.K., P.Mandal and N.Kumar, Seismicity Around Dhamni Dam, Maharashtra, India, PAGEOPH, 150 (3/4),493-509, 1997.

Rastogi, B.K., Chadha, R.K., Sanna, C.S.P., Mandal, P., Satyanarayana, H.V.S., Raju, I.P., Narendra Kumar,Satyamurthy,C. and A. Nageswara Rao, Seismicity at Warna Reservoir (Near Koyna) through 1995, Bull. Seism.Soc.Arn., 87, 1484-1494, 1997.

Rastogi, B.K., Latur earthquake not triggered. Mem. Geol. Soc. Ind.,No.35, 131-138, 1994.

Rastogi, B.K. And M.N. Rao (1994). After effects of Latur Earthquake: Smoke/Gas Emanations and SubterraneanSounds/ Microearthquakes, Mem.Geol.Soc.Ind., No.35, 139-149.

66

Sarma, S.V.S., G. Virupakshi, T. Harinarayana, D.N. Murthy, S. Prabhakar, E, Rao, K. Veeraswamny, M. Rao,M.V.C. Sarma, and K.R.B. Gupta, A wide bands magnetotelluric study of the Latur earthquake region, Maharashtra,India, Mem. Geol. Soc. India, 35, 101-118, 1994.

Srinivasan,R., S.H. Jaffri, G.V. Rao and G.K. Reddy, Phreatomagmatic eruptive center from the Deccan trapprovince, Jabalpur, central India, Current Science, 74(9), 787-790, 1998.

Sundar, A., S. Roy, G.V. Rao, and R.U.M. Rao, Ground temperature measurements at some sites of smoke emanationand borehole temperature measurement for evaluation of heatflow, Mem. Geol. Soc. India, 35, 75-82, 1994.

Bhattacharya,S.N., Ghose,A.K., Suresh,G., Baidya,P.R., Saxena,R.C.,Source Parameters of Jabalpur Earthquake of22nd May 1997, Current Science,V73, pp855-863.

Bhattacharya,S.N., Ghose,A.K., Suresh,G., Baidya,P.R., Saxena,R.C.,Analysis of Broadband seismograms forevaluation of Source Parameters of Jabalpur earthquake of May 22, 1997, Proc. of workshop on Earthquake DisasterPreparedness, Oct. 13-14, 1997, Roorkee University.

IMD Report (1997): Jabalpur earthquake of May 22, 1997 and its aftershocks (A consolidated document).

Bhattacharya,S.N., (1998), Source characteristics and focal mechanism solutions of some recent Koyna-Wamna(Maharashtra,lndia) earthquakes through inversion of Broadband wavefonm record. Paper presented at theSymposium on 'Earthquakes through inversion of Broadband wavefonn record. Paper presented at the Symposium onEarthquake hazard assesment and earth's interor related topics'. NGRI, Hyderabad, Dec 1-3, 1998

Saxena,R.C., Suresh,G., Ghose,A.K., - DST Newsletter,Source parameters of Jabalpur earthquake of 22nd May 1997and its aftershocks, DST Newsletter, v7, Aug1997.

Singh,S.K, Ordaz,M., Dattatrayam,R.S., and Gupta,H.K., (1998): A spectral analysis of the May 21, 1997Jabalpur,India Earthquake (Mw=5.8),and estimation of Ground motions from future earthquakes in the Indian shieldregion. Paper presented at the Symposium on 'Earthquake hazard assesment and earth's interor related topicse. NGRI,Hyderabad, Dec 1-3, 1998

Dattatrayam,R.S, Singh,S.K, Shapiro,N., Pachkoj., Mandal,P., Bhattacharya,S.N., Midha,R.K., (1998), Crustal andupper mantle structure of Peninsular India and source parameters of the May 21, 1997, Jabalpur earthquake(Mw=5.8): Results from a new regional broadband network. Paper presented at the Symposium on 'Earthquakehazard assesment and earth's interor related topics'. NGRI, Hyderabad, Dec 1-3, 1998

N.Purnachandra Rao., Masahiro Kosuga., Tameshige Tsujuda.,S.C.Bhatia.,and G.Suresh (1998), Moment tensorinversion of Body and Surface Waves using regional Broadband data of the 21 May 1997 Jabalpur earthquake. Paperpresented at the Symposium on 'Earthquake hazard assesment and earth's interor related topics'. NGRI, Hyderabad,Dec 1-3, 1998

Verma,R.K., Suresh,G., Shukla,A.K., and Ghose,A.K., (1998),Comparative study of source parameters for Jabalpurearthquake from P and S waves spectra using digital data of IMD observatories - presented at Proc.Eleventh Symp.On Earthquake Engineering Dec 17-19, 1998, Roorkee University.

MAP SECTION

BRO 25479RI

73' 15' 76- 77- 78- 19,

M A D H Y A P R A D E S H A.- 0T. J�bb�I,- EPICENTRAL REGION J

-q�

G UJARAT

fD H U L E

Jf- -1 AMRAVAT( NIG U R

JALGAON'

21 -B�A�a�m-R1111A

w.,dh

BULDHANAT,. V.1-d -B.1dh...

A1011N A 6 I

YAVAT MALr CHANDRAPUR

2�-

JA

-20, ALIRANO ARI�I(ROU

A... LN

4H A N E"Tt f-,,

J

WNA OAk DEATHS AS % J-1PF POPULAIION:

A

FE 0 1 MSK�TENSITY.

AYkl A N D H R A 2

P R A D E S H 5U N 0 Vil

0 VI20

RATqAI)H I V

rQL-k-

RAJASTHAN -9j OtTA9QPRAEFSH

PAKISTANis-

r,,-7 -$MANkA#AD E-1

r Aj.R .4

S,0 �A P VR-� GTJJAkATHyd-6.d

I N D I A

'J, /P

RATNA RI MAHARASHTRA EARTHQUAKERECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

-17- ORISSA

PROJECT DISTRICTS: 17�

WORST AFFECTED DISTRICTS V-Ly I 'MJ�ARASHTRA

�jK A R N A T A K A AFFECTEE) DISTRICTS

KOLHAPUR 'K' I r,H d d

DISTRICT CAPITALS 0AND 'A'5TATE CAPITAL PRADEpt,",

INDH URG 50 100 150 2000 NATIONAL HIGHWAYS

KILOMETERS RIVERS (�OA�,,[- � 4ow �'KA�ATAKtA 1N ��',A N

- - - DISTRICT BOUNDARIESTh;� .. p F,.d-d byh� Mp 0-9. U t f Th� W.,)d 8-k UM-Low 0, OCEAN

Th. 6-d�-, c.l., d---,- .,d-y.lh�, W.-ti- A.- STATE BOUNDARIESfhi, .p d. -I iply, - t6 p�l f Th� W-Id B-k G-P, -y

d9-1- Ih.kg.1v.W f.,,y -i-y,., INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES JINSET) fltotl

-cc��- d -h w'"tly Q,,4, 90, 3m

5-- mef'- St TA M I L KROAAVEkS71- 7 7 ORIFA, N

7,5' 7,6 77- 18� 1' JS:18934904 P O) ADU

JUNE 1999

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - World Bank...MAVIM Mahila Arthik Vikas Mahamandal MELTRON Maharashtra...

Documents

Transcript of FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - World Bank...MAVIM Mahila Arthik Vikas Mahamandal MELTRON Maharashtra...